

conflict with terror and tyranny, we have an unmatched advantage, a power that cannot be resisted – and that is the appeal of freedom to all mankind.

As global powers, we serve the cause of freedom in many ways, in many places. By promoting development and fighting disease and famine, we are fulfilling moral duties, as well as encouraging stability and building a firmer basis for democratic institutions. By working for justice in Burma and Sudan and Zimbabwe, we give hope to suffering peoples, and improve the chances for stability and progress. By extending the reach of trade, we foster prosperity and the habits of liberty. And by advancing freedom in the greater Middle East, we halt a cycle of dictatorship and radicalism that brings misery to millions and dangers to our own peoples.

The stakes in that region could not be higher. If the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, anger, and violence for export. And no distance on the map will protect our lives and way of life. If the greater Middle East joins the democratic revolution that has reached much of the world, the lives of millions will be bettered, and a trend of conflict and fear will be ended at its source.

No one imagines this movement of history will be easy. Arab scholars speak of a “freedom deficit” that has separated whole nations from the progress of our time. The essentials of social and material progress – limited government, equal justice under law, religious and economic liberty, political participation, a free press, and respect for the rights of women – have been scarce across the region. Yet that has begun to change. In an arc of reform from Morocco to Jordan to Qatar we are seeing elections, and new protections for women, and the stirrings of political pluralism. Many governments are realizing that theocracy and dictatorship do not lead to national greatness, they end in national ruin. They are finding, as others will find, that national progress and dignity are achieved when governments are just and people are free.

The democratic progress we have seen in the Middle East was not imposed from abroad – and neither will the greater progress we hope to see. Freedom, by definition, must be chosen, and defended by those who choose it. Our part, as Western nations, is to ally ourselves with reform wherever it occurs.

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Perhaps the most helpful change we can make is a change in our own thinking. In the West, there has been a certain skepticism about the capacity, or even the desire, of Middle Eastern peoples for self government. We are told that Islam is somehow inconsistent with a democratic culture; yet more than half of the world's Muslims are today contributing citizens in democratic societies. It is suggested that the poor, in their daily struggles, care little for self government; yet the poor especially need the democratic power to defend themselves against corrupt elites. The peoples of the Middle East share a high civilization, a religion of personal responsibility, and a need for freedom as deep as our own. It is not realism to suppose that one-fifth of humanity is unsuited to liberty. It is pessimism and condescension. And we should have none of it.

In changing our approach we must shake off decades of failed policy in the Middle East. Your nation and mine, in the past, have been willing to make a bargain – to support oppressive elites for the sake of stability. Longstanding ties often led us to overlook their faults. Yet this bargain did not bring stability or make us safe; it merely bought time while problems festered and ideologies of violence took hold. [No longer should we turn a blind eye to oppression because the oppression is not in our backyard. No longer should we think tyranny is benign because it is temporarily convenient. Tyranny is never benign to its victims, and it should not be excused by our great democracies.]

Calling Arab allies "tyrants" goes too far. This can be dropped. (PWR)

We have now changed course. We are pursuing a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East. We will consistently challenge the enemies of reform, and confront the allies of terror. We will expect a higher standard from our friends in the region. And we will meet our responsibilities in Afghanistan and Iraq by finishing the work of democracy we have begun.

There were good faith disagreements, in this country and mine, over the course and timing of military action in Iraq. Whatever has come before, we now have only two options: To keep our word, or to break it. The failure of democracy in Iraq would throw its people back into misery, and turn that country over to terrorists who wish to destroy us. Yet democracy will succeed in Iraq, because our will is firm, our word is good, and the Iraqi people will not surrender their freedom.

Since the liberation of Iraq, we have seen changes that could hardly have been imagined a year ago. A new Iraqi police force protects the

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people instead of bullying them. A hundred and fifty Iraqi newspapers are now in circulation, printing what they choose, not what they are ordered. Schools are open and free of propaganda. Hospitals are functioning and well supplied. Iraq has a new currency, the first units of a new army, representative local governments, and a governing council that will guide the nation to full sovereignty. This is dramatic progress, and much of it has proceeded faster than comparable efforts in Japan and Germany after World War Two.

Our progress is also measured by what has not come to pass. We did not see the refugee crisis many expected. We did not see the mass starvation some feared. And we have not seen the sectional violence some predicted.

The violence we are seeing in Iraq today is serious, and comes from Ba'athist holdouts, ilhadists from other countries, and terrorists drawn to the prospect of innocent bloodshed. It is the nature of terrorism that the cruelty of a few can bring grief and loss to many. The armed forces of both our countries have taken losses, felt deeply by our peoples. And some families now live with the burden of great sorrow. We cannot take the pain away, but these families can know that they are not alone, and that we will never forget the courage of the ones they loved.

The terrorists have a purpose, a strategy, to their cruelty. They view the rise of democracy in Iraq as a powerful threat to their ambitions in the region and beyond. In this they are correct. They believe their acts of terror against our coalition, against international aid workers, and against innocent Iraqis, will make us recoil and retreat. In this they are mistaken. We did not charge hundreds of miles into the heart of Iraq, and liberate 25 million people, and pay a bitter cost in casualties, only to retreat before a band of thugs and assassins. We remain in this just cause for the reasons we entered it: We will secure the freedom of the Iraqi people. We will defend our own people from danger. And we will prevail.

A forward strategy of freedom must also apply to the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is a difficult period in a part of the world that has known many. Yet our commitment has not changed. We seek justice and dignity and an independent state for the Palestinian people, who have been betrayed by others for too long. We seek security and recognition for the state of Israel, which has lived in the shadow of random death for too long.

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These are worthy goals in themselves – and by reaching them, we will also remove an occasion and excuse for hatred and violence in the broader Middle East.

Achieving peace in the Holy Land is not just a matter of pressuring one side or the other on the shape of a border, or the site of a settlement. This approach has been tried without success. As we negotiate the details of peace, we must look to the heart of the matter, which is the need for a viable Palestinian democracy. It is clear that peace will not be achieved by Palestinian rulers who intimidate opposition, tolerate and profit from corruption, and maintain their ties to terrorist groups. These are the methods of the old elite, who time and again has put its own self interest above the interests of the people it claims to serve. The only service it can do them now is to make way for true leaders capable of creating and governing a Palestinian state.

Even after the setbacks and frustrations of recent months, good will and hard effort can bring about a Palestinian state and a secure Israel. Those who would lead a new Palestine should adopt entirely peaceful means to achieve the rights of their people, and create the reformed institutions of a stable democracy. Arab states should end incitement in their own media, cut off public and private funding for terrorism, and establish normal relations with Israel. Israel should freeze settlement construction, dismantle unauthorized outposts, and not prejudice final negotiations with the placement of walls and fences. Leaders in Europe should withdraw all favor and support of a Palestinian ruler who has failed his people and betrayed their cause. And Europe's leaders should also strongly oppose any trace of anti-Semitism that lingers on this continent, and poisons public debates over the future of the Middle East.

Ladies and gentlemen, we have great objectives before us that make our Atlantic alliance as vital as it has ever been. By remaining faithful to the purposes of international institutions ... by giving force, when necessary, to the defense of freedom ... and by the confident advocacy of democracy in all parts of the world ... we are serving the peace and security of all free nations in a time of danger. So much good has come from our alliance of conviction and might. So much now depends on the strength of this alliance as we go forward. The American government has always found the most capable and forthright of allies in London – men and women of good judgment, and blunt counsel, and backbone when times

are tough. And we have found all those qualities in your current Prime Minister, who has my deepest thanks.

The ties between our nations, however, do not depend on how two leaders get along. Those ties will always endure, because they are formed by the experience, and responsibilities, and adversity we have shared. And in the memory of our peoples, there will always be one experience, one central event, when the seal was fixed on the friendship between Britain and the United States.

The arrival in England of half a million American soldiers and airmen in the 1940s was a crucial turning point in the war. For many Britons, it was a first close look at Americans other than in the movies. Some of you here today may still remember the Friendly Invasion. Our lads took some getting used to. And there was even a saying about what many of them were up to "over here." At a reunion in north London some years ago, an American pilot who settled here after his years of service said, well, "I'm still over here, and probably overpaid – so two out of three isn't bad."

In that time of war, the English people did get used to the Americans. They took to calling them "Our boys." And 60,000 of those boys walked off with English brides – doing their part to affirm the "special relationship."

Americans gained a certain image of England as well, and it hasn't changed. The British people are the sort of partners you want when serious work needs doing. The men and women of this country are good and kind and generous and brave – and America is fortunate to call this country our closest friend in the world.

Thank you.

Drafted by: *Mike Gerson, John McConnell, and Matthew Scully, Office of Speechwriting*

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4 May 2003

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: Ambassador Bremer ~~3~~
SUBJECT: Nation-Building: lessons learned

Saturday I mentioned the new RAND paper on lessons learned from the US efforts at "nation building". They studied seven cases from the past half-century--Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan. The summary is attached.

Several key points bear on our efforts in Iraq.

- We succeeded when we had a very substantial troop presence (either US or coalition). We took and inflicted more casualties when we were under-strength. If in Iraq one sought the same ratio of troops per capita we had in Bosnia, we would need about 250,000 for at least two years. The Kosovo model would suggest a need for twice that many. Naturally, this would include non-American forces.
- Another major variable was the amount of external assistance per capita. The Kosovo model would yield the need for about \$19 billion over two years.
- Neighboring countries can exert decisive influence on the outcome. "It is nearly impossible to put together a fragmented nation if its neighbors persist in trying to tear it up."
- Staying a long time does not guarantee success. Leaving early assures failure. "No effort at democratization has taken hold in less than five years".

While we are certainly not condemned to repeat history, we will want to bear these points in mind as we work through issues such as:

- The CENTCOM draw-down plan we touched on briefly Saturday;
- Keeping a close eye on Iranian objectives and activities; and
- The need to stress to all concerned that this will be a long process.

Attachment: As stated.

CC: Paul Wolfowitz, Doug Feith, Ryan Henry

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1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

This report contains the results of a study on best practices in nation building. The purpose of this study was to analyze U.S. and international military, political, and economic activities in post-conflict situations since the Second World War to determine key principles for success in these types of operations and to draw implications for future U.S. military operations, including Iraq. This report contains the results of this analysis, including the lessons learned from each of these operations, and then applies these lessons to the case of Iraq.¹

RATIONALE FOR STUDY

During the 1990s and continuing into the current decade, the United States has invested significant amounts of military, political, and economic capital into operations conducted in the aftermath of conflict or civil unrest. All these post-conflict operations have been closely analyzed. Countless studies, articles, and reports have been published on various aspects of these individual operations. For the most part, these studies have also focused on the post-Cold War period. This is the first effort of which we are aware to review each of the major American experiences in nation building exercises going back to 1945, to compare and contrast the results of these various operations, to determine how lessons learned and best practices evolved over time, and then to suggest how those lessons might be applied to the current challenges facing American policymakers in Iraq.

¹ The preponderance of this research was conducted prior to the March 19, 2003 commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom, but the project team was focused on the near-term implications of our effort throughout the course of our work. To that end, this study served as the point of departure for a RAND conference on nation building and the future of Iraq that was held in Arlington, Virginia on May 6-7, 2003 and the results of that conference were factored into the final version of this study. A list of conference attendees is included in Appendix A of this report.

SWNCC	State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee
TBD	Thousand Barrels per Day
TMK	Kosovo Protection Corps
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNJLC	United Nations Joint Logistics Center
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USFORSOM	United States Forces Somalia
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance

METHODOLOGY

First we developed a working definition for nation building. We then identified cases for research based on that definition. Then we established a template for examining each of the cases. Once we had analyzed the individual cases, we made cross-comparisons in areas where comparable statistics were available, for instance as regards the levels of external military and police forces, of economic assistance and of democratization and economic growth. Finally, we then turned to Iraq to see how such lessons might be applied there.

Various terms have been used over the past fifty-seven years to describe the activities we are seeking to analyze. The German and Japanese operations were referred to as occupations. The operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and were generally termed peacekeeping or peace enforcement. The current U.S. administration has preferred to use the terms stabilization and reconstruction to refer to its post conflict operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq. In all these cases the intent was to use military force to underpin and in some cases to actually compel a process of democratization. Occupation, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, stabilization and reconstruction do not fully capture this idea. Neither does the term nation building, but we believe it comes closer to encompassing the full range of activities and objectives involved.

We chose seven historical cases for this study: Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. These are the most important instances in which American military power has been used to underpin efforts at democratization. We did not include the American colonial experience in the Philippines because the societal transformation there attempted spanned several generations. We did not include the post WWII occupation of Austria because we felt its lessons would largely parallel those of Germany and Japan. We did not include the Cold War interventions in the Dominican Republic, Lebanon, Grenada and Panama because these were shorter lived and more limited in their objectives.

Once we identified the cases, we developed a structure for examining each. First, we described the nature of the settlement which terminated the conflict in question. We next addressed the security, humanitarian,

administrative, political, and economic challenges that were present at the outset. We then described the roles that the United States and international organizations assumed during the intervention. This included discussion of the military mandate for the operation and the type of civil administration, if any, that would be set up in the country. We next examined how each operation developed over time: how the security environment stabilized or grew more fragile; how the humanitarian situation evolved; how the civil administration interacted with the appointed or elected government; how the process of democratization developed and how reconstruction progressed across the country.

FROM GERMANY TO AFGHANISTAN

The post WWII occupations of Germany and Japan were America's first experiences with the use of military force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin a comparatively rapid and fundamental societal transformations with the objective of rendering any repetition of that conflict less likely. The success of these endeavors established that democracy was transferable; that societies could, under certain circumstances, be compelled to transform themselves, and that such transformations could prove enduring. These two operations set a standard for post conflict nation building that has not since been matched.

For the next forty years, from 1950 to 1990, there were few attempts to replicate these early successes. In the bipolar world of the Cold War, faced with the threat of nuclear destruction, American policy emphasized containment, deterrence and maintenance of the status quo. Efforts were made to promote democratic and free market values, but generally without the element of compulsion, even with the most recalcitrant of students. American military power tended to be employed to keep things as they were, not to improve them; to preserve the equilibrium, not alter it; to manage crises, not to resolve the underlying problems. Germany, Korea, Vietnam, China, Cyprus and Palestine remained divided. American and international forces were used to maintain these and other divides, not to compel resolution of the

underlying disputes. American interventions in places like the Dominican Republic, Lebanon, Grenada or Panama were intended to displace unfriendly regimes and reinstall friendly ones, rather than to bring about fundamental societal transformations.

The end of the Cold War created new problems for the United States and opened new possibilities.

Prominent among the new problems was a rash of state failures. During the Cold War many weak or artificial states had been propped up by one side or the other (and in some case by both) for geopolitical reasons. For instance, Somalia, Yugoslavia and Afghanistan had each been regarded as important pieces on the Cold War chessboard. Regimes there had received extensive external support as a result. With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, Moscow lost its capability and Washington its geopolitical rationale for sustaining such regimes. Denied such support, these and other states disintegrated.

After 1989, a balance of terror no longer impelled the United States to preserve the status quo. This meant that Washington was free to ignore regional instability when it did not threaten American interests. On the other, this freedom also meant that the United States now had the option of using its unrivaled power to actually resolve, rather than to simply manage or contain international problems of importance to it.

From 1990 onward the United States has felt able, when it chose, to intervene not simply to police ceasefires or restore the status quo but to bring about the democratic transformation of conflicted societies, much as it had those of Germany and Japan four decades earlier. And after 1989 the United States was also more able to secure broad international support for such efforts when it chose to mount them.

The rest of the international community also became more interventionist. Of the 54 peace operations the UN has mounted since 1945, 41 (or nearly 80%) have been initiated since 1989. Fifteen are still underway.

Despite this more supportive international environment, the costs and risks associated with nation building remained high. Washington consequently has not embarked on such endeavors lightly. It withdrew from Somalia in 1993 at the first serious resistance. It opted out of

international efforts to stem genocide in Rwanda in 1994. It resisted European efforts to entangle it in Balkan peace enforcement for the first four years of Yugoslavia's violent breakup. Even after intervening in Bosnia, it spent three more years seeking a non-military solution to ethnic cleaning in Kosovo.

Nevertheless, despite this reticence, throughout the 1990's each successive American led intervention, from Somalia to Haiti to Bosnia to Kosovo, proved wider in scope and more ambitious in intent than its predecessor. In Somalia the original objective was purely humanitarian, subsequently expanded to democratization. In Haiti the objective was to reinstall and renew a preexisting regime. In Bosnia, it was to create a multiethnic state. In Kosovo it was to establish from the ground up a democratic polity.

As a candidate, George W Bush criticized the Clinton Administration for this expansive agenda of nation building. As President, he adopted a more modest set of objectives when faced with a comparable challenge in Afghanistan. The Bush Administration's efforts to reverse the trend toward ever larger and more ambitious American led nation building operations has proved short lived, however. In Iraq the United States has taken on a task comparable in nature to the transformational attempts still underway in Bosnia and Kosovo, and in scope to the earlier American occupations of Germany and Japan.

CROSS-CASE TRENDS

Following the seven individual country studies, we sought to extract data that was broadly comparable across the cases. Although each case was unique, we attempted find areas where comparisons could prove useful. In particular, we attempted to quantify and compare measures of nation building input, that is to say peacekeeping-troops, police and economic assistance—and output, in the form of democratic elections and economic growth.

Military force levels varied significantly across the cases. They ranged from the 1.6 million U.S. forces in the European Theater of Operations at the end of the Second World War to the approximately 14,000 U.S. and international troops currently in Afghanistan. Looking at gross

numbers, however, does not allow for useful comparison across the cases because the size and populations of the countries being analyzed was so disparate. We therefore decided to look at the number of U.S. and international military soldiers per thousand inhabitants in each of the cases. In addition, we thought it important to look at how force levels changed over time. Figure S.1 shows the number of troops per thousand inhabitants for each of the cases at the outset of the intervention and at various intervals over time:





Figure S.1: Military Presence Over Time

24
10
240,000 Bosnia
480,000 Kosovo

As the data illustrates, force levels varied widely across these operations. Bosnia, Kosovo, and particularly Germany started with substantial numbers of military forces while the initial levels in Japan, Somalia, Haiti, and especially Afghanistan were much more modest. These levels (with the partial exception of Germany) all decreased over time, but by varying degrees. Overall, the differences across the cases had significant implications for other aspects of the post-conflict operation.

We conducted similar analysis on external assistance in these seven cases. Cumulative figures are useful to some degree, but to assess the true impact of assistance on individuals in post-conflict situations, it is important to look at how much assistance was provided on a per capita

basis. Figure S.2 captures how much per capita assistance was provided to each person during the first two years in the various cases (in 2001 U.S. dollars):



24
800
19200
19 bn / 2 years

Figure S.2: Per Capita External Assistance

Due to varying populations, comparable sums of money can have drastically different effects on the residents of a country. For example, although Germany was granted by far the most assistance in monetary terms (\$12 billion), the amount per citizen came to only a little over \$200. Meanwhile Kosovo, which ranked fourth in terms of total assistance, was granted over \$800 per resident. In a recovering economy, these discrepancies are quite significant.

CASE CONCLUSIONS

The German and Japanese occupations set standards for post-conflict transformation that have not since been equaled. One of the most important questions an inquiry such as this must to address, therefore, is why those two operations succeeded so brilliantly while all those that

have come after have fallen short, to one degree or another. The easiest answer is that Germany and Japan were already highly developed, economically advanced societies. And this certainly explains why it proved easier to reconstruct the German and Japanese economies than it has to fundamentally reform those underdeveloped economies in our other five case studies.

Economics is not a sufficient answer, however. Nation building, as we have defined it, and more importantly, as those who launched the seven interventions studied herein defined American objectives, was not primarily about working economic, but rather political transformations.

The spread of democracy in Latin America, Asia, and parts of Africa suggests that this is not uniquely an artifact of Western culture or of advanced industrial economies: that democracy can, indeed, take root in circumstances where neither obtains. No post conflict program of "reconstruction" could turn Somalia, Haiti or Afghanistan into thriving centers of prosperity. But the failure of American-led interventions to install substantial democracies in those countries has other than purely economic explanations.

All three of those societies are divided ethnically, socio-economically and/or tribally in ways that Germany and Japan were not. So homogeneity helps. But again, it is not essential. For the kind of communal hatreds that mark Somalia, Haiti and Afghanistan are even more marked in Bosnia and Kosovo, where, nevertheless, the process of democratization has made some progress.

What distinguish Germany, Japan, Bosnia and Kosovo, on the one hand, from Somalia, Haiti and Afghanistan on the other, are not their levels of Western culture, of economic development, or of national homogeneity. Rather what distinguishes these two groups, one where democratization has or is taking hold, and the other where it has not, is the level of effort the United States has put into their democratic transformations. Nation building, as this study illustrates, is a time and resource consuming effort. The United States and its allies have put twenty five times more troops and money into post conflict Kosovo than into post conflict Afghanistan. This higher level of input accounts, at least in part, for

the higher level of output in terms of democratic institutions and economic growth.

In the late 1940's, while it was shouldering all the burden of Japan's transformation and most of that for West Germany, the United States produced some 50% of the world's GNP. By the 1990's, when nation building again came into vogue, that figure was down to around 22%. International burden sharing had become commensurately more important.

Throughout the 1990's the United States wrestled with the problem of how to achieve wider participation in its nation building endeavors while also preserving adequate unity of command. In Somalia and Haiti, the United States experimented with sequential arrangements by which it organized, led, largely manned and funded the initial phase of the operation itself, but then quickly turned responsibility over to a more broadly representative (and more widely funded) United Nations force. These sequential efforts can not be deemed a success. In Bosnia the United States succeeded in achieving unity of command and broad participation on the military side of the operation through NATO, but resisted the logic of achieving a comparable arrangement on the civil side. In Kosovo, the United States achieved unity of command and broad participation on both the military and civil sides, through NATO and the UN respectively. While the military and civil aspects of that operation remained under different management, the United States assured that the mandates and capabilities of the two entities, KFOR and UMMIK would overlap thereby preventing a gap opening between them.

None of these models proved entirely satisfactory. Arrangements in Kosovo, however, do seem to have provided the best amalgam of American leadership, European participation, broad financial burden sharing and strong unity of command. Every international official in Kosovo works ultimately for one of two people, the NATO commander or the Special Representative of the Secretary General. Neither of these is an American, but by virtue of its credibility in the region and its influence in NATO and the UN Security Council, the United States has been able to maintain a fully satisfactory leadership role, while paying only 16% of the reconstruction costs and fielding only 16% of the peacekeeping troops.

The efficacy of the Kosovo model for managing a large scale peace operation depends very heavily upon the ability of the United States and its principal allies to attain a common vision of the enterprises objectives and to then shape response of the relevant institutions, principally NATO, the European Union and the United Nations, to those agreed purposes. Where the principal participants in a nation building exercise have such a common vision, the Kosovo model offers a viable amalgam of burden sharing and unity of command.

More recently, in Afghanistan, the United States opted for parallel arrangements on the military side, and even greater variety on the civil. An international force, with no US participation, operates in Kabul, while a national, mostly US force operates everywhere else. The UN has responsibility for promoting political transformation while individual donors coordinate economic reconstruction (or more often fail to do so). This arrangement is a marginal improvement on Somalia, since the separate US and international forces are at least not operating in the same physical space, but represents a clear regression from what was achieved in Haiti, Bosnia or, in particular Kosovo.

Another aspect in which these seven cases differ is that of duration. Some were begun with clear departure deadlines which were adhered to--Haiti. Some began with very short time horizons but saw those amended - Germany, Japan, Somalia and Bosnia. And some were begun without any expectation of an early exit - Kosovo and Afghanistan. The record suggests that while staying long does not guarantee success, leaving early assures failure. To date, no effort at enforced democratization has taken hold in less than five years.

And if democratization takes hold, is that the ultimate exit strategy? These case studies suggest not. American forces have left clear failures behind - Somalia and Haiti--but remain present in every successful or still pending case - Germany, Japan, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. These five interventions were motivated by regional or global geopolitical concerns. Democratization alone may not fully address such concerns. Germany and Japan were disarmed and consequently required American help in providing for their external security long after they became reliable democracies fully capable of looking after their own

internal affairs. Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan also may well require American (or perhaps, in the case of Bosnia and Kosovo, European) assistance with their external security long after their internal peace is established. Whether this help will take the form of an external troop presence, an external security guarantee, or external leadership in forging new regional security arrangements remains to be seen, but some American and or European security commitment is likely to continue long after the democratic transformation is completed. Indeed, if Germany and Japan are any guide, the more thorough the democratic transformation, the more deeply forged may be the residual links. The record suggests that building a nation in ones image creates ties of affection as well as of dependency that persist long after the successful birth.

With these considerations in mind, we came to the following general conclusions in addition to those associated with specific operations:

- Many factors influence the ease or difficulty of nation building - prior democratic experience, level of economic development, national homogeneity. Another important determinant of success, however, is the level of effort, in time, men and money, invested in the process.
- Multilateral nation building is more complex and time consuming than unilateral. It is also considerably less expensive for any one participant.
- Multilateral nation building can produce more thoroughgoing transformations and greater regional reconciliation than unilateral efforts.
- Unity of command and broad participation are compatible if the major participants share a common vision and can shape international institutions to their needs.
- Neighboring states can exert decisive influence, for better or worse. It is near impossible to put together a fragmented nation if its neighbors persist in trying to tear it apart. Every effort should be made to secure their support.
- Accountability for post injustices can be a powerful component of democratization. It also tends, however, to be among the most difficult and controversial aspects of any nation-building

endeavor and should, therefore, be attempted only if there is a deep and long term commitment to the overall operation.

- There is no quick route to nation building. Five years seems the minimum required to enforce an enduring transition to democracy.
- Successful nation building can create ties, affection and a long-term dependence for external security long after the need for assistance in building democratic forms and maintaining internal security is past.

APPLYING THESE LESSONS TO IRAQ

Finally, after reviewing these experiences and seeking to draw the resultant lessons, this study suggests how these best practices might be applied to future operations, and, in particular to Iraq.

Although the military phase of the war against Iraq went better than could have been hoped for and the regime collapsed much faster than many expected, the U.S. has been left with an unenviable task in seeking to nation build in Iraq. The British spent several decades forging an Iraqi state out of remains of the Ottoman empire but neither they nor their Iraqi successors succeeded in forging a real Iraqi nation; none really tried to build a democratic, pluralist polity.

Nation building in Iraq faces a number of deep-rooted challenges. Iraq has no tradition of pluralist democracy; instead politics has always been about authoritarian rule and the settlement of disputes by force. Although a sense of Iraqi national identity does exist, this does not override communal forms of identity along ethnic, geographic, tribal or religious grounds. The majority of the population, the Kurds and Shia, have no real tradition of representation as communities in national Iraqi politics but will now have to be brought into the polity. To make matters worse, organized crime and banditry are strongly rooted. Furthermore, the past decade of sanctions and Saddam Hussein's dictatorship have denuded Iraq of its once strong middle class, who had a stake in development of a civil society.

In addition to these particular Iraqi problems, the country faces the familiar challenges of a society emerging from a long period of

totalitarian rule. The military, security services and bureaucracy need to be radically reformed and purged. Justice needs to be achieved for victims of human rights abuses. The economy needs a major overhaul to make it competitive in the global market.

These challenges would have faced any attempt to achieve transformation in Iraq. Due to the diplomatic circumstances of the conflict, the U.S. also has to cope with unsympathetic neighbors - Iran, Syria and Turkey all have an interest in shaping Iraqi politics and perhaps in destabilising a smooth transition. At the international level, the pre-war splits in the UN Security Council make it much harder for the U.S. to adopt the burden sharing models adopted in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. At the same time, the U.S. was unable to undertake pre-war preparations that would have eased post-war transition, such as coordinating humanitarian relief with the UN and NGOs, organising international civil police forces and establishing an international political authority to rebut Arab suspicions of American imperialism.

① Nonetheless, Iraq does have some advantages for nation-builders. First, it has a nation-wide civil administration, which is relatively efficient. This administration needs to be rebuilt but not reconstructed from scratch. This administration, staffed mainly by Iraqis, will reduce the need for direct international intervention and facilitate security and development across the country. Second, the civil administration and ② the extensive links with UN agencies means that the humanitarian issues should be soluble. Third, Iraq's ③ oil means that the country will not remain dependent on international aid in the medium term.

As it embarks on its most ambitious programme of nation-building since 1945, the U.S. must learn important lessons from the case studies examined in this report. The U.S. has staked its credibility on a positive outcome in Iraq. This will require an extensive commitment of resources (financial, personnel and diplomatic) over a long period of time. The U.S. cannot afford to contemplate early exit strategies, nor can it afford to leave the job half done. The real questions for the U.S. are not how soon it can leave but rather how fast and how substantially to share power with Iraqis and with the rest of the world

while retaining enough itself to oversee an enduring transition to
democracy.

2. GERMANY

The Second World War was the bloodiest conflict in European history. Millions of soldiers and civilians were killed in battle or in concentration camps operated by Nazi Germany. In May 1945, Germany surrendered unconditionally to the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain. The allies had already decided to occupy Germany militarily. The United States, Great Britain, and, it was later decided, France would occupy zones in the west while the Soviets would occupy the east. The capital of Berlin was also partitioned among the four occupying powers. Common allied policy was developed in a series of summit meetings, most notably at Casablanca in January 1943, Yalta in February 1945, and at Potsdam in August 1945. At Casablanca, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and American President Franklin Roosevelt had decided to accept only unconditional surrender from Germany. This decision was reiterated in subsequent meetings that included Soviet leader Josef Stalin. The Yalta declaration called for unconditional surrender; the destruction of Nazism; the disarmament of Germany; the speedy punishment of war criminals; reparations; and an economy able to sustain the German people, but not capable of waging war. The Potsdam agreement elaborated on these political and economic principles and included agreements about occupation areas, the disposition of eastern German borders, population transfers, and the treatment of war criminals.²

CHALLENGES

Germany was utterly defeated by the end of the war. The last years of the war had damaged the state's physical infrastructure, in some cases severely, although later analysis found that the damage was not as extensive as first thought.³ The more immediate problem was the collapse

² The United States Department of State, *Occupation of Germany: Policy and Progress 1945-46* Publication 2783 (Washington: GPO, 1947), p. 3.

³ John Killick, *The United States and European Reconstruction: 1945-1960*; Keele University Press, Edinburgh, 1997, pp. 61, 88.

DONE

November 19, 2003

*Advance
copy
sent*

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Steve Bucci

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Thursday House Intel Briefing

Please have Paul Wolfowitz do the House ops intel briefing for me on Thursday.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111903-4

.....
Please respond by 11/20/03

350.09

11/19/03

U22337 /03

November 19, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iraq

ZRAS

Attached is an article on Iraq that is worth looking at.

Thanks.

Attach.

Taheri, Amir. "What to Do," *National Review*, November 24, 2003, p. 18-19.

DHR:dh
111903-5

.....
Please respond by _____

19 Nov 03

U22338: /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20541



■ COVER STORY ■

What to Do

The problem in Iraq is neither political nor military;
it is a security problem

AMIR TAHERI

In late October and early November, the Iraqi capital of Baghdad had some horrible days, with terrorist attacks that claimed scores of victims. The attacks put the usual what-is-to-be-done industry into overdrive in Washington and elsewhere. There has been no dearth of ideas, some outrageous, others amusing. One is to impose a 24-hour curfew in Baghdad. Another is to abandon democratization, and appoint a military junta to restore calm. (The calm, that is to say, of the graveyard.) We are told to court tribal sheikhs, to cuddle the mullahs, or to crown this or that aspiring despot as "strongman." The avalanche of ideas includes other gems: get a new U.N. resolution, put Kofi Annan in charge, call Jacques Chirac to the rescue, and even beg the mullahs of Tehran for help.

Mr. Taheri is an Iranian journalist and author of ten books on the Middle East and Islam. His most recent book, *L'Irak: le dessous des cartes*, was published last year by Editions Complexe.

The best short answer to the question, however, is to do nothing. Doing nothing is often better than knee-jerk reactions and panic measures. A longer answer, however, will have to start by establishing what it is that we face in Baghdad today. To present the attacks as "the Iraq problem" falsifies the issue. Iraq does remain a problem, not only for the U.S.-led coalition but also for the Persian Gulf, and, beyond it, the whole world. But to reduce that problem to the terrorism that we have witnessed since May would be to miss the point.

The terrorist attacks—in localities that account for perhaps just over 1 percent of Iraqi territory—do need to be dealt with, but they cannot be dealt with unless we understand their nature. First of all, they are not political. Their instigators have not presented any political demands, nor have they presented their terrorism in the context of any political analysis. The choice of targets, too, shows that there is no coherent political strategy behind the attacks. (To be sure, pundits speculate about such

motives. We are told, for example, that the attacks come from Iraqis who wish to drive the Americans out. In that case, one wonders why the terrorists attacked Muslim embassies, the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, hospitals, universities, and other points of concentrations of Iraqi civilians.) No, the agenda behind these acts is not political, and thus cannot be dealt with through political means such as changing policies, establishing dialogue, seeking compromises, and altering alliances.

Nor can the attacks be understood in military terms. One idea, from those who see the attacks as a military problem, is to flood Iraq with boots, to the tune of half a million or more. Another is to withdraw the GIs into cordoned-off bases, and let the Iraqis settle it among themselves. Yet another is to bring in the Turkish and Jordanian armies because they supposedly know how to deal with "the natives." The truth, however, is that these attacks do not represent a military threat to the coalition. The instigators are not trying to capture territory or deny territory to the coalition. Nor are they seeking to destroy the coalition's major assets or gain control of vital resources, such as water, or even to disrupt the logistics of the "enemy."

As things stand today, then, the U.S.-led coalition faces neither a political nor a military challenge in Iraq. Politically, the coalition enjoys support from a majority of Iraqis on two points: 1) making sure that the fallen regime does not return in any form and 2) preventing a single ethnic and/or religious group from winning an exclusive hold on power in any future regime. (This support, however, could be lost if a growing number of Iraqis sensed that, for domestic political reasons, the U.S. might not want to stay the course.)

Nor does the coalition face a military challenge in Iraq in the foreseeable future. (Gen. John Abizaid overstated the case when he suggested that Iraq was witnessing a guerrilla war.) The suggestion that, in military terms, Iraq could become "another Vietnam" comes from those who know neither.

This terrorism is, in fact, a security problem, which must be combated with policing methods. The coalition and the Iraqi Governing Council have had a measure of success in dealing with the wave of ordinary crimes that hit Baghdad in the

EPSTEIN/ZACKLIN U.S. SOLDIERS VIEW SUE OF DOWNED HELICOPTER IN IRAQ, 10/30/03

immediate aftermath of liberation. That success has been achieved through the organization of Iraqi police units and the establishment of neighborhood-watch networks that supply the information needed for prevention and detection of crime.

That method has not been used against terrorism. For reasons that are hard to fathom, the U.S.-led administration has excluded the Governing Council and the newly created Iraqi police force from the task of combating terrorism. As for the Governing Council, some of its members claim that terrorism is "part of the war," and thus "a preserve of the Americans." Again for reasons hard to explain, the coalition has refused to build up an adequate counterterrorism capacity. It was not until early in October that Washington assigned a couple of counterterrorism experts to the reconstituted Iraqi Ministry of Defense. Of the 56 specialist detectives promised for a new division to deal with terrorism, only two have been assigned.

At the same time, the interim administration, perhaps anxious to do the best thing for the longer term, is trying to introduce technologies and equipment that few Iraqis understand and can handle. Creating a genetic database for criminal investigations, for example, may be useful in the long run. But right now you need people who know which tribes to infiltrate, which teahouses to frequent, and which money-changers to keep an eye on. The newly created police computer center in Baghdad looks like a Hollywood set. But very little of immediate use goes in, and less comes out.

On the ground, there is no organized effort to search out and destroy the terrorists. Whatever raids the coalition forces carry out and whatever arrests they make are prompted by information volunteered by Iraqis who share the dream of a new Iraq. This is a reactive, rather than proactive, way of fighting terror. The terrorists in Iraq have an easy time because no systematic watch is kept on them, no one is hunting them, and no one disrupts their cash flow. The American force that faces them, though large and well equipped, is unsuited to the task of infiltrating and destroying clandestine cells.

When Saddam Hussein went into hiding just before April 9, he made sure that his henchmen had emptied the contents of

the Central Bank. By most accounts they took something like \$1 billion. Of that, half was recovered by the coalition, including \$400 million in a cache close to the Tigris River in Baghdad. Saddam has therefore almost half a billion dollars to play with—that is to say, to spend on his terror network, possibly with the help of professional criminals and remnants of foreign terrorist groups that he had sheltered and financed for decades. Half a billion dollars is a lot of money, especially in cash-starved Iraq, and could buy quite a few volunteers for terrorism. And as long as there is no efficient policing action, the terrorists will see no reason why they should stop.


Nevertheless, this terror campaign lacks staying power. Saddam's money is bound to run out, sooner rather than later. Because he is not using terror in the context of a popular political program, his field of recruitment is bound to remain limited to diehard Ba'athists, mercenaries, and foreign militants thirsting to kill Americans wherever possible. There are no signs that the terror network has prepared for using the fundraising methods of classical terrorist organizations, such as robbing more banks, setting up rackets, and running extortion networks. Saddam has always been a reckless tactician and a cowardly strategist: He always started with as much violence as he could muster, but ended up looking for a hole in which to hide. In previous cases, such as the war he launched against Iran and his invasion of Kuwait, he got off the hook thanks to either the Western powers that supported him or the United Nations that offered him a way out.

This time he is unlikely to get a break. Sooner or later, the coalition will create and deploy a counterterrorism force constituted mainly of Iraqis. With this endeavor, some of Washington's allies, notably the British, can help. Rather than clean up after every terrorist attack, the new force would go on the offensive against an adversary that is politically isolated and militarily doomed. The liberation of Iraq was and remains a success; no explosion in Baghdad should make us forget that Iraq could become a problem only in Washington—if short-term domestic political considerations override the broader goal of winning the war against global terrorism. NR

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November 20, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Nichols

230.02

What did I interview that fellow Nichols for that he said I didn't give him the job?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112003-4

.....
Please respond by 11/25/03

✓
11/20

SECDEF -

Back in March, you interviewed Nichols by SVTC. He was the Navy's 2nd choice for 3d Fleet. You selected the primary candidate, VAdm McCabe.

At the time, Nichols was serving as Moseley's Deputy

20 Nov 03

11/20

U22339 /03

November 20, 2003

TO: Mark Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Plan

I wanted to reuse the material I had when I repeated about five times "our plan was this," "our plan was that," "our plan was this." It is good stuff. Let's use it again.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112003-5

.....
Please respond by _____

OB
12/15

350.001 SD

20 Nov 03

U22340 /03

November 20, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Visits from Germany and France

Larry Di Rita
11/21

When is Schroeder coming to the U.S., and when did the information say that the MoD of France might come? I want to look at my schedule.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112003-9

.....
Please respond by 11/25/03

11/21

Secret -

- Schroeder was in New York 20-21 November.

- French MoD is supposedly here in January, but I cannot confirm. Originally, apparently, she was to be coming in December. Will press for detail.

003
20 NOV 03

U22341 /03
11-L-0559/OSD/20546
Larry Di Rita
11/21

November 20, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Visits from Germany and France


When is Schroeder coming to the U.S., and when did the information say that the MoD of France might come? I want to look at my schedule.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112003-9

.....
Please respond by 11/25/03

11/21



To: *[Handwritten signature]*
Exec Sec -
Lauren Haber can probably find out.
[Handwritten signature]

Larry Di Rita
11/21

November 20, 2003

TO: Doug Feith
CC: PAUL WOLFOWITZ
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Letter to Talabani

If it is appropriate, please draft a letter from me to Talabani, complimenting him on his piece in the *Wall Street Journal* today. It is first-rate.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112003-12

.....
Please respond by 11/24/03

OB
12/16

000.7

30 Nov 03

U22342 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20548

SJ

November 20, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: State Department Cable

Please let me see the Department of State cable on Taiwan that Steve Cambone mentioned today.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112003-14

Done

.....
Please respond by 11/21/03

11/20

SecDef -

*It is the one
Rodman gave you for
the plane. We'll get another
copy D.R. t*

China (Nats)

20 Nov 03

TEN
11/20 U22343 /03

November 20, 2003

TO: Dick McGraw
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*
SUBJECT: Afghanistan

Afghanistan

I think it is a great idea for you to help out in Afghanistan.

You are indeed a superb "utility infielder," among other things!

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112003-16

.....
Please respond by _____

U22344 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20550

20000000

IS

DHR

I consider myself your utility infielder or designated hitter. Unless you've got something else you'd like me to do, Marty Hoffmann has asked me to go to Afghanistan with Jack Bell and Zalmay Khalilzad to work on the economic and political reconstruction. That's an important task and I'm willing to do that.

Dick McGraw

Call

V 11/29

November 21, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D.
SUBJECT: 9/11 Commission Status

I want a weekly report on where we stand on the 9/11 Commission requirements that we are supposed to be fulfilling.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112103-3

.....
Please respond by 12/5/03

334

21 Nov 03

U22345 /03

57

November 21, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Interview to Devon Cross

Please send Devon Cross a copy of the *Paris Match* interview. She wanted to see it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
112103-7

.....
Please respond by 11/30/05

12/2

*→ Col Rhyndarone -
Just send her the
transcript of the
interview. Tnx.*

D.L.R.

Larry Di Rita
12/8

000.75D

21 Nov 03

U22346 /03

C12/15

1:49 PM

TO: LTG John Craddock
Larry Di Rita

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: November 24, 2003

SUBJECT: 9/11 Commission

334

Please make sure anything that comes out of our office that relates to that subject that is going to be sent over to the 9/11 Commission that I have a chance to see it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112403.19

Please respond by: _____

✓
12/15

SIR

Nothing related to your personal calendar will be sent without your knowledge.

All official material-- NSC/PC, briefs, Summaries of Conclusion, etc., are being compiled for your review.

SC
12/13

26 Nov 03

9:09 AM

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 24, 2003
SUBJECT:

See if the US/Japan Parlimentary exchange still exists. If so, who the members are, how often they meet, who funds it and how it works. I would like to know who is on the US side and who is on the Japan side.

Japan

Thanks.

*Don
Dunnan
1/30*

DHR/azn
112403.03

Please respond by: 12/1 File copy

29 NOV 03

U22348 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20555

SS

9:09 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
 CC: Col. Bucci
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
 DATE: November 24, 2003
 SUBJECT: **Calendar**

Please block out an hour some time for me to get back into the record keeping file, and the meetings we had with the contractor, the Library of Congress, and the historians. We are doing nothing on it and we need to get going.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
 112403.06

Please respond by: 12/1 File copy

0205D

29 Nov 03

U22349. /03

9:11 AM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: LTG Craddock
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 24, 2003
SUBJECT: US Ambassador to Iraq

IRAQ

I probably ought to meet soon the new woman who is going to be Ambassador to US from Iraq.

Let's get it arranged.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112403.07

Please respond by: _____ 11 | 30

*Done
12/12*

24 Nov 03

U22350 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20557

1:02 PM

TO: Jerry Bremer
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 24, 2003
SUBJECT: IGC

✓ 12/21

LEAD

Carl Levin keeps asking if you have asked the IGC what their thoughts would be if the CPA decided to reconstitute units of the Iraqi army, using people, some below rank such as lieutenant, with mostly enlisted personnel. I told him we were already hiring back former Army individuals as policeman, border patrol, etc. He said no, he's talking about actually bringing them back in units.

He needs an answer. Please let me know.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112403.13

Please respond by:

12/6

file copy

24 Nov 03

U22351 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20558

Snowflake

1:39 PM

TO: Secretary Gordon England

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: November 24, 2003

SUBJECT: **Intern Program**

Thanks for your note on interns. I appreciate your quick response. I will look forward to hearing what you and David Chu have by way of proposals.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112403.14

Reference: Intern Program Response to SD from SN 11/21/03

Please respond by: _____ 12/8 File copy

230.02

24 Nov 03

U22352 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20559


Chu

November 21, 2003

To: SECDEF

Fr: SECNAV

Subj: Intern Program Response

 Secretary,

By your note of October 20, you asked that I review DOD intern programs and provide you my thoughts.

Bottom line:

- Intern programs have broad support across constituent groups in DOD.
- Intern programs are varied and large (8,000 people +), all formed under broad and general OPM guidance.
- Programs mirror the overall employee situation in DOD; namely, not performance focused.
- Most are open ended, without measures of effectiveness.
- No DOD policy directive regarding objectives, strategy or implementation guidance for the program.
- With the right controls and measurement, intern programs can provide a useful civilian recruiting tool.

Recommendation:

- Incorporate intern program guidance and performance measures as a part of NSPS.
- David Chu concurs. We will be back with you with specific intern program approaches/implementation as part of NSPS way ahead.



11-L-0559/OSD/20560

ENCL

1:32 PM

TO: Gen. Pete Schoomaker
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: November 24, 2003
 SUBJECT: Congressman Jim Saxton

*CF:
OCU
ECC*

320.2

Congressman Jim Saxton was in today and said that he would be delighted to introduce legislation after you have thought through how you want change the force structure in the army and the organization.

Here's his card. You might want to talk to him about it some time. He wants to be helpful. Please keep me posted.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112403.14

Attach: Business card of H. James Saxton

Please respond by:

12/6

12/20

*Sir,
Response attached.
w/CDR Nosenya*

FILE
*FAXED FWD 12/19/03
TEN*

12/19

24 Nov 03

U22353 /03



UNITED STATES ARMY
THE CHIEF OF STAFF

INFO MEMO

December 19, 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, Army

Schoomaker
19.12.03

SUBJECT: Response to Congressman Jim Saxton

Sir,

Congressman Saxton came to the Pentagon for lunch today. He brought Mr. Tom Hawley, a professional staff member from the HASC. It was a useful session – we discussed a wide range of issues, including his recent visit to U.S. SOCOM and his interest in our transformation. I think he was looking to gain some insights for the subcommittee he chairs: Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities.

I agree he wants to be helpful and will maintain contact with him as we move forward next year.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: LTC Stephen P. Tryon, (b)(6)

CC: Deputy Secretary of Defense
Acting Secretary of the Army

2:36 PM

TO: Secretary Jim Roche

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Larry Di Rita
Powell Moore
Mike Wynne

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: November 24, 2003

SUBJECT: Tankers

4527

My impression is that Sen. McCain may ask that there be a new contract negotiated on the tankers. Apparently he entered into a colloquy on the floor of the Senate suggesting that that's what the bill suggests, even though others don't agree with that.

What's your thought?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112403.15

Please respond by: 12/6 *file copy*

*03
12/8*

U22354 /03

24 Nov 03

TAB A

2:34 PM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: November 24, 2003

SUBJECT: **Chairman Duncan Hunter**

12/10

Duncan Hunter was in today and mentioned hidden cameras in Baltimore's high crime areas. He recommended it to Seal Team 6 Iraq. Would you have someone look into that?

Somebody ought to talk to his staff, find out what it's about, and look at it in an orderly way.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112403.16

~~Tab A~~

*Response attached
C 12/18
14/22*

24 Nov 03

U22355 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20564

7:47 AM

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: November 25, 2003
SUBJECT: Boeing

BOY

I noticed that some people were fired at Boeing, and one of them had worked at DoD previously. Should DoD look into her conduct while she was at DoD and determine whether it was appropriate?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112503.11

Please respond by:

12/6

OB
12/8

25 NOV 03

U22356 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20565

7:40 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: November 25, 2003
 SUBJECT: **Military Construction Funds**

600.1

I've got to get briefed on the way that the services have cut military construction funds beyond where we wanted them to.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112503.08

Please respond by: _____

12/6

DR

12/15

25 NOV 03

U22357 /03

7:26 AM

020

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: November 25, 2003
 SUBJECT:

*Closed
 per
 SMA/DSS
 /B*

IRAQ

What do we do about getting Sanchez' headquarters truly joint in Iraq. This is not the way to be doing business.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
 112503.05

Please respond by: _____ *12/6*

25 NOV 03

U22358 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20567

7:25 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: November 25, 2003

SUBJECT: Active and Reserve

I do have to get briefed on the active and reserve component balancing.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112503.04

Please respond by: 12/8

*Done
12/13*

*W
22
03*

25 NOV 03

U22359 /03

7:24 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

DATE: November 25, 2003

SUBJECT: **Iraqi Ambassador**

Needless to say, we ought to have the Iraqi ambassador in to see me, but also if we have a Pentagon event where we include other people it would be nice to include her.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112503.03

Please respond by: _____

Done

R/R

IRAD

AS 11/25/03

U22360 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20569

7:03 AM

TO: Protocol
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 25, 2003
SUBJECT: Photos

Make sure we send these two photos to Bellano.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112503.02

Attach: Photos

Ask Larry his name - I think it's Mike Balzano?

060

Please respond by: _____

Mike - follow up on Ads
t. Schneider @ SB
12/8
MCM -
Is this happening?
DR

Larry Di Rita
12/8

30 NOV 03

U22361 /03

1:18 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 25, 2003
SUBJECT: **Post Conflict**

IRAO

See me on my discussion with you on the post conflict lessons learned and the Defense Science Board. We've got to figure out a precise approach for them.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112503.14

Please respond by:

12/1

*OB
12/15*

U22362 /03

25 NOV 03

11-L-0559/OSD/20571

9:16 AM

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 24, 2003
SUBJECT: **Statistics**

11/25

000.5

Please give me the number of Americans who were killed in WWI, WWII, the Korean War and Vietnam.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112403.09

Please respond by: 11/30

24 NOV 03

U22363 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20572

MEMO FOR: SECDEF

25 NOV 2003

FROM: LTG CRADDOCK

SUBJECT: STATISTICS

IN RESPONSE TO YOUR SNOWFLAKE, 24 NOVEMBER: " PLEASE GIVE ME THE NUMBER OF AMERICANS WHO WERE KILLED IN WWI, WWII, THE KOREAN WAR, AND VIETNAM".

WORLD WAR I	116,516 KIA
WORLD WAR II	405,399 KIA
KOREAN WAR	36,576 KIA
VIETNAM WAR	58,200 KIA

SOURCE: OSD WEBSITE

11-L-0559/OSD/20573

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 29, 2003
SUBJECT: **Procedures**

Take a look at this memo from Mike Wynne to you. It seems to me it would be the easiest thing in the world for you to just automatically send me something like that so I am aware of it.

You ought to get your office staff organized with the thought of keeping me informed of things like this. I think we do much better job of keeping your office informed. If we don't let me know and I'll try and fix it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
113003.01b

Attach: Action Memo (10/9/03) to DSD Re: Force Protection from M. Wynne

Please respond by: _____

12/10

OB/12/0

U22364 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20574



ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

DEP SEC DEF
HAS BEEN
PW APPROVED
OCT - 9 2003

Why not
for me.
early

No more

Action Memo

October 9, 2003

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: Mr. Michael W. Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)

FROM: Dr. Ronald M. Sega, Director of Defense Research and Engineering *RMS 10/9/03*

SUBJECT: Force Protection

• Earlier today you approved the items listed below for priority funding from FY03 or FY04 sources and rapid fielding to CENTCOM as force protection enhancements. This list was prioritized by CENTCOM and has been vetted with the Services, Joint Staff and OSD.

• The total cost of the items is \$335.54M and they are listed in accordance with CENTCOM's prioritization:

- \$70M funds to increase production of Interceptor Body Armor (IBA)
- \$59.3M funds to increase production of Up-Armored HMMWVs (UAH)
- \$25M funds to increase production of Lightweight Counter- Mortar Radars
- \$38.3M funds to increase production of AEROSTATS with Electro-optical sensors
- \$840K funds for Air scan Systems-Scan Eagle Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.
- \$31M funds to complete the purchase of 185 SUAV Raven Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.
- \$8.1M funds to complete Change Detection Devices.
- \$26.5M funds to increase production of 107 Warlock Orange electronic countermeasure devices.
- \$5.5M funds to replace 10 Channel Cottonwood electronic countermeasure devices.
- \$1.0M funds to test and evaluate 50 Radio Frequency Detection Devices.
- \$70M funds to develop and procure Rapid Reaction/ New Solution technologies.

• Actions:

- The Army will execute those items that can be rapidly resourced with organic funds in the near-term.

- o USD-Comptroller will utilize FY-04 Iraqi Freedom Funds to reimburse the Army and fund those items the Army can not resource in the near-term.
- o AT&L/DDR&E will provide oversight of the Rapid Reaction/New Solution technology funds.
- o The Army, DDR&E, Joint Staff, and USD-Comptroller will reassess, and report back to me *on an urgent basis* the appropriate level of effort to be applied the Shadow-Unmanned Aerial Vehicle and Add-On Ballistic Protection for Wheeled Vehicles.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve this list of items and actions listed.

COORDINATION: OUSD (C), CICS J4, CJCSJ8, SecArmy, Sec Navy,

Approved PW 10/9/03

Disapproved _____

Prepared By: Col S.E. Brown (b)(6)

TO: David Chu
CC: Larry Di Rita
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 29, 2003
SUBJECT: Dept. of Transportation

MEM

Norm Mineta called me. He's got a program to reduce preventable traffic accidents by 50%. The goal is to reduce them by some 50%. He's seeking a joint press conference between December 19th and January 4th. They are planning a crackdown on drivers in the 19-24 year old range - the military age range.

Please get with Larry Di Rita on the phone to discuss this and figure out what DoD ought to do, talk to Mineta's office, and then let me know while I am in Europe. I think he's on a short time frame.

I hope you had a good Thanksgiving!

Thanks.

12/8 ✓ *12/9*

Se a Def - Next week, in all probability.

DHR/azn
113003.10c

Di Rita
Larry Di Rita
12/8

Please respond by: _____ *12/5*

29 NOV 03
12/8

U22365 /03 3

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 29, 2003
SUBJECT: **Iraqi Security Force Strength**

IRAQ

Here's a memo from Newt. He is right. We have got to up the ante on this again.
Why don't you come back to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
113003.02b

Attach: 11/11/03 Email to SD from N. Gingrich

Please respond by: _____ 12/10

*OB
1/2/04*

e

U22366 /03 18

September 15, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Kirtland AFB

323.3 AF

I want to go to KUMMSC at Kirtland AFB.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091503-41

.....
Please respond by _____

✓ 9/17 will track for execution in conjunction w/ next TAOS visit.
v/r
CDR Navarro
9/17 C9/17

T 12/10

15 SEP 03

U22401 /03

December 3, 2003

R U S S I A

TO: Gen. Pete Pace
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Exercises w/Russia

I do need to get some clarity as to what the United States proposed to Ivanov on exercises, whether it was cleared up at the Chairman of the Joint Chief's level and your level and whether it makes sense.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120303-9 (is computer)

.....
Please respond by _____

OB
12/15

U22445 /03

Ⓢ

3 Dec 03

December ¹¹/~~8~~, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Iraq Assessment Team

625

I want to see the draft charter for this assessment team for Iraq, and I want to see the proposed membership of it. I may want to add some folks.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120803-17

.....
Please respond by 12/18/03

*Closed
12/12
C*

11 Dec 03

U22446 /03

December 8, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Transition to State Dept. in Iraq

Please come back with a proposal as to who should chair and who will be involved in the transition from DoD to State in Iraq. Get a rhythm of reporting to me weekly on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120803-13

.....
Please respond by 1/16/04

cc: Doug Feith

OB
12/12

8 Dec 03

U22447 /03

Rumsfeld

December 8, 2003

IRAC

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Indictment

I think General Abizaid's idea of indicting Saddam Hussein and possibly others as war criminals is a good idea. Let's get going on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120803-8

.....
Please respond by 12/18/03

*DB
12/12*

8 Dec 03

U22448 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20583

2/9
1300

Snowflake

December 8, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Kennedy Center Event

*Mary Claire:
Can you
find out?*

330.11

There was an African-American woman who stood in the aisle last night and led a young people's chorus singing the song, "Georgia." There must have been a hundred of these young people up on the stage and she was down in the aisle.

*Thanks,
Jayne
Durnan
12/9*

Please see if you can find out who she is, what her name is, what her position is, and what school the chorus is from that she leads.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120803-7

.....
Please respond by 12/15/03

8 Dec 03

U22449 /03

December 6, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meeting with Reuben Jeffery

✓
12/9

0200CPA

I need a meeting with Reuben Jeffery in the next 48 hours to figure out what is going on with people and why we are not getting them out there. I am just going to assign a group of military people out there to fill the slots.

I need to get someone in charge of this who I can rely on who will get it done. They are short of Arabic speakers, and they are short of PAOs—the Department of State has not filled the quotas.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120603-9 (ts computer)

Done

Please respond by

6 Dec 03

U22450 /03

December 9, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Resettlement in North

Please tickle a note for December 15. I want to talk to Jerry Bremer about solving the resettlement issue in the north. There simply has to be a policy in place fast, or things could unravel.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120603-6 (ts computer)

.....
Please respond by _____

*OB
1/2/04*

0200CPA

9 Dec 03

U22451 /03

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

December 9, 2003

004

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Boeing Deal

Please look into that report in the *New York Times* that someone may have tried to get the deal signed after I said I wanted it looked at.

See me fast.

Thanks.

Attach.

Early Bird title page, Jehl, Douglas, "Air Force Pursued Boeing Deal Despite Concerns of Rumsfeld", *NYT*, December 6, 2003.

DHR:dh
120603-4 (to computer)

.....
Please respond by _____

*OB
12/15*

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

U22452 /03

9 Dec 03

CURRENT NEWS

EARLY BIRD

December 6, 2003

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Story numbers indicate order of appearance only.

TOP STORIES

1. **US Defense Secretary Visits N. Iraq To Meet Troops**
(New York Times on the Web)....Reuters
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld began a first-hand appraisal of political and military conditions in Iraq on Saturday, swooping into the northern city of Kirkuk to meet troops and local leaders. Rumsfeld arrived in rainy conditions aboard a U.S. Air Force C-17 cargo plane that flew from Tbilisi, Georgia. He was met at the airport by Major General Ray Odierno, commander of the U.S. 4th Infantry Division.
2. **Air Force Pursued Boeing Deal Despite Concerns Of Rumsfeld**
(New York Times)....Douglas Jehl
Even after Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld expressed concern late last month about improprieties in a proposed \$20 billion contract with the Boeing Company, the Air Force's top acquisitions official, Marvin R. Sambur, distributed messages urging Pentagon officials to sign the deal "A.S.A.P.," according to internal Pentagon e-mail messages.
3. **Army Will Face Dip In Readiness**
(Washington Post)....Vernon Loeb
40 percent of the active-duty force -- will not be fully combat-ready for up to six months next year, leaving the nation with relatively few ready troops in the event of a major conflict in North Korea or elsewhere, a senior Army official said yesterday.
4. **Iraqi Genocide Tribunal Forming**
(Philadelphia Inquirer)....Niko Price, Associated Press
Saddam Hussein and hundreds of his aides could go on trial for crimes against humanity and genocide before an Iraqi-led tribunal that will be established in the coming days, Iraqi and U.S. officials said yesterday.
5. **Bush Taps Baker For Iraq Task**
(Los Angeles Times)....Maura Reynolds
President Bush on Friday called in his family's trusted troubleshooter, former Secretary of State James A. Baker III, to take on the thorny job of persuading other countries to forgive or restructure Iraq's immense debt.
6. **16 Countries To Aid Iraq Reconstruction**
(Washington Times)....Associated Press
Governments from 16 countries, including the United States, Japan and some European nations, agreed yesterday to insure payment of up to \$2.4 billion worth of exports to Iraq as part of efforts to rebuild the country and jump-start its economy, officials said.

RUMSFELD TRIP

7. **Rumsfeld Visits Iraqi Northern Oil Fields**
(New York Times on the Web)....Associated Press

11-L-0559/OSD/20588

December 6, 2003

370

SUBJECT: Redeployment Process

I need to get somebody in charge of the force redeployment process to develop a complete list.

I promised I would never go through this again like we did on the deployments going over and the TPFDD, but we are doing it again. It is just as bad. The system still doesn't work. It is still Service-centric, instead of being run through Joint Forces Command. I am concerned about it.

For example, we are going to change out all these human intelligence teams at exactly the same time. It is a disaster waiting to happen.

Every time a corporate headquarters moves, they have a lousy quarter or two. We cannot afford it.

OB
12/16

DHR:dh
120603-3 (ts computer)

6 Dec 03

U22453 /03

December 5, 2003

IRAP

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Hussein's Intentions

Please take a look at this article in the *Wall Street Journal*. Do we know anything more about the points in this article?

Thanks.

Attach.

Kempe, Frederick and Cloud, David S. "Baghdad Records Show Hussein Sought Missiles, Other Aid Abroad," *Wall Street Journal* (date unknown)

DHK:dh
120503-18 (ts computer)

.....
Please respond by 1/9/04

OB
12/12

5 Dec 03

U22454 /03

Hussein's Links Abroad

Continued From First Page

about which companies, individuals and countries may be implicated in the files.

From records and interrogations the U.S. has learned that two teams of Yugoslav missile experts went to Iraq in 2001 to develop plans for extending the 190-mile range of Iraq's scuds by strapping several rocket motors together, the senior official said. The Yugoslav experts and experts from another country worked in Iraq on the project well into 2003, said the official, who wouldn't identify the second country. The revelation, if true, is significant because U.N. sanctions barred Iraq from possessing missiles with ranges of more than 93 miles. Coalition forces haven't reported finding any scuds in Iraq. Yugoslavia earlier this year was renamed the Federation of Serbia and Montenegro.

Investigators also have uncovered evidence that Mr. Hussein's relationship with North Korea was deeper than previously thought. The official said "written evidence of a contractual negotiation" shows that North Korea offered to sell Baghdad Nodong missiles with a 1,300-mile range. Versions of the same missile based on North Korean technology appeared in Iran and Pakistan in 1998 and 1999, a European official said.

Iraqi government documents showed that Baghdad made a down payment to North Korea in late 2002 of \$10 million for delivery of a Nodong missile, the senior U.S. official said. But North Korean officials replied that they couldn't deliver the weapon because they were being watched too closely by the Bush administration. The Iraqi side asked for its money back, though there are apparently no documents to confirm they got it, the official said.

The disclosures about Iraq's missile programs come after David Kay, who heads coalition efforts to locate unconventional weapons inside Iraq, issued an interim report last month that was seen in Congress as casting doubt on the Bush administration's main rationale for the war. The report found that Iraq may have abandoned production of chemical weapons after 1991 and biological agents after 1996. There was no evidence that nuclear-weapons activity had been conducted after 1998.

Since then, Bush administration officials have tried to deflect criticism over the failure to find such weapons by pointing to evidence that Iraq had an active missile-development program. "The David Kay report already makes clear that Saddam Hussein was in flagrant violation" of U.N. missile restrictions, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said in a radio interview released Friday. "We can argue about how much he had and whether he moved his program, and whether he was waiting to rebuild it, but he was hiding something pretty important."

The U.S. official familiar with the Iraqi files said the documents and other evidence suggest that Mr. Hussein's strategy may have been to develop delivery systems first—a lengthy process—and then turn to developing chemical weapons. Mr. Kay's report said Mr. Hussein asked underlings involved in previous chemical-weapons programs how long it would take to develop new weapons. They told him they could produce mustard gas within two to three months and sarin within six months, the report said.

In interviews with American interrogators, Iraqi military commanders have said they believed strongly that their army had chemical weapons and that it would deploy them once U.S. troops reached the outskirts of Baghdad, the senior official said. Yet the Americans have been unable to find any commander who was in possession of chemical weapons stockpiles, the official said. Instead, each commander has pointed to another reputed to have had them.

Former Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz has told investigators separately that Mr. Hussein wasn't ready for the American attack and so didn't respond aggressively because he was "repeatedly told" by French and Russian officials that it would never happen, the official said. Mr. Aziz has been unreliable in the past, but the U.S. official said he is cooperating now that the U.S. has removed his family from Iraq.

Even if America started an air war, Mr. Aziz said, the French and Russians assured Iraq that the U.N. Security Council would intervene to stop a ground invasion. Asked about the matter, the French and Russian foreign ministries declined to comment. "Saddam's high command couldn't execute the defense plan because Saddam didn't believe it once the invasion had started," the official said, summarizing Mr. Aziz's account.

Federal prosecutors in July charged Khaled Abdel-Latif Dumaisi, a 61-year-old, Iraqi-born Chicago man, with being an unregistered Iraqi government agent. They alleged that he gathered information on Iraqi exiles in the U.S. for the Iraqi intelligence service. The case grew out of a dossier on Mr. Dumaisi in Iraqi intelligence service files, prosecutors said. Mr. Dumaisi has pleaded not guilty.

The files also include evidence that Iraq was behind several small-scale terrorist attacks against the U.S. and other countries, officials said. In one case, the 1993 bombing of a U.S. facility in Asia now has been linked to Iraq; orders for the operation were found in the files, a law-enforcement official said. The attack caused no casualties, the official said, refusing to disclose its exact location.

Baghdad Records Show Hussein Sought Missiles, Other Aid Abroad

U.S. investigators have unearthed Iraqi records of Saddam Hussein's agents world-wide, a treasure trove of intelligence that U.S. officials expect will help to identify foreigners paid to serve the former dictator's interests and to unravel international networks for procuring missiles and other banned weapons.

A senior U.S. official familiar with the records said the documents—along with interrogations of former regime officials—

By Frederick Kempe in Baghdad, Iraq, and David S. Cloud in Washington

still haven't turned up evidence that Iraq was actively producing chemical and biological weapons or had restarted its nuclear program, as Bush officials asserted prior to the war. But the documents, as described by the U.S. official, could lend credence to more recent assertions by the Bush administration that Mr. Hussein was seeking to develop long-range missiles as a preliminary step to renewing a program of chemical and biological weapons.

U.S. officials say archives of Iraq's domestic security and foreign intelligence services, the broad reach of which hadn't previously been disclosed, could provide a revealing look at Mr. Hussein's efforts in the past decade to conduct intelligence activities and influence other countries' political stances toward Iraq. Other Iraqi government documents show for the first time Baghdad's efforts to purchase from North Korea missiles with longer ranges than allowed by United Nations sanctions. Previously, the Bush ad-

ministration had disclosed that Iraq was seeking missile technology from North Korea, not actual missile purchases.

Information contained in the files could prove troublesome for individuals, companies and countries that may be implicated in aiding Mr. Hussein's regime. U.S. officials say the documents could help establish tribunals in Iraq for people involved in crimes against the Iraqi people. Already, revelations from the files have prompted the Federal Bureau of Investigation to open new espionage and criminal probes in the U.S.

"We have the equivalent of the Stasi archives," said the senior U.S. official, referring to the East German state security service files recovered after that Communist regime's collapse. Those archives, which implicated both domestic and foreign informants and agents, sparked a series of political scandals and some legal prosecutions.

The Iraqi documents are among 25 tons of papers seized at the abandoned headquarters of the country's intelligence services days after the fall of Baghdad in April, according to U.S. officials. The records include a "complete listing of the amount of money paid for political influence" to foreigners, including politicians, business people and others, said the U.S. official familiar with the files. Mr. Hussein's overseas intelligence apparatus kept track of Iraqi exiles opposed to his regime, and Baghdad also kept lists of informants paid for their help in that regard.

"We're busy vetting" all lists of people paid by Iraq, the official said. The official declined to disclose more details.

Please Turn to Page A4, Column 5

December 5⁸, 2003

NATO 3a2

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: NATO Response Force

I have asked several times to know what is going on with the NATO Response Force—what we are contributing and what the shortfalls still are for each of the rotations.

I have indicated my willingness to up the ante by the US.

I still don't feel I have any good idea of it. I have received some papers on it, but I cannot understand them. I need to know what they are looking for, what we could supply, and how we would stand relative to other countries, including France.

It may be that I will have to have a meeting, because people aren't going to be able to figure out how to present the material in a sensible way unless I walk them through it step-by-step.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120503-13 (ts computer)

.....

Please respond by 1/16/04

OB
1/2/04

8 Dec 03

U22455 /03

December 5, 2003

000.7

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Al Hunt Op-ed

1/29
Carl R. Hyndman

Did the response get printed?

D. Di Rita
LARRY DI RITA
42

This piece by Al Hunt in the *Wall Street Journal* is disgraceful.

We need to get a point-by-point rebuttal to it and get it in the *Wall Street Journal*.
It is inexcusable, and it is making history wrong.

Please get it done and get back to me fast.

Thanks.

Attach.
Hunt, Albert R. "What Might Have Been," *Wall Street Journal*, December 4, 2003.

DHR:dh
120503-7 (is computer)

.....
Please respond by 12/12/03

5 Dec 03

U22456 /03

defence contractors and technology companies as possible participants in the fund, according to people familiar with its operations.

Boeing's participation has come to light as Hollinger International, the publishing group where Mr Perle and Mr Kissinger are board members, is reviewing its Dollars 2.5m investment in Trireme for any improprieties.

Mr Perle was the subject of an ethics probe this year for advising Global Crossing, a bankrupt telecoms company whose proposed restructuring met Pentagon opposition.

Mr Perle resigned as Defence Policy Board chairman in March although he was cleared last month of any ethical misconduct in that case.

Washington Post
December 4, 2003
Pg. 22

41. Makers Of Body Armor Boost Production To Combat Shortage

By Renae Merle, Washington
Post Staff Writer

The Army's rush to overcome shortages of body armor and armored Humvees in Iraq is sparking a mini-boom for manufacturers of the equipment.

Body-armor manufacturers are increasing output to 25,000 vests a month from 3,300. An Ohio-based subsidiary of Armor Holdings Inc. -- the military's only maker of armored Humvees -- is ramping up to 24-hour production in an effort to turn out 220 vehicles a month within six months. It currently produces 80 a month.

The Army initially provided body armor only to infantry and combat troops. Now it wants to outfit everyone on the ground in Iraq.

In the past few months, Ceradyne Inc. of Costa Mesa, Calif., has spent \$2 million to increase production of the ceramic plates used in vests to

14,000 a month from 9,000. Each vest contains at least two plates. The company has hired 120 workers and bought 16 new furnaces to fire the plates, said David P. Reed, vice president and general manager. The price of Ceradyne's common stock has soared 145 percent since June 2.

"We're investing for the long run," Reed said. "Body armor is here to stay for the military."

The Army has shifted hundreds of armored Humvees into Iraq and Afghanistan from other areas and has about 1,500 in those two countries. It aims to have 3,500 of the \$150,000 armored vehicles there, though the time frame is uncertain, according to Army spokesmen.

"The evidence to date suggests that U.S. forces are not properly trained or equipped for guerrilla warfare on a long-term basis," said Loren B. Thompson, a defense industry analyst with the Lexington Institute. "That's illustrated not only by an absence of body armor and hardened vehicles but a shortage of people who can speak the local language."

Armor Holdings, which also provides armor for nonmilitary vehicles, has moved its commercial operations out of its main plant so all 140,000 square feet can be dedicated to armored Humvees. The company is bringing on 150 workers, a hiring drive that will expand its staff by nearly 50 percent. Armor hasn't operated at this pace since the military significantly accelerated orders during the war in the Balkans, said Robert F. Meerey, president of the company's aerospace and defense group.

The company will probably produce 850 armored Humvees this year, an increase of 227 from last year, said Peter J. Barry, an analyst with investment bank Bear, Stearns & Co. Production is expected to grow to 2,265 in 2004. "It doesn't hurt that the pricing competition is negligible,"

Barry said.

Armor's common stock price is up about 82 percent since the beginning of June.

The military is also moving to add armor to traditional Humvees by tacking on lightweight interior insulation panels. The number of inquiries about the technology "has increased quite substantially" in recent months, said Brad Squires, chief technology officer of US Global Nanospace Inc., a Nevada company that developed the panels.

Wall Street Journal
December 4, 2003
Politics and People
**42. What Might Have
Been**

By Albert R. Hunt

As we mourn November's record 104 coalition casualties in Iraq, consider whether things might have been better if the "post-liberation" Pentagon planners had listened to Eric Shinseki.

Gen. Shinseki, the Army chief of staff, told inquiring congressmen in February the coalition would need as many forces in the period after Saddam was ousted -- "something on the order of several hundred thousand" -- as were required during the actual war phase.

For this alleged apostasy -- the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz party line then was we would be greeted as liberators and reconstruction would be relatively safe -- the 38-year Army veteran was savaged. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld huffed that it was illogical to think we would need as many forces after the conflict as it took to win the war. Paul Wolfowitz labeled Gen. Shinseki's estimates "wildly off the mark" and expressed strong irritation to then-secretary of the Army, Thomas White.

Privately, they depicted the Army chief of staff as a career hack who was mad because he was going to be

replaced and as someone who, as Mr. Rumsfeld once suggested in haranguing him at a meeting, just didn't get it. Gen. Shinseki, it turns out did get it; sadly, he was prescient. Defense chiefs Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were the ones that didn't get it. The consequences have been exceedingly costly in dollars and lives.

The Shinseki saga is more than simply a what might have been. It's a story of the extraordinary arrogance of the top men who run the Pentagon, and the war, who continue to insist they've been right all along.

"Rie Shinseki was really given shabby treatment," says Mr. White, who also clashed with the Rumsfeld crowd.

Gen. Shinseki, a Japanese-American, was a West Point graduate and later got a master's in English literature from Duke. He was seriously wounded in Vietnam, came back to fight and then his right foot was blown off by a grenade. Still, he rose to a four star general in the physically macho U.S. Army.

He excelled every step of the way -- "a soldier's soldier" one top military expert calls him -- and ran the Army's peace-keeping mission in Bosnia. In 1999 he was named Army chief of staff, where he clashed with Wesley Clark, then NATO commander, over tactics in the Kosovo war. Gen. Shinseki was considered a reformer who wanted to change the Army.

Inexplicably, he was viewed suspiciously by the new administration in 2001. This was exacerbated when, before Sept. 11, the Rumsfeld crowd, infatuated with a lighter, faster, higher-tech, space-oriented military, seriously considered cutting two divisions out of the Army, and several National Guard units. This was passionately opposed by Gen. Shinseki who still believes "our army is smaller than the mission it's being asked to do." Thankfully, he prevailed -- imagine the

shape of today's over-stretched Army if he hadn't -- but became persona non grata.

A few months later, though he had more than a year to serve, it was leaked that he would be dumped. No one told him -- and Mr. White says there's no question who was behind the leak: Secretary Rumsfeld.

As the administration prepared for the Iraq war, Gen. Shinseki, even though the Army would carry the brunt of any invasion and occupation and his Bosnia experience was instructive, was shut out, never consulted.

In February, he was testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee and responded to a question on what force levels might be required in the occupation. He said "several" hundred thousand, making it clear he was talking about something comparable to the current levels in the region, which were then more than 200,000 troops, including, as he did, coalition as well as U.S. forces in the region.

General Shinseki remembers, not expecting the question, he quickly calculated what was necessary in Bosnia and multiplied that by four or five times to reflect the Iraqi population and the internal conflicts. He made one other assumption: "These things are never easier than you think."

But top administration planners, who basically thought the Iraqi campaign would be a cakewalk, went ballistic. In blasting Gen. Shinseki, Mr. Wolfowitz argued there was no history of ethnic strife in Iraq, that other countries, even those that opposed the war, would rush in to assist and that reconstruction would be a relatively easy venture, financed largely by Iraqi oil revenues.

Even after subsequent events proved Gen. Shinseki right, Messrs. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz continued to belittle him. Recently, in television interviews, they've seized on

the "several" hundred thousand observation to argue the general was calling for an American force of 300,000 or more. They know, or if they looked at the record they would know, that's not what he said.

Then they might have to explain why they were so ill-prepared for the early looting, the anti-Americanism and the casualties. It's clear that Pentagon planners never engaged in a serious "troops to task analysis," as Gen. Shinseki advocated. As a voluminous report by the Army's Third Infantry Division recently revealed there was virtually no preparation for what actually occurred post-liberation. Gen. Shinseki, the State Department's Future of Iraq project or anyone who didn't hew to the party line was ignored.

Today, Gen. Shinseki's views that "we never broke the will of the enemy to resist," and that "you cannot have much reconstruction without security," are indisputable. Surely, the situation would have been less grave with a larger post invasion force level.

Gen. Shinseki, a patriot who has long argued "the last thing our country needs are flag officers who are political," has never criticized his critics, despite the continued sniping at him: "I only wish I could have been more convincing to that group in the Pentagon." Yet he remains hopeful: "Iraq will get turned around. It will take longer and will be a lot more painful."

New York Times
December 4, 2003

43. God And Man In Baghdad

By Thomas L. Friedman

Are you sitting down?

We've encountered many surprises since we invaded Iraq, but now that the political process is under way the biggest surprise may be just around the corner, and it's this: The first post-Saddam

democratic government that the U.S. gives birth to in Iraq may be called the Islamic Republic of Iraq -- and that's not necessarily a bad thing. I told you to sit down.

The challenge of reforming any of the 22 nondemocratic Arab states comes down to a very simple question: How do you get from here to there -- how do you go from an authoritarian monarchy or a military regime to a more representative government -- without ending up with a Khomeini-like theocracy à la Iran or a civil war à la Algeria?

Virtually all of these Arab states suffer from the same problem: because of decades of political repression, one-man rule and economic stagnation, there is no viable middle class and no legitimate, independent political parties and institutions to fill the void once the authoritarian leadership is removed. Iraq exhibits this problem in spades.

As a result, in the Sunni and Shiite areas of Iraq, the primary sources of legitimacy, and political expression, are tribal and religious. This dependence upon, and respect for, religious authority will be reflected in the first post-Saddam government -- whether it comes about by indirect or direct elections. Because Shiites make up 60 percent of Iraq, and because the only current legitimate Shiite leaders are religious figures, their views and aspirations will have to be taken into account.

There is, however, good reason to believe that Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the most revered Shiite cleric in Iraq and the only one who can claim to speak for Iraqi Shiites as a whole, does not aspire to be a Khomeini. Many Iraqi Shiite clerics have lived in Iran and avowedly do not want to follow its authoritarian path. Moreover, because Shiites are a majority in Iraq, they are the ones with the greatest stake in keeping Iraq a unified state.

Given their numbers, any democratic Iraq is one where Shiites, be they liberals or conservatives, will have great influence. But to keep Iraq unified the Shiites will have to respect the rights and aspirations of Iraq's Kurds and Sunnis, as well as other minorities.

What is unfolding in Iraq today -- a tug of war between Ayatollah Sistani and the Governing Council over how an interim government should be elected -- is something inevitable, essential and inescapably messy.

"What we are witnessing," explains Yitzhak Nakash, the Brandeis University professor who is the author of "The Shi'is of Iraq," is a very healthy bargaining session over what will be the relationship between religion and politics in Iraq and over the process of choosing legitimate national and communal leaders. It is very important that the Americans show respect for the views of Sistani -- whose tacit support for the U.S. presence in Iraq has been enormously important -- and let Sistani and the other Iraqi political forces thrash this out on their own."

Ayatollah Sistani is "not a Khomeini," adds Mr. Nakash, and he does not envisage an Iraq ruled directly by clerics. The ayatollah comes from the quietist school of Shiite clerics, who have traditionally attempted to shield themselves from politics. In demanding elections, he's obviously looking out for Shiite interests, but he's also insisting that the new Iraqi government be as legitimate and stable as possible.

"If there is going to be a stable government in Iraq, it has to come about after some genuine public debate and after some consensus is reached regarding the relationship between religion and state, and between the clerics and the politicians," Mr. Nakash said. "Otherwise, no Iraqi government will last once the

December 5, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Denmark and GTMO Detainee

383.6

I met with the Danish MoD. He said that if we turned over the Danish GTMO detainee to them, they would not be able to keep him incarcerated but would be able to keep an eye on him. He said it would be helpful to their prime minister if we could do that. Apparently the human rights people ask him questions about it every week.

Do we have a process where we can help develop argumentation for these folks, so they can answer back? My impression is we are not giving them any help and we are not acting proactively.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120503-6 (is computer)

.....

Please respond by 12/29/03

OB
12/12

U22457 /03

5 Dec 03

December 5, 2003

33350

TO: Marc Thiessen

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DT*

SUBJECT: POTUS Memo/Central Asia

One of the items for the end of trip memo to the President is the fact that this part of the world, Central Asia, is feeling pressure from the Russians. The Russians clearly have increased pressure on all of these countries, and they feel it. The result is that they wonder how reliable the US is as a partner in helping them preserve their territorial integrity and sovereignty. It is important that we pay attention to these countries, which is the reason I made these stops.

It also means that as a government we are going to have to rearrange our priorities and see that we rebalance our attention and financial support, as well as physical presence, to reflect the importance of these countries relative to some other countries in the world where we have historically been heavier in our presence.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120503-5 (ts computer)

.....

Please respond by _____

OB
12/9

5 Dec 03

U22458 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20598

f

December 8, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DIA and Security Assistance Cooperation

OAO DIA

Please make sure you follow up on that idea of going to DIA and finding out the number and ranks of the people in each of the countries.

Please see to what extent they have changed since 9/11 and whether or not they fit with the security assistance cooperation approach we have refashioned. My impression is they haven't done a lick.

Let's get it fixed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120503-4 (ts computer)

.....
Please respond by _____

8 Dec 03

U22459 /03

December ⁸/₄, 2003

IRELAND

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Collins Film on Irish Insurrection

Newt tells me there is a film by Michael Collins, I believe, on the topic of the 1916 Irish war against the British. I would like to have you get that film for me so I can see it. It is about two hours long.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120403-29 (ts computer)

.....
Please respond by 12/17/03 *OB*
12/9

8DEC03

U22460 /03

December 4, 2003

EUROPE

TO: LTG John Craddock
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: POTUS Memo Follow-Up

Would one of you please talk to Paul Wolfowitz or Doug Feith and see if there was any action resulting from my memo to the President on ESDP.

Since the Europeans want to solve that in the next eight days, and we are not going to get back until Sunday and won't be in the office until Monday, there is not much time left after that. I would be curious to know if the NSC has keyed up the President or the Vice President to do anything about it.

I would also be curious to know what happened on the POTUS phone call to Blair that was scheduled on Thursday or Friday, I believe.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120403-28 (ts computer)

OB

12/9

Please respond by 12/6/03

4 DEC. 03

U22461 /03

Snowflake

December 4, 2003

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Disseminating Your Speech

350.001

I think we ought to think about sending your remarks around to the key countries in the world that we deal with on this subject.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120403-13 (13 computer)

.....
Please respond by _____

*OR
12/12*

U22462 /03

4 Dec 03

December 4, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Disseminate Feith's Speech

350.001

Let's possibly send Feith's speech on global presence out to Members of the House and Senate and have somebody up there put it in the Congressional Record. Also, let's get it out to the press corps.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120403-12 (ts computer)

.....
Please respond by 12/12/23 


4 Dec 03

U22463 /03

BCC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pete Pace

December 17, 2003

334NSC

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: PC Meetings

Condi—

We seem to have fallen into a practice where your staff periodically asks that one of the combatant commanders or subcommanders participate in a PC.

Dick Myers, Pete Pace and I have discussed this issue. We are uncomfortable with that practice, given that the statutory military advisors to the NSC are the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Needless to say, when the President would like a combatant commander or subcommander to participate in a National Security Council meeting, we arrange it. However, with respect to PCs, I suggest we go back to the normal practice of having the Chairman or the Vice Chairman represent the uniformed military in PCs.

DHR:dh
121503-21

file
copy

in Dec 03

U22464 /03

December 15, 2003

Colombia

TO: Gen. Pete Pace
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Colombia

If you are comfortable with what General Hill wants to do in Colombia with respect to those bases, then I am comfortable and you can tell him so.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121503-15

.....
Please respond by _____

U22465 /03

15 Dec 03

December 15, 2003

2006

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Award from American GI Forum

This fellow, David Rodriguez, wants to come and present an award to me that was supposed to be given to me at a dinner I did not attend. It will take 20 minutes.

Please set it up for my office, maybe this week if it is convenient for him. Let's get it behind us.

Thanks.

Attach.
Business card

DHR:dh
121503-7

.....
Please respond by _____

AMERICAN GI FORUM OF THE UNITED STATES



David Rodriguez
National Commander

Office: (b)(6)
Home: (b)(6)
Cell: (b)(6) GIForum@pacbell.net

765 Story Road - San Jose, California 95122

Cathy M
Larry Di Rita
12/15

15 Dec 03

U22466 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20606

9:29 AM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: December 13, 2003
SUBJECT:

630

Korea(North)

George Tenet suggested we meet Art Brown on North Korea as I recall, to look at some excursions.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
121303.10

*closed
per
SMA/DSS
1/8*

Please respond by: _____

1/8

17Dec03

U22467 /03

December 11, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: 9/11 Commission

334

I think I ought to consider bringing in the other members of the 9/11 Commission. We have had Hamilton, Lehman, Slade Gordon and Zelicoe come in.

Please get me the rest of their names, and I will think about inviting them in. Certainly we want to have in John Kerry, the new one.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121103-4

.....
Please respond by 1/9/04

U22468 /03

11 Dec 03

December 11, 2003

322

TO: Powell Moore
Gen. Pete Schoomaker
Les Brownlee
David Chu

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Briefing on Readiness

It seems to me that we need to get Congressman Duncan Hunter and Senator John Cornyn, respectively of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, briefed on the readiness issue.

They both are focused on that subject, and I think it would be important to get them briefed before the cow gets out of the barn.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121103-5

.....
Please respond by 1/9/04

U22469 /03

11 Dec 03

Handwritten initials/signature at top of page.

December 10, 2003

004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Boeing

You are going to have to get back to me with the different models we might want to use on that Boeing issue.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121003-9

.....
Please respond by 12/17/03

Handwritten checkmark and date 12/16

*SecDef —
Scheduled for Thursday
morning, 18 Dec*

12/15

10 Dec 03

U22470 /03

December 10, 2003

350.001WH

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: POTUS Remarks

I gave this note to Andy Card, and he wrote this note on the bottom. He said he thought it was all fixed.

Please talk to Brett Kavanaugh. Tell him what we are getting and what we are not getting, and see if we can figure out what the problem is.

Thanks.

Attach.

11/24/03 SecDef memo to Card re: Presidential Visit to Fort Carson [112403.22]

DHR:dh
121003-6

.....
Please respond by 12/30/03

DB
12/15

10 Dec 03

U22471 /03

7

TO: Honorable Andy Card

CC: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
Mike Gerson

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: November 24, 2003

SUBJECT: Presidential Visit to Ft. Carson

We did not see anything that the President was planning to say at Ft. Carson.

The system seems to be broken.

Please fix it so we can be helpful.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112403.22

but

Brett Kavanaugh (Staff Secretary) wrote a responsive memo to you on this and the DOD authorization signy a week or so ago. I think the process has been fixed. — Did you see the memo?

OB
12/15

W013710/03

8:27 AM

TO: LTG Craddock
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: December 9, 2003
SUBJECT: **Statistics**

*Exec Sec
For Action*

000.5

Please find out how many homicides, murders, assassinations took place in Washington, DC in the year 2002, and so far this year in 2003. Find the same information for New York, Detroit and Chicago. I also would like the populations of each.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
120903.13

Please respond by: _____

12/12

*OB
12/15*

9 Dec 03

U22472 /03

9:39 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: December 9, 2003

SUBJECT:

IRAQ

I was told by congressmen that a widow of one of the people killed in Iraq is furious with us because she received a letter from me that had been "stamped" and used the word, "assets."

I want to see everything that's been signed by SOM. I want to know if we even have a stamp. I want to see all the model letters we are using and I want to edit them.

From now on I want to personally sign any letter that goes to the parents or spouse of someone killed.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
120903.10

Please respond by:

12/12

OB

12/15

9 Dec 03

U22473 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20614

626

7:37 AM

TO: Gen. Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: December 9, 2003

SUBJECT:

What happened to your project on trying to get retirees to come back and serve in Washington, Iraq or Afghanistan? Let me know.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
120903.06

Please respond by: _____

12/5

*Closed
per
SMA/DSS
1/8/04*

*cc: David Chu
Wolfowitz*

IRAO

9 Dec 03

U22474 /03

December 22, 2003

334

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: 9/11 Commission

You ought to take a look at this article on the 9/11 Commission.

Thanks.

Attach.

O'Meara, Kelly Patricia. "A Historical Whitewash?" *Insight*, December 9-22, 2003.

DHR:dh
122203-12

.....
Please respond by _____

22 Dec 03

U22475 /03

A Historical Whitewash?



The '9/11 Commission' runs into resistance from official Washington as it investigates the attacks on New York City and the Pentagon.

By KELLY PATRICIA O'MEARA

Receiving a subpoena in Washington is becoming as common as "credible but non-specific" terrorist threats, and few are more likely to be issuing them than the bipartisan 10-member commission set up by Congress to investigate the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. The problem for the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission) is that Nov. 27 marks its first anniversary and time is running out before the May deadline for filing its report. The 9/11 Commission was allotted 18 months and \$14 million to investigate the circumstances that produced the Sept. 11 attacks, but commission insiders say the federal agencies with the most information haven't been cooperating.

The commission is tasked with "providing an authoritative account of the attacks of September 11, 2001, and [making] recommendations as to how to prevent such attacks in the future."

More specifically, the commission is mandated to investigate "facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks," including those relating to intelligence and law-enforcement agencies, diplomacy, immigration, nonimmigrant visas and border control, the flow of assets to terrorist organizations, commercial aviation, the role of congressional oversight and resource allocation and other areas determined relevant by the commission.

A Pentagon release says Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld has "directed that the Department [of Defense] be responsive to help ensure the commission can meet its deadlines" — that is, cooperate and do so in a timely fashion.

But across the Potomac River from the Pentagon the White House had been refusing to turn over highly classified presidential daily briefings (PDBs) seen only by the president — specifically an Aug. 6 briefing President George W. received from CIA Director George

Tenet titled "Bin Laden Determined to Strike the United States." Finally, in a last-minute compromise reached by the White House and the 9/11 commissioners, the White House has agreed to provide "restricted access" to years of PDBs. In line with what many family members of the victims believe to be the White House's already-excessive intrusions into the commission's mission, the agreement will allow a few of the commissioners to review portions of the daily briefings. They will only be allowed to take notes, which then must be vetted by the White House before being shared with the remaining commissioners or made part of the commission's report. But the content of the PDBs will continue to be redacted.

Like the secretary of defense, the White House has been reassuring, saying it "believed it was being fully cooperative with the commission" and that "it hoped to meet all of the panel's demands for documents."

Kristen Breitweiser, who on Sept. 11 lost her husband Ronald in the collapse of the second World Trade Center tower and was instrumental in getting Congress to set up the 9/11 Commission, tells *INSIGHT* that the vagueness of the official statements are upsetting. "I wrote a letter to the *New York Times* last week because I didn't like the language of the White House spokeswoman. She said, 'We think we're cooperating.' There is a difference between thinking and know-

ing, and I think at this point in the game they can't 'think' they're cooperating, they have to 'know' they're cooperating. It was upsetting, and reminiscent of [National Security Adviser] Condoleezza Rice's comment a few days after the attack when she said that the White House 'didn't think they [terrorists] could use planes as missiles.'"

Breitweiser is especially concerned about the many press reports, supported by information gleaned from previous investigations of the events of Sept. 11, that cite nearly a dozen countries as having passed information on to Washington about an impending attack on the United States [see time line at the bottom of pp. 20-21].

Terrorism intelligence that reportedly was forwarded to the United States prior to the Sept. 11 attacks came from many countries friendly to the United States, including Egypt, Morocco, Argentina, Germany and Jordan (and even from the not-so-friendly Taliban in Afghanistan). Given the long list of prior "general" warnings, Breitweiser thinks it was disingenuous for the president's national-security adviser to express surprise that planes could be used in a terror attack on the United States.

"One of the questions I raise," explains Breitweiser, "and why I think the PDBs need to be released, goes to the vital flow of information. Why didn't that foreign-intelligence information about planes being used as weapons get into the hands of the national-security advisers; why didn't it get to the president? We need to find out where the breakdown occurred. The record is replete with information about planes being used [for planned terror attacks], so how could the national-security adviser come out days after the attack and say the [White House] didn't think planes could be used as missiles?"

"You know," explains Breitweiser, "it is very upsetting that the 9/11 Commission had to subpoena the Federal Aviation Administration [FAA]. According to news reports, there are 150,000 documents that were left out of what the FAA sent to the commission. Those documents went toward the time line of when the FAA notified the North American Aerospace Defense Command [NORAD], when the fighter jets were scrambled and the communications between air-traffic control and the pilots. These are threshold issues that go to the heart of the matter. How did the FAA overlook 150,000 documents pertaining to these issues? It is more than mildly upsetting that they would leave out these documents."

Breitweiser continues, "Look, it's been more than three years since my husband



ROBERT L. WOOD/UNANSWERED



CHRIS COLEMAN/UP

was murdered. I watched it happen on television and I still don't know why he's dead. I don't know if the FBI was following the hijackers, I don't know what time the fighter jets were scrambled and I don't know why the Port Authority [of New York and New Jersey] didn't tell my husband to leave tower two. There are a lot of questions that I have, that the families of the victims have, and when we try to seek answers from the FBI or intelligence committees, we get one of three answers. First they say they can't tell us because it could hinder [suspected 20th hijacker Zacarias] Moussaoui's right to a fair trial, or they say the information is part of the FBI's ongoing investigation or, finally, that it could compromise sources or methods."

Understandably, Breitweiser is more than a little discouraged. She says, "Just about everyone can figure out that there were failures, that there were huge breakdowns in intelligence. Why not

An uphill battle: 9/11 widow Breitweiser, above, and commission member Roemer, left, feel that they are being stonewalled by official Washington.

Some of the Questions

1. Why did the White House claim "no one imagined" that hijacked planes could be used in an attack?

2. Given that in the previous year there were 129 intercept orders, and in 2001 there were 67, why did U.S. air defenses fail to follow standard operating procedures on Sept. 11, 2001?

3. Why did President George W. Bush state on two occasions that, while at Booker Elementary School, he watched on a television as the first tower was hit, though it was not televised until 24 hours later?

4. How is it possible that so many foreign intelligence services had information about a possible terrorist attack on the United States, and claim to have shared it with authorities here, but U.S. intelligence agencies claim ignorance of any such warnings?

5. Why were five separate investigations into suspected al-Qaeda terrorists operating here suspended by the FBI?

6. Why did Maj. Gen. Mahmud Ahmed, chief of the Pakistani intelligence service ISI, wire \$100,000 to hijack leader Mohammed Atta?

7. What was the content of the Aug. 6, 2001, presidential daily briefing relating to Osama bin Laden?


8. What prompted the Pentagon to rehearse the scenario of a passenger plane crashing into the building in the year prior to Sept. 11? And what lessons were learned from that rehearsal?

SOURCE: WWW.UNANSWEREDQUESTIONS.ORG

Dollar Value of Select Investigations

- \$25 million reward for information leading to arrest or proof of death of Saddam Hussein
- \$27 million for information leading to apprehension or conviction of Osama bin Laden
- \$30 million (paid) for tip leading to the whereabouts of Uday and Qusay Hussein
- \$40 million to investigate the explosion of NASA's Space Shuttle Columbia
- \$50 million to investigate the Clintons' failed Whitewater real-estate deal
- \$14 million to investigate the terrorist attacks of 9/11

— KPO



Who dropped the ball?

Clockwise from top, FBI chief Mueller, CIA head Tenet, National Security Adviser Rice, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld — or was it dropped long ago?

cooperate and let America know that you're cooperating by doing everything you can to get the answers? This is about the lives of people, and I don't understand the reluctance to turn over documents. If you've done nothing wrong, what's the big secret? It's very hard to lose a loved one, to watch it happen — to watch a colossal breakdown and still have no explanation and no assurance that everything is being done so it will never happen again."

Obviously aware of the close attention being paid to the efforts of the commission by the family members of the victims, 9/11 commissioner and former congressman Timothy Roemer (D-Ind.) tells *INSIGHT* that on the eve of the commission's first anniversary there have been both successes and frustrations. "Some of these areas include access to the value-added information that would help us to reflect on how our policymakers reacted to the threat of terror-

ism and the extent to which the bureaucracy provided good and timely information. As a member of the House-Senate joint inquiry I said that we needed the PDBs for two reasons. First, it would let us know how the president and other policymakers were informed about an impending tactical or strategic threat of terrorism from al-Qaeda. The other, just as important, is how the organizations, agencies and analysts were getting this important information to the top policymakers. We need to figure out whether from a policy perspective the top people, including former president Bill Clinton and President Bush, were warned and what kind of timely information they had."

Roemer continues, "Certainly you have to investigate if there was prior knowledge in the Clinton and Bush administrations — whether there was a smoking gun. The 9/11 Commission should focus on the policy side and the executive branch: Were there policy failures? Did they develop policies to do something about that threat? Did they work with the other agencies to coordinate and proactively plan together to address the most potent post-Cold War enemy that we could possibly face?"

As Roemer sees it, "There are two fundamentally important questions that are critical for the commission in terms of its credibility. Did we get access to the right documents in order to fulfill our statutory mandate and mission? If we don't get [full and unredacted] access to the PDBs and other policy documents there will forever be questions of the kind that dog and debase some of the other infamous commissions from

If the world was talking, why didn't we listen?

March 2001

The Italian government shared "general" information of possible attacks based on bugs in apartments in Milan.



May 2001

An Iranian in custody in New York City told local police about a plot to attack the World Trade Center.



June 2001

German intelligence alerted the CIA, Britain's MI-6 intelligence service and Israel's Mossad that Middle Eastern terrorists were training for hijackings and targeting American and Israeli interests.



June 2001

Pakistanis were taken into custody June 4 in the Cayman Islands after they were overheard discussing hijacking attacks on New York City; they were questioned and released, and the information was forwarded to U.S. intelligence.



the past. The other issue involves making sure we know from an accountability perspective what the two administrations knew ahead of time and how they reacted. We've had a number of frustrations, and I have been increasingly vocal and aggressive in trying to get this commission to move forward on these issues because we now have more sand in the bottom of the hourglass than in the top. We've reached the end of our rope so to speak on dealing with access questions when we should be dealing with policy questions, recommendations and working toward our report."

In the end, Roemer believes access to all related data is a matter of life or death. "If we don't get the needed documents and necessary access, if we don't get the answers to our questions for accountability, for the American people and for reforms for the future, we'll have to ask for an extension. That may be the worst nightmare for the White House because then our report will come out closer to the election. ... Getting the facts of what happened on 9/11 won't kill us, but not getting the facts certainly might kill us — meaning that getting at the most sensitive information is essential to getting the facts."

Bill Harvey lost his wife of one month, 31-year old Sara Manley, in the collapse of World Trade Center tower one. He tells *INSIGHT* that "there seems to be a consensus that the Aug. 6 PDB was about al-Qaeda and using airplanes as weapons. I don't know this to be true, but I believe it is true. One of the questions that no one has really asked is, 'Why was this the issue of the Aug. 6 PDB?' You know, did someone whisper in the president's ear that this was an issue, or maybe the president said al-Qaeda is a threat and came up with it himself? Maybe we're not giving the president enough credit."

Harvey continues, "Even so, I think the president resisted release of the

Records, Documents Not Made Public

- Recorded audio communications between the four flights, air traffic control and other responsible authorities on Sept. 11, 2001.
- The original passenger manifests of the four hijacked flights.
- Full, uncensored data from any undamaged cockpit voice recorders and flight data recorders (the "black boxes"), as well as all records of phone calls from the four flights.
- Primary and secondary radar records of the four flights.
- Video footage from the airports from which the alleged hijackers boarded their flights.
- Video footage of the Pentagon attack as taken from the Sheraton Hotel across from the Pentagon (impounded on Sept. 11 by the FBI) and from video cameras on the Pentagon grounds.
- The content of the redacted passages from the Congressional Joint Inquiry.

— KPD

PDBs because he genuinely thinks to do so would create a dangerous constitutional precedent. It's one of those things where you can have an honest disagreement. The 9/11 Commission is charged with making a record of what happened on 9/11, but my own interest in getting the PDBs is to see how and whether the intelligence process failed the last two presidents. I think the PDBs will show the systemic problems with the intelligence community and not necessarily those of the Bush administration."

What does Harvey think about the continuing efforts of the 9/11 Commis-

sion? "Well," he says, "I have high hopes, but I've been discouraged by a lot of things. For instance, the lack of urgency on the part of the commission that reaches all the way back into the spring is something we've argued about with them. Now the commissioners see that they're six months away from issuing a report and are becoming frantic. I don't like to be the person who told them so, but I told them. They haven't taken advantage of all the weapons at their disposal to prosecute a vigorous investigation. Yes, they're doing it now, but I wonder if it is too late."


Kyle Hence, cofounder and New York director of 9/11 Citizens Watch, a watchdog group established to monitor the commission, also is concerned about the untimeliness of its recent push to subpoena documents. "Here we are," says Hence, "two-thirds of the way through an 18-month investigation with a commission still waiting on important documents from the DoD [Department of Defense], FAA, CIA and the White House. The commission has taken an overly polite softball approach."

Hence would like to see more aggressive attempts to get answers to questions such as what happened to U.S. air defenses at the time of the attacks. "Our air defense," says a disgruntled Hence, "was a manifest failure on September 11. What is supposed to be the most protected airspace in the world just wasn't defended. Why? Look, warnings came in prior to 9/11 from almost a dozen countries — fairly specific warnings, including information about planes being used and hijackers being trained; even Russian President [Vladimir] Putin said in advance that 25 Arabs were being trained for just such an attack. Who received these warnings, were they shared with the national-

(CONTINUED ON PAGE 38)

July 2001

Indian intelligence shared general information.




August 2001

Based on its own intelligence, the Israeli government provided "general" information to the United States in the second week of August that an al-Qaeda attack was imminent.



August 2001

French intelligence echoed the "general" information in the final week of August.



Summer of 2001

Russian President Vladimir Putin said he ordered his intelligence agencies to alert the United States that suicide pilots were training for attacks on U.S. targets.



investigation with a commission still waiting on important documents from the DoD [Department of Defense], FAA, CIA and the White House. The commission has taken an overly polite softball approach."

Hence would like to see more-aggressive attempts to get answers to questions such as what happened to U.S. air defenses at the time of the attacks. "Our air defense," says a disgusted Hence, "was a manifest failure on September 11. What is supposed to be the most protected airspace in the world just wasn't defended. Why? Look, warnings came in prior to 9/11 from almost a dozen countries - fairly specific warnings, including information about planes being used and hijackers being trained; even Russian President [Vladimir] Putin said in advance that 25 Arabs were being trained for just such an attack. Who received these warnings, were they shared with the national-security adviser and, if not, why not? The commission should have held hearings until it could determine why U.S. airspace wasn't protected."

Another question, says Hence, "is how the FBI was able to identify all 19 hijackers within a 24- to 48-hour time frame. The suspicion of the families of the victims is that these hijackers already were being tracked. But despite the fact that law enforcement and intelligence say they were caught completely off guard on 9/11 - that no one suspected hijackers would use planes as weapons - the FBI was able to identify every one of these hijackers in a couple of days! And, while speaking about airspace, why is it that members of the bin Laden family and nearly 150 Saudis were allowed to leave the U.S. a couple of days after the attack? Who were these people? Were they interrogated before they were allowed to leave? If they were interrogated, what was gleaned and, if not, why not?"

"Most importantly," says Hence, "we need to know if there was prior warning. I think you can establish a baseline of deception on the part of the White House as far as those warnings are concerned. Initially they said there were no warnings, and then they said 'there were no specific, detailed warnings.' But I think any reasonable person reading the House/Senate Joint Inquiry or press accounts about the warnings that were issued from overseas would say the threats were quite specific, using such words as 'imminent' and 'mass casualties,' etc. Clearly there were warnings."

Aside from the questions, says Hence, "There are concerns about how the commission is conducting interviews. It appears that it has knuckled under, bowed to demands by the administration to have 'minders' sit in on all interviews. The commission said, 'Well, if it's a really important point we'll ask the minders to leave the room.' How conducive is this for someone to get out and really tell the truth when they know a superior is watching over them? I mean how absurd is that? Another problem is that the witnesses are not being asked to testify under oath! Chairman of the 9/11 Commission Thomas Kean [Republican former governor of New Jersey] said something to the effect that 'Well, if they're not under oath, they'll be more forthcoming.' The fact that they're not requiring their witnesses to testify under oath doesn't make any sense."

Hence concludes, "Everyone is polite and everyone is giving them the benefit of the doubt. But the more you look at it, the more it looks like a dog and pony show. Unless the commission forces the issue, and there is a great public outcry to demand that [all] ... cooperate to provide documents that are at issue here, we may be left wondering what led to a commission report that has no weight or standing in the eyes of the public. That would be a tragedy."

*Kelly Patricia O'Meara is an investigative reporter for **Insight**.
email the author*

For more on this story, read the following sidebars:

- ["Some of the Questions"](#)
- ["Dollar Value of Select Investigations"](#)
- ["Records, Documents Not Made Public"](#)

In reply refer to EF-7726 and I# 03/016588

December 3, 2003

TO: Doug Feith
CC: LTG John Craddock

SUBJECT: Format for Talking Points

When I get talking points, they should put the name of the country on the paper.

Second, they should not carry one subject over to a new page, so that the same subject is on two different pages.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120303-17 (is computer)

.....
Please respond by 12/12

Policy ExecSec's Note

December 11, 2003

CDR Nosenzo,

- SecDef's guidance re TPs has been disseminated throughout Policy.
- My office is currently working on web-based templates for all memoranda that will be available to all desk officers.

Colonel C. L. O'Connor, USMC
Director, Policy Executive Secretariat

12-03 10:37 IN

U22476 /03

381

3 Dec 03

12:48 PM

TO: Gen. Pete Pace

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: December 19, 2003

SUBJECT: Sensors

350.09

In the meeting today with John Abizaid he raised the question of not using sensors well. I have no idea what he is talking about. Would you please get in touch with him and find out what he is talking about and let's get that sorted out.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
120103A.10tscom

*OB 1/2
answered
SF 122303-10*

19 Dec 03

U22477 /03

6347
637

12:48 PM

TO: Gen. Pete Pace
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: December 19, 2003
SUBJECT: Sensors

In the meeting today with John Abizaid he raised the question of not using sensors well. I have no idea what he is talking about. Would you please get in touch with him and find out what he is talking about and let's get that sorted out.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
120103A.10tscom

22 DEC 03

For SECDEF:

SIR, I SPOKE WITH JOHN ABIZAID. HE WOULD LIKE RON SEGA TO ORGANIZE A SMALL TEAM TO THINK THROUGH HOW SENSORS MIGHT BE USED IN AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, AND IRAQ TO TRACK TERRORIST MOVEMENT. JOHN APPRECIATES THE WORK DR SEGA IS DOING ON IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES. JOHN THINKS RON SEGA CAN HELP THINK THROUGH POTENTIAL USES FOR SENSORS WE NOW HAVE PLUS THOSE WE MIGHT DEVELOP.

VR *[Signature]*

COPY TO: DEPSECDEF
CJCS
DR. SEGA

C/12/10

December 3, 2003

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Uzbekistan

Is it true that Uzbekistan is getting less than one-third as much assistance per capita as Tajikistan? That doesn't make any sense.

Thanks

DHR:dh
120303-1 (to computer)

✓
12/11

Please respond by 12/12

DEC 9 2003

- Attached are the FY03 and FY04 funding levels for Central Asia and Caucasus countries. Uzbekistan received about 1/3 less funding per capita than Tajikistan in FY03.

- Armenia receives substantial security assistance per capita despite the fact that it has not been a strong supporter of the US in GWOT. Furthermore, Armenia has close relations with Iran and its military. - Mira

03-12-03 10:37 AM

③

U22478 /03

Received and Forwarded 12/10 TEM

UZBEKISTAN

Spec 03

CAUCASUS/CENTRAL ASIA SECURITY ASSISTANCE (PER CAPITA CALCULATION)							
Nation	Population (CIA Factbook)	FY03 FMF, IMET &	FY03 Security Assistance	FY03 Total USG Aid	FY03 Total USG Aid		
		SUPPLEMENTAL	Per Capita		Per Capita		
Uzbekistan*	26M	\$15.7M	\$0.60	\$30.6M	4 \$1.17 ?	\$11.6M	\$0.44
Kazakhstan*	16.7M	\$3.80M	\$0.23	\$51.2M	\$3.06	\$4.2M	\$0.25
Tajikistan	6.8M	\$6.3M	\$0.92	\$16.7M	\$1.32	\$1.1M	\$0.16
Kyrgyzstan*	4.8M	\$10.9M	\$2.27	\$36.3M	\$7.56	\$7.2M	\$1.50
Turkmenistan	4.7M	\$0.9M	\$0.21	\$8.7M	\$1.85 ?	\$1.2M	\$0.25
Georgia*	4.9M	\$8.1M	\$1.65	\$99.9M	\$20.38	\$11.3M	\$2.30
Azerbaijan*	7.8M	\$8.4M	\$1.07	37.9M	\$4.85	\$3.4M	\$0.43
Armenia	3.3M	\$3.6M	\$1.09	\$92.3M	7 \$27.96	\$3.4M	\$1.03
Macedonia	2M	\$11.5M	\$6.25	\$52.9M	\$26.45	\$10.7M	\$5.35
Ukraine*	48	\$4.7M	\$0.09	\$182.9M	\$3.81	\$4.7M	\$0.10

* Priority Security Cooperation Nations

Snowflake

December 5, 2003

092

TO: Doug Feith
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Assistance to Foreign Countries

I think we ought to get the interagency process going to take a look at how the US government as a whole deals with countries, so that it is put on a more rational basis.

As I was going into Azerbaijan, which is a country that has helped us considerably, I found out that they are receiving something like one-third of what Tajikistan is receiving. That doesn't make much sense to me. DoD ought to have a voice in this, and we ought to approach it like we are approaching our security cooperation, worldwide, and see if we can't get a more reasonable worldwide approach.

A second problem is really government-wide, including the Department of Defense. It takes a year or two for anything to happen in the US Government. These foreign countries, particularly the ones that we have relatively new relationships with, cannot believe we are as slow, sluggish and incompetent as we are. When they experience long delays, they assume that something else is going on and that we don't want to help them. There has to be a way to put some energy into the US interagency process and speed it up.

We have to find a way to get the priority countries we have the Security Cooperation Guidance to filter down through not just DoD, but also through the

5 Dec 03

U22479 /03

rest of the USG, unless someone wants to come back and argue with us about what the priorities ought to be, in which case that would be a good process.

If we have to take our force posture into the interagency, why wouldn't the State Department and OMB's judgments about which countries should get what amounts of money also be in the interagency process, with an opportunity to appeal it up to the President, if necessary? It is important to our relationships worldwide.

I would like to see what the US Government as a whole does for various important countries. We ought to look at the totality of it and see how it ends up impacting the key countries. My guess is that nobody really knows the answer to that, except those countries and the ambassador. And that it very likely doesn't fit what we believe ought to be the proper priorities.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120303-22 (to computer)



Please respond by 1/9/04

Snowflake

In reply refer to EF-7724 and
03/016584

December 3, 2003

C 12/10
12/12
293

TO: Mira Ricardel
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Romania's Casualties in Afghanistan

Did I write Pașcu after he lost some people in Kandahar, Afghanistan? I don't even remember that he did lose people there. If I did not, I should have.

What happened? Here is a letter he gave me.

Thanks.

Attach
December 2003 letter from Ioan Mircea Pașcu to SecDef

DHR:dh
120303-21 (to computer)

.....
Please respond by 12/12

Sir,
Response attached.
Original attachment
is last under.
vr / CDE Wbscy
10/12

U22480 /03 ①

3 Dec 03

05-12-03 10:37 IN



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

✓
12/12

EF-7724 and I # 03/016584
USDP *[Signature]* DEC 9 2003

INFORMATION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: MIRA RICARDEL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR EURASIA (PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY) *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Romania's Casualties in Afghanistan

- You asked if you had written to Romanian Defense Minister Pascu after he lost some troops in Afghanistan.
- Romania suffered its first casualties – one dead and one wounded NCO -- in Afghanistan on November 11, 2003.
- A letter of condolence to Minister Pascu was drafted on November 11 and you signed on November 13 (see TAB A). The second soldier died of his wounds in a Kabul hospital on November 14.
- General Myer sent a letter of sympathy covering both deaths to the Romanian Chief of Staff on November 25.

COORDINATION:

Director, European Policy

For: James Hursch *[Signature]* 12/12

DASD, EUR & NATO Policy

For: James Townsend *[Signature]*

Prepared By: MCopson, ISP/EUR

(b)(6)



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

EF-7525

I-03/015588-EP

USDP

*copy provided
11/21/03*

NOV 12 PM 5:09

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY

ACTION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: MIRA RICARDEL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR EURASIA (PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY)

John Row

NOV 12 2003

SUBJECT: Condolences to Romanian Defense Minister Pascu

- Romania suffered its first casualties in Afghanistan on November 11, 2003.
 - Non Commissioned Officer Iosif-Silviu Fogorasi was shot to death and another NCO wounded as their APC convoy was ambushed in the Spin Puldac area of South Afghanistan, close to the border with Pakistan.
- The convoy was returning from a mission. It was part of the Romanian 151st Infantry Battalion "Razboieni."
 - The unnamed wounded NCO was taken by helicopter to the military hospital in Kandahar, and is reportedly in stable condition after surgery.
- Elements of the Romanian Opposition may try to use this incident to gain political advantage, but there is popular bipartisan support for Operation Enduring Freedom.
 - Over 2,000 people were killed during Romania's Revolution, and Romanians understand the importance of the war against terrorism.
 - This incident will not undermine Romania's resolve to continue the mission.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the letter at TAB A.

COORDINATION: TAB B.

Attachments: As stated.

Prepared by: MCopson, ISP/EUR, (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	<i>SP2/11/03</i>
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	<i>11/13</i>

U18739 03
12-11-03 16:42 IN

UNCLASSIFIED

RAAUZYUW RUEWDAS8923 3181955-UUUU--RUECHRS.
ZNR UUUUU ZUI RUEKJCS8923 3181955
R 141942Z NOV 03
FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
TO RUECHRS/DMSCHAIRS TEST AMHS
RUEKNMA/NCCS AMHS PRIMARY//SECDEF-C//
RUEKNMB/NCCS AMHS SECONDARY//SECDEF-C//
ZEN/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP CHAIRS//

BT

UNCLAS

SUBJECT: LETTER OF CONDOLENCE FROM SECDEF RUMSFELD
OTHERORG

UNCLASSIFIED//

1. REQUEST YOU DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO MINISTER PASCU.

QUOTE

QUOTE

THE HONORABLE IOAN MIRCEA PASCU
MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
STRADA IZVOR 13-15
SECTOR 5, BUCHAREST
ROMANIA

DEAR MINISTER PASCU:

PAGE 02 RUEWDAS8923 UNCLAS

(PARA)

I WAS SADDENED TO HEAR OF THE DEATH OF NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER
IOSIF-SILVIU FOGORASI IN AFGHANISTAN. THE LOSS OF A SOLDIER IS
TRAGIC. BUT HE FELL IN THE VITAL CAUSE OF OPERATION ENDURING
FREEDOM.

(PARA)

PLEASE EXTEND MY SYMPATHIES TO HIS FAMILY, FRIENDS AND COLLEAGUES.

//SINCERELY,//

DONALD H. RUMSFELD

END QUOTE

2. HARD COPY TO FOLLOW.

----- PROCESSED BY DECISION AGENT -----

DA MESSAGE ID: 1045560

MTSID: C=US;A=DMS;P=GOV+DMS+NIPR;L=AVTAYZ05-031114194304Z-145448

SOURCE FORMAT: IPM.NOTE.MSP4

SIGNATURE: [SIGNED BY:/C=US/O=U.S. GOVERNMENT/OU=DOD/OU=OSD/

OU=ORGANIZATIONS/L=WASHINGTON DC/

OU=SECDEF(UC) *** VALIDATED ***, ENCRYPTED BY: /

C=US/O=U.S. GOVERNMENT/OU=DOD/OU=OSD/

OU=ORGANIZATIONS/L=WASHINGTON DC/

PAGE 03 RUEWDAS8923 UNCLAS

OU=SECDEF(UC) *** VALIDATED ***]

DMS DTG(ZULU): 2003/11/14 19:42:00Z

----- PROFILED RECIPIENTS -----

ALL MESSAGES (ACTION)

DMS MESSAGES (ACTION)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6) (INFO)

DMSCHAIRS TEST AMHS (ACTION)

NCCS AMHS PRIMARY//SECDEF-C// (ACTION)

NCCS AMHS SECONDARY//SECDEF-C// (ACTION)

----- ORIGINATOR -----

OR ADDRESS: C=US;A=DMS;P=GOV+DMS+NIPR;O=VA2;OU1=TAYZ3;OU2=PTSC;

OU3=SECDEF;

DDA:MSXCX500=C:US,O:U.S. GOVERNMENT,OU:DOD,OU:OSD,OU

:ORGANIZATIONS,L:WASHINGTON DC,OU:SECDEF(UC);

DN: OU1=TAYZ3;OU2=PTSC;OU3=SECDEF;O=VA2;P=GOV+DMS+NIPR;A=DMS;

C=US;

PLA: SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

BT

#8923

NNNN

<[^^^]> 11/14/2003 1502 <[^^^]> CHAIRS

ROMANIA
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE



MINISTER

Bucharest,

December 2001

12/3

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

This is just a short, rather personal note, to thank you for the solidarity shown by your military in Afghanistan, with respect to the loss of our two men in Kandahar.

Together with the letter from President Bush that solidarity, of which I mentioned to the families of those who lost their lives and to the Romanian public, have helped alleviate the consequences of the tragedy and strengthened our resolution to continue along the way we have engaged after 9/11 2001.

Sincerely Yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Ion Mircea Pașcu'.

Ion Mircea Pașcu

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
Washington, DC

③

11-I-0559/OSD/20634

In reply refer to EF-7727 and I#03/016589

December 3, 2003

TO: Mira Ricardel
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Assistance to Ukraine

In the Ukraine meeting, they said they want NATO or UN help in destroying tons of dangerous materials. What is the situation? What can we do to help?

Thanks.

DHR:db
120303-20 (to computer)

.....
Please respond by 12/12

✓ 12/12
C 12/11
Sir,
Response attached.
vr/CDR Noseny
12/11

Ukraine

3 Dec 03

05-12-03 10:37 IN

6

U22481 /03



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

INFO MEMO

EF - 7727 ✓ 1412
C/12/11

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY

USDP FOR Q DEC 11 2003
I-03/016784 RUE
016589 ES

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY (Mira Ricardel--Acting, (b)(6))

DEC 9 2003

SUBJECT: Assistance to Ukraine

- You asked about Ukraine's request for assistance in destroying tons of dangerous materials.
- Ukraine has 7 million Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and 2 million tons of ammunition, much of it dating as far back as World War I.
- In October 2002, Greece offered to take the lead in development of a step-by-step approach to assist Ukraine in the destruction of 133,000 tons of munitions and 1.5 million SALW.
- A NATO Expert Team (NET) concluded a feasibility study in June 2003.
 - The NET proposed establishing a PfP Trust Fund to strengthen existing demilitarization facilities in Eastern Ukraine and establish a new facility in Western Ukraine.
 - The total cost of demilitarization is estimated at 75.5 million Euros over the 12-year life of the project (20 million from trust fund contributions, 55.5 million from Ukraine).
- When NATO sets up the trust fund and starts to solicit donations; Germany, Turkey, and Greece will likely be the first to donate.
- We will explore funding options for a possible U.S. contribution and will get back to you.

A/DASD Eurasia /M 12903

NATO/EUR

Prepared by: Colonel Steve Dalbey, ISP/Eurasia, (b)(6) 9 December 2003

11-L-05510SD/20636

Snowflake

In reply refer to EF-7729 and I#03/016595

Closed
3/10

December 4, 2003

FU1: ASD

Q Afghanistan - Zal

AFGHANISTAN

✓ **TO: Bill Luti**
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

SUBJECT: DoD Backup for Zal

After you have thought through the Marty Hoffmann backup for Zal in DoD, please get back to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120403-22 (31 computer)

DJF

*Handled at SD
12table or
12/16.*

*Hoffman
not
willing to
be
"Jeffery" for
Atty.*

.....
Please respond by 12/30/03

Sir, C 12/11
Response attached.
vr/
CDR Nosung
12/11.

4 Dec 03

U22482 /03

INFO MEMO

11 DEC 2003

EF-7729

I-03/016595

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Luti (b)(6)

SUBJECT: DoD-based Reach-back Capability for Ambassador Khalilzad

- You recently asked about the possibility of Marty Hoffman providing DoD backup for Zal Khalilzad.
- This is an initial response; we will update you as we develop this idea further.
- We talked with Mr. Hoffman, who has agreed to head a DoD-based group based on the Reuben Jeffrey model, and developed a general framework.
 - Like Mr. Jeffrey, he would report to the DepSecDef and SecDef.
 - The group would be set up to provide out-of-government expertise and react swiftly to events on the ground in Afghanistan.
- The purpose of the group would be two-fold:
 - To advocate for the Ambassador's and ARG's interests at the AIOG;
Afghanistan Reconstruction Group
 - To facilitate development of a market economy in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group
- Its functions would be administrative, logistical, and reconstruction-oriented, with a focus on mobilizing the private sector to undertake projects in Afghanistan.
 - It would coordinate with Ex-Im Bank and OPIC.
Overseas Private Investment Corp.
 - It would develop replicable models of public-private economic projects and programs.
 - Its activities would not overlap with the NESAs regional office.
Near East South Asia

11-L-0559/OSD/20638

- The AIOG does not possess the capability to encourage projects that are essentially private-sector based.
- Its staff would include DoD employees in addition to consultants with private sector backgrounds.
- It would support the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs by coordinating with Zal, the AIOG, and private sector institutions and assisting in policy implementation.
- Possible drawbacks include the State Department and AIOG's likely opposition.
 - State may see this as an usurpation of its role in Afghanistan.
 - It is unclear how this group would coordinate with the OSD representative at the AIOG.

Snowflake

INFORMATION RETENTION

EF-7835
03/017149

December 4, 2003

Afghanistan

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Women in Afghanistan

Attached is a memo from Newt with a copy of an op-ed about women in Afghanistan.

I think it is an enormously important point. I let Zal read it and urged him to push hard on it. You might want to dig into it yourself.

Thanks.

Attach
12/3/03 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Women in Afghanistan

DHR:dh
120403-25 (ts computer)

.....
Please respond by _____

SIR,
Response attached.
vr/CDR Nosen *12/18*
1 SA / NESA

12/18

INFORMATION RETENTION

FILE
FAXED FWD
12/19/03
TEN

4 Dec 03

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

INFO MEMO

USDP *copy provided 12/14/03*
I-03/017149

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AFFAIRS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
Rodman, (b)(6)

W. Rodman DEC 17 2003

SUBJECT: Women in Afghanistan

- You recently asked that we look into a recent New York Times op-ed piece on women in Afghanistan.
- While the author of the op-ed piece is correct in noting that the draft constitution does not explicitly guarantee women's safety, the draft does provide certain guarantees.
 - The Preamble and Articles 6 and 22 prohibit discrimination and require the state to recognize the equal rights of all Afghan citizens.
 - According to Article 7, the state must adhere to signed international conventions and treaties and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
- Another concern of the author was labor conditions.
 - Article 48 refers to the law's regulation of working hours, paid holidays, and employee rights, but does not elaborate on this law.
 - Contrary to the op-ed piece, Article 49 explicitly prohibits forced labor, in particular, of children.
- The op-ed piece implied that the constitution did not adequately ensure equal access to education and health care.

11-L-0559/OSD/20641



- The constitution considers education and health the right of all Afghan citizens, with Article 44 referring specifically to the promotion of education for women.
- The op-ed was correct in noting that the constitution does not provide for representation of women at the local level; however, Article 33 refers to Afghan citizens' right "to elect and be elected."
- On December 12, the Principals reaffirmed USG redlines for the constitution, one of which was equal rights for women.
- Zal Khalilzad will continue to communicate these redlines to key Afghan leaders and advance the issue of women's rights and protections under the draft constitution.

Prepared by Nat Tropy, Jr., ISA/NESA, (b)(6)

[Handwritten signature] *[Handwritten initials]* ASD/ISA *[Handwritten initials]* PDASD/ISA _____
18

C124

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Thrdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Wednesday, December 03, 2003 6:48 AM

To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6) jack.patterson@osd.mil;
sbzaljp@centcom.mil

Subject: women in afghanistan-newt

for secdef,depsecdef
from newt
12/03/03

Given Mrs. Bush's publicly stated interest in the fate of women in Afghanistan this column should be very disturbing.

Isn't this column at the heart of what President Bush has been sying and a key measure of whether we are paying in blood and money to bring about real change or merely exchanging one barbatic tyranny for a slightly friendly barbaric tyranny

OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR

Making a Nation More Equal

By NOELEEN HEYZER

The language of Afghanistan's draft constitution must be amended to acknowledge women's rights explicitly.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/03/opinion/03HEYZ.html?th>

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5

The New York Times
nytimes.com

AMERICA
FOR THE PEOPLE
SUPPORTING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

December 3, 2003

Making a Nation More Equal

By NOELEEN HEYZER

Women in Afghanistan have only a short time to influence the new draft constitution to be considered by the Constitutional Loya Jirga scheduled for next week. Although the new draft upholds the principle of human rights, there is no explicit guarantee of women's equality. This is not a matter of semantics. Rather, it raises serious questions about the document's commitment to protect women's rights.

Despite visible advances in society, many Afghan women have seen little change over the past two years. Particularly outside of Kabul, women live under the tight restrictions of authoritarian and traditional practices, which keep women and girls at home and deny them access to education, job training and health care.

Violence against women continues. Child marriages and forced marriages remain common, fueled by impoverishment and instability. Young girls are "married" to bring money into households or to settle disputes, a practice that condemns young girls to sexual abuse and sustained poverty. Outside of Kabul, women's security is threatened by local warlords who abuse women with impunity.

The international community must rally behind the women seeking to enshrine their rights in the country's constitution. When every member of the Supreme Court, under the new constitution, must take an oath "to support judicial justice and righteousness in accord with the provisions of the sacred religion of Islam," there must be clear language securing women's equality as a requisite counterbalance against extreme interpretation of Islamic law.

The new constitution should state clearly that women have full and equal rights with men before the law. Although the constitution provides for an Afghan society based on "social justice, protection of human dignity, protection of human rights, and realization of democracy," there is no explicit prohibition against discrimination based on gender. The constitution should also include clear language prohibiting any customs and traditional practices that discriminate against women. It should stipulate, for example, that marriage must take place freely and with the agreement of both parties.

The Afghan Constitution must also include a clear definition of the word "citizen." (It should also substitute the term "female-headed households" for "women without caretakers" throughout the text.) In the past, there have been questions about women's rights to full citizenship, as only men have been issued ID cards.

Although the constitution states that women are entitled to a specific number of seats in the National Assembly, it makes no provisions for their representation at the local level, where resistance to women's participation is most formidable.

Women's right to work under fair and just conditions must also be stipulated in the constitution, along

Making a Nation More Equal

Page 2 of 2

with prohibitions against forced labor. Women also deserve equal access to education and health care, and the constitution should ensure that school curriculums reflect the equality of men and women. Access to gender-specific health services should also be guaranteed.

All of these changes have been suggested by legal experts in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Earlier this year Afghanistan ratified an international treaty that provides the Constitutional Loya Jirga a framework for incorporating them into the new draft.

Two years ago, when Afghanistan was liberated from Taliban rule, the world realized that global security is inextricably linked to the protection and rights of women in society, and there was an international commitment to supporting Afghan women on the path to securing these rights. Today, we have a narrow window in which to make good on this commitment. The international community must direct its efforts to ensure that the constitution reflects the needs of the women we promised to help.

Noeleen Heyzer is executive director of the United Nations Development Fund for Women.

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December 8, 2003

092.3

TO: LTG John Craddock
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: SEDM Ministerial Meetings

In the future I need to be told about these SEDM ministerial meetings. I wasn't even aware of it that I can recall. I need to have a chance to say yes or no on invitations.

Thanks.

*Done
Dernan
1/30*

Attach.
11/28/03 ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef re: SEDM Ministerial Trip Report, November 29, 2003

DHR:dh
120503-14 (ts computer)

.....

Please respond by _____

8 Dec 03

U22484 /03

12/1
1700



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

EF-7664 12/5

2003 DEC -1 PM 1:56

INFO MEMO

I-03/016211-EP
USDP: *[Signature]*

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mira Ricardel *[Signature]* Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Eurasia (Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Policy) NOV 28 2003

SUBJECT: SEDM Ministerial Trip Report, November 19, 2003

- DASD Ian Brzezinski represented you at the eighth annual Southeast Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM) held in Zagreb, Croatia on November 19.
- The Ministerial was attended by Ministers of Defense from Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Macedonia, Slovenia, Turkey, Moldova, and Ukraine, and Deputy Defense Ministers from Albania, Italy, and Romania.
- DASD Brzezinski's *(SEE BRIG)* remarks emphasized the need to prepare the Southeast European Brigade for stability operations beyond the Balkans, where the need for such missions is much diminished. SEE BRIG must be ready to support NATO where the need is greatest.
- He also delivered briefings on recent developments in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- SEDM members were asked to consider greater contributions to these efforts, particularly for Provincial Reconstruction Teams and training support for the Afghan National Army.

Other Insights:

- Greek Minister of Defense Papantoniou and others supported SEDM's expansion to include Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia Herzegovina, and countries to the East and bordering the Black Sea.
- Ukrainian Minister of Defense Marchuk made a strong pitch for SEDM and NATO membership, and offered his country's peacekeeping facilities and experience to assist SEE BRIG's preparations for deployment.
- Turkish Minister of Defense Gonul, in a conversation with Brzezinski, expressed concern that the Kurds were driving CPA's new plan to bring Iraqis self-governance. Brzezinski emphasized this was not the case.

Good
X

Prepared by: MCopson, ISP/EUR, (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	C 12/5
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	1119542 / 03



11-L-0559/OSD/20647

December 5, 2003

TO: David Chu
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Press on Personnel Issues

Please take a look at this piece in the *Newport News Daily*. First of all, I would like some real data on the length and frequency of deployments over the years, and to what extent people have really been put upon.

370

In addition, please look at some of these other issues and get back to me.

Thanks.

Attach.

Philpott, Tom. "Administration Seen As Tone Deaf On Some 'People' Issues," *Newport News (VA) Daily Press*, November 28, 2003.

DHR:dh
120503-17 (ts computer)

.....

Please respond by 1/16/04

5 Dec 03

U22485 /03

former judge advocate general for the Navy, Rear Adm. John D. Huson, who was involved in the development and enforcement of the policy, recently said that the ban is a failed policy whose elimination would strengthen the military. A Fox News poll conducted in August shows that 64 percent of Americans now favor allowing gays to serve openly in the military, up from 56 percent in a similar poll taken in 2001.

Even within the military, anti-gay sentiment has declined over the past decade. One study conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School in California found that between 1994 and 1999, the percentage of Navy officers who feel uncomfortable in the presence of gay people decreased to 36 percent from 58 percent.

The debate over gays in the military was never really about balancing civil rights with national security. Britain, Israel, Canada and Australia are among 24 militaries that lifted bans on gay soldiers without undermining unit cohesion or combat readiness. These experiences show that the choice is not between gay rights and military readiness. It is between prejudice that compromises national security and equality that enhances it. And that's no choice at all.

Nathaniel Frank is a senior research fellow at the Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military at the University of California, Santa Barbara.

Newport News (VA) Daily Press

November 28, 2003

Military Update

55. Administration Seen As Tone Deaf On Some 'People' Issues

By Tom Philpot

With President Bush signing the first-ever \$400 billion defense bill, including another military pay raise and housing allowance increase

that will more than match growth in wages and rents nationwide, it would seem hard to argue that this administration has lost touch with troops.

Yet beneath the surface image captured by an amiable signing ceremony at the Pentagon Nov. 24, are currents of worry and disappointment inside the military over actions of the Bush administration.

No president since the all-volunteer force began 30 years ago has used the military as aggressively. Bush, after all, elected to invade Iraq and to remove whatever threat Saddam Hussein and his illusive weapons of mass destruction posed. The war and occupation of Iraq, and also Afghanistan, have left U.S. military operations at their highest sustained level in decades.

They also have left many service people concerned, mostly over the length and frequency of deployments given the enormity of Bush's promise to establish a democracy in Iraq, for a people more used to tyranny and more inclined by culture and geography toward Muslim fundamentalism.

Other service people are wary that a presidential election next year will shake administration resolve. A premature exit could dishonor the sacrifices so far, particularly of those who have died or been wounded.

Despite that sensitive backdrop, Defense officials led by Donald Rumsfeld seem unconcerned about angering large segments of the military community. For every initiative to please military folks, like contracting with movers to reimburse families the full replacement value of good damaged in household moves, two seem to float by aimed at tightening people programs.

Key provisions of the defense bill Bush signed will benefit active duty personnel, reserve and Guard members

and disabled retirees in ways the administration opposed. One will extend through December 2004 wartime increases in danger pay and family separation allowance that Congress first approved last April. The administration wanted them rolled back. By late summer, it argued these increases should be replaced by higher hazardous duty pay but only to persons assigned to Iraq and Afghanistan. Congress, at least this year, declined to go along.

Another initiative the Bush team fought will open TRICARE to non-mobilized reservists who lack employer-provided health insurance.

A third will phase out, over 10 years, the ban on "concurrent receipt" of both military retired pay and disability compensation for retirees with disabilities rated 50 percent or higher. A fourth will expand Combat-Related Special Compensation to any retiree with combat or combat-training injuries, not just to those with Purple Hearts or disabilities rated at least 60 percent.

Another initiative gives reservists and families immediate and unlimited access to commissaries, which are military grocery stores.

None of these gains would have been in the 2004 Defense Authorization Act had Congress followed White House budget guidance.

Meanwhile, Rumsfeld and his top aides are sending fresh signals they want future budgets squeezed on prized military perks including commissaries and dependent schools. Defense officials said in mid-October memo that they plan to close 19 smaller commissaries, most of them overseas, and have their eye on 19 more. They also plan to close Defense-run schools on up to 14 military bases, stateside and overseas.

Gen. B. B. Bell, commander of U.S. Army Europe, in a Nov. 15 memo,

described as nearly "unconscionable" the proposal by DoD officials to close four small commissaries in Germany "at a time when military sponsors are deployed to hostile-fire environments."

Joyce Wessel Raezer, director of government relations for National Military Family Association, said it's time to stop raising anxiety levels among military families with "business-case" attacks on military support systems like schools and the \$1 billion-a-year commissary subsidy.

"Why is it so important right now to nickel and dime the commissary benefit," she said. "It's just raising stress. And it is small potatoes compared to some of the other items in the defense budget."

Raezer, wife of a retired Army officer, said the strain on families from the uncertainty of current deployments is unlike anything she has seen in her long association with service life.

"Volunteers on the front line of family support are wearing out," she said, as they counsel families stressed by finances, childcare challenges and the constant danger to loved ones in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Deployments not only are longer than planned but families know that loved ones who return safely still could return to Iraq or Afghanistan another year or two. It's a worry reinforced, Raezer said, "with every announcement by leadership that we're going to be in this for a long time."

Raezer said the robust reenlistment rates cited by leaders of deployed units likely have more to do with tax breaks than with unit morale. Soldiers know that reenlistment bonus contracts signed in a war zone are tax free.

"I worry about when that person gets home, what the spouse will say," said Raezer. "Traditionally, reenlistment is a decision made around the

kitchen table. Not now. It's being made away from home...A family facing another round of deployments is going to say, 'Hey, look, I'm still exhausted from that last one. I can't handle it.' That's a real issue."

Military families "support what the service member is doing," she said. "But when that member gets home, it is going to be harder to send them off again. That's where we're going to get the problems."

December ⁹~~8~~, 2003

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Back-to-Back Deployments

Please read this article and tell me what numbers of people have actually had back-to-back deployments with little rest in between. My impression is that that is not the case, except for isolated incidents. Am I wrong?

Thanks.

Attach.

Grange, David. "Second-Guessing War Only Does Harm," *Chicago Tribune*, November 16, 2003.

DHR:dh
120603-19 (ts computer)

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Please respond by _____

U22486 /

Chicago Tribune
— ONLINE EDITION —

<http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/perspective/chi-0311160091nov16,1,6731835.story?coll=chi-newsopinionperspective-hed>

Second-guessing war only does harm

By David Grange. David Grange is a retired U.S. Army brigadier general and chief operating officer of the McCormick Tribune Foundation

November 16, 2003

In 1862, near the end of the Shenandoah Campaign, Gen. Stonewall Jackson told some of his nervous officers, who expressed concern about an operation under way, "never take counsel of your fears." No matter how bad a situation becomes, to his way of thinking, once you have committed to a battle, you can't become distracted, second-guess yourself, or quit because you and everyone around you becomes consumed by fear of failing. Take counsel before committing, not after.

We are now committed to a successful conclusion in Iraq. We need success for our national security. We owe it to those who have been slain and to the people of Iraq to finish what we have started. Seven months into our efforts to shore up Iraq, there are several thoughts to consider.

Many say the war in Iraq is turning into another Vietnam. Not true. There are similarities, but there are far more differences. One three-day fight in South Vietnam's Ia Drang Valley between a U.S. cavalry battalion and an enemy regiment killed 305 Americans. From March 19 to Nov. 4 of this year, 379 U.S. troops were killed. Though every lost GI breaks hearts, we are not likely to have more than 58,000 GIs killed in Iraq, as we did during the Vietnam War.


Iraq, however, is becoming a sustained fight, and troop casualties will be the norm, not the exception.

In Vietnam, the Viet Cong conducted operations to set advantageous conditions for the regulars, the North Vietnamese Army, to engage American units. These guerrillas were all Vietnamese, fighting to unite North and South Vietnam. In Iraq the guerrillas stand alone, with a very complex force makeup, consisting of international terrorist elements, leftover paramilitary fighters, foreign jihadists, criminals and Iraqis who want revenge or are hired guns. There is no enemy army to maneuver against coalition forces.

In Vietnam, adjacent countries openly provided havens, military equipment and infiltration routes. Powerful opponents of the United States--China and the Soviet Union--also hovered in the background. In Iraq, the surrounding countries provide support, but on a much smaller scale, almost entirely covert, fearing U.S. retaliation. There is no opponent to check America's primacy in the region.

The stated purpose for war in Vietnam was to stop the spread of communism--the threat of a percei

Advertisement



communist domino effect. In Iraq, the purpose is to position the U.S. for continued war on terrorists and to induce a domino effect, spreading some type of democratic governance.

What is the same between the two conflicts is that Iraq is another living-room war. The war in Vietnam brought the fight to the living room of the American home. Though the action may have been a few days old, the gruesome broadcast images of war had a tremendous effect on the American public. It is the same today in Iraq, though in real time because of satellite linkage from the war zone to America. The news media's in-your-face, continuous 24/7 coverage has an immediate influence on the public.

Playing the rebels' tune

The guerrillas smell blood. They know that the daily grind of losing American GIs affects the continued support of the American people, and tragic losses such as the Nov. 2 downing of a Chinook helicopter that killed 16 soldiers feed that frenzy. Combine that with a threatening environment that forces relief agencies to leave the country; fear among ordinary Iraqis that the U.S. will lose interest and go home, leaving them to Saddam Hussein and his cronies; and the perception that the guerrillas can attack anywhere at will, and you have a recipe for guerrilla success, unless they are crushed.

Political posturing in the U.S. plays to the guerrilla agenda. Candidates who use the war for political advancement by condemning U.S. involvement, now that this country and its citizen soldiers are committed to the fray, add to the enemy's strategy and hamper troop morale. The president is responsible for the outcome, and wearing his hat as commander in chief of the armed forces, he must focus on the war, not on a debate agenda using the war for political gain.

Even with 30 to 35 guerrilla attacks a day on coalition forces, and the losses America has incurred (an average of one GI killed and eight wounded every day), they are militarily insignificant. But every loss is important to this country, and they do have a cumulative, eroding effect on support for the war. As Americans, we have a hurry-up-and-finish-it mind-set, but in a guerrilla war, it is a hurry-up-and-wait scenario.

British strategist Basil Liddell Hart has said that "it is the loss of hope, not the loss of life, that decides the issues of war," and if the American people lose the commitment or the will to carry on until the mission is accomplished, it is futile to try to keep the military committed.

It is important during this period of doubt to remember the sacrifices made to date and to ensure that those sacrifices were not made in vain.

There is an old Special Forces saying, "When the ground varies from the map, you got to go with the ground." It translates to the best-laid plans as well. And if what is found on the ground in Iraq is different than what was assumed for the going-in plan, then the plan must change.

There is nothing wrong with having the flexibility to adapt to the situation. The Bush administration had difficulty accepting and adapting to what it found immediately after the major combat operational phase but has since adapted to the ambiguous environment, elusive foe and sustained insurgency and now is making steady progress.

Every commander interviewed has said that what is needed most is "actionable intelligence"-- information that is timely, accurate and usable to the troops in the field. Most of America's intelligence-collection capability is technical, developed for use against another sophisticated, modern military. What is needed in Iraq when fighting guerrillas is human-source intelligence, street stuff, like what the police use.

11-L-0559/OSD/20653

the resolve of the American people. The why is--as strategy and intelligence analyst George Friedman has stated--"Iraq is a means to an end, not an end in itself." Iraq is the most strategic country in the region, and its transition to some form of democratic governance will affect the entire region, as well as influence the roots of growing hatred for the West.

The American presence in Iraq is driving Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations crazy. That is why Americans in Iraq are a magnet to terrorists, drawing them into the conflict. Though eliminating Hussein's regime and its possible weapons of mass destruction and winning freedom for the Iraqi people are noble causes, and ones that I would fight for today, they are only intermediate objectives supporting the strategic goal of changing the status quo in the Middle East and assisting us in fighting terrorists over there, not in our own country.

The absence of attacks in the United States since Sept 11, 2001, might indicate that the strategy is working. Bush did a better job of explaining the strategy Nov. 6 at the National Endowment for Democracy; however, it needs to be explained continually to the American people as conditions and commitments change. And America has yet to explain it to the people of the Middle East. One of our government's greatest weaknesses is getting our message out overseas.

Information, as a tool, must be a dominant means in winning the global war on terrorism. Everything American flows from the spirit of the statement "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," and that message must somehow be translated to this region of the world.

We are knee-deep in this commitment with Iraq, as we are with Afghanistan.

It is too late to say, "It is too hard. Let's cut and run." Winning, though the costs will continue to be painful, is worth the effort. The outcome of this war is in the better interests of the United States, and it will be better for mankind.

America, Iraq and most of the world will be more secure from this endeavor, an endeavor that no other country could have taken on even if it wanted to. As Americans, our resolve, our will to succeed, must be stronger than Hussein's and Osama bin Laden's.

It's tough being the leader, but someone has to lead the way. Right now that someone is the United States of America.

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December 9, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Intel Teams

I am deeply concerned about the deployments to and redeployments from Iraq. It is all going to occur within a three or four month period. There is a great danger.

My understanding is that it includes the human intelligence teams. I think that is unacceptable. I cannot imagine losing our memory. It is not a responsible approach.

Please screw your head into it, and find out what you think we ought to do about it. Find out precisely what is going to happen. Find out what kind of approach we could take (ask David Chu)—such as asking for volunteers to stay on or volunteers to go earlier or offering incentives. We need to lengthen the period of changeover, so the contacts can be passed and the knowledge transferred. It may be that we have to send some of the new people over early, so we don't keep non-volunteers and the people who won't accept being incentivized staying there longer to achieve a good changeover period.

I am concerned.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120603-18 (ts computer)

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Please respond by 12/9/04 *OB*
12/12

U22487 /03
11-L-0559/OSD/20656

9 Dec 04

622

December 9, 2003

W
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TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Gen. Pete Schoomaker
Paul Wolfowitz
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Army Readiness

*closed
in
SMA/DJS
1/8*

I read this article in the *Washington Post* about the Army facing a dip in readiness. We need to think through that issue. I cannot imagine any Army that is engaged in a war that wouldn't have a dip in readiness, if readiness is defined as what one is supposed to be doing during peacetime to get ready for war. We need to discuss the precise details.

I have a feeling that folks are proceeding along the basis that the world is at peace and are using the same metrics, and they may not be appropriate.

Please take a look, and let's visit.

Thanks.

Attach.
Early Bird title page, article #3, Loeb, Vernon. "Army Will Face Dip in Readiness," *Washington Post*, December 6, 2003.

DHR:dh
120603-5 (ts computer)

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Please respond by 19 Dec

9 Dec 03

U22488 /03

CURRENT NEWS

EARLY BIRD

December 6, 2003

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Story numbers indicate order of appearance only.

TOP STORIES

1. **US Defense Secretary Visits N. Iraq To Meet Troops**
(New York Times on the Web)....Reuters
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld began a first-hand appraisal of political and military conditions in Iraq on Saturday, swooping into the northern city of Kirkuk to meet troops and local leaders. Rumsfeld arrived in rainy conditions aboard a U.S. Air Force C-17 cargo plane that flew from Tbilisi, Georgia. He was met at the airport by Major General Ray Odierno, commander of the U.S. 4th Infantry Division.
2. **Air Force Pursued Boeing Deal Despite Concerns Of Rumsfeld**
(New York Times)....Douglas Jehl
Even after Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld expressed concern late last month about improprieties in a proposed \$20 billion contract with the Boeing Company, the Air Force's top acquisitions official, Marvin R. Sambur, distributed messages urging Pentagon officials to sign the deal "A.S.A.P.," according to internal Pentagon e-mail messages.
3. **Army Will Face Dip In Readiness**
(Washington Post)....Vernon Loeb
40 percent of the active-duty force -- will not be fully combat-ready for up to six months next year, leaving the nation with relatively few ready troops in the event of a major conflict in North Korea or elsewhere, a senior Army official said yesterday.
4. **Iraqi Genocide Tribunal Forming**
(Philadelphia Inquirer)....Niko Price, Associated Press
Saddam Hussein and hundreds of his aides could go on trial for crimes against humanity and genocide before an Iraqi-led tribunal that will be established in the coming days, Iraqi and U.S. officials said yesterday.
5. **Bush Taps Baker For Iraq Task**
(Los Angeles Times)....Maura Reynolds
President Bush on Friday called in his family's trusted troubleshooter, former Secretary of State James A. Baker III, to take on the thorny job of persuading other countries to forgive or restructure Iraq's immense debt.
6. **16 Countries To Aid Iraq Reconstruction**
(Washington Times)....Associated Press
Governments from 16 countries, including the United States, Japan and some European nations, agreed yesterday to insure payment of up to \$2.4 billion worth of exports to Iraq as part of efforts to rebuild the country and jump-start its economy, officials said.

RUMSFELD TRIP

7. **Rumsfeld Visits Iraqi Northern Oil Fields**
(New York Times on the Web)....Associated Press

11-L-0559/OSD/20658

179
1300 - Snowflake

MT

D

December 8, 2003

H

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld Ph.
SUBJECT: Comparisons to Germany

Exec Sec
Please respond.
Germany

Please have someone find out what the population of Germany was in 1945 at the end of the war, compared to Iraq today.

J
Durnan
12/9

Please have someone find out how many Allied military occupied Germany and for how long after the war ended in 1945.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120803-5

Please respond by 12/14/03

- Da Binaria Adams -
(b)(6)
12/14/03

Copy to:
Marc Thussen
Larry Di Rita
12/22
Done 12/22

8 Dec 03

U22489 /03

(A)

SUBJECT: Comparisons between post war Germany and Iraq

	Population	Area	Population of occupied zone	Occupation zone
Germany 1945	65,910,999	144,016 sq miles	18,200,000	45,046 sq miles
Iraq 2003	24,683,313	168,754 sq miles	24,683,313	168,754 sq miles

Occupation zone in Iraq is 4 times larger than occupation zone in 1945.

SUBJECT: Comparisons between post war Germany and Iraq

(b)

Numbers of Allied Military in Occupied Germany

	US	USSR	UK	FRENCH
1945	1,622,000	1,500,000		
1946	277,584	700,000		
1947	119,367	350,000	140,000	70,000
1948	80,857			
1949	83,080			
1950	79,370			
1951	134,983			
1952	236,832			
1953	215,001			
1954	217,961			
1955	220,428			

Germany regained most of its sovereignty in 1952, with ratification of the General or Germany Treaty. All sovereignty returned in 1955 with ratification of Paris Treaties.

The USSR broke off East Germany in 1949 and in 1954 recognized the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic (GDR)

12/9
1300 Snowflake

C 12/19

December 8, 2003

PA lead

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **DR**
SUBJECT: Korb Op-ed

Larry Di Rita
12/18

Please see if you can find out if I ever said what Lawrence Korb says I said in the *Washington Post* op-ed piece today. I sure don't remember it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120803-6

.....
Please respond by 12/12/03

000.7 ST

12/17

Sec Def -
You said it. The
message to the troops 20 March 03
I think Korb's use of your
text is a little frivolous.
I am doing letter to him?
~~editor~~ editor
Di Rita

Copy BTM
done 12/18
30

FILE
FAXED
FWD 12/19/03
TEN

Larry Di Rita
12/18

U22490 /03

8 Dec 03

washingtonpost.com

A War of Choice or of Necessity?

By Lawrence J. Korb

Monday, December 8, 2003; Page A25

Eight months after the Bush administration got us involved in a bloody war in Iraq, we are now told by one of Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's closest advisers that Iraq was a war of choice after all. According to Richard Haass, director of policy planning at the State Department until June 2003 and still the Bush administration's special envoy to Northern Ireland, the administration "did not have to go to war against Iraq, certainly not when we did. There were other options" [op-ed, Nov. 23]. Really?

This is not what the administration told us before the war and continues to tell us to this day. On March 20, as he was sending troops into Iraq because the regime of Saddam Hussein allegedly possessed weapons of mass destruction and had ties to al Qaeda, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld told them, "We are at the point at which the risk of not acting is too great to wait longer. As you prepare, know that this war is necessary . . ." Some three weeks into the war, Powell, who had made the case for war to the United Nations, stated: "We do not seek war. We do not look for war. We don't want wars. But we will not be afraid to fight when these wars are necessary to protect the American people, to protect our interests, to protect friends."

Even after it had become abundantly clear that the arguments the Bush administration advanced for going to war were specious, both Vice President Cheney and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz explicitly rebutted Haass's position. In an Oct. 10 speech to the Heritage Foundation in which he lashed out at those who said we had a choice about invading Iraq, the vice president said: "Some claim we should not have acted because the threat from Saddam Hussein was not imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike?" On Nov. 4 Wolfowitz stated: "But one of the things that Sept. 11 changed was that it made it a war of necessity, not a war of choice."

The president himself continues to proclaim how necessary the war was. On Nov. 22 he said at a press conference in London, "Our mission in Iraq is noble and it is necessary." On Thanksgiving Day the president told the troops in Baghdad: "You are defeating the terrorists here in Iraq so we don't have to face them in our own country."

Even more surprising is Haass's contention that despite its public pronouncements, the Bush administration knows that, because this is a war of choice, Americans will not support it unless it is relatively short and cheap. This is why the administration has changed its policy and accelerated the timetable to hand over increasing political responsibility to Iraqis, even if it means reducing what it is trying to accomplish.

Haass weakens his own case by arguing that the first Persian Gulf War was a real war of necessity and Vietnam was only a war of choice. Even those who argued against the recent invasion of Iraq would not

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contend that it was less necessary than the first Persian Gulf War. As Secretary of State James Baker noted in 1990, that war was really about oil. And Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as such defense hawks as Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), wanted to give sanctions more time to work before invading Iraq. (If it was so necessary, why did the administration of the elder Bush not invade until it got other nations to fund the war?)

It is equally absurd to argue that the first Gulf War was more necessary than Vietnam. In the mid-1960s many Americans, including most of us who were in the armed forces, believed that if South Vietnam fell to the Communists all of Southeast Asia would soon follow and the containment policy would be undermined. This is why the American people supported that conflict through the Tet offensive of 1968, even though more than 30,000 Americans had died by then.

Ironically, while Haass is wrong about Vietnam and the first Gulf War, he is right about Iraq. It is a war of choice -- a bad choice as it turns out. Unfortunately, he was unwilling to go public with his views, as did Gen. Eric Shinseki, while he could have made a difference. This article should have been written nine months ago when Congress and the American people had a choice. Now our only real choice is to continue to stay and absorb the casualties and the cost.

The writer is senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and senior adviser to the Center for Defense Information. He was assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration.

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SECDEF MESSAGE TO TROOPS ABOUT WAR WITH IRAQ

Most likely taped on 20 March 03 (but it could have been one day prior), but definitely presented on the Pentagon Channel and all the AFN Networks on 20 March 03 - per Larry Reuben, AFRTS

(The following is exact wording from the tape.)

"The President has made the case for Iraq clear. He has set forth what is at stake, and invested the diplomatic and political effort needed to exhaust all options short of war. We are at the point at which the risk of not acting is too great to wait longer. The answers are clear. It is essential to world peace and our security that we act against the regime of Saddam Hussein.

As you prepare -- know that this war is necessary, it is just, and that you have the resources and commitment you need to achieve victory."



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Updated: 20 Mar 2003

Rumsfeld Praises Troops, Cites Iraq War As 'Necessary, Just'

By Gerry J. Gilmore
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, March 20, 2003 – Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld today praised American troops deployed overseas to disarm and oust Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, noting that their efforts support a just cause.

"It is essential to world peace and our security that we act against the regime of Saddam Hussein," Rumsfeld said in a taped message to service members, as U.S. and coalition forces continue the military campaign against the dictator's regime.

"Know that this war is necessary, it is just, and that you have the resources and commitment you need to achieve victory," the secretary declared.

Rumsfeld pointed out that Saddam brushed off President Bush's Monday evening ultimatum for the dictator to leave Iraq within 48 hours or face war.

"In rejecting the president's ultimatum, the Iraqi regime has chosen war over peaceful disarmament," Rumsfeld said.

"Saddam Hussein's regime will be now removed from power – and the Iraqi people will be liberated," he declared.

American service men and women "will deliver on the president's pledge" to disarm Hussein's regime and oust the dictator, Rumsfeld said.

If Saddam isn't stopped now, the secretary pointed out, the dictator could provide his weapons of mass destruction to terrorists, who likely would attack the United States again.

"The result could be the deaths not of 3,000 people, as on September 11th, but 30,000 or 300,000 or more innocent people," Rumsfeld emphasized, noting that the mission of U.S. troops arrayed against Iraq "is to prevent that from happening."

U.S. troops "are the best trained, strongest, and most capable military in the world," the secretary said, adding that he and other senior leaders "have full

confidence in your ability, your courage and your dedication to our country."

America's troops won't face danger alone, as they "will fight alongside the forces of such stalwart friends as Australia, Great Britain and many others," the U.S. defense leader said.

The president made the right decision to oust Saddam, Rumsfeld reiterated, noting that all diplomatic avenues to peacefully disarm the dictator had come to naught.

"We are at the point at which the risk of not acting is too great to wait longer," he emphasized.

Rumsfeld said the troops have the support of their commander in chief, of Congress and of the American people.

"I thank you for all you do for our country. May God bless you, and keep you, and guide you in the days ahead," he concluded.

Related Site of Interest:

- [Secretary's Message to the Troops on Operation Iraqi Freedom](#)

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Questions or comments not about this article? [See Questions.](#)



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1248
1500



December 8, 2003

TO

TO: LTG John Craddock
Larry Di Rita

Advance copy sent

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Harlan Ullman

I will see Harlan Ullman off the record. I would like you or Larry to be there and I will do it for ~~45~~ *20* minutes, possibly ~~at lunch~~ on Saturday, December 14.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/4/03 Ullman ltr to SecDef

Done - 2/24

DHR:dh
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.....
Please respond by 12/10/03

cc: CATHY

U22491 /03

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4/Dec03

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Personal For:

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
The Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon (Room 3E-880)
Washington, D.C.


December 4th, 2003

Dear Don,

I would be enormously grateful for an hour of your time possibly over the next month. I understand a good time to do this is on Saturday mornings. The purpose is two-fold. First, I wanted to share some of the tentative conclusions in the book I am completing called "Finishing Business (Or How to Win the Global War on Terror)" that will be published next fall.

More importantly and drawing on your own memo on the Global War on Terror, I wanted to get your views as to what we should be doing now that we are not to anticipate and prepare for future events that may occur perhaps next or five or ten years hence. We can do that on or off the record.

Best Wishes,



Harlan K. Ullman

12/9
1.300 Snowflake

TO SD

December 8, 2003

C11/13

PA LEAD

2/11

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: *Paris Match* Article

Durnan
1/13

Please give me the text in English of the article in *Paris Match*.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120803-11

.....
Please respond by 12/18/03

000.7 SD

Sir,
Response attached
VF/CDR Nasmy

U22492 /03

8 Dec 03

TEN
1/13

November 27 – December 3, 2003
Weekly news magazine Paris Match
Circulation: 728,000

Informal translation by AMEmbassy – Paris Press Office

This issue of Paris Match (the French equivalent to Life magazine with a circulation of 728,000) carries an eight-page profile of Donald Rumsfeld entitled “Rumsfeld is Not Disarming.” The profile begins under the caption: “While there is continued resistance in the field, at the Pentagon the Secretary of Defense continues to fight for democracy in Iraq. He gives an exclusive interview to Paris Match,”

The introduction to the interview: “A vast labyrinth lit with yellow neon lights. Everywhere, on the walls there are paintings, prints, sketches, photos and lists of hundreds of names of fallen soldiers. The Pentagon is also a sanctuary for memories. Normandy, Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, 25 kilometers of halls and of history that the 25,000 people who work for the greatest military power on Earth use everyday. There are portraits of General Eisenhower indicating that we are approaching the office of the Secretary of Defense - number 3E880. In the vestibule, there are large photos of Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld at the White House. Two shy secretaries stare intently at their computers, ignoring the comings and goings of the blue or khaki uniforms of the green or beige fatigues, of the black, gray or tan suits. They ignore the footfalls of the triple-soled combat boots. In the vicinity of the Secretary of Defense’s office there is rarely saluting. A door opens. General John Abizaid, commander of the forces in Iraq, exits the office, arms loaded with thick files. I hear him say to an advisor “that won’t work” then he takes him by the shoulder to speak to him in private. In a corner, on CNN, Michael Jackson is making the V-sign for victory, only the secretaries react to this. It is time. I walk into a vast office decorated with paintings and with at least six bronze statues. In the entry there is a bust of Theodore Roosevelt. Rumsfeld tells me he found it at a flea market. Above the bust there is a drawing of Eisenhower. “He isn’t smiling, it was during the war,” says the Defense Secretary. In the center of the room, where seven piles of files are rigorously aligned on a desk, there stands a buffalo. Behind him there are archers and another statue of Roosevelt, this time with a hat. In the background there are two figures, one is a pilot, echoing to the branch of the armed forces in which Rumsfeld served. Donald Rumsfeld sits with his elbows on the desk, he is watching Fox news, his favorite channel. On the screen, Michael Jackson again. Behind his desk there is no chair, he likes to work standing. On a lectern there is a piece of rusted metal. On it there are the words “September 11, 2001 Airlines 77.” Yes, it is indeed a piece of the plane that hit the Pentagon marking the beginning of the war for the twenty-first Defense Secretary of the United States. His handshake is warm. We take a seat around a small coffee table. He looks grandfatherly and in fact at the age of 71 he has six grandchildren. However as soon as he speaks he looks more like the teacher that you hoped you’d never have. When he is not being curt, he abruptly brushes aside the things he does not want to hear, his favorite part is playing the cynic. He juggles issues with the power of a former wrestler... Mr. Rumsfeld is straightforward. With the military he has developed a reputation as a visionary. He never has doubts...

Interview:

In brackets – words that were changed or added as compared with DoD transcript

Paris Match: At the age of 43 you were the youngest Secretary of Defense in history under Gerald Ford. Today you are the oldest and the only person to have held the office twice. What are the changes you have noticed between these two periods?

SecDef: One thing that is the same... Our forces [must become] more agile and lighter and have greater flexibility.

Paris Match: You were one of the biggest partisans of the American intervention in Iraq. Do you admit that you made a mistake in underestimating the post-war?

SecDef: The decision to go into this conflict was made by the country through Congress. [Certainly] not by one individual or one cabinet member. [We can be nothing but happy by the fact that] 23 million people who have been liberated from a dictator [who] used every conceivable repressive technique [against his people]. Most people with the benefit of time will agree that [this war] was a good thing. It was done with a minimum loss of life, with [greater] precision [than in any] conflict that has been conducted. [We carried out this war] with a great deal of effort to [spare civilians by facilitating the surrender of security forces.] There was no humanitarian crisis. [No problem of refugees nor] internally displaced people which happened during the [first] Gulf War. [The] oil wells were not [or almost not] put to flame as they were in Kuwait. The infrastructures [remained intact]. In six months we have [provided Iraq] with a new central bank, new currency. Schools are open, [as are] hospitals and clinics. There is a Governing Council [that has] appointed Ministers. The Ministers are functioning. The services are [as good as or] better than prior to the conflict. [You ask me if I am willing to admit that there are things we did not plan for]. No one ever has a plan that is perfect. The electric grid was [too] fragile. [We had not anticipated that]. [On the other hand] the intelligence anticipated that there would be resistance by the Fedayeen Saddam and there has been by the remnants of the former regime leadership. That is going on [and has resulted in the dead and injured we have heard of recently]. [This is terrible, but the sacrifice is worth it]. We are proceeding with a [34-country strong] coalition.

Paris Match: Why did you declare victory on May 1?

SecDef: [The president did not declare victory], he said that major combat operations had been concluded. He was correct. Other people characterized that as claiming victory. We said all along that it would take time.

Paris Match: Fine. But what would be the criteria for victory seeing how the situation has worsened?

SecDef: For me... and I think for the Coalition... the goal is to have a single country... that is at peace with its neighbors and that has a system of government that is representative and not [a regime] that is abusive of its religious or ethnic minorities. [We want] a country that is in charge of its own affairs, both governance and security of the country. That is the goal [nothing] other than that.

Paris Match: Are you still sure that Saddam Hussein had or has weapons of mass destruction?

SecDef: [There is no country] in the United Nations [that argued that he did not]. Our intelligence [and that of other countries] argued that [he] had chemical and biological weapons. [He] did not have nuclear weapons... [but he] had programs. [This is a country] with a pattern of denying and deceiving. They buried twelve jet airplanes! We have not found hard evidence of these programs yet. [We are waiting] for the final report from the Iraqi Survey Group by Dr. David Kelly. I believe [that the] intelligence before the war was correct. [But do not expect] to just discover or find things. [On the other hand we are on the verge of finding people] who will [talk about the existence of these weapons]. [It is still difficult to find] key people [from the former regime who are willing to talk], partly because Saddam Hussein is still alive.

Paris Match: Two years after September 11 and seven months after the fall of Baghdad Ben Laden and Saddam Hussein still have not been caught. They continue to taunt you with their messages. Does this signify failure?

SecDef: If you look at the major nations of the world [they all] have their most wanted list of criminals. People are on those lists for five, ten, fifteen years. Take Saddam Hussein. He stole something in the neighborhood of a billion dollars out of the central bank [of Iraq]. We found maybe a... third of that, some of it with his sons when they were killed. We currently have captured or killed 42 of the top 55 [in the Iraqi leadership]. That's pretty good. [There are thirteen left]. The Department of Defense was never organized... to find specific individuals. It was trained to deal with armies. The new security environment of the 21st century [presents us] with a new challenge that is difficult. [Finding Saddam] is like finding a needle in a haystack. When a person [has] a billion dollars and has hundreds of supporters that benefited from his dictatorial rule, it is not surprising that he is able to find assistance. [Now, is he behind the attacks? No, he is too busy hiding].

Paris Match: In 1983 you had met him in Baghdad. What do remember of this man?

SecDef: Iraq was in the Iran War. We had a problem with Syria and Lebanon. 241 Marines had been killed [in Beirut] by terrorists with the assistance of Syria. [If] Iran [had prevailed it would have become influential in the region]. [Yes] we were talking to the Iraqi government [at the time] about that.

Paris Match: Do you remember him as being friendly or cold?

SecDef: [I never] jump to conclusions on first impressions. [I knew beforehand] that he [was a brutal dictator engaged in a war]. [I went in knowing certain things about him]. I delivered the messages on behalf of our government. [But] I talked with Tariq Aziz for many hours.

Paris Match: The war in Iraq has undermined certain alliances. Do you think that the quarrel with France went too far? Was it unnecessary?

SecDef: I was Ambassador to NATO in 1973 and 1974 that was a difficult period for the Atlantic Alliance. Michel Jobert was the Foreign Minister. Henry Kissinger was the Secretary of State [Things go] back and forth [with France]. I am 71 years old. This has been going on most of the history of NATO. Every three or four years [an] issue [like this] pops up. [It was the] neutron bomb during the Carter administration. During the Reagan administration there was the natural gas pipeline. [In 1966] Mr. De Gaulle [broke from] NATO. There has never been a five-year period ... where there has not been something. We have survived all [of these crises]. We are in the 21st century [the Alliance] is still there [and] it is still working.

Paris Match: In Iraq the French, Germans and Russians are not present in terms of troops and to help 'finish the job.' Do you admit that "Old Europe," as you call it, would have been useful after all?

SecDef: Who ever suggested it would not be useful? [The countries you mentioned] made other decisions. The United States went to the United Nations twice. It asked for assistance and got it from 34 countries. [You have a strange way of asking the question] 'do you admit now that it would have been helpful.' The United-States was looking for help from the beginning. Some countries made their own decision not to help. That is their right as sovereign countries. [That is all I have to say about that]. [We should not forget that these] countries are helping in the global war on terror. [They are] helping in Afghanistan.

Paris Match: You are the only member of the administration who risked his life on Sept. 11.

SecDef: [At the time of impact I was] sitting here.

Paris Match: Did you hear the noise?

SecDef: [Yes, of course], the place shook. [Behind you on the table] there us a piece of the plane that hit the building. [The office] was filled with smoke. [In the entire building there were only a few places where] we could function relatively free of smoke. [That is where we set up] command centers. I was having breakfast with some congressmen [in the next room]. Someone walked in and said that a plane hit the WTC. [I turned on the television in the office]. I had my CIA briefer here for my

morning briefer. [He was] sitting where you are. [Again] someone came in and said that a second plane had hit [in New York]. [Then it was our turn].

Paris Match: In Guantanamo you are holding some 680 enemy combatants. Why don't you try them? Truman was able to properly try the Nazi leaders in Nuremberg?

SecDef: Most countries engaged in war capture people and keep them [to prevent them from killing] again. [In Nuremberg in 1946 it was a different situation because] the war had been over for a year. When you scoop up an enemy combatant, a prisoner of war... the purpose is not to punish them, the purpose is to keep them off the street. Which is why we had thousands of German... and Japanese prisoners in the United States [during the Second World War]. In Europe [you did the same thing] during every war. [What we are doing in Guantanamo] is new to some people who do not have a memory. [We are also holding them] to interrogate them [to find out] who trained them and where they are getting their money. I can tell you this [thanks to the information that we have gotten from people we picked up] in Afghanistan, we were able to stop a terrorist attack in Singapore.

Paris Match: Your deputy Paul Wolfowitz escaped a bombing. Do you ever think about death?

SecDef: No. [I] get up very morning and go about [my] job and try to do the best [I can]. I have been doing this [for a long time]. For any human being or country a terrorist can attack at any time at any place. It is impossible to defend everywhere at every moment of the day. A car bomb, a rocket propelled grenade, anthrax, [there is no way to be 100% safe]. The only way to deal with the global war on terror is to attempt to find the terrorist networks, to break them up, to stop their financing and reduce [their ability to do harm]. Once you become fearful they have won. [we cannot] sit there and hope something will not happen [to us]. This is a very serious problem for the world.

Paris Match: When you wake up in the morning and you switch on the tv, what do you think when you find out that another young American died in Iraq?

SecDef: {All of my heart and thoughts go out to them and] to their families. I have visited the wounded [in the hospitals]. They are proud of [serving] They recognize the importance of what they are doing. There are things that are worth putting you life at risk for. We would not have a free country today if there had not been wonderful Americans and allies of America [who had not risked their lives]. [They did] and God bless them for it.

Compiled: S Dos Santos / Paris Press

11-L-0559/OSD/20675

Paris Match
Nov. 27-Dec. 3, 2003

Rumsfeld Is Not Disarming

While there is continued resistance in the field, at the Pentagon the Secretary of Defense continues to fight for democracy in Iraq. He gives an exclusive interview to Paris Match.

By Regis le Sumier

A vast labyrinth lit with yellow neon lights. Everywhere, on the walls there are paintings, prints, sketches, photos and lists of hundreds of names of fallen soldiers. The Pentagon is also a sanctuary for memories. Normandy, Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, 25 kilometers of halls and of history that the 25,000 people who work for the greatest military power on Earth use everyday. There are portraits of General Eisenhower indicating that we are approaching the office of the Secretary of Defense - number 3E880. In the vestibule, there are large photos of Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld at the White House. Two shy secretaries stare intently at their computers, ignoring the comings and goings of the blue or khaki uniforms of the green or beige fatigues, of the black, gray or tan suits. They ignore the footfalls of the triple-soled combat boots. In the vicinity of the Secretary of Defense's office there is rarely saluting. A door opens. General John Abizaid, commander of the forces in Iraq, exits the office, arms loaded with thick files. I hear him say to an advisor "that won't work" then he takes him by the shoulder to speak to him in private. In a corner, on CNN, Michael Jackson is making the V-sign for victory, only the secretaries react to this. It is time. I walk into a vast office decorated with paintings and with at least six bronze statues. In the entry there is a bust of Theodore Roosevelt. Rumsfeld tells me he found it at a flea market. Above the bust there is a drawing of Eisenhower. "He isn't smiling, it was during the war," says the Defense Secretary. In the center of the room, where seven piles of files are rigorously aligned on a desk, there stands a buffalo. Behind him there are archers and another statue of Roosevelt, this time with a hat. In the background there are two figures, one is a pilot, echoing to the branch of the armed forces in which Rumsfeld served. Donald Rumsfeld sits with his elbows on the desk, he is watching Fox news, his favorite channel. On the screen, Michael Jackson again. Behind his desk there is no chair, he likes to work standing. On a lectern there is a piece of rusted metal. On it there are the words "September 11, 2001 Airlines 77." Yes, it is indeed a piece of the plane that hit the Pentagon marking the beginning of the war for the twenty-first Defense Secretary of the United States. His handshake is warm. We take a seat around a small coffee table. He looks grandfatherly and in fact at the age of 71 he has six grandchildren. However as soon as he speaks he looks more like the teacher that you hoped you'd never have. When he is not being curt, he abruptly brushes aside the things he does not want to hear, his favorite part is playing the cynic. He juggles issues with the power of a former wrestler... Mr. Rumsfeld is straightforward. With the military he has developed a reputation as a visionary. He never has doubts...

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SecDef: [There is no country] in the United Nations [that argued that he did not]. Our intelligence [and that of other countries] argued that [he] had chemical and biological weapons. [He] did not have nuclear weapons... [but he] had programs. [This is a country] with a pattern of denying and deceiving. They buried twelve jet airplanes! We have not found hard evidence of these programs yet. [We are waiting] for the final report from the Iraqi Survey Group by Dr. David Kelly. I believe [that the] intelligence before the war was correct. [But do not expect] to just discover or find things. [On the other hand we are on the verge of finding people] who will [talk about the existence of these weapons]. [It is still difficult to find] key people [from the former regime who are willing to talk], partly because Saddam Hussein is still alive.

Paris Match: Two years after September 11 and seven months after the fall of Baghdad Ben Laden and Saddam Hussein still have not been caught. They continue to taunt you with their messages. Does this signify failure?

SecDef: If you look at the major nations of the world [they all] have their most wanted list of criminals. People are on those lists for five, ten, fifteen years. Take Saddam Hussein. He stole something in the neighborhood of a billion dollars out of the central bank [of Iraq]. We found maybe a... third of that, some of it with his sons when they were killed. We currently have captured or killed 42 of the top 55 [in the Iraqi leadership]. That's pretty good. [There are thirteen left]. The Department of Defense was never organized... to find specific individuals. It was trained to deal with armies. The new security environment of the 21st century [presents us] with a new challenge that is difficult. [Finding Saddam] is like finding a needle in a haystack. When a person [has] a billion dollars and has hundreds of supporters that benefited from his dictatorial rule, it is not surprising that he is able to find assistance. [Now, is he behind the attacks? No, he is too busy hiding].

Paris Match: In 1983 you had met him in Baghdad. What do remember of this man?

SecDef: Iraq was in the Iran War. We had a problem with Syria and Lebanon. 241 Marines had been killed [in Beirut] by terrorists with the assistance of Syria. [If] Iran [had prevailed it would have become influential in the region]. [Yes] we

were talking to the Iraqi government [at the time] about that.

Paris Match: Do you remember him as being friendly or cold?

SecDef: [I never] jump to conclusions on first impressions. [I knew beforehand] that he [was a brutal dictator engaged in a war]. [I went in knowing certain things about him]. I delivered the messages on behalf of our government. [But] I talked with Tariq Aziz for many hours.

Paris Match: The war in Iraq has undermined certain alliances. Do you think that the quarrel with France went too far? Was it unnecessary?

SecDef: I was Ambassador to NATO in 1973 and 1974 that was a difficult period for the Atlantic Alliance. Michel Jobert was the Foreign Minister. Henry Kissinger was the Secretary of State [Things go] back and forth [with France]. I am 71 years old. This has been going on most of the history of NATO. Every three or four years [an] issue [like this] pops up. [It was the] neutron bomb during the Carter administration. During the Reagan administration there was the natural gas pipeline. [In 1966] Mr. De Gaulle [broke from] NATO. There has never been a five-year period ... where there has not been something. We have survived all [of these crises]. We are in the 21st century [the Alliance] is still there [and] it is still working.

Paris Match: In Iraq the French, Germans and Russians are not present in terms of troops and to help 'finish the job.' Do you admit that "Old Europe," as you call it, would have been useful after all?

SecDef: Who ever suggested it would not be useful? [The countries you mentioned] made other decisions. The United States went to the United Nations twice. It asked for assistance and got it from 34 countries. [You have a strange way of asking the question] 'do you admit now that it would have been helpful.' The United-States was looking for help from the beginning. Some countries made their own decision not to help. That is their right as sovereign countries. [That is all I have to say about that]. [We should not forget that these] countries are helping in the global war on terror. [They are] helping in Afghanistan.

Paris Match: You are the only member of the administration who risked his life on Sept. 11.

SecDef: [At the time of impact I was] sitting here.

Paris Match: Did you hear the noise?

SecDef: [Yes, of course], the place shook. [Behind you on the table] there us a piece of the plane that hit the building. [The office] was filled with smoke. [In the entire building there were only a few places where] we could function relatively free of smoke. [That is where we set up] command centers. I was having breakfast with some congressmen [in the next room]. Someone walked in and said that a plane hit the WTC. [I turned on the television in the office]. I had my CIA briefer here for my morning briefer. [He was] sitting where you are. [Again] someone came in and said that a second plane had hit [in New York]. [Then it was our turn].

Paris Match: In Guantanamo you are holding some 680 enemy combatants. Why don't you try them? Truman was able to properly try the Nazi leaders in Nuremberg?

SecDef: Most countries engaged in war capture people and keep them [to prevent them from killing] again. [In Nuremberg in 1946 it was a different situation because] the war had been over for a year. When you scoop up an enemy combatant, a prisoner of war... the purpose is not to punish them, the purpose is to keep them off the street. Which is why we had thousands of German... and Japanese prisoners in the United States [during the Second World War]. In Europe [you did the same thing] during every war. [What we are doing in Guantanamo] is new to some people who do not have a

memory. [We are also holding them] to interrogate them [to find out] who trained them and where they are getting their money. I can tell you this [thanks to the information that we have gotten from people we picked up] in Afghanistan, we were able to stop a terrorist attack in Singapore.

Paris Match: Your deputy Paul Wolfowitz escaped a bombing. Do you ever think about death?

SecDef: No. [I] get up very morning and go about [my] job and try to do the best [I can]. I have been doing this [for a long time]. For any human being or country a terrorist can attack at any time at any place. It is impossible to defend everywhere at every moment of the day. A car bomb, a rocket propelled grenade, anthrax, [there is no way to be 100% safe]. The only way to deal with the global war on terror is to attempt to find the terrorist networks, to break them up, to stop their financing and reduce [their ability to do harm]. Once you become fearful they have won. [we cannot] sit there and hope something will not happen [to us]. This is a very serious problem for the world.

Paris Match: When you wake up in the morning and you switch on the tv, what do you think when you find out that another young American died in Iraq?

SecDef: [All of my heart and thoughts go out to them and] to their families. I have visited the wounded [in the hospitals]. They are proud of [serving] They recognize the importance of what they are doing. There are things that are worth putting you life at risk for. We would not have a free country today if there had not been wonderful Americans and allies of America [who had not risked their lives]. [They did] and God bless them for it.

Editor's Note: Informal translation by American Embassy, Paris, Press Office. In brackets, words that were changed or added as compared with DoD transcript.

December 8, 2003

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Control of Naval Home

cc. PAUL WOLFSON

002

Please take a look at this material, and get back to me with a report on what you think should be done in connection with the material raised by Mr. Weeks.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/19/03 (b)(6) ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
120803-10

.....

Please respond by 1/16/04

8 Dec 03

U22493 /03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

SIGNED
12/8

(b)(6)

Dear (b)(6)

Thanks for your letter about the Naval Home. I'll ask David Chu, our Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness (a first-rate thinker), to look into this and get back to me.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

U19959 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20681

November 19, 2003

Dear Don,

I tried to get in touch with you when I was in Virginia but your schedule did not allow it. I was at a Naval reunion at the Lake Wright Resort in Norfolk. The VR Navy Mats reunion.

Please see the attached petition for returning the Naval Home to the control of the military. We have a mess here with the Chief Operating Officer in charge. He knows nothing of the military retiree, etc. and has made disastrous changes which resulted in the loss of staff doctors on the premises and especially the new rules in the acceptance of residents. They now only have to have been in the military for a very short time. Our problems are too numerous to mention in this letter but we really need some help in removing the COO position. When the Navy was in charge we were doing great. The Armed Home Force home in DC has all of the financial problems. We were doing extremely well financially here before combining the homes. This guy Cox only knows the assisted living business. He is trying to turn our retirement home into a nursing home or assisted living facility.

Many retirees have left the home in the last six months because of the conditions and more are scheduled to leave. We are willing to come to Washington to meet with you on this issues. Please let me hear from you.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

want to \$5 together:

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

PETITION

TO REPEAL

**PUBLIC LAW 101-510-NOVEMBER 5, 1990
"Armed Forces Retirement Home Act of 1991"**

Return The Home To Control of The Military

NAME	SERVICE	NAME	SERVICE
George Wutz	USN RET	Louis M. Menee	USN
Ben H. Mellon	USAF RET.	Joe J. Long	USN
Harold Spruance	Ret.	William W. Long	USN
Ray Snyder	Army	McBuckett	USN
Whitehall Mays	USN	Andrew Chapman	USMC
W.R. Baker	Army	St. P. Gage	USN
R.B. Sitt	USN	Tom Kiley	USN
Cliff J. Jones	USN	Quirk, Clark	USAF
Arnie Willard	USN RET	Arnold Boyd	
Nicholas R. Nibrich	USAF	Garrett C. Peja	USAF
Charles D. Hill	AF	Jim J. Cole	
Floyd G. Gille	Army	Joise C. Hogan	USN
Francis J. Benjamin	USAF	Dennis McBarney	
Lobby Campbell	USAF	William L. Allen	USN
James W. Smith	USN + USA	St. John G. Jackson	USNR
Robert K. Kinsler	USAF	Peter V. DeLoe	
Edward H. Zorank	USMC	Robert J. DeLoe	
James E. Cotta	USN	Charles A. DeLoe	
Edell W. Minn	USN	B.P. Norris	
Norris Rogers	NAVY	Arthur J. Krick	
C. Ruggs	NAVY	Raymond H. DeLoe	
Arnold Matthews	Army/USMC	John S. DeLoe	
W.E. Grisham	USN	James H. Hardest	
J.D. Herrick	USN	Nancy Littus	
Andrew E. Seltzer	Air Force	W.C. Rigsby	ARMY
Ronald A. Monroe	ARMY NAVY		

NAME

SERVICE

NAME

SERVICE

Eugene P. Spencer USAF
 Nick [Signature] USNR
 Harry [Signature] USA
 Robert Halloran USN
 Frank [Signature] USN
 Archie Edwards USAF
 Charles S. [Signature] USN
 Lois O'Neil Navy
 John Sakatys USN
 James F. Williamson USNR
 Gene Hastings USAF
 Kenneth [Signature] USN
 [Signature]
 Richard Pace USN
 Richard W. Root USN/USAF
 Paul C. [Signature] USA
 Frank W. Roberts USA
 [Signature] USAF
 Myrtle [Signature] USN
 Bill H. [Signature] USAF
 Francis C. Scott USA
 Ethel W. Blythe USA
 Robert E. Cotta USA & USN
 John [Signature] USMC
 [Signature] USN
 Robert [Signature] USAF
 Richard [Signature] USN
 Dickie [Signature] USAF
 [Signature] USN

Frank B. [Signature] ARMY
 William L. Adams USMC
 Charles [Signature] USN RET
 Philip S. [Signature] ARMY
 John W. [Signature] USN
 George T. Kennedy USN
 J. Marcia the force
 Jack [Signature] Army
 Billy G. Spencer USAF
 [Signature] USNR
 Betty [Signature] USN
 E.B. [Signature] USN
 [Signature]
 Franklin [Signature] ARMY
 Lorraine [Signature] USN
 C.A. Miller USNR
 Peter [Signature] USMC
 W.H. [Signature] NAVY
 [Signature] USAF
 [Signature]
 [Signature] USN
 [Signature] NAVY
 Edward W. McCullough NAVY
 [Signature] ARMS
 [Signature]
 [Signature] USN
 [Signature] USN
 [Signature] USN
 [Signature] ARMY

NAME

SERVICE NAME

SERVICE

Don Ober

AF

Chad Dan

AF
OSNR

Allan T. Helton
Leo Costello

AF

Army Navy

3 Sybil Jackson

James Danoschak
Royce J Scheeler

W.F. "Jack" Childs USMC

Walter Appuhn USMC

William J. Lockhart

USN

Norval E. Kellam USN

James W. Emmert

USAF

James M. Spencer USAF

David W. Rexon

USN

Walter

USAF

Joseph Zucker

USN

Forest L. Schmidt Navy

Walter

USN

David D. Bean

R. E. Bluffin

Stanley J. Lane

USN

Walter L. Grubb

Engelbert Rainey

USA

Nelson Furr

Richard E. Crayford

USN

Carole Landry

Harry L. Spiker

USN

A Daniel Lyons

James Pawson

USN

Merinda L. Powers

USN

Frank R. Rumbly

USN

Bernard A. Egan

USN (RET)

Marvin Westcott

USN (RET)

Carole Syvank

USN (Ret)

Engene White

USN

Jackie Bacon

WAVE

John Taylor

AF

Rex & Corina

USN

7:42 AM

TO: Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: December 9, 2003

SUBJECT:

Sam Johnson R-500 AF 51-79

Viet

Please give me the name of the congressman who was so severely wounded, I believe, in Vietnam. We had him down to the parade ground one day and he was the honoree. He's quite disabled, and a very nice man. His name may be Sam Johnson, or something like that.

In any event, he has a place in Angel Fire, and he's going to be in Taos over Christmas. His phone number is (b)(6) Call his office and get the correct number and find out the dates he's going to be there. I would like to give him a call and have him come to the house to see us.

Let me know. Thanks.

DHR/azn
120903.07

Please respond by: _____

12/17

U22495 /03

9 Dec 03

3rd DISTRICT / TEXAS

Rep. Sam Johnson (R)



Elected May 1991; 5th full term

Solid, steady and unassuming, Johnson is a dependable anchor for the conservative faction of House Republicans, offering his younger compatriots the lessons of his experience while helping them to remain focused on their goal of limiting federal government.

Born in 1930, Johnson is older but every bit as conservative as the younger-generation hard-liners who compose the chamber's right wing.

Johnson was a career Air Force pilot who spent seven years as a prisoner of war in Vietnam. He came to Congress in 1991, four years before the large conservative Class of 1994 took office. His conservative views are unchanging. That background, combined with his seniority and dependability, wins him the respect, and the attention, of his colleagues.

Everyone seems to like Johnson, even those with whom he disagrees. That is fortunate, because Johnson's brand of conservatism often puts him at odds on policy matters not only with most Democrats, but also with many moderate Republicans. He is one of the four founders of the Conservative Action Team, known as the CATs, a group of the most conservative House members.

The goals of the CATs are most often associated with the large and assertive Class of 1994, and Johnson takes no offense that, despite his founding member status, he is often overlooked as a conservative spokesman. In fact, Johnson would just as soon remain in the background.

That's not to say he's a shrinking violet: He was particularly outspoken in his criticism of President Clinton, dating back to the 1992 presidential campaign, when he characterized Clinton's post-college trip to Moscow and his avoidance of military service as un-American. And he had run-ins with fellow Republican Newt Gingrich as well, participating in an abortive attempt to topple the Speaker when he thought that the GOP leadership was too willing to compromise its principles in dealing with Clinton.

But Johnson praises Speaker J. Dennis Hastert for trying to accommodate the competing desires of factions in the party while being mindful of the GOP's slim margin of control. Because Johnson feels he and other conservatives receive a fair hearing, he says he's more inclined to cut Hastert some slack to deal with the political reality of a small margin. Johnson reports that most of the CATs seem to agree, although some of the more militant members occasionally "have to be leaned on" to be more pragmatic.

Johnson remains committed to reducing the size of federal government and its reach into citizens' lives. Although years of experience on Capitol Hill have tempered his short-term expectations, he has remained confident that his views will ultimately prevail. He says it takes a term or two in Congress to develop a full appreciation of the way things work in Washington — particularly the role of the Senate and the White House. For that reason, he is sorry to see some lawmakers voluntarily limit their terms in Congress.

Johnson's staff reports he is perpetually optimistic, even while pursuing some seemingly endless campaigns such as the one he waged to eliminate the so-called Social Security earning test, in which the benefits of some senior citizens were reduced if they continued to earn a salary. He finally saw victory on that front in 2000.

From his post on the Ways and Means Committee, Johnson has been a leader in the CATs' push for big tax cuts, including elimination of the inheritance tax, cuts in the capital gains rate and a fix of the "marriage penalty," a quirk in the tax code that results in some two-earner married couples paying higher taxes than they would if each partner were single. Johnson says

CAPITOL OFFICE
225-4201; fax 225-1485
1000 Longworth Bldg. 20515

INTERNET
e-mail: www.house.gov/writerap
web: www.house.gov/samjohnson

COMMITTEES
Education & Workforce
(Employer-Employee Relations - chairman)
Ways & Means

HOMETOWN
Piano

BORN
Oct. 11, 1930, San Antonio, Texas

RELIGION
Methodist

FAMILY
Wife, Shirley Melton, three children

EDUCATION
Southern Methodist U., B.B.A. 1951; George
Washington U., M.S.I.A. 1974

MILITARY SERVICE
Air Force, 1951-79

CAREER
Home builder, Air Force pilot

POLITICAL HIGHLIGHTS
Texas House, 1985-91

ELECTION RESULTS

2000 GENERAL

Sam Johnson (R)	187,486	71.6%
Billy Wayne Zachary (D)	67,233	25.7%
Larce Flores (LIBERT)	7,178	2.7%

2000 PRIMARY

Sam Johnson (R)	40,802	93.6%
J.A. Gonnell (R)	2,840	6.5%

1998 GENERAL

Sam Johnson (R)	106,690	91.2%
Ken Ashby (LIBERT)	10,288	8.8%

PREVIOUS WINNING PERCENTAGES

1986 (73%); 1994 (81%); 1992 (86%); 1991 Special
Runoff Election (53%); 1991 Special Election (20%)

TEXAS 3rd DISTRICT

he would favor repealing the 16th Amendment, which authorized the collection of federal income tax.

Johnson is on the board of regents of the Smithsonian Institution, and he is particularly enthusiastic about the National Air and Space Museum annex under construction near Dulles International Airport in Virginia. He originally won appointment to the Smithsonian board in 1995 when he and other lawmakers protested an exhibit on the "Enola Gay" — the plane that dropped the first atomic bomb on Japan — because it depicted Japan as a victim. Johnson got Gingrich to appoint him to the board, and a scaled-back exhibit focused on the mechanics of the plane rather than the morality of its mission.

Johnson doesn't talk much about his days as a POW, which included almost three years in solitary confinement, but he did write a book about his experience, "Captive Warriors." After his solitary confinement ended, he roomed with Sen. John McCain at the prison camp. Although Johnson was tortured and sustained permanent injuries, he never despaired of being freed.

Johnson did not plan on a military career. He recalls that participation in the ROTC was mandatory when he went to high school toward the end of World War II. He continued ROTC at Southern Methodist University in his hometown of Dallas but was aiming at a career in business and law.

The Korean War intervened, however, and his entire ROTC class was called to duty. Johnson was quickly accepted into flight training, and he fell in love with flying. That's what sold him on a career in the Air Force.

He flew combat missions in Korea and Vietnam, was a member of the precision flying team, the Thunderbirds, for two years, and served as the Air Force's "Top Gun" — director of the Air Force Fighter Weapons School.

Johnson's plane was shot down over North Vietnam in 1966, and he was held prisoner nearly seven years. While in prison, he began thinking about a future in politics. Upon his release, he had three operations on his right hand, including a tendon transplant, and was able to resume flying.

After retiring from the Air Force in 1979 as a colonel, Johnson went into the home-building business in Dallas. He became active in local Republican Party affairs and, in 1984, he won a seat in the Texas House representing the suburbs of Collin County, where he built a reputation as a law-and-order conservative. He broadened his contacts in the Dallas area as co-chairman of George Bush's north Texas 1988 presidential campaign and as chairman of 3rd District GOP Rep. Steve Bartlett's campaigns in 1988 and 1990.

Bartlett resigned in March 1991 to run for mayor of Dallas. Johnson overcame a tough scramble to win the GOP nomination, but in the wealthy, solidly Republican 3rd District, has had no electoral difficulty since.

KEY VOTES

- 2000**
- No Raise hourly minimum wage by \$1 over two years
 - Yes Halt funding for U.S. mission in Kosovo unless European nations pay more
 - Yes Provide Medicare benefits to military retirees and their dependents
 - Yes Grant China permanent normal trade status
 - Yes Phase out excise, gift and trust taxes
 - Yes Prohibit implementation of president's national monument designations
 - Yes Approve GOP plan to provide prescription drug coverage for Medicare beneficiaries
 - No Increase help for poor nations indebted to international financial institutions
- 1998**
- No Impose steel import quotas
 - Yes Kill proposal to take aviation trust funds off budget
 - No Require background checks on buyers only at gun shows with 10 or more vendors
 - Yes Remove barriers among banking, securities and insurance companies
 - No Authorize state grants to hire teachers and reduce class size
 - No Overhaul campaign finance law ban "soft money" and restrict advocacy advertising
 - No Approve bipartisan plan to increase rights of patients in managed-care health plans

INTEREST GROUPS

	AFL-CIO	ADA	CCUE	ACU
2000	0%	0%	85%	100%
1999	0%	0%	88%	96%
1998	0%	0%	82%	100%
1997	0%	10%	100%	96%

CQ VOTE STUDIES

	PARTY UNITY		PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT	
	Support	Oppose	Support	Oppose
2000	98%	2%	25%	75%
1999	97%	3%	17%	83%
1998	96%	4%	20%	80%
1997	95%	5%	29%	71%

TEXAS 3

Northeast Dallas suburbs; Plano

Most of the 3rd's population comes from suburban Dallas, but the district extends northward to take in much of Collin County as well. Before its boundaries were altered by a federal court in 1986, the 3rd was a bastion of affluence and power. Although the alterations removed wealthy areas like Highland Park and University Park and added a section of Plano's black neighborhoods, the district remains economically well-off, white and Republican.

Collin continues to see tremendous growth as Dallas sprawls northward. Many corporate headquarters have moved into the Plano area, and wealthy executives have built half-million-dollar homes in sections like Oakfield. The concentration of electronic and telecommunications firms along U.S. Highway 75 has earned that area the name, "Telecom Corridor." Texas Instruments and Electronic Data Systems are a major presence along the corridor. Just off the Lyndon B. Johnson Freeway along U.S. 75, Richardson has benefited greatly

from high-tech firms and is growing at a rapid rate. Frisco also is undergoing a population and development boom.

The district has middle-class areas like Mesquite, which has just over 100,000 residents, and Garland, which grew at a steady pace in the '80s and '90s. Virtually all of Garland and about half of Mesquite are in the 3rd. Although downtown Dallas is in the 30th, its white-collar companies rely heavily on the 3rd for their workforce.

The district is solidly Republican — Collin County is filled with young, upwardly mobile professionals and is even more Republican than the Dallas suburbs. The district, which in general is fiscally conservative and holds traditional views, votes Republican at local, state and national levels.

MAJOR INDUSTRY
Telecommunications, transportation, banking

CITIES
Garland (tot), 189,415 (1990); Plano (pt), 153,896 (1990); Richardson, 87,517; Dallas (pt), 83,768 (1990); Allen, 42,075

UNUSUAL FEATURES
Annual hot air balloon festival in Plano.

December 10, 2003

TO: David Chu
 Dov Zakheim
 Powell Moore

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Increase in End Strength

Larry Di Rita
1/2

Apparently there are close to 100 Congressmen who have asked for an increase in end strength. I think they said 8 percent for all the Services, but someone ought to look at the proposal. We ought to find out what it is going to cost.

Please let me know.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
 121003-3

.....
 Please respond by 1/9/04

Copy to:
Marc Thuesen
done 1/2

320.2

10 Dec 03

U22496 /03



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100



INFO MEMO

December 19, 2003, 10:00 AM

COMPTROLLER

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Increase in End Strength

- Members of Congress (135) are recommending that the Services' end strength levels be increased by 8 percent (TAB A).
- We estimate that the costs would be, at minimum, \$6.6 billion per year as follows:

	(\$ in Billions)	(End Strength)
Army	2.1	38,400
Navy	1.5	29,900
Marine Corp	0.6	14,000
Air Force	1.5	28,700
Def-Wide*	.9	-
Total DoD	6.6	111,000

*Includes healthcare costs and Department of Defense Education Activity.

- This estimate assumes:
 - Growth is only in the Active Forces,
 - Growth is via accessions (rather than retention),
 - There is also 8 percent growth in issued equipment, readiness training, school house training, and recruiting.
- The estimate does not include cost that would be incurred for Family Housing/barracks, Defense Health or retirement costs.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Prepared By: John M. Evans

(b)(6)

Copy to Marc Throsson 12/31

Why?

PL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	C/12
MA BUCID	
EXECSEC MAHROTT	12/22

U21058-103

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

November 21, 2003

President George W. Bush
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President,

We are concerned that our Armed Forces are over-extended and that we are relying too heavily upon members of the Guard and Reserve in the continuing war on terrorism.

You will be making decisions over the coming months that will be reflected in your FY05 budget request to the Congress. We believe that we must significantly increase the number of people on active duty in the military and revise the missions given to the National Guard and Reserve during the up-coming budget year. We encourage you to incorporate proposals to address these challenges in your budget. Making these changes would be met with broad, bipartisan support in the Congress.

The operational tempo required to maintain forward-deployed forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, Korea, and elsewhere is unprecedented. Not since the Vietnam War has the U.S. Army had such a large fraction of its active-duty forces deployed.

While we understand that the administration will seek to reduce U.S. forces in Iraq as Iraqi security forces are trained, we must expect that the Iraq deployment will continue at substantial levels for a considerable time. Moreover, the war on terrorism is not a crisis for which the military can surge and then recover. This will be a lengthy war that will define entire careers. We must size and structure our forces to prevail over the long haul.

We are also concerned about the mix of Active, Reserve and Guard units needed to sustain the war on terrorism. We are asking more from our reservist citizen-soldiers than ever before. While they have served admirably, we believe that we need to review and adjust the missions and specialties in the reserve components so that we can protect the homeland and prevail against terrorists without over-reliance on citizen soldiers for long periods of time.

The men and women of our Guard and Reserve can and should be called upon to assist our country in times of crisis on a temporary basis. Many of the units currently serving in Iraq will have served for nearly 15 months, in some cases longer, by the time their tours are finished. When they come home, the nature of this war is such that they know they are quite likely to be called up again sometime in the near future.

FORMED OR REVISED PAGE

11-L-0559/OSD/20693

Mr. President, every day we read stories about the potential impending loss we could suffer to our Guard and Reserve forces if the current situation is not fixed. The Army Guard is not going to meet its recruitment targets this year. Many of us have served, currently serve or have family and personal friends that serve in the Guard and Reserve. All of us have constituents who serve. Unless these burdens are reduced we may find ourselves in the midst of a recruiting and retention crisis in the reserve components. We need to send a clear message in the coming budget to members of the Guard and Reserve that help is on the way.

Repeated, long-term deployments will clearly take a toll on spouses and children of our men and women in the military here at home. Military service always entails time away from home, but we think that the active services – and particularly the Army – must find a way to better balance the demands of overseas deployments with the needs of troops' families back home. Otherwise, we may face a mid-grade retention problem in the coming years that will be devastating to our forces.


We are particularly concerned about the size of the active duty Army. While we will certainly work with you and your administration, we feel that your budget should include a build up to two more combat divisions so that we can reduce the pressure on the reserve components and sustain the war on terrorism for the long term without losing expertise that will "hollow-out" the Army.

The size of the current Army—and the Army budgets that pay for it—are predicated upon an early-1990s strategy that did not foresee the tempo of today's operations or the long-term war on global terrorism. During the decade of the 1990s, the Army shrank from 18 divisions to 10. The Cold War was over and the war on terrorism had not yet begun. We must now make the decisions needed to structure our forces so that we prevail in this new war that is likely to continue for some time. Increasing the size of the force is no panacea for meeting all of the challenges we face, but we believe it is a critical element of any plan to address the needs of our nation's security.

Mr. President, our military needs help now. We ask that you show strong leadership and take the necessary steps to increase the end strength of our Armed Forces and adjust the mix of active and reserve component forces in the upcoming budget year.

We stand with you ready to confront any and all challenges to our great nation.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/20694

E. L. Cross

Laura A. Davis

John Davis

Marty Meel

Joe Wilson

Gene Taylor

Frank Straker

[Signature]

Conrad S. Miller

John M. Spratt Jr.

John Kline

Paul Summers, A/2
(COL, USAF, RET)

[Signature]

Frank Sanchez

Richard Hansen

John W. High

Medicine J. Scudello

[Signature]

Art Hill

Neil Abernethy

Walter B. Jones

Max F.

Gil Gutkunt

W. H. H.

Samuel D. King

Ed. Kelly

Shelley Moore Capito

Bill Calvert

John Sullivan

Jim Boy

Ron Lewis

Jim Gibbons

Hal Rogers

John H. Stetter

Howard "Buck" McKeon

Ray Sawyer

McLannan

Carl Carlson

J. Reed Hulse

Cliff Edwards

Sam Adams

Walter Hill

Tom Osborne

Gene Smith

Ralph W. Hall

Mary Keptur

DeLoe

Pip

John

Walter Long

A. B.

Carl

Sam Johnson

Robert E. An

Robin Hayes

Mike Roger (AL)

Bartlett

Lane Evans

D. Carly

Phil English

Mike Han

John Boyer

John Evans

Mark Hley

~~Buty~~ Fry

Ed Fanning

Jim Dargwin

Zak Wamp

Klana Kos-Lekinen

George Buterrecht

Barbara Arlen

Gil Butrecht

Donald Marshall, Jr.

Ed White

Donald K. Cunningham

[Signature]

Bob Brown

[Signature]

Paul Burt

Sam Cole

Jim Hill

Pat Burns

Steve Green

Wayne E. Gilbert

Ed. [Signature]

De [Signature]

Dez Walden

Cathy [Signature]

William J. [Signature]

Nathan [Signature]

W. Goddard

Tom Osborne

E. Alcock

Tim Muegley

Jim Mathews

Phil King

Chris A.

Bob Jones

W. J. Anderson

Wally Harger

Don Bennett

Tom Starnes

Bert Johnson

Bob G.

June Hurmer

Ed Bradley

W. E. Lopez

Jim Moran

Marianne Conway

Rick Buckner

Archie J. Young

Yvonne McDowns

Carolyn E. Kelpak

Tom [unclear]

Cliff [unclear]

Steve [unclear]

Jim [unclear]

Mal [unclear]

John A. [unclear]

[unclear]

Frank Ballou

Tom Lantos

L. A. [unclear]

John E. [unclear]

Tim Ryan

[unclear]

Ken Terry

Ellen Traucher

Michael A. ...

John B. ...

John B. ...

COORDINATION PAGE

USD (P&R)	Dr. David Chu	Dec. 15, 2003
PDASD(LA)	Mr. Stanley	Dec. 15, 2003
TJS (J-8)	LtGen James E. Cartwright	Dec. 15, 2003

December 11, 2003

TO: Les Brownlee
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
David Chu
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Correspondence from Council on American-Islamic Relations

Here's a letter I received. I have not read it closely, but the person writing appears to be making some pretty serious allegations.

Please get back to me quickly and tell me what you intend to do about this.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/4/03 Hooper ltr to SecDef re: alleged comments via e-mail from Army officer

DHR:dh
121103-3

.....
Please respond by 12/17/03

✓
Myer
Response attached
12/22

250.4

17 Dec 03

U224978/03

0800

In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

CAIR

Council on American-Islamic Relations

458 New Jersey Avenue, S.E.

Washington, D.C. 20003

Tel: (b)(6)

Fax:

E-mail: cair@cair-net.org

URL: <http://www.cair-net.org>

December 4, 2003

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-100

VIA FAX: (b)(6)

Post-It [®] Fax Note	7671	Date	# of pages 4
To	SEC. RUMSFELD		
Co./Dept	Co.		
Phone #	Phone #		
Fax #	Fax #		

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I hope this letter finds you in good health and spirits.

It is my unfortunate duty to bring to your attention bigoted anti-Muslim comments sent to our office by an officer in the U.S. military. In a series of e-mail messages, (b)(6) made statements such as: (See attached copies of the messages.)

1. "We will purge you from our land and you will return to the desert and dust."
2. "The writings of your so called Prophet are filled with hate and promises of violence against Jews and Infidels."
3. "Islam and Christianity have always been likened to Oil and Water they do not and never have mixed. America will not change for you and we will not tolerate your disruption into our Culture."
4. "I believe that we must stop the building of Mosques until there is peace..."
5. "Muslims must be monitored on a monthly basis."
6. "I would have all US Citizen Muslims put in camps, as evidenced by 9-11, living amongst us does not deter their hidden agenda. At this point in time, due to all the above reasons and many more, I believe extreme measures must be taken very soon by my country or we will be fighting hand to hand combat in our neighborhoods. Then Muslims will see what we are truly made of and if it comes to this they will be thrown out forever never to be given another chance maybe this is what it will take."

I respectfully request that the extremist and Islamophobic views of this officer be investigated and appropriate action be taken. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,

Ibrahim Hooper
Communications Director

Cc: Dep. Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, via fax (b)(6)

SECRET CABLES DISTRIBUTION				
SECDEF	IDESEC	SPL ASST	IS/CSEC	USDP
USDI	ICAD	CCD	CABLE CH	INTE

From: (b)(6)
To: 'CAIR' <cair@cair-net.org>
Subject: RE: Muslims good will
Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2003 09:57:18 +0100
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2657.72)
X-Loop-Detect:1

I believe for the safety of my fellow countrymen that we must deport all illegal Muslims. I believe that we must stop the building of Mosques until there is peace and no fear of another 9-11. In Iraq today the gunmen are using the Mosques, because the world says we cannot touch them, what better place to hide? Do not attempt to tell me this is not true, I am a Cpt in the Army and I know it to be a fact, along with I know that the bodies of our soldiers are defiled and mutilated, whenever the opportunity presents itself. This is something kept from the American people but soon it will be revealed. I believe Muslims must work very hard to let us know they can live and accept us in our own country. They teach intolerance of Jews and Infidels in schools in my own country, this must stop. I believe, just like my mother and grandfather, who came to America after WWII, Muslims must be monitored on a monthly basis. This is what my mother and grandfather, due to their place of birth, had to endure for 7yrs before they were allowed to become American Citizens. Muslims must stop demanding people like Dr. Laura not speak against them. Muslims use the Freedom of Speech to their advantage and then want to take that very freedom away from anyone who might have a different view of them. Americans have always enjoyed this freedom and the more Muslims attempt to stop our discussions, good, bad or indifferent, the more they breed distrust. If you are of true goodwill you can stand the tongue lashings and voiced fears. I believe my country must stop all immigration of any Middle East peoples until this situation of differences and very real threat to our very existence is resolved. During WWII all Japanese Americans were put into camps, this may sound extreme but I wonder how many 9-11's were avoided because we took this action? My mother, father and grandfather spent 3.5yrs in Japanese prison camps and believe me there was no compensation or mercy shown them by the Japanese. In fact out of a total of 6000+ people from all over the world only 2000 survived. I believe we can live together, however the attitudes I have seen displayed by Muslims towards Americans throughout my country, is one of "I am above you, do not talk to me and if I am your neighbor, do not think our children can play together". I would have all US Citizen Muslims put in camps, as evidenced by 9-11, living amongst us does not deter their hidden agenda. At this point in time, due to all the above reasons and many more, I believe extreme measures must be taken very soon by my country or we will be fighting hand to hand combat in our neighborhoods. Then Muslims will see what we are truly made of and if it comes to this they will be thrown out forever never to be given another chance maybe this is what it will take.

-----Original Message-----

From: CAIR [mailto:cair@cair-net.org]
Sent: Wednesday, December 03, 2003 4:40 PM
To: (b)(6)

Printed for CAIR <cair@cair-net.org>

12/4/2003

Subject: RE: Muslims good will

Peace

What do you think should be done with Muslims in America?

At 02:51 PM 12/3/2003 +0100, you wrote:

>America a land where other immigrants have come including my mother. They
 >made no demands, did not threaten us or kill us and were proud to be
 >Americans. Our written rights related to Freedom of Religion were based on
 >the Christian Faiths. There were no Hindus, Muslims, Atheist's etc. on the
 >boats that came to America for Religious Freedom. You are welcome for the
 >lesson on tolerance, having read your Koran and the life of Mohammed I was
 >certainly inspired by your claims to a Peaceful Religion. Tolerance for
 >anything other than Islam is non-existent as proven by your killing of
 >peoples all over the world today. You have only one Koran so there are not
 >different segments of your beliefs only different interpretations. The
 >writings of your so called Prophet are filled with hate and promises of
 >violence against Jews and Infidels. He even says he will be at the Throne
 >of God on Judgement Day and it will be him, not God Judging. He is the
 only
 >so called prophet who tells his followers they must obey God and him. He
 >imitates the Biblical stories and even takes quotes directly from the
 Bible.
 >Hagar was told her son would be a donkey of a man who would be against all
 >the people and all the people against him. If the Jews had accepted
 >Mohammed's writings and acknowledged him as a prophet would he have been
 >filled with such venom? He came late onto the scene, hundreds of years
 >after Christianity and he was 40yrs old when he went into that cave. He
 >never says his religion was inspired by God he says the Angel Gabriel was
 >his inspiration. Islam and Christianity have always been likened to Oil
 and
 >Water they do not and never have mixed. America will not change for you
 and
 >we will not tolerate your disruption into our Culture. Others meshed and
 >blended you only rub the wrong way.

>-----Original Message-----

>From: CAIR [mailto:cair@cair-net.org]
 >Sent: Wednesday, December 03, 2003 2:29 PM
 >To: (b)(6)
 >Subject: Re: Muslims good will

>At 01:26 PM 12/3/2003 +0100, you wrote:

>>I am an Army Nurse stationed in Germany. I wish you all to leave my
 >>country.
 >
 >
 >Which country?
 >

> >Why do you come to a country whose very way of life you decry and despise
> >enough to perpetrate violence against us? I know why, Christianity
> >teaches tolerance, you believe that is how you will overcome we may be
> >tolerant but we are not ignorant and you will soon see more of this
> >rhetoric as more and more Americans become aware of what you really
> >are. We will purge you from our land and you will return to the desert
> >and dust. The only support I will give to any Muslim organization is a
> >one-way ticket to your sandbox.
>
>
>Thank you for your lesson in tolerance.

In reply refer to EF-7801 and I#03/016984

December 11, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Ryan Henry

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Reducing Stress on the Force

I want a report on whether we are making progress on reducing stress on the force.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121103-11

.....
Please respond by 1/16/04

✓
12/18
c 12/17

Sir,
Response attached.
vr/
CDR Nucuzo
12/17

U22498 /03

12-12-03 14:26 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/20709

322

11 Dec 03



POLICY

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
2100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2100

✓
12/18

INFO MEMO

Reply to EF-7801 and I#03/016984
16 December 2003, 1500

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: Update on "Stress on the Force" Initiative

- The purpose of this info memo is to respond to your snowflake of 11 December 2003 (Tab A) concerning relieving "Stress on the Force".
- I issued a call for updates today, 16 December, for the approximately 200 specific actions we have catalogued as being related to relieving stress on the force.
- Personnel and Resources, the Joint Staff, JFCOM, and many other organizations are working various pieces.
- I've requested updates to this work plan be submitted by 22 December so that we can assess the progress, plans and likely outputs and provide you a report.
- I plan to coordinate this update with the Chairman and get it to you by 16 January.

KEY ISSUE: Preparing update on actions to reduce "Stress on the Force"

COORDINATION: None

RECOMMENDATION: None. For your information only.

ATTACHMENTS: As Stated

Prepared by: David Bak, (b)(6)

3/20 1683

Snowflake

In reply refer to EF-7803 and I#03/016986

December 11, 2003

0913

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

CC: [unclear]

3/29

Sec Def

SUBJECT: Memo on Security Assistance

We need to get a memo on the handling of security assistance—IMF, IMET, etc.
The funding was slashed. Only \$42 million goes for Eurasia.

The interagency process is broken. Congress is imposing requirements on something like 80 percent of the total funds. There is no consideration for support in the Global War on Terror Article 98. We need to get it fixed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121103.7

.....
Please respond by 1/9/04

✓ 3/30

C 3/30

Sir,
Response attached. Related snowflake is last under.
vr/CDR Nasenzo
3/30

11 Dec 03

EF-7803

U224994/03

12-12-03 14:27 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/20711

GF-7803 ✓
3/30

I/04-003743-STRAT
I-03/016986
I-03/016601

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef _____

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *3/26/04*

SUBJECT: Snowflake Response: Improving the Interagency Security Assistance Process

- You sent us two snowflakes on security assistance.
- We are developing a briefing for you that proposes:
 - Modifying the interagency process to:
 - provide strategic guidance from Principals to State and DoD, and
 - improve execution of USG aid programs in the field.
 - Increasing, rather than reducing, the security assistance budget.
- We are also looking at how we can improve internal DoD processes, linking DoD components more effectively.
 - We will look at adapting the missions and functions of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to tie together our security assistance tools with our security cooperation objectives.
 - We will brief you on this initiative when we have developed our preliminary recommendations.

T B L

Prepared by: Mary Tighe, Strategy (b)(6)

11-L-0559-04

In reply refer to EF-7732 and I#03/016601

December 5, 2003

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Assistance to Foreign Countries

I think we ought to get the interagency process going to take a look at how the US government as a whole deals with countries, so that it is put on a more rational basis.

As I was going into Azerbaijan, which is a country that has helped us considerably, I found out that they are receiving something like one-third of what Tajikistan is receiving. That doesn't make much sense to me. DoD ought to have a voice in this, and we ought to approach it like we are approaching our security cooperation, worldwide, and see if we can't get a more reasonable worldwide approach.

A second problem is really government-wide, including the Department of Defense. It takes a year or two for anything to happen in the US Government. These foreign countries, particularly the ones that we have relatively new relationships with, cannot believe we are as slow, sluggish and incompetent as we are. When they experience long delays, they assume that something else is going on and that we don't want to help them. There has to be a way to put some energy into the US interagency process and speed it up.

We have to find a way to get the priority countries we have the Security Cooperation Guidance to filter down through not just DoD, but also through the

EF-7732
U22479 /03 016601

rest of the USG, unless someone wants to come back and argue with us about what the priorities ought to be, in which case that would be a good process.

If we have to take our force posture into the interagency, why wouldn't the State Department and OMB's judgments about which countries should get what amounts of money also be in the interagency process, with an opportunity to appeal it up to the President, if necessary? It is important to our relationships worldwide.

I would like to see what the US Government as a whole does for various important countries. We ought to look at the totality of it and see how it ends up impacting the key countries. My guess is that nobody really knows the answer to that, except those countries and the ambassador. And that it very likely doesn't fit what we believe ought to be the proper priorities.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120303-22 (to computer)

.....
Please respond by 1/9/04

December ¹⁵ 12, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Brief on Boeing

Please set a meeting with Paul Wolfowitz and anyone else he wants to brief me on the models he has come up with on the Boeing matter.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121203-16

.....
Please respond by 12/17/03

U22500 /0:

OK per MR

December 10, 2003

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Boeing

You are going to have to get back to me with the different models we might want to use on that Boeing issue.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121003-9

.....
Please respond by 12/17/03

U22470 /03

✓
1/5

In reply refer to EF-7802 and I # 03/016983

December 11, 2003

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
SUBJECT: Foreign Visits

I read this memo from Peter Flory about how the Argentines were treated at the Executive Office Building.

My recommendation is we stop setting up appointments at the NSC for visitors to the Pentagon. It is complicated to get in there, the Secret Service are tough and why put people through it? If someone from over there wants to see him, have them come over and meet with him here at the Pentagon.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/11/03 PDASD(ISA) memo to SecDef re: Incident Involving Argentine MoD

DHR:dh
121103-24

.....
Please respond by 1/9/04

091.112

Sir.
Response attached.
Original attachment included behind.
vr/
CDR Noseny
12/2/04
C112

11 Dec 03

12-12-03 14:27 LW

11-L-0559/OSD/20717

U22501 /03



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

INFO MEMO

JAN 2 2004
USDP *[Signature]*

EF-7802
I-03/016983-ES

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6))

[Signature] DEC 31 2003

SUBJECT: Foreign Visits

After the Argentine MOD had a difficult time at the Eisenhower Executive Office Building earlier this month, you recommended that we stop setting up appointments at the NSC for our foreign visitors

- We (OSD) generally do not get involved in setting up these appointments.
- Most appointments with the NSC staff are made directly by the visitor's own embassy.
- In the future, we will warn visitors of potential security problems at the White House and offer facilities at the Pentagon, but many visitors seek the prestige of a "White House" meeting.

NSC staff is working to prevent future foul-ups of this type by:

- Warning embassies at the time an appointment is made that all visitors require photo ID for entrance to White House grounds.
- Use of non-secure White House-controlled building nearby—no ID necessary.

Prepared by: Michael M. MacMurray, ISA/WHA,

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/20718

31-12-03 10:44 10



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

✓
12/11

PDUSDP copy provided

INFO MEMO

I-03/016901

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter C. W. Flory, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

11 DEC 2003

SUBJECT: Incident Involving Argentine MOD at Eisenhower Executive Office
Building on ~~Tuesday~~ ^{Wednesday}, 9 December
_{WS) 10}

You should be aware of an incident involving MOD Pampuro and the Secret Service yesterday afternoon.

- The Minister was scheduled to meet at 3:30pm with Mr. Thomas A. Shannon, the NSC Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs. Pampuro did not have any photo identification, and the Secret Service refused to admit him to the EEOB.
- When his U.S. military escorts attempted to resolve the matter, the situation apparently became ugly, with the Secret Service threatening to arrest everyone involved.
- Additionally, General Chevalier, the Argentine Air Force chief, set off the metal detector and objected to the resultant pat-down by the guards.

We do not think Pampuro will complain about this incident to you, but it may affect his attitude when you meet with him this afternoon.

- Mr. Shannon will meet with the Minister at his Embassy after your meeting today.

Prepared by: M. M. MacMurray, ISA/WHA, (b)(6)

*Latest info - this morning -
appear the situation is
smoothed over, all etc.*



C 12/11

2/12
1503

rec'd
5 Feb

December 11, 2003

337

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: "Formers"

*Don Rumsfeld
1/50*


Please show me a list of who was invited to the meeting of the "Formers" I had today, so I can see who did not come.

Thanks.

*Col Rhynedance:
Please provide*

DHR:dh
121103-27

.....
Please respond by 12/15/03



*Thanks,
Jaymie
Turner*

2/3

Cc: ES

U22502 /03

11 Dec 03

As of November 25, 2003



**Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
Outreach Meeting with the Formers**

Thursday, December 11, 2003 12:30 to 2:00 pm Room 3E869, The Pentagon

Confirmed List of Invitees

Former Secretaries of State:

Madeleine K. Albright
James Baker III
Lawrence Eagleburger
George Shultz
Alexander Haig, Jr.
Henry Kissinger

Former Secretaries of Defense:

William Cohen
William Perry
Frank Carlucci III
Caspar Weinberger
Harold Brown
James Schlesinger
Melvin Laird
Robert McNamara

Former National Security Advisors:

Brent Scowcroft
William Clark
Richard V. Allen
Zbigniew Brzezinski

Former Central Intelligence Agency Directors:

James Woolsey
William Webster

11-L-0559/OSD/20721

Updated December 11, 2003/7:39 a.m.

**READ AHEAD FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD H. RUMSFELD
LUNCHEON MEETING WITH THE FORMERS**

FROM: Larry Di Rita (b)(6)

Date/Time: Thursday, December 11, 2003 1:00 p.m. to 2:00 p.m.

Location: Secretary of Defense Conference Room (3E928).

Audience: Confirmed are: Harold Brown, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Frank Carlucci III, William Clark, Lawrence Eagleburger, Henry Kissinger, Robert McNamara, James Schlesinger, Brent Scowcroft and Caspar Weinberger. You last met with roughly this same group July 31, 2003.

Format: Brigadier General Vincent K. Brooks, Deputy Director for War on Terrorism (J5), Joint Staff will update attendees beginning at 12:30 p.m. on our fight against global terrorism. Ryan Henry, who will discuss U.S. global posturing, will follow Brigadier General Brooks. After attendees have been served their lunch, you will make remarks (provide update on NATO meetings in Brussels, and meetings in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Iraq) beginning at 1:00 p.m., followed by Q&A. Luncheon meeting to conclude by 2:00 p.m.

Timeline: 12:30 p.m. **Welcome and Introduction**
Chris Willcox, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

12:31 p.m. **Background Briefings: The Road Ahead**
GWOT Update (approximately 15 minutes)
Brigadier General Vincent K. Brooks, Deputy Director for War on
Terrorism (J5), Joint Staff

Global Posture Brief (approximately 5 minutes)
Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

12:55 p.m. **Break for Lunch**

1:00 p.m. **Luncheon Discussion with Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld**

Also present to assist with questions:
General Richard B. Myers (general military operations)
Ryan Henry (global posture footprint)
Reuben Jeffrey (CPA, reconstruction efforts)

2:00 p.m. **Farewells as appropriate. Lunch discussion concludes.**

Attachment: Recent Public Comments (Tab 1)

Prepared by: Brent Krueger (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/20722

December 11, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Update

ORO DOD

I would like to update my accomplishments, initiatives and priorities sheets.
Please give me the latest version and any suggestions you or others might have.

Thanks.

DHR:db
121103-22

.....
Please respond by 12/17/03

11 Dec 03

U22503 /03

The First 31 Months—1/01-8/03—Highlights

Accomplishments

- **Global War on Terrorism—**
 - Removed Taliban from Afghanistan
 - Removed Iraqi regime from power
 - Degrading/damaging worldwide terrorist networks
 - Innovative approaches—TST
 - Transforming mindset
- **Improved Military Readiness**
 - Funding increases
 - Combat capability strengthened
 - Targeted pay raises
- **Nuclear Posture Review**
 - New triad
 - Offensive reductions underway
- **Implemented Space Commission Recommendations**
- **Implemented Senior Level Review Group Process**
- **Restructured Missile Defense Program**
 - ABM Treaty withdrawal
 - Refocused and broadened R&D
 - Fielding operational testing
- **Defense Status (QDR)**
 - New defense strategy
 - New force sizing construct
 - New risk balancing focus
- **Modernized Unified Command Plan**
 - Northern Command
 - JFCOM—
 - Focus on Transformation
 - Supreme Allied Commander-Transformation
 - New Space/Strat Command
 - NATO command structure agreement

8/25/03

1

The First 31 Months—1/01-8/03—Highlights

Accomplishments (cont.)

- **Enhanced Working Relationships**
 - OSD & Joint Staff
 - DoD & CIA
- **New Strategic Direction**
 - DoD role in new political military strategy
 - Defense Planning Guidance
 - Contingency Planning Guidance improving speed/relevance/value of plans
- **New Strategic Relationships**
 - South Asia and Central Asia/Caucasus
 - Poland and NATO
 - Missions determining Coalitions
 - Security Cooperation Guidance implemented
- **Improved Strategic Reconnaissance Operations Process**
- **Adopted Realistic Budgeting/ Cost Estimates**
- **Illustrative Program Decisions**
 - Crusader to FCS/Precision
 - Acceleration of UAVs/UCAVs
 - SBIRS restructuring
 - DD-21 to DD-X
 - Stryker Brigade combat capability
 - SSBN to SSGN
 - Navy “Area-Wide” restructuring
 - “Ship Swaps”
 - Laser Comms and C4ISR funding
 - USAF tanker leasing
 - Future Combat System

8/25/03

2

11-L-0559/OSD/20725

The First 31 Months—1/01-8/03—Highlights

Initiatives

- **Operation Enduring/Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned**
 - Unique approach and construct
 - Real-time impacts
 - Informing future investment strategy
- **Iraq – Phase IV – Coalition Provisional Authority**
 - Interagency approach
 - Governance Council
 - Conops for stability operations
- **Quality of Life Improvements**
 - Housing programs/privatization
 - Personnel policy reviews
 - Progress on longer tours
- **Operational availability improvements**
- **Global posture being adjusted**
 - Global versus regional perspective
 - Innovative approaches—Navy surface fleet surge capability
 - Further Unified Command Plan refinement
- **Supply chain management reform**
- **Active/Reserve Components Balance**
 - Roles
 - Structure
 - Mobilization/demobilization process
- **Worldwide Footprint for Future**
- **Financial management initiatives**
- **Special Operations Forces Modernization and Expansion**
- **End Strength Analysis**

8/25/03

3

The First 31 Months—1/01-8/03—Highlights

Initiatives (cont.)

- **Focus on Stewardship of Taxpayer Dollars**
 - Improved Readiness Standards
 - Acceleration of acquisition, spiral development technique
 - Navy/Marine TAC Air Consolidation
 - HQs Realignment/Staff reductions (11.1%)
 - BRAC planning—U.S. and overseas
- **Joint training**
 - Joint National Training Center
 - Joint Experimentation Plan
- **Stand-up of:**
 - USD(I)
 - ASD (Homeland Defense)
- **Modernizing DoD Processes**
 - Program/Budget Process consolidation
 - 2-Year cycle inside DoD (no FY'05 build)
 - Acquisition regulations streamlining
 - Joint Concepts of Operation work
 - Deployment/redeployment process improvements
 - Capabilities based planning
- **Defense Transformation Legislation**
 - National Security Personnel System
 - Range and Training Area Readiness
 - Contracting processes
 - Acquisition processes

8/25/03

4

11-L-0559/OSD/20727

Top Priorities for Next 16 Months

(8/03-12/04)

1. Successfully Pursue the Global War on Terrorism
 - Reset the force
 - High value target plan
 - Global Peace Operations initiative
2. Strengthen Combined/Joint Warfighting Capabilities
 - Develop joint CONOPS to integrate air, land, sea, and ISR assets
 - Translate Joint CONOPS into acquisition strategy
 - Strengthen combined/joint exercises and training
 - Bring jointness to the lowest appropriate level
 - Sustain an on-call, global precision-strike capability
 - Sustain strategic deterrence
3. Transform the Joint Force
 - Lighter, more agile, easily deployable military units
 - Instill a military culture that rewards innovation and risk-taking
 - Place experienced joint warfighters in key posts
 - Balance the Department's active and reserve components
4. Optimize Intelligence Capabilities
 - Refocus intelligence priorities for new defense strategy
 - Strengthen intelligence capabilities for the 21st century
 - Improve vertical and horizontal intelligence distribution
5. Counter Proliferation of WMD
 - Reverse the existing WMD capability of unfriendly state and non-state entities
 - Establish counter proliferation roles, missions and objectives
 - Deter the global spread of WMD
 - Integrate DoD activities with those of other departments

6. Improve Force Manning

- Develop 21st century human resource approach
- Implement longer tours, revised career paths, improved language capabilities, etc.
- Rebalance active and reserve forces
- Sustain quality of life, installation and infrastructure enhancements

7. New Concepts of Global Engagement

- Implement revised Security Assurance and Cooperation Plan and refocus Overseas Presence/Basing
- Continue to fashion new relationships worldwide, update alliances, build coalition of unequal partners, refocus security cooperation and initiate a foreign constabulary force
- Continue to assess and refine the Unified Command Plan

8. Homeland Security

- Clearly define the Department's role in Homeland Security
- Organize the Department to implement Homeland Defense and provide support to Homeland Security
- Initial missile defense deployments
- Internally and externally integrate the Department's Homeland Defense command and control systems and procedures

9. Streamline DoD Processes

- Shorten PPBS and acquisition cycle time
- Financial Management Reform
- Shorten DoD processes by 50%
- Output metrics built around balanced risk and President's Management Agenda

10. Reorganize DoD and the USG to Deal with Pre-War Opportunities and Post-War Responsibilities

- Reduce time to respond; create a surge capability
- Rationalize NSC and Homeland Security Council
- Develop Departmental and interagency conops for post-war stability operations

Binder- **FILE**

December 17, 2003
EF-7858
I-03/017242

000.5

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Jim Haynes

FROM:

SUBJECT: Recruiting in Prisons

The subject came up about some radical religious people recruiting in prisons. I don't know if that is just the civilian side or military as well, or how religious people get access. We ought to think through what we want to do about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121703-7

.....
Please respond by 1/16/04

12/18/03

→ SD

We'll add a specific reference to this problem to our Battle of Ideas strategy briefing (which you have for review).

Paul Butler from SOLIC will raise this with the Dept of Justice, develop recommendations and report back to you.

Doug Feith

COMPLETED

DEC 19

U22504 /03

17 Dec 03

18-12-03 17:13 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/20730

December 18¹⁹, 2003

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Absentee Ballots for Military

Please work with David Chu and get back to me with precisely how we have fixed the absentee ballot issue in the military. I want to develop conviction that we have done the right things, and I don't have conviction at the present time.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121803-6

.....
Please respond by 1/23/04

*OB
8/14*

014, 35

19 Dec 03

U22505 /03

December 18¹⁹, 2003
634

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Guard and Reserve

*12/29/03
DR
SMA*

I would like to see a piece of paper that shows every Guard and Reserve unit, how many times they have been called up and when they have been called up.

Thanks.

326

DHR:dh
121803-7

.....
Please respond by 1/9/04

U22506 /03

19 Dec 03

December 18¹⁹, 2003

TO: Gen. Pete Pace
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Availability

We have to think through how we want to adjust the speed at which units are available. That is something you have been working on.

Please come up with a format, and show me what you think we ought to ask for.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121803-8

.....
Please respond by 1/16/04

U22507 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20733

351

19 Dec 03

A-185

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: December ²³~~19~~, 2003
SUBJECT:

I think we ought to get a letter off to Chairman Keane of the 9/11 Commission. If he knows of anyone in the Defense Department who failed to do their job and contributed to September 11th, or who is currently failing to do their job, he should tell us promptly so we can do something about it.

Thanks.

000.5

DHR/azn
121903A.03tscsm

Please respond by: 1/8/04

*Response attached
12/26*

*FAXED TO TAOS
FILE
12/29*

23 Dec 03

11-L-0559/OSD/20734 **U22508 /03** 2

1/23/1430 Snowflake

MCFP
per PO
182
24 Dec

TO: David Chu
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: December ²³~~18~~, 2003
SUBJECT: Ft. Bragg Troop Visit

1/28

Please talk to General Motors. Find out what their policy is. We were told by the widow of a soldier killed in OIF that GM gives a \$750 rebate on the purchase of a GM vehicle for anyone on active duty in Afghanistan or Iraq.

Her husband was wounded and died two weeks before their car purchase. She did not get the rebate. See if you can figure out what the policy is. We will want to get back to her. at some point. I believe her name is (b)(6)

123

Thanks.

*she got the rebate
video*

DHR/azn
121903.02@com

Please respond by: 1/10/04

*Siv, 1/29
Response attached.
vr/CDR Nosenzo
1/29*

23 Dec 03

U22509 /03

1/23
1430



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

✓
1/29

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

January 12, 2004, 1:00PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSEC Action _____

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL & READINESS)

*Dr. David S. C. Chu
12 Jan 04*

SUBJECT: Ft. Bragg Troop Visit - Snowflake

- (b)(6) widow of (b)(6) relayed that she did not receive a rebate of \$750.00 offered by GM for the purchase of a vehicle for anyone on active duty in Afghanistan or Iraq.
- (b)(6) was killed in Iraq on 26 October 2003.
- (b)(6) purchased a 2004 Chevrolet Tahoe on 29 November 2003.
- The automobile purchase is not related to any DoD or overseas auto sales programs.
- The GM rebate program is only applicable to active duty personnel and not transferable to other family members. The rebate program did not consider the "surviving spouse" issue.



After consultation with (b)(6) casualty assistance officer, the automobile dealership and Automotive Information Systems, Inc. (rebate program coordinator) approved the \$750.00 rebate for (b)(6)

- We will speak to her casualty assistance officer again in thirty days to confirm that she did receive the rebate.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

COORDINATION: None.

ATTACHMENTS:

As stated

PREPARED BY: Mark Ward, OFP, ODUSD(MC&FP), (b)(6)

*Mark Ward
1/16/04*

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	<i>e.ck</i>
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	<i>1/23</i>



11-L-0559/OSD/20736

OSD 01027-04

DSD

PDUSD(P&R)

Charles S. Abell

C&A 1-21-04

11-L-0559/OSD/20737

EF-7934
I-03/017528

December 27, 2003

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter to Bulgarian MoD

If we lost some Bulgarians in Iraq, I ought to get a letter off to the Minister of Defense of Bulgaria.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122703-10 (to computer)

.....
Please respond by 12/30/03

BULGARIA

Policy ExecSec's Note

December 31, 2003

CDR Nosenzo,

- The attached letter was forwarded electronically to Bill Marriott and Monica Generous on 30 Dec 03 in response to this SecDef note.

C. L. O'Connor

Colonel C. L. O'Connor, USMC
Director, Policy Executive Secretariat

CLOSED
1/2/04
CDR N

27 Dec 03

U22510 /03



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

The Honorable Nikolay Svinarov
Minister of Defense
Ministry of Defense
Bulgaria 1000 Sofia
3 Diakon Ignatii St

Dear Minister Svinarov:

I offer my condolences on the deaths of the Bulgarian soldiers killed in Karbala. We are saddened by the tragic loss in these recent terrorist attacks.

Please convey my sympathies to the families of those lost. They are in our thoughts during this difficult time and we wish those who were injured a speedy recovery.

We are grateful for the continued commitment Bulgaria is making in the global war on terror and to the reconstruction efforts in Iraq.

With deepest sympathy,

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/20739

Haber, Lauren, CIV, OSD-POLICY

From: Haber, Lauren, CIV, OSD-POLICY
Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2003 5:52 PM
To: Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD; Marriott, William P, CAPT, OSD
Subject: Bulgarian condolence



The Honorable
Nikolay Svinarov...



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JAN 2 2004

The Honorable Nikolay Svinarov
Minister of Defense
Ministry of Defense
Bulgaria 1000 Sofia
3 Diakon Ignatii St

Dear Minister Svinarov:

I offer my condolences on the deaths of the Bulgarian soldiers killed in Karbala. We are saddened by the tragic loss in these recent terrorist attacks.

Please convey my sympathies to the families of those lost. They are in our thoughts during this difficult time and we wish those who were injured a speedy recovery.

We are grateful for the continued commitment Bulgaria is making in the global war on terror and to the reconstruction efforts in Iraq.

With deepest sympathy,

Sincerely,

U21088 /03

U 21088-03

11-L-0559/OSD/20741

December 27, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Press Avail on End Strength

Done
Burns
2/2

Here is an interesting memo from David Chu on personnel.

It strikes me that this might be something we would have David brief the press on early in January, so everyone is working off the same set of facts. Possibly I would have an opening statement that day. I think it would be helpful if people in the Congress knew where we are—we are over end strength, we are over because it is authorized to be over in a time of emergency and that is what that provision of the law is for.

330, 2

Let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/17/03 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: End Strength [U20872/03]

DHR:dh
122703-16 (to computer)

.....
Please respond by 1/9/04

U22511 /03

210003

1210
1800

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2003 DEC 18 PM 1:22

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

December 17, 2003 - 12:00 PM

*Lobby DI Rita
12/22/03*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

David S. C. Chu 18 Dec 03

SUBJECT: End Strength

- Little noticed in the general clamor about active end strength is the fact that actual active end strength is well above "authorized" levels, and will remain so under current plans well into FY04 and, in the case of some Services, beyond. This is permitted under the Presidential Declaration of National Emergency, although all understand your guidance to bring end strength back within the 3% "flex" allowed in "peacetime." (Formerly, this flex was 2%).
- Tab A provides graphics depicting the situation for each Service FY03-05. The Army and Air Force deviations are the most significant. The Army is 4% over at the end of FY03, or almost 20,000 personnel, and the Air Force 4½ % (16,000).

Active End Strength

Service	FY03 Authorized	FY03 Actual	Difference
Army	480,000	499,301	+4.02%
Navy	375,700	382,235	+1.74%
Marines	175,000	177,779	+1.59%
Air Force	359,000	375,062	+4.47%
Total DoD	1,389,700	1,434,377	+3.22%


It is striking that those additional personnel have augmented the staffing of existing units, rather than creating new capabilities. In the Army, for example, all but one of the major combat units in the Active component are above 100% of their authorized strength. The Army recently has been adding "personnel margin" to units in anticipation of deployment. The 1stCav, soon to deploy, is at 106% of authorized unit strength.



SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	12/22
SR MA CRADOCK	017/73
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARIOTT	

0208724/03

FY03/04/05 Personnel Strength Army




Based on Aug 03 Data

24 OCT 03


11-L-0559/OSD/20744

FY03/04/05 Personnel Strength Navy



Based on Jul 03 Data


FY03/04/05 Personnel Strength Marine Corps



As of 30 June 03

11-L-0559/OSD/20746

FY03/04/05 Personnel Strength Air Force



Active Duty Strength



Mobilized Reserve Strength Est.



FY03-FY05 AC Program



Updated 30 Oct 03

OPR: AF/DPLFR

11-L-0559/OSD/20747

647
December 27, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Three-Star Headquarters

My impression is that the three-star headquarters are not really joint, and therefore they cannot end up being warfighting staffs.

They seem to train by Service.

One would think we ought to fix this. What do you propose?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122703-31 (to computer)

.....

Please respond by 1/31/04

*Closed per SAA
3/26/04*

322

27 Dec 03

U22512 /03

December 27, 2003

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Old Directives

LARRY DI PIETRO
1/2

Please see the attached memo from me to Jim Haynes and tell me what you think we ought to do about it.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/27/03 SecDef memo to GC [102403-17]

DHR:dh
122703-33 (to computer)

.....
Please respond by 1/31/04

300-8

21 DEC 03

U22513 /03



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

2003 DEC 16 AM 11:33

INFO MEMO

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: RAYMOND F. DUBOIS, DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

Ray Dubois DEC 16 2003

SUBJECT: Mandatory Review of DoD Directives

- In an October 27th snowflake you expressed concern (Tab D) about the currency of DoD Directives.
- Principal Staff Assistants (PSAs) were asked to conduct a review of all Directives under their purview to determine if they should be canceled, revised or continued in effect (Tab C).
- Of the 653 Directives presently in effect, the PSAs identified 50 for cancellation, 334 for revision and 269 as being current. At Tab B is a summary of the PSAs' reviews.
- Listings for all of the Directives and the PSA annotation for each are at Tab A.
- The suspense date for completion of this project is April 5, 2004. Communications and Directives staff will track closely the progress of each Directive and provide me with periodic reports. The coordination process, historically the primary impediment to finalizing revised Directives, will also be accelerated.

300.8

COORDINATION: None

cc:
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
General Counsel
Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Mr. H.D. Neeley, (b)(6)

16 Nov 03

11-L-0559/OSD/20750

U20475703

October 27, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
 Doug Feith
 LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Old Directives

I don't know if you were in the room when we found out that the SOLIC directive is dated 1995. It seems to me that you ought to set up a system where we review every directive that exists, listed by date and name, and let me look at it. I can select the ones I want to start having people review, so that we can get them up to date.

September 11 changed the world, and if we keep using the same directives that existed before, we are making a bad mistake. We owe it to ourselves. It may require getting some outside outfit like IDA to assist with a systematic review. I am sure there are a lot of directives.

Please let me know, and let's put some structure into this problem.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
 102403-17

.....
 Please respond by _____

U18026 /03

December 27, 2003

TO: David Chu

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Guard and Reserve

326

Please follow up on this Guard and Reserve memo I sent to Dick Myers.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/19/03 SecDef memo to CJCS [121803-7]

DHR:dh
122703-34 (is computer)

.....

Please respond by 1/16/04

U22514 /03

87 Dec 03

December 18¹⁹, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Guard and Reserve

I would like to see a piece of paper that shows every Guard and Reserve unit, how many times they have been called up and when they have been called up.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121803-7

.....
Please respond by 1/9/04

U22506 /03

December 27, 2003

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Recruiting

340

We need to make sure our recruiting accurately reflects the kinds of deployments we expect.

Do you have a sense of how closely the Services are with respect to the accuracy and likelihood of deployments?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122703-32 (ts computer)



Please respond by 1/31/04

27 Dec 03

U22515 /03

December 23, 2003

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Fringe Benefit Computation

012

I take it your memo covers travel to and from the Pentagon and my home. I can't really tell that that is what it is, but that is what it appears to be.

I took a few other trips that were personal that I would have paid for had I been in an airplane—for example, to St. Michaels, Maryland.

I would like to have somebody take a look at this and make sure I am paying as much as I am supposed to be paying, and not underpaying.

Let's develop a policy and an approach and then see me about it. If I agree to it, we can then go back and recalculate.


Thanks.

Attach.
12/11/03 WHS memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
122303-9

Please respond by

1/9/04



*03
3/6*



U22516 /03

23 DEC 03

12/18
1400

✓
12/23



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
1155 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155

Honorable Donald Rumsfeld

(b)(6)

DEC 11 2003

Dear Mr. Rumsfeld:

Pursuant to amendments made to the tax code in 1984, the Department is required to place a value on the personal use of the official vehicles and drivers and provide this value to employees for use in preparing their tax returns. Under IRS regulations, commuting is considered personal use and the term "employer" includes the Federal Government. You fall under the scope of the regulations because of the portal-to-portal service given you by this Department.

We have calculated this amount, based on our best information regarding your use of the Government furnished vehicle. The period covered this year is from November 1, 2002 to October 31, 2003. This amount will appear on a separate W-2 form, which you will be receiving in the near future. Attached is a work sheet explaining this amount. You may wish to share this information with your tax accountant or attorney.

If you have any questions, please contact me.

Sincerely,

Howard Becker
Assistant Director
for
Raymond F. DuBois
Director

(Howard
Becker
DIRECTOR
WASHINGTON
HQ SERVICES)

Attachment:
a/s

Ray DuBois
RFB
12/22
(b)(6)
(I think he gets this every year)

D. M.
Larry Di Rite
12/22



ATTACHMENT

PORTAL TO PORTAL 2003 FRINGE BENEFIT COMPUTATION
FOR
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RUMSFELD

The Commuting Valuation Rule (Business-Orientated Security Concerns) bases the taxable benefit on \$1.50 value for each one-way commute of an employer-furnished vehicle. This rule applies only to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. The figure for the number of one-way commutes is based on information provided by your office.

$$663 \text{ trips} \times \$1.50 = \$994.50$$

In reply refer to EF-7829 and
I# 03/017101

FILE

December 15, 2003

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Reuben Jeffery

SUBJECT: Mine Clearance Unit

I understand there is a UN-sponsored Iraqi-manned mine clearance unit in Iraq that may be languishing now that the UN has withdrawn. Is that something we should look into and see how these trained people, if they exist, could be helpful?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121503-14

.....
Please respond by 1/9/04

RONCO

COMPLETED

DEC 22 2003

U22517 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20758

471.6

15 Dec 03



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR POLICY

7 January 2004

NOTE FOR: Secretary of Defense

FROM: Douglas J. Feith *DJF by*
W.H. 1/7/04

You raised the attached at today's roundtable meeting. We sent a response to your office on December 22, 2003.

11-L-0559/OSD/20759

UNCLASSIFIED

EF-7829

I-03/017101

INFO MEMO

USDP *7e* *(Russo)*
DEC 22 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Clawett 12/14/03

FROM: Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC)

SUBJECT: Mine Clearance Unit

- On December 15, 2003, you asked if there was a UN-sponsored Iraqi-manned mine clearance unit in Iraq that may be languishing now that the UN has withdrawn. You also asked if this is something we should look into and see how these trained people, if they exist, could be helpful.
- To the best of our knowledge, there are no willing Iraqi-manned demining teams available in Iraq. There are approximately two thousand former UN deminers that have refused CPA's wage offers. They are not clearing minefields.
- Wages paid by DoS for a deminer are more in line with the local economy, but are less than those wages previously paid by the UN. For example, the UN paid \$800-\$1200 per month and now DoS pays \$87-\$120 per month. Approximately half of the 4000 deminers previously employed by the UN now refuse to work under the new pay scales. However, there are sufficient demining applicants to fill existing DoS requirements.
- After the UN pulled out of Iraq, the U.S. Department of State (DoS) assumed most of its functions. DoS issued contracts and grants to NGOs employing all available deminers to continue ongoing demining operations until December 31, 2003. On January 1, 2004, DoS will issue new grants and contracts to demining NGOs to continue operations through 2004.
- DoS established Regional Mine Action Centers, a National Mine Action Authority, and the Iraqi Mine Action Center. These organizations are staffed with personnel from RONCO (the DoS primary contractor for demining), the Mine Advisory Group, Norwegian Peoples Aid and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. These NGOs extensively employ Iraqi nationals.

Prepared by: LTC (P) John D. Jordan, SO/LIC (Stability Operations), (b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED
11-L-0559/OSD/20760

F

December 27, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Clearances

380.01

In reference to this memo you gave me of December 23 on the clearances, why in the world would we take it back to DoD if we have done such a lousy job previously? What makes us think we can do such a good job as proposed for 04?

Please see me on it. I am concerned.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/23/03 USD(I) memo to SecDef re: Snowflake on Clearances

DHR:dh
122703-7 (ts computer)

OB

Please respond by 1/16/04

1/26

27 Dec 03

U22518 /03

September 1

Snowflake

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Clearances

Please give me an updated report on how we stand in the backlog on clearances. I am told we are a year behind on getting nuclear clearances for folks.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
091503-40

.....
Please respond by 9/26/03

✓
12/27

Response Attached
@ 12/24

U21873 /03 2

11-L-0559/OSD/20762



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000
INFO MEMO

D ✓
14/27

INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEC 23 2006

FROM: Stephen A. Cambone

SUBJECT: Snowflake on Clearances *gc*

*This is not a
good story.
I'll give it my
attention.*

In response to the subject, the following is provided:

- Through FY03 both Defense Security Service (DSS) and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) conducted background investigations for DoD. Beginning in FY04 all investigations will be conducted by OPM. *?*
- During FY03, Defense Security Service (DSS) averaged the following case completion times:
 - ✓ Secret and Confidential - 150 days
 - ✓ Initial Top Secret - 300 days
 - ✓ Top Secret Periodic Reinvestigations - 385 days
- During FY03, OPM averaged the following case completion times:
 - ✓ Secret and Confidential - 250 days
 - ✓ Initial Top Secret - 374 days
 - ✓ Top Secret Periodic Reinvestigations - 477 days
- The FY04 DoD goal is:
 - ✓ Secret and Confidential - 75-90 days
 - ✓ Initial Top Secret - 90-120 days
 - ✓ Top Secret Periodic Reinvestigations - 180 days
- There are currently approximately 416,000 DoD investigations pending *?*
- With regard to the nuclear/restricted data priority investigations:
 - ✓ DSS currently has 632 nuclear/restricted data priority investigation pending. The average lapse time for FY03 ranged from 93 to 512 days for these cases.



- ✓ OPM currently has 638 initial Top Secret investigations pending for which 35-day processing was requested. The average FY03 case completion time was approximately 100 days.

COORDINATION: Tab B

Prepared by: Charleen Wright, ODUSD (CI&S), (b)(6)

COORDINATION SHEET

not required
General Counsel, DoD

Date

* [Signature]
Director, Administration and
Management

10.3.03
Date

*As revised (see attached)

S

December 23, 2003

f

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Gen. Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Sensor Issue

4/3/77

Please get Ron Sega to get going on this sensor issue that Pete Pace and Abizaid are concerned about.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/22/03 VCJCS response to SecDef memo #120103A.10tscom

DHR:dh
122303-10

DB

Please respond by 1/16/04

12/23 1/20

*SecDef -
Sega is into it
E-mail attached.
S. Leh*

23 Dec 03

U22519 /03

634
C/12/12

12:48 PM

TO: Gen. Pete Pace

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: December 19, 2003

SUBJECT: Sensors

In the meeting today with John Abizaid he raised the question of not using sensors well. I have no idea what he is talking about. Would you please get in touch with him and find out what he is talking about and let's get that sorted out.

Thanks.

DHR/ozn
120103A.10tscm

22 DEC 03

FOR SECDEF:

SIR, I SPOKE WITH JOHN ABIZAID. HE WOULD LIKE RON SEGA TO ORGANIZE A SMALL TEAM TO THINK THROUGH HOW SENSORS MIGHT BE USED IN AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, AND IRAQ TO TRACK TERRORIST MOVEMENT. JOHN APPRECIATES THE WORK DR SEGA IS DOING ON IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES. JOHN THINKS RON SEGA CAN HELP THINK THROUGH POTENTIAL USES FOR SENSORS WE NOW HAVE PLUS THOSE WE MIGHT DEVELOP.

VR
[Signature]

COPY TO: DEPSECDEF
CJCS
DR. SEGA

U22477 103 3

Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD

From: Sega, Ronald, Dr, OSD-ATL
Sent: Tuesday, December 23, 2003 2:16 PM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD
Cc: Wynne, Michael, Hon, OSD-ATL; Myers, Richard B, Gen, JCS CJCS; Milano, James M, COL, JCS VCJCS; Wolfowitz, Paul, Dr, OSD
Subject: RE: "Sensors" Note
Signed By: ron.sega@osd.mil

Secretary Rumsfeld,

I was copied on the "Sensors" reply note to you from Gen. Pace on Dec 22nd (attached pdf). In response, I will quickly form a small team of experts composed of government and non-government participants, as appropriate. We will coordinate with Gen. Abizaid and his staff and will likely visit the AOR to better understand CENTCOM's existing capabilities, concerns, and issues regarding tracking terrorist movement.

The team will focus on tagging, tracking, and locating technologies, near term implementation, and optimal employment strategies. We will also examine the application of data mining and information fusion technologies to enhance information derived from the sensors. Rapid development of new technical solutions will also be addressed.

v/r,
Ron

BCC: GEN. DICK MYERS
PAUL WOLFOVITZ
DOUG FETTS

December 22, 2003

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Sistani

Attached is an interesting piece on Sistani.

Attach.
Paper on Sistani

DHR:dh
122203-10

IRAQ

22 DEC 03

U22520 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20769

12/22

Confronting Sistani should be done in a diplomatic way by sticking to our position. Amb. Bremer has already issued his own "fatwa" calling for selecting the transitional national assembly through the caucus process, and this decision has found favor with the majority of Iraqis, who want to see their nation recover its sovereignty soon. More importantly, we do not want to demonstrate any hesitation when setting policy or set a precedent and have to coordinate our policy in the future through Sistani, or any cleric (stand firm in our position of separation of church from state).

According to our sources incountry, the Shi'a in the Heartland respect Sistani and his views, but they do not follow him blindly and are not, in any sense of the term, a monolithic bloc. The analogy would be like American Catholics (of which I am one) relating to the Pope: they listen respectfully to what he has to say and then make up their own minds. Among the Shi'a, "ijihad" or the right of independent reasoning is a treasured value. Moreover, in the largely tribal society here, the traditional leadership strongly supports the separation of the religious and political spheres, largely out of concern that politics not be allowed to corrupt religious belief and practice. They feel strongly that the Iranian revolution has led to such a corruption of Shi'ite belief there, and they want to avoid Iran's mistakes.

To the extent that Sistani limits his pronouncements to religious matters, the tribal shaykhs who form the core of his power base support him more; to the extent that he speaks out on political matters, they support him less. Indeed, some of our most influential interlocutors are insisting that we disregard Sistani's statements about the political process, on the grounds that we in the coalition should back the separation of religion from politics. The growing popularity of Sayyed Farqat al-Qizwini in Hilla for example is due in large measure to his support for the separation of religion and politics and the establishment of a democratic system that would allow Shi'a tribal leaders to run for office.

There is also a growing feeling that Iraq's Shi'a need an Iraqi religious leadership as opposed to the current situation, in which most of the senior ayatollahs are in fact citizens of foreign countries. Sistani himself holds an Iranian passport and has only an Iraqi residence card. He is not an Iraqi citizen, and he was born in Iran, not Iraq. These facts are being increasingly discussed in the mudhifs [Iraqi guest house], coffee shops, and mosques here. Qizwini's descent from a long line of Iraqi ayatollahs is strengthening his appeal vis-a-vis Sistani.

As has always been the case since Liberation, by the way, the views of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and the SCIRI movement he heads are greeted with great skepticism here, due to the suspicions aroused by his longstanding Iranian connections. Hence, his call for electing the assembly rather than selecting it is not finding much support. It would be a grave error to confuse public opinion in al-Hakim's fief in Najaf or even in Sadr City with the views of the Shi'ite Heartland.

Another point of note: to local Iraqis, the procedure CPA is proposing qualifies as an "election" under their understanding of the Arabic word "intikhabaat," which encompasses both direct voting and the kind of caucus process we are planning.

Most Iraqis in the south want a sovereign Iraqi government to be formed soon. That said, they want the coalition to retain a strong military, diplomatic, and economic presence in their country. The sooner we reach that point, the better off we and Iraq will be. There is no patience here with the notion of taking another 14 to 18 months to conduct a census and voter registration, draft a permanent constitution, and then hold elections in mid-2005. If we drag things out that long, the results could be disastrous.

In sum, we should follow the Shia example by treating Sistani and his ideas with respect, while sticking to our plan.

639

December 23, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Rebalancing RC/AC

326

As I understand it, you and Pete Pace are going to work with the Air Force to get a rebalancing of the RC/AC with respect to C-130s and airlift, as well as ground support for them.

My recollection is that aeromedical is something like 80 percent Reserves, intra-AOR is 70 percent and inter-AOR is 60 percent in the Reserves. That is obviously not the right balance.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122303-6

.....
Please respond by 1/23/04

DR
Sir,
Closed per your discussion
w/ DJS on 8 Jan 04.
LTC Seay

23 Dec 03

U22521 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20771

Action Info		Notes	Images	Logs			
SJS No:	03-08082	Date/Time:	12/02/2003 18:22	SJS Date Changed:	01/13/2004 16:39	CJCS Has Seen:	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
To Chief AD:	<input type="text"/>	Editor:	<input type="text"/>	Red Tag:	<input type="checkbox"/>	Classification:	UNCLASSIFIED
Subject:	SF-639/ REBALANCING RCIA/C						
Summary:	SECDEF MEMO TO CJCS ON REBALANCING						
Addressee:	<input type="text"/>			Keyword:	MYERS		
How Referred:	CJCS REPLY						
Distribution:	J-8, OCJCS/LC, AIR FORCE			Assignment:	<input type="text"/>		
Originator Data	Originator: OSD/SD Originator No.: 22303-8 Originator Name: RUMSFELD			Origination Date: 2/23/2003 Originator Phone: <input type="text"/>	Directorate: J-8 J Division: FD Action Officer: DUKE, JOHN R, LTC, JCS J8 AO Phone: (b)(6)		
Suspense Date		Completion Data					
Current SJS Suspense:	<input type="text"/>	Originally:	01/21/2004	Task:	<input type="text"/>	Chgt:	<input type="text"/>
Current J Suspense:	<input type="text"/>	Originally:	01/21/2004	Date Completed:	01/13/2004	Signed:	<input type="text"/>
Current Orig. Suspense:	<input type="text"/>	Originally:	01/23/2004	How Completed:	REMOVED FROM THE SECDEF TRACKING LIST, IFAR		
Changes:	<input type="checkbox"/>						
Special Instructions:	<input type="text"/>						

Ready

SJS Action 1 of 1

02/10/2004 12:49 PM

11-L-0559/OSD/20772

File Edit View Transfer Administration Window Help

Action Info Notes Images Logs

Action Number: 03-06062

Origin: AJ ATS Action Folder Note 1 of 5

Date Entered	Date Modified	Author	Recipient	Subject
01/06/2004 11:02		John Duke, J-8	JACO (Air Force)	External Coordination
01/06/2004 10:51		John Duke, J-8	JACO (Air Force)	External Coordination
12/31/2003 10:11		John Duke, J-8	Anthony Bennett, SJS	Add Air Force to Required Coordination
12/30/2003 10:26		Anthony Bennett, SJS	ALL	Tasker

Author: Maureen Shields, SJS, CJCS To: ALL

Subject: Action Closed Out

Note: This action is closed out. As a result of a Jan 2004 meeting between the DJS and the SECDEF MIL Assistant, this action has been removed from the SECDEF tracking list and will be answered by other means. Have called the J-8 MILSEC, Nancy, and asked her to inform the AO and return the folder.

Ready

[SJS Action 1 of 1

[2/10/2004 12:43 PM

December 22, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: E-Mailed Questions

000.5

Here is an e-mail. I do not know who it is from, but General Schoomaker sent it up.

Could you please take a look at these questions this fellow is asking, and then get back to me with a response on each one, so we can decide what we think we ought to do about any of them that have not been acted on.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/27/03 E-mail

DHR:dh
122203-14

.....
Please respond by 1/30/04

22 Dec 03

U22522 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20774

SecDef - Gen Schoomaker ^{Page 1 of 2}
asked that this email be provided
to you

12/22


10/30

Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD

From: gharne (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, October 27, 2003 9:33 PM

To: (b)(6)



Subject: RE: Fw: SECDEF guidance

John,

Glad you asked. Here are some other questions I'd ask if I were the Secretary:

How many combatant commanders have been issued an Execute Order actually directing them to wage war on one or more designated terrorist organizations in their AORs?

Which combatant commanders have been issued an Execute Order directing them to conduct combat operations against designated terrorist organizations across AOR boundaries?

Outside Iraq and Afghanistan, how many members of DOD are actively engaged in tactical combat operations against designated terrorist organizations?

How many 42-inch waist terrorist financiers have been pulled from their warm beds in the middle of the night and told they will be killed if they don't help us follow the money?

Who in the USG has been designated to lead the global influence operation designed to counter the propaganda taught in the Islamist schools and reduce the recruiting pool of the terrorist organizations? What is that person's budget? Who in DOD is in charge of supporting the effort? What is that person's budget?

Who in DOS has been directed to tell our friends the political and economic consequences of allowing Islamist schools to operate on their territory?

Who in DOJ is in charge of shutting down the Islamist schools operating in our own territory? [If the KKK was

11-L-0559/OSD/20775

10/30/2003

running its own private school system, how long do you think the public outcry would allow them to remain open?]

What steps has the USG taken to shut down Saudi financing of Islamist schools? How many members of the Saudi royal family have we visited in the middle of the night?

How many more Active Duty HUMINT, military police, Special Forces, and FAO billets do the Armed Forces have than they did on 11 September 2001, not counting mobilized reservists?

How many linguists speaking languages critical to the war on terrorism, and how many people with critical ethnic backgrounds for clandestine HUMINT and SOF assignments, have the Armed Forces recruited since 11 September 2001? Do programs for such targeted recruiting even exist?

How many critical DOD strategic guidance and direction documents still use the term "peacetime" in the current tense?

And two final questions for the historians: On 27 October 1943, what percentage of the people working in the Pentagon were primarily concerned about the FY 1946-1951 program or how the Armed Forces of the United States would fight in 1955? What is the comparable percentage today?

Glenn

-----Original Message-----

From: Warlord21 (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, October 27, 2003 9:48 AM

(b)(6)

Subject: Fwd: Fw: SECDEF guidance

Most addressees have already seen Secretary Rumsfeld's memo in some form. I relay it once again to refresh memories, and will follow with "Outside the Box" thoughts by Dick Halloran. COLLINS

10/30/2003

11-L-0559/OSD/20776

DRAFT

December 22, 2003

TO: Jim Roche
 Les Brownlee
 Gordon England

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
 Paul Wolfowitz
 Jerry Jones

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Military Academies

352 Academies

Attached is a memorandum concerning the military academies. Why don't the three of you think about it, talk to each other, work with Jerry Jones to fashion a single set of recommendations and get back to me.

Thanks.

Attach.
 10/2/03 SecDef memo to Jerry Jones
 12/12/03 Jones Memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
122203-15

.....
 Please respond by _____

22 Dec 03

DRAFT

U22523 /03

TO: Jerry Jones
 CC: Gen. Dick Myers
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: October 2, 2003
 SUBJECT:

I think we ought to do some work on figuring out how to fix the process that appoints people to the military academy boards of trustees.

The Tillie Fowler report indicates that she doesn't feel that the boards of trustees are doing a good job of monitoring the academies, particularly from the standpoint of the subject she studied.

Tell me how they are picked and how we would go about fixing it so that they could be held accountable. We could check their attendance, we could make sure we have a voice on who gets appointed and it should not be strictly by the congress or the executive branch in terms of appointing friends and cronies.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
 100203.37

✓ MZ
 Sir,
 Response attached.
vr/ CDR Nosen
 12/15

Please respond by: 10/18 _____ 12/15

U220777/03

C 12/13
12/22

December 12, 2003, 1600

FOR: Don Rumsfeld
FROM: Jerry Jones 

SUBJECT: Thought Piece on Governance of the Military Academies

Attached is a thought piece in answer to your snowflake, which lays out alternatives to the conventional wisdom solution to improved Academy governance through legislative reform of the Board of Visitors. I think the additional recommendations in this paper can be initiated by you or by each Service Secretary without further approvals. Please note that these recommendations have not been vetted in the building nor have I asked Jim Haynes to check into legalities.


If you are interested in the ideas, I'll vet them properly.

✓
12/22

INFO MEMO

December 12, 2001, 1300

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: JERRY JONES



SUBJECT: Improving Governance at the Military Academies

I. BACKGROUND

- A. A Constant: One or another of the military academies is in a scandal or just overcoming one at all times.
- B. This being the case, the Boards of Visitors clearly are not providing leadership on these matters nor do they often respond effectively when an episode occurs.
- C. Unfortunately these Boards are the victims of their own prestige. Membership is perceived as high status – so the status seekers take over. Membership of the Boards and meeting schedules are not conducive to oversight.
- D. Worse yet, the allocation of the board's membership is fixed by legislation. The President appoints only 18 of the 45 slots; the Secretary of Defense appoints none of the members.
- E. However, when things go wrong, the Department of Defense is held responsible.
- F. This current crisis at the Air Force Academy gives the Secretary of Defense the opportunity to attempt a repair of the governance problem at the Academies.

II. GROUND TRUTH

- A. Frequent problems at the Academies

1. Rape
 2. Cheating
 3. Drugs/Alcohol
 4. Car Theft
 5. Hazing
- B. After sexual hazing and car theft at Naval Academy, Jim Cannon, then Chairman of the Naval Academy Board of Visitors, cites a Naval Academy Administrator as saying that the Academy admits students from across the broad spectrum of America's population and can expect to address social pathologies within the student body which affect the American culture in general.
- C. If anything, the American cultural pathologies have worsened since then.
- D. It is inescapable: The Academies' administrators will be addressing the problems cited above and others as long as the American culture continues on its current trend line.

III. PROBLEMS OF GOVERNANCE

- A. There is no ongoing, day-to-day oversight of Academy Administrators. Some Administration teams are effective; some are not. Often disaster strikes before we realize there is inadequate leadership.
- B. The Boards of Visitors are not effective oversight mechanisms as currently constituted.
1. Boards meet two times a year
 2. These boards can work when effective Chairmen are in place who can spend the time necessary for Academy business (even full-time when required) and take on the governance tasks for the boards
 3. Selecting effective chairmen is hit or miss. Each board elects a chairman from its membership at the beginning of each term. If people of Chairmen quality are not appointed to the boards, then strong chairmen are not possible.
- C. There are no mechanisms for detailed study of specific aspects of the Academies' Missions.
- D. DoD has no Board of Visitor monitoring role.
1. The Department is blamed for the problems but does not have the power to control the work of the Boards of Visitors.

2. The Department needs mechanisms to assert governance direction when the Board of Governors' leadership is inadequate.

IV. REQUIREMENTS FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION

- A. There must be effective day-to-day or week-to-week oversight of the Academies.
- B. There must be a mechanism to identify and solve problems before they become scandals.
- C. The Boards of Visitors must become more effective.

V. POTENTIAL ACTIONS

- A. Restructure Boards so they can provide more effective governance.
- B. Put in place a more effective day-to-day guidance mechanism for the Academy Superintendents.
- C. Establish the ability to look in depth at specific areas by establishing special oversight committees that would supplement the Board of Visitors.

VI. STEP A: Restructure Boards

- A. The Boards of Visitors can be improved particularly with provision for appointment of strong chairmen with adequate time to spend on Academy tasks.
 1. Boards have been effective in the past when the Chairman has been a concerned, experienced activist, e.g. Jim Cannon during the Naval Academy travails in the 90's.
 2. However, unless there is wholesale reform of the boards (membership, mission, number of meetings per year, etc.) they are unlikely to provide strong oversight.
- B. We can attempt to restructure the Boards by legislation to attempt to improve attendance, the quality of members, and the quality of the Chairman.
 1. This should be done, but the quality of the governance will only be as good as the appointing authorities, the appointees, and their willingness to devote the necessary time to oversight duties.
 - a. The two missed meeting rule

- b. Criteria for appointed officials
- c. Presidential authority to appoint the Chairman

- 2. These steps alone will probably be inadequate.
 - a. Too much political pressure to appoint cronies.
 - a. Congressional interference.
 - b. Lack of will to do it right; e.g. monthly meetings, intrusive subcommittee work requiring extensive time commitment.
 - 1. The prestige appointees will probably not spend the necessary time to do the oversight job.
 - 2. The Administrators will continue to run the Academies without the necessary oversight.
 - 3. "Business as usual" will prevail: note past record.

C. Conclusion: Reform of the Board of Visitors is needed, but it will not be enough. This is not the permanent fix.

VII. STEP B: Put in place a more effective day-to-day, or week to week guidance mechanism for the Academy Superintendents directed by Senior Executives in DoD.

- A. A good model for this option is the Harvard Corporation – a panel of five members that run the University on a day-to-day basis.
 - 1. Make up of the Corporation: The University President, three other members, and I believe, the Chairman of the Board of Overseers.
 - 2. These members usually meet weekly and together make the policy decisions for the Administration of the University.
 - 3. A similar set-up could be established for the Service Academies with the makeup of this senior group or Management Committee being something like this: the superintendent, the Secretary of the Service, the Chief of Staff of the Service, the Chairman of the Board of Visitors and the Undersecretary for Personnel and Readiness.
 - a. This group would meet frequently, at least once a month, and delve into the details of the Academy's operations.
 - b. Its mission would be to identify problems early and start a problem-solving process quickly.
 - c. It would also involve itself in goal setting, strategy and metrics.
 - d. Finally, it would see the Academy Administrators frequently enough to evaluate their effectiveness and catch appointment errors early.

- B. The Management Committee could be required to report quarterly to the Secretary or Deputy about governance matters.
- C. The three Academies Management Committees could also meet together to exchange concerns, share trends and problems and provide case study solutions to each other.

VIII. STEP C: Establish the ability to look in depth at specific areas.

- A. When the Management Committee identifies a potential problem, it should require a visiting committee (appointed by the Service Secretary) be formed to investigate the problem or issue and provide a report including recommendations for solutions back to the Management Committee and to the Board of Visitors
- B. These visiting committees would be made up of DoD personnel – military and civilian – and civilian experts in the issue area.
- C. In order to rapidly identify potential problem areas, the superintendent would be required to provide derogatory communications and reports of troublesome events in a timely manner to the Management Committee. Waiting six months to respond to a letter reporting rapes is unacceptable as was the case at the Air Force Academy.
- D. The product of visiting committees studies would be available to the Secretary and the Department immediately and of course, would be available to the Boards of Visitors.

IX. The last two steps most likely can be ordered by the Secretary of Defense without legislation.

X. CONCLUSIONS

- A. The Academies do not have sufficient oversight from their Boards of Visitors.
- B. Reform of these boards would be helpful, but most likely would not be thorough enough to solve the problem.
- C. Other reforms can increase oversight, problem anticipation and problem solving.
- B. These reforms should be able to be made by the Secretary of Defense as administrative initiatives.

- C. DoD has not devoted the time and energy in the past to insure effective oversight on cultural, social and leadership problems at the Academies.
- D. Solutions are at hand if we have the "will to manage".

C112

December 22, 2003

✓
15

TO: Jerry Jones
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Military Academies

Larry Di Rite
12/31

352 Acco...

Before I send your memo to these folks, you might want to take your name off of it, and you might want to clean it up a little in case it leaks. Then, if you agree with this approach, let me know and we'll send it to those people.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/22/03 Draft SecDef memo to Service Secretaries
10/2/03 SecDef memo to Jerry Jones
12/12/03 Jones Memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
122203-16

.....
Please respond by 1/23/04

12/27

Sec Def -

Received 1/2/03
v/cor Noseny

I conveyed this info to Jerry Jones orally. He will re-do his memo as you suggested. You are tentatively scheduled to see the Service Secretaries Monday at lunch. You can discuss it there if you choose.
DR

200...

Larry Di Rite

12/31
U22524 / 103

11-L-0559/OSD/20786

December 22, 2003

TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Terrorism

Here is a memo from Steve Herbits that makes a good point. Victory might very well be when terrorism goes “the way of slavery and piracy—generally unacceptable behaviors that ordinary citizens across the globe, as well as their governments, will participate in combating.” That is a good construct.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/24/03 Herbits fax to SecDef

DHR:dh
122203-11


.....
Please respond by _____

000.5

22 Dec 03

U22525 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20787



✓
12/22

November 24, 2003

TO: SecDef
FROM: Steve Herbits
SUBJECT: The definition of Victory

Watched your Town Hall meeting on C-SPAN the other day. (Relevant except below.)

Perhaps a point to add to your comments about what "victory" might be is that the war for minds should help the world adopt the belief that terrorism should go the way of slavery and piracy - generally unacceptable behaviors that ordinary citizens across the globe, as well as their governments, will participate in combating. I was struck by the President's comments at the UN this fall about the sex/children slave issue. The parallel was noteworthy.

more J

Except. November 21, 2003.

Q And my other comment is about what kind of indicators can you give us to let us know that we've actually won the war on terror? It sounds like the spread of democracy may be one indicator, but how can we be certain that we've won the war on terror?

SEC. RUMSFELD: (To General Myers) Do you want to take the --

SEC. RUMSFELD: On the second part, the purpose of terrorism is to terrorize; it's to -- it's to alter the behavior of people. And with free people, that is what we're about, is being free. And so terrorism strikes at the very heart of our system and our lives.

It seems to me the answer to your question is that success in the global war on terror is that we're not altering our behavior, that we're not fearful; that we have been sufficiently successful in going after the terrorists where they are and breaking up those cells, those networks, dealing with the countries effectively that harbor or provide haven for terrorists, find ways to dissuade and discourage and stop those who train and teach and fund terrorists. And that is not an easy task...

The other thing we have to do, it seems to me, is to engage in the battle of ideas and find ways to see that the number of people that are being drawn into that activity, that are being encouraged or funded or trained to kill people are reduced...

This is something that's going to take time, that's going to affect all the countries of the world, in one way or another. And we're very fortunate to have a broad coalition of 90 nations helping.

But what it will look like, I think -- that is to say, what victory will look like, what the end of this will look like -- will be a return to a circumstance where people, when they walk out

of the door, are not fear-filled. They're able to send their children to school and know they're going to come home...

And it's the kind of a task, given the nature of human beings, I'm afraid, that we'll have to stay at for some period of time. If you think about it, we could almost say, "When we will not need policemen?" And I'm afraid there are going to be people that are going to be inclined to do damage to other human beings. And so, just as we need policemen in our own society, we're going to need to be able to deal with those people who are determined to go out and kill large numbers of innocent people.

December 30, 2003

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Gingrich's Trip

33

Please think through Newt Gingrich's memo and get in touch with him.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/25/03 Gingrich e-mail

DIR,dh
122903-2 (ts computer)

.....
Please respond by 1/9/04

*OB
1/2/04*

30 Dec 03

U22526 /03

December 27, 2003

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: US Citizenship for Iraqis

019.33

Should we have a rule that if an Iraqi serves in the US military for five years, he could become a US citizen?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122703-40 (is computer)



Please respond by 1/31/04

27 Dec 03

U22527 /03

December 27, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meet w/Speaker Hastert about US-Japan Parliamentary Exchange

I would like to go up and see Speaker Hastert sometime when I am up on the Hill in January and talk to him about the US-Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program. I want to take this material with me.

Thanks.

ATTACHED MATERIAL HELD BY (b)(6)

Attach.

12/17/03 DSD notes on 12/16/03 SecDef memo [121603-2] w/news articles re: McDermott
12/11/03 LA memo to SecDef re: US-Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program

DHR:dh
122703-39 (ta computer)

.....

Please respond by 1/31/04

Japan

27 Feb 03

U22528 /03

December 8, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Efforts in Washington, DC

092

I want to think through what we ought to do in Washington, DC, to improve relations with key countries. We could deal with ambassadors, we could do a better job of inviting defense ministers over, and I could start seeing foreign ministers more. We could structure and set up things that would improve relations.

We have to be more proactive and more creative instead of reactive. We have to start working off our outbox instead of working off our inbox.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120403-6 (to computer)

.....
Please respond by 1/16/03

8 Dec 03

U22529 /03

December 27, 2003

TO: Doug Feith
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Relations w/Key Countries

092

Please see the attached memo to John Craddock and Larry Di Rita. We should do a more creative job than we are doing. What do you propose?

Thanks.

Attach.
 12/08/03 SecDef memo to SMA and TSA [120403-6 (ts computer)]

DHR:dh
 122703-38 (ts computer)

.....

Please respond by 1/31/04

27 DEC 03

U22530 /03

December 16, 2003

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Afghan Security Forces

*Stand to take
now to security*

AFG

You were going to get back to me and show me what we are doing to accelerate the Afghan security forces and what the exact status is, and you were going to do it today.

Thanks.

DHR:db
121603.5

.....
Please respond by 12/16/03

*SecDef -
Response attached
Tab A - SOLIC wrap-up
Tab B - Joint Staff
wrap-up*

16 DEC 03


12/16

U22532 /03



Total Security Forces in Afghanistan

AFGHANISTAN INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS GROUP





Security – National Police

AFGHANISTAN INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS GROUP

Summary as of 5 Dec 03:

Lead Nations: U.S. and Germany

Jun '04 Goal: 12,500

Current Trained: 1,194


Change since Sep 30: + 194

Assessment: Potential impediments include recruitment, construction, security.

German training goals:

- Rebuild Kabul police academy and commence 3 year (officers) and 1 year (NCO) programs – Academy training underway
- Graduate 1,000 police by end-Dec – on track
- Provide trainers to US regional training centers – planning underway

Police (US-Funded Training)



US Program will build 7 Regional Training Centers (RTCs) for Police, Border Police, and Hwy Patrol in proximity of 7 PRTs.

- Gardez RTC (30 recruits in school)
- Mazar-e-Sharif RTC (Dec 03)
- Kandahar RTC (Jan 04)
- Konduz RTC (Feb 04)
- Jalalabad RTC (Mar 04)
- Herat RTC (Apr 04)
- Bamian RTC (May 04)



Security - Border Police/Highway Patrol

AFGHANISTAN INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS GROUP

Summary as of 5 Dec 03:

Lead Nations: U.S. and Germany



Jun '04 BP Goal: 5,500

Current BP Trained: 400 (GER)

Jun '04 HP Goal: 2,000

Current HP Trained: 0

- **German training goals:**
 - Graduate 400 BP for Kabul Airport by end of Dec – complete
 - Continue coordinating with U.S. on remaining training






Security - Afghan National Army

Summary as of 12 Dec 03:

Lead Nation: Jun '04 Goal: 10,000
Current Trained: 6,085
Change since 25 Sep: + 1262
Change since 25 Oct: + 579
ANA Strength: 5,187

Assessment: # of recruits flowing into Kabul increased last two weeks as Afghan Mobile Training Teams and influence of new MOD staff begin to show results.



Total forces = # of ANA forces minus AWOL >20 days plus trainees.

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New Developments:--

- USG funding regional recruiting centers to improve recruitment. Centers opened in Kabul, Jalalabad, Bamian, and Gardez. Thirty more planned.
- Deployments: 4 BN providing CLJ security; one deployed to Mazar-i-Sharif.
- OMC-A is planning to reduce training class length by 3 weeks to accelerate training schedule and complete Central Corp by early Jul 04



Afghanistan Security Forces Status Report

12 December 2003

**This briefing provides a status report on the development of
Afghanistan Security Forces.**

Agenda

- **Afghanistan Security Force Overview**
- **Force Description and Status**
 - **Police**
 - **Border Police**
 - **Highway Patrol**
 - **Afghan National Army**

Afghanistan Security Forces Overview

	Police	Border Police	Highway Patrol	Afghan National Army	Afghanistan Security Forces (Total)	Afghan Militia Forces	
Ministry	Interior	Interior	Interior	Defense	<div style="border: 2px solid black; border-radius: 50%; padding: 10px; width: fit-content; margin: auto;"> <p>Total Security Forces in Afghanistan <u>99,954</u> US Forces 15,643 (12%) Afghan Forces (80%) Coalition Forces 1,826 (2%) ISAF Forces 5,935(6%)</p> </div>	Defense	
Lead Country	Germany	Germany	Germany	US		Afghanistan	
Duties	Law Enforcement	Security of border crossings; enforce customs and immigration	Security of primary roads	Military tasks: protect territorial integrity inside Afghanistan. Prevent the reemergence of terrorism inside Afghanistan.		Provide provincial security. Limited counterterrorism operations	
Command and Control	Ministry of Interior	Ministry of Interior	Ministry of Interior	MoD/CJTF-180		Governors/ Warlords	
Uniform	Black pants w/ Black shirt	Camouflage	Camouflage	Camouflage w/ Green Beret		Various to none	
Vehicles	Various	Various	Various	Various		Various	
Weapons	Various	Various	Various	Various		Various	
Pay	Set by MOI, paid from LOFTA fund	Set by MOI, paid from LOFTA fund	Set by MOI, paid from LOFTA fund	USG/AFG Approved ANA Pay Chart		Governors/ Commanders	
On Duty	71,000**	400	0	5150		76,550	~ 70,000 **
Additional Recruits	367	0	200	1800		2367	DDR this month 1500
Today's Total	71,367	400	200	6950		Total DDR 1500	
Planned Strength	35,400 Dec 05	12,000 Dec 05	2,400 Dec 05	70,000 Dec 08	120,000 Dec 08	0 Date TBD	

** include Militia/Police forces that are not formally trained

Afghanistan Police



Afghanistan Police Force

Afghanistan Police Force

Ministry: Interior

Lead Nation: Germany

Duties: Law Enforcement

Uniform: Black pants, black shirt

Vehicles: various

Weapons: various

Pay: set by the MOI, paid out of Law and Order Trust (LOFTA) fund

Afghanistan Police

Mission

- Primary civil law enforcement agency responsible for public safety, security, and order

Command and Control

- All Police forces are controlled by the Ministry of Interior.
- A radio network links the Ministry of Interior in Kabul with the 32 regional chiefs of police.
- Police training and Ministry on Interior guidance is conducted by Germany and the United States.

Force Structure

- 32 regionally based police forces under the command of a regional chief of police.
- The regional chief of police maintains contact with the Ministry of Interior and other regional chiefs of police through a radio network system.

Rationale

- The establishment for an National Police force was decreed by the Afghanistan Presidential Decree on the reform of the National Police Force (May 2003).

FY 04 Supplemental for Afghanistan

Funding and Equipping

- \$106M is in FY 04 DOD Supplemental
- Various equipment


Measures of Effectiveness

- Number of crimes against property (vandalism, arson, theft)
- Number of crimes against person (assault, rape, kidnapping, robbery)
- Number of murders
- Number of 911 calls
- Number of complaints that are not answered
- Average time to respond to calls
- Number of criminal events disrupted
- Installation and operation of a radio network to link the MOI in Kabul with the 32 provincial chiefs of police.
- Construction and equipment for 7 regional police training centers (RTCs)
- Development of a police ID card system with linkage to a personnel database.

Objectives for next three months

- Train 3,200 National Police, Border Police, and Highway Patrol by Dec 2003
- Gardez Regional Training Center Opened Nov 03, 30 recruits in training. Due to graduate 7 Dec 03.
- Finish the Mazar-e-Shariff Regional Training Center

Police on Duty



Afghanistan Police : Training Program

- **German Training Program**

- Rebuilt and restarted the Kabul Police Academy
- Program consists two programs:
 - Officer Program: Approximately 3 years in duration.
 - Program consists of 1 year academics, 1 year on-the-job training, 1 year finishing school. Length of course depends on previous experience and academic requirements.
 - NCO Program: Approximately 1 year in duration. Focuses on the basics of police work and on-the-job training.
- German Program has graduated 0.
- Goal is to graduate 1,000 from the Kabul Police Academy by end of December.




Afghanistan Police : Training Program (Cont.)

US Training Program

- Program consists of an eight-week basic training program for 4,000 patrolmen in Kabul; a two-week transition/integration program introducing human rights principles, democratic policing concepts, and supervision and management skills refresher for 3,000 Officers and NCOs; and an ongoing training program for provincial police trainers.
- As police training accelerates, the US Program will build 7 Regional Training Centers (RTCs) in proximity of 7 PRTs.
 - Gardez RTC (30 recruits in school)
 - Mazar-e-Shariff RTC (Dec 03)
 - Kandahar RTC (Jan 04)
 - Konduz RTC (Feb 04)
 - Jalalabad RTC (Mar 04)
 - Herat RTC (Apr 04)
 - Bamian RTC (May 04)
- The RTCs will offer the following courses for national police, border police, and highway patrol. Curricula will be standardized, with minor modifications to focus on the specific participants.
 - Transitional Integration Program- 2 wk course
 - Basic Policing Skills Program- 8 wk course
 - Instructor Development Course- 3 wk course
- Each RTC will have the capacity to produce a minimum of 750 graduates every 8 weeks.

US program has graduated 940 policemen



Border Police



Mission

- Security of border crossings; enforce customs and immigration

Command and Control

- All Police forces are controlled by the Ministry of Interior.
- Police training and Ministry on Interior guidance is conducted by Germany and the United States.

Force Structure

- Border Police will consist of 9 brigades. The first brigade (airport brigade) is already in place at Kabul International Airport. The 8 additional brigades will be regional.
- Objective is 4,000 by Jun 04; 400 Border Police already trained by Germany.

Rationale

- Patrol 5,800 miles of the border, man permanent crossing points, provide security and customs support to airports, and provide periodic surveillance and interdiction capability for smuggling routes and illegal crossing points.

FY 04 Supplemental for Afghanistan

Funding and Equipping

- \$60M is in FY 04 DOD Supplemental
- Lightly armed with communications and light wheeled vehicles.

Measures of Effectiveness

- Construction and refurbishment of Border Police facilities.
- Identify and train 4,000 Border Police recruits
- Amount of Customs Revenue collected

Objectives for next three months

Border Police

400



4K
JUN 04



Scale marker (200 per block)

9

400 Border Police already trained by Germany

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Highway Patrol



Highway Patrol
Ministry: Interior
Lead Nation: Germany
Duties: Security of Primary Roads
Uniform: camouflage uniforms
Weapons: various
Pay: Set by MOI, paid out of LOPTA fund

Highway Patrol



Mission

- Security of primary and secondary roads.

Command and Control

- All Police forces are controlled by the Ministry of Interior.
- Police training and Ministry on Interior guidance is conducted by Germany and the United States.

Force Structure

- 0 Highway Patrol currently on duty
- Highway Patrol training scheduled to start this month for 200 trainees.
- Highway Police will be created as a national police that shall eventually become part of the regional structure of the police.

Rationale

- Afghanistan Presidential Decree on the reform of the National Police (May 2003) establishes the need for a highway police program.

FY 04 Supplemental for Afghanistan

Funding and Equipping

- \$11M is in FY 04 DOD Supplemental
- Lightly armed with communications and light wheeled vehicles.

Measures of Effectiveness

- Number of crimes against person (assault, kidnapping, robbery)
- Average time to respond to calls
- Number of criminal events disrupted
- Identify and train 2500 Highway Patrol recruits

Objectives for next three months

- Highway Patrol training scheduled to start in Kandahar in Mid-November for 200 trainees.

Key International Involvement


Germany/ US providing training

Highway Patrol




Scale marker (200 per block)

Afghan National Army (ANA)



Afghan National Army soldier training



Afghanistan National Army (ANA)



Mission

- Establish, develop, and deploy an Afghan National Army capable of:
 - Protecting the territorial integrity of Afghanistan
 - Capable of preventing the reemergence within Afghanistan of international terrorist organizations or groups that support International terrorism.

Proponent

- President Karzai is the Commander-in-Chief of the ANA.
- Ministry of Defense is the administration that has oversight of the Afghan National Army, however the ANA and MOD receive guidance from CJTF-180, CFC, and ISAF.

Force Structure

- The ANA will be comprised of the Central Corps, three regionally based corps, and an air element.

Rationale

- Recruiting and training capacity are the pacing items for force structure goals.

FY 04 Supplemental for Afghanistan

Funding and Organization

- \$669.6M is in FY 04 DOD Supplemental
- The ANA will be comprised of the Central Corps, three regionally based corps, and an air element.

Measures of Effectiveness

- Number of joint operations with Coalition forces
- Retention: Attrition rate through training, 6 mos. After training, 1 year after training.
- Recruiting: MOD routinely processes sufficient numbers of recruits to being training on time.
- Units starting and completing training on time.
- Units reaching C2 in training, manning.
- MOD operation of the pay system.


Objectives for next three months

- Continue to open District Recruiting Centers
- Increase from 2 to 3 BNs in training concurrently
- Increase Retention Numbers

Key International Involvement

US is lead nation for ANA. France (Officer Training), UK (NCO training), Germany (Maintenance training), Romania (T-62 training), Bulgaria (28 BMP training), and Mongolia (B-30 training) are assisting.

Afghan National Army




UNCLASSIFIED

OVERALL TRAINING CONCEPT



National Events



➔ Quick Start May-Sep 02

★ ➔
Phase I Sep 02 - Jun 04

- Capable **Central Corps** that can provide security and stability
- Partially functioning **Ministry of Defense and General Staff**
- **Support Command** capable of limited logistical and administrative support



Phase II Jun 04 - Jun 06

- Complete **Central Corps**
- Capable **MoD/GS**, administering policy, planning, budget & operations
- Build **Regional Corps**
- Establish **Air Element**



Phase III Jun 06 - Jun 08

- Fully Functioning **MoD and Command Structure** with integrated **Regional Corps**



UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

100
12/27
DC

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 29, 2003
SUBJECT: DoD Historical Advisory Cmte

334

What do you think about having a single DoD Historical Advisory Committee rather than several.

We could combine all the existing ones and then tone it down over time and see that the services get to recommend people.

Thanks.

Let me know what you think!

DHR/azn
113003.03a

Attach: Info Memo to SD from DuBois 11/19/03 DoD Historical AC

Please respond by: 12/10

Sir,
Response attached.
Original attachment included behind.
1/27
1/26
29 Nov 03

U22533 103 / *CDR N*
1/26

✓
1/27

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: January 24, 2004

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: DOD Historical Advisory Committee

Don,

In order to respond to your snowflake on this subject, I asked Eliot Cohen to give me his private views. The attached paper comes from him although we should not circulate it with his name on it without his permission.

I think Eliot's recommendation makes a lot of sense. If you agree, as a next step I would ask Eliot and two or three distinguished historians to undertake a review of how we organize our historical advisory committees, to come up with more detailed recommendations along the lines of what Eliot has here.

I believe this could be done relatively quickly, and it would give us a good basis for moving forward.

Paul W.

SUBJECT: DOD Historical Advisory Committee

1. Our current system has the following disadvantages:

a. It is service-based, where the reality of warfare is joint and combined operations;

b. Nominally, we ask the advisory committees to cover a great deal of ground, from advising on declassification, to commenting on commemoration and museum design, to quality control of long term studies. In actual fact, they accomplish little. In particular, I suspect they do us very little good in the area DOD can use history most – timely operational history and analysis in support of professional military education and decision-making;

c. Like most advisory committees, they spend too much time in plenary session, not enough in well-defined projects;

d. The personnel currently assigned to various committees is, to put it mildly, uneven. With some notable exceptions, they are heavily weighted to insiders, friends of the services, and undistinguished academics.

2. Military history is the foundation of military education, and has been recognized as such for centuries; no profession rests so heavily on history as does that of warfare. The health of our official military history programs is not, therefore, a matter merely of fulfilling a bureaucratic requirement, but rather of insuring the intellectual health of our armed forces.

3. The golden age of American military history was in the 1950's and early 1960's when some of the country's leading historians – Kent Roberts Greenfield, R. R. Palmer, Samuel Eliot Morison, Frank Craven, and many others – participated in the preparation of the official histories of World War II. These superb works, which have stood the test of time, were produced swiftly, and in time to contribute to professional military education and policy-making. Particularly in the Army's case, this was possible because of support at the very highest level, from Generals George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower. We cannot imitate that experience exactly, but the lessons are that quality and high level attention matter.

4. DOD should, therefore, create a high profile and energetic DOD Historical Advisory Committee. Its key features should be:

a. A very strong, compact executive committee of half a dozen, and a much larger pool of members (say, forty or more) who would participate in ad hoc task forces and subcommittee.

b. The executive committee, to include a chairman and vice chairman, should have some staff support, to include travel funds, and should develop an annual statement of work, to be approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense;

c. Examples of some of the projects that might be undertaken immediately would include assessments of:

i. current operational history efforts;

ii. the way in which DOD writes joint and combined history;

iii. the uses of recent military history in professional military education

iv. the desirable mix of in-house and contract history writing.

d. Those recruited for the advisory committee should be some of the best military historians in the United States. More than half of the committee's membership (and certainly more than half of the members of the executive committee) should come from outside DOD institutions.



ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

NOV 20 01 3 45

INFO MEMO

November 19, 2003

Lamy in File
11/24

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director of Administration and Management

SUBJECT: DoD Historical Advisory Committee

- This responds to your question regarding the DoD Historical Advisory Committee, which was established in 1993.
- The purpose of the Committee is to provide advice to the Secretary of Defense and the secretaries of military departments regarding the professional standards, historical methodology, program priorities, liaison with professional groups and institutions, and adequacy of resources connected with the various historical programs and associated activities of the Department of Defense. These include: historical, archival, commemorative, museum, library, art, curatorial, and related programs.
- The committee consists of three subcommittees: the Department of the Army Historical Advisory Committee; the Department of the Navy Historical Advisory Committee; and the DoD Historical Records Declassification Panel (HRDAP). The first two subcommittees report to their Service Secretaries and the third formally reports to you.
- A listing of subcommittee members is attached.
- Administrative oversight of the subcommittees is the responsibility of the OSD Historian, who is also the chairman of the HRDAP.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments: As stated

Prepared By: Jennifer Spaeth (b)(6)

SPI ASSISTANT DI RITA	11/24
SR MA CHADBOCK	11/24
MA BUCCO	11/24
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	11/24

11-L-0559/OSD/20818

U19149 / 03

Secretary of the Navy's
Advisory Subcommittee on Naval History
October 2003

Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, USN (Ret.) – Joint Military Intelligence College

Vice Admiral George W. Emery, USN (Ret.) – Naval Historical Foundation

Dr. John B. Hattendorf – North American Society for Oceanic History

Rear Admiral John T. Kavanaugh, SC, USN (Ret.) - USS Wisconsin Foundation

Rear Admiral John M. Kersh, USN (Ret.) – American Operations Corporation

Lox (Burt) Logan - USS Constitution Museum

Dr. James R. Reckner – Texas Tech

Virginia S. Wood – Boston University

Members of Department of the Army
Historical Advisory Committee
October 2003

Dr. Eric Bergerud - Department of General Education Lincoln University

Mr. Mark Bowden - Lincoln University

BG James T. Hirai - U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Dr. James T. Stensvaag - Chief Historian, Army

COL Robert A. Doughty - U.S. Military Academy

Ms. Sandra Stroud - Department of the Army

Professor Adrian R. Lewis - University of North Texas

Professor Brian M. Linn - Texas A&M University

Mr. Howard Lowell - National Archives

COL Craig Madden - U.S. Army War College

Dr. John H. Morrow, Jr. - LeConte Hall The University of Georgia

Professor Reina Pennington - Norwich University

Professor Ronald H. Spector - George Washington University

→ Dr. Jon T. Sumida - University of Maryland (Chairman)

Professor Russell F. Weigley - Temple University

Members of DoD Historical Records
Declassification Advisory Panel
October 2003

Dr. John W. Chambers – Rutgers University

Dr. Ronald Hoffman – William and Mary

Dr. Irving B. Holley, Jr. – Duke University

Dr. Lorraine M. Lees – Old Dominion University

Dr. Brian Vandemark – U.S. Naval Academy

Dr. James Hershberg – George Washington University

Dr. Alfred Goldberg – OSD Historian (Chairman)

Dr. David Armstrong – Chief, Joint History Office

Dr. Jeffrey Clarke – Chief Historian, Army

Dr. William Dudley – Chief Historian, Navy

Dr. William Heimdahl – Deputy Chief Historian, Air Force

Mr. Fed Graboske – Archivist, US Marine Corps Historical Center

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: November 29, 2003
SUBJECT: SecDef Gifts

Set a meeting with Dan Dell'Orto for me to go over this SecDef Gifts paper. I just don't understand it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
113003.03a

Attach: Info Memo to SD from Dell'Orto re: SD Gifts 10/20/03

Please respond by: 12/15

U22534 /03

005

→
29 Nov 03



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

ACTION MEMO

December 24, 2003, 12 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes*

SUBJECT: Letter to Chairman Kean of the 9/11 Commission

- You sent the Deputy and me the following note, dated yesterday:

I think we ought to get a letter off to Chairman Keane of the 9/11 Commission. If he knows anyone in the Defense Department who failed to do their job and contributed to September 11th, or who is currently failing to do their job, he should tell us promptly so we can do something about it. Thanks.

- Tab A contains my proposed letter.
- The article from which Chairman Kean's comments are drawn is at TAB B.

RECOMMENDATION: Secretary sign the letter to Chairman Kean. (TAB A)

Attachments:

As stated

cc:

Deputy Secretary of Defense
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)

000.5

24 Dec 03

U22535 /03



TAB A



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

Honorable Thomas H. Kean
Chairman
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States
301 Seventh Street, N.W.
Room 5125
Washington, D.C. 20407

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The New York Daily News (December 19, 2003) attributes to you the assertion that the attacks on the World Trade Center could have been prevented, "but officials in Washington 'simply failed' in their vigilance." The article quoted you as saying: "This was not something that had to happen." You are also cited to the effect that some of the people who failed in their vigilance before September 11 continue to hold their jobs today.

If you believe any specific officials – either civilian or military – within the Department of Defense failed to discharge their duties properly on or before September 11, 2001, please provide their names to me immediately. I also ask that you provide me the information that led you to conclude that these individuals failed in their duties. As you must know, the enemies that attacked our country so treacherously on September 11, 2001, continue to threaten us. Making such charges without further information is not just unhelpful; it is also potentially quite harmful. It prevents or delays those of us responsible for defending the country from ensuring that we can correct the deficiencies you allege. It also threatens to undermine irremediably the public's confidence in its government.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/20825

TAB B

30 of 1555 DOCUMENTS

Copyright 2003 Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service
Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service
Daily News (NY)

December 19, 2003, Friday

SECTION: DOMESTIC NEWS

KR-ACC-NO: K6840

LENGTH: 366 words

HEADLINE: 9/11 preventable, says panel head

BYLINE: By James Gordon Meek and Dave Goldiner

BODY:

The World Trade Center attack could have been prevented, but officials in Washington "simply failed" in their vigilance, the Republican head of the Sept. 11 commission said Wednesday.

"This was not something that had to happen," said Thomas Kean, the former New Jersey governor whom President Bush put in charge of the bipartisan panel investigating the worst terror attacks in American history.

Kean said he was flabbergasted that unnamed officials who should have done more still have their jobs.

"There are people that, if I was doing the job, would certainly not be in the position they were in at that time, because they failed," Kean told CBS News. "They simply failed."

Kean vowed major revelations next month when his committee starts hearing public testimony from top officials _ possibly even President Bush and former President Bill Clinton.

A commission spokesman insisted Kean isn't trying to finger anyone in either administration _ yet.

"We are going to have some disturbing conclusions," spokesman Alvin Felzenberg said.

The White House refused last night to comment directly on the CBS interview. "The President wants to learn everything possible about what happened," said deputy spokeswoman Claire Buchan.

The commission already has skirmished with the Bush administration over briefings the White House resisted handing over. A compromise will allow selected members to see most of the documents.

Victims' relatives welcomed Kean's frank talk and said hearing the attacks should have been prevented is not news to them.

"I realized that two years ago," said Stephen Push, whose wife, Lisa Raines, died in the plane that crashed into the Pentagon.

Kristen Breitweiser blasted national security chief Condoleezza Rice for saying the U.S. never dreamed planes could be used as suicide weapons when FBI agents had testified earlier about such a plan.

"We had tons of warnings. Apparently it all went unnoticed," said Breitweiser, 32, of Monmouth County, N.J., whose husband, Ronald, died in the World Trade Center.

11-L-0559/OSD/20827

Daily News (NY) December 19, 2003, Friday

With Derek Rose and Kenneth R. Bazinet

—
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Visit the Daily News online at <http://www.nydailynews.com/>

JOURNAL-CODE: NY

LOAD-DATE: December 19, 2003

11-L-0559/OSD/20828

December 27, 2003

India

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: PACOM and CENTCOM

Here is a Vern Clark e-mail on the lines between PACOM and CENTCOM that we ought to think through. Please see me on it.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/24/03 CNO e-mail re: India/Pakistan Trip Thoughts

DHR:dh
122703-29 (ts computer)

.....
Please respond by _____

1/23/04

27 Dec 03

U22539 /03

No Classification in Message Body

010/21
12/21

Craddock, John J, LTG, OSD

From: Clark, Vern (N00) [Clark.Vern@cno.navy.smil.mil]
Sent: Friday, October 24, 2003 6:16 PM
To: 'john.craddock@osd.smil.mil'; 'meyersrb@js.pentagon.smil.mil'
Cc: 'fargotb0@hq.pacom.smil.mil'; 'abizaijp@centcom.smil.mil'
Subject: India/Pakistan trip thoughts

Importance: High
Sensitivity: Personal

WLS

John,

-- Please pass to Secretary Rumsfeld --

Mr. Secretary and Chairman,

You may recall I recently visited India and Pakistan. It was a terrific trip and very fruitful.

Two major issues for me:

- * One: the disconnect in both countries with how the UCP divides sensible relations with these two nations.
- * Our dividing lines are impacting them.
- * India wants to be engaged to the west. They have real national interests in that direction.
- * We are protective to the west because, in CENTCOM, we protect the feelings of Pakistan. (I'm not casting blame; just addressing perceptions)
- * So...India is not as engaged in the Gulf as they would like to be and they told me they sense a lack of connection with CENTCOM. They feel they have no entrance to deal in that AOR, e.g. exercises, liaisons, etc.
- * They don't see themselves as "belonging" to PACOM only.
- * It is less true for Pakistan looking east. As you know, Pak is keeping score of every move we make with India, but in naval stuff, they played in PACOM's submarine rescue event and liked it.

* Recommendation: We need to figure out how to fuzz the lines between these kinds of boundaries.

- * Two: Recovering from sanctions.
 - o Lots of frustration. This is familiar to you I know.
 - o We need to figure out how to look proactive in a post sanctions window. We don't.
 - o Example: Pak already has the HARPOON surface-to-surface missile. During the years of sanction their HARPOON missiles became inoperable ...lack of support, parts, test equipment, etc. They are unable to obtain much needed parts and support equipment for legacy systems like this without starting over through our formal, multiagency approval process.
 - * Recommendation: When we lift sanctions, we should consider a fundamental change to our interagency approval process and issue, pre-emptively, a list of items already approved. We should not force the nation to go through the approval process again.

All in all a good trip. I told each of them you had given me, and each of the Chiefs, the direction to get engaged. That message was well received.

VR, Vern

12/17
1302



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

December 16, 2003, 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs, 697-6210

SUBJECT: Response to SecDef Snowflake #120903.09 regarding Congressional
Breakfast

- Representative Mary Bono (R-45th, CA) was last at the Pentagon on October 10, 2002. You briefed her and 28 other select House Members on Weapons of Mass Destruction and Iraq. On October 10, 2003, you hosted eight women House Members at the Pentagon for breakfast to discuss their all-women Codel to Iraq; Mary Bono was not in the group.
- Rep. Bono was a member of the Armed Services Committee in the 106th Congress. She left that Committee for the Energy and Commerce Committee.

032

Attachment:
SECDEF Snowflake

16 Dec 03

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: Paul Wolfowitz
SUBJECT: Iran/Turkey; Shia Divisions

DATE: April 22, 2003 -HC 1215
4/23

Don,

Attached is a good and simple summary of:

1. Key drivers of Turkish and Iranian interests in Iraq – described as a combination of fears and temptations;
2. A brief history of the two main strands of Shia thinking.

U22743⁰⁰¹/03

11-L-0559/OSD/20832

Guest Comment

On NRO

[E-mail Author](#)
[Send to a Friend](#)
[Print Version](#)

April 21, 2003, 8:35 a.m.

The Neighborhood

Temptation and fear.

By Amir Taheri

Iraq has two things that interest Turkey and two other things that interest Iran. One of the two is a source of temptation, the other of fear.

What tempts Turkey in Iraq is a share in the oilfields of Mosul and Kirkuk.

What Turkey fears is that Iraqi Kurds may get too big for their boots and give ideas to Turkish Kurds.

What tempts Iran's mullahs is the prospect of extending the Khomeinist revolution into Iraq, thus ending their ideological isolation in the Muslim world.

What Tehran fears, of course, is the revival of Najaf, in central Iraq, as the heart of a moderate Shiite Islam allied with the United States.

With the future of Iraq undecided, Turkey and Iran have started series of maneuvers to secure what they covet and to minimize what they fear.

Turkey lacks a significant constituency inside Iraq. It has close ties with a number of Iraqi Turkmen parties and personalities, and will use them as chips in negotiations about the future government in Baghdad. But the Turkomen account for just one percent of the Iraqi population and, concentrated in the Mosul region, lack national reach.

Ankara is trying to make up for its lack of an Iraqi support base by flexing its military muscles. Turkey has the world's largest army, after the United States, and seems determined to rattle a few sabers in the crucial months ahead.

The Turks are also reviving old treaties and accords, some dating back to the Ottoman Empire, that could give Ankara a veto over key aspects of a future Iraqi government's policy.

Ankara suffered a strategic setback when the Turkish Parliament refused to let the US open a second front against Saddam Hussein in northern Iraq by using Turkish territory. A few months ago the Americans, unsure that they would topple Saddam so easily, were ready to give Turkey a say in shaping the future of Iraq. Now they have no incentive or reason to offer the Turks anything.

11-L-0559/OSD/20833

It would thus be unthinkable for the U.S. to veto the greatest possible autonomy for Iraqi Kurds solely to allay Turkish fears.

Compared to Turkey, Iran has more assets in Iraq. For more than 20 years it has invested in several Shiite, Kurdish, and even Arab Sunni opposition groups, in some cases as joint ventures with Syria.

There is no guarantee that those in whom Iran has invested will emerge as obedient tools of Iranian strategy. Some Iraqi Shiite leaders may turn out to be as ungrateful to Iran as the Chinese Maoists proved to be towards their Communist siblings in the Soviet Union in the 1960s.

Nevertheless, the Iraqi Shiites, financed, trained, and armed by Iran, are unlikely to switch sides easily if only because of the perception that the Americans will not stay long while the Iranians will always be next door.

Iran's current strategy, therefore, is aimed at preventing the emergence of an independent Iraqi Shiite *marjaiyah* (source of emulation) around Grand Ayatollah Ali Muhammad Sistani. In that context Iran is forging an alliance with Shiite groups, including the family of the late Ayatollah Muhammad-Sadeq Sadr, who had collaborated with the Baathist regime.

The realities of power on the ground in Iraq are such that Tehran's strategy may not get anywhere. But it sure can make life more difficult for the Americans as they try to shape a new government in Baghdad.

Tehran is also making noises about old treaties that gave Iran "a right of observation" over the Shiite shrines in Mesopotamia.

Tehran's fears that Najaf may become an alternative center for Shiite theology and thought are not groundless.

Under the influence of a string of great theologians, starting with Mirza Hassan Shirazi in the 19th century and passing by Abol-Qassem Khoi in the 20th century, Iraqi Shiism steered clear of politics and focused on the ethics of the theological discourse.

This was in contrast with what the late Ayatollah Ruhallah Khomeini, the father of the Islamic revolution in Iran, preached from the 1950s.

Khomeini spent 14 years in exile in Najaf (1965-1978) where he was a lone voice among theologians.

He argued, "Only a good society can create good believers."

Khoi's argued the opposite: "only good believers can create a good society."

Khomeini believed that, left to their own, most people would not live by the precepts of Islam.

"Man is half angel, half devil," he wrote in *Tozih al-Masayel (Explication of Issues)*, his magnum opus. "The devil part is always stronger than the angel part. This is why society should organize to combat it through laws and suitable punishments."

Khoi rejected that view, too.

He asserted that the individual was capable of taming "the devil side" and using "the angel side" to improve society thanks to "divine guidance rather coercion".

Khomeini believed that mullahs should seize power and use it to create "the perfect society" even if that meant "purification" in the form of hundreds of thousands of executions.

Khoi rejected the possibility of creating the "perfect society" in the absence of the Hidden Imam whose return is awaited by the Shiites for more than 12 centuries.

Today, Khoi's views, continued by his disciple Sistani, enjoy a wide audience among Shiites, including in Iran where the grand ayatollahs reject Khomeini's theory of rule by the mullahs.

Until Saddam imposed his tyranny, Najaf had often acted as a refuge for dissident Iranian theologians. It could become one again. And that frightens the mullahs in Tehran.

As for Turkey, it has always used the bogeyman of a separate Kurdish state in Iraq as an excuse for denying its own Kurds minimum rights, such as speaking Kurdish and promoting their culture. Iraq's success in developing a system in which Kurd and Arab, and other ethnic groups, live together in peace and harmony could deal a serious blow to Turkish chauvinism.

One danger remains: If the Iraqi state is eclipsed for a long period, at some point Turkey and Iran may come together to exert joint influence on future developments in Iraq. And that could be bad news not only for the U.S.-led Coalition but also for the Iraqi people.

— *Amir Taheri is an Iranian author of ten books on the Middle East and Islam. He's reachable through www.benadorassociates.com.*

<http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-taheri042103.asp>

11-L-0559/OSD/20835

11/10
PB

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: November 10, 2003

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz (Dictated but not read)

SUBJECT: Paul Butler Briefings

337

Don,

Paul Butler, in coordination with Steve Cambone, is working on preparing two separate briefings for you, one on Guantanamo detainees, which will focus principally on: (1) how we're handling transfer and release issues; (2) the ICRC issues; and (3) the kinds of issues you referred to in Roundtable this morning that had been brought up by the Danes.

The second briefing will be on Iraqi detainees and will focus on what intelligence we're obtaining from them, how that intelligence is processed, and how we can do a better job of getting relevant information elevated to your level.

Paul will be giving me an initial look at the briefings on November 12, so that we can have something ready for you when you get back from your trip.

10/10/03

1110
11/5

November 4, 2003

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ^D
SUBJECT: Detainees

I need to have a briefing on detainees in both Iraq and Guantanamo Bay. I am concerned.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110403-2

.....
Please respond by 11/21/03

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: July 28, 2003 -1405

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz 

HC

SUBJECT: UN Drivers

UN

Don,

I am told by someone in the World Bank office in Baghdad that they are paying their drivers \$750 a month, which is apparently the standard UN rate. (Clay McManaway says he doesn't think it's that high, and he will check for me. However, he agrees that it is way above any normal wage in Iraq.)

As a result, we have engineers and teachers working as chauffeurs for the UN, at the same time that schools are open and we are trying to repair power supplies.

I also asked Clay McManaway to check on how much we pay our drivers. I'm sure it's not as much, but it still may be too high.

2872103

U22790 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20838



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

August 15, 2003

THE DIRECTOR

020 CPA

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD

FROM: Joshua B. Bolton
Director

SUBJECT: Supplemental for CPA

Thanks for your note attaching Ambassador Bremer's message about a supplemental. I know the President will want us to be as helpful as possible in getting CPA the resources it needs, when it needs them.

The best timing of a request, however, is sensitive and not obvious. Several factors make an early September request problematic:

- we've said publicly we won't need money in '03;
- a successful request will need detailed justification – which I understand is still in development – as well as extensive consultation (nearly impossible in August); and
- early introduction of a supplemental could badly complicate action on pending '04 spending bills. Both Appropriations chairmen told me that a supplemental introduced in the midst of the '04 process would be unwelcome (though I did have the chance to alert Chairman Stevens last week that action this year might be necessary).

Several questions deserve serious consideration before we make a recommendation to the President, including:

- What timing maximizes the prospect of rapid congressional action while minimizing the prospect of unnecessary add-ons and interference with other legislation?
- What's the best strategy for maximizing international contributions?
- Will we be prepared to present simultaneously a defense supplemental, and if not, what are the pros and cons of doing two separate supplementals?

I've asked my staff to go to work immediately with the Comptroller's office to expedite review of CPA's recommendations when they arrive. The usual sharp OMB pencils will be deployed, but they will be fast, cooperative, and sympathetic to the extraordinary circumstance that CPA faces. In the meantime, I'd ask that in his congressional contacts in Baghdad, Ambassador Bremer avoid discussion of a specific dollar amount, timing, or form for a supplemental – so as not to preempt presidential decision and consultation with congressional leadership.

15 AUG 03

U22958 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/20839

I've had a chance to discuss this briefly this afternoon with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, and would be pleased to discuss in detail with you at your convenience.

cc: The Honorable Richard B. Cheney
The Honorable Paul D. Wolfowitz
The Honorable Andrew H. Card
The Honorable Condoleezza Rice

July 9
July 6, 2003

1525
7/9
SLE

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Jerry Bremer

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Baghdad

IRAQ

Attached is an article on Baghdad and Frank Lloyd Wright's interest in it. I found it interesting.

Thanks.

Attach.
Ringle, Ken. "The Genie in an Architect's Lamp," *Washington Post*, June 29, 2003.

DHR:dh
070603-1 (ts computer).doc

.....
Please respond by _____

97u103

washingtonpost.com

The Genie in an Architect's Lamp

Frank Lloyd Wright's '57 Plan for Baghdad May Be Key to Its Future

By Ken Ringle

Washington Post Staff Writer

Sunday, June 29, 2003; Page N01

Many stories in recent weeks have told us that the United States fights an uphill battle for public support in Iraq, partly because of a persistent belief on "the Arab street" that the West is intent on erasing Islamic culture. How can the United States convince Iraqis that it's not true?

Two Middle Eastern specialists at the Library of Congress say the answer lies in little-known plans by the celebrated American architect Frank Lloyd Wright for rebuilding Baghdad into a glittering capital of Islamic culture like the one that once dazzled the world.

Why not call on Iraqis to embrace Wright's grand vision, the scholars ask: a dazzling new, high-tech Baghdad deliberately rooted in its fabled past?

It is impossible to overemphasize the power of such a vision to unite Iraq's religious factions and tribes, says Mary Jane Deeb, who has lectured on Arab history and culture from Sweden to Morocco as well as in her native Beirut.

Even the most illiterate Iraqi child -- "or, indeed, any Arab child," she says -- has heard of the Baghdad of Scheherazade, Sinbad and "The Arabian Nights." They all know that when Europe was wallowing in feudal darkness, "Baghdad was a triumph of civilization -- a place of tolerance and philosophy, of poetry and music and great architecture and science. Why should it not be that sort of city again?"

Mina Marefat, Rockefeller Fellow in Islamic Studies at the Library of Congress's Kluge Center, agrees.

The significance of the Frank Lloyd Wright drawings, she says, is that they show such profound respect for the very cultural heritage to which the West is supposed to be hostile.

"Iraqis think we want to kill their culture," she says. "Yet when America's greatest architect drew a plan for Baghdad" in 1957, "where did he turn for inspiration? Not to American or European 'modernism,' which was so fashionable at the time, but to Arab and Persian architecture, which had shaped the famous Baghdad of the 8th and 9th century."

That realization might help inspire Iraqis to lift their sights beyond the immediate squabbles and resentments of occupation, she says. "Wright's vision for Baghdad need not be the only vision," she says. "Other architects, Iraqi architects, could be called on to submit designs. The key factor is to focus on the ingredients that made Baghdad great long ago" and challenge Iraqis to make their greatest traditions live again in a reborn city.

Marefat is hoping to arrange an exhibit of Wright's Baghdad drawings both at the Library of

Congress and in Baghdad. She is also hoping to interest some filmmaker in making a documentary about Wright's Baghdad project.

Wright's plans for Baghdad remain a little-known last act in the long career of the flamboyant architect. He was 93 when he traveled to Iraq in May 1957 to take up a commission for an opera house that would "help modernize" the capital city of what was then a kingdom ruled by King Faisal II. Dissatisfied with the site selected for the opera house, Wright lobbied for and received permission to build it instead on an island in the Tigris River. He then expanded his proposal to include a civic auditorium, a landscaped park with monuments, fountains and waterfalls, a parking deck in the shape of a three-story ziggurat, museums for both ancient and modern art, a botanical garden and zoo, a casino, a bazaar, an amphitheater and an entire university complex. He also designed a new post office in the old city of Baghdad.

"We've got a great opportunity there," he wrote, ". . . to demonstrate that we're not destructive but constructive, where the original forces that built the civilizations of the world are concerned. . . . We are not there to slap them in the face but to do honor to them."

In a chapter she authored on "Wright's Baghdad" in the book "Frank Lloyd Wright: Europe and Beyond," Marefat wrote that Wright's proposed Baghdad civic center "was intended to reinforce a cultural identity rooted in a rich historic past. To this end he mined both Islamic and pre-Islamic imagery, relying as much on myth and memory as on historical context. His circular plan was in fact reminiscent of al-Mansur's city" and featured "domed shapes and lofty spires" of Islamic memory plus ziggurats and terraces "alluding to the ancient Assyrian and Mesopotamian heritage" of Iraq.

Mindful of such modern urban challenges as traffic flow and communications towers, she added, "what Wright prepared in Baghdad was a rare mixture of respect for the past and for the technology of the future. . . . But the city he evoked was [the] city of memory . . . of imagination," the Baghdad of Scheherazade and Sinbad -- powerful enough to endure for centuries even when the real city was long destroyed."

However much Arab storytellers have embroidered it over the years with magic lanterns and flying carpets, Deeb and Marefat point out, the fabulous Baghdad of the Middle Ages was more than just an Islamic Camelot: It really did exist.

It was built between 762 and 766 by 10,000 slaves laboring under the orders of the Abbassid al-Mansur, the second of the 37th caliphs of that dynasty. Mansur thought himself an architect. He envisioned a perfectly circular walled city roughly a mile and a half in diameter, its sections radiating out from a central palace and mosque like the sections of an orange. To double-check the geometry of his design before construction, Arab chronicles say, he had his workers outline the path of Baghdad's intended wall with a shallow trench, fill it with a mixture of cottonseed and oil and set it afire while he watched from a nearby height.

That Baghdad was destroyed in 1258 by invading Mongols who burned its mosque and minarets and libraries and looted its splendors, and went on killing for 40 days. Arabs have been mourning its loss ever since.

"There is no way to exaggerate the hold the myth of Baghdad has on the Arab imagination,"

Deeb says. "Arabs know their civilization was great once. They don't understand why that greatness passed away. The fundamentalist Mullahs tell them it is because they have been corrupted by infidel teachings from the West" -- never mind that Baghdad was sacked not from the West, but from the East.

The more likely explanation for the decline, she says, is that the greatest thinkers of the Arab world were killed by the Mongols. The surviving Muslims, much like Catholic Spain in the same era, turned against rationality and scientific inquiry, considering them subversive of religious orthodoxy and faith. That attitude in Spain inspired the infamous Inquisition, expulsion of the Jews and a long twilight of bloodshed and intolerance. In the Arab world it led to increasing Islamic factionalism and tribal enmity and a long decline in the face of the technologically superior West.

Nowadays, Deeb says, young Arabs are being asked to choose between a faith-based Islamic fundamentalism with ties to their cultural past and a high-tech Western culture that they're told exploits them to marginality.

"They look around and see nothing that echoes this great past they've heard about. The prospect of a Baghdad rebuilt to mirror that greatness could be a profoundly inspiring and healing vision," she says. "One vital not just for Iraqis: one in which all Arabs could feel they share."

Wright had grown up with the "Arabian Nights" tales and was so fond of them he adorned his own children's playhouse in Oak Park, Ill., with a mural depicting "The Fisherman and the Genii," Marefat writes. But his involvement in Baghdad was anything but fantasy.

Iraq had come into being as a nation in 1924, its boundaries conforming not to any resemblance of its past kingdoms but to the negotiated wishes of the great European powers in the wake of World War I. The British, who with the aid of Lawrence of Arabia had evicted the Turks during the Great War from their long dominion over Arab lands, installed Faisal I of the Hashemite family as Iraq's king. They continued to influence Iraqi affairs even after World War II when the country nationalized its mushrooming oil production, making vast sums available for public development projects.

In 1950 Iraq created a Development Board to chart a path for using the oil money to move the still primitive desert country into the modern age. For the first five years the board targeted the country's infrastructure: roads, flood control, sewerage, hospitals, schools and the like.

By 1957 the basics had been taken care of and the board was ready to move on to more ambitious public works. With Iraqi architects scarce at the time, leading architects from the West were invited to submit proposals for specific projects.

Among those who did were Germany's Walter Gropius, France's Le Corbusier and Italy's Gio Ponti. Wright was enlisted almost as an afterthought.

"The irony," says Marefat, "is that Wright was the only one giving a thought to Iraq's cultural heritage in his designs, and his weren't built. The others created 'modern' architecture of the era that had little or no relation to Iraq or its history."

Those designs, she said, influenced the design of buildings in the years since, "so that today Baghdad looks like any Western city . . . maybe Los Angeles. The chance to reshape it with a distinctive character was lost."

It is the chance to recover that character, she says, that continues to fuel her fascination with Wright's vision.

"Americans -- and I am one myself -- are not very good at grasping the importance of traditional culture in a country like Iraq," she says. "We tend to think that because our political and economic system makes life good for us, it will solve problems for others if we just transport it. But Iraqis must feel they are holding onto the culture that makes them Iraqis as they adapt their society to the post-Saddam era. They are a proud people. We should help them express that cultural pride in a constructive way. It would solve so many of their present problems. And ours, too."

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October 14, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Gen. John Abizaid
Jerry Bremer
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Sunni Triangle

Attached is an e-mail from a person on the ground in Iraq with some strong views.
It is worth reading and thinking about.

Thanks.

Attach.

9/29/03 Bing West e-mail to James Schlesinger re: Report from Sunni Triangle

DHR:dh
101403-17

.....
Please respond by 10/31/03

OB
10-21

WAA

11/03

U23021 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20846

✓
10/14

Subject: Fwd: Report from Sunni Triangle
Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2003 13:58:42 -0400
From: Bing West <westf@gamacorp.com>
To: "Schlesinger James R." (b)(6)

The Marines should be sent into the toughest area ASAP.
Begin forwarded message:

-----Original Message-----

From: Bing West (mailto:(b)(6))
Sent: Monday, September 29, 2003 10:34 AM
To: Schlesinger James R.; Marshall Andrew; Mamin N
Subject: Report from Sunni Triangle

Below is a sobering report from a friend who is a Foreign Service officer and a major in the Army's Special Forces.

Dear Bing,

I spent a week in Baghdad and then a week in the Shia heartland in Hillah and finally landed six weeks ago as Ambassador Bremer's Governance Coordinator in Ramadi, southern piece of the Sunni Triangle. I worked with the 3d ACR for four weeks and am now with the 82d. Fascinating assignment, but the most consistent danger I have experienced. These IEDs and RPG attacks are psychologically worse than combat and are taking a toll on the troops. While it is statistically improbable that one will be hit, they remain unnerving, especially for those of us that have been through an attack.

Difficult to establish ground truth here, because of the diversity from North to Center to South. It certainly is a different world in Najaf and Karbala than what we experience here with the angry Sunnis. Marines in Karbala -- LTC Lopez and his battalion -- did really incredible work.

All depends on whether one is a winner or a loser in the new Iraq I suppose. The game is to expand the realm of winners so they squeeze out the operating space of the losers, but I have to say that in my neighborhood we are losing that fight, as the bad guys are playing a contrary game with some effectiveness. Fallujah has a level of rage that I haven't seen since Mogadishu and I would have to guess is right at the tipping point of a wholesale revolt. The problem is we lost so much time that we are now playing a desperate game of catch up, and it may be too late.

I think we have six months here, and whatever we accomplish in six months is what we will be able to do. We can stay around through pure force, but Iraq will be set in the next half year and if we are still in the muddle we are in now I think we will have completely lost the initiative.

It is all about power (electrical power), police, and political process, and if we can deliver on those three, we could still make this work. But we need a surge on all three, not the little of this little of that kind of approach we have had to date. I still find the police program maddening for its lack of focus and the inability five months into this to have something in place that would be producing a quality force.

During the Cold War America employed a "we pay, you fight" policy of national defense, using proxies to wear the Soviet Union down on its behalf. This evolved during Gulf I to a "you pay, we fight" policy, as wealthy Arab sheikhs and Asian oil consumers financed the U.S.-led expulsion of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. We have now adopted a "we pay, we fight" policy, as around the globe America is doing it all, and paying for it all. It is a policy that is wearing us down, made all the worse by the ready availability of allies that have not been fully empowered to enter the fight.

11-L-0559/OSD/20847

A quality Iraqi police force, properly armed and equipped, could take over many of the risky jobs American soldiers are performing, such as keeping the roads cleared of improvised explosive devices and controlling the borders that are reportedly being infiltrated by terrorists. Police in Iraq could be employed for \$2 per day. But they are not being employed in anything close to the numbers that are needed, and those that are on the beat are shabbily armed and largely untrained.

Forming quality security forces in a hurry has been done before. In 1983 President Reagan made a determination to stop the advance of FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador. Over a period of four months the entire Salvadoran junior officer corps was brought to the United States for basic officers' training, while whole battalions were brought to bases in the U.S. and Honduras for unit training. A newly empowered Salvadoran Army took to the field and rapidly turned the tide, leading the country into peace talks in 1989 and to a full participatory democracy that included the country's former guerrilla foes thereafter.

Iraq needs a proficient and well-equipped police force in a hurry so that our soldiers can go home - for our sake, and for Iraq's sake, since our welcome is quickly wearing out.

C10/20

October 14, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Gen. John Abizaid
Jerry Bremer
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION					
SECRET	TOP SECRET	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	TOP SECRET	CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET	TOP SECRET	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	TOP SECRET	CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Sunni Triangle

Attached is an e-mail from a person on the ground in Iraq with some strong views. It is worth reading and thinking about.

Thanks.

Attach.

9/29/03 Binag West e-mail to James Schlesinger re: Report from Sunni Triangle

✓
10/21
Sir,
Typed transcript of
below response attached
w/ CDR Nosemy
10/10

ESR:dk
101403-17

.....
Please respond by 10/31/03

Mr. Secretary:

I presume this constant delay of "send the Marines in" has some purpose I do not understand or appreciate. Please feel free to send in the Marines. CENTCOM needs capability not service squabbling. Otherwise I agree with some key points noted.

017148 103

*WCS
CF: 10/11*

Transcription of Note from General Abizaid to Secretary Rumsfeld**Mr. Secretary,**

I presume this constant deluge of "send the Marines in" has some purpose I do not understand or appreciate. Please feel free to send in the Marines. CENTCOM needs this capability, not service squabbling. Otherwise, I agree with some key points noted.

V/R A**Copy For: CJCS**

2:36 PM

12/1
5-437

TO: Secretary Jim Roche

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Larry Di Rita
Powell Moore
Mike Wynne

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: November 24, 2003

SUBJECT: Tankers

45AT

My impression is that Sen. McCain may ask that there be a new contract negotiated on the tankers. Apparently he entered into a colloquy on the floor of the Senate suggesting that that's what the bill suggests, even though others don't agree with that.

What's your thought?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112403.15

Please respond by: _____ 12/6

*Sir,
Response attached.
vr/CDR Nosing
12/8*

U23062 / 03

aynov03



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON



DEC 5 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: KC-767 Tanker Lease/Purchase Contract Approach (Your November 24, 2003 Tanker Snowflake)

Bow

Your impression conveyed in your snowflake is correct, there is a difference of opinion on what the bill authorizes as evidenced by opposing colloquy's. With respect to Senator McCain, he maintains the need for an incrementally funded multi-year contract for the purchase of 80 KC-767A tanker aircraft, separate from the initial 20-aircraft lease. This is reflected both in his Senate floor colloquy and his November 13, 2003 letter to the DEPSECDEF. In contrast, a colloquy by Congressmen Hunter/Tiahart/Dicks states their belief that the bill authorizes one or more contracts with purchase on delivery.

We are in final negotiations on a contract for the lease of twenty aircraft in compliance with the FY2004 National Defense Authorizations Act (NDAA), with the goal of awarding upon conclusion of the Inspector General's review. We are also working the details of a second contract for the purchase of the remaining eighty aircraft on a multi-year basis. This is consistent with previous bill language that restricted the original lease to an operating lease, therefore requiring any purchase of tanker aircraft be executed under a separate contract vehicle.

That said, there remain outstanding contract issues and we are currently developing options for decision. We will consult with Congress before proceeding.

Per the December 1, 2003 letter from Secretary Wolfowitz to Senator Warner, CM Hunter, and Senator McCain, our actions will be consistent with "a pause in the execution of the contracts," and will allow for closure of the renewed DoD IG assessment.

And, frankly, if there was a way for me to choke the Dragon and Boeing for their dumb and unethical behavior, I'd do it! Thank

Attachments:

- 1. December 1, 2003 DEPSECDEF Letters to Senators Warner and McCain and CM Hunter
- 2. November 13, 2003 Sen McCain Letter to DEPSECDEF

is right.

4521

5 Dec 03

2:36 PM

12/1
5-437

TO: Secretary Jim Roche

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Larry Di Rita
Powell Moore
Mike Wynne

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: November 24, 2003

SUBJECT: Tankers

My impression is that Sen. McCain may ask that there be a new contract negotiated on the tankers. Apparently he entered into a colloquy on the floor of the Senate suggesting that that's what the bill suggests, even though others don't agree with that.

What's your thought?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112403.15

Please respond by: _____

12/6

*Sir,
Response attached.
vr/
CDR Nosing
12/6*

January 6, 2003 4:06 PM

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
CC: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Accelerated Acquisition of the VXX Program

Pete Aldridge, the Under Secretary for Acquisition, has reviewed the memo you sent regarding the President's helicopters.

Apparently, we have a plan in place to phase out the current inventory by 2014. Doing it sooner will cost more, assuming we could field a replacement any sooner given technical requirements.

I am not aware of performance deficiencies that have impacted service to the President and have asked for more information. If you have some specific information that would be helpful, please pass it along.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/26/02 Card ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
010603-58

1/16
Have Pete Aldridge review
D. Rumsfeld

4524

Larry Di Rita
1/7
6 Jan 03



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

DEC 30 2002 11:38

ACTION MEMO

COPIES
DISTRIBUTION

December 30, 2002, 8:30 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: E.C. Aldridge, Jr., Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics) *EC Aldridge 12/03*

SUBJECT: VXX Response to Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff

- The Secretary of Defense should sign TAB A to respond to Mr. Card's request to accelerate the VXX program, the President's VH-3D vertical lift aircraft. (TAB B)
- This response should be provided to Mr. Card, in conjunction with, an estimate of an accelerated program above DoD's topline prior to budget lock at the end of the calendar year.
- It is reasonable for the Secretary to provide this response because this is over DoD's topline, in FY 2004-2009, and does not impact our existing programs.

RECOMMENDATION: SECDEF sign the memo to Mr. Card (TAB A).

COORDINATION: TAB C.

Prepared By: Gary J. Gray (b)(6) 2002-0713471

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA RUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>[Signature]</i>

W00004-03

11-L-0559/OSD/20855



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

**MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
CHIEF OF STAFF**

SUBJECT: Accelerated Acquisition of the VXX Program

The Department's FY 2004 budget currently supports an operational capability for the VXX program, a VH-3D replacement with enhanced capability, in FY 2014. Based on your memorandum, we are looking at potential approaches to reduce that timeline with additional resources.

I will provide the Office of Management and Budget with an estimate of an accelerated approach that includes an associated increase in risk, and required resources above DoD's topline through the FY 2004-2009 period.

In light of the additional safety and reliability considerations associated with vertical lift support to the President, the flight test program takes on much greater significance. In addition, the relative maturity of the potential airframes will have a significant impact on potential fielding dates. Therefore, I cannot commit to an operational capability by FY 2007 until the Department conducts a thorough assessment of the program. After a Defense Acquisition Board Review in the summer, we will provide you an update of the program.



11-L-0559/OSD/20856

COORDINATION PAGE

Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I)	Dr. Wells	Dec 23, 2002
USD (Comptroller)	Mr. Zackheim	Dec 30, 2002
Secretary of the Navy	Mr. Aviles	Dec 24, 2002
General Counsel	Mr. Dell'Orto	Dec 26, 2002

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 26, 2002

NOV 27 17:41:16

OSD
WHITE HOUSE SECTION


MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

In the post-September 11 national security environment, I am convinced of our need to reexamine the replacement schedule for the VH-3D Presidential helicopter fleet. According to my understanding, the aircraft is scheduled for retirement no later than 2014, with the identification process for its replacement to commence later this year. In the interim, I am concerned about identified VH-3D maintenance and performance deficiencies that directly impact the ability to provide requisite level of support to the President. We should aim for an acceleration of that timeline, given the obvious imperatives associated with travel for the President.

Understanding the wartime demands on the Department of Defense budget, I can reasonably anticipate support for this effort from the Office of Management and Budget. Specifically, I would expect that the costs associated with an accelerated acquisition in the VXX program would and should be funded above the line for the Department of Defense.

I believe a realistic and achievable goal should be to have operational capability for the replacement aircraft by 2007 and look forward to your support and cooperation in achieving that goal.

Sincerely,

ANDREW H. CARD, JR.
Assistant to the President and
Chief of Staffcc:
Mr. Mitchell Daniels
Mr. Joseph W. Hagin

January 2, 2003 9:38 AM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Memo

Attached is a memo I dictated apparently on February 25, 1966. Bruce Ladd sent it up to me recently.

Given what is currently taking place, I thought you might find it of interest.

Please protect. [!]

~~_____~~
Regards,

Attach.

02/25/66 Congressman Rumsfeld draft of comments on the briefing at the White House

DHR:dh
010203-18

337 WH

25 Jan 03

W00007-03

11-L-0559/OSD/20859

Draft of Comments on the Briefing at The White House
on Friday, February 25, 1966

(Dictated 1 hour after briefing)

Present were the President, the Vice President, and various officials of the Executive Branch, including Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Admiral Raborn, Director of CIA, and his deputy, Mr. Helms, General Wheeler, Ambassador Averill Harriman, and ten or fifteen more, including White House Staff, plus about 20 White House interns. The briefing lasted from about 8:30 A.M. to 10:30 A.M. Approximately 150 to 200 Members of the House and the Senate were present. Apparently, this was the second half of the Congressional briefings, the other having been held on Thursday. The stated purpose of the briefing was to hear from Vice President Humphrey on his trip to Southeast Asia.

I had the feeling that the briefing was one of historical interest, from a variety of standpoints. First, the briefing, as well as the President's conduct, revealed much about the character and temperament of the man. Second, the implications of the briefing from the standpoint of the U.S. effort in South Viet Nam. Third, the continuing question in our system of the relationship between the Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Federal Government, as well as the whole question of the degree of Congressional involvement in foreign policy and national security decision-making. And fourth, the political implications of the war in Southeast Asia in the 1966 elections.

It should be noted that the briefing was called at 5:30 P.M., Thursday afternoon. A phone call from the White House to my office invited me for 8:30 next morning. It snowed last night and the streets were covered with snow; it was a Friday morning with no session of the House to be held, and despite these factors, the attendance was excellent.

The President opened the meeting with brief remarks. Then the Vice President spoke on his Asian trip and then invited brief remarks by Harriman.

This portion lasted maybe 25 minutes. During the remainder of the time, the Vice President supposedly chaired the meeting but with the almost continuous assistance and interruption of the President, whether necessary or not, and responded to questions. He also called upon Rusk, McNamara, and Wheeler to respond to questions. The President was up and down like a yo-yo all morning long. He gives the impression of a man sitting on the lid of a volcano, and he keeps erupting. He made at least three direct jabs at Senator Robert Kennedy's speech (without using Kennedy's name) concerning dealing with the Viet Cong.

Humphrey's speech was well done, but would be more appropriate for an audience in Minnesota, in that it seemed politically very astute but was superficial and, in my opinion, devoid of fact, theory, or new information. Humphrey's remarks were typically "Humphrey," very optimistic and bubbling, an excellent sales job. The first question asked, obviously a planted question, involved desertions, and the questioner quoted an article from the morning paper. Humphrey tried to explain that--and this is unbelievable--the Viet Cong had defections (not desertions) at the rate of 80 per day and that they came to South Viet Nam. The army of South Viet Nam didn't have defections, they had some desertions and they were simply instances where the men went home to harvest crops. He explained that the soldiers were allowed to do it under the French and just didn't understand that they shouldn't now, but that Ky was going after them and bringing them back.

Both Humphrey and General Wheeler seemed to have resurrected that word, "Victory." If you carefully sift through the verbiage, you discover that the word is applied only in a broad sense, to the war on the "ancient enemies" of want, disease, etc., not to the military war effort. General Wheeler applied it in a very limited way to the war effort by specifying

victory with respect to our U.S. objectives and commitment, namely, stopping aggression in South Viet Nam.

President Johnson came up with a number of homey anecdotes. He quoted Sam Rayburn's comment concerning General George Marshall and, apparently, a reporter's question to Rayburn about military strategy and a Marshall decision relating thereto. The President quoted Rayburn as having said to the reporter something to the effect that "I don't comment on such matters. If he (Marshall) doesn't know more than I do in this area, then we have been wasting a whale of a lot of money on West Point for the past decades." This seemed to be aimed at giving the audience the impression that we probably would be well advised not to second-guess L.B.J. and his advisers on the subject of Viet Nam, unless we believed we have been wasting a lot of money on West Point all these years. The President buttressed this point later when he, in a burst of paragraphs, tied practically everyone in the world into his policy by saying that this was President Kennedy's policy; that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense were appointed by someone other than President Johnson, namely, President Kennedy; that he, President Johnson, has the best advisers in the world, and he named them all, including Ambassador Goldberg, and that they had talked to the Pope, etc. And how can anyone suggest that all these President's advisers, etc., including President Eisenhower, who was always the first to support and has never failed to support President Johnson's decisions--how can anyone in the world think they know the answers better than this group of talented people. He spelled it out, saying, "There is no Senator or Congressman whose judgment or knowledge can be compared with those individuals, with that team." He quoted an anecdote from Rayburn again, to the effect that when President Truman came to Rayburn (I presume

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2/25/66

he meant ^XPres. Roosevelt came to Rayburn) and said, "We need money to develop an atomic bomb," Rayburn said, "How much will it cost?" The answer was \$2 billion, and Rayburn said, "I will tell Joe Martin, but only Joe Martin. If we tell any more of the Congressman, it will get out." (Suggesting that he can't tell us all or Members of Congress will leak it.) "Why do you need it?" The answer was given, and Rayburn said, "O.K., you can have the \$2 billion. If it works, it will end the war, if it fails, it is on you." (All responsibility on the President.)

The President, in a fit of emotion, yelled at one questioner, "Hanoi is the stud (or stuck) duck in this operation." (Whatever that meant.)

Later on, he commented that Hanoi has more tin-horn lawyers pleading their case than you can shake a stick at. They always say, Why don't you do this and that. ^{IN HASTENING} ₁ "Well, we have done all those things--we have changed the Generals, we have changed the head of the South Vietnamese Government, (some admission!) we have asked everybody in every capital--we have tried everything. Finally, we decided we had done everything but take it to the UN. So, we took it to the UN, but I'll bet you a speckled bird dog," LBJ said, "that they said, why didn't we take it there sooner, or later, or taller, or shorter, or hotter, or colder."

I asked a question, which was almost exactly as follows: "Congressman John Young of Texas asked the question, why, in view of all of the power, the airplanes, the bombing, the manpower, the billions of dollars, have not the Viet Cong quit? Vice President Humphrey's answer to Congressman Young was that they were not convinced that we won't pull out. They are not convinced they are going to lose. Later, Secretary Rusk said the same thing, basically that the North Vietnamese, the Viet Cong, think they will win. They believe

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2/25/66

the U.S. will fold up like France did. My question is, Why are they not convinced of our national will? In what ways have we failed to convince them of this determination, and what is being done, or can be done, to convince them?"

Before Humphrey could answer, President Johnson popped up and pointing his finger, yelled, "I'll tell you what will convince them--more of the same like we've given them." I said, "Like the bombing pause?" He didn't answer that. He said, "For the past 30 days we've stepped up bombings, 20,000 casualties," and so on and so on, he described the damage that the U.S. is inflicting on the Viet Cong and the tons of bombs the U.S. is dropping. I then said, "Well, Mr. President, if we have been doing this since the conclusion of the pause, is there any hint or indication that we are, in fact, being successful in convincing them? ~~As this message getting through?~~" And he said, "No, there isn't."

LBJ said that no man wants to end the war as badly as he does, because, he said, "I've got a lot riding on it." That statement summarizes the whole last hour of the briefing. The last hour was devoted not to details of the conflict but rather to a long, rambling, extremely political, statement by the President, showing how everyone in the world, including the Pope, was tied into his policy. How practically every Member of Congress was tied into his policy, and explaining the political facts of the situation here in the U.S., as he sees them, trying to convince, I presume, the Democrats that they are going to be all right in the next election if they stick to him and don't sway on this issue. And the Republicans that if they raise their voices on this issue he is going to land on them with both feet. He reiterated

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2/25/66

of course, that Rusk, McNamara, and Lodge have all been appointed by Kennedy, and that Ike supported his actions.

At one point, in describing all of the things they attempted to do, such as, changing the General in South Viet Nam to Gen. Westmoreland, etc., he defended the present regime and Ky, saying that they have four goals: (1) To resist the aggression; (2) to wipe out the "ancient enemies"; (3) to have a secure peace, and something else--and that these are all "laudable" goals. And he said some people don't like Ky--well, we could dump him like we dumped Diem and the others, but we have nothing better to take his place.

This is the first time I have heard any official of the U.S. Government admit that the U.S. Government had played a role in the changes of government which have taken place in South Viet Nam in the past 5 years.

At one point, LOJ said nice things about Rusk, and the audience stood and applauded. McNamara received only slight applause. McNamara was dogmatic in his answers. He said that there was "absolutely no substance to Hanson Baldwin's article," in answer to a question by Congressman Philbin.

The President pulled out of his pocket a crumpled piece of paper which was the ^X1964 Congressional resolution. He then proceeded to quote it practically from memory. He said he had it in his pocket every day since the resolution was passed. He repeated and repeated various phrases from it, such as, "support and approve." He said, "That's two words, and they are both there." He talked about the SEATO Treaty and how the Senators voted for it; he knew each Senator's vote and pointed out that he had been absent, hinting he wasn't responsible; and how, in summary, practically every Member

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3/25/66

of Congress was responsible for the commitment that the U.S. faced today, and that Johnson was not responsible for it, that previous Presidents and the Congress were responsible for it; and that he, Johnson, is not responsible for the war and that he is tired of hearing people say that Well, we have to do something, but I don't like the way he is doing it. He pointed out that George Kennan had never been in Southeast Asia and Gen. Gavin had been Ambassador to France. He dismissed them critically. X He said that he, Johnson, is not to blame, that his advisers are doing the job, and they were appointed by other people. To use a Johnsonian phrase, my impression of the briefing was to recall the old saying that "A stuck pig squeals," and President Johnson was indeed squealing this morning. It is clear to me that the political situation in the country as of this date, regardless of what happens next November, is moving in favor of the Republican Party, in large part because of the situation in Viet Nam; clearly, this is a source of great concern to President Johnson. His actions as President appear to be geared, in large part, as a reaction to that political fact which faces him--and he does not like it.

The last 20 minutes of LBJ's performance were defensive and emotional, and at points, I felt embarrassment for him.

He repeatedly said, "I want to be able to say I've tried everything." Note he didn't say, I've tried everything because I want peace. He said, I want to be able to say I did. This type of slip, if it was a slip, is but one of the numerous instances that his comments were phrased in terms of the political situation and where blame would fall and how he

White House Briefing - page 8
2/25/66

would defend himself, and how he would attack anyone who attacked him. He asked repeatedly, Where were all the critics and experts when the commitments were being made?

Throughout the first half of the morning, at least 5 White House Aides circulated throughout the audience, planting questions. I personally saw questions planted with Senator Javits, who asked a question which was carefully pro-Johnson and anti-Kennedy, and with Jack Brooks and with another Member sitting two rows in front of me.

The President closed the briefing by saying, "And don't any of you ever say you have not been briefed." These were his last words. He pointed out that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense had spent day after day on the Hill, briefing Congress, and that he needed them to do their jobs.

Interestingly, the next day Vice President Humphrey declined to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where he would have had to submit to cross-examination, rather than simply perform as he did at the White House under the protection of the President and where he could respond to planted questions. ** Some briefing!

**The Vice President met in executive session with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Wednesday, March 2, 1966, but did not appear.

January 3, 2003 11:15 AM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Briefings

As I told you, I am preparing the DoD briefings log to show the ones we have presented and the ones we are working on and that will be available in the weeks immediately ahead.

What I would like to receive from you is a copy of the briefings that all the other government agencies—Department of State, CIA, NSC and any others—plan to present and when.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
01/03/03-23

337 DHR

3/10/03

W00022-03

11-L-0559/OSD/20868

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 10, 2003

RECEIVED
OSD
OPERATIONS SECTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Change-2 to Unified Command Plan 2002

Pursuant to my authority as Commander in Chief, I hereby approve and direct the assignment of Global Strike, Integrated Missile Defense, DOD Information Operations, and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) missions to U.S. Strategic Command. On or before January 1, 2004, the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, will provide me, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, an assessment of his command's ability to perform these newly assigned missions, and, if Full Operational Capability has not been achieved, will identify the additional capabilities needed to achieve Full Operational Capability.

You are directed to notify the Congress on my behalf as required by title 10, United States Code, section 161(b)(2), as a result of implementing this revision to the Unified Command Plan.



W00041-03

11-L-0559/OSD/20869

11:39 AM

TO: Vice President Richard Cheney
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: January 16, 2003
SUBJECT: *CQ Monitor News Article*

Attached is a worrisome piece on Iran that looks like we are moving away from our policy.

Thanks.

Iran

DHR/azn
011603.015

Attach: CD Monitor News: Biden, Hagel May Meet Iranians in Back-Channel Diplomacy Move by Pomper, CQ Staff Writer (1/14/03)

16 Jan 03

W00069-03

11-L-0559/OSD/20870

1/15
Sec Def -

FYI. See highlight

next page

D. White

Larry Di Rita

1/15

CQ MONITOR NEWS
Jan. 14, 2003 - 8:17 p.m.

Biden, Hagel May Meet Iranians in Back-Channel Diplomacy Move

By Miles A. Pomper, CQ Staff Writer

Delaware Democrat Joseph R. Biden Jr., then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, extended his hand to Iran last March in a bid to ease tensions between Washington and Tehran.

"I am prepared to receive members of the Iranian Majlis [parliament] whenever its members would like to visit," he said. "If Iranian parliamentarians believe that's too sensitive, I'm prepared to meet them elsewhere."

Now, nearly a year later, Iran is taking Biden up on his offer.

Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's permanent representative to the United Nations, has invited Biden and Sen. Chuck Hagel of Nebraska, the panel's second-ranking Republican, to meet at his New York office, Biden disclosed Tuesday.

Biden said he and Hagel are "seriously considering" traveling to New York, and that the meeting has been given the green light by President Bush's national security adviser Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell.

He said the purpose of the talks with Zarif would be to pave the way for talks with Iranian parliamentarians. Such talks might take place in the United States, Iran or a third country, such as Switzerland, which handles U.S. interests in Tehran.

The meeting with Zarif originally had been scheduled to take place Jan. 13 but had to be postponed because of the death of Hagel's mother. The meeting had been arranged after several discussions between Iranian diplomats at the United Nations and aides to Biden and Hagel.

The United States and Iran have not had formal diplomatic relations since the 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran by Iranian students. In 1999, the Clinton administration eased some sanctions against Iran, permitting Iranian pistachio nuts, caviar and carpets to be exported to the United States. Now the two countries have a common enemy in Iraq, against which Iran fought a bloody eight-year war in the 1980s.

Biden said any talks with Zarif would focus on the potential for Iranian cooperation on key issues such as a common policy towards Iraq and Iran's oil and gas production. "We have a lot of mutual interests," Biden said.

But Biden said he and Hagel also would express U.S. concerns about Iran's atomic

energy program and its alleged attempts to secretly build nuclear weapons. He said they also would raise U.S. allegations of Iran's sponsorship of terrorism.

In his State of the Union speech a year ago, Bush included Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea, as part of the "axis of evil" nations that threaten U.S. security with weapons of mass destruction.

The Bush administration also is concerned about Iran's virulent opposition to the now-moribund Israeli-Palestinian peace process and its support for the Lebanese Shi'ite Muslim political party Hezbollah, which the State Department has designated a terrorist organization.

A majority of Iranian parliamentarians support moderate Iranian President Mohammed Khatemi, who has called for improved relations with the United States. Opposing Khatemi is Iran's conservative anti-American spiritual leader, Ayatollah Khameni, who directs Iran's national security apparatus.

The administration's nod to the Biden-Hagel gesture toward Iran appears at odds with its stated policy. Last year, the White House said it would abandon its policy of cultivating the moderates surrounding Khatemi, saying they had little influence. The administration said it was opting instead for direct appeals to the Iranian people through U.S.-funded radio broadcasts and other programs.

Some other lawmakers strongly supported Biden's initiative. "If you're looking for progress with a member of the 'axis of evil,' the best chance is probably here," said Pat Roberts, R-Kan., the incoming chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

But others saw the effort as futile. "People go in there and meet the moderate foreign minister and the moderates around him, and they fool themselves into thinking the regime will change," said John McCain, R-Ariz., a senior member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. "The religious mullahs will never let them."

Source: **CQ Monitor News**

Round-the-clock coverage of news from Capitol Hill.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FEB 5 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Designation of Acting Secretary of the Navy

I recommend that, pursuant to the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, you direct the Honorable H. T. Johnson to perform the duties of the office of Secretary of the Navy. The attached draft memorandum would convey that direction to him.

I recommend that you issue the attached memorandum.

Attachment

O20NAVY

SFeb03

W00134 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20873

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE H. T. JOHNSON

Pursuant to the Constitution and the laws of the United States, including section 3345(a) of title 5, United States Code, as amended by the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, you are directed to perform the duties of the office of Secretary of the Navy.

POTUS

cc:
Secretary of Defense

11-L-0559/OSD/20874

February 10, 2003 7:47 AM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Iraq

IRAQ

Here is an article with some information that might be useful in your meeting with Blix.

Attach.

"Iraq's New 'Progress'," *The Wall Street Journal Online*, February 10, 2003

DHR:dh
021003-1

10 Feb 03

W00147-03

11-L-0559/OSD/20875



February 10, 2003

REVIEW & OUTLOOK

Iraq's New 'Progress'

It was entirely predictable that Iraq would follow Colin Powell's damning report last week with a new public display of cooperation with U.N. inspectors. It is also entirely predictable that some people -- the French, the Chinese, Howard Dean -- will want to believe it's real.

The gullible might consider the details of the U.N.'s first "private" interview late last week with Iraqi biologist Sinan Abdul Hassan. Iraq had previously insisted that any scientist be interviewed only with an Iraqi "minder" also on hand. But the Iraqis needn't worry about Mr. Abdul Hassan betraying any secrets, because he is himself a senior Iraqi minder as a member of Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate, which deals with the U.N. An Iraqi official actually told the Western media that the biologist had "volunteered" for this duty.

Then there is the place Mr. Abdul Hassan was interviewed -- the al-Hayat hotel in Baghdad. With all of the Iraqi bugs that must have been in the room, the U.N. might as well have interviewed the man on Iraqi television.

U.N. Resolution 1441 expressly calls for Iraqi scientists to be interviewed "outside of Iraq," with "family members" along for the trip, so Saddam Hussein can't have them killed afterward the way he once did his own brother-in-law. But the U.N. inspectors are now settling for interviewing a Saddam apparat/scientist in a place where every word can be overheard, and the world is supposed to believe this is a sign that Iraq is showing "the beginning of a change of heart." in the amazing words of inspector Mohamed ElBaradei.

We can anticipate more such "progress" in coming days, all designed not to disarm or facilitate inspections but to give the U.N. some new excuse to interfere with President Bush's intention to enforce the U.N.'s own resolutions.

URL for this article:

<http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1044842615650752463,00.html>

Updated February 10, 2003

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February 10, 2003 9:16 AM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Support to States for Homeland Security

384

When I was in Munich for the Wehrkunde conference, several Democratic Congressmen I spoke with there were adamant that money be released to state and local governments for homeland security.

I don't have any idea what they were talking about, but it is something I think you ought to think about as to where we are and what is actually happening. I simply don't know.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021003-13

W00149-03

11-L-0559/OSD/20877

10Feb03

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 12, 2003

RECEIVED
2003 FEB 12 11:20
OPERATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Request for Increase to the Partial Mobilization Ceiling

In your January 17, 2003, memorandum to me you requested that I endorse a new ceiling of 400,000 for Ready Reserve personnel ordered to involuntary active duty. I endorse this increased ceiling.



February 12, 2003 7:51 AM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Invitation

Here is an invitation from the Navy that just came to me. It is a nice event, and I hope you will consider it. I think you would enjoy it.

Thanks.

Attach.
01/24/03 SecNav ltr to National Security Adviser

DHR:dh
021203-5

001. 165H

12 Feb 03

W00162-03

11-L-0559/OSD/20879



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

January 24, 2003

Dr. Condoleezza Rice
National Security Council
The White House
Washington, DC 20504

Dear Dr. Rice:

The guided missile destroyer MASON (DDG 87) is scheduled to be commissioned on Saturday, April 12, 2003, in Cape Canaveral, Florida.

It is my pleasure to invite you to be the principal speaker at the commissioning ceremony. The Honorable Olympia J. Snowe, United States Senator from Maine is the sponsor.

I hope your schedule will permit you to participate in this exciting event. The point of contact in my office is Captain Kevin Wensing, U.S. Navy. He can be reached at (b)(6). It should be a memorable occasion for all those associated with MASON.


Sincerely,

11-L-0559/OSD/20880

February 13, 2003 3:11 PM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

CC: The Honorable Tom Ridge
The Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
The Honorable Mitchell E. Daniels Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Accelerated Release of Funds

384

I wonder if there is some way to accelerate the release of funds targeted at consequence management functions at federal, state and local levels, and to do so in a very public way.

I have been on the Hill a lot the past two weeks, and it seems to be a steady theme for some.

Obviously, these are things that go beyond the DoD budget, but I thought you should have the feedback from what they were saying to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021303-28

13 Feb 03

February 14, 2003 2:53 PM

TO: President George W. Bush

CC: The Honorable Anthony J. Principi

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D Rumsfeld*

SUBJECT: VA and DoD

I thought you would appreciate seeing this article. The task force you set up is bearing fruit!

Thanks.

Attach.

Freedberg, Sydney J. Jr. "Pentagon and the VA Save by Sharing," *National Journal*, February 14, 2003.

DHR:dh
021403-15

040 VA

14 Feb 2003

W00193 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20882

National Journal

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02-15-2003

DEFENSE: Pentagon and the VA Save by Sharing

As America sends tens of thousands of troops into harm's way, an enormous medical establishment is already wrestling with how best to care for those who come back less than whole. In fact, there are two such establishments. The Defense Department spends about \$20 billion a year on the medical needs of some 6.2 million troops, family members, and retirees. And the Veterans Affairs Department spends about \$25 billion a year caring for 4 million former service members, primarily the poor and the disabled. Getting these giant departments to work together better could save taxpayers billions and help heal those wounded in the nation's wars.

Now, after years of stops and starts-and kicks from Congress-the arcane but costly question of how the two departments can share the medical burden has made its way onto President Bush's agenda. But even with the president pushing, it can be hard to budge the two largest bureaucracies in the federal government.

Look at some success stories from the Southwest. For years, when a veteran in El Paso, Texas, needed specialized care, the VA outpatient clinic in town usually had to refer him to the nearest full-service VA hospital-in Albuquerque, N.M., a four-hour drive away. Today, that vet can go literally next door-to a military hospital. William Beaumont Army Medical Center gives the VA access to expensive expertise and equipment, such as pathologists and MRI scans, that the smaller clinic could never support on its own; in return, the VA reimburses the Army nearly \$5 million a year, well below the going rate for the same medical care in the private sector. As an added bonus, soldiers mustering out at Beaumont can get their VA workup for disability benefits done on the spot, where their military records are easily available. Meanwhile, up at Albuquerque, the tables are turned, with the big VA hospital there providing specialized support to a smaller Air Force clinic located on VA property-at an estimated savings to the military of \$341,000 a year over private-sector providers of the same services.

All this sharing seems straightforward. It is not. Each joint venture took intensive negotiations to get it started-and constant work-arounds to keep it going. Reimbursement rates had to be thrashed out for every medical procedure or treatment. Every day, patient data is laboriously cut-and-pasted from the VA's records software into the military's incompatible program. The VA and the military still run separate pharmacies even when their facilities are under the same roof. And every new idea has to work its way up two chains of command, each with its own clashing culture.

With all of these obstacles, it's a wonder anything gets done. But two powerful trends in American medicine are pushing the departments together.

The first is specialization. In the old days of black bags and horse

buggies, all doctors' training and tools were much the same. But today's treatments require an array of expensively educated specialists and their million-dollar machines-which few hospitals can afford on their own. In Albuquerque, for example, it takes the added demand from military patients to make having a VA mammography department worthwhile. And at Great Lakes, Ill., the Naval Hospital struggles to support an in-house radiology department, so it is working to send X-rays electronically to the VA's North Chicago hospital for analysis.

The second recurring theme is decentralization. More-sophisticated, less-invasive procedures mean fewer patients are recovering overnight in hospitals. More focus on minor surgeries, prescriptions, and catching illness early means more-frequent walk-in visits. This trend-reinforced by military downsizing over the past decade-means that both Defense and VA are underusing their big, old-fashioned, costly hospitals, at the same time they're struggling to build networks of smaller, cheaper clinics. Sometimes, a new VA facility fits neatly into the unused space at a base hospital, as is the case at the VA clinic housed in the base hospital at Fort Knox, Ky. Sometimes, the two departments can build a community clinic together, as they're considering doing in Pensacola, Fla.

These two great trends have created countless local opportunities for sharing. By the Defense Department's estimate, VA and military facilities from the East Coast to Hawaii have some 600 sharing agreements valued at \$86 million a year. But that's a drop in a \$45 billion bucket-less than 1 percent of the two systems' combined health care spending.

Such figures show the limits of a retail approach to linking the medical services of the two huge departments. "An awful lot of it has been from the bottom up, [and] that's terrific, but it's a little too idiosyncratic," said Gail Wilensky, co-chair of a presidential task force on improving veterans' benefits, which is due to report in March. "The difficulty is attempting to institutionalize this."

When neighboring facilities happen to have like-minded managers, sharing can get started. But if either leader leaves, the successor might drop the project. And even joint ventures that build momentum must cut against the grain of incompatible bookkeeping procedures, clinical practices, and computers. Local innovators can work around such systemic problems-but only national leadership can solve them.

Which is what has actually started happening in the past few years. The two departments are buying drugs in bulk together: The estimated savings of \$98 million in fiscal year 2001 more than tripled to \$369 million in 2002. Last October, the VA and Defense Departments agreed on a common price list for medical services, based on Medicare standards. Now, instead of each facility laboriously negotiating unique reimbursement rates, said the undersecretary of Defense for personnel and readiness, David S.C. Chu, "they can just send a patient and send the bill." Local pilot projects such as El Paso's, where troops about to leave the service can get their VA disability exam while still on active duty, are being made standard procedure nationwide. And by 2005, the departments expect to be able to share key electronic medical records. An approving Congress has reinforced many of these initiatives in statute and set aside \$15 million of each department's 2003 budgets specifically for new sharing ventures.

These successes build on two decades of hard work. But many observers in the bureaucracy, Congress, and veterans groups agree that this administration has given sharing new momentum. President-elect Bush raised the issue in his very first meeting with Anthony J. Principi, whom he later made VA secretary. And since then, Bush has personally nudged Principi and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to keep moving. Said Principi, "At Cabinet meetings from time to time, he will look at me

and look at Don, and say, 'How well are you two working together?'

The workhorse of cooperation is a high-level council co-chaired by Principi's deputy, Leo Mackay, and by Chu. This council was created under President Clinton—albeit one level lower down, and with a narrower mandate—but it was virtually defunct by 2001. Now that it has been revived and elevated, said Chu, "there's a whole different tone between the leadership of the two Cabinet departments."

Years of painful history show the importance of such high-level pressure. After Congress passed the first law on sharing back in 1982, there was "a blossoming of sharing, hundreds and hundreds of agreements," recalled one long-serving Hill staffer. The sharing had died down by 1992, amid the distractions of post-Cold War downsizing at Defense and major internal changes at both departments. But by the mid-1990s, the heads of the two health systems—acting Assistant Secretary Dr. Edward Martin at Defense and Undersecretary Dr. Kenneth Kizer at VA—set up the original VA-Defense sharing council and held regular meetings.

"If we skipped a month," recalled Kizer, "things would start eroding immediately. It had to be continuous, ongoing pressure from the two top officials." Martin, however, retired in 1998; Kizer, a controversial, hard-charging reformer, was ousted in 1999, and sharing waned again.

The obstacles to VA-Defense sharing are enormous—and they represent more than bureaucratic stubbornness. Experts in both departments, Congress, and veterans groups point out that the two systems serve very different missions. Military patients are mostly young troops and their families—delivering babies is big business at base hospitals—who move every few years. Veterans are older, less mobile, and less healthy. For the severely disabled in particular, Defense has nothing to match the VA's world-renowned services for spinal cord injuries, blindness, and posttraumatic stress. And the one population eligible for benefits from both the VA and Defense—military retirees with 20 or more years of service—has fought a long, hard, and politically successful battle to get the majority of their medical care at the military hospitals to which they grew accustomed while on active duty. Any sharing that sacrificed the unique core competencies of each system would have generals, retirees, and veterans groups howling in protest.

"Any kind of merger of the two systems into some kind of hybrid would be totally unworkable," warned Richard Fuller, legislative director of the Paralyzed Veterans of America. "We've made that very plain." But short of that bright red line, most veterans advocates are perfectly willing to let the VA and Defense look for efficiencies, especially in "back-office" functions such as bulk purchasing of pharmaceuticals, which do not affect patients directly. "Both systems need to be careful," said Fuller, but "the approaches that the VA and DOD have taken so far have been more or less appropriate and done with common sense."

Senior officials are quick to emphasize that they plan no radical upheavals. "I don't think there's any thought or consideration being given to merging the two departments," reassured Mackay. "We serve some very different patient populations, and we serve them in very different ways.... There are some natural limits to what this [sharing] can achieve. That said, I think there are some powerful efficiencies that can be garnered; real savings that can be made for the American taxpayer; and real improvements in the quality of services that we give to service members and veterans."

Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.

National Journal

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February 24, 2003 5:56 PM

TO: Vice President Richard Cheney
Honorable Condoleezza Rice
Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Honorable Mitchell E. Daniels Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Defense Supplemental

Here is a draft that may help frame our discussion at our meeting tomorrow at 11:25 a.m.

Thanks.

Attach.
Draft ltr to Dir, OMB

DHR:dh
022463-16

110.01

24 Feb 03

W00200-03

11-L-0559/OSD/20887

DRAFT

The Honorable Mitch E. Daniels, Jr.
Director
Office of Management and Budget
Washington, DC 20503

Dear Mitch:

Thank you for your memo of February 11, 2003, regarding the various possible approaches for a DoD supplemental appropriation. The assumptions we make about the size of our request and the purposes for which we state we intend to use the funds will send important signals about the seriousness of our intent and our expectations as to the critical tasks before us. That being the case, I believe it would be best to submit to the Congress a supplemental request the very day the conflict starts, if and when that occurs.

I recommend we request an amount that would cover the range of activities that are likely through the end of fiscal year 2003. We believe the period ahead can be divided roughly into three phases of activity, as follows:

- **Major Conflict Phase:**
 - Additional force flows as required
 - High Intensity Warfare
 - Establish control over uncontested/defeated areas
 - Some WMD identification/safeguarding
- **Transition Phase:**
 - More limited combat operations, possibly in several urban areas
 - WMD Identification/isolation/destruction
 - Begin force reconstitution – replace weapons used/equipment lost

DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/20888

- Limited force redeployment/withdrawal
- **Reconstitution/Reconstruction Phase:**
 - Remaining force reconstitution
 - Significant force redeployment
 - Establish baseline presence in country

A virtue of this approach to the supplemental is flexibility in the use of funds across the likely range of expected activities. While we can make assumptions about the duration of each phase, and we will be doing so as we prepare the specific request, we clearly cannot know with certainty whether the major conflict phase, for example, will be a few days or a few weeks. If it proves to be at the shorter end of that range, then we can accelerate force redeployment and reconstitution. Conversely, a longer period of high intensity combat would delay force redeployment. In either event, we will need the funds.

Having the funds available across the three phases for the remainder of the fiscal year could obviate the need for multiple supplemental appropriations requests this fiscal year, assuming the size of the request we make is sufficient to meet the expected requirements.

Other Assumptions. There are other factors that will affect the manner in which supplemental funding likely will be applied across these three broad phases of activities.

These assumptions include:

- Whether or not weapons of mass destruction are used against us or Iraq's neighbors
- The degree of coalition support for the combat phase
- The nature and amount of post-conflict participation by other countries
- The success of our international financial assistance collections

Other Items to be Included. In addition to these Iraq-related requirements, the supplemental funding request must include:

- The amount needed in fiscal year 2003 for the ongoing operations in the non-Iraq related aspects of the global war on terrorism; and funds to cover the Iraq-related preparatory tasks we have already performed. These figures are as follows:
 - An estimated \$13.9 billion for the balance of the FY 2003 for Operation Enduring Freedom (GWOT) and Operation Noble Eagle (U.S. Combat Air Patrols, etc.) requirements (this figure includes funds for coalition support, principally to Pakistan and Jordan);
 - The amount we will have spent in Iraq-related preparatory tasks by the time the supplemental passes. We already have spent \$2.6

billion and will have spent considerably more by the time a supplemental is likely to pass;

- Supplemental funding for intelligence purposes, which I have discussed previously with the Vice President, Andy Card, and you, and which would not be Iraq-specific;
- Other Iraq-related requirements from the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and other departments or agencies, and;
- There would be value in maintaining a reserve fund of some amount for use by the President, the DoS, and the DoD, or for other purposes related to the war on terrorism, the specific uses of which cannot be projected just now.

Legislative Provisions. We propose that the supplemental request be accompanied with certain of the legislative proposals that appear in the Department's Appropriations Act submission for FY 2004. These proposals would permit the DoD greater authority and flexibility in managing its funding and supporting friendly foreign forces whose cooperation is necessary to ensure the success of coalition military operations.

Finally, it would be best if the supplemental funds were made available to the Department of Defense in a centralized transfer account, such as the Defense Emergency Response Fund. In the past, this approach has enabled us to meet our obligations in a

timelier manner than the normal procedures allow. Expenses will conceivably include urgent infrastructure demands, civil-military operations, or refugee management.

It is my understanding that DoD and OMB staff have begun to develop estimates for the supplemental appropriations request. I look forward to discussing it with you soon.

Sincerely,

March 17, 2003 11:05 AM

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Donald Rumsfeld*

SUBJECT: Public Sentiment

Attached are some clippings from a pre-World War II rally, where the America First Committee filled Madison Square Garden on May 23, 1941, just six and a half months before Pearl Harbor. They held similar rallies across the country opposing U.S. intervention in World War II.

Isolationist sentiment in the U.S. constrained us from acting to stop Hitler early, at a minimal cost of lives. It not only might have stopped Hitler early, but it might have deterred Japan.

Sincere people can be sincerely wrong.


Respectfully,

Attach.
Press clipping

DHR:dh
031703-20

031703-20
068.7

17 MAR 03
W00287 /03



Inside the big auditorium



They spoke: Senator Burton K. Wheeler and Charles A. Lindbergh
The New York Times

\$10,000 to Combat Lindbergh Is Sought From Movie Unit of Friends of Democracy

While girls outside in vivid scarlet costumes proclaimed loudly that every one who crossed their picket line must have Fascist and anti-Semitic sympathies fifty members of the motion picture division of Friends of Democracy lunched at Sbur's restaurant, 51 West Fifty-first Street, were asked by this organization's national director, Dr. L. M. Birkhead, to contribute \$10,000 for a publicity campaign branding Charles A. Lindbergh as a Nazi.

The restaurant was being picketed because of the management's differences with a local union that had no quarrel with Friends of Democracy. However, at least one of those invited to the luncheon—John Garfield, an actor, expressed reluctance to cross the picket line.

Dr. Birkhead appealed for a fund to combat Lindbergh's "technique of using anti-Semitism to further his un-American crusade" and thereby block also the alleged intention of "pro-Nazi organizations to convert the America First Committee into a political instrument for establishing Lindbergh, who is the perfect type of American Hitler, as their leader."

He asserted a little less than the \$10,000 previously given him by the

motion picture division of the organization was necessary "to get Father Coughlin off the air." Without giving any details, he explained that he went directly to the priest's superiors in the Catholic Church to argue for discontinuance of Father Coughlin's radio broadcasts.

Dr. Birkhead also assumed full responsibility for "halting the political careers of two other pro-Nazis." He said he meant Joseph McWilliams of this city and the Rev. Gerald B. Winrod, who sought the Republican nomination as that party's candidate for United States Senator from Kansas.

March 17, 2003 11:08 AM

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: European Sentiment

Attached is a brief clipping from Peter Schweizer's book, *Reagan's War*.

It chronicles the European response when President Reagan tried to rally the Allies, following the 1981 crackdown on Solidarity in Poland. The German reaction sounds familiar.

It says something about leadership.

Respectfully,

Attach.

Schweizer, Peter. *Reagan's War* excerpts

DHR:dh
031703-21

0007

17MAR03

W00288 /03

REAGAN CONVENED AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE NSC. "THE Soviet-backed action must not stand," he declared. As his advisers discussed the situation, Reagan jotted a note to himself. His goal was nothing short of free elections in Poland.¹⁹

As Reagan recorded in his diary: "I took a stand that this may be the last chance in our lifetime to see a change in the Soviet empire's colonial policy re Eastern Europe. We should take a stand and tell them unless and until martial law is lifted in Poland, the prisoners were released and negotiations resumed between Walesa and the Polish government, we would quarantine the Soviets and Poland with no trade or communications across their borders. Also tell our NATO allies and others to join us in such sanctions or risk an estrangement from us."

It quickly became apparent that whatever Reagan planned to do, he was probably going to have to do it alone. In Europe, the Socialist International, an influential body that included political leaders and heads of state from Social Democrats and Socialists in Germany, France, Great Britain, and a smattering of other Western European countries, issued a bland statement. Comparing the human rights situation in Poland to that in Turkey, it went on to equate the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan with the civil war in El Salvador. (The group never explained how ninety thousand occupying troops were the same as fifty-five American military advisers.)

On orders from Washington, U.S. diplomats in West Germany met with officials to gauge the German position. What they discovered was more than a bit disturbing. According to U.S. State Department cables, West German officials were less concerned about martial law than about American remarks. German officials said they were taking a wait-and-see attitude as to whether Jaruzelski would succeed or not. They even proposed extending economic assistance to Poland because it might help Jaruzelski succeed in his "national renewal" efforts. West German officials emphasized that whatever happened in Poland, they didn't want it to affect relations with the Soviet Union.²⁰

The response from many other allies was similar, so Reagan decided to act alone.

"We can't let this revolution against Communism fail without offering a hand," he wrote in his diary. "We may never have an opportunity like this in our lifetime."

On December 29, Reagan took to the airwaves to announce an embargo against Poland and the Soviet Union for the declaration of martial law. Poland would now lose its most favored nation (MFN) trading status and face high tariffs on its exports to the United States. Reagan would work to prevent any new financial credits from being extended to the Polish government. Most important, he issued a decree banning the sale of oil and gas technologies to the Soviet Union. It was a decision that would cost the Kremlin billions.

The sanctions were hard-hitting and designed to target critical sectors of the Soviet-bloc economy. Reagan wanted to use the sanctions as a tool to keep the freedom experiment in Poland alive. "If the Polish government will honor the commitments it has made to basic human rights in documents like the Gdansk agreement, we in America will gladly do our share to help the shattered Polish economy, just as we helped the countries of Europe after both world wars."²¹

As a weapon the sanctions were well targeted; Poland was vulnerable to Western economic pressure. "Poland is largely dependent on the West, above all on the German Federal Republic and the USA," said one Warsaw Pact report. "Its capital debt is some \$27 billion." Without an infusion of capital from the West or the opportunity to export goods to the United States, Poland's economy would be in shambles.²²

Poland exported large amounts of natural resources and other goods to the United States. Sanctions meant that Poland now had little access to the American market, cutting off access to critically needed hard currency. As General Czeslaw Kiszczak, then Polish interior minister and cocreator of martial law, told me, "Economic sanctions caused enormous losses in the economy."²³

* * *

REAGAN'S FIRM LINE LEFT HIM ALONE AMONG WESTERN LEADERS. The most critical Western power with ties to Poland was West Germany. Washington tried to convince Bonn to support at least some of what Reagan was doing. But Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was offering at best only grudging support. In a private meeting with East Germany's Erich Honecker, according to a secret East German

transcript, Schmidt declared that martial law was "necessary."²⁴ In a meeting between German foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher and the Polish vice premier, Genscher likewise justified the imposition of martial law.²⁵

Schmidt arrived in Washington in early 1982 to discuss the situation in Poland and met with Secretary of State Al Haig. The two sat for breakfast and engaged in a wide-ranging discussion. Schmidt was frank and blunt.

He declared that the Soviets viewed Poland as "theirs," and that it was ridiculous for Reagan to think he could "overthrow the post-World War II division of Europe," according to a secret State Department transcript of the meeting. Schmidt actually chided Haig about the idea that political freedom was possible in Poland.

"The West needs to be realistic regarding the possibilities for change in Eastern Europe," he said. Reagan was suffering from "illusions" if he expected Moscow to honor the Helsinki Final Accord guaranteeing basic individual rights. He even went so far as to justify martial law because he had "continuing doubts regarding the organizational skills of the Polish people, given their inclination to romanticism."

Haig pressed Schmidt to support some form of sanctions against the Soviet Union, because "we had to find ways to keep pressure on the Soviets." Schmidt responded that West Germany "would not stick its neck out."²⁶

Nor, it seems, would anyone else. In Canada, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau declared his "impartiality" over what was going on in Poland and refused to support sanctions or other measures. NATO ally Greece would not publicly criticize the crackdown at all, and while Italy criticized martial law, it said it would simply "pause to reflect" on economic relations with the Soviet bloc. Norway said Reagan's sanctions were a mistake "because they exacerbate tensions and offer no real promise of economic or political gain." France strongly condemned the imposition of martial law and pledged to hold consultations regarding new credits to Poland. But privately officials professed to understand the "difficulties and escalation" that had led to martial law. Even Reagan's erstwhile ally, Margaret Thatcher in London, would go only so far. Denouncing martial law as barbarous and declaring her support for sanctions against Poland,

she was skeptical of sanctions against the Soviets. Reagan, it seemed, was all alone in his efforts to keep the Solidarity movement alive.²⁷

Reagan dispatched Haig and Defense Secretary Weinberger to Europe to try to convince the U.S. allies. Ministers from all the NATO countries gathered in January for a special session of the North Atlantic Congress (NAC) to consider how the West should deal with the crisis. Haig and Weinberger haggled with their counterparts for several days and hammered out a compromise. While no one was willing to consider the kind of hard-hitting sanctions Reagan had put in place, alliance members did commit themselves to the goal of encouraging reform in Poland. As general as it was, this action was a long way from Schmidt's mild endorsement of the crackdown.

Reagan, however, made clear that he was firmly committed to liberating Poland. "What is at stake in Poland is freedom," read the official U.S. statement following the NAC meeting. "We in the west have a responsibility not only to preserve our own freedom but to nurture it where it does not exist."²⁸

Reagan's commitment to nurturing freedom in Poland won him criticism from many who believed he was risking conflict with the Kremlin. George Kennan, who had first formulated containment in 1947, declared that demands for freedom in Poland were "inevitably self-defeating," and that Reagan was undermining détente.²⁹


* * *

IN MOSCOW, KREMLIN LEADERS TOOK COMFORT IN THE MILD words emanating from Western Europe. They applauded Europe's "realism" and "genuine concern," as opposed to the "wild accusations" coming out of Washington.³⁰ In Warsaw, martial law officials went a step further. With morale low among their own military officers, they circulated quotes by Schmidt made to Polish officials that "General Jaruzelski acted in the best interests of the nation."³¹

But Reagan was clearly throwing down the gauntlet. Sanctions against Poland were a major drain on Soviet resources. "We already are stretched to the limit in our capacity to help the Poles, and they are still making more requests [for money and food]," Brezhnev told the Politburo somberly after the sanctions were announced. "Perhaps we can do a bit more, but we certainly can't give a lot more."³²

March 14, 2003 1:50 PM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Map of Iraq

I asked the CIA to give you a good map of Iraq, as you requested. I have a pretty good one over here that I showed to my CIA briefer, and he is going to get one for you.

Iraq

DHR:dh
031403-7

14 Mar 03

W00293 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20898

Snowflake

March 19, 2003 4:00 PM

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: External Organizations

Attached is a paper that was provided to me. I have not had a chance to study it, but I think these are just a few of the things that I am automatically a part of as Secretary of Defense. Clearly, something like the National Security Council makes sense. On the other hand, there are a lot of things on here that not only don't make sense for the Secretary of Defense, but I would guess don't make sense for the government.

Maybe you could ask OMB to take a review of all of these commissions. We could propose that Congress abolish the ones required by statute that don't make sense anymore, and we can take care of the administrative ones established by Executive Order by abolishing them or reviewing the membership. That would be a good task for OMB.

Regards,

Attach.

Secretary of Defense Memberships in External Organizations Under Statute or Executive Order, November 21, 2002 draft version

DHR:dh
031103-9

334

19 Mar 03

W00297 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20899

**Secretary of Defense Memberships in External Organizations Under Statute or
Executive Order**

1. National Security Council, member

-Requirement: 50 U.S.C. §402

-Established: Jul. 26, 1947

-SecDef attends.

-Purpose: The NSC advises the President on domestic, military and foreign policies relating to national security.

2. Export Administrative Review Board, member

-Requirement: Exec. Order No. 12981, 60 Fed. Reg. 62981 (Dec. 5, 1995), continues the Board established by Exec. Order No. 11533 (Jun. 4, 1970) and Exec. Order No. 12002 (Jul. 7, 1977), amended by Exec. Order No. 13020 (Oct. 12, 1996), Exec. Order No. 13026 (Nov. 15, 1996) and Exec. Order No. 13118 (Mar. 31, 1999)

-Established: June 4, 1970

-SecDef attends.

-No alternate Board member shall be designated, but the acting SecDef or Deputy Secretary may serve in lieu of SecDef

-Purpose: The Board is responsible for interagency dispute resolution concerning export license applications; Board meets only when necessary to resolve disputes.

3. Homeland Security Council, member

-Requirement: Exec. Order No. 13,228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51812

-Established: Oct. 8, 2001

-SecDef designee: Thomas E. White, Sec Army/Interim DoD Executive Agent for Homeland Security

DRAFT
March 19, 2003

-Purpose: The Council advises and assists the President with respect to all aspects of homeland security. It ensures coordination of homeland security-related activities of executive departments and agencies and effective development and implementation of homeland security policies.

4. President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board

-Requirement: Exec. Order No. 13,231, 66 Fed. Reg. 202

-Established: Oct. 16, 2001

-SecDef designee: John Stenbit, ASD(C3I), secondary is Carol Haave,
DASD(S&IO)

-Purpose: The Board recommends policies and coordinates programs for protecting information systems for critical infrastructure, including emergency preparedness communications, and the physical assets that support such systems.

5. Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, Chairman

-Requirement: 22 U.S.C. §2751

-SecDef may designate a DASD-level or above representative to perform his routine duties

-Established: Oct. 22, 1968

-SecDef designee: Paul Wolfowitz, DepSecDef

-Purpose: The Committee is charged with optimizing funding, development and deployment of highly effective technologies for purposes of detection, monitoring, collecting, processing, analyzing, and disseminating information in support of counterproliferation policy and efforts.

-Miscellaneous: USD(AT&L) chairs interagency group supporting committee.

6. Invasive Species Council, member

-Requirement: Exec. Order No. 13112, 64 Fed. Reg. 6183

-Established: Feb. 3, 1999

-SecDef designee: John P. Woodley, ADUSD(E)

-Purpose: The Council prevents the spread of invasive species (species non-native to the ecosystem under consideration and whose introduction is likely to cause economic or environmental harm or harm to human health) through interagency coordination, creation of a cross-agency budget for rapid response to emerging problems, and reauthorization and expansion of the National Invasive Species Act.

7. U.S. Coral Reef Task Force, member

-Requirement: Exec. Order No. 13089, 63 Fed. Reg. 32701,
16 U.S.C. §6401 note

-Established: June 11, 1998

-SecDef designee: H.T. Johnson, ASN(I&E)

-Purpose: The Task Force's mission is to protect and enhance coral reef ecosystems.

8. Board of Directors, National Veterans Business Development Corporation, nonvoting ex officio member

-Requirement: 15 U.S.C. §657c

-Established: Jul. 18, 1958

-SecDef designee: Frank Ramos, Dir Small & Disadvantaged Business,
OUSD(AT&L)

-Purpose: The Corporation created a business model process of establishing business plans that will provide resources to veterans for businesses and cash flow to the corporation.

-Miscellaneous: Meets quarterly.

9. DoD Advisory Council on Dependents' Education (Federal Advisory Committee), cochairman

-Requirement: 20 U.S.C. §929

-Established: Nov. 1, 1978

-SecDef designee: Charles S. Abell, ASD(FMP)

-Purpose: The Council provides advice to the Director, DoDEA regarding curriculum selection, administration, operation of the DoD Dependents Schools (DoDDS) (the Department's overseas school system), national educational best practices and programs that should be considered for inclusion in DoDDS. ACDE members include representatives from DoD and DoEd, teacher union presidents, military general officers, nationally recognized educators external to DoDEA, DoDDS parents, and a DoDDS student.

10. Board of Directors, U.S. Institute of Peace, member

-Requirement: 22 U.S.C. §4605

-SecDef may designate a DoD PAS official

-Established: Oct. 19, 1984

-SecDef designee: Douglas Feith, USD(P)

-Purpose: The Board debates on current conflict resolution and policy issues.

11. White House Commission on the National Moment of Remembrance, member

-Requirement: Pub. L. No. 106-579 (36 U.S.C. §116 note)

-Established: Dec. 28, 2000

-SecDef or designee: No designee currently in place

-Purpose: The Commission encourages people and entities at the national, State, and local level to commemorate Memorial Day and to participate in a National Moment of Remembrance in tribute to those individuals who sacrificed their lives for the United States. The commission provides national coordination for commemorative speeches, publications, exhibits, and events.

12. Advisory Council on Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance, member

-Requirement: 38 U.S.C. §1974

-Established: Sep. 29, 1965

-SecDef designee: USD(C)

-Purpose: The Council reviews the operations of the Department of Veterans Affairs regarding Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance and advises the Veterans Affairs Secretary on matters of policy relating to the Secretary's activities under this statute.

-Miscellaneous: DoDD 1341.3, "Servicemen's Group Life Insurance," assigns the DoD Comptroller responsibility for financial policy and ASD(FMP) responsibility for administrative policy of the SGLI Program.

-Council meets at least once a year or more often at the call of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs.

13. Professional Certification and Licensure Advisory Committee, ex officio member

-Requirement: 38 U.S.C. §3689

-Established: Nov. 1, 2000

-SecDef designee: Ollie Smith, Transition Assistance Program Director,
OASD(FMP)

-Purpose: The Committee advises the Secretary of Veterans Affairs on requirements of organizations or entities offering licensing and certification tests to individuals on whose behalf the DVA pays for those tests. The Committee expands the educational opportunities for military personnel who signed up for the Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB). As of March 1, 2001, individuals with MGIB benefits possess the option to test on professional certification and licensure examinations. Testing on a DVA-approved professional certification or licensure exam assures eligibility to receive after-the-fact reimbursement.

14. Advisory Committee on Veterans Employment and Training, ex officio non-voting member

-Requirement: 38 U.S.C. §4110

-Established: Oct. 14, 1982

-SecDef or designee: No current representative

-Purpose: The Committee's objectives are to: assess the employment and training needs of veterans; determine the extent to which the programs and activities of the Department of Labor are meeting such needs; carry out such other activities as may be appropriate; and make recommendations to the Secretary of Labor with respect to the employment and training needs of veterans at such times and in such manner as the Committee determines appropriate.

-Miscellaneous: The Committee meets quarterly.

15. Corporation for National and Community Service, ex officio non-voting member

-Requirement: 42 U.S.C. §12651a

-Established: Nov. 16, 1990

-SecDef designee: Ernie Gonzalez, Director, Civil Military Youth Programs and Innovative Readiness Training, OASD(RA)

-Purpose: The Corporation works with governor-appointed state commissions, nonprofits, faith-based groups, schools, and other civic organizations to provide opportunities for Americans of all ages to serve their communities.

16. Advisory Committee on Women Veterans, ex officio member

-Requirement: 38 U.S.C. §542

-SecDef or SecDef designee (after consultation with DACOWITS)

-Established: Aug. 6, 1991

-SecDef designee: DACOWITS Military Director

-Purpose: The Committee advises the Secretary of VA on benefits provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs for women veterans, prepares reports and conducts studies pertaining to women veterans and the needs of women veterans with respect to compensation, health care, rehabilitation, outreach, and other benefits and programs administered by VA.

17. Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, member

-Requirement: 5 U.S.C. §552 note

-Established: Oct. 8, 1998

-SecDef designee: Christina Bromwell, OASD(C3I)

-Purpose: The mission of the Working Group is to locate, recommend for declassification, and make available to the public through the National Archives all classified Nazi and Japanese Imperial Government war crimes records.

***Note:** The Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Act of 2000 requires the President to "designate the Working Group established under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act (Public Law 105-246; 5 U.S.C. 552 note) to also carry out the purposes of this title with respect to Japanese Imperial Government records" by February 25, 2001.

18. Committee on Climate Change Science and Technology Integration, member

-Requirement: Presidential approval, reflected in a February 25, 2002 memo signed by the Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality, Executive Office of the President

-Established: Feb. 4, 2002

-SecDef designee: Ron Sega, Director, Defense Research & Engineering

-Purpose: The Committee will provide recommendations concerning climate science and technology to the President and recommend the movement of funding and programs across agency boundaries.

19. Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board

-Requirement: 29 U.S.C. §792

-Established: Sept. 26, 1973

-SecDef designee: Charles S. Abell, ASD (FMP)

-Purpose: The Board ensures compliance with the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, which allows physically handicapped individuals accessibility to certain federal buildings.

20. Economic Adjustment Committee, chairman (yearly rotating basis w/ Secretaries of Commerce and Labor) or member

-Requirement: Exec. Order No. 12,788, 57 Fed. Reg. 2213 (Jan. 21, 1992)
-SecDef or designated principal deputy

-Established: May 25, 1999

-SecDef designee: DUSD(I&E)

-Purpose: The Committee coordinates federal technical and financial assistance for state and local economic adjustment activities in response to Defense actions, including base closures, contractor reductions, and encroachment. It also prioritizes domestic program support for Defense-affected areas.

21. National Capital Planning Commission, ex officio member

-Requirement: 40 U.S.C. §71a
-SecDef from time-to-time may designate an alternate to serve in his stead

-Established: Dec. 24, 1973

-SecDef designee: Raymond F. DuBois, Jr., DA&M

-Purpose: The Commission reviews plans for the construction and renovation of buildings on federal property in the National Capital area.

22. National Armed Forces Museum Advisory Board, ex officio member

-Requirement: 20 U.S.C. §80

-Established: Aug. 30, 1961

-SecDef designee: Alfred Goldberg, DoD Historian

-Purpose: The Board provides advice to the Smithsonian Institution on matters

concerned with the portrayal of the contributions of the Armed Forces to American society and culture. The DoD Historian advises that the Board met once in 1980 and decided there was no reason to meet again.

23. Interagency Task Force on the Economic Development of the Southwest Border, member

-Requirement: Exec. Order No. 13,122, 64 Fed. Reg. 29201 (May 25, 1999)

-Established: May 25, 1999

-SecDef designee: DUSD(I&E)

-Purpose: The Task Force facilitates the provision of Federal resources to spur economic development along the southwest border region.

-Miscellaneous: The Task Force terminates May 15, 2002, unless the Task Force reaches a consensus recommending continuation of its activities.

25. Interagency Council on the Homeless

-Requirement: 42 U.S.C. §11312

-Established: Jul. 22, 1987

-SecDef designee: OEA became the DoD representative to the Council in 1994.

-Purpose: The Council provides an interagency forum for the coordination of federal policy and assistance to support the homeless.

26. Civilian Community Corps Advisory Board, member

-Requirement: 42 U.S.C. §12623

-Established: Nov. 16, 1990

-SecDef designee: Ernie Gonzalez, Director, Civil Military Youth Programs and Innovative Readiness Training, OASD(RA)

-Purpose: The Board facilitates the pooling of national, state and local resources.

March 22, 2003 12:40 PM

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

Mr. President—

You asked about Henry Stimson.

It turns out that what I told you with respect to Secretaries of Defense was accurate.

It also turns out that what you said about Secretaries of War was accurate. It is becoming increasingly clear that I can never catch Stimson!

I thought the meeting this morning was a good one. Have a good weekend.

Very respectfully,

DHR:dh
032203-10

020 5,3

22 Mar 03

W00313 /03

March 21, 2003, 7:00 PM

TO: The Secretary of Defense
FROM: Marc Thiessen
SUBJECT: Secretaries of Defense/War

There were Secretaries of War that were both younger and older than you:

- The youngest Secretary of War was John McAllister Schofield—who was 36 years old on his first day as Secretary. (He was born on December 29, 1831 and became Secretary of War on June 1, 1868).
- The oldest Secretary of War was Henry Lewis Stimson—who was 78 years old on his last day as Secretary. (He was born on September 21, 1867 and served as Secretary of War from July 10 1940 to September 21, 1945).
- Like you, Stimson also served in the same post twice. Like you, the first time was at age 43 (from May 26, 1911 to March 4, 1913). Like you, he also returned to the same job roughly a quarter century (27 years) later.
- If the President is re-elected, and you serve out his entire 8-year term, you still would not catch up to him—you'd be 76.

11-L-0559/OSD/20910

March 25, 2003 12:38 PM

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: GWOT Medals

Andy—

Here are the new medals you broke loose. Thanks so much.

Attach.
Army Times, March 31, 2003, p. 16.

DHR:dh
032503-5

200.6

15 Mar 03

W00326-03

11-L-0559/OSD/20911

Frontlines

STAFF AND WIRE REPORTS FROM ALL OVER

www.armytimes.com

3/25
FYL. This is help
What Army C. helps
Shake loose.
D?

NEW MEDALS

Two awards created for service during war on terrorism



The Global War on Terrorism Service Medal

Executive order March 12 sets criteria for actions in the global

Terrorism Expeditionary Medal and Terrorism Service Medal recognize military members who make significant contributions in operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and other areas, House officials said.

The Expeditionary Medal will be awarded to members who take part in expeditions to Afghanistan, Iraq, or other areas, such as Operation Enduring Freedom.

The Service Medal will be awarded to members who serve in operations to Afghanistan, Iraq, or other areas, such as Operation Enduring Freedom, to safeguard military

and civilian facilities with the United States.

The awards, which can be given posthumously, do not replace the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal or the Armed Forces Service Medal.

"Any member who qualified for those medals by reason of service in operations to combat terrorism between September 11, 2001, and a terminal date to be determined by the Secretary of Defense, shall remain qualified for those medals," the executive order states. "Upon application, any such member may be awarded either the Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal or the Global War on Terrorism Service Medal in lieu of the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal or the Armed Forces Service Medal."

Defense and service officials are drafting guidelines for awarding the medals.

NEWS BREAKS

FOUR MORE CHARGED IN OLD GUARD THEFT RING

Charges have been filed against four Old Guard soldiers for involvement in an alleged Fort Myer, Va., theft ring.

The soldiers have been accused of hiding goods that police say five other Old Guard soldiers stole in January, said Maj. James W. Smith, chief of military justice for the Military District of Washington.

Smith identified them as Spc. Jason Barnett, Pfc. Austin Dillon, Pfc. Matthew Felty and Pvt. Matthew Chesshir. All have been accused of concealing stolen property or being an accessory after the burglaries.

In January, five other Old Guard soldiers were arrested and charged with breaking into at least four homes and a Radio Shack in suburban Washington D.C. The Army will prosecute them all at Fort Meade in Washington, Smith said.

SIX FILE SUIT TO STOP ANTHRAX INOCULATION

Six service members and Defense Department civilian contractors filed suit March 18 in U.S. District Court to ask that a federal judge declare the military anthrax vaccine to be experimental and illegal.

The identities of the plaintiffs are being withheld for fear of government retaliation, said their lawyers, Michael J. and Mark Zeid.

They also filed a separate motion against the Defense Department to halt further mandatory anthrax inoculations without informed consent or a presidential waiver.

The lawsuit names the Food and Drug Administration as a defendant, claiming it never has formally approved the vaccine for use.

FORMER RANGER EXECUTED

11-L-0559/OSD/20912

March 26, 2003 11:59 AM

091.3

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Colin Powell
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Security Cooperation Document

When you have a chance to look over the security cooperation document I gave you at lunch last week (March 19), I would very much appreciate any suggested edits or thoughts you may have.

Thanks so much.


DHR dh
032603-11

W00331 / 03

26MAY03

March 31, 2003 6:46 AM

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Appeasement

Mr. President—

Attached is an interesting piece by Alistair Cooke on appeasing Hitler and Saddam.

Respectfully,

Attach.

Cooke, Alistair. "Appeasing Hitler and Saddam," BBC News, February 20, 2003.

DHR:dh
033103-5

Iraq

31 Mar 03

W00344-03

11-L-0559/OSD/20914

Appeasing Hitler and Saddam

By Alistair Cooke

BBC News | February 20, 2003

I promised to lay off topic A - Iraq - until the Security Council makes a judgment on the inspectors' report and I shall keep that promise. But I must tell you that throughout the past fortnight I've listened to everybody involved in or looking on to a monotonous din of words, like a tide crashing and receding on a beach - making a great noise and saying the same thing over and over. And this ordeal triggered a nightmare - a day-mare, if you like. Through the ceaseless tide I heard a voice, a very English voice of an old man - Prime Minister Chamberlain saying: "I believe it is peace for our time" - a sentence that prompted a huge cheer, first from a listening street crowd and then from the House of Commons and next day from every newspaper in the land. There was a move to urge that Mr. Chamberlain should receive the Nobel Peace Prize.

In Parliament there was one unfamiliar old grumbler to growl out: "I believe we have suffered a total and unmitigated defeat." He was, in view of the general sentiment, very properly booed down. This scene concluded in the autumn of 1938 the British prime minister's effectual signing away of most of Czechoslovakia to Hitler. The rest of it, within months, Hitler walked in and conquered. "Oh dear," said Mr. Chamberlain, thunderstruck. "He has betrayed my trust."

During the last fortnight a simple but startling thought occurred to me - every single official, diplomat, president, prime minister involved in the Iraq debate was in 1938 a toddler, most of them unborn. So the dreadful scene I've just drawn will not have been remembered by most listeners. Hitler had started betraying our trust not 12 years but only two years before, when he broke the First World War peace treaty by occupying the demilitarised zone of the Rhineland. Only half his troops carried one reload of ammunition because Hitler knew that French morale was too low to confront any war just then and 10 million of 11 million British voters had signed a so-called peace ballot. It stated no conditions, elaborated no terms, it simply counted the numbers of Britons who were "for peace." The slogan of this movement was "Against war and fascism" -- chanted at the time by every Labour man and Liberal and many moderate Conservatives - a slogan that now sounds as imbecilic as "against hospitals and disease." In blunter words a majority of Britons would do anything, absolutely anything, to get rid of Hitler except fight him. At that time the word preemptive had not been invented, though today it's a catchword. After all the Rhineland was what it said it was - part of Germany. So to march in and throw Hitler out would have been preemptive - wouldn't it?

Nobody did anything and Hitler looked forward with confidence to gobbling up the rest of Western Europe country by country - "course by course," as growler Churchill put it.

I bring up Munich and the mid-30s because I was fully grown, on the verge of 30, and knew we were indeed living in the age of anxiety. And so many of the arguments mounted against each other today, in the last fortnight, are exactly what we heard in the House of Commons debates and read in the French press. The French especially urged, after every Hitler invasion, "negotiation, negotiation." They negotiated so successfully as to have their whole country defeated and occupied. But as one famous French leftist said: "We did anyway manage to make them declare Paris an open city - no bombs on us!"

In Britain the general response to every Hitler advance was disarmament and collective security. Collective security meant to leave every crisis to the League of Nations. It would put down aggressors, even though, like the United Nations, it had no army, navy or air force. The League of Nations had its chance to prove itself when Mussolini invaded and conquered Ethiopia (Abyssinia). The League didn't have any shot to fire.

But still the cry was chanted in the House of Commons - the League and collective security is the only true guarantee of peace. But after the Rhineland the maverick Churchill decided there was no collectivity in collective security and started a highly unpopular campaign for rearmament by Britain, warning against the general belief that Hitler had already built an enormous mechanised army and superior air force.

But he's not used them, he's not used them - people protested. Still for two years before the outbreak of the Second War you could read the debates in the House of Commons and now shiver at the famous Labour men - Major Attlee was one of them - who voted against rearmament and still went on pointing to the League of Nations as the saviour.

Now, this memory of mine may be totally irrelevant to the present crisis. It haunts me. I have to say I have written elsewhere with much conviction that most historical analogies are false because, however strikingly similar a new situation may be to an old one, there's usually one element that is different and it turns out to be the crucial one. It may well be so here.

All I know is that all the voices of the 30s are echoing through 2003. .

..

March 31, 2003 6:46 AM

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: League of Nations

Mr. President—

Attached is some background material on how the League of Nations did itself in.

Respectfully,

Attach.
Material on League of Nations

DHR:dh
033103-6

080

31 MAR 03

W00345-03

11-L-0559/OSD/20919

March 10, 2003, 11:35 AM

Larry Di Rita
3/14

TO: The Secretary of Defense
FROM: Marc Thiessen
SUBJECT: France and Abyssinia

You asked if France was responsible for preventing the League of Nations from acting in Abyssinia. The answer is: yes—though the British also bear some of the blame.

Britain and France were the main powers in the League capable of dealing with the Italian aggression, but chose not to. France was afraid of driving Italy into an Alliance with Germany, and Britain was afraid Italy might attack the Suez Canal.

They agreed to impose limited sanctions on Italy, but would not agree to use force, to tougher sanctions (such as an oil embargo that would have had an effect on Italy) or closing the Suez Canal (which could have trapped Italian forces in East Africa).

In August 1935, the British Ambassador to Paris cabled back to London: “France and [French Foreign Minister] Laval care little or nothing for the fate of Abyssinia, but only regard it in so far as it affects French security in Europe.... [Laval] will refuse as long as he can to adopt a definitely hostile attitude to Italy and will seek a means of reaching a compromise.”

That “compromise” came in December of 1935, when Laval and British Foreign Secretary Hoare offered Italy a secret deal—known as the “Hoare-Laval Pact”—giving Italy two-thirds of Abyssinia in exchange for a cease-fire. It fell apart when it was leaked to the French press, causing scandal in both countries.

The lesson was not lost on Germany: three months later, on March 7, 1936. Hitler occupied the Rhineland.

Attached is some historical information with more details of how events unfolded.

11-L-0559/OSD/20920

League of Nations was an international association of countries created to maintain peace among the nations of the world. The victors of World War I (1914-1918) including Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States—drew up a *covenant* (constitution) for the League in 1919. President Woodrow Wilson of the United States was the chief planner of the League of Nations. The League was established in January 1920, with headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. The organization ceased to function after World War II began in 1939. It was formally dissolved in April 1946, and the United Nations took its place.

Wilson had believed that world wars would continue to occur as long as each nation was responsible for its own defense. Under this condition, nations would form competing groups, each arming against the other. Wilson wanted the nations of the world to join together in the League of Nations, and pledge to defend the territory and independence of any member attacked by another nation. He believed that even a powerful nation, knowing it would face the united opposition of all other powerful nations, would not go to war.


Wilson got other countries to agree to his plans for the League, but he and members of the U.S. Senate differed over the terms on which the United States would join. In March 1920, the U.S. Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles, which would have made the United States a member (see Wilson, Woodrow [Opposition to the League; Wilson's collapse]). Within a few years, most Americans decided there was no need to concern themselves with conflicts overseas, and the United States never did join the League of Nations.

Powers and organization

The League Covenant contained articles pledging member nations to preserve the independence and territory of all members against attack. Members agreed to submit any disputes that might lead to war either to *arbitration* (decision by a third party) or to an investigation by the League Council. They promised not to go to war with any member that agreed to the recommendations of a court of arbitration or the League Council. If any member went to war in violation of these articles, member nations agreed they would apply economic *sanctions* (penalties), such as stopping trade with the offending nation. At the League Council's request, they would also use military force against that nation.

The Council was the principal peacekeeping agency. Its size varied from 8 to 14 members during the League's history. The most powerful members of the League had permanent seats on the Council. Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union held permanent seats during the years they were members of the League. The remaining seats were rotated among the small nations of the League. Recommendations of the Council had to be decided by unanimous vote.

The Assembly was composed of all member nations, and each member had one vote. The Assembly controlled the League budget, admitted new members,



Alan A. Phillips

The Palace of Nations in Geneva, Switzerland, was the headquarters of the League of Nations until the League was dissolved in 1946. The *Sphere of Nations* stands in the foreground.

elected the temporary Council members, and made amendments to the Covenant. On these matters, the Assembly could decide by a two-thirds or a majority vote. The Assembly also could discuss threats to the peace. It needed a majority vote plus the votes of all Council members to recommend on such a matter.

The Secretariat provided the administrative staff of the League. A secretary-general, who was nominated by the Council and approved by the Assembly, headed a staff of about 600 officials. These officials assisted the peacekeeping work of the League and provided personnel for special study commissions on disarmament, the protection of ethnic minorities, and colonial affairs. The Secretariat also staffed the various international organizations set up by the League to promote cooperation in international trade, finance, transportation, communication, health, and science.

The League in action

Wilson and the other statesmen who designed the League hoped it would lead nations to stop seeking protection through special alliances. Instead, they favored a system of *collective security*, in which the security of each member would be guaranteed by the protection of all. For collective security to work, it was essential that all League members—especially the most powerful ones—come to the aid of any member attacked. Neither the Council nor the Assembly could force members to help an attacked nation. Such action had to be voluntary. Each member had to believe a threat to the peace of any nation was a threat to its own peace.

Disagreement among members. The most powerful nations did not agree that collective security was the main purpose of the League. France saw the League mainly as an instrument to maintain the territorial settlement and arms restrictions imposed on Germany after World War I. The Germans resented the League because it seemed to them, too, that this was the League's real purpose. British leaders saw it as a meeting place for powerful nations to consult in the event of a threat to peace. But they did not want to commit themselves to do anything that might have threatened their security or prosperity. The Soviet Union believed the League was an imperialist fraud because Communism taught that

The League of Nations

The following nations were the original members of the League. Many other nations joined later, and many withdrew from the League before it was disbanded in April 1946.

Argentina	France	Panama
Australia	Greece	Paraguay
Belgium	Guatemala	Peru
Bolivia	Haiti	Poland
Brazil	Honduras	Portugal
Britain	India	Romania
Canada	Iran	South Africa
Chile	Italy	Spain
China	Japan	Sweden
Colombia	Liberia	Switzerland
Cuba	Netherlands	Thailand
Czechoslovakia	New Zealand	Uruguay
Denmark	Nicaragua	Venezuela
El Salvador	Norway	Yugoslavia

war was inevitable among capitalist nations. During the 1930's, Japan and Italy showed their disregard for collective security by attacking member nations.

Japan withdrew from the League in 1933 because the League refused to recognize its conquest of Manchuria. Germany, admitted to the League in 1926, withdrew in 1933 because the League would not change the arms limitations imposed on Germany after World War I. An arms build-up by Germany under dictator Adolf Hitler led the Soviet Union to join the League in 1934. Italy withdrew from the League in 1937 to join Japan and Germany in an alliance against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was expelled in 1939 for attacking Finland.

The League achieved some success in ending armed conflicts between small nations. For example, it ended fighting between Greece and Bulgaria in 1925, and between Poland and Lithuania in 1927. But when a powerful nation was involved, the League was ineffective.

Why the League failed was most dramatically illustrated when Italy attacked Ethiopia in October 1935. The Council declared that Italy had violated the Covenant. This action obligated League members to apply economic sanctions and to consider the use of force against Italy. Members agreed to stop all imports from Italy and to send no money or war material to Italy.

But the United States, Japan, and Germany were not members. Thus, the overwhelming "community of power" that Wilson originally had in mind for use against an aggressor was reduced to three nations—Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. The other League members did not have enough power to affect Italian policy. Even so, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union would have been able to stop the Italian attack, if they had been united and determined to do so.

However, Britain and France were not willing to use force or to employ measures that might risk war. They failed to use strong economic measures, such as an oil embargo, which would have seriously hurt the Italian war effort. By May 1936, Italy had conquered Ethiopia. The League canceled its sanctions in July.

The French and British shared responsibility for the League's failure during the Ethiopian crisis. France feared that strong League action might lead Italy to join Germany in an anti-French alliance. The British feared that Italy might attack the British-controlled Suez Canal or even launch air strikes against English cities. Neither government was prepared to face such risks. The Ethiopian case completely discredited the League as an instrument to keep peace.

Cary B. Ostrower

See also United Nations; International relations; Mandated territory; Wilson, Woodrow; World War II

international political evolution and moral progress. And in Britain, the League of Nations Union was dramatically successful in mobilizing mass popular support for the League and collective security, as the 'Peace Ballot' of early 1935 demonstrated. Some eleven million British households responded to this unprecedented testing and focussing of public opinion, with overwhelming support being given to the League and its policy of promoting disarmament and peaceful resolution of disputes, backed by economic sanctions and, for a still substantial majority, military sanctions if necessary. With a general election approaching, the National Government of Stanley Baldwin pledged that the League of Nations would form the 'sheet-anchor' of British foreign policy.

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The great test for the League of Nations and collective security came with the Italian aggression against the African kingdom of Abyssinia in October 1935. All the resources of diplomacy, and the appeal to the League under Articles 11 and 15, failed to find a peaceful resolution to the dispute in face of Fascist Italy's drive for conquest. Britain and France, the leading League members, attempted a complex diplomacy of deterring Mussolini with the mobilization of selective economic sanctions under Article 16, while concurrently offering a compromise partition of Abyssinian territory in an effort to keep Italy within the balance of power aimed at containing Nazi Germany. With Mussolini threatening a Mediterranean war against League powers if effective sanctions were imposed (an oil embargo, closure of the Suez Canal), and French Premier and Foreign Minister Pierre Laval manifestly unwilling to risk this, British leaders were faced with an impossible dilemma. Their diplomatic attempt to implement simultaneously a strategy of collective security as announced by Foreign Secretary Samuel Hoare in a famous speech to the League Assembly on September 11, a balance of power that kept Italy in the Stresa Front of early 1935, and an imperialist appeasement put together in the pact secretly negotiated by Hoare with Laval, came to grief with the premature disclosure of the latter in early December 1935. The subsequent moral outrage in British and French public opinion at this unseemly betrayal of both Abyssinia and the commitment to collective security through the League compelled the pact's embarrassed abortion and the resignation of Hoare. Although buried in ignominy, the Hoare-Laval pact was nevertheless not replaced with a determined effort to resist Italian aggression and protect its victim, as Abyssinia would succumb to modern military technology and poison gas in the spring of 1936.

The successful Italian aggression marked the beginning of the end for the League, as the hopes reposed in collective security had been destroyed and the League itself was now once again relegated to the periphery of world affairs in its final, sad phase. It was easy to blame the British and French leaders for their duplicity in promising to support the Covenant and then betraying these promises on the altar of 'realism.' But in the perspective of some sixty years, and informed by the governmental records generated by the anxiety-filled policymaking of 1935, historians are less ready to indict

From: The League of Nations, F.S.
Northridge

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since 3 September of a newly created department in the Foreign Office dealing exclusively with Abyssinian affairs, was sent to Paris to help the Ambassador there, Sir George Clerk, ascertain French views on Italian offers, if any, for a settlement. Peterson's attitude towards the League was summed up by his statement that he 'detested Geneva, where the lack of realism was even more marked than in any House of Commons debate'.³³ Clerk had written to Hoare on 24 October that the French Prime Minister agreed that Peterson and his French opposite number, St Quentin, should get to work at once and 'see how far they can rearrange the map of Abyssinia'.³⁴

Laval, according to Peterson, talked every day on the telephone with Mussolini, and then tried to squeeze the British team into swallowing more and more of the Italian conception of a settlement, especially the idea of an Italian mandate for Abyssinia.³⁵ The fact that Italy, though one of the leading Allied powers in the First World War, had not been invited to accept a former German or Turkish dependency when the mandates were distributed in 1920 particularly irked the Italians. Perhaps Abyssinia would do instead. The British authorities, fortified by a general election held on 14 November, which was largely fought on the issue of defence of the League Covenant, and which, while reducing the government's majority, still left them with a massive lead over their Labour and Liberal opponents, continued to resist.³⁶ At the end of November, the Foreign Office accepted in principle a package of proposals which Peterson was instructed to stand by in Paris. These included a League plan of assistance for Abyssinia, an exchange of the districts of Adowa, Denakil and most of Ogaden against a port on the Gulf of Aden and a corridor joining it with Abyssinia, and British support for Italy receiving 'the fullest possible facilities for economic development in such areas of southern Abyssinia as may be suitable'. In these areas, however, Abyssinian sovereignty would not be affected. It implied 'the creation of a special sphere for Italian economic development and colonisation' under League of Nations supervision.³⁷

It was already common knowledge that Italy would find such proposals as these unacceptable, as Ambassador Grandi told Vansittart in a conversation in London on 5 December.³⁸ Italian forces were at that time poised in massive strength to complete their conquest of a country with which the government in Rome could then do as it wished. Oil sanctions could not prevent that

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happening, Mussolini told Sir Eric Drummond on 7 December, since Italy felt 'fairly safe' even if the oil embargo were imposed; sufficient precautions had been taken in time.³⁹ In any case, oil sanctions, the Italian Under-Secretary of State for the Interior let it be known, would cause Italy to go to war.⁴⁰ The British and French governments, as they deferred debate on the oil sanction week after week until the moment to impose it had passed, would evidently do anything rather than face that prospect. In the British case this fear concerning oil sanctions was strengthened by arguments from the Naval Chiefs of Staff that a strong Italian attack on the British Mediterranean Fleet would cripple it as a source of reinforcement – in terms of ships – for the Far Eastern Fleet.

Laval confronted Hoare with the dangers of war when they met in Paris on 7 December, when the British Foreign Secretary was on his way to Switzerland for a holiday after his heavy labours piloting the Government of India Bill through the Commons before going to the Foreign Office in June.⁴¹ He later confessed that he was 'pulled down' by poor health, and this may explain his submission in Paris to Laval's pressure to accept the well-known plan for the virtual partition of Abyssinia which has since borne the names of the two men. The plan consisted of three parts: (1) an outlet to the sea at Zeila for Abyssinia with a corridor joining the port with the latter country, though Abyssinia would not be allowed to construct a railway through the corridor in order to safeguard French interests in Djibuti and the Franco-Abyssinian railway; the Abyssinian acquisition would be, as *The Times* described it, 'a corridor for camels'; (2) in exchange, part of Tigré and territory in the east and south-east of Abyssinia would be assigned to Italy; (3) a large zone in the south and south-west would be recognised as an Italian monopoly in respect of economic development under League of Nations supervision, though still under the Emperor's sovereignty.⁴² The effect of the Hoare-Laval plan would be that, directly or indirectly, Abyssinia would lose somewhat more than one half of its territory as it stood before the Italian invasion. Hoare and Laval agreed at their Paris meeting, which at France's request was extended to include Sunday, 8 December, that Mussolini would be told of the plan first, and that afterwards, on 10 December, Haile Selassie would be informed, but only that Britain and France were seeking a solution by conciliation based on principles determined by the Committee of Five in September and already accepted by Abyssinia.⁴³ This, if

not precisely a lie, was plainly intended to deceive the Emperor. Laval was brutal enough to tell Vansittart (who also attended the Paris meetings) that, if Haile Selassie rejected the plan, the oil sanction must be dropped.⁴⁴ It had never, of course, been applied, and never would be.

The sequel to the story is well known; how the Hoare-Laval plan was leaked to the French press and published by the journalist Madame Tabouis in Paris newspapers on 9 December, almost in full; how a storm of amazement and disapproval swept Britain—the Cabinet were told that opinion in the City regarded it as 'the most miserable document that has ever disgraced the signature of a British statesman';⁴⁵ how Geneva and the different League bodies involved in the dispute were thunderstruck; how the British Government, at their meeting on 9 December, at first approved the proposals, then, in view of the outcry, disowned them, forcing Hoare, now in a hospital bed after breaking his nose ice-skating in Switzerland, to resign and extinguishing all interest in the plan in Rome, where initial reactions had been favourable; and how Anthony Eden, now thirty-eight years old, sprang into Hoare's chair at the Foreign Office on 22 December, accepting the grudging invitation of Prime Minister Baldwin, who told him 'it looks as if it will have to be you', and set about picking up the pieces.⁴⁶

The consequences of the Hoare-Laval plan for the sanctions front were unsurprisingly disastrous, though the plan itself had far more to be said for it than the cries of protest suggested. After all, the League's Committee of Five had openly been working on a scheme, which Haile Selassie had accepted in principle and which would in any case have much diminished Abyssinia's existence as an independent country; the Hoare-Laval proposals did not do much more than carry this process further. The League Council had itself blessed Anglo-French efforts to find a solution, and it was not to be supposed, in view of Italy's military position when 1936 began, that one could be found satisfactory to the two sides which did not involve some drastic reduction of Abyssinia's size and of its freedom to run its own affairs. Had the plan been quietly accepted by the parties and the League, the Emperor would at least have retained the Amharic core of his country: the failure of the Hoare-Laval plan meant that he lost all of it, though how long he could have held on to the core must remain a matter of speculation. Above all, the military odds in Abyssinia were entirely on Italy's side. By the end of March, the Emperor had lost

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the decisive battle of Mai Chio, which led to the wholesale retreat of his forces. On 4 May, Badoglio reached Addis Ababa and on the same day the Emperor embarked on HMS *Enterprise* at Djibuti. Five days later Badoglio was shaking hands with Graziani, the Italian victor in the south, at Diredawa. Neville Chamberlain, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, wrote on 2 May that he was 'sure the time had not come for the League to own itself beaten'. 'All the same', he went on, 'it is beaten'.⁴⁷

The fact is that the British and French Governments never had any intention of using force against Italy to stop its advance in Abyssinia, or even of closing the Suez Canal, which would have locked Italian forces in East Africa in a trap. Nor had any other country, though all were ready to cheer Britain and France on from the side-lines, had they gone into action. Laval even regarded an oil embargo as a form of military sanction since he considered that it would have military consequences, and he opposed it for that reason. It was equally evident that, for his part, Mussolini did not intend to be prevented from conquering his victim by anything short of superior force. The conquest of Abyssinia was too important in his foreign policy; he had invested too much money, too much of his own political future, in it. At the end of 1935, that conquest did not look as though it would take anything like the two or three years which most foreign military experts thought it would. In these circumstances, what course remained for the chief League Powers except to try to reach a compromise settlement which might at least keep some part of Abyssinia outside the new Roman Empire? The brutality and cynicism, the blatant deception, of the Hoare-Laval proposals might be deplored, but their logic was less easily condemned.

The rest of the Abyssinian story is little more than a tail-piece to the Hoare-Laval débâcle. The Anglo-French plan, regardless of how much common sense there was in it, struck the heart out of the sanctions enterprise. Whereas, the day before the plan was out in the open, the smaller countries in the League – states like Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia – could feel that, after all, there might be some safety for them under the League umbrella, which Britain and France were bravely holding over their heads, the news that these two erstwhile League champions had been plotting for months to carve up the victim's body and reward its attacker with substantial parts of it dealt the campaign for collective action a mortal blow. When the next assault on the international order came – and it came, almost as a consequence of

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the Abyssinian crisis, in the form of Germany's armed entrance into the demilitarised Rhineland on 7 March - it was clear that survival for a small country must lie, not in Geneva, but in neutrality or some other form of isolation, or in coming to terms with the big bullies now roaming the streets. After all, the Hoare-Laval plan had shown that the bully's methods paid off, at least in the short run.

With the disappearance of Laval from the French scene in January 1936 and his replacement as Foreign Minister by Pierre-Etienne Flandin on the 27th, Albert Sarraut being the new Prime Minister, it might have been expected that the French bias against sanctions and in favour of the kind of terms which might buy off Mussolini would decline. But this did not happen. Internal politics continued to dominate French diplomacy. The French people did not want a quarrel with Italy and would not support any government which pursued one; in so far as the League meant anything to them, it was a weapon for using against Hitler's Germany. The new Germany, with its burning fanaticism, was the real threat, and who could disagree with that? Lloyd Thomas, the British Minister in Paris, had written home as early as 7 October, when the Italian attack on Abyssinia was no more than a few days old, that Laval's opinion was that 'the French would fight for France, they would fight for the frontiers of Belgium and he thought they would probably fight for England, but otherwise they would never fight outside France and in his personal opinion they would not ... even incur the risk of war for Austria or Czechoslovakia, much less for Russia'.⁴⁸ As later history showed, even that was an optimistic statement about the French appetite for fighting. However, Flandin was bound to take account of the same political realities, to drag his feet over the oil sanction and steer clear of any action likely to weaken the links with Rome. Against his repeated warnings of the dangers of adopting the oil measures, Eden struggled to keep interest in them alive. On 4 March, the British Foreign Secretary was forced into the pathetic justification of the oil sanction that, if it were applied, 'it will be less applied by reason of its probable effectiveness than as a means of demonstrating the determination of Members of the League to persist in the policy upon which they have embarked'.⁴⁹ It was another way of saying that they meant to press on with sanctions because they had made up their minds to do so.

Then came Hitler's Rhineland *coup* and the diversion of the world's attention from Africa to Europe. The French asked, with

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popular enthusiasm, found himself having to explain its diplomatic implications to sceptical colleagues.

These colleagues were alarmed by Britain's tendency during the crisis to move out of line with France. 'Go as far in this sanctions business as France', Churchill advised Hoare, 'but no further'. The French were strictly limited in the extent to which they would oppose Italy at the League. France's main fear was Germany, morning, noon and night. If Italy were on Germany's side in the coming struggle for power in Europe, France's position would be parlous, it being all but impossible that she should stand on guard on two fronts, one facing Germany, the other Italy. On 4 January 1935, Pierre Laval arrived in Rome and three days later reached an agreement with Mussolini under which Italy would withdraw troops from its border with France. Four further conventions were entered into as part of the understanding: (1) frontier rectifications in Italy's favour would be effected as between French West Africa and Libya and French Somaliland and Eritrea; (2) in Tunisia, children born of Italian parents would be able to opt for French nationality after 1945 and would become French after 1965. Italian schools would be subject to French law after 1955; (3) Italy and France would recommend to all states concerned a non-intervention agreement with respect to Austria; pending its conclusion, the two countries would consult together whenever Austria's independence seemed threatened; (4) as far as armaments were concerned, no country could modify its obligations with respect to them by unilateral action. These agreements were published; there was, however, a secret agreement on armaments which did not see daylight until after the Second World War; this stated that, 'in the event of circumstances permitting the resumption of international negotiations with a view to the conclusion of a general disarmament agreement, the two governments will concert their efforts so that the figures of limitation inscribed in the agreement will ensure the two countries, in respect to Germany, the advantages which will be justified for each of them'. Though nothing about it was stated in the written agreements, it was generally assumed that France would, as a result, recognise Italian economic primacy, with perhaps a suggestion of political primacy, too, in Abyssinia.⁵²

When Eden, on his own visit to Rome in June, protested that the latter agreement had nothing to do with the political realm, he reported the Duce as having 'flung himself back in his chair with a gesture of incredulous astonishment'.⁵³ Mussolini had joined

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MacDonald and Sir John Simon, together with Laval, at a conference in Stresa from 11 to 14 April, in the immediate aftermath of Hitler's denunciation of the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty a month before, the Final Declaration issued after the meeting speaking of the three Powers finding themselves 'in complete agreement in opposing, by all practicable means, any unilateral repudiation of treaties which may endanger the peace of Europe and will act in close and cordial collaboration for this purpose'. Mussolini later claimed that the words 'of Europe' were inserted on his own initiative, the intention being to exclude Abyssinia. There is little doubt, however, that the British and French participants had clearly intended to limit the discussion to Europe.⁵⁴

But it is hardly necessary to consider whether Britain and France maintained a conspiracy of silence about Africa at Stresa as a way of giving Mussolini the green light to carry out his plans for Abyssinia. The essential fact is that they counted on Italian co-operation against Germany, and when, along with almost fifty other League states, they banded together to punish Italy for attacking Abyssinia, a blow was inevitably struck against the Stresa front. It was equally inevitable that they, and especially France, should want to soften the effects of that blow. When Hitler remilitarised the Rhineland in March 1936, Italy was quick to make it plain that League sanctions against Italian policy in Abyssinia ruled out all prospect of herself participating, as a joint guarantor with Britain of the Locarno treaties of 1925, in measures against Germany. It was natural for the French to conclude that the British obsession about sanctions against Italy had ruined all prospect of sanctions against Germany's far more serious offence, certainly to the extent that they depended upon co-operation with Italy.

The great question – how it hung in the background throughout the Italo-Abyssinian affair! – was Germany, and what the situation in Europe would be like once Germany was restored to strength. 'Throughout the whole Abyssinian conflict', Sir Samuel Hoare told Laval on 10 September, the day before his great speech on defence of the Covenant at the sixteenth League Assembly, 'he had been thinking, not so much of the Italian dispute or a backward country, as of the reactions of the dispute on the European position, with Germany rearmed and under temptation to make a threat to European security some time during the next ten years'.⁵⁵ In a further talk with Laval on the next day, Hoare said that during his speech at the Assembly on 11 September 'he had the whole

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time been thinking of the German danger'.⁵⁶ That was the language that Laval, like any Frenchman, wished to hear. But what was the connection between the Italian and the German situations? British sanctionists, like Hoare, at least in the frame of mind in which he was on 11 September, thought that, if the League failed in Abyssinia, it would certainly fail if put to the test by Germany. Hitler would be immensely encouraged by Mussolini's successful defiance of the League, British public opinion discouraged to the point of being driven into a hopeless isolationism. But there was also the view adopted by the French, namely that the connection between sanctions against Mussolini and sanctions against Hitler was that the former destroyed the Stresa front, and it was in that front that the chief hopes of organising a system of sanctions against Hitler lay.

If war with Germany came, as a result, for instance, of an attempt to restrain Hitler, the French knew that they must bear the brunt of it; Britain's contribution in the shape of land forces, at least in the early stages, would be as slight as in 1914, perhaps even more so. Since 1914 the air age had arrived, as the devastating Italian bombardment from the air of undefended villages of Abyssinia showed only too well. The British authorities worried even about the bombing of London by the Italian air force during the dispute about Abyssinia: during 1935 they pursued the chimera of an 'air Locarno', an agreement with the states of Western Europe for mutual assistance in the event of an air attack on one of the signatories. France, seeing herself left to grapple with German armies in the mud, had no wish to prod Italy into throwing in her lot with Germany. Yet that might happen if sanctions were persisted in. Sir George Clerk, the British Ambassador in Paris, wrote to Hoare on 15 June 1935 that 'the sentiment of the bulk of the public is on the side of Italy; a policy of whole-hearted support of Abyssinia, with whom there is very little sympathy, would be most unpopular'.⁵⁷ After all, France herself was a colonial Power in Africa. In January, Abyssinian tribesmen had crossed into French Somaliland and killed a French official, sixteen militiamen and eighty Issas natives.

France's plight was alarming. Racked with internal unrest, torn between Left and Right, her only substantial ally was unrealistic and sentimental Britain, smitten with a League of Nations fever in defence of a backward and entirely insignificant African country against a European great Power with a most distinguished history. Clerk had written home on 22 August that 'France and Laval care

little or nothing for the fate of Abyssinia, but only regard it in so far as it affects French security in Europe'. Laval, the Ambassador went on, 'will refuse for as long as he can to adopt a definitely hostile attitude to Italy and will seek a means of reaching a compromise ... In the last resort it may be possible to make him do so but only if he secures satisfactory assurances that he will have the support of HM Government in resisting German encroachments'.⁵⁸

France watched the fires of militant nationalism stoked in nearby Germany by a practically insane leader who left no doubt in anyone's mind that he intended to turn his 70 million people into the scavengers of Europe. Britain appeared to be in no mood for taking Hitler seriously, condoned his repeated breaches of the Versailles Treaty system, and signed agreements with him, like the Anglo-German naval treaty of June 1935, which ratified Germany's illegal rearmament, without consulting France or even notifying her of her intention to do so. Yet Britain was bent on alienating Mussolini, a guardian of the Locarno regime which Britain had played a leading role in creating, and which protected the demilitarised zone of the Rhineland, imposed by the Allies at such terrifying cost less than twenty years before. It was almost in despair that the French, on 2 May 1935, signed their treaty for collective defence with Soviet Russia, a country which practically every French politician either despised or mistrusted, or both. The irony of it was that it was this agreement which was used by Hitler as an excuse for denouncing the Locarno treaties and remilitarising the Rhineland in March 1936. Such was the pretext, but the opportunity, every Frenchman concluded, was provided by the disarray in the Stresa front caused by the application of League sanctions against Italy. By far the greatest responsibility for that lay with 'perfid Albion'.

The failure of sanctions in the Abyssinian crisis of 1935-36, and hence the failure of the League, not merely in that crisis, but for all time, has been attributed to the leaders of the principal sanctionist countries, the 'guilty men', who never believed in the League system, but went along with public opinion in supporting it, as long as it won votes or averted political defeat, and then betrayed it at the first opportunity. The saying goes that it was not that the League was tried and found wanting; it was found difficult and not really tried at all. Alternatively, it could be said that democratic leaders in the 1930s were, if not intentionally guilty, at least unintentionally so. They straddled two diplomatic worlds, the

11-L-0559/OSD/20932

March 31, 2003 7:57 AM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

CC: Honorable Colin Powell
Honorable George Tenet
Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: North Korea

Attached is an interesting paper I received on Korea.

Thanks.

Attach.

Undated paper: "Seeing North Korea As It Isn't: Common Misperceptions in Assessing the Kim Family Regime." Author's name not listed.

DHR:dh
033103-12

Korea (North)

31 Mar 03

W00346-03

11-L-0559/OSD/20933

02/24
Interesting assessment!

**Seeing North Korea As It Isn't:
Common Misperceptions in Assessing the Kim Family Regime**

With the emergence of a perceived crisis on the Korean Peninsula, a host of "experts" are commenting on what North Korea wants, what North Korea needs, and what North Korea can and cannot do. Unfortunately, few of the "experts" have more than a cursory knowledge of the regime's ideology, organization, operations, and culture. The end result is an application of American logic to uniquely North Korean problems, denying the analyst perspective, and therefore, accuracy.

This skewed process results in ridiculous assertions such as CNN claiming that Kim Il Jong "always wanted warmer relations the US," diplomats arguing for negotiations to "get past" the nuclear issue, and a former Clinton Administration ambassador claiming that North Korea "is reacting only because it is threatened by the US." Unfortunately, all three are closer to fiction than fact. Even more disconcerting, these and a host of other misconceptions have created a sort of accepted dogma about the "workers' paradise" that bears little relationship to reality.

The intention of this paper is to debunk the ten most common myths often assigned the Kim Family Regime so that policymakers and analysts can better perceive the regime as it is, rather than how we wish it.

Misperception #1: "The Kim Family Regime is willing to make fundamental change." The dictatorship's survival against potential internal forces is directly dependent on its ability to control information and maintain surveillance of the population in conjunction with Kim Jong-il's ability to materially reward the elite. Kim is acutely aware that a breach of these controls results in the release and acceleration of competing domestic forces that would doom the regime. Since the elite directly link their survival and successes to unquestioning allegiance to Kim, they can be expected to make selections that reinforce their commitment to the regime, creating an impetus for obedience and compliance. Faced with eschewing change to maintain coercive mechanisms or accepting change and concomitant regime failure, the regime must choose system sustainment and avoid the debilitating and destructive forces of reform at all costs.

Misperception #2: "The Kim Family Regime operates as a conventional government." Despite the trappings of a modern state, North Korea is more closely structured along the lines of an organized crime family in both organization and practice. Key institutions report directly to Kim Jong Il, individuals are promoted based on their loyalty and usefulness to Kim Jong Il, and punishment for "disloyalty" is usually total. Like a mafia family, after loyalty the regime most values an underling's ability to bring treasure to Kim Jong Il. The regime's organization consists of expanding tiers surrounding the core, each reporting within its own pyramidal structure. In short, the regime is little more than a family-run enterprise singularly focused on servicing the core rather than a legitimate political entity.

Misperception #3: "North Korea has a failed economy that limits its military capability and forces it to seek improved relations with the US." Economic support for the regime and North Korean people is unique and challenges the application of conventional analysis. The "socialist" economy, similar to a plantation economy, is designed to sustain the population at a subsistence level so they can in turn service the regime with products and corvée labor. Within this macro structure are two prioritized and interrelated micro economies – the core elite and the Korean People's Army (KPA) systems. Elite support takes precedent over all other needs, is hard-currency based, and is largely funded by cash inputs from the sale of illicit drugs, counterfeiting, ROK bribery, resale of international aid, and US joint recovery operations. The KPA support system is

higher in priority than the economy at large and gains funding from US-provided oil, international missile and arms sales, other international commerce conducted through front companies, and the control of most industrial production. This funding and independent nature of the military support structure effectively ensures that the KPA stays fully prepared to conduct the WMD-supported blitzkrieg campaign KPA doctrine espouses, substantially insulated from macro economic stagnation and decline.

Misperception #4: "North Korea's elites represent a diverse advisory body that offer a range of views to Kim Jong Il, i.e. there are "liberals" and "conservatives" within the elite." The monolithic nature of the regime cannot be overstated. All members of the elite are positioned through a system of hereditary ties, family associations, and assessed loyalty. Overwhelming evidence indicates that survival in this system depends on absolute loyalty to Kim Jong Il. The chance that someone could attain even a minor position in the regime and show anything less than total devotion to Kim is slim, and for national level positions nil. In short, as long as Kim maintain coercive power, a member of the elite can offer views contrary to Kim's only at their own and family's peril. Kim's agenda is the elite core's agenda.

Misperception #5: "Kim Jong Il and the ruling elite are unsophisticated and have a limited understanding of international politics and behavior." While Kim Jong Il's orientation is influenced by revolutionary juche ideology, his leadership is shaped by the brutal pragmatism taught him by his father. He is further informed by an extensive array of information gathering apparatus that ensures he and his trusted elite are fully appraised of international events, opinions and diplomatic techniques. Significant evidence indicates that the elite is well-informed and in turn they keep Kim Jong Il extremely well-informed, most likely knowing that the penalty for withholding information would be elimination. Finally, as repeatedly exhibited, the regime is acutely aware of its limits and has repeatedly accurately gauged US responses to gain incredible concession significantly disproportionate to just deserts.

Misperception #6: "The regime conducts international negotiation in good faith and seeks viable political compromises to solve conflict." The regime rarely negotiates for solutions but instead negotiates for its exclusive benefit with the ultimate goal of reunification under "socialism." Rather than diplomatic discourse, the regime views "negotiation" as a mercantile transaction, often requiring payment to conduct meetings.

Misperception #7: "The Kim Family Regime recognizes the futility of trying to reunify the Peninsula through force and has given up on the idea." The regime has consistently and aggressively, particularly over the last decade, pursued increased capabilities to enable reunification by force. As renowned economist Marcus Noland notes the regime continues to choose guns over butter and there is no indication of any change in this orientation. KPA military training and writings consistently stress the themes of "tempo" and "loyalty," providing the operational and political corrections to the regime's 1950 failure. It is fair to assume that the regime's senior leadership believes a rapid campaign combined with a slow response by US policymakers would allow for victory. It is for this practical reason, and not for "national prestige," that the regime pursues weapons of mass destruction, seeing them as viable tools to give US decision makers "cause for pause." The bottom line is the regime continues to harbor the concept of armed invasion supported by ROK internal disruption as a viable and practical method to reunify the Peninsula.


Misperception #8: “Kim Jong Il is an innovator who badly wants to shed the constraints of *juche* ideology.” Kim Jong Il is a Kim Il Sungist first and foremost whose entire regime is underpinned and legitimized by *juche* philosophy. Often mistakenly referred to as “self-sufficiency,” *juche* ideology is a humanist philosophy that casts man as the master of his element. For the regime, this determinist approach lays the responsibility for failure on the shoulders of the people, allowing the regime to abdicate responsibility. As indicated by Kim’s every action since assuming leadership in the early 1980s, he views the world through a staunchly *juche* prism and does not seek to adopt other views except those that can be crafted within the core ideology. These adjustments, often mistakenly proclaimed as “reforms,” only underscore the regime’s commitment to staying the course to achieve the revolution’s mandate of reunification under Kim’s unique brand of “socialism.”

Misperception #9: “Time is on our side – we can ignore NK because the regime will eventually fail and fade away.” Not surprisingly, the regime takes a similar view of America. The regime’s core believes that the march of time favors their success. To support this they cite their willingness to never compromise, commitment to well-defined goals, and willingness to sacrifice, as opposed to what they see as inherent corruption in the ROK system. While noted economist Janos Kornai postulates that the DPRK will eventually fail and implode economically if left unsupported, he also argues that there is no reliable prediction as to the duration of survival of socialist economies. Given the regime’s ability to obtain external support and the micro economies that exist within the regime, it is logical to assume the regime will survive, if not thrive, for the foreseeable future barring any active attempt to end it. This, combined with its possession of and expansion of WMD, means that over time the regime’s ability to threaten the US and successfully attack the ROK increases rather than the opposite.

Misperception #10: “Kim Jong Il cares about his people, or at worst doesn’t fully comprehend the plight of his people.” All evidence supports that Kim Jong Il is keenly aware of the plight of the people. Other evidence indicates that not only is he aware but that he routinely makes decisions as to what individuals, groups and regions benefit within his franchise. Other evidence garnered from multiple sources over several decades indicates that he is a ruthless dictator that has no compunction where the brutalization and exploitation of the populace for his benefit is concerned. To the contrary, he has intensified his father’s systems of coercive and oppressive control, surveillance and punishment and selectively increased the destitution of the general populace while increasing rewards to the core elite and expending massive state resources on enhancing offensive military capability.

The author, a Koreanist since 1984, has specialized in studying the North Korean leadership and *juche* ideology for the last decade. He holds masters degrees in Korean Studies from the University of Washington and Defence Studies from the University of Canberra in Australia, and was a Senior Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. He has lived and worked in South Korea for more than eight years, Hawaii and Australia for one year each, and has traveled extensively in China and Japan. To advance his knowledge of the Kim Family Regime he has studied under some of the world’s preeminent scholars on North Korea, spent more than a month in Pyongyang and the North Korean countryside, has met dozens of North Korean scholars, officials and students, and interviewed several dozen defectors. In July 2003, he will return to Korea as a Senior Fellow at the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis.

April 1, 2003 1:37 PM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: UN Commission

Here is a worrisome paper by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. If you look at the marked section on the second page, it appears to be laying the groundwork for future charges of U.S. war crimes.

Also, as I recall, this is the fellow who has criticized us for our handling of prisoners at Guantanamo.

Attach.

3/27/03 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Statement: "High Commissioner Repeats Call on Parties in Iraq to Respect Human Rights and Protect Civilians"

DHR:dh
040103-14

UN

1 Apr 03

W00352-03

11-L-0559/OSD/20937



***** HIGH COMMISSIONER REPEATS CALL ON PARTIES *****
IN IRAQ TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS AND
PROTECT CIVILIANS

Geneva, 27 March 2003

Following are the comments by United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Sergio Vieira de Mello to the fifty-ninth session of the Commission on Human Rights today:

You – the Commission on Human Rights – have decided not to hold a special sitting dedicated to the humanitarian and human rights consequences of the current conflict in Iraq. The debate culminating in this decision revealed divisions – yes – but also the common thread of profound concern over the plight of the Iraqi people. That they are facing, and have for some time faced, the most difficult, dreadful plight is beyond dispute.

As High Commissioner for Human Rights, my principal concern, as is yours, is for the human rights of all people the world over and the need for these rights to be protected. In a statement I issued on the day that hostilities began in Iraq, and which I reiterated before you when introducing my report on the work of my Office – and which I repeat again now – I called on all parties to the conflict to respect fundamental human rights and humanitarian law and to observe meticulous precautions in protecting civilians.

I repeat this because it can never be said enough – not least while we continue to see, in conflict after conflict, civilians bearing the brunt of the violence.

We must also remember that the human rights crisis in Iraq did not begin a week ago. The human rights of the Iraqi people have been violated for many years, as has been abundantly documented by the Special Rapporteurs of this Commission on the situation of human rights in Iraq, as well as reputable human rights experts in non-governmental organizations. I am grateful to the current Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iraq, Mr. Mavrommatis, for hastening – at my request – his arrival in Geneva so as to make himself available to members of the Commission – or to the Commission itself – should it so require.

Our concern also requires us to recall that the Iraqi people have also suffered as a result of the sanctions regime imposed on Iraq.

We are now over a week into hostilities. Prisoners have been taken by both sides. Combatants and civilians have been killed; many have been injured. Property has been damaged. Water, sanitation and other basic necessities essential for sheer survival are unavailable to significant numbers of civilians. No-one in this room can be anything but increasingly concerned for the welfare of the people of Iraq.

In such difficult circumstances as war, indeed particularly in war, humanitarian law and fundamental human rights must be protected on the ground by the parties to the conflict. No-one can be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life. No one can be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. No-one can be arbitrarily arrested or detained. Persons deprived of their liberty should be afforded all the guarantees provided by international law, and prisoners of war should be treated humanely and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Third Geneva Convention.

I must also call on all parties to observe the rules applicable in armed conflict, particularly the principle of distinction between combatants and non-combatants.

Parties must never direct attacks against the civilian population or civilian objects, even if the purpose is to strike at a military target. This is true even if human shields are being used. Conversely, states must never use such an abhorrent practice as intentionally placing civilians in harm's way.

States must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilians and the military. They must preserve infrastructure and other assets essential to the civilian population – including, of course, religious and historical sites – as well as protect the environment of Iraq. Tragic experience demonstrates that the precision of modern weapons, particularly at long range, is not reliable, not least in densely populated, urban areas. So let me state quite clearly here, and this is an appeal, a strong, urgent appeal: If there is any doubt at all, restraint and refrain must be the watchwords. In other words, do not attack that particular target.

There must be no reprisals against the civilian population. Humanitarian assistance must not be hindered. In short, the parties must take every possible precaution to ensure that civilian casualties do not occur.

All these, you will agree with me, are categorical imperatives.

I regret that the cardinal human rights dimension of the situation in Iraq was not given, over the years, the prominence it deserved in the deliberations of the Security Council.

By preserving this focus in this forum, we shall ensure that the centrality of this Commission and its mandate will be preserved and, I earnestly hope, enhanced. We must avoid grandstanding which will lead us nowhere and which will certainly not improve the situation currently faced by the Iraqi people. In human rights, as in politics, as in life, we should be fully aware that throwing stones in glass houses can only lead to damage.

Let us be honest and ask, at the outset, what it is that we wish to achieve. We have all been impotent in changing the past behaviour and human rights record in Iraq. Let us therefore redouble our efforts to make sure that we are not so powerless now. Let us seek results. Let us make a difference – a real difference – for the people of Iraq. I cannot think of a more noble and worthy cause around which this Commission can and must unite.

However I may be of assistance, you can count on my and my colleagues' services. Thank you.

April 1, 2003 1:42 PM

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Situation in Iraq

Attached is a background interview that may have been by General Abizaid, indicating what he is finding in talking to the folks out there. It is interesting.

Very respectfully,

Attach.

Broder, John M. "Top Commander Suggest Shiites Haven't Rebelled Because U.S. Failed Them In '91," *New York Times*, April 1, 2003.

DIR:dh
040103-15

Iraq

1 Apr 03

W00353-03

11-L-0559/OSD/20940

New York Times
April 1, 2003

Good interview. Was this Abizaid?

Top Commander Suggests Shiites Haven't Rebelled Because U.S. Failed Them In '91

By John M. Broder

CAMP SAYLIYA, Qatar, March 31 — The United States, through its past acts, is largely to blame for the failure of Iraq's Shiite majority to rise in revolt against Saddam Hussein, a senior American military commander at Central Command said here today.

"We bear a certain responsibility for what we didn't do in 1991," the officer said.

After the Persian Gulf war in 1991, the American government encouraged a Shiite uprising, then did not act when Mr. Hussein's forces slaughtered thousands of civilians.

"We let them down once," the officer said in a background session with reporters. "We're not going to do it again."

The officer, who spoke on condition that his name not be used, said millions of leaflets and round-the-clock radio broadcasts into Iraq had failed to convince the Iraqi population that the United States and its allies were fully committed to overthrowing the Baghdad government.

He said years of repression and a succession of what he called barbarous acts against civilians by government agents and militia since the start of the current war had caused the people to largely refrain from acts of rebellion.

"If you have been beaten up and beaten down the way they have been for 12 years, it should not surprise us that they're waiting to see," said the officer.

Nonetheless, he expressed optimism that ultimately the Iraqis would recognize that the American-led forces were serious about toppling Mr. Hussein and dismantling his apparatus of terror.

The officer said cultural misunderstandings and a failure to learn the lessons of recent history contributed to miscalculations by American military and civilian leaders. He said those planning and prosecuting the war might have failed to appreciate how deeply Mr. Hussein's personality and organs of repression pervade Iraqi society.

"There are big cultural differences between ourselves and the Arab world," he said. "Their version of the truth is different from our version of the truth. They come at it from a different way."

He said that on some days at least, Baghdad was winning the public relations war in the Arab world by showing pictures of wounded children and devastated public marketplaces, while American officials were showing antiseptic videotapes of precision weapons hitting buildings. The coalition has not effectively shown skeptical audiences in the Arab world and around the globe the brutality of the Iraqi war effort.

"The way this regime fights is despicable, it's barbarous," he said. "We cannot allow anyone, especially in the Arab world, to believe that the way they fight is honorable."

11-L-0559/OSD/20941

He said Arabs were, as a rule, more emotional than Americans and Europeans. Those who have lived for decades under what he called Mr. Hussein's totalitarian rule tend to discount, even distrust, American promises of liberation and relief aid. He compared the Iraqi population to the Germans under Hitler and the Russians under Stalin, who were so cowed by their charismatic leaders that they did not revolt in an organized way.

He said Iraq was not, as some strategists inside and outside the government presumed, a "house of cards" that would topple quickly if given a modest push. "That's just not true," he said.

Mr. Hussein appears invincible to many Iraqis who have known no other leader. "He's won the lottery every time," the officer said. "Saddam is a huge symbol for these people. He's everywhere. He's everything."

That is why American bombers and missiles repeatedly attack Iraqi state television, and why British troops in Basra are knocking down statues and posters of Mr. Hussein.

The officer said that in some places at least, the Iraqi people were close to believing that the end of the government was near.

"They are rising up, even though slower than we hoped," he said. "I sense we're near the tipping point in Basra. I sense we're near the tipping point in Nasiriya."

Intercepted communications between Iraqi army commanders and conversations with Iraqi officers who have surrendered or been captured indicate that at least some in the military believe that the government is in its final days, he said.

"They are worried," he said. "And they ought to be."

But he acknowledged that ground actions — and particularly the heavy bombardment of Baghdad, which apparently has resulted in dozens of civilian deaths and injuries — might have had the effect of stiffening the anti-American resolve of at least some of the citizenry.

He also said, however, that he believed that more Iraqi civilians had been killed by the Iraqi government "than by any of our errant bombs."

He charged that scores of civilians had been killed by the Iraqis in Basra and that more than 60 had been "executed" in Mosul.

But he warned that more American and Iraqi casualties were a certainty in the days to come.

"We're prepared to pay a very high price," he said. "We're not going to walk away. We're going to take him out."

He added, sadly, "There's no such thing as a clean war."

April 1, 2003 3:54 PM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: SARS

Attached is a report on the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS).

Regards,

Attach.

3/31/03 ASD(Health Affairs) memo to SecDef re: Situation Report on Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)

DHR dh
040103-16

7/10

1 (Apr 03)

W00356-03

11-L-0559/OSD/20943

412



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

SECDEF HAS SEEN

APR 2 2003

INFO MEMO

March 31, 2003 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Situation Report on Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)

STW/DJ/SB
4/2

- Fort Benning, Georgia reports a 3-fold increase in respiratory illness cases over the past two weeks. A cluster of 5 pneumonia cases at Anderson AFB, Guam are also reported. These cases are under investigation but no link to SARS has yet been identified. The threat to deployed forces from SARS remains low.
- Enhanced awareness and surveillance is ongoing. Central Command staff is coordinating the Global Emerging Infection System network to enhance respiratory laboratory surveillance in the Southwest Asia theater of operations.
- Three pneumonia deaths among residents of Kuwait are under investigation. CDC is testing biological specimens. No link to SARS has yet been found.
- Vietnam reports no additional SARS cases over the past 6 days indicating the Hanoi outbreak is under control. Hong Kong, mainland China, and Canada remain countries where active disease transmission is occurring.
- Hong Kong has issued an unprecedented isolation order to prevent further spread of SARS. Residents of a housing complex where active transmission is ongoing have been ordered to remain in their flats until April 9, 2003.
- Canada has divided SARS cases into two categories, suspected and probable. In addition to 44 probable cases reported, they are investigating an additional 40 suspected cases.
- WHO reports 143 new SARS cases worldwide since March 28, 2003. An updated matrix by country is at Attachment 1.

cc: SEE DISTRIBUTION

Attachment: As stated

Prepared By: David Tornberg, MD, DASD (Clinical & Program Policy),

SARS SITUATION REPORT
March 31, 2003

World Health Organization (WHO) update:


A total of 1628 SARS cases and 58 deaths are reported worldwide; an increase of 143 cases from March 28, 2003. Hong Kong, China, and Singapore remain the countries where disease spread is most likely.

Country	Cumulative number of case(s)	Number of deaths	Local transmission
Canada	44	4	Yes
China (Guangdong)	806	34	Yes
Hong Kong	530	13	Yes
France	1	0	None
Germany	5	0	None
Italy	2	0	None
Republic of Ireland	2	0	None
Romania	3	0	None
Singapore	91	2	Yes
Switzerland	3	0	None
Taiwan, China	10	0	Yes
Thailand	5	1	To be determined
United Kingdom	3	0	None
United States*	65	0	To be determined
Viet Nam	58	4	Yes
Total	1628	58	

* Suspected Cases; none confirmed

April 4, 2003 7:46 AM

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: The President's National Security Speeches

I am really concerned about the fact that I never see the President's speeches when he is speaking on national security matters or to defense audiences.

I have raised it for two years. I keep being told that it will get fixed. It never is fixed. It is systemic.

I would really appreciate it if you would take control of it and see that I am given a draft of speeches and comments on national security affairs before they are made.

Needless to say, I have no interest in editing his speeches or turning "happys" into "glads." I do think that we can avoid some mistakes.

The system is broken. Please help fix it.

Thanks.

DIR:dh
040403-10

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4 Apr 03

W00377 103

April 7, 2003 6:39 PM

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Press Reports

Attached is a packet of articles that reflect a hemorrhaging in the administration.
It is clearly not disciplined.

This is on top of the fact that State went up and got the President's proposal
changed in the Congress as to how the funding should go through Defense.

Regards,

Attach.
"Recent Comments on Post-Saddam Iraq"

DHR:dh
040703-38

Iraq

7/19/03

W00382-03

11-L-0559/OSD/20947

RECENT COMMENTS ON POST-SADDAM IRAQ

A. New York Times, "Iraqi Shadow Government Cools Its Heels in Kuwait," by Jane Perlez, 4/3/03

"Arrayed below General Garner is a group of former army officers, former and present American ambassadors, aid bureaucrats..., a smattering of State Department officials, several British officials and a cluster known as the "true believers.

"These are the people ... who in the shorthand for Mr. Wolfowitz are known as 'Wolfie's' people. They are thought to be particularly fervent about trying to remake Iraq as a beacon of democracy and a country with a tilt toward Israel....

"Fairly predictably, **State Department officials say**, the Pentagon deemed the most senior State Department appointees as unsuitable for the enterprise, even though one of them, Timothy Carney, a former ambassador to Sudan, was invited to come here by Mr. Wolfowitz....

"Only slightly less controversial is the role the United Nations will play in Baghdad.... The State Department would also like a U.N. present as a way of easing the anger in Europe and elsewhere toward the American-led military action. The Pentagon is less keen....

"At a meeting with Kuwaiti academics and businessmen last week, General Garner said he would measure his success by how quickly he could hand over authority to Iraqis. But the longer the war grinds on, the harder it will be for the Americans to find enthusiastic Iraqis, **a State Department official said**....

"One of the faraway masters, in the minds of many here, is someone known fondly, or not so fondly – depending on one's political orientation – as Wolfowitz of Arabia....

"Mr. Wolfowitz is also passing judgment on other assigned here, making the transitory Potomac here as divisive and political as the permanent one at home, some participants say."

B. U.S. News & World Report, "Exclusive: Rumsfeld memos," by Bruce Auster, 4/3/03

"Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is urging President Bush to install an interim Iraqi government immediately – even as the war continues....

"...The view expressed by Rumsfeld is hotly disputed by others inside the U.S. government ... have become a real source of infighting between the Pentagon on one

side and the State Department and CIA, which believe the expatriates have no credibility in Iraq, on the other. 'They will be viewed as part of the American occupation,' says one intelligence official.

C. The Times of London, "Rumsfeld 'resisting' Powell's Iraq Team," by Elaine Monaghan, 4/3/03

"A US official told *The Times* that Donald Rumsfeld, the Defence Secretary, was resisting State Department appointments to the administration-in-waiting, at least one of whom is already in Kuwait.

"He said that the Pentagon had ruled that Mr Rumsfeld should personally approve appointments to the temporary US-British administration, 'and there are many people who question his authority to take that decision, including, I assume, the Secretary of State.' "

D. Foreign Reports Bulletin, "Post-War Battles," 4/2/03

"The hawks in the Pentagon apparently want their buddies and intellectual soul-mates to have the key jobs of 'civilian advisors' to post-war Iraqi ministries, with the State Department favoring Arabists with regional experience....

The Pentagon hawks may have received a setback yesterday in Congress, when Appropriations Committees in both the House and the Senate voted to give the State Department and other agencies authority of \$2.5 billion in post-war aid which the Administration has wanted the Pentagon to be in charge of."

E. Washington Post, "After the War," Editorial, 4/3/03

"[A] secretive Pentagon-led group is already far advanced in plans to unilaterally install a postwar regime dominated by Americans and Iraqi exiles – one that would effectively exclude not only the United Nations but also European and Middle Eastern allies who support will be essential to stabilizing the country. Even the State Department's nominees would be shut out by Defense Department leaders who talk of leaping from military rule to an interim Iraqi government in 90 days with the help of the American officials who would run Iraqi ministries. This narrow approach could compound the diplomatic damage of the war and expose the United States and its soldiers to large and unnecessary risks....

"The problem with the Pentagon's emerging approach is that it would ... make virtually inevitable an Iraqi transitional government dominated by the small group of exiles long favored by the Pentagon....

"Postwar Iraq may determine whether the United States regains that [international] cooperation – or embarks on a dangerous multilateral course.

F. New York Times, "Bush Promises to Adopt Plan for the Mideast," by Steven R. Weisman, 3/14/03

"Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage said at a State Department staff meeting today that the announcement [i.e. of the "road map"] marked a tremendous victory for Mr. Powell over those in the administration who resisted the peace plan's adoption, in part because of Prime Minister Sharon's antipathy toward it."



G. Washington Post, "'Road Map' for Colin Powell," by Richard Cohen, 3/27/03

"For a time this week I was 'embedded' in Secretary of State Colin Powell's office at the State Department....



"... At the moment, the State Department, which used to conduct American foreign policy, has been outgunned by the Pentagon, the National Security Council (now with Elliott Abrams) and Dick Cheney, a vice president with very strong views about the Middle East. Suffice it to call them pro-Sharon."

New York Times
April 3, 2003

Irqi Shadow Government Cools Its Heels In Kuwait

By Jane Perlez

KUWAIT, April 2 — Along a promenade of beachside villas, several hundred American government officials — from well-worn former generals to fresh young aid workers — are working at their laptops, inventing flow charts and examining maps of Iraq in what has become Potomac on the Persian Gulf.

This is the nucleus of the Bush administration's new Iraqi government. One of the faraway masters, in the minds of many here, is someone known fondly, or not so fondly — depending on one's political orientation — as Wolfowitz of Arabia.

The reference, of course, is Paul D. Wolfowitz, the undersecretary of defense, who has dispatched some of his protégés here to prepare key Baghdad ministries for American management.

Mr. Wolfowitz is also passing judgment on others assigned here, making the transitory Potomac here as divisive and political as the permanent one at home, some participants say.

The overall boss of this Iraqi government-in-waiting, an operation that has been endowed with the Washington-speak title "Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance," is retired Army Lt. Gen. Jay Garner. When he gets to Baghdad, he will be in charge of everything the American military is not: feeding the country, fixing the infrastructure and creating what the Bush administration has said will be a democratic government.

A stocky 64-year-old, on leave from a top post at the defense contractor L-3 Communications, General Garner was responsible for protecting Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq after the first gulf war, a smaller task than the one at hand but one that gave him a taste for the country, a colleague said.

Arrayed below General Garner is a group of former army officers, former and present American ambassadors, aid bureaucrats who give themselves away by their many-pocketed khaki jackets, a smattering of State Department officials, several British officials and a cluster known as the "true believers."

These are the people, like Robert Reilly, a former head of the Voice of America, who in the shorthand for Mr. Wolfowitz are known as "Wolfie's" people. They are thought to be particularly fervent about trying to remake Iraq as a beacon of democracy and a country with a tilt toward Israel. Mr. Reilly is working with Iraqi exiles to create radio broadcasts for use in the post-Saddam Hussein Iraq.

General Garner reports to the chief of Central Command, Gen. Tommy R. Franks, a fact that makes the civilian government-in-waiting an operation of the Pentagon.

Fairly predictably, State Department officials say, the Pentagon deemed the most senior State Department appointees as unsuitable for the enterprise, even though one of them, Timothy Carney, a former ambassador to Sudan, was invited to come here by Mr. Wolfowitz.

Mr. Carney is preparing to run the Baghdad Ministry of Industry. Another person the Pentagon is resisting, at least temporarily, is the former ambassador to Yemen, Barbara Bodine. But she has also arrived, established an office in one of the villas, and is informally known on the campus as the mayor of Baghdad.

11-L-0559/OSD/20951

Others who have been held up back in Washington include Robin Raphel, former ambassador to Tunisia, who is slated to run the Ministry of Trade; and Kenton Keith, a former ambassador to Qatar, who is supposed to head the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Not all the 23 ministries in the present Iraqi government will be reopened, a member of the Garner team said. The all-important Ministry of Information will definitely be kept, although who will run it remains unresolved. James Woolsey, a former director of Central Intelligence in the Clinton administration, is a favorite of the Pentagon for that job, people here said.

The politics of the Potomac aside, some of the officials acknowledge they have been handed complex jobs, the real complexity of which will not be known until they know how the war ends.

If there is a surrender by the Iraqi forces and Saddam Hussein is toppled, their jobs will be easier, they say. There could be a messier ending: perhaps some kind of festering war, with outbursts of urban fighting, that would make the Americans' jobs much more precarious.

Another complexity is the role of the Iraqi exile groups that the Bush administration has been courting.

The State Department and the Pentagon hold profound differences on this question, and advocates in the administration say, a definition of the role of the exiles still awaits a decision by President Bush and his senior foreign policy advisers.

Ahmad Chalabi, the head of the Iraqi National Congress, has made it clear that he would not be satisfied with just an advisory position. The State Department has made clear it would prefer a diminished role for Mr. Chalabi. In recent days Mr. Chalabi has said through spokesmen that he wants the formation of a provisional government in which he would be a leading figure. In this he has backing in the Pentagon.

"The decision on the new political class in Iraq is very hot. It has yet to be made in Washington," said one member of the Garner team here.

Only slightly less controversial is the role the United Nations will play in Baghdad. The British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, said in the House of Commons today that the U.N. must have a pre-eminent role in post-Saddam Iraq. The State Department would also like a U.N. presence as a way of easing the anger in Europe and elsewhere toward the American-led military action. The Pentagon is less keen.

The mantra here is that every effort should be made to find what one person called the "good Iraqis" in the ministries — probably those one echelon below the avid Baath Party members — and encourage them to step into responsible roles.

At a meeting with Kuwaiti academics and businessmen last week, General Garner said he would measure his success by how quickly he could hand over authority to Iraqis.

But the longer the war grinds on, the harder it will be for the Americans to find enthusiastic Iraqis, a State Department official said. "The original idea was that we would be slipping in with fast evaluations and liaising with the technocrats who were left," the official said. "The longer this goes on the more problematic that assumption is."

Many of the officials here rushed to Kuwait City in the belief they would be sent almost immediately to Baghdad. Now that the war has gone longer than they were led to expect, there is a lot of cooling of heels, and time for reading. Few of these people are Iraqi experts. But some have come armed with books and articles on

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- the history of Iraq. The chapters on the mistakes of British rule are well underlined.

General Garner visited Iraq for the first time Tuesday, touring Umm Qasr, the town and port controlled by British forces. But the first launching of American civilians will be through the north, where there has been little fighting. A group of aid workers from the Agency for International Development now positioned in Turkey are likely to travel down to the Kurdish areas where there has been virtually no fighting. That leaves the team assembled here on the beach beside the Persian Gulf still waiting their turn.

US News & World Report
April 3, 2003

Exclusive: Rumsfeld memos President Bush is urged to declare an interim Iraqi government

By: Bruce Auster

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is urging President Bush to install an interim Iraqi government immediately—even as the war continues. The new authority would be made up of Iraqi opposition groups in exile, including the Iraqi National Congress, led by Ahmed Chalabi. Rumsfeld suggested that this step would be a way to turn international perceptions in the United States' favor.

Rumsfeld's request, outlined in two memos to the president this week, calls for the United States to "support those Iraqis who share the president's objectives for a free Iraq." In a section entitled "Strategy to Achieve These Objectives," the defense secretary makes the case that Iraqi and Kurdish expatriates are better equipped to take over Iraq than are opposition leaders still inside the country. Rumsfeld's reason: The exiles have experienced democracy while living in the West; the indigenous anti-Saddam Hussein forces have not.

The makeup and timing of a U.S.-backed interim government have been extensively debated at lower levels. The view expressed by Rumsfeld is hotly disputed by others inside the U.S. government, and the issues surrounding an interim government have become a real source of infighting between the Pentagon on one side and the State Department and CIA, which believe the expatriates have no credibility in Iraq, on the other. "They will be viewed as part of the American occupation," says one intelligence official.

As U.S. News reported in December, there was an interagency consensus against declaring an interim government and for giving only a supporting role to the opposition groups in exile. Now, on the heels of the rapid advance of U.S. forces, Rumsfeld is appealing to the president to reverse the policy and install an opposition-led Iraqi government. His memos come at a moment when Secretary of State Colin Powell is out of the country.

Rumsfeld's proposal is likely to infuriate European allies who oppose a U.S.-dominated administration of Iraq. The memos—insiders call Rumsfeld's writings "snowflakes" because he tends to issue one after another—were circulated only to top government officials: Vice President Cheney, Secretary of State Powell, CIA Director George Tenet, and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. Senior government officials say

Rumsfeld sent his first paper last Sunday. It was described as a two-page memo along with 11 pages of attachments.

Rumsfeld followed with a second memo Wednesday. It called for the president to ask Gen. Tommy Franks, the head of U.S. Central Command, to announce that the expatriates are in charge. Rumsfeld quotes Gen. George Patton to the effect that a good plan executed rapidly is better than a perfect plan executed too late. He then declares that the time has come for the planning to cease—and the execution to begin.

With Kevin Whitelaw

The London Times
April 3, 2003

Rumsfeld 'resisting' Powell's Iraq team

BY: ELAINE MONAGHAN

A NEW chapter opened yesterday in the battle for control of US policy in postwar Iraq.

A US official told The Times that Donald Rumsfeld, the Defence Secretary, was resisting State Department appointments to the administration-in-waiting, at least one of whom is already in Kuwait.

He said that the Pentagon had ruled that Mr Rumsfeld should personally approve appointments to the temporary US-British administration, "and there are many people who question his authority to take that decision, including, I assume, the Secretary of State".

Of Colin Powell's nominees, he added: "We haven't gotten a no, we just haven't gotten an answer (from the Pentagon)."

He said that it was unclear how the row would end as the decision-making process was in flux. "The White House has to step in. One of the variables is Mr Tony Blair. Once again, he will be a critical voice in all of this," he said.

Barbara Bodine, an experienced US diplomat expected to take the job of administering Baghdad, is in Kuwait waiting to enter Iraq. US officials have said that an inter-agency tussle is going on over whether she should get that job or a national position as coordinator of the civil administration, for which Michael Mobbs, a Pentagon lawyer, was the favourite.

Other State Department appointees whose participation is now in question include Robin Raphel, the vice-president of the National Defence University, and Kenton Keith, a former ambassador to Qatar.

The row boils down to control over policy-making on Iraq in the postwar phase, with the State Department anxious to create an environment that is more acceptable to foreign countries while the Pentagon is anxious to stay in control.

Critics of the Bush Administration's neo-conservative wing, which dominates the Pentagon, say that its ranks are anxious to build a new Iraq in the image of the United States, using Westernised Iraqi exiles such as Ahmed Chalabi, a favourite of the Pentagon who is disliked by the State Department. The differences over how to involve Mr Chalabi, the Iraqi opposition leader, have raged for months.

Meanwhile, General Powell and Mr Blair are trying to secure a prominent role for the United Nations in an attempt to avoid further alienating US allies in Europe. State Department moderates are hoping that Mr Blair can repeat his apparent diplomatic success in keeping the Middle East peace process high up on President Bush's priority list by getting him to intervene in the State Department-Pentagon spat.

The official said Mr Blair wanted an international flavour for the postwar phase in Iraq "and that naturally means a larger role for the State Department". Foreign-aid experts have written to Mr Bush asking him to invite the UN to appoint a humanitarian co-ordinator for Iraq.

Mr Blair supports the State Department position that the UN should play a prominent role in Iraq.

Foreign Reports BULLETIN April 2, 2003
POST-WAR BATTLES

There are abundant signs that Iraqi forces are losing their will to fight as U.S. forces meet little resistance in their advance on Baghdad and as more elements of the population in the rear turn cooperative rather than hostile.

While war always contains surprises, the battle over the future of post-war Iraq is also clearly intensifying. Within the Bush Administration there is wrangling over what would be the "right kind" of American officials to help run post-war Iraq, with the Pentagon rejecting a list of eight current and former foreign service officers put forward by the State Department. The hawks in the Pentagon apparently want their buddies and intellectual soul-mates to have the key jobs of "civilian advisors" to post-war Iraqi ministries, with the State Department favoring Arabists with regional experience.

These "civilian advisor" jobs would fall under retired General Jay Garner, now staying at a beachfront villa in Kuwait. Garner has already assembled a staff of some 100 people to plan how the new Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance will run post-war Iraq. The plan is to set up an Interim Iraqi Authority as soon as possible. The civilian advisors will be calling the shots, just as Britain's colonial "political advisors" did in Iraq from 1918-1932. It's not clear whether the fight over who gets these jobs is just ideological. Some British colonial political advisors amassed large fortunes on the side. They may have gone into colonial service to do good, it was said, but they also did very well indeed.

The Pentagon hawks may have received a setback yesterday in Congress, when Appropriations Committees in both the House and the Senate voted to give the State Department and other agencies authority over \$2.5 billion in post-war aid which the Administration has wanted the Pentagon to be in charge of. The aid is part of the emergency supplemental covering the cost of the war.

Garner visited the port of Umm Qasr yesterday for the first time. He promised to provide Iraq with "a form of government that represents the freely elected will of the people" and to do that "as fast as we can."

Umm Qasr is the only place in Iraq now under sufficient U.S. and British control for these forces to start the job of getting Iraqis back to work. The port employed some 5,000 people before the war. The British have just begun to locate some former workers and supervisors there?the top jobs were held by Ba'ath party members who have fled for good?and have hired a handful of these as recruiters for the prevailing wage of \$36 per month, to be paid in cash dollars with packs of cigarettes in advance. One of these recruiters said he needed 200 more packs of cigarettes to get his former colleagues to overcome their fear of Saddam death threats and show up for job interviews and screening. Umm Qasr, therefore, may be a micro-model of the vast job which Garner and his crew will face once the war is over.

Both inside and outside of Iraq, Iraqis are also positioning themselves for the post-war situation, either taking steps which they hope will end up in their group being blessed and anointed as a new leadership by one or more factions in Washington, or by planning more long-term political strategies. The Iraqi National Congress (INC), headed by Ahmed Chelabi, favored by the hawks in the Pentagon and distrusted by the State Department and the CIA, late last week announced the formation of an interim government in a statement issued out of Kurdistan and signed by Chelabi, rival Kurdish leaders Massoud Barzani

and Jalal Talabani, and the Iranian-backed opposition leader Bakr Hakim. Chelabi would like Garner to anoint him as the head of the Interim Iraqi Authority and then become the country's permanent leader.

In London, Iraq's well-respected 80-year-old former Foreign Minister Adnan Pachachi, who left the country to become an advisor to Abu Dhabi's Sheikh Zaid after Saddam came to power, is speaking out in the press and reaching out to other Iraqi exile leaders, including the intellectual Laith Kubba, an early architect of the INC who split with Chelabi because of the latter's authoritarian and egotistical tendencies. The State Department "discovered" Pachachi as a Chelabi alternative last summer. Pachachi would be very wary of assuming an interim role under Garner.

Pachachi is the quintessential representative of what old-line Iraqis call "good family." These "good families," or older social upper classes, come from the Sunni, the Shi'a and the Kurds and have their origins either as landed or merchant aristocratic families. The distinctions between the landed and merchant families and between Sunni, Shi'a and Kurd faded under the monarchy (1932-1958), partly as a result of intermarriage. During the monarchy, some were in the service of the King, while most participated actively in the parliamentary life of the country. The Shi'a Kubbas, for example, were originally a silk-trading merchant family from the South. The Pachachis were merchants. Besides former Foreign Minister Adnan Pachachi, two other family members served as Prime Minister, four others served at various times in the Parliament, and thirteen were appointed to ministerial posts.

Many of these families were eclipsed from power as Saddam's grip on power increased; others financed the early Ba'athists; some members of these good families hold ministerial posts today; some helped develop his nuclear program; while others from the same family ran their businesses in Iraq or became exiles. Now, a number of these families inside and outside of Iraq are putting together the organization of a post-war political party to be called the Iraqi Republican Party. They aim to create their party based on issues, to organize it at the grass-roots level, and to have a political platform which can unite Iraqis on issues rather than on personality cults or semblances of ethnic and sectarian balance. On economic matters, they have a strong emphasis on free enterprise, attracting foreign investment, a judicial system which doesn't discriminate between foreigners and citizens and protects property rights, including intellectual, and a nondiscriminatory tax policy. Since all foreign trade in Iraq was nationalized in 1964, they have a blank slate on which to create a new private sector economy within Iraq and wish to do so in a way which would make early Iraqi accession to the WTO possible. They want to be ready to field slates of candidates for the first elections, rather than accept interim appointments by Garner?although they too are doing their best to liaise with Garner.

All of these plans depend first and foremost on how the war unfolds and then on whether or not order and security can be established. Otherwise, the natural tendency in the country will be for the situation to devolve into chaos, looting, and civil war, punctuated by anti-occupation resistance.

Washington Post
April 3, 2003
Pg. 22

After The War

The weekend before the war started, President Bush signed on to a statement with British Prime Minister Tony Blair pledging to "work in close partnership with international institutions, including the United Nations," in postwar Iraq and to seek a Security Council resolution to "endorse an appropriate post-conflict administration." Yet a secretive Pentagon-led group is already far advanced in plans to unilaterally install a postwar regime dominated by Americans and Iraqi exiles -- one that would effectively exclude not only the United Nations but also European and Middle Eastern allies whose support will be essential to stabilizing the country. Even the State Department's nominees would be shut out by Defense Department leaders who talk of leaping from military rule to an interim Iraqi government in 90 days with the help of the American officials who would run Iraqi ministries. This narrow approach could compound the diplomatic damage of the war and expose the United States and its soldiers to large and unnecessary risks.

Few dispute that a U.S. military administration will be needed immediately after the conflict, and administration officials are right that Iraq should be turned over to Iraqis as quickly as possible. The problem with the Pentagon's emerging approach is that it would structure this supposedly limited military regime in such a way as to concentrate control over the subsequent political transition in U.S. hands, effectively limiting international participation to providing a nominal blessing or working in a subordinate technical capacity. It would make virtually inevitable an Iraqi transitional government dominated by the small group of exiles long favored by the Pentagon. Some administration officials appear to believe they can impose this scheme over the protests of allies but still count on U.N. humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping contributions that would allow an early withdrawal of most U.S. troops.

The Security Council's failure to follow through on its own resolutions on Iraq and the irresponsible obstructionism of allies such as France might seem to justify that course. Yet Mr. Bush rightly pledged to seek the repair of alliances and of the United Nations after the war, and the Pentagon's plan would surely deepen the rifts. Even a parting with Britain could not be ruled out; Mr. Blair has made U.N. involvement in postwar Iraq the centerpiece of his own political strategy. An isolated United States might find little help in feeding or policing Iraq's 23 million people, while being condemned across the Middle East as an occupying power. The Pentagon's Iraqi friends could quickly come to be regarded as quislings and puppets. U.S. forces could find themselves the targets of resistance and terrorism, while any hope of postwar progress on an Israeli-Palestinian settlement could disappear.

A better model is readily available. Mr. Blair is proposing that the United Nations convene a conference to decide on the formation of a transitional government -- like the one that led to an Afghan administration after the ouster of the Taliban. The United States inevitably would have a major influence in shaping that administration, just as it did the Afghan regime, but the U.N. umbrella would give the process far greater legitimacy. It would also open the way for international participation in reconstruction and peacekeeping, as in Afghanistan, and allow for U.N. as well as American technical help in rebuilding institutions. It could provide a platform for repairing U.S. relationships with countries such as Germany; even France, which has threatened to obstruct Security Council agreement on a postwar administration, has signaled its willingness to work with the British formula. Mr. Bush said, on that prewar weekend, that he understands "incredible international cooperation" is needed to manage the threats of the 21st century. Postwar Iraq may determine whether the United States regains that

11-L-0559/OSD/20960

cooperation -- or embarks on a dangerous unilateral course.

11- L-0559/OSD/20961

New York Times

March 15, 2003

Page A1

Bush Promises To Adopt Plan For the Mideast

By: Steven R. Weisman

President Bush, yielding to pressure from Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain, promised today to adopt a long-deferred plan for a Palestinian state as soon as the Palestinians choose a new prime minister, which could happen as soon as next week.

In a hastily scheduled announcement that followed several days of urgent negotiations between the White House and Mr. Blair, Mr. Bush said the United States would soon publish the peace plan, known as a road map, and then serve as an "active partner" in carrying it out.

"We have reached a hopeful moment for progress toward the vision of Middle Eastern peace that I outlined last June," Mr. Bush said in the Rose Garden this morning. "There can be no peace for either side in the Middle East unless there is freedom for both. Reaching that destination will not be easy, but we can see the way forward."

The White House has for months resisted formal adoption of the plan, in part because of objections by Israel, whose cooperation is needed in the event of a war with Iraq. Washington is pressing Israel not to retaliate if it is attacked, something Israeli leaders say they cannot agree to.

Mr. Blair and others have demanded publication of the peace plan to quell the anger throughout the Arab world over the Bush administration's perceived focus on Iraq to the exclusion of the creation of a Palestinian state, the cause the Arabs consider paramount.

In a sign that the announcement had been coordinated with London, moments after Mr. Bush announced his acceptance of the plan, Mr. Blair emerged to hail it. He said the announcement showed "the obligation of even-handedness" on the eve of a possible war to free Iraq from tyranny.

Mr. Bush said adoption of the plan was made possible when the Palestinians moved last weekend to establish the office of prime minister to take over many of the functions of Yasir Arafat, the Palestinian leader.

Mahmoud Abbas, a moderate, is slated to get the job and become the chief negotiator with Israel. Both Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel and Mr. Bush have said they would no longer deal with Mr. Arafat on peace talks.

Mr. Bush's statement was a sudden counterpoint to the talk of war that has been dominating Washington for weeks, as criticism has mounted in Europe and the Muslim world that the United States was offering no hope to the Palestinians.

Only a week ago, administration officials said there would be no adoption of the peace plan until after the Iraq issue was settled. But Mr. Blair never stopped pressing for it, especially as critics at home battered him over the United States' apparent lack of interest in the subject.

In making his announcement, Mr. Blair did something that Mr. Bush pointedly avoided. He telephoned Mr. Arafat -- a sign that the British and perhaps other Europeans had not written him off. Many experts say that despite Mr. Abbas's selection, Mr. Arafat remained likely to call the shots in any negotiation.

Mr. Bush made clear that the American position was that Mr. Arafat would have to step aside. "To be a credible and responsible partner, the new Palestinian prime minister must hold a position of real authority," he said.

Administration officials said Mr. Bush was hoping that by endorsing the plan now the United States could nudge events along, enhancing Mr. Abbas's stature.

"There will be a constant struggle between the prime minister and Arafat," a senior administration official said. "That means that people who want this to work, and who want the prime minister to gain power as the months go by, have got to support this move. We want to help make it work."

Mr. Bush's announcement was seen as a victory -- a surprising one, in the view of many -- for both Mr. Blair and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, who has pushed for adoption of the plan since last fall. Mr. Powell also was said to feel strongly that it was necessary to put it forward to quell the anger toward the United States in the Muslim world.

Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage said at a State Department staff meeting today that the announcement marked a tremendous victory for Mr. Powell over those in the administration who resisted the peace plan's adoption, in part because of Prime Minister Sharon's antipathy toward it.

To prepare for the announcement, the White House held long meetings this week with aides to Mr. Sharon.

The Israeli leader has taken the public view that the peace plan is acceptable as a concept. Privately, he has told many visitors of his disdain for its particulars, especially the role the European Union, Russia and the United Nations played in drafting it over the last year.

Israel does not want the Europeans, especially, to help in carrying out the plan, a seven-page document calling for reciprocal steps over three years leading to the creation of a Palestinian state.

While the Palestinians are to replace Mr. Arafat and curb terrorism, Israel is supposed to withdraw its forces from Palestinian areas, ease curbs on movement and employment of Palestinian civilians and, eventually, end and even pull back on Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza.

Administration officials said the decision to publish the plan was made final in the last several days.

Mr. Bush was said to have promised Mr. Blair in late January that he would formally adopt the plan before any war with Iraq. But that promise looked as if it would not be fulfilled, despite rising political problems for Mr. Blair, until the Palestinians acted on the prime minister's post last weekend.

Subsequently, Mr. Arafat tried to weaken the powers of the prime minister, and members of the Palestinian Legislative Council pushed back. It was then, an official said, that Mr. Powell and Mr. Blair pressed the White House for action.

"If we had not had these credible steps by the Palestinian Legislative Council, clearly over Arafat's objections, we would not have been able to do what we did today," an administration official said.

The president's announcement today seemed to reflect the hasty, frantic and improvisational atmosphere surrounding administration decisions on Iraq in recent weeks.

Just as the White House has shifted positions on whether to ask for a vote on a second United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq, so Mr. Bush swerved suddenly this week on the Middle East.

To the Israelis, the most important statement Mr. Bush has made on the subject came last June 24, when he embraced the concept of a Palestinian state living side by side with Israel, but also rejected once and for all the idea of negotiating such a state with Mr. Arafat.

Various drafts of the plan since then have been seen by both sides on an informal basis. The main partners working on the language have been the United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations secretary general, Kofi Annan -- known collectively as the quartet.

Though the document is fairly detailed, Israel is concerned about certain ambiguities in the language that might require it to withdraw its forces and take other concrete steps in return for mere commitments by the Palestinians to end violence.

The Bush administration says it is highly sympathetic to these concerns and, until today, has said they should be incorporated in the document before it is published.

Today Mr. Bush shifted slightly, saying changes in the document could be made after it was published.

Another focus of Israeli concern is the quartet as a concept. Israelis say pointedly that they do not want the same people who think Iraq is cooperating with arms inspections to determine whether Palestinians are easing up on attacks on Israelis.

One of the vaguest parts of the peace plan is when, and how extensively, any "settlement activity" must end in what the plan calls the "occupied territories." Mr. Sharon has said Israel would make painful concessions for peace, but it is not clear that he would be willing to dismantle more than a tiny fraction of the settlements.

Mr. Bush did not clarify his position today. American officials say the action on settlements would be a phased-in policy to be negotiated in the future, and that Palestinians must first end their violence.

Officials insisted that Mr. Bush would remain sensitive to Israeli concerns at all times, even as he desired to capture the moment when the Palestinians seemed ready to reduce Mr. Arafat's power.

"If it were not for the situation the Palestinians created, I do not believe the president would have made this move," an administration official said. "What caught his eye was the chance to move the ball forward. That changed his appreciation of how he could make a contribution. He came to the conclusion that we could actually do some good."

Washington Post
March 27, 2003
Pg. 21

'Road Map' For Colin Powell

By Richard Cohen

For a time this week I was "embedded" in Secretary of State Colin Powell's office at the State Department. I use the media-military term of the moment because as war is being waged in Iraq, Powell is planning some campaigns of his own. One of them -- maybe the most important -- is to take the Israelis and the Palestinians and knock their heads together. It's about time.

The Bush administration is already on record as favoring the creation of a Palestinian state. It is already on record as demanding that Israel cease building West Bank settlements -- and dismantle some existing ones. It is on record for doing all the right things. Trouble is, it has done none of them.

The failure to deal forthrightly and, in the argot of Washington, robustly with Ariel Sharon and his right-wing government has cost America plenty in the Middle East. The United States is seen as unabashedly in Sharon's corner, which in fact it has been. Only recently has the administration said it is serious about getting -- "imposing" is probably the better word -- a plan to end the incessant violence between Israelis and Palestinians.

Before the Israelis and the Palestinians can get their act together, however, the Bush administration will have to do the same. At the moment, the State Department, which used to conduct American foreign policy, has been outgunned by the Pentagon, the National Security Council (now with Elliott Abrams) and Dick Cheney, a vice president with very strong views about the Middle East. Suffice it to call them pro-Sharon.

For this reason, a certain amount of skepticism is in order. So I asked Powell who besides him in the administration favored a plan that would mean going to the mat with Sharon. "The president," he responded quickly. I asked if he was certain of that.

"Yeah, I just left him 30 minutes ago and we talked about it," Powell said. "Because I know what some people in the administration think. I also know that there are some, not in the administration but outside, who are saying that he [Bush] wouldn't have done this but for Tony Blair. . . . But he understands that the whole world is going to be looking to him to do something about the Middle East once Iraq has been dealt with."

The plan is referred to as the "road map," and it asks a lot of both parties. The Palestinians would have to end terrorism -- a course already advocated by the new Palestinian prime minister, a moderate named Mahmoud Abbas.

Still, Yasser Arafat remains the effective head of state and in charge of "national security." Whether he can or will crack down on Hamas and other terrorist outfits remains to be seen. Even with the best of intentions -- and who knows Arafat's intentions? -- the Palestinian Authority may now have been so weakened that its wish will be nobody's command.

As for Sharon, it's questionable whether his right-wing coalition will even consider the emotional issue of dismantling settlements -- or even if Sharon himself would want to. The Israeli leader is a truculent

11-L-0559/OSD/20966

sort who is not given to understatement. After Bush invited Arab and Muslim nations to join the United States in the war against terrorism, Sharon likened that to "the dreadful mistake of 1938" when Czechoslovakia was thrown to Nazi Germany -- in other words, appeasement. Sharon apologized -- but it was the statement, not the apology, that came from his heart.

In the Arab world, not to mention Europe, the settlements are representative of alleged Israeli oppression and belligerence. Some of this rhetoric is overheated and tinged with anti-Semitism, but there is no doubt that the seizure of Arab land and the creeping enlargement of Israel into an area forbidden by international law is winning the Jewish state few friends -- not that it had all that many to begin with.

Powell is determined to bring Israelis and Palestinians back to where they once were -- oh so close to an agreement. But Sharon is sure to stall, issuing excuse after excuse as he eyes America's political calendar. As the presidential election nears, it could be Karl Rove as much as Colin Powell who will be making Middle East policy.

The longer the plan is delayed, the less likely it will succeed. Powell, after all, may not stick around for a second term. Given the makeup of Bush's inner circle, his successor might be someone even to the right of Sharon.

So it is up to Bush to put his money where his mouth has been. If Powell is going to be able to crack heads in the Middle East, Bush must first crack heads in his own administration.

April 7, 2003 10:27 AM

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: OPM Response

Here is the letter David Chu got from Kay James of OPM that was discussed in the meeting. You will recall this involved our desire to rapidly hire some Arabic linguists. After you read this, I think you will see what the problem is.

Thanks for your help.

Regards,

Attach.
2/25/03 Director, OPM, ltr to USD(P&R)

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11-L-0559/OSD/20968



OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
WASHINGTON, DC 20415-1000

FEB 25 2003

The Honorable David S.C. Chu
Under Secretary of Defense
For Personnel and Readiness
4000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-4000

Dear Dr. Chu:

The employment of non-citizens is an important policy issue for the Nation. In recognition of the related national defense issues, I am approving a request submitted by your Deputy Under Secretary for Civilian Personnel Policy. This approval will allow you to appoint non-citizen, Arabic linguists when qualified U.S. citizens are not available.

This letter amends your Interagency Delegated Examining agreement and provides the authority for the Department of Defense (DoD) to approve the hiring of non-citizens under Schedule A 213.3102(bb). This authority can assist DoD in its efforts to recruit Arabic-speaking individuals needed for linguistic support.

In order to use the Schedule A 213.3102(bb) authority, you must first use competitive examining procedures (including public notice). If you find no qualified citizens available to fill the competitive service position, and if the individual meets the requirements of Immigration Law (i.e., authorized to live and work in the United States), you may hire the non-citizen under 5 CFR 213.3102 (bb). When filling a position in this manner, you must withdraw it from the competitive service for the period it is filled by the non-citizen. The excepted appointment does not give the employee eligibility for any other job. He or she may not be promoted or reassigned to a position in the competitive service, except in situations where a qualified citizen is not available and another Schedule A appointment is used. In these situations, you must apply competitive procedures again.

When granting approval under the Schedule A 213.3102(bb) authority, you must ensure that the search of all likely recruitment sources for qualified U.S. citizens was both diligent and thorough. In practical terms, this means looking beyond just the vacancy announcement and length of time it was posted. You should also give consideration to whether the agency or component conducted any targeted recruitment efforts (e.g., in trade journals, among the faculty of colleges and universities, in communities, etc.).

11-L-0559/OSD/20969

Dr. David S.C. Chu

2

In addition to the Schedule A 213.3102(bb) authority, you have several options for hiring individuals with Arab language and culture skills. Options for hiring U.S. citizens with these skills include:

1. Competitive examining;
2. The Federal Career Intern Program;
3. The Student Career Experience Program;
4. 213.3102(r), which allows you to hire individuals in fellowship and intern programs such as the National Security Education Program (NSEP). This program awards fellowships to graduate students to study less commonly studied foreign areas, languages, and other international fields critical to U.S. national security. NSEP fellows are required to work for the Federal government or in the field of higher education--in an area related to the study funded by NSEP; or
5. Contracting with private firms for these services.

In your search for individuals with the required language skills, I strongly encourage you to first consider all available sources of Arabic-speaking U.S. citizens. In the event you do not find any Arabic-speaking U.S. citizens, additional options for hiring non-citizens with language skills include:

1. 213.3102(o), which allows you to appoint bona fide faculty members for up to 130 working days per year to scientific, professional, or analytical positions;
2. Hiring these individuals as experts under 5 CFR 304; or
3. 213.3102(i)(2), which allows you to make 30 day appointments when a critical need exists, pending completion of competitive examining, clearances, etc. Agencies may extend these appointments for an additional 30 days.

The Office of Personnel Management is pleased to assist DoD in its efforts to partner with the Arab-American community as a way to combat terrorism. If you have any questions, please have your staff contact Ms. Ellen E. Tunstall at (b)(6)

Sincerely,


Kay Coles James
Director

BCC: VICEPRESIDENT

April 7, 2003 7:29 AM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA,
SUBJECT: Embassy in Iraq

Attached is a press report suggesting that the U.S. is planning to set up an embassy in Baghdad. That, of course, makes sense—eventually.

However, as you and I know, and as I thought we had all agreed, there will be no ambassador and no embassy, until such time as we have all considered it and the President decides it is time. Any consulate responsibilities that need to be performed will be performed by a group of State Department people working for Jay Garner, as was agreed.

Please make sure there is no mistake about this. We cannot afford to slip into the Afghanistan model.

Thanks.

Attach.

4/3/03 AFP wire story: "Baghdad Hotel Chosen as Site for Temporary U.S. Embassy in Post-Saddam Iraq"

DIIR:dh
040503-7

W00384-03

11-L-0559/OSD/20971

Revised table

Norwood, Scott, COL, CIV-OUSSDP

From: Alert - ORHA [alert@rendon.com]
Sent: Thursday, April 03, 2003 2:40 PM
To: alert@rendon.com
Subject: Baghdad hotel chosen as site for temporary US embassy in post-Saddam Iraq (1425 EST)

>> PLEASE NOTE: THIS INFORMATION HAS NOT BEEN VALIDATED BUT IS RUNNING
>> ON THE WIRES <<

Baghdad hotel chosen as site for temporary US embassy in post-Saddam Iraq

WASHINGTON, April 3 (AFP) - The United States will set up a new, temporary embassy in post-war Iraq at a Baghdad hotel it plans to lease and renovate, two senior State Department officials said Thursday, as US troops continued their advance on the Iraqi capital.

US President George W. Bush has asked Congress for 20 million dollars to rent, refurbish and secure the site, and the officials said they expected the interim embassy to be up and running shortly after Saddam Hussein has been ousted.

"We have actually identified a hotel which would provide interim office capability plus quarters for a limited number of people we would have there initially," said Under Secretary of State for Management Grant Green.

Neither Green nor Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who were testifying before a House budget subcommittee, gave specifics about which hotel had been chosen as the site.

But they defended the decision to lease a temporary facility instead of immediately purchasing a site and starting to construct a new embassy, saying the use of the hotel would be more effective in the short term.

In addition to the 20 million dollars for the interim mission, Bush asked Congress last week for 35.8 million dollars for a new, well-fortified embassy in the longer term.

Armitage told the subcommittee that the cost of that facility would jump by another 137 million dollars as the department moves to ensure it meets security standards imposed after the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

About 200 US officials from the State Department and other government agencies are eventually expected to work out of the new, permanent embassy in Baghdad which Washington hopes to be in operation within five years, Armitage said.

"One would hope after this that perhaps we wouldn't have to take five years to negotiate with the new Iraqi authorities," he said.

It remained unclear whether the permanent embassy would be located on the site of the former mission, built in the late 1940s, which Armitage said was not in particularly good condition when the last US diplomats left Baghdad ahead of the 1991 Gulf War.

The high cost of the embassy is due to security requirements "commensurate with the threat level" in Baghdad, which is expected to be high for some time after the war is over, State Department officials said last week.

In addition to construction costs, the money will go toward the purchase and installation of barriers around the perimeter, closed-circuit television cameras, video equipment, bomb detection devices and armored vehicles, they said.

The new embassy will also be equipped with state-of-the-art chemical and biological weapons counter-measures, and it will be patrolled by a "US surveillance detection team" as well as local guards, the officials said.

--
Privileged and Confidential:

April 10, 2003 11:12 AM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA

SUBJECT: TotalFinaElf

Here is the piece on TotalFinaElf that was mentioned in this morning's meeting.

Attach.

4/9/03 AFP wire story: "TotalFinaElf Boss Wants Role in Post-war Iraq"

DHR.dh
041003-13

W00398-03

11-L-0559/OSD/20973

Subject: TotalFinaElf boss wants role in post-war Iraq (0557 EST)

>> PLEASE NOTE: THIS INFORMATION HAS NOT BEEN VALIDATED BUT IS RUNNING >> ON THE WIRES <<

TotalFinaElf boss wants role in post-war Ira

qBRUSSELS, April 9 (AFP) - French oil giant TotalFinaElf staked its claim Wednesday to a role in rebuilding Iraq once the dust settles from the US-led war.

In an interview with Belgian newspaper L'Echo, TotalFinaElf chairman Thierry Desmarest said "international law must be respected" when the United States hands out reconstruction contracts.

"Calls for international tenders must be launched to determine who will take part in the reconstruction and the development," he said.

Desmarest said TotalFinaElf holds the "trump cards" in Iraq's oil industry with drilling concessions in the southern region of Bassorah.

"In this respect, we're a year ahead of our main competitors in terms of technical expertise," he said.

Desmarest denied that his company had fallen victim to any anti-French sentiment in the United States over the Iraq war, which Paris along with other capitals such as Moscow has staunchly opposed.

French and Russian companies led the way in forging contracts with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's government, before a United Nations embargo imposed after the 1991 Gulf War.

Washington appears in no mood to let such companies back in to the lucrative business of rebuilding Iraq now that Saddam's regime appears on the way out.


"Our leadership follows this logic: it's unlikely someone will give you a piece of the pie if you didn't help bake it," Robert Ebel, a top energy analyst at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, said in an interview with the Russian business daily Kommersant Wednesday.

~~PERSONAL~~/SENSITIVE

April 11, 2003 5:50 PM

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Post-Iraq

Attached is something that was drafted by a friend of mine. I would appreciate it if you would take an opportunity to look at it over the weekend.

If you have any questions or comments, I would be happy to discuss it with you.

Very respectfully,

Attach.
"Getting Post-Iraq Right"

DIR dh
041103-23

I am available on
the phone to discuss this
SAT. & SUN. -
Don

Iraq

11 APR 03

~~PERSONAL~~/SENSITIVE

W00403-03

11-L-0559/OSD/20975

Getting Post-Iraq Right

When the military phase of the President's Iraq policy is complete, it is essential that the strategy move through its final phase as quickly and effectively as possible. Since the diplomatic first phase has fallen short in achieving a broadly-based consensus for action, success in phase three is critical not only to the people of Iraq and the region, but also to the viability of his basic strategy across the globe. If the only successful phase of the three was the one conducted by force, American and human values will not prosper.

This paper explores why the President's appointment of Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz for the leadership role in phase three may be essential to make the overall strategy in a success in Iraq and a publicly acceptable alternative in the future.

What are the rewards of success after phase three?

- The President's vision and agenda are vindicated.
- The strategy becomes the dominant model for the creation of a Palestinian state, enhancing the likelihood of Palestinian support for resolution of the conflict.
- World permission for the next steps in the global war on terror becomes achievable – Saudi Arabia and Egyptian governmental support, Syrian constraint, Hisbollah's elimination of its military arm, Iranian overthrow.
- America's stature for its strategy to bring Russia, Japan, and South Korea into the solution for North Korea is enhanced.
- Similar stature can be expected to be able to involve other additional governments and stronger efforts in on-going support for free Iraq and Afghanistan

What are the benchmarks of success specific to phase three?

- In the months after the shooting stops, it is essential that there be no civil war. Civil wars, rightly or wrongly, hearken back to Vietnam. The President's strategy will die in the embrace of such a comparison.
- Iraq must be disarmed. Disarmament was not an excuse for regime change. Regime change became a prerequisite for disarmament.
- War refugees must be resettled as soon as possible. Iraq must be the scene of solutions to old problems, not the creation of new ones.
- An orderly and healthy life for Iraqis must quickly be established on a self-sustainable basis.
- The oil and transportation infrastructure is nearly instantly rebuilt.
- The administration of war-related justice is perceived as fair and prompt.
- Liberation is perceived by the world to have been triggered across Iraq
- Liberation across the factions is sustained.
- The interim domestic civilian government becomes an always considered and often cherished model for the rest of liberty-desiring peoples and governments.
- Corruption is minimized internally and from outside parties offering support or doing business with Iraq.

What authority is required for a successful episode of Presidential Envoy?

The Presidential Envoy must:

- be the absolute USG authority on all Iraq questions outside of military activity.

- be a full partner to the military on their decisions with SecDef as arbiter as needed.
- report to the President if possible and the SecDef as only other option.
- Should provide structural authority to sign contracts, directives, etc., as necessary.
- must have total personnel authority for all decisions in all directions with access to all appropriate choices at all times, particularly personnel

Why the Presidential Envoy should be DepSecDef Wolfowitz

- The very appointment of Paul provides clarity to the world of the President's vision for freedom and the unacceptability of terrorism.
- Paul's appointment will remove any ambiguity within the Administration so that all forces within the government will be able to focus more on the job and less on their own visions of the world, particularly traditional Department of State resistance to seeking change in the region. Paul's appointment belies the structural suggestions that this is a DOS function despite the technical role of DOS. This assignment cannot be their function in reality because the role must be to execute the President's strategy, not their strategy. As important, the execution of the proper strategy is not within their capability for three reasons:
 - It is not among their skills. DOS personnel do not have sufficient contracting or executive experience.
 - It is not their professional style, which is centered on the roles of discussion, reportage and diplomacy.
 - Their experience is not in the arena of joint efforts with the military.

- Paul has the confidence of the President, the Vice President and SecDef.
- Structurally, Paul is appropriate for three other reasons:
 - He has all of the necessary authority in his current position.
 - He has familiar access to all of the necessary resources.
 - Paul will attract the best talent within and without the government to help address the challenge of creating the peace.
- But perhaps most important and exclusive to Paul personally are the facts that he enjoys the widest support among Iraqi's. To say that *he* is not essential could be seen as saying that *they* are not important. Since some policy-makers are, correctly or incorrectly, seen as believing that point, his choice would unequivocally demonstrate that the importance of the Iraqi Diaspora is, indeed, central. He is the best long-term symbol of the overall strategy.
- His presence would adamantly assert the clarity and commitment to the President's policies.
- His being Jewish is a plus: it is a reminder that this is not a war against a religion, it is a clear signal that the position is temporary, and that the former Ambassador of the world largest Muslim nation for three years has experience in being culturally sensitive.

April 14, 2003 2:12 PM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ⁷

It looks as though DoS is putting the Inspector General on Chalabi.

Attach.

"Smearing Mr. Chalabi," *Wall Street Journal*, April 10, 2003.

DHR:dh
041403-19

Iran

11/11/03

W00412 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20980



April 10, 2003

REVIEW & OUTLOOK

Smearing Mr. Chalabi

Iraqis cheered U.S. troops yesterday in the streets of Baghdad. But they might be disappointed to learn what some Americans really think about the prospects for Iraqi democracy. We raise that issue after watching much of the federal bureaucracy, and its media echo chamber, deride Ahmed Chalabi and his Iraqi National Congress, a coalition of Iraqis who have risked their lives opposing the despotism of Saddam Hussein.

No American official wants to admit to this view publicly, especially with President Bush promising a new government run by Iraqis themselves. But we've now found smoking-gun proof of the State Department's hostility in the form of records of meetings compiled by auditors in State's Office of Inspector General. The minutes suggest that the forces of the Middle East status quo will resist Iraqi democracy even once Saddam is history (if he isn't already).

One redolent passage, dated May 17, 2002, says that, "During the meeting, Ms. [Yael] Lempert stated that NEA would appreciate any assistance the OIG could provide with NEA's desire to 'shut down the INC.'" The NEA is State's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, and the hand holder of Egypt and Saudi Arabia and other Middle East despotisms.

According to the notes, the Inspector General's office replied that it would "do a 'by the book' audit as always" and "report accordingly." The INC would later receive a clean bill of health from the OIG, which opined publicly that it was "impossible" for the INC to comply with various State demands. The auditors also document a number of other apparent NEA attempts to influence the audit process, noting that NEA was "violating" government rules and "the possible lack of independence and conflict of interest that can occur when the grants officers report to Bureau management."

In any event, the Near East Bureau had no authority to "shut down the INC." In 1998, Congress passed, and Bill Clinton signed, the Iraq Liberation Act. The act made "regime change" the policy of the U.S. government and appropriated \$97 million for the Iraqi opposition. But these papers make clear that State went to unusual lengths to avoid implementing the law.

This is all highly relevant now because of the growing smear campaign against Mr. Chalabi and the fight over the future of Iraq. Numerous news stories are repeating the unsubstantiated allegations (financial impropriety, no support in Iraq) that State and the CIA have been peddling about the INC for years. And our media colleagues are swallowing the stories hook, line and sinker.

Their credulity is all about guilt by association. Mr. Chalabi must be bad news because "hawks" like Dick Cheney, Don Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz have taken the time to get to know him and actually like him. As for the State Department, it will never forgive Mr. Chalabi and his allies for helping to persuade the Bush Administration of an Iraq policy that the diplomats never supported. Having failed to stop the war, State is now trying to hijack the peace.

Besmirching Mr. Chalabi's reputation is only part of the strategy. Another appears to be wresting control of Iraqi reconstruction funds. Though Mr. Bush had wanted to be able to spend such money without

restrictions, both houses of Congress voted last week to keep a whopping \$2.5 billion in reconstruction aid away from the Defense Department, with the House version specifying it be controlled by Colin Powell and his deputy, Richard Armitage. (The bills were being reconciled in a House-Senate conference yesterday.)

Senior State Department officials deny rumors they played a role in Congress's decision to deny the President's request for flexibility. "No calls were made by me. No lobbying was done by me. This is complete [expletive]. I testified on behalf of the President's submission," Deputy Secretary Armitage told us.

But the documents we received show that State hasn't been above such underhanded games on this issue in the past. They were leaked by an official aghast that State would be entrusted with such responsibility given its record on Iraq.

Mr. Armitage's name comes up repeatedly. "Deputy Secretary makes all decisions," one Near East Affairs staffer is quoted as saying of the Bureau's policy on the INC. "Ms. Lempert stated that D (Deputy Secretary Armitage) instructed NEA to issue the last three grant amendments" restricting funding for the INC, says the account of another meeting. At bottom the motivation seems to be a simple policy disagreement. "If the INC were allowed to operate inside Iraq, they would start a war," someone from NEA is paraphrased as saying.

These shenanigans began during the Clinton Administration, when despite the Iraq Liberation Act there was no clear direction from the top. But the fact that they continued after President Bush had set a firm policy of disarming Saddam amounts to insubordination. It speaks volumes about who should be entrusted with rebuilding a post-Saddam Iraq.

State's Near East Affairs Bureau has always been a force for preserving the region's despotic status quo. And now that Saddam's regime is on the way out, NEA bureaucrats would prefer to see him replaced by ex-Baathists more amenable to their friends in the Saudi and Egyptian foreign ministries. We're not saying the U.S. should anoint Mr. Chalabi or any individual as the next Iraqi leader. But State and the CIA seem less afraid of Saddam than of real democrats who could set a new example and exert pressure for change throughout the Middle East.

If Mr. Bush means what he says about a democratic Iraq, the last thing he should want is State's hands on the purse strings. If the war supplemental arrives on his desk with Foggy Bottom in control of Iraqi reconstruction, he would be well-advised to consider a veto.

URL for this article:

<http://online.wsj.com/article/0..SB104993585923623700.00.html>

Updated April 10, 2003

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11-L-0559/OSD/20982

April 14, 2003 2:11 PM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

It looks like they are at it again.

Attach.

Novak, Robert D. "Colin Powell's Burden," *Washington Post*, April 10, 2003, p. 29

DHR:dh
041403-18

copy to PPW

14 Apr 03

W00416 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20983

Colin Powell's Burden

By Robert D. Novak

Arab government officials and military officers, visiting the Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies in Washington last week, frantically asked their American hosts if Iraq was only the beginning of U.S. military intervention in their region. What worried them was the kind of American rhetoric that they had been hearing and that was to be used three days later by a prominent Pentagon adviser who publicly declared World War IV.

It also worries the secretary of state. For all the chatter over whether the State Department or the Defense Department will dominate postwar Iraq, what really concerns Colin Powell is broader policy after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. Does the United States intend a series of military interventions throughout the Arab world, or will it try to restore this country's tattered international standing?

Friends of Powell say he puts a high priority on improving spoiled multilateral relationships. While he views rifts with France and Germany as reparable, he knows that the image of the United States in the rest of the world has never been so poor. That is of no great concern at the Pentagon, where the sword is seen as mightier than public relations. But the secretary of state believes that President Bush shares his view, rather than Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's, about global American prestige.

That prestige suffers from events such as the April 3 conservative "teach-in" at the University of California at Los Angeles. Former CIA director James Woolsey announced that the United States is engaged in World War IV (the Cold War, he said, was World War III) and it will last for years. Besides Iraq and al Qaeda, he identified as America's enemies Iran's mullahs and Syria's "fascists." Woolsey went on to warn America's friends in Egypt and Saudi Arabia that they are on the wrong side in this war.

Woolsey is not just another talking head. A Democrat who was President Bill Clinton's first director of central intelligence, he is a serious person who serves on Rumsfeld's Defense Policy Board and is slated to be a minister in Iraq's military government. His rhetoric at UCLA may have been vivid, but it accurately reflects how senior Pentagon civilians think.

On NBC's "Meet the Press" Sunday, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz distanced himself from his friend Woolsey's talk of a clash of civilizations between Christendom and Islam. What he said next, however, about alleged support for Saddam Hussein's regime, did not reassure Damascus.

The Syrians, said Wolfowitz, "are doing some things they shouldn't be doing, and the sooner they stop, the better it will be for them." While the United States is now "focused on winning the war" in Iraq, he added, "I think the Syrians need to know, though, that what they do now...they'll be held accountable for." Wolfowitz's bottom line: "There's got to be change in Syria."

Support from Damascus for Saddam Hussein may be mainly rhetorical, though Israeli intelligence contends Anglo-American forces have not found weapons of mass destruction in Iraq because they have been transported to Syria. Having long urged U.S. military action to change the Iraqi regime, Israel now offers the rationale for extending military intervention in Syria.

Powell wants to modify Syrian behavior without sending in the Marines. On March 30 he warned Syria (as well as Iran) to stop supporting terrorist organizations. He issued that warning from a venue intended to display U.S.


solidarity with Israel: a meeting of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the preeminent pro-Israel lobbying organization.

That Powell, not Runisfeld, delivered this message was widely interpreted as a signal that the United States has not designated Syria as its next military target following Afghanistan and Iraq. Powell, notoriously unenthusiastic about a military solution in Iraq until the president made his decision, is not signing on to World War IV. He believes (and surely hopes) that Bush shares his outlook.

Powell puts a high premium on pursuing President Bush's road map for a Palestinian state, a prospect that evokes little enthusiasm among Pentagon civilian chiefs and even less in the Israeli government. The secretary of state considers it an essential component of U.S. foreign policy and restoration of the world's good opinion of America. That will be Colin Powell's burden in the months ahead.

April 18, 2003 7:57 AM

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Humanitarian Update

Attached is the April 15 humanitarian update. I think you will find good progress.

Have a terrific Easter weekend.

Respectfully,

Attach.
4/15/03 Humanitarian Update—POTUS Talking Points

DHR dh
041803-4

042

18 Apr 03

W00437-03

11-L-0559/OSD/20986

15 APRIL HUMANITARIAN UPDATE- POTUS TALKING POINTS

General

- Security rapidly improving: none or minimal looting in most areas; isolated engagements with paramilitary.
- Population supportive of coalition presence. However, still cautious- afraid coalition force will leave and Ba'athists will seek retribution for cooperation.
- Life approaching pre-war standards: in some areas already exceeds pre-war conditions.
- Iraqi civic leaders emerging and encouraging basic service and public safety workers to return to jobs.
- Joint coalition military and local police patrols have begun in Basrah, Baghdad, others.
- Next two weeks—Restoring electrical power is the main effort.

By key city, since we last talked.

Umm Qasr

- Population: Supportive of coalition presence. Rehired port workers.
- Water: Supplies exceed the need, even with increased population. UK agreed to rebuild 75KM water pipeline from Basrah in disrepair.
- Electricity: 100% supplied by Port Generators
- Port: Open to military traffic; dredging work begun to clear channel for deep-draft civilian ships. Stevedore Services of America arrived to take over port management from UK
- ORHA-South deployed to area: will probably set up in Basrah.
- Reestablish local civil administration next two weeks.

Basrah:

- Looting now minimal: Security situation permissive.
- Joint Iraqi and coalition military police patrols begun in the city: 300 Iraqi volunteers for security.
- Water: Supply meets need.
- Power: Restored: Lines to distribute power from Basrah to other southern cities down.
- Food supplies good. Some markets and shops open.
- Repair power distribution lines. Continue to improve services next two weeks.

An Nasiriyah:

- Security situation permissive.
- Water crisis alleviated. 3 ROWPU units operational and local water purification meeting needs of An Nasiriyah and surrounding villages.

- Electricity: Assessment conducted. Almost half of local power plant workers returned. Restart of functional turbines requires repairs to power lines from Basrah.
- No food or health care issues.
- Local leaders emerging to conduct civil administration.
- Next week- repair power system.

As Samawah:

- Security situation improving—some looting.
- Local leadership council formed. Local leaders establishing an interim police force—requesting US provide uniforms.
- Water still dependent on delivery. Supply sufficient.
- Power: Forward Engineering Support Team (FEST) assessment concluded damage more extensive than initially thought.
- Next two weeks-- repair power grid.

An Najaf:

- Security situation steadily improving. Local leaders establishing an interim police force. Kho'i murder demonstrates still a dangerous place.
- Water: Still dependent on delivery- sufficient supply.
- Power: Natural gas line between An Najaf and Basra requires inspection. Power station needs 200,000 gallons of fuel every 3-5 days to power generators until natural gas pipeline repaired. Repairs to generators and junction boxes require 5 days.
- Food supplies adequate
- Next week: Restore power.

Karbala:

- Security: Hostile, but improving. Town establishing leadership.
- Water: Water readily available. Kuwaiti Joint Red Crescent Society delivering water by convoy.
- Electric: Critical facilities running off generators. Assessment will commence when security situation improves.
- No food or medical issues reported.
- Next week- continue to stabilize security situation; assess power system requirements.

Baghdad:

- Security: Non-permissive. Looting continues at a much lower pace. Iraqi police and coalition military have begun joint patrols. Iraqi's unarmed.
- Water: Water is functioning in some parts of the city.
- Power: Most power remains down; Estimate restoration of power and water within 3-5 days.
- Engineering team, headed by a Brigadier deployed to Baghdad Saturday to tackle critical infrastructure problems.

- Food: Adequate supplies stockpiled.
- Medical: Hospitals straining under load. Power required to alleviate stress.
 - Jordan announced plans to send a field hospital to the Baghdad area in the next week.
 - Medical supplies flown into Baghdad last three nights for distribution by ICRC. ICRC resumed operations after 24 hour lapse because of security situation.
- Next two weeks: Clear pockets of enemy. Stabilize the environment to allow access and repairs to power grid. Restore power and water to city.

Tikrit

- Security: Hostile. Limited looting of regime facilities reported.
- NFI
- Next week: Establish security; Conduct HA assessments.

Mosul

- Security: Permissive. Small pockets of paramilitary remain.
- Limited looting of regime facilities. No looting in residential areas.
- Water/Electric/Food/Medical all remain at prewar conditions.
- Local leaders emerging to control population and restore civil administration.
- Next two weeks: Reestablish local civil administration.

Kirkuk

- City calm. Small residual paramilitary presence.
- Water/Electric/Food/Medical all remain at prewar conditions.
- City employees and leaders beginning to reappear
- Next two weeks: Stabilize area. Reestablish local civil administration.

Other areas; Al Kut, Baqubah, Al Hillah, Ar Ramadi; AlQaim, etc.

- Not fully assessed. Will work in turn.

April 18, 2003 7:57 AM

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FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Humanitarian Update

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DHR dh
041803-4

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- Water: Supplies exceed the need, even with increased population. UK agreed to rebuild 75KM water pipeline from Basrah in disrepair.
- Electricity: 100% supplied by Port Generators
- Port: Open to military traffic; dredging work begun to clear channel for deep-draft civilian ships. Stevedore Services of America arrived to take over port management from UK
- ORHA-South deployed to area; will probably set up in Basrah.
- Reestablish local civil administration next two weeks.

Basrah:

- Looting now minimal; Security situation permissive.
- Joint Iraqi and coalition military police patrols begun in the city; 300 Iraqi volunteers for security.
- Water: Supply meets need.
- Power: Restored; Lines to distribute power from Basrah to other southern cities down.
- Food supplies good. Some markets and shops open.
- Repair power distribution lines. Continue to improve services next two weeks.

An Nasiriyah:

- Security situation permissive.
- Water crisis alleviated. 3 ROWPU units operational and local water purification meeting needs of An Nasiriyah and surrounding villages.

- Electricity: Assessment conducted. Almost half of local power plant workers returned. Restart of functional turbines requires repairs to power lines from Basrah.
- No food or health care issues.
- Local leaders emerging to conduct civil administration.
- Next week- repair power system.

As Samawah:

- Security situation improving—some looting.
- Local leadership council formed. Local leaders establishing an interim police force--requesting US provide uniforms.
- Water still dependent on delivery. Supply sufficient.
- Power: Forward Engineering Support Team (FEST) assessment concluded damage more extensive than initially thought.
- Next two weeks-- repair power grid.

An Najaf:

- Security situation steadily improving. Local leaders establishing an interim police force. Kho'i murder demonstrates still a dangerous place.
- Water: Still dependent on delivery- sufficient supply.
- Power: Natural gas line between An Najaf and Basra requires inspection. Power station needs 200,000 gallons of fuel every 3-5 days to power generators until natural gas pipeline repaired. Repairs to generators and junction boxes require 5 days.
- Food supplies adequate
- Next week: Restore power.

Karbala:

- Security: Hostile, but improving. Town establishing leadership.
- Water: Water readily available. Kuwaiti Joint Red Crescent Society delivering water by convoy.
- Electric: Critical facilities running off generators. Assessment will commence when security situation improves.
- No food or medical issues reported.
- Next week- continue to stabilize security situation; assess power system requirements.

Baghdad:

- Security: Non-permissive. Looting continues at a much lower pace. Iraqi police and coalition military have begun joint patrols. Iraqi's unarmed.
- Water: Water is functioning in some parts of the city.
- Power: Most power remains down; Estimate restoration of power and water within 3-5 days.
- Engineering team, headed by a Brigadier deployed to Baghdad Saturday to tackle critical infrastructure problems.

- Food: Adequate supplies stockpiled.
- Medical: Hospitals straining under load. Power required to alleviate stress.
 - Jordan announced plans to send a field hospital to the Baghdad area in the next week.
 - Medical supplies flown into Baghdad last three nights for distribution by ICRC. ICRC resumed operations after 24 hour lapse because of security situation.
- Next two weeks: Clear pockets of enemy. Stabilize the environment to allow access and repairs to power grid. Restore power and water to city.

Tikrit

- Security: Hostile. Limited looting of regime facilities reported.
- NFI
- Next week: Establish security; Conduct HA assessments.

Mosul

- Security: Permissive. Small pockets of paramilitary remain.
- Limited looting of regime facilities. No looting in residential areas.
- Water/Electric/Food/Medical all remain at prewar conditions.
- Local leaders emerging to control population and restore civil administration.
- Next two weeks: Reestablish local civil administration.

Kirkuk

- City calm. Small residual paramilitary presence.
- Water/Electric/Food/Medical all remain at prewar conditions.
- City employees and leaders beginning to reappear
- Next two weeks: Stabilize area. Reestablish local civil administration.


Other areas; Al Kut, Baqubah, Al Hillah, Ar Ramadi, AlQaim, etc.

- Not fully assessed. Will work in turn.

SECRET
2003 APR 23 11 04 40

April 24, 2003 10:32 AM

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Russian Military

Attached is an interesting article from the *Moscow Times* from about two weeks ago.

The success of the campaign appears to have caught the attention of the Russian military establishment.

It is particularly interesting that two "retired" Russian generals (three-star) were directly involved in planning the Iraqi defense and, according to the article, were awarded medals by Saddam Hussein.

Respectfully,

Attach.
Felgenhauer, Pavel. "The Elite's Feeling the Heat," *Moscow Times*, April 10, 2003.

DHR:dh
042403-12

Russia

24 Apr 03

Moscow Times
April 10, 2003

The Elite's Feeling the Heat

By Pavel Felgenhauer

As the war in Iraq winds to its inevitable end, uneasy reflections are taking over Russia's political and military elite. No one in Moscow ever seriously believed that Saddam Hussein might indeed "defeat" the allied forces. But the speed and decisiveness of the offensive has bewildered many.

Russian generals were expecting another prolonged so-called non-contact war, like the one against Yugoslavia in 1999, in Afghanistan in 2001 or the first Gulf War in 1991, when a four-day ground offensive was preceded by a 39-day air bombardment. It was believed that the Americans were afraid of close hand-to-hand encounters, they would not tolerate the inevitable casualties, and that in the final analysis they were cowards who relied on technical superiority.

In the first week of the war, allied forces rapidly fanned out of Kuwait, occupied most of southern Iraq and moved deep into the central part of the country without prolonged preliminary air bombardment.

This successful blitz caused shock in Moscow. Then came news of the first U.S. casualties and prisoners, of severe sandstorms hampering movement, of increased Iraqi attacks and an overall pause in the offensive.

As the allies' push into Iraq seemed to falter, many hearts in Moscow and in Europe rejoiced. In a poll taken in late March, 52 percent of Russians were of the opinion that the U.S.-led military action in Iraq was unsuccessful; 58 percent believed it would be a long war; 35 percent were convinced the United States would win in the end, while 33 percent assumed Iraq would prevail.

Last week it was disclosed that two retired three-star generals -- Vladislav Achalov (a former paratrooper and specialist in urban warfare) and Igor Maltsev (a specialist in air defense) -- visited Baghdad recently and were awarded medals by Hussein. The awards were handed out by Iraqi Defense Minister Sultan Khashim Akhmed.

It was reported that the retired generals helped Hussein prepare a war plan to defeat the Americans. Achalov confirmed he was in Baghdad just before the war and received medals from Hussein for services rendered. He also told journalists that the defense of Baghdad was well organized, U.S. tanks would be burned if they enter the city and U.S. infantry would be slaughtered. According to Achalov, the only way the allies could ever take Baghdad and other Iraqi cities was to raze them to the ground by carpet bombing.

Last week, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov echoed Achalov's opinion: "If the Americans continue to fight accurately, avoiding high casualties, the outcome is uncertain. If the Americans begin carpet bombing, Iraq will be defeated." Ivanov also announced that the Defense Ministry was attentively studying the war in order to learn how to build a stronger Russian army.

It seems that up to now the result of the study has been negative. It would appear that Russian generals and Ivanov assume it's the Americans that should be learning from them how to flatten cities -- the way our military destroyed the Chechen capital, Grozny.

Many Russian generals truly believe that a bombing campaign that leaves some buildings still standing is ineffective. Precision-guided munitions are widely considered to be costly pranks -- not real weapons. In Chechnya, we tried to use some of these gadgets, but they did not work, as most Russian officers and men have not been trained in how to use the limited

number of modern weapons our military inherited from the Soviet armed forces.

The worst possible outcome of the war in Iraq for the Russian military is a swift allied victory with relatively low casualties. Already many in Russia are beginning to ask why our forces are so ineffective compared to the Brits and Americans; and why the two battles to take Grozny in 1995 and 2000 each took more than a month to complete, with more than 5,000 Russian soldiers killed and tens of thousands wounded in both engagements, given that Grozny is one tenth the size of Baghdad.

The Russian media is generally avoiding the hard questions and serving up anti-American propaganda instead. It is alleged that the U.S. government is concealing casualties" (like its Russian counterpart), and that hundreds if not thousands of U.S. soldiers have already been killed. Maybe this deceit will become the main semi-official excuse for disregarding the allied victory.

Or perhaps our generals who do not want to build a modern post-Soviet military will come up with some other propaganda ploy.

Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst.

April 25, 2003 8:20 AM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Dinner

Joyce and I are having 30 of our high school classmates and their spouses to Washington for a reunion May 16, 17 and 18. We are going to have dinner at our house on Friday, May 16, and Saturday, May 17.

It would be terrific if you could join us for one of those two evenings.

If you are in town and would like to do it, we would love to have you. It would be a thrill for them to meet Lynne and you.

There is no rush to let us know, but it would be fun for us and we hope you can do it.

Regards,

DHR:dh
042503-4

001164H

25 Apr 03

W00466-03

11-L-0559/OSD/20997

~~SENSITIVE~~

May 8, 2003 10:15 AM

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Policy Guidelines—Iraq

Iraq

Attached is a rough draft I dictated on policy guidelines for Iraq for Ambassador Bremer and General Franks. I think and hope that it tracks well with your views and pronouncements. I will be discussing it with the Principals shortly.

I will find an opportunity to discuss it with you to receive any thoughts you may have.

Respectfully,

Attach.

5/8/03 "Principles for Iraq—Policy Guidelines"

DHR:dh
050803-1

8 May 03

~~SENSITIVE~~

W00515 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/20998

May 8, 2003 11:59 AM

Principles for Iraq—Policy Guidelines

1. **Global significance.** The importance of Coalition success in Iraq cannot be overstated. If Iraq, with its size, capabilities and resources, is able to get on a path toward representative democracy, the impact in the region and the world could be historic—with effects on Iran, Syria, the Palestinians, and elsewhere. Iraq could become a model—an example that a moderate Muslim state can succeed in the battle against extremists that is taking place in the Muslim world.
2. **Supporting President Bush's vision for a free Iraq.** Iraqis desiring to participate in the future of Iraq will be sought out, encouraged and empowered to the extent they are supportive of President Bush's vision of a free Iraq. Those who are not supportive will be opposed. Iraq will:
 - Be a single country;
 - Not have weapons of mass destruction;
 - Not be a terrorist state and will not harbor terrorists;
 - Not be a threat to its neighbors or to diverse elements within the country;
 - Have a market economy and an independent judiciary; and
 - Have respect for the rule of law, for ethnic and religious minorities, for the rights of women, and will be on a path to representative democratic government.
3. **Assert authority, provide security.** The Coalition Provisional Authority will assert authority over the country—a country that has been a dictatorship for decades. It will not accept being defied—it will tolerate no self-appointed Mayors of Baghdad. It will work to ensure the security of the Iraqi people. The Coalition will be ready and willing to use force to impose order as required. Without security for the Iraqi people, none of our other goals for the Iraqi people will be achievable.

~~SENSITIVE~~—PRE-DECISIONAL
DRAFT WORKING PAPER

4. **Commitment to stay; commitment to leave.** The Coalition will maintain as many security forces in Iraq as necessary, for as long as necessary, to accomplish our goals, and no longer.
5. **Unity of leadership.** There will be clarity that the Coalition is in charge, with no conflicting signals to the Iraqi people, Coalition partners or neighbors. The Coalition will have unambiguous unity of leadership and effort.
6. **Iraqi foreign missions.** The Coalition will gain control over Iraqi foreign embassies and, to the extent possible, Iraqi seats in international fora.
7. **Improve conditions; involve Iraqis.** The Coalition will contribute to the improvement of the circumstances of the Iraqi people, month-to-month. It will work to achieve visible accomplishments in vital public services, and create an environment that encourages the involvement of the Iraqi people, since it will be their responsibility to improve their country.
8. **Promote Iraqis who share coalition's goals.** In staffing ministries and positioning Iraqis in ways that will increase their influence, the Coalition will work to have acceptable Iraqis involved as early as possible, so Iraqi faces can explain the Coalition's goals and direction to the Iraqi people. Only if Iraqis are seen as being engaged in, responsible for, and explaining and leading their fellow citizens will the broad public support be achieved that is essential for security. We accept the reality that, regardless of what the Coalition does, it will be assumed that the Coalition set up the Iraqi Interim Authority. Its fingerprints will be on it. Therefore, we should accept that fact, not worry about that, and get on with the task and make sure it succeeds.
9. **Hands-on political reconstruction.** As the political process proceeds, the Coalition will consistently steer the process in ways that achieve stated U.S. objectives. The Coalition will not "let a thousand flowers bloom."
10. **De-Baathification.** The Coalition will work with forward-looking Iraqis and will actively oppose Saddam Hussein's old enforcers—the Baath Party, Fedayeen Saddam, etc. We will make clear that the Coalition will eliminate the remnants of Saddam's regime.
11. **Justice for bad actors.** Those who committed war crimes or crimes against humanity on behalf of the regime will be tracked down and brought to justice. Mechanisms will be established to detain and screen out members of organizations that carried out Saddam Hussein's repression and to bring them

~~SENSITIVE~~—PRE-DECISIONAL
DRAFT WORKING PAPER

to justice. De-Baathification may cause inefficiencies, but that is acceptable and indeed necessary to remove pervasive fear from Iraqi society.

12. **Repairing social fabric.** Iraq will need to find ways to heal the wounds that the Baathists inflicted on the society. The experiences of Eastern Europe, South Africa and elsewhere could inform that process.
13. **Property claims.** Mechanisms will be established to adjudicate property claims peacefully.
14. **Favor market economy.** Economic decisions will favor market systems, not Stalinist command systems, and activities that will diversify the Iraqi economy beyond oil. We will move as quickly as possible to privatize the economy.
15. **Pay smart.** We must avoid allowing the Coalition or the international community to distort the economy with floods of highly paid workers.
16. **Oil.** Iraqi oil will be used for the Iraqi people. The Coalition Provisional Authority, based on a study of best practices around the world, will develop a plan for the Iraqi oil industry that is based on transparency and private ownership. The plan should be designed to benefit the Iraqi people.
17. **Contracts—promoting Iraq's recovery.** Contracts for work in Iraq will go first to those who utilize Iraqi workers, and to countries that were supportive in liberating the Iraqi people, especially key neighbors such as Jordan and the Gulf states, because it will contribute to greater regional economic activity and accelerate Iraq's economic recovery.
18. **Third-states and international organizations.** Other countries and international organizations, including the UN, will be encouraged to assist in Iraq, but not if their presence is designed to further complicate an already difficult task.
19. **Outsiders—assistance, but not interference.** Assistance from neighbors will be welcomed. Conversely, interference in Iraq by its neighbors or others in the international community will not be accepted. Iraqis who are complicit or, for example, serve as agents of Iranian or Syrian influence will be dealt with.

~~SENSITIVE~~ PRE-DECISIONAL
DRAFT WORKING PAPER

20. **Monitoring NGOs.** We welcome NGO assistance, but activities of NGOs will be closely monitored and regulated. Those with extremist ties will be excluded.
21. **Priority sources of funds.** The U.S. will be the funder of last resort, not first. In order of preferred expenditure: Iraqi funds located in Iraq, Iraqi funds at the UN, seized frozen Iraqi assets in the U.S. and in other countries, donors from other nations, and finally U.S. appropriated funds. Once the U.S. starts funding an activity, it will be difficult to get others to take over that responsibility. It is best for the U.S. not to start funding in the first place, and instead to use the urgency of the problem to serve as leverage to get access to Iraqi funds or to raise money from others.
22. **Trial and error.** Democracies in transition are inherently untidy. Trial and error and experimentation will be part of the process. Perfection will not. Course corrections will be necessary.
23. **New matters.** Additional issues will be addressed as they surface (the role of the UN, debt relief, etc.).
24. **Patience and respect for Iraq's singular character.** The transition from despotism to a democracy will not happen fast or easily. It cannot be rushed. It will evolve over years. Rushing elections could lead to tyranny of the majority. Further, the ultimate outcome must be for Iraq and be decided by Iraqis, within the broad principles laid out by President Bush. One ought not expect the Iraqi outcome to replicate any other system. For example, there may well be a larger role for religion than in many other countries, and that is acceptable. Elections will likely best be held only after the mechanisms of a civil society are in place.


DHR:dh
Iraq/Principles for Iraq

~~SENSITIVE~~

May 8, 2003 10:52 AM

Iraq

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Policy Guidelines

Attached is a rough draft of some policy guidelines for Iraq that I plan to coordinate and then provide to Ambassador Bremer and General Franks.

If you have suggestions, please let me know soon. I assume we will be discussing this in a PC or NSC this week or next.

Attach.
5/8/03 "Principles for Iraq—Policy Guidelines"

DHR:dh
050803-2

8 May 03

W00516 /03

~~SENSITIVE~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21003

May 8, 2003 11:59 AM

Principles for Iraq—Policy Guidelines

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~~SENSITIVE~~ PRE-DECISIONAL
DRAFT WORKING PAPER

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DRAFT WORKING PAPER

~~SENSITIVE~~ PRE-DECISIONAL

11-L-0559/OSD/21005

~~SENSITIVE~~—PRE-DECISIONAL
DRAFT WORKING PAPER

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
~~SENSITIVE~~—PRE-DECISIONAL
DRAFT WORKING PAPER

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DHR:dh
Iraq/Principles for Iraq

May 9, 2003 11:19 AM

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Jay Garner

If Zal does not become U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, I think Jay Garner would be the right man for Afghanistan. I have told Colin and Condi. They are thinking about it.

My concern is I don't think we have a lot of time for further delay. I am convinced we need to get some energy into our leadership in Afghanistan.

I believe he is the kind of person who could work well with Karzai. My hope is that we can make a decision on this soon, so that either Zal, Jay or someone else is nominated, goes through the confirmation process, gets out there and gets at it.

Very respectfully,

DHR:dh
050903-17


Afghanistan

Garner 03

W00536 /03

May 19, 2003 10:55 AM

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: POTUS and Middle East

I asked Torie to think about whether the President might want to do something out in the Middle East. Her memo is attached. It is interesting.

Thanks.

Attach.

5/14/03 Clarke memo to SecDef re: Thoughts for POTUS Middle East Trip

DHR:dh
051903-19

333
WT

19 May 03

W00585 /03

2

14 May 2003/0930

TO: SecDef

FROM: Tofie Clarke

SUBJECT: Thoughts for POTUS Middle East Trip

Assumptions:

POTUS visit to Middle East will be:

- Welcomed by many as sign of his commitment to peace process.
- Exploited by some as sign of U.S. intent to dominate region.
- Viewed through prism of evolving U.S.-Arab relationships and changing "footprint" in region.
- A spotlight on U.S. presence in Iraq -- how long, how many?

Objectives:

- Demonstrate sincerity and long-term nature of U.S. commitment to a Middle East peace process.
- Emphasize U.S. respect for Arab culture and heritage.
- Thank U.S./Coalition troops for job well done but make clear there is still hard work ahead in the global war on terrorism (GWOT).
- Make clear we said what we meant about Iraq: we'd stay as long as necessary, but not one day longer.

Strategy:

- Manage expectations -- about Middle East and GWOT.
- Demonstrate sincerity and respect through tangible signs of commitment on both fronts (Middle East and GWOT) and tangible signs of respect for their culture and heritage.

Major Elements:

Before trip:

- POTUS presents "Mohammed" with a commendation at White House (White House has under consideration).

On trip:

- Visit 5th Fleet HQ in Bahrain. While there, visit DoD school attended by Bahraini children.
- GCC meeting in Kuwait in which POTUS participates.
- Darryl Worley concert in Kuwait for troops or concert by Arab/Western duo. POTUS introduces entertainer(s).

In Baghdad:

- POTUS gets briefed by Jay Garner and Iraqis on humanitarian and reconstruction efforts.
- POTUS announces return dates for 3rd ID and 1st MEF.
- POTUS delivers message to Iraqi people via Commando Solo and other transmission capabilities.

In An Najaf:

- POTUS, with appropriate escort, visits Ali Mosque in An Najaf, one of the most important mosques in the world and protected by U.S. troops.

In Afghanistan:

- POTUS visits KMTC and watches ANA training. Depending on timing, could be there for a graduation.
- Potential announcement with Karzai of additional PRTs.
- POTUS and Mrs. Bush visit a school.

May 21, 2003 12:16 PM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
CC: Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Codel Requirements

Attached is the letter I sent to Bill Frist loosening up the Codel requirements. I sent similar letters to the Speaker and the "Big Eight."

If either of you have suggestions as to how we can satisfy them without putting folks at risk, I would sure like to hear them.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/17/03 SecDef ltr to Senator Frist

DHR:dh
052003-10

333

21 May 03

W00602-03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAY 17 2003

The Honorable Bill Frist
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Room H-230 Capitol
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Leader:

The Department's letter to you of May 8, 2003 addressed Department of Defense support for Congressional Delegations (Codels) in the Central Command area of responsibility. As you know, the only restrictions that the Central Command has suggested relate to Afghanistan, Iraq and Djibouti. All other countries in that Command are without any limitations. Regrettably, the security situation in those three countries is such that some restrictions are still necessary.

After visiting with the leadership and senior members of our Committees of jurisdiction in the House and the Senate, we have gone back to the Central Command and requested that they review those three countries to see if there is a way to expand their ability to support Congressional delegations.

I am pleased to be able to report that they are recommending that the following support for Codels be proposed:

- Djibouti: Visits by Codels of up to 20 persons to Camp Lemonier can be accommodated.
- Afghanistan: Visits of Codels of up to 20 persons to Baghram and Kabul can be supported;
- Iraq: Codels of up to 20 persons can be supported, with visits to Baghdad International Airport where U.S. forces are located, and to the headquarters of the Command Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) for troop visits and briefings by the office of the Presidential Envoy and the office of the Joint Task Force. Support for visits to other locations in Iraq will be considered subject to approval by the Central Command. There are no time restrictions. It is recommended that there be one Codel per House per month, subject to the approval of the Speaker and the Majority Leader, and that there not be requests for overnight stays for the time being.

333

17 May 03



U07394-03

3


11-L-0559/OSD/21013

The Honorable Bill Frist
Page 2

I want you to know that I believe it is exceedingly important for members of the House and Senate to have opportunities to meet with the troops where they are stationed across the globe and to have opportunities to fulfill their important oversight responsibilities. I have asked the Central Command to periodically review these matters and will work with the Combatant Command to see that they are as forthcoming as possible. As I am sure you can understand, these are not decisions that can be made in the Pentagon. These are force protection issues and therefore decisions that are best made by the Combatant Command, since they have the responsibility for providing for the security and making judgments with respect to the allocation of forces.


Again, let me assure you of my personal commitment to see that we do everything possible to be supportive.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. H. Hoefel". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long horizontal line extending from the end.

May 22, 2003

**From: Paul Bremer
To: The President of the United States
Through: The Secretary of Defense**



Iraq

Mr. President:

After a week on the ground, I thought it might be useful to give you my first impressions of the situation here.

We have two important goals in this immediate period. We must make it clear to everyone that we mean business: that Saddam and the Baathists are finished. And we must show the average Iraqi that his life will be better.

I have now visited cities in the North and South and have traveled around Baghdad every day, speaking often to Iraqis on the streets or in stores. As I have moved around, there has been an almost universal expression of thanks to the US and to you in particular for freeing Iraq from Saddam's tyranny. In the northern town of Mosul yesterday, an old man, under the impression that I was President Bush (he apparently has poor TV

22 May 03

W00610-03

11-L-0559/OSD/21015

reception), rushed up and planted two very wet and hairy kisses on my cheeks. (Such events confirm the wisdom of the ancient custom of sending emissaries to far away lands).

No doubt you have seen reports of demonstrations criticizing America. But these relate almost entirely to the continued lack of order (which is largely a Baghdad phenomenon) and basic services. No one publicly supports Saddam.

The dissolution of his chosen instrument of political domination, the Baath Party, has been very well received. Several Iraqis have told me, literally with tears in their eyes, that they have waited 30 years for this moment. While the resulting dismissal of public servants has caused some inefficiencies and griping, in most cases younger civil servants have expressed pleasure, even joy, at the measure. (At a minimum they are attracted to the prospect of promotion opportunities.) I will parallel this step with an even more robust measure dissolving Saddam's military and intelligence structures to emphasize that we mean business. We are seeing signs that the outlawed organizations are behind some of the street violence here.

We will combine these declaratory policies with vigorous steps to impose law and order on the streets of Baghdad. This, far more than the much-discussed evolution of political structures, is what dominates the life of the average urban resident. General McKiernan and I are cooperating closely to increase the visible presence of police and armed forces on the streets. People must no longer fear to send their children to school or their wives to work.

Restoring law and order is a necessary but insufficient condition for success. We face a series of urgent issues involving the restoration of basic services. We have made great progress under Jay Garner's leadership. Iraqis in the north and south have more electricity, and residents of Basra have more water, than they had before the war. In Baghdad our priority remains getting electricity back to prewar levels, for on it also depend the water and sewer systems.

I have relaunched the political dialogue with Iraqi leaders. My message is that full sovereignty under an Iraqi government can come after democratic elections, which themselves must be

based on a constitution agreed by all the people. This process will take time. Patience will be a virtue (though evidence of it is thus far lacking). At the same time, I am stressing that we are prepared to move that process as quickly as the Iraqis provided it is one that leads to a representative government at peace with its neighbors.

Our immediate goal will be to arrange a National Conference this summer, which will set in motion the writing of a constitution, and reform of the judicial, legal and economic systems. As the Iraqis are progressively more prepared to assume responsibility, we would be prepared to give it to them. But we must be firm and clear: a legitimate sovereign Iraqi government must be built on a well-prepared base.

Respectfully,

**Jerry Bremer
Baghdad
May 20 2003**

May 22, 2003 7:32 AM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
CC: Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)
Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
Honorable George Tenet
Honorable Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Oil and Democracy

463

Attached is a memo I dictated after a visit with Alan Greenspan that you might find of interest.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/21/03 SecDef memo to USD(P) re: Oil and Democracy [052003-19]

DHR:dh
052203-3

22 May 03

W00611 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/21019

May 21, 2003 9:45 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Oil and Democracy

Alan Greenspan came by to see me. The subject was oil and democracy.

Our discussion was along these lines:

We must keep the revenues from oil away from government. Throughout the world, underdeveloped countries with oil have wasted the revenues. They have been stolen, misused and used to suppress the population.

In the old days, the people of a country could swarm over a small minority that was robbing them or repressing them. Not so today. Small minorities—bullies—can use technology to successfully repress majorities. Repression works because of modern technologies.

The goal in Iraq from the outset should be to get the oil revenues into the hands of the Iraqi people. One approach might be to establish four or five mutual funds and put the revenues from oil and gas into them. They would be owned by the Iraqi people. The plan would be to take a small portion of the revenues of the funds, and pay them to the owners of the funds, all adult Iraqi citizens. There are issues as the definition of an Iraqi citizen (for example, are the people who just returned Iraqi citizens) but those issues could be dealt with.

Fortunately, the average income in the country is so low that it could make a significant difference and substantially affect the annual income of the Iraqi people by giving them a relatively small amount of money. Each of the funds would pay exactly the same monthly dividends, regardless of their varying successes.

The rest of the funds' income could be for:

1. Strengthening the oil infrastructure, improving liftings, building pipelines, and finding more efficient ways to do things.

11-L-0559/OSD/21020

2. Other infrastructure in the country that will benefit the Iraqi people and contribute towards increasing private sector economic activity and the economic well-being of the country.
3. Loans for small businesses. If the fund made loans for small businesses, it could help to develop a middle class, an entrepreneurial class, people who would develop material values, which could then begin to create in the Iraqi people a sense of progress. This could weaken the pull of Islamic fundamentalism.

Democracy

Democracy is linked to this idea. Democracy can be dangerous in the sense that if you have a group of people who have spiritual values but not material values and have not practiced the art of compromise, if they go too fast to an election by majority rule, it could end up with a permanent mistake—one vote, one time—and another Iran-like theocracy.

In short, we need to lay a foundation for self-government. The way to get a non-theocratic system is to go slowly. People have to begin to see what is in it for them.

That suggests we should not rush to have elections. We can have votes on things like city councils with a limited mandate—to help get sewers fixed, help get the garbage picked up, help get policemen out. Otherwise, the fundamentalists will very likely sweep, in a way that is disadvantageous to the people in terms of their long-term future and benefit.

Democracy involves choosing between things. If the people don't have things to choose between and there are strong, dominant theocratic forces, the outcome may be an unhappy one.

In short, the management of the oil revenues could conceivably help to begin to lay the foundation for movement towards democracy.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052003-19

.....

Please respond by _____



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAY 23 2003

President George W. Bush
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Enclosed is an invitation from Acting Secretary of the Army, R. L. Brownlee, to attend the Army Birthday Ball commemorating the Army's 228 years of service to the nation. The Birthday Ball is the capstone to a week of events designed to increase public awareness of the Army Birthday and to pay tribute to our soldiers and Army civilians who sacrifice so much to ensure freedom around the world. The Army plans to recognize your outstanding leadership in the Global War on Terrorism during the evening.

I hope your schedule will permit you to attend this special event.

Respectfully yours,

Enclosures

001, 1 W

23 May 03



W00616-03

11-L-0559/OSD/21022



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON DC 20310



MAY 15 2003

President George W. Bush
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the soldiers, civilians, and families of the United States Army, it is with great pride that I invite your participation in celebrating the Army's 228th Birthday by attending the Army Birthday Ball on June 21st 2003, at the Washington Hilton. The Army would like to formally recognize your outstanding leadership in the ongoing war on terrorism during the evening by presenting a *Soldiers' Award for Leadership*.

The Birthday Ball is the capstone of a week of events celebrating the Army's 228th Birthday. It promotes camaraderie and professional pride in our Army and raises public awareness of the Army's soldiers and civilians who have guaranteed our nation's freedom for 228 years. The Ball features performances by the US Army Soldier Show, the Army Field Band, and a special guest performance by Wynonna Judd.

If you are able to participate, COL Jane Maliszewski, Chair of the Army Birthday Ball, stands ready to assist in making the necessary arrangements. She can be reached at (b)(6) I hope your schedule will permit you to participate, as your soldiers would be deeply honored to have you share in the recognition of the Army's Birthday with us.

Respectfully,

R. L. Brownlee
Acting Secretary of the Army

11-L-0559/OSD/21023



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON DC 20310



MAY 15 2003

Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, DC 20501-0279

Dear Mr. Vice President:

On behalf of the soldiers, civilians, and families of the United States Army, it is with great pride that I invite your participation in celebrating the Army's 228th Birthday by attending the Army Birthday Ball on June 21st 2003, at the Washington Hilton.

The Birthday Ball is the capstone of a week of events celebrating the Army's 228th Birthday. It promotes camaraderie and professional pride in our Army and raises public awareness of the Army's soldiers and civilians who have guaranteed our nation's freedom for 228 years. The Ball features performances by the US Army Soldier Show, the Army Field Band, and a special guest performance by Wynonna Judd.

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Respectfully,

R. L. Brownlee
Acting Secretary of the Army


11-L-0559/OSD/21024

SENSITIVE

May 8, 2003 10:52 AM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

Iraq

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Policy Guidelines

Attached is a rough draft of some policy guidelines for Iraq that I plan to coordinate and then provide to Ambassador Bremer and General Franks.

If you have suggestions, please let me know soon. I assume we will be discussing this in a PC or NSC this week or next.

Attach.
5/8/03 "Principles for Iraq—Policy Guidelines"

DHR:dh
050803-2

8 May 03

W00628 /03

SENSITIVE
11-L-0559/OSD/21026

May 8, 2003 11:59 AM

Principles for Iraq—Policy Guidelines

1. **Global significance.** The importance of Coalition success in Iraq cannot be overstated. If Iraq, with its size, capabilities and resources, is able to get on a path toward representative democracy, the impact in the region and the world could be historic—with effects on Iran, Syria, the Palestinians, and elsewhere. Iraq could become a model—an example that a moderate Muslim state can succeed in the battle against extremists that is taking place in the Muslim world.
2. **Supporting President Bush's vision for a free Iraq.** Iraqis desiring to participate in the future of Iraq will be sought out, encouraged and empowered to the extent they are supportive of President Bush's vision of a free Iraq. Those who are not supportive will be opposed. Iraq will:
 - Be a single country;
 - Not have weapons of mass destruction;
 - Not be a terrorist state and will not harbor terrorists;
 - Not be a threat to its neighbors or to diverse elements within the country;
 - Have a market economy and an independent judiciary; and
 - Have respect for the rule of law, for ethnic and religious minorities, for the rights of women, and will be on a path to representative democratic government.
3. **Assert authority, provide security.** The Coalition Provisional Authority will assert authority over the country—a country that has been a dictatorship for decades. It will not accept being defied—it will tolerate no self-appointed Mayors of Baghdad. It will work to ensure the security of the Iraqi people. The Coalition will be ready and willing to use force to impose order as required. Without security for the Iraqi people, none of our other goals for the Iraqi people will be achievable.

~~SENSITIVE~~—PRE-DECISIONAL
DRAFT WORKING PAPER

4. **Commitment to stay; commitment to leave.** The Coalition will maintain as many security forces in Iraq as necessary, for as long as necessary, to accomplish our goals, and no longer.
5. **Unity of leadership.** There will be clarity that the Coalition is in charge, with no conflicting signals to the Iraqi people, Coalition partners or neighbors. The Coalition will have unambiguous unity of leadership and effort.
6. **Iraqi foreign missions.** The Coalition will gain control over Iraqi foreign embassies and, to the extent possible, Iraqi seats in international fora.
7. **Improve conditions; involve Iraqis.** The Coalition will contribute to the improvement of the circumstances of the Iraqi people, month-to-month. It will work to achieve visible accomplishments in vital public services, and create an environment that encourages the involvement of the Iraqi people, since it will be their responsibility to improve their country.
8. **Promote Iraqis who share coalition's goals.** In staffing ministries and positioning Iraqis in ways that will increase their influence, the Coalition will work to have acceptable Iraqis involved as early as possible, so Iraqi faces can explain the Coalition's goals and direction to the Iraqi people. Only if Iraqis are seen as being engaged in, responsible for, and explaining and leading their fellow citizens will the broad public support be achieved that is essential for security. We accept the reality that, regardless of what the Coalition does, it will be assumed that the Coalition set up the Iraqi Interim Authority. Its fingerprints will be on it. Therefore, we should accept that fact, not worry about that, and get on with the task and make sure it succeeds.
9. **Hands-on political reconstruction.** As the political process proceeds, the Coalition will consistently steer the process in ways that achieve stated U.S. objectives. The Coalition will not "let a thousand flowers bloom."
10. **De-Baathification.** The Coalition will work with forward-looking Iraqis and will actively oppose Saddam Hussein's old enforcers—the Baath Party, Fedayeen Saddam, etc. We will make clear that the Coalition will eliminate the remnants of Saddam's regime.
11. **Justice for bad actors.** Those who committed war crimes or crimes against humanity on behalf of the regime will be tracked down and brought to justice. Mechanisms will be established to detain and screen out members of organizations that carried out Saddam Hussein's repression and to bring them

2

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
~~SENSITIVE~~—PRE-DECISIONAL

11-L-0559/OSD/21028

~~SENSITIVE~~—PRE-DECISIONAL
DRAFT WORKING PAPER

to justice. De-Baathification may cause inefficiencies, but that is acceptable and indeed necessary to remove pervasive fear from Iraqi society.

12. **Repairing social fabric.** Iraq will need to find ways to heal the wounds that the Baathists inflicted on the society. The experiences of Eastern Europe, South Africa and elsewhere could inform that process.
13. **Property claims.** Mechanisms will be established to adjudicate property claims peacefully.
14. **Favor market economy.** Economic decisions will favor market systems, not Stalinist command systems, and activities that will diversify the Iraqi economy beyond oil. We will move as quickly as possible to privatize the economy.
15. **Pay smart.** We must avoid allowing the Coalition or the international community to distort the economy with floods of highly paid workers.
16. **Oil.** Iraqi oil will be used for the Iraqi people. The Coalition Provisional Authority, based on a study of best practices around the world, will develop a plan for the Iraqi oil industry that is based on transparency and private ownership. The plan should be designed to benefit the Iraqi people.
17. **Contracts—promoting Iraq's recovery.** Contracts for work in Iraq will go first to those who utilize Iraqi workers, and to countries that were supportive in liberating the Iraqi people, especially key neighbors such as Jordan and the Gulf states, because it will contribute to greater regional economic activity and accelerate Iraq's economic recovery.
18. **Third-states and international organizations.** Other countries and international organizations, including the UN, will be encouraged to assist in Iraq, but not if their presence is designed to further complicate an already difficult task.
19. **Outsiders—assistance, but not interference.** Assistance from neighbors will be welcomed. Conversely, interference in Iraq by its neighbors or others in the international community will not be accepted. Iraqis who are complicit or, for example, serve as agents of Iranian or Syrian influence will be dealt with.

~~SENSITIVE~~—PRE-DECISIONAL
DRAFT WORKING PAPER

20. **Monitoring NGOs.** We welcome NGO assistance, but activities of NGOs will be closely monitored and regulated. Those with extremist ties will be excluded.
21. **Priority sources of funds.** The U.S. will be the funder of last resort, not first. In order of preferred expenditure: Iraqi funds located in Iraq, Iraqi funds at the UN, seized frozen Iraqi assets in the U.S. and in other countries, donors from other nations, and finally U.S. appropriated funds. Once the U.S. starts funding an activity, it will be difficult to get others to take over that responsibility. It is best for the U.S. not to start funding in the first place, and instead to use the urgency of the problem to serve as leverage to get access to Iraqi funds or to raise money from others.
22. **Trial and error.** Democracies in transition are inherently untidy. Trial and error and experimentation will be part of the process. Perfection will not. Course corrections will be necessary.
23. **New matters.** Additional issues will be addressed as they surface (the role of the UN, debt relief, etc.).
24. **Patience and respect for Iraq's singular character.** The transition from despotism to a democracy will not happen fast or easily. It cannot be rushed. It will evolve over years. Rushing elections could lead to tyranny of the majority. Further, the ultimate outcome must be for Iraq and be decided by Iraqis, within the broad principles laid out by President Bush. One ought not expect the Iraqi outcome to replicate any other system. For example, there may well be a larger role for religion than in many other countries, and that is acceptable. Elections will likely best be held only after the mechanisms of a civil society are in place.

DHR:dh
Iraq/Principles for Iraq


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DRAFT WORKING PAPER
~~SENSITIVE~~—PRE-DECISIONAL

11-L-0559/OSD/21030

May 29, 2003 9:59 AM

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Jay Garner

Attached is a memo to you from Jay Garner. Jay is in the process of winding up his activities in Iraq and will be back at some point in June.

When he arrives back, I would like to bring him over to meet with you for a photograph and a thank you.

I intend to award him the Defense Department Distinguished Service Medal for his able service. It is also my intention to put him on the Defense Policy Board.

Respectfully,

Attach.
5/27/03 Bremer memo

DHR:dh
052903-15

Iraq

29 May 03

W00641-03

11-L-0559/OSD/21031

May 27, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT via the Secretary of Defense

5/28
SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 29 2003

From: Jay Garner

As I near the end of my service as Director of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs, I want to thank you for allowing me to serve the country and you in this important mission. I believe we have set a baseline that will bring stability to Iraq, although there will certainly be ups and downs in the period ahead. We have assembled a wonderful team of professionals, and Jerry Bremer is fine choice to take the team to the next level and help create the conditions for true political and economic reform in Iraq.

Your decision to connect reconstruction activities to the broader military presence was a sound one. Together with Lieutenant General Dave McKiernan, Commander of the Joint Task Force, I have formed joint civilian-military teams to prioritize resources, develop schedules for progress, and execute key tasks. The following is a summary of where we stand in each area:

- 1. Get Ministries to a Functional Level:** With so much of the country controlled by Baghdad, getting the ministries moving is key to getting the country moving in the short run. Just 7 of 23 ministries had minimally habitable workspaces when we arrived; the rest were destroyed by looting or combat. We have identified facilities for the remaining ministries, selected interim Iraqi leadership, cleaned and begun refurbishing the buildings. Much more work remains, but key early successes include reopening universities and schools, and organizing nationwide salary payments through the Ministry of Finance.
- 2. Pay Salaries Nationwide:** Our goal is to pay, by the end of June, the March, April, and May salaries to about 1.5 million civil servants whom we have asked to return to work. We made \$20 emergency payments to all workers over the past month, and began paying a half million pensioners last week. On Saturday, May 24, we began to pay April salaries, and will be paying salaries continuously between now until the end of June to catch up to back payments.
- 3. Restore Police, Courts, and Prisons:** In Baghdad, we have recruited more than 7000 police so far, and we are training, equipping, and restoring stations for them. Similar work is going on in Mosul, Basra, and elsewhere. Our military forces are conducting joint patrols with the new police. We have opened two courts in Baghdad, will open the courts in Basra the first week in June, and reopen all operable courthouses in the country by mid-June. We hope to have sufficient prisons operating by mid-June to relieve U.S. forces of detention responsibility.

11-L-0559/OSD/21032

4. Restore Basic Services to Baghdad: In most of the country outside of Baghdad, electricity and water are better than pre-war conditions. In Baghdad, we are meeting about half the daily requirements in power and water/sewage. Damage from prior looting, ongoing looting, and a decrepit underlying infrastructure are the principal causes for continued delay. In electricity, we hope to restore to pre-war conditions (about 75% of daily demand) by early June. In sewage, the pre-war condition was to treat just 32% of all sewage discharge; our goal is 100% sewage treatment. We are removing thousands of cubic meters of garbage daily, and plan to eliminate the backlog soon.

5. End the Fuel Crisis: The lifting of U.N. sanctions will result in rapid restoration of distilled fuel services throughout the country. Gasoline lines are already shorter. By the end of May, we should be meeting domestic demand. The shortage of LPG (primarily used in power generation and cooking) will persist for a little while, but imports will make up much of the shortfall until domestic production can take over. We expect to meet domestic demand by mid-June.

6. Purchase Crops/Distribute Food: This is the responsibility of the World Food Program and we have been working closely with WFP to ensure a smooth operation beginning in early June. Our goal is to purchase the Iraqi grain harvest for distribution inside the country (in the past, WFP purchased grain from outside the country.) Sixty percent or more of the public is dependent upon government food distribution. The long-term solution is to free up the agricultural sector, along with the entire economy.

7. Install Interim Town Councils: We have established interim town councils in 17 of the 26 largest cities (100,000 or greater population). Local military commanders, civil affairs authorities, and civilian support teams are developing processes that vary somewhat from location to location, but which are producing interim Iraqi-led bodies based upon technocratic skills to help manage city services and put an Iraqi face on the work we are doing. We hope to have a council in Baghdad and the remaining largest cities by mid-June.

8. Meet Pressing Public Health Issues/Avoid Epidemics: Success in this area will be a function of water, sewage, electricity, trash removal, and food distribution. We are conducting public health awareness campaigns and working with the World Health Organization, UNICEF, and other organizations to stay ahead of the matter. Medical supplies in country and the region are plentiful.

Thank you, again, Mr. President, for honoring me with this assignment. It was challenging, exhilarating, and rewarding. Thank you, too, for your inspired wartime leadership.

~~SENSITIVE~~ – BUT UNCLASSIFIED

7:20AM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: May 30, 2003

SUBJECT: **President's Remarks at Wawel Castle**

Attached are my few suggested edits to Draft #12.

On page 3, I feel we would be making a mistake to announce the anti-proliferation initiative in this speech. It is almost a throw away, whereas I think of it as something that has to be a major, significant Presidential effort. Therefore, I hope the paragraph at the bottom of page 3 will be deleted.

To stem the flow of weapons of mass destruction, we will have to mount a major, bold campaign and sustain it over a long period of months and years. It should become a central part of our national security strategy and policy.

Given that importance and potential impact of the initiative, I feel it should be introduced not in a few brief sentences, imbedded in a larger and broader speech about Europe and the Trans-Atlantic Alliance, but rather in a major address to the world that begins the process of educating the public of the technically advanced nations whose cooperation we will require if we are to achieve success. In short, it should be introduced in a way that emphasizes its significance, promotes support and insures its success.

DHR/azn
052303.01S

Attach: Remarks at Wawel Castle, Draft #12

350.001 W17

30 May 03

Remarks at Wawel Castle
May 31, 2003
Draft #12

Mr. President, Prime Minister, distinguished guests, citizens of Poland: I am honored to be in the city of Krakow, where so many landmarks give witness to Poland's history, and to Poland's faith. From this Castle, Polish kings ruled for centuries in a tradition of tolerance. Below this hill lies the market square, where Kosciuszko [kos-CHOO-sku] swore loyalty to the first democratic constitution of Europe. And at Wawel [VA-vel] Cathedral in 1978, a Polish cardinal began his journey to a conclave in Rome – and entered history as Pope John Paul the Second, the greatest moral leader of our time.

In all the tests and hardships Poland has known, the soul of the Polish people has always been strong. Mrs. Bush and I are pleased to make our second visit to this beautiful country, and we bring with us the friendship and good wishes of the American people.

In Warsaw two years ago, I affirmed the commitment of my country to a united Europe, bound to America by close ties of history, commerce, and friendship. I said that Europe must finally overturn the bitter legacy of Yalta, and remove the false boundaries and spheres of influence that divided this continent for too long. And we have acted on this commitment. Poland, the United States, and our allies have agreed to extend NATO eastward and southward – bringing the peace and security of this alliance to the young democracies of Europe.

As the Atlantic Alliance has expanded, it has also been tested. America and European countries have been called to confront the threat of global terror. Each nation has faced difficult decisions about armed conflict in Afghanistan, and in Iraq. We have seen unity and common purpose. We have also seen debate – some of it healthy, and some of it divisive.

I have come to Krakow to state clearly the intentions of my country. The United States is committed to a strong Atlantic Alliance – to ensure our security, to advance human freedom, and to keep the peace of the world.

Poland and America understand that a united Europe must not be allowed to divide the West. You struggled for decades to participate fully in

the life of Europe – and soon you will be a member of the European Union. You also struggled to become a full member of the Atlantic Alliance. You have not come all this way – through occupations, tyranny, and brave uprisings – only to be told that you must now choose between Europe and America. Poland is a good citizen of Europe, and a close friend of America – and there is no conflict between the two.

America owes our moral heritage of democracy, and tolerance, and freedom to Europe. We have sacrificed for those ideals together, in the great struggles of the past. In the Second World War, the forces of freedom came together to defeat Nazism. In the Cold War, our transatlantic alliance opposed imperial communism. Today our enemy is more scattered, but no less deadly. Our alliance of freedom faces a toxic combination of terrorist groups ... outlaw states seeking weapons of mass destruction ... and an ideology of power and domination that targets the innocent and justifies any crime. This is not a time to stir up divisions in a great alliance. This is a time for all of us to unite in defense of liberty, and step up to the shared duties of free nations.

For America, our resolve to fight terror was firmly set on a single day of violence and sorrow. The attacks of September 11th, 2001 changed my country. On that morning, the American people saw the hatred of our enemies, and the future of grief they intend for us. And the American government accepted a mission: to strike and defeat the terror network, and hold accountable all who harbor and support it. For my country, the events of September 11th were as decisive as the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the treachery of another September day, in 1939. And the lesson of all those events is the same: Aggression and evil intent must not be ignored or appeased – they must be opposed, early and decisively.

We are striving for a world in which men and women can live in freedom and peace, instead of in fear, and chaos – and every civilized nation has a stake in the outcome. By waging this fight together, we will draw others to our cause, and speed the day of final victory.

One of the main fronts in this war is right here in Europe, where al-Qaida used cities as staging areas for their attacks. Europe's capable police forces and intelligence services are providing essential help in hunting the terrorists. Poland has led the effort to increase anti-terror

cooperation among Central and Eastern European nations, and America is grateful.

Some challenges of terrorism, however, cannot be met with law enforcement alone – they must be met with direct military action. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan chose to support and harbor al-Qaida terrorists – and so that regime is no more. The dictator in Iraq pursued weapons of mass murder, cultivated ties to terror, and defied the demands of the United Nations – and so his regime has been ended. In the battles of Afghanistan and Iraq, Polish forces served with skill and honor in a great coalition. America will not forget that Poland rose to the moment. Again you lived out the words of the Polish motto, “For Your Freedom and Ours.”

Poland and America are proud members of NATO – and our military alliance must be prepared to meet the challenges of our time. This is a matter of capability, and a matter of will. Our common security requires European governments to invest in modern military capabilities – so our forces can move quickly, with a precision that can strike the guilty and spare the innocent. NATO must show resolve and foresight to act beyond Europe, and it has begun to do so. NATO has agreed to lead security forces in Afghanistan, and to support our Polish allies in Iraq. A strong NATO Alliance, with a broad vision of its role, will serve our security and the cause of peace.

The greatest threat to peace is the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and we must work together to stop proliferation. The countries of the G-8 committed last year to aiding Russia and others in securing and eliminating deadly weapons that remain from the Soviet era. I welcome Poland’s decision to join this effort. And I call on America’s G-8 partners to follow through on their financial commitments, so we can stop proliferation at its source.

When weapons of mass destruction or their components are in transit, we must also have the means and authority to seize them. So today I announce a new effort to fight proliferation called the Proliferation Security Initiative. The United States and a number of our close allies, including Poland, have begun working on new agreements to search planes and ships carrying suspect cargo, and to seize illegal weapons or missile technologies. Over time, we will extend this partnership as broadly

Delete.
Why
throw it
away

Delete?

as possible, to keep the world's most destructive weapons away from all our shores, and out of the hands of our common enemies.]

In the last 20 months, the world has seen the determination of my country, and many others, to fight terror. Yet armed force is always a last resort, and Americans know that terrorism is not defeated by military power alone. We believe that the ultimate answer to hatred is hope. As we fight the forces of terror, we must also change the conditions in which terror can take root. Terrorism is often bred in failing states – so we must help nations in crisis to build a civil society of free institutions. The ideology of terror takes hold in an atmosphere of resentment and hopelessness – so we must help men and women around the world to build lives of purpose and dignity. In the long term, we add to our security by helping to spread freedom and alleviate suffering. And this sets a broad agenda for nations on both sides of the Atlantic.

NOTE:
The argument
can be
made that
terrorists
have hope.
The hopeless
are passive.

In Africa, the spread of HIV/AIDS threatens the lives of millions, and the stability of an entire continent. The United States has undertaken a comprehensive, 15-billion-dollar effort to prevent and treat AIDS, and provide humane care for its victims. I urge our partners in Europe to make a similar commitment, so we can work together in turning the tide against AIDS in Africa.

Hunger in Africa is a chronic challenge, and a present crisis. The United States is establishing an emergency fund, so we can rush help to countries where the first signs of famine appear. The nations of Europe can greatly help in this effort, with emergency funds of their own. And I hope European governments will reconsider policies that discourage African farmers from using safe biotechnology to feed their own people.

Wealthy nations have the responsibility to help the developing world – and to make certain our help is effective. Through the Millennium Challenge initiative, I have proposed a 50 percent increase in America's core development assistance. This aid will go where it will do the most good – not to corrupt elites, but to nations that are ruled justly, that invest in the health and education of their people, and that encourage economic freedom. If European governments will adopt these same standards, we can work side by side in providing the kind of development aid that helps transform entire societies.

One of the greatest sources of development and growth in any society is trade, and lowering trade barriers can bring millions of people into a growing circle of prosperity. America and Europe should lead the effort to bring down global trade barriers, and work together for a world that trades in freedom. And as we spread prosperity, we must also join in applying new technologies that improve the quality of our air and water, and protect the health of our people.

America and Europe are called to advance the cause of freedom and peace – and these two commitments are inseparable. It is human rights, and private property, and the rule of law, and free trade, and political openness that undermine the appeal of extremism, and create the stable environment that peace requires. We are determined to demonstrate the power of these ideals in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq. And these ideals will provide the foundation for a reformed, peaceful, independent Palestinian state.

Today in the Middle East, the emergence of new Palestinian leadership which has condemned terror is a hopeful sign that the parties can agree to two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security. Early next week, I will go to the Middle East, to meet with the Palestinian and Israeli Prime Ministers, and other leaders in the region. The work ahead will require difficult decisions and leadership – but there is no other choice. No leader of conscience can accept more months and ^{bitterness} years of ~~humiliation~~ humiliation, and killing, and mourning. For peace to prevail, terrorism must end. All concerned must shake off the old arguments, and the old ways, and act in the cause of peace. I will do all that I can to help the parties reach an agreement, and to see that agreement enforced.

To meet all these goals of security, peace, and a hopeful future for the developing world, we welcome, and we need, the help, advice, and wisdom of friends and allies. I look forward to working with members of the Atlantic Alliance in addressing the tough problems of the world. And I urge the governments of Europe not to allow a new theory of rivalry to undermine the great principles and obligations we share. The enemies of freedom have always preferred a divided alliance – because when Europe and America are united, no problem, and no enemy, can stand against us.

Within an hour's journey of this castle lies a monument to the darkest impulses of man. Today I saw Auschwitz, the sites of Holocaust and Polish

Martyrdom – a place where evil found its willing servants and its innocent victims. One boy imprisoned there was branded with the number A70713. Returning to Auschwitz a lifetime later, Elie Wiesel recalled his first night in the camp: “I ask myself: God, is this the end of your people, the end of mankind, the end of the world?”

With every murder, a world was ended. And the death camps still bear witness: They remind us that evil is real ... and must be called by name ... and must be opposed. All the good that has come to this continent – all the progress, the prosperity, the peace – came because, beyond the barbed wire, there were people willing to take up arms against evil. And history asks more than memory – because hatred, and aggression, and murderous ambitions are still alive in the world. Having seen the works of evil firsthand on this continent, we must never lose the courage to oppose it elsewhere. As Elie Wiesel said, “It is here where all hope ended that we must profess to the world that human beings are worthy of hope. Let us hope the legacy of horror, despair, and violence that have marked the 20th century will be a warning for the 21st century.”

In those years of the Second World War, another legacy of the 20th century was unfolding here in the city of Krakow. As a young seminarian, Karol Wojtyla [voy-TEE-wah] saw the swastika flag flying over the ramparts of Wawel [VA-vel] Castle. He shared the suffering of his people, and was put into forced labor. From this priest’s experience and faith came a vision: That every person must be treated with dignity, because every person is known and loved by God. In time, this man’s vision, and this man’s courage, would bring fear to tyrants, freedom to his beloved country, and liberation to half a continent.

To this very hour, Pope John Paul the Second speaks for the dignity of every life, and expresses the highest aspirations of the culture we share. Europe and America will always be joined by more than our interests. Ours is a union of ideals and convictions. We believe in human rights, and justice under law, and self government, and economic freedom tempered by compassion. We do not own these beliefs, but we have carried them through centuries, we will advance them further, and we will defend them together.

Thank you very much. May God bless this great nation, and the Polish people.

Drafted by: Mike Gerson, John McConnell, Matthew Scully and John Gibson

Office: (b)(6)

Cell:



SENT 6/9
June 5, 2003

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Lawsuits in Belgium

Our lawyers say that unless the basic problem gets solved, the suits against President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Colin Powell, Gen. Franks and others are going to continue to be a serious problem for our country.

I think we may want to tell the Belgians that we will not be inclined to attend NATO meetings until the fundamental problem gets solved—not each case, but the basic problem. We should consider recommending that NATO hold the money to build the new NATO building until it gets sorted out, and that after four or five months the US will not be sending senior civilian or military officials to NATO meetings if they are held in Belgium.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060503-6

Belgium

9 Jun 03

June 9, 2003

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Economic Update

Attached is an economic update from Jerry Bremer.

Attach.
6/9/03 Bremer memo to SecDef re: Economic Update

DHR:dh
060903-35

123

9 Jun 03

W00684 /03

C64

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN - 9 2003

9 June 2003

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: Paul Bremer <signed>
SUBJECT: Economic Update

Mr. Secretary:

Restoring law and order as well as basic services continue to be our top priorities. But we also must get the economy moving again. To that end, I intend to announce Tuesday an emergency construction plan which will use \$100 million in vested assets to:

- 1) Complete urgent construction work on projects suspended by the war (roads, bridges, dams, etc.);
- 2) Rebuild many of the government buildings destroyed by looting after the war; and
- 3) Carry out other projects in the regions identified as priorities by local communities.

Our main objective in all of these projects is to stimulate the economy and create jobs to begin to deal with the massive unemployment rate here (it was probably over 50% even before the war).

Meanwhile, we are urgently reviewing options for a more aggressive plan to rehire or otherwise deal with the demobilized military (at the non-Ba'athist levels).

SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION				
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<i>NA/SEC/AM</i>		<i>BUCKET</i>		

June 16, 2003

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

CC: Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Belgium Statute

Attached is a piece on the Belgium statute that is the basis for the lawsuits against so many senior Americans. It is worth reading.

Attach.

Casey, Lee A. and Rivkin, David B. Jr. "Arrest This," *National Review*, June 16, 2003, pp. 22-24.

DHR:dh
061603-8

Belgium

16 Jun 03

about the extent of his program at every opportunity. In the decade after the first Gulf War, it suited Saddam's purposes to create a high degree of strategic ambiguity about his weapons program. By denying that the weapons existed, he sought to forestall a U.S. attack. At the same time, he was doing everything possible to make it look as though he had a program. Why? Because in that area of the world there is a tremendous strategic gain in convincing your neighbors that you are the baddest kid on the block.

In all likelihood, Saddam played a game with the world and miscalculated. He did everything possible to convince all concerned that he was a dangerous man who possessed dangerous weapons. It was unfortunate for him that people took him at his word—and that there was a U.S. president willing to act on the very real threat that he posed.

Are there still WMDs in Iraq waiting to be found? Did Saddam move his program to another country or underwrite another country's program? Did Iraq maintain only a base-level program that could be quickly brought up to scale once international pressure was lifted? Eventually, we will have the answers to all of these questions, but in terms of long-term geopolitical stability, it hardly matters. As the hunt for WMDs goes on, there are some simple truths that many seem to be forgetting: 1) At one time, Saddam had an extensive WMD program and enough chemical weapons and toxins to annihilate the eastern United States; 2) in the past, he used those weapons against his enemies, internal and external; and 3) he was an aggressive dictator who tortured and massacred his own people and bullied and periodically invaded neighboring countries.

For the past ten years, Saddam may have found it too costly or too difficult to maintain his WMD program. If that is true, we have U.N. sanctions to thank—and the United States, which maintained pressure on the Iraqi regime and those who appeased it. Which leads to the greatest truth of all: In time, sanctions would have been relaxed and U.S. attention would have shifted to other areas of interest. And when that happened, Saddam would have had the ability, wherewithal, and proven inclination to quickly reconstitute a WMD program. The world is better off without that risk. NR

■ INTERNATIONAL LAW

Arrest This

Against Belgium's self-righteous, illegitimate, kangaroo courts

LEE A. CASEY &
DAVID B. RIVKIN JR.

ONCE the war against Saddam Hussein reached a successful conclusion, the war against that war entered a new phase. Activists, asserting that the United States committed "war crimes" in Iraq, are even now in the process of initiating criminal prosecutions against American officials, including President George W. Bush and Gen. Tommy Franks, as well as British prime minister Tony Blair. These actions have been brought in Belgium and Switzerland; the Belgian government already has "referred" the Franks case to the U.S. Justice Department—giving the U.S. an opportunity to punish its general lest the Belgian government do it for us.

This Belgian missive should be rejected and returned forthwith, along with a note politely explaining that the writ of Albert II, king of the Belgians, does not run on these shores—and reminding his majesty's government that the U.S. has never taken kindly to such pretensions. An updated quote from Patrick Henry would be a nice touch: "Caesar had his Brutus, Charles I his Cromwell, and Albert II's ministers may profit by their example." To give this referral *any* other consideration would work to validate the profoundly flawed legal theory on which Belgium's actions are based.

Belgium's referral has been made under an assertion of "universal jurisdiction," and this is not the first time that Brussels has attempted to punish foreign

Messrs. Casey and Rivkin are partners in the Washington, D.C., office of Baker & Hostetler LLP. They served in the Justice Department in the Reagan and first Bush administrations.

leaders for what it defines as "international crimes." Under its "Law Concerning the Punishment of Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law," Belgium's courts are even now considering allegations against as many as 30 foreign political leaders, including Israel's Ariel Sharon, as well as the first President Bush, Colin Powell, and Dick Cheney, on account of the 1991 Gulf War. In 2000, a Belgian investigating magistrate actually issued an international arrest warrant against Congo's foreign minister, Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndobasi, alleging violations of the Geneva conventions and "crimes against humanity."

Whatever the substantive merits of Belgium's claims against Yerodia Ndobasi, its proceedings in that case can only be characterized as epic chutzpa—considering its own sorry record of imperial brutality in what was, not so very long ago, the "Belgian" Congo. The claims were also legally unfounded, since, under international law, Belgium has no right to prosecute criminally offenses that did not take place in Belgium ("territorial" jurisdiction), were not perpetrated by Belgian nationals ("nationality" jurisdiction), did not victimize Belgian nationals ("passive personality" jurisdiction), and did not threaten Belgian national security ("protective" jurisdiction). In fact, Belgium's only claim of right to prosecute in this case was founded on the dubious doctrine of "universal" jurisdiction.

Not surprisingly, Congo rejected Belgium's claims, and challenged the arrest warrant before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In February 2002, the ICJ ruled in Congo's favor—although it never reached the fundamental question of Belgium's right to assert universal jurisdiction over foreign officials. Rather, it concluded that high-level government officials, such as a foreign minister, simply are immune from prosecutions by foreign judicial systems, noting that it was "unable to deduce from [the relevant state practice] under the well accepted rules of customary international law any form of exception to the rule according immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministers of Foreign Affairs."

But if the question of universality is seriously examined, it quickly becomes

evident that the Belgian, and other, universal-jurisdiction statutes also have no foundation in accepted international-law principles. There is, of course, plenty of support for universal-jurisdiction theories in the legal literature, and universality is the obvious goal of many activists and non-governmental organizations. However, law professors, commentators, and NGOs do not make international law—sovereign states do, either by treaty or through long and consistent practice. Although the opinion of scholars may be some evidence of international law, only actual state practice that is widespread and consistent over lengthy periods of time can result in a binding norm. To justify the universal-jurisdiction claims of Belgium and Switzerland, not to mention those of their excited NGO supporters, there would have to be a long and well-established line of cases where the courts of one country have tried and punished the nationals of another, even though the prosecuting state has no connection to the offense other than its “international” character, and *equally abundant* precedent where the accused’s home state has accepted the prosecution and punishment of its nationals—including government officials—for the sole reason that this is what international law requires. And this practice would have to exist for each and every “offense” over which jurisdiction is claimed—which it does not.

Even in the area of piracy, where notions of a universal jurisdiction first developed, there are few instances where the international character of the offense was the only ground for jurisdiction over an individual case. Certainly in the Anglo-American experience, most such cases involve some other, far less controversial jurisdictional basis, i.e., either the accused or the victim(s) were nationals of the prosecuting state. Moreover, although there are a handful of cases in which American courts have referenced, recognized, or even purported to apply universal-jurisdiction principles, these cases rarely involve criminal prosecutions, and almost invariably reference the 1946 Nuremberg trials as the supporting state practice. Nuremberg, however, does not provide the necessary authority.

The “International Military Tribunal,” which sat at Nuremberg and tried the surviving top Nazis, never claimed to exer-

cise universal jurisdiction. In its written opinion, that court definitively based its authority on the rights of the victorious allies to legislate for a conquered Germany. The court expressly stated that it was established as “the exercise of the sovereign legislative power by the countries to which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered; and the undoubted right of these countries to legislate for the occupied territories has been recognized by the civilized world.”

In fact, there is only one notable case in which a (former) government official actually was tried criminally for international offenses on a universal-jurisdiction theory, and that was Israel’s prosecution of Adolf Eichmann. Eichmann, of course, was the bureaucratic mastermind behind Hitler’s Final Solution. He fled to South America, but was finally located and captured by Israeli agents in 1960. Since Israel did not exist when Eichmann’s offenses took place, it could not assert jurisdiction based on territoriality, nationality, or state interest, and the Israeli Supreme Court relied upon universal jurisdiction to justify Eichmann’s prosecution. However, even here, the court also suggested that some form of “passive personality” jurisdiction would have applied, since Eichmann’s principal victims were Jews, even if not technically Israeli citizens. In any case, assuming that Eichmann’s prosecution was an application of universal jurisdiction, a single case does not establish an international practice, let alone “make” customary international law.

State practice sufficient to support an international legal rule permitting universal jurisdiction to prosecute “international crimes” simply does not exist, and for good reason: Any such rule would undermine the principles of national sovereignty upon which the international system is based, and would shortly lead to international legal chaos. Despite the claims of activists and NGOs, there is no clear international consensus on what conduct actually constitutes “war crimes,” “crimes against humanity,” or even “genocide.” Still less is there agreement on what constitutes “aggression,” which even the

drafters of the 1998 Rome Statute, establishing the new International Criminal Court (ICC), could not define. For example, although it is well established that deliberate attacks on civilians violate the laws of war, and that indiscriminate attacks on civilians or civilian objects are also criminal offenses, there is little or no agreement, in practice, on what is “indiscriminate.” A number of NGOs, and even some states, consider U.S. “cluster”

munitions to be inherently indiscriminate and their use, therefore, illegal. The U.S., of course, categorically rejects this claim—as it has every right to do. Each state, as an attribute of sovereignty, has the legal right to interpret and apply international norms

Each state has the legal right to interpret and apply international norms for itself.

for itself. Efforts by one state, through the prosecution of foreign officials, to impose its interpretation on others invite—indeed, they virtually demand—retaliation in kind. This, more than any other reason, is why there is no state practice supporting universal jurisdiction for violations of international humanitarian law: Such practice would long ago have reduced international relations to a series of tit-for-tat criminal prosecutions.

Unfortunately, that may be exactly the road the U.S. must now take—at least in the short term—in order to protect its citizens and its sovereignty. Belgium and other states that claim universal jurisdiction have thrown down the gauntlet, and the challenge must be accepted. International practice does not support their pretensions, but if prosecutions based on universalist theories are not opposed by the U.S., new international norms may, over time, be developed. This is especially true given the universalist aspirations of the ICC, which claims jurisdiction over the nationals of non-parties and has been ratified by 89 states.

The U.S. has a number of options that it should pursue vigorously. First, the administration should transmit formal and public diplomatic notes to both Belgium and Switzerland, making clear that the U.S. rejects their claims, and that it will view investigations or prosecutions of its nationals for alleged “offenses” in Iraq as unlawful, and as unfriendly

acts. The initiation of criminal investigations against American civilian and military officials is a very serious matter, and cannot be handled, through private complaints and assurances, as a minor diplomatic faux pas.

Second, the administration should make clear to Belgium that its status as the home of NATO's principal command structures will be affected by its universal-jurisdiction law. If American officials cannot travel safely to and from Belgium, without the fear of groundless "war crimes" charges, then NATO headquarters must be relocated to a country that takes international law, and its international obligations, more seriously. In this regard, Belgium's recent efforts to ameliorate the impact of its universal-jurisdiction law, by permitting the Belgian government to "refer" cases to the accused's home state before taking action, does nothing to solve the problem. To accept such referrals would, in effect, be a recognition that Belgium has the legal right to investigate and prosecute in the first instance, when it does not.

Finally, the administration should introduce "blocking" legislation in the U.S. Congress. Such legislation would formally reject universality as an acceptable basis of international jurisdiction, and would permit the assertion of American criminal jurisdiction over individuals who attempt such prosecutions against U.S. nationals. Unlike universal-jurisdiction statutes, this law would have firm support in accepted international-law norms, since it would be based on acts undertaken against U.S. nationals (passive-personality jurisdiction) and against the U.S. government (protective jurisdiction).

Overall, the allegations brought against American officials reveal just how far bitter, ideologically driven activists are prepared to go to punish lawful policies with which they disagree. These charges also reveal how small states, with little or no responsibility for international peace and stability, have sought to manipulate international-law principles as a means of cutting a figure on the world stage. It is high time for the U.S. to begin redressing the balance. Although there are a number of measures that can be taken, the one thing the U.S. must not do is nothing. NR

■ THE ECONOMY

Rich Man, Poor Man

How to think about income inequality. (Hint: It's not as bad as you may think)

KEVIN A. HASSETT

As the 2004 campaign begins in earnest, it appears the Democrats' preferred strategy will be to tie a weak economy to President Bush's economic policies. But what will they talk about if the economy gets strong? Several pieces in the *New York Times* suggest the answer: income inequality. The best example is a *Times Magazine* piece by Paul Krugman contending that we are entering a new Gilded Age as "extravagant as the original." He recounts anecdotes of truly awe-inspiring wealth, of executives being treated like "royalty," and reports that in 1998 the 13,000 richest families had about the same combined income as the 20 million poorest households. The data are pretty striking, and reveal that income is far more concentrated at the top than it used to be. What should one do about it? Yale's Robert Shiller, writing in the *Times* op-ed section, proposed a law that would automatically increase tax rates on the wealthy if inequality increases.

Such drastic measures might be advisable if inequality were demonstrably harmful. But is it? I recently coedited (with R. Glenn Hubbard) a volume, *Inequality and Tax Policy*, that pulled together the leading research on the economics of inequality. One chapter in our book, contributed by Robert Barro of Harvard, found that inequality has a fairly unusual relationship with economic growth. If inequality is very high in a very poor nation, that country is likely to have low growth; but in wealthy, devel-

Mr. Hasset is director of economic policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute.

oped nations such as ours, economies have tended to do better when inequality is higher. And there is certainly no evidence that inequality results in political upheaval in such democracies: If we gave Bill Gates an extra \$50 billion, it would not have a predictable effect on the typical voter's life.

Inequality matters to the voter mostly to the extent that it affects his sense of the basic justice of society. Many of the inequalities arise because of choices. Workers with unpleasant jobs are often compensated for that unpleasantness with a higher wage. But other forms of inequality, such as abject poverty, may also be the result of misfortune. In this area, redistributive arguments appear quite compelling: Hungry children will be fed everywhere if only we roll back President Bush's tax cuts.

But the president would be right to insist on the tax cuts. Consider an example first suggested by Milton Friedman in his landmark book *Capitalism and Freedom* that I take some liberties with here. Imagine a small tropical archipelago with three islands. We drop one individual on each island, and each faces dramatically different circumstances. One of the islands is densely forested with fruit and coconut trees and provides a pleasurable life of leisure to its inhabitant. Another has sufficient fish in its lagoons to provide sustenance, but only to a hard-working fisherman. The third is a barren wasteland, and the poor individual who lands there can barely survive by eating insects.

Now imagine that you have been appointed governor of this archipelago. Should you move everyone to the nice island? Should you seize resources from the lucky fellow and give them to the insectivore? A typical response might be that the different outcomes are purely the result of luck, and hence have no moral standing. Government could enter and make the poor better off—and is justified in doing so, since the wealthy fellow would want there to be redistribution if he had landed on a different island.

If this example is not extreme enough to arouse such a response in you, then let's revise it to try to change your mind. Suppose that a young child lands on the bad island and will die if we do not take some food from the good

June 18, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Change

Mr. President—

We talked a bit about change in the Department of Defense at our meeting this morning. Attached is an article from this week's *Time* magazine that discusses change in the Pentagon. I thought you might like to see it.

Very respectfully,

Attach.

Duffy, Thompson and Weisskopf. "Secret Armies of the Night," *Time*, June 23, 2003, pp. 40-45.

DHR:dh
061803-23

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18 Jun 03

SECRET ARMIE

Sidelined for years, U.S. special forces are changing the way America fights. An exclusive look at how they fared in the war in Iraq and how they're remaking the military **By Michael Duffy, Mark Thompson and Michael Weisskopf**

NEARLY EVERYONE AT U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AGREED that the sprawling Faw oil-refining and -shipping facility on Iraq's southeastern coast was a must-seize first-night target in the war on Baghdad—almost as important as killing Saddam Hussein. Capture it early, went the thinking, and the next Iraqi government at least had a chance of getting back on its feet. Ignore it, and Saddam might blow up the facility, flooding the nearby Persian Gulf with crude, compromising Iraq's economy and shutting down

critical water-desalination plants all along the Arabian Peninsula.

But veined and dotted with pipes and pumps and meters, Faw was also a delicate target, easily damaged by wayward ordnance or sabotage. So, on the first night of the war, when others were trying to destroy Iraqi targets, the men of the Naval Special Warfare Task Group were trying to save one. Large, specially equipped Pave Low helicopters flew dark, low and fast toward the refinery from just over the Kuwait border. Dispersing on arrival, the choppers simultaneously

UNDER COVER
Working with Kurdish fighters in the north, teams of clandestine U.S. commandos called in air strikes on Iraqi forces

BY CHARLIE SEBASTIAN
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE
ZUMA PRESS



TOUR DE FORCE
Rumsfeld greets U.S. troops at a Baghdad electric company at the end of April

IRAQ | THE WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH

General David McKiernan, the top U.S. commander in Iraq. "Their effects were felt before D-day and are still felt today."

The increasing faith in special-operations forces (SOF) can be traced to one man: Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Since taking over as Pentagon chief, Rumsfeld has repeatedly handed the commandos starring roles in the war on terrorism and pressed his Vietnam-era generals and admirals to abandon old ways of fighting for new approaches that emphasize speed and stealth. That push is only a piece of the larger war he has been waging on old-fashioned military thinking. But the "SOF guys," as they are called around the Pentagon, have emerged as the biggest winners in the Rumsfeld era. The defense chief has set in motion a host of changes that will boost their budgets and swell their ranks in the next five years. And last week Rumsfeld took the extraordinary step of recommending a retired four-star general, Peter Schoomaker, an original member of Delta Force, to be the next Army Chief of Staff. This is the first time in U.S. history that a top commando has been tapped to lead the entire Army and is yet another indication of the Administration's growing reliance on America's secret soldiers. "God love him," said Air Force Colonel Randy O'Boyle, who directed part of the Faw operation. "[Rumsfeld] had the confidence to unleash us on the target."

Some 10,000 special-forces troops saw action in Iraq, the largest such deployment since World War II and three times the number who participated in Gulf War I. From a secret base in western Saudi Arabia, they seized a pair of airfields and scoured the Iraqi desert for Scuds every night for nearly a month. In the east, they secured a port for the delivery of humanitarian goods.

And in the south, they fought to keep Saddam from destroying the 1,000 oil wells that are the country's financial future. Teams in humvees and low-flying helicopters rolled into dozens of towns in search of arms caches; riverine squads on inflatable boats cleared mines and other vessels from Umm Qasr harbor; and with help from the Marines, Army Rangers and some locals, a SEAL team freed Private Jessica Lynch from a Nasiriyah hospital.

Special forces were usually ahead of the tip of the spear: as U.S. troops pushed toward Baghdad, secret combat teams zipped into Iraq aboard specially outfitted MC-130 Combat Talon planes that used highways as landing strips, surprising the enemy at its rear. On the road to Tikrit, they fingered Iraqi vehicles fleeing the capital for destruction by M1 tanks. And inside the capital, the elite Delta Force slipped into Baghdad's back alleys and into its sewers to eavesdrop on communications, cut fiber-optic cables, target regime leaders and build networks of informants.

Sometimes they just got lucky: a 12-man Green Beret team in customized humvees came upon a Shi'ite cleric and several hundred of his anti-Saddam disciples near Basra on March 20, according to the team's intelligence officer. The cleric sheltered the U.S. troops and their vehicles in warehouses as they plotted joint maneuvers. The Americans deputized the locals and then passed out Chinese-made weapons to the cleric's men and led them on a number of successful raids, seizing more than 100 antitank missiles. When the same Green Berets couldn't dislodge a well-entrenched Iraqi detachment from around a bridge in Basra, they broadcast the sound of approaching tanks from their humvees,

THOUGH GLAMORIZED, SPECIAL FORCES HAVE ALW



HOLD IT RIGHT THERE
At a Baghdad bank,
special-forces soldiers
detain suspected
toolsters in mid-April

DAVID GUTTENFELDER—AP
drawing the Iraqi troops out of hiding and exposing them to fire—a model psychological operation. “It was bait-and-ambush,” the intelligence officer said later.

SOME OF THE SPECIAL-FORCES TROOPS IN IRAQ HAD SEEN it all before—12 years ago, to be exact. Long before the war with Iraq began, officials at the U.S. Special Operations Command in Tampa, Fla., combed service records for names of commandos who had seen action in 1991’s Operation Provide Comfort, which gave food and shelter to Kurdish refugees after Saddam crushed their rebellion. The goal: to lure these American soldiers out of private life and back into action. “We wanted them for the places they’d been and the people they knew,” said a top officer. Army rules prohibit the service from relying on more than 100 retired commandos at any time; by mid-March, a top Army official told *TIME*, 88 had been tapped to return to the region.

Grouped in tiny knots of fewer than half a dozen, many of these special-forces veterans were dropped into northern Iraq months before the war. The teams began to renew old ties and make new ones, traveling with interpreters, wearing local garb, trying to blend in and take control. An Army captain who jumped into the region with a team of four others told *TIME* that his detachment suddenly found itself in charge of 300 Kurdish fighters from the north, known as *peshmerga*, who had been fighting Saddam for a dozen years. Joint strategy meetings were anything but regular Army. “A lot of communication goes on over pita

bread, *chai* and rice,” said the U.S. officer. “We ate what they ate.”

But they fought with very different weapons. The Army captain carried a special scope that enabled him, while hiding several miles away, to fix on elements of an Iraqi artillery battalion south of Arbil, moving toward the city. With U.S. and Kurdish troops blocking the way, the Army officer radioed targeting information on his scope to Air Force air-traffic controllers. They sent B-52s packing a flurry of 2,000-lb. bombs to push the Iraqis 10 miles back down the road. Several U.S. officials who worked on coordinating air strikes for special-forces teams told *TIME* that often as little as 10 minutes elapsed between an initial call for help from the Kurdish-controlled areas of the north and the first bombs falling. “How do you make 50 special-forces teams look 10 feet tall?” asked General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the war’s opening days. “You put Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force power with them. With the right communications and laser designers, you’ve got a pretty formidable force.”

For all the worry about moving human targets, few objectives received as much attention from military planners as the giant Faw facility, stretching out several miles along the Shatt al Arab waterway. Several U.S. military planners told *TIME* that Central Command regarded Faw as so important to the future of Iraq—and so likely to be subject to an act of sabotage by those loyal to the Saddam regime—that many believed it should be seized before the decapitating attacks on Saddam and his inner circle began. “We felt this was a strategic target to begin the war,” said Navy Captain Bob Harward, who planned and commanded the operation.

WAYS BEEN THE RUNT OF THE MILITARY’S LITTER


In the end, it didn't happen that way. President Bush jumped the war when his intelligence chief told him that informants had details on Saddam's whereabouts. That attack failed, but the planning for the raid on Faw began long before the shooting started. Weeks earlier, the U.S. sent Predator drones aloft to map the refinery from above. Working in neighboring countries, the SEALs divided into five teams to study the information, learning about the refinery, where the Iraqi army had built fortified positions and how to avoid parts of the facility where gunfire could start larger explosions. Minimizing collateral damage was vital: a secret Navy estimate predicted that if Iraqis sabotaged just one of the two offshore oil terminals, 12 times as much oil could pollute the gulf as the *Exxon Valdez* spilled into Alaskan waters in 1989. "There was a huge interest in maintaining oil infrastruc-

metering stations and manifolds were seized just minutes after the operation began. The U.S. suffered no casualties. Central Command refused to quantify the Iraqi toll, but a U.S. officer told *TIME* that 40 Iraqis were killed in one fire fight alone. There was general agreement that most of the Iraqis either working at or defending the complex gave up or fled. "They didn't know we were there until we were on top of them," said a Navy officer involved in the operation, "and many of them were very happy for us to arrive."

As easy as the military made it look, Faw was a mission that just 10 years ago the Pentagon would have been reluctant to undertake—and for good reason. The mere idea of choreographing a battle with units from different services—much less with elements of a foreign army and air force—would have been far more

SPECIAL FORCES AT WORK

Commandos travel north through Halabja on their way to join the Kurdish *peshmerga* fighters in March; special-forces soldiers search for weapons and bombmaking materials in an Iraqi official's home in Baghdad in April; a member of the team has a quiet moment at his temporary house in Mosul; as the war is winding down in mid-April, well-armed soldiers patrolling Mosul stop to talk shop with the locals



DUBBED "SNAKE EATERS," SPECIAL-FORCES SOLDIERS

ture from Day One," said an Air Force major. The SEALs rehearsed the entire operation twice.

THE GOPLATS (GAS AND OIL PLATFORMS) MISSION, AS THE military called it, began at dusk on March 20. All the practice paid off: the Pave Low choppers had no trouble finding their drop points; one chopper lowered its SEAL squad right on top of a fortified Iraqi bunker. The commandos hardly went in alone: 20 different types of aircraft circled overhead helping out. Navy jammers stir-fried Iraqi radio communications from upstairs; A-10 Warthogs—twin-engine jets armed with 30-mm machine guns—bore down on military vehicles; British jets fired specialized precision-guided bombs at Iraqi antiaircraft guns, as reconnaissance planes identified enemy troop concentrations and relayed coordinates to AC-130 Spectre gunships. While the entire operation took six hours from start to finish, the vital valves,

dangerous if not impossible in the mid-1980s. That's because for all their box-office power and dazzle, special forces have long been a Pentagon afterthought, an orphan merely tolerated by mainstream generals and admirals but never really loved or understood. Though they have been glamorized from time to time by Presidents—J.F.K. transformed the Green Berets into a tool to fight communism—special forces have always been the runt of the military's litter. To many senior officers, they didn't inspire a lot of confidence.

That view was confirmed over the years in several high-profile missions in which special forces flamed out. In 1980 the ambitious Delta Force rescue mission for American hostages in Tehran had to be scrubbed after one of the U.S. helicopters crashed into a C-130 cargo plane at the Desert One staging site in southeastern Iran, killing eight. Special forces again overplayed their hand in the 1983 invasion of Grenada, where, in what should have been a walkover, commandos suffered unusually high casualties in two

LARRY ADORNIO-CORBIS; ANJA NIEMINGHAUS—AP

separate missions. One reason for their mixed results was that conventional military planners didn't know how to use the units in the first place and were reluctant to mix them in. Many just assumed their best use was as lone rangers, sent off on some long-shot charge all by themselves.

That suited everyone fine for years, because the special warriors, derisively dubbed "snake eaters" by their more conventional counterparts, have always been different. They tend to be older and more specially trained than regular troops. They generally operate only at night, which has fostered their Pentagon moniker, "the Dark Side." Being nocturnal isn't the only reason for the nickname: they carry themselves with a hidden swagger the regulars sometimes resent. They have separate bases, and when they don't, they often live apart and by different rules. And while their unit cohesion is legendary, many of these soldiers tend to be loners, in part because that's always been an element of the training too. Notes Colonel O'Boyle of his colleagues: "They know that if they're shot down, nobody will be there to rescue them. We tell them they'll be executed or become a POW."

firepower, routed the Taliban and took over the country in two months. But in Afghanistan, the special forces weren't cut loose. Instead, Rumsfeld teamed them with U.S. bombers for a potent ground-air duet that pulverized the Taliban from 35,000 ft. with a minimal U.S. presence on the ground. In part because of the success of special forces in Afghanistan, by the middle of last year, a huge shift in their favor was under way in Washington.

In January, Rumsfeld proposed giving the special-operations command the highly prized authority to propose and carry out missions for the first time. He then asked Congress to increase the SOF budget some 30%, to almost \$7 billion, and to expand the number of commandos roughly 10% over the next several years. But Rumsfeld isn't stopping there: a senior U.S. military official told TIME that Rumsfeld has ordered more special-forces personnel to be "forward deployed"—that is, stationed overseas—and some will be given the same kind of civilian cover that intelligence agents get in order to stay closer to the action. "The global nature of the war, the nature of the enemy and the need for fast, efficient operations in hunting down and rooting out terrorist networks



ERS TEND TO BE OLDER, NOCTURNAL AND LONERS

YUNGBI KIM—CONTACT FOR TIME (2)
The tensions began to ease about 10 years ago, after Congress passed a law designed to end the services' silly longtime rivalries and force them to work together more. But it wasn't until Rumsfeld returned to the Pentagon in 2001 after a 24-year absence that things began to really change. Rumsfeld's idea—and he wasn't the first to have it, just the first Pentagon chief to enforce it—was that a few special forces, with the right gear, intelligence and a little luck, could sometimes substitute for the brawn of a 3,000-man brigade. Rumsfeld's views on this point hardened after 9/11. In a world where terrorists lurk, handfuls of commandos can scour the earth much faster and more effectively than thousands of G.I.s moving in division strength. And if you combine the commandos' unusual skills with those of more conventional forces, the results can be dramatic.

The Pentagon took Rumsfeld's theory for a test drive in Afghanistan, where a relatively small force of several hundred special forces, relying nearly as much on cash as on pinpoint

around the world have all contributed to the need for an expanded role for the special-operations forces," said Rumsfeld at a January briefing. "We are transforming that command to meet that need."

It would be wrong to imagine that Rumsfeld can convert his special units into supersoldiers who can do anything or stop anyone. Even he knows that. Special forces have yet to find Osama bin Laden after a 20-month manhunt in Afghanistan. And for all their military success in Iraq, notes a Pentagon official pointedly, "we haven't got Saddam, and we haven't found any weapons of mass destruction." But for the officers who have been fighting the military's conventional thinking for decades, Iraq was the war they had been waiting for. "There are certain things we can do, and there are certain things we can't," said a top special-forces officer who served in Afghanistan. "We can't take and hold ground. But there are some things we can do, and finally the civilian commanders have learned the proper mix." ■

June 19, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

Mr. President—

Here is a very positive article on General Pete Schoomaker, the nominee for Chief of Staff of the Army, from the *Army Times*, a journal that generally tends to be quite critical.

Very respectfully,

Attach.

Naylor, Sean D. "Your New Chief?" *Army Times*, June 23, 2003, pp. 8-9.

DHR:dh
061903-20

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Your new chief? Retired Gen. Schoomaker is likely nominee

By Sean D. Naylor
TIMES STAFF WRITER

The man who called himself "Coyote" is about to become the Army's top dog.

In a signal that he wants to, in the words of one senior Defense Department official, "shake things up" in the Army, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has recommended to President Bush that retired Gen. Pete Schoomaker become the next Army chief of staff.

A former commander of "Delta Force," where his call sign was "Coyote," Schoomaker retired as head of U.S. Special Operations Command in November 2000.

Another Pentagon official confirmed June 11 that Rumsfeld forwarded Schoomaker's name (pronounced "Skoo-maker") to President Bush as his choice to be the next Army chief of staff. If nominated, Schoomaker would have to be confirmed by the Senate. An Army official said the Pentagon's plan is to have Schoomaker's Senate confirmation completed by June 24.

Retired and active-duty generals who have worked closely with Schoomaker unanimously hailed him as an inspired choice, an innovative leader of moral and physical courage who stands as good a chance as anyone of bridging the

divide that now exists between the Army and Rumsfeld's office.

But the unprecedented nature of the selection — retired four-star generals have been called back on active duty a handful of times before, but never to be chief of staff — struck some as a clear, and intended, slight toward the Army on the part of Rumsfeld.

"He's going to be wonderful for the Army, there's no doubt in my mind," said retired Brig. Gen. David Grange, a former commander of the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) who served as deputy commander under Schoomaker in Delta. "But at the same time, it's a little bit of a kick in the teeth to the Army that a current serving three- or four-star flag officer can't make the cut for Rumsfeld."

"Sure there's going to be bruised feelings," said a retired senior leader. "How could there possibly not be?"

"It'll be difficult for younger leaders to understand this, and that'll be a challenge for Pete," agreed retired Gen. John Abrams. But Abrams, who retired as head of Training and Doctrine Command in November 2002, doubts the hurt feelings will last long.

"This is an extraordinary team builder," said Abrams, who worked alongside Schoomaker for a year

in the early 1990s when both were assistant division commanders with the 1st Cavalry Division. "People will enjoy the leadership environment that he creates. He's very professional. I don't see that to be any problem."

"I think the four-stars will rally around him and welcome him with open arms," said another retired four-star. "I talked to two or three of the serving four-stars, and they're happy."

Retired Lt. Gen. Ted Stroup, a vice president of the Association of the U.S. Army, said he and AUSA president, former Chief of Staff Gen. Gordon Sullivan, talked to several general officers about Schoomaker's likely nomination during outgoing Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki's retirement ceremony at Fort Myer, Va., on June 11. "The feedback we got was all upbeat," Stroup said. "If they had to bring a retired guy back, they couldn't have picked a better one."

An active-duty general with recent Pentagon experience agreed and said there was far less griping among his peers than might have been expected. He described their mood upon hearing that Schoomaker probably would be their next chief as "hopeful."

"Everybody has a great deal of confidence in his intelligence and



Gen. Pete Schoomaker, shown in a Feb. 17, 2000, photo, has been recommended by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as the nominee for Army chief of staff.

his integrity," the general said. "Everybody that has either served with him or been around him is absolutely convinced that whatever he does will be in the best interests of the institution."

In particular, the generals are hoping Schoomaker can ease the strains that have developed between the Army and the office of the secretary of defense since Rumsfeld's arrival. Army officials complained bitterly that Rumsfeld's team was bent on cutting the service's force structure, did not support the Army's Transformation initiative because it was begun during the Clinton years and was not only outdated but took in its treatment of Army senior leaders.

That friction became public when Rumsfeld canceled the City

sader artillery system over the objections of Shinseki and Army Secretary Tom White, then again when Shinseki publicly disagreed with Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz over how many troops would be needed to garrison post-conflict Iraq. In a sign of his increasing frustration with the nation's largest service, Rumsfeld forced White to resign April 27.

"There's a general perception among most of us that the Army has (not) more confidence in its own generalship in (the) process of active duty general selection. That's what's frustrating more than anything to get any credit for it."

Schoomaker's arrival is expected to

From previous page

Rumsfeld's confidence, the general said.

"Those who know Schoomaker well said it would be a mistake to assume Rumsfeld will find him a pushover. "He won't kowtow to Rumsfeld," Grange said. "He'll be a team player, but he won't be a yes man."

"I can guarantee you that the secretary is not expecting a yes man and Schoomaker is not a yes man," said the senior Defense Department official. "Anybody who thinks this guy is coming in to be the secretary's lap dog doesn't know Pete Schoomaker. He's going to speak forcefully and advocate for the Army that he loves, and the secretary's going to listen."

"He's a visionary, and the secretary knows him, respects him and trusts him."

Although Schoomaker spent most of his career in special operations, he was commissioned as an Armor officer and spent eight years in conventional Army before entering the special-ops world in 1978. In 1992 he rejoined the conventional forces again, spending a year at Fort Hood, Texas, as 1st Cav's assistant division commander for support. These experiences have helped him gain a perspective on the Army that is informed by more than just life as a secretive special operator.

At Hood, he served with several officers who have risen to three- and four-star status in today's Army, including Training and Doctrine Command chief Gen. Kevin Blymes, U.S. Forces Korea commander Gen. Leon LaPorte and Lt. Gen. David McKiernan, who commanded all ground forces in the recent war in Iraq.

"He's familiar with many of the communities in the Army," a colonel in the Pentagon said. "He's not a one-dimensional guy." Schoomaker "knows and understands" the Army's heavy and light forces, Abrams said. "I am a huge fan of him."

Since retiring in 2000, Schoomaker has kept abreast of Army developments, sources said. "He stayed in touch with the Army," said the colonel in the Pentagon. "Right after 9/11, when the chief was talking to different folks about the way ahead for the Army, Gen. Schoomaker was one of the folks he was talking to."

Abrams said that as TraDoc commander, he enlisted Schoomaker's help in reshaping the Army's leader development programs at Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

"He really does have a broad knowledge of the Army," another retired four-star general said.

Officers who served with Schoomaker praised him and were eager to list the qualities they said he would bring to the job of chief.

"I love Pete Schoomaker," said retired Gen. Wesley Clark, a former supreme allied commander, Europe, who commanded 1st Cav

when Schoomaker was assistant division commander. "He's very balanced, he's thoughtful, he makes reasoned judgments, he tells the truth upward, and he's loyal to the people that work for him. He takes care of people."

"He has the moral courage to face the tough issues and make the right calls," Clark said. "He's going to be an outstanding leader

for the Army," said Clark, who also worked closely with Schoomaker during the 2½ years Clark was supreme allied commander, Europe, and Schoomaker was in charge at U.S. Special Operations Command.

Abrams was one of several retired senior generals who referred to Schoomaker's ability to "think outside the box," an ability that

has presumably served him well in the many combat missions he conducted while a special operator.

"There is no more seasoned operational commander than Pete Schoomaker," Abrams said. "He has been in some very tough, complex operations, both at the junior level as well as at the senior level."

"He has been linked with almost every special-operations mission

that has been conducted since the rescue attempt of the hostages in Tehran — Central America, South America, the Pacific, Bosnia, Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and Operation Just Cause in Panama."

"Make no mistake, Pete Schoomaker is a warrior," Abrams said. "He has a great touch with NCOs, officers and soldiers. He really inspires people." □



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June 23, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable George Tenet
Honorable Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Defense Strategy

381

Attached is an early draft of an updated Andy Marshall paper on defense strategy.
I think you will find it interesting.

Very respectfully,

Attach.
6/12/03 "Defense Strategy Paper 2003"

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Defense Strategy Paper 2003

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 23 2003

I. Overview

- A. The US starts from a strong position. We dominate high end conventional warfare, and the oceans provide large strategic buffers for us while allowing the projection of our forces to the Eurasian continent. This position is the result of geography, the absence of another major power in this hemisphere, the history of the past century, and past investment in military capabilities (including superior military training in the last 30 years). And we are currently ahead in exploiting what technology offers.
- B. We did not seek this dominant position, but we have it and should not give it up. We are not perfectly protected—September 11, 2001 is evidence of that—and the logic of the situation tends toward a search by potential opponents for other ways of dealing with us, either attacking/threatening the US homeland, or preventing US forces from entering areas near themselves. Those efforts encourage proliferation of nuclear weapons and other WMD.
- C. While some long term trends are visible—e.g., the rise of Asia, and the rapid pace of scientific and technological development—the level of uncertainty we face in planning for the future is higher than existed during the past.
- D. The strategy we propose includes:
- preferential investment in a selected portfolio of military capabilities in order to maintain a position of strong advantage in a particular area or to create a position of strong advantage in an important emerging area of future warfare that is central to the maintenance of our strong strategic position.
 - measures to cope with the responses of potential opponents, e.g., increased efforts for homeland defense, preparations for limiting proliferation of WMD, and preemption if that fails, etc.
 - long term repositioning and reshaping of our forces, officer corps, and alliances to focus more on Asia and to hedge against the possible rise of a hostile China.

II. The Future Situation

A. The Logic of the Situation

- The U.S. has a substantial geostrategic and military advantage over possible major competitors for the next decade. With the oceans as strategic buffers that limit threats to U.S. territory, we station and project forces forward to join with allies and friends to deter or defeat threats.
- Some nations dissatisfied with this situation will try to erode the U.S. position, and economic and technology trends may allow them to do so. They will search for ways to make it difficult for the U.S. to operate close to their borders; and will have strong incentives to obtain long-range systems and nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons that can threaten U.S. territory as a deterrent to U.S. intervention overseas.

B. Uneven economic growth will gradually reshape the balance of potential power.

- China, India, and South Korea are likely to grow faster than the US, Europe, Russia, and Japan, although long term economic forecasts cannot be taken literally and there is particular uncertainty about China.
- Post-Soviet Russia's geographic and economic contraction has reduced its economic size to something more like Italy, Brazil, or Canada.
- Illustrative numbers: Percent of total world GDP.
 - US 23% in 2000, 22% in 2025.
 - EU 21% in 2000, 16% in 2025.
 - China 8% in 2000, 13% in 2025.
 - Japan 8% in 2000, 5% in 2025.
 - India 5% in 2000, 8% in 2025.
 - Russia 2.5% in 2000, 2.1% in 2025.
- Implication: Asia gradually emerges as a potential source and potential prize of large-scale military power.

- Indicators of potential power do not decide where U.S. priorities lie or where conflict is most likely. But since the demise of the Soviet Union, no other country has commanded aggregate resources anywhere near those of the U.S. *If we are going to face a military competitor with a formidable resource base in the next several decades—or if military rivalry or conflict develops between other great powers—it is likely to be in Asia.*
 - The vast distances within the Asian theater and the lower density of U.S. basing options there place a premium on long-range systems. For example, a Taiwan-China theater is 650 miles from Okinawa, 1000 miles from other U.S. air bases in Japan and Korea, 2000 miles from Guam, and more than 4000 miles from Australia and Hawaii. The distance from Asia to the American continent, and the distances within the Asian theater, should inform our planning for logistics systems, and for the mix of platforms and capabilities we develop.
 - DoD and the U.S. in general will need to develop widespread regional expertise. This will entail developing a new generation of experts in the languages and strategic cultures of Asian countries, and increasing DoD's familiarity with the region by placing more headquarters in the region, sending officers to schools in the region, etc.
 - Demographic trends are one contributor to the economic forecast, and will amplify its effect, as services for aging populations will tend to divert resources away from the military in Europe, Japan, and (slightly later) the United States.
 - There is particular uncertainty about China. Measures of past performance and relative size are suspect and disputed. Insolvent banking system supports large and inefficient state owned enterprises, clouding future prospects. China's population will also age, though trailing Europe, Japan, and the US.
- C. Continuing growth of world trade, including China and India becoming significant importers of oil.

- Japan, South Korea, Germany, and France are already roughly 100% dependent on imported oil. By 2020 (according to very rough projections), China could go from importing a third of the oil it consumes to importing seven-tenths of it; India could go from 60% dependent to 85%.
- Notwithstanding the likely development of oil supplies in the Caspian Basin, and the large share of U.S. oil imports that will originate in our own hemisphere, the Persian Gulf will remain uniquely important as the major supplier to the global oil market that determines the price we and other importers pay for oil. The Persian Gulf will retain its special strategic significance as long as oil remains a key energy source, a situation of finite but uncertain duration.
- Import dependence is probably not a cause of conflict, but is a vulnerability in wartime, and may shape forces and policies. For example, reliance on oil imports may spur investment in naval forces; or efforts to influence oil exporting countries, e.g., by arms sales.

D. Emerging military challenges

1. Proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

- Iran, Libya, and North Korea are currently the most likely new additions to the nuclear club; actual (or effectively threatened) use of a nuclear weapon could provoke a considerably broader proliferation.
- WMD threats (against U.S. allies, hosts, forces, or U.S. territory) will likely, among other things, be attempts to deter U.S. power projection operations.
- Russia, China, and others could develop low yield tactical nuclear weapons and appropriate operational concepts to counter what they see as overwhelming U.S. conventional capabilities.

2. Increasing threats to U.S. territory.

- Terrorists may use more lethal means, including weapons of mass destruction.
- To deter or respond to U.S. military intervention against them, adversaries are likely to threaten or strike U.S. territory and interests, using covert operations

- or, as they obtain them, longer-range strike systems (cruise and ballistic missiles) and nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.
- Opponents may also target electronic networks on which U.S. infrastructure, banking, and communications increasingly depend, so as to threaten or demonstrate an ability to inflict severe economic disruption.
3. Proliferation of advanced conventional technologies may permit more sophisticated anti-access strategies against U.S. power projection.
- Ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced mines and submarines, and target recognition and guidance systems would be designed to prevent U.S. forces' timely arrival or deter their deployment. Forward bases and U.S. aircraft carriers would be targets—as would allied, coalition, or host country forces and facilities.
 - Information warfare could be waged against U.S. territory to disrupt U.S. force deployments, and against U.S. forces highly dependent upon shared information for self-defense and strike effectiveness. Measures would likely include computer network attacks, anti-satellite attacks, jamming of Global Positioning System (GPS) signals, and use of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and radio frequency (RF) weapons.
4. Opponents will look for other means of offsetting the advantages of US forces once in theater.
- Efforts to offset U.S. air attack will include concealment, decoys, dispersal, hardening, and infrared-guided surface to air missiles.
 - We can expect wider proliferation of older, simpler, but still effective weapons such as small arms, grenade launchers, and shoulder-fired missiles. Even the most recent versions of these weapons are available for sale internationally.
 - Opponents will try to use urban areas, restricted terrain, and guerrilla tactics to limit U.S. options.
5. The proliferation of accurate missiles may have other important effects.

- It could create options for coercive threats or attacks against economic assets.
 - The growing role of international commerce, the increasing wealth of countries, the difficulty of conquering and occupying territory, and the technical challenge of targeting mobile or hidden enemy military forces—all these considerations may encourage attempts to use military force coercively, against commerce or other economic assets.
 - U.S. allies and friends who face such threats may seek U.S. help against them.
 - Incentives to initiate war preemptively may increase, as owners of accurate missiles may think they can disarm the enemy decisively, and fear that a missile-armed enemy will act first.
- 6. U.S. efforts to deter aggression or the use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons will confront different circumstances.
 - The larger number of actors and variety of actions we may wish to deter make us unlikely to have a reliable understanding of those actors' calculations and psyches.
 - Our Cold War focus on the Soviet Union and the peculiarly "rationalist" style of Communist doctrine facilitated our deterrence calculations; but our success may conceal the role of luck, and the risk of failure was probably higher than hindsight recalls.
 - In contrast to the Cold War focus on deterring the conquest of Western Europe and a massive nuclear attack on the United States, some of the actions we wish to deter in the future will threaten less dire and immediate consequences for us. The actors we wish to deter may have or think they have much higher stakes at risk than we do, which will reduce the deterrent effect of our advantage in military capability.
- E. Recent and likely technological advances appear to permit radical innovations in military methods over the next several decades. The full exploitation of new

technologies will probably require changes in how military forces are organized and in their concepts of operations. This is both an opportunity for the U.S. and a source of potential threat. The U.S. will face a wide ranging menu of options—as will potential enemies, aided by global commerce and the “dual use” character of many important technologies.

- Robotic systems could be developed for a variety of missions. Stealth, performance, cost, and casualty concerns may move the U.S. and competitors toward a greater reliance on unmanned combat systems.
- Much smaller, even microscopic, sensors and weapons could be linked by information networks.
- Space based systems could take on a wider range of military functions.
- In general, information processing technology, whose rapid recent development has been widely exploited by military forces, is a likely source of further change.
 - Communications networks permit vast improvements in the precision and coordination of military effort; but an opponent's use of information technology to deny, disrupt, or corrupt communications and information may have offsetting—or even devastating—effects.
 - Information operations more broadly considered may also be a critical strategic tool, as military forces as well as entities outside of the military engage in public diplomacy, psychological warfare, and deception. These methods may be enhanced by advances in cognitive sciences.
- Biological technologies and diseases may be the basis of various new measures and countermeasures, with soldiers, populations, crops, and livestock as potential targets.
- In combination with, or as successors to, the proliferation and improvement of long range strike forces, these technologies could permit radical changes in warfare, devaluing capabilities today thought formidable, or the significance of geographic distance, oceans, and mountain ranges.

F. Uncertainties

1. The surprises and erroneous predictions that litter the historical record caution against confidence in forecasting. Since we face an irreducible uncertainty about crucial matters, our strategy must lead, hedge, and adapt—not simply anticipate.
2. Unpredictable discontinuities may affect the security environment more severely than predicted trends.
 - In most of the world's undemocratic countries, some kind of revolution or political instability is plausible but not predictable.
 - Technological breakthroughs can belie assumptions about existing sources of military advantage.
 - Use of nuclear weapons would promote a scramble for defenses, nuclear proliferation, and a search for (or, depending on what had just happened, loss of confidence in) "guarantees" extended by others, particularly the U.S.
 - Additional major terrorist attacks on the U.S. remain possible.
3. We cannot predict the timing, identity, and extent of future military challenges.
 - E.g., technology appears widely available to support "anti-access" capabilities, and we already see some evidence that several countries are developing them; but we do not know how rapidly this will proceed and how robust the capabilities built will be.
 - E.g., China's growing wherewithal makes it a central actor, but a wide range of policies and developments are conceivable.
 - Will the priority of trade and economic growth inhibit military ambitions? Would China try to absorb Taiwan by force, and if so when might they have the capability? Will China press for US withdrawal from Japan, Korea?
 - Will economic reversals or political change disrupt any such intentions?

- Large-scale conflict between major powers does not appear to be the most likely case for the next decade or so; but a prudent DOD strategy must remain fully prepared for that contingency.

III. Sustaining the Favorable US Position

A. Advantage-based strategy

- An advantage-based strategy focuses on identifying the most important sources of existing US military advantage; determining how to sustain advantages that might be challenged; deciding whether and how we can favorably influence the forces and behavior of potential opponents by enhancing certain advantages; and selecting emerging warfare areas in which it is most important to attain new advantages.
- There will certainly be some military requirements we will face that we must prepare to meet even if we are not in an advantageous position.
 - For example, even if missile defense is difficult and costly compared to the offensive missile threats that may proliferate in the future, we will probably need to pursue that mission.
 - Whether or not we are able to become especially proficient in post-war “constabulary” duties, we are likely to face that task.
 - Thus focusing on a “portfolio of advantages” is a way of exploiting our strengths, but it is not a comprehensive prescription for force planning.
- To be a useful management tool, the portfolio of key advantages must be a limited, selected set—not an exhaustive list of useful military capabilities. The intention is to identify areas for special attention where U.S. strength appears to have the highest payoff, where particular efforts of analysis and experimentation may be warranted. Depending on what judgments are reached about a particular area, it may or may not gain in budgetary priority.

- Given the great uncertainties involved, as well as the difficulty of combining the variety of considerations that deserve some weight, there is no straightforward recipe for the portfolio. This section outlines the main issues to be considered, in particular
 - identifying key advantages evident in our current capabilities
 - introspection about the sources of those military advantages
 - analysis of the dynamics of longer term competition, i.e., how our capabilities shape the investments, operations, and even goals of potential opponents
 - assessment of prospects for technological and operational innovation, and their impact
 - judgment of how to place bets and hedge against risks.

B. Key advantages in current capabilities

- Central to our favorable geostrategic situation is a strong US superiority in projecting forces for high intensity conventional warfare, and in preventing any such power projection against US territory.
 - Our power projection superiority did not prevent the attack of September 11, 2001, but has shown its value in the aftermath of that attack. This capability not only supports allies threatened by aggression, as has long been the case; it is essential to our ability to prevent or deter terrorist attacks on ourselves.
- The U.S.'s superior position in power projection and counter-power projection depends in part on access and cooperation provided by numerous overseas allies and friends. And it depends on a number of specific military competences in which we have superior (in some cases, overwhelmingly superior) capabilities.
 - For example, US superiority in aerial warfare means that U.S. leaders count on quickly gaining control of the air, limiting if not eliminating enemy ability to mount aircraft attacks against our deployed forces or against regional airbases, airheads, logistics facilities, and ports used by American forces and allies in the

region. Air superiority also enables us to deliver much more ordnance against targets than can an enemy whose only long range strike systems are missiles.

- The US also has a strong advantage in using space assets to enhance military operations, exploiting satellites for rapid communication with and among globally dispersed forces, and for precision navigation and targeting.
- The recent goal of regime change in Iraq made clear that a key element of US power projection dominance is embodied in ground forces capable of rapid movement and territorial control. One should add airlift and sealift assets to the list; indeed a comprehensive list of the military capabilities that enable our successful power projection operations would be a very long one.
- Criteria developed below offer a way of more sharply focusing managers' attention.

C. Sources of these elements

- The specific US military competences just mentioned are attributable to more general sources. Strategy should try to understand and where necessary cultivate those roots. For example, the complexity, scope, and realism of U.S. military training activities are well beyond the capabilities of most other nations, and have created force-wide levels of "first battle" competence without precedent in American history.
- The chain of causation can be traced back farther: While US training advantages are partly the result of past resource allocations and institutional learning, they may also reflect certain cultural or political characteristics of our country—such as a tolerance for very frank discussion between personnel of different ranks, including discussion of errors and failures.
- Whether specific US military advantages are traced to luck, or history, or culture, the key point for strategy is to comprehend our collection of inherited assets, and to consider which of their sources may need future nourishment, and which of those assets might be more fully exploited in the future.

- While we also look for promising new areas of military advantage, existing areas of advantage may have particular merit in making use of underlying national strengths. And we want to preserve and build on assets acquired with great cost and difficulty, rather than planning to rebuild them only when needed. Apart from the likely high cost of recreating discarded assets, institutional and personnel competences may be difficult to rebuild at all.
- Some existing US advantages may lie in methods of warfare that could be more fully exploited, that is, applied to a broader range of military functions.
 - For example, the US has a highly developed competence in undersea warfare, which may offer important operational options to cope with a more difficult anti-access environment.
 - Or the US advantage in naval platforms and operations could support missile defense systems in close enough proximity to launch sites to permit boost phase interception.
 - The US's highly developed space capabilities might reward efforts to bring down the high cost of launching to orbit (currently (\$5,000 to \$10,000 per pound) so as to permit innovations that could create new military advantages.

D. The dynamics of longer term competition

- The idea of a portfolio of advantages is meant to focus attention on the long term competitive effects of US military advantages, that is, their effects on the investments, operations, and even the goals of potential US military opponents (and, for that matter, on US allies as well). Some US advantages that do not appear conspicuous in a review of recent warfare may nevertheless play a crucial role as "entry barriers" to threatening capabilities. Such barriers are likely to be under appreciated if they are successful and no threat becomes manifest.

- For example, US sea denial capabilities and US counter-air capabilities make it extremely difficult for anyone to contemplate acquiring a capability for very large scale, inexpensive bombardment of our territory.
- Worldwide sea control requires a tremendous commitment in manpower and resources; modern ships have high acquisition costs and large supporting infrastructures that will likely dissuade all but the most economically successful countries from developing blue water navies. It may therefore be quite feasible for the US to retain a very large margin of advantage in sea control, preserving a formidable barrier against future enemy long distance power projection. This does not necessarily require more money or innovation; we may need only to recognize the strategic value of our advantage, keep an eye on developments, and maintain forces sufficient to keep up the entry barrier.
- US air superiority also serves as an entry barrier in theater war operations. If enemies realize they cannot hope to defeat that superiority, they may build hundreds or thousands of missiles to generate a strike capability, but they cannot marshal the tens of thousands of relatively cheap strike munitions that manned aircraft can deliver.
- One effect of an entry barrier is to divert opponents' efforts toward other, alternative activities.
 - There is some benefit if we can reduce our uncertainty about what future opponents may do by making some options infeasible for them. We may in some cases want to pursue innovations that make our capabilities a more robust, moving target for asymmetric strategies that attempt to exploit an existing set of vulnerabilities or achieve a narrow area of advantage. And we should look for opportunities to divert opponent efforts into activities less dangerous to ourselves.

- Not to be underestimated is the possibility that opponents' goals may themselves be influenced by our evident determination to retain a superiority that would be very difficult to challenge.
- In any case, to manage of portfolio of advantages effectively we will need to monitor carefully what other countries are up to—in particular how they respond to our own choices—and adjust our plans accordingly.

E. Frontiers of technological and operational innovation

- A portfolio of advantages designed for the long term must take account of changes in technology that may make formidable new capabilities possible or undercut the effectiveness of existing capabilities.
- Technological change makes it likely that new and much more effective systems and methods of warfare will be invented. We want to develop superior competence in the methods of warfare that will be most decisive in the future, including most robust against successive rounds of countermeasures. This is not only a matter of anticipating and thwarting enemy innovations, but of pursuing advantageous opportunities.
- For example, unmanned systems are likely to become increasingly capable due to advances in information technology, microelectronics, power supplies, and artificial intelligence. They can overcome endurance and maneuver limits associated with human pilots, and reduce force protection concerns. Our technology base and experience make this a promising area, even if we cannot foresee how quickly various capabilities can be developed or precisely what military role they will play.
- In some cases, a key US military advantage may be at risk from emerging trends. In that case the question is how the advantage can be preserved—by force modernization or expansion, perhaps, or (more likely) by the development of new military methods, including new operational concepts or military organizations. For example:

- The proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles threatens the forward bases and aircraft carriers on which much of our long range precision strike capability depends. To preserve our advantage in long range strike, we may need different sorts of forces, systems, and concepts—perhaps missile defense systems, perhaps a greater reliance on long range aircraft, aerial refueling, unmanned aerial combat vehicles, or cruise missiles or other precision ordnance fired from surface ships or submarines.
- As competitors buy or develop increasingly lethal anti-access capabilities, non-stealthy U.S. naval assets will operate at increased risk and may be denied access to key littoral areas. This may require a greater reliance on, for example, the stealth associated with undersea warfare.
- Emerging U.S. advantages in using space to enhance military operations within the atmosphere will likely provoke opponents to try to negate these capabilities—so that to retain our advantage we will need to find the means to survey foreign activities in space, identify hostile movements, and protect satellites.
- The selection of key areas of advantage would both guide, and be informed by the results of, a robust, sustained program of experimentation to develop and test new means of warfare. Programs of experimentation, and implementation of new methods in a limited part of our forces, will create options and allow learning.
 - We will face considerable uncertainty about the rate of progress and technical effectiveness of a variety of measures and countermeasures, so we will need to develop multiple options and conduct experiments.
 - On the basis of what we learn—about what weapons systems are feasible and effective, what organizational changes and operational concepts take best advantage of new systems, and how to execute those concepts—we will be in a position to make broader adjustments over a longer period of time.

- Innovations may be introduced initially to relatively small, selected elements of the force, as a foundation for further experimentation and experience, including experience gained from participation in any combat operations that occur in the future.

F. Placing bets and hedging against risks

- By selecting a number of promising areas of military competence we would build a portfolio of advantages the diversity of which would be a hedge against the uncertainty about the future value of each. We would try to place the most promising “bets,” but not expect all to pay off.
- Defense managers will need to consider the possibility that a certain area of advantage is or could become unsustainable, and that the U.S. must look for substitutes elsewhere in its “portfolio.”
 - The real merit of preserving existing advantages (such as those we have in manned aircraft and large surface ships) runs the risk of cost-ineffective—or futile—efforts to preserve methods that new technologies (like supersonic, stealthy cruise missiles) may make obsolete.
 - This will be a difficult analytical and political challenge.

G. Examples: Key areas of military advantage

What military competences would constitute a manageable “portfolio” to support sustained US superiority in power projection? This would require serious deliberation by the Services, Joint Staff, and OSD. But what has been said above suggests a notional first draft for such a portfolio:

1. Aerial Warfare. This is an area where we have a strong existing superiority in both our equipment and our training, which plays a central role both in power projection and in denying options for enemy power projection. US microelectronics and software skills facilitate sensor and communications improvements. Accurate enemy missiles targeted at US forward bases or carriers appear to be the chief means by which our advantage might be challenged. And,

absent innovations to extend our operating ranges, our effectiveness may also be undermined by the long distances characteristic of the Asian theater.

2. **Sea Control.** Both our ability to project and sustain power long distances, and our ability to deny enemies the ability to project power onto our soil depend in large measure on our success in controlling the seas. This is currently an area of strong US superiority, and the high cost of naval forces gives the wealthy US an advantage in preserving their entry barrier against large scale enemy power projection. Naval forces used for force projection are likely to face anti-access challenges including missiles, mines, and submarines, requiring innovations on our side (e.g., a greater reliance on the stealth of undersea systems) to retain our advantage.
3. **Space Operations.** The US is well ahead of other nations in making military use of space, and relies much more than others do on the contribution of space assets to military operations (e.g., communication, navigation, timing, sensors, and precision guidance using GPS). Space assets are well suited to a globally dispersed force such as ours. Opponents are unlikely to match these capabilities, but antisatellite threats will probably mandate innovations in our hardware or practices.
4. **Training.** This is a US superiority that we acquired at great cost after the Vietnam War. It manifests itself across many forms of warfighting, seems to draw to some extent on conducive US cultural traits, and is embodied in assets like the instrumented ranges at Nellis AFB and the Army's National Training Center. An important issue is the extent to which our practices could be effectively imitated by opponents who observe their effectiveness.
5. **Unmanned Systems.** For reasons mentioned earlier, this appears to be both a very promising area for military innovation in general, and one particularly suited to US concerns with protecting our own personnel, the benefits of enhanced ISR, and the need to operate in a wide range of environments. While it appears that unmanned systems will be important, it is difficult to foresee how exactly they will

be employed. Therefore a useful hedging strategy is to develop a broad-based competence in this area so that the nation can adapt quickly as new technologies and operational concepts emerge. Experimental units incorporating such systems could test and refine new concepts and capabilities in the field.

IV. Implementation

A. Activities outside the portfolio. The “portfolio” approach just described is not a comprehensive prescription for our forces and budgeting. We want to sustain and exploit our advantages, but we will need to perform some missions even where we face disadvantages.

- Indeed our dominance in conventional warfare and power projection will cause some of our most determined opponents to focus their efforts not on denying access to our projection forces or developing large scale projection forces of their own, but on short cuts that they think can circumvent our superiority: covert terrorist or missile attacks, perhaps using nuclear or biological weapons. While a continuing US superiority in power projection is a critical means by which these threats may be dissuaded, deterred, or preempted, there is no doubt that measures for the direct defense of US territory (including missile defense) will be a major claimant on resources.
- Similarly, the example of Iraq reminds us that power projection for regime change creates a requirement for post-war “constabulary” forces. While such capabilities would probably not fit into the portfolio described here, DOD managers must certainly consider how the requirement can be met—whether by specialized forces, contributions of allies, or other approaches.

B. Development of Analytic Concepts, Measures, and Expertise. Implementing an advantage-based approach to strategic planning within DOD will require new analytic techniques and people trained to use them. This is likely to be a multi-year effort, perhaps on a scale similar to that associated with the rise of PPBS in the 1960s. Appropriate steps include a program of research at think tanks, war colleges, and

other institutions to develop a literature, set of practices, and trained practitioners; and changes to the curricula and faculty at the war colleges, Naval Postgraduate School, and elsewhere to emphasize this new approach to defense strategic planning. As new concepts develop and expertise grows, we will need to apply these to existing practices within DOD, that is, alter the planning guidance to reflect the emphasis on developing and maintaining areas of advantage rather than focusing on threats; focus the acquisition process on longer-term capabilities; and alter force sizing analysis and force selection processes to incorporate the new emphasis on developing strong positions in the areas identified in the portfolio. An advantage-based strategy should also inform changes in intelligence collection priorities, indicators and warnings, and other intelligence community products.

- C. Determining Areas to Include in the Portfolio.** Selecting areas of military competition to be included in the portfolio will not be easy. As a start, OSD might convene a study effort, together with senior officers from the military services, to identify those areas that seem to be most centrally related to our ability to retain the favorable position we have today. At the same time, top defense managers and senior officers ought to be considering new or emerging areas that will be important in future warfare. Here study will need to be complemented by a robust experimentation program, in which new technologies and concepts can be honestly explored and evaluated.
- D. Experimentation.** Innovative approaches to gaining or extending US advantages will need to be refined and tested before their role and merit will be clear. This requires field experimentation, including experimental military units that would adapt emerging technologies, field new systems, develop new operational concepts and methods of organizing, and engage in training exercises against existing forces and opposing forces that carefully study the culture and tactics of potential adversaries. Special efforts should be made to exploit the “natural experiments” that occur when US forces improvise and innovate in wartime, so that advantageous methods are incorporated into subsequent training and operational plans.

E. Focus more DoD attention on Asia. It would be useful to develop a broad base of military personnel well schooled in Asia, especially officers who understand the culture and history, speak the language, and have lived in and interacted with the people of Asian countries. In addition, curriculum changes in the war colleges and in training programs could improve understanding of Asia. The creation of additional military command infrastructure within Asia would allow more officers to serve there and experience the size and distances of the Asian region.

June 23, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Shultz Paper

Mr. President,

In case you haven't seen this speech by George Shultz late last month, I thought you might like to have a copy. It is excellent.

Very respectfully,



Attach.

Shultz, George P. "The Work on Diplomacy," given at the dedication of the George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center Dedication Ceremony May 29, 2003.

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23 Jun 03

THE WORK OF DIPLOMACY**George P. Shultz****The George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center
Dedication Ceremony****Arlington, Virginia
May 29, 2002**

Mr. Secretary, friends of the Department of State and Foreign Service: Today's ceremony, which links my name to this Institute and to the Foreign Service, is an honor beyond anything I ever imagined. I take it as a profound compliment not only from the wonderful colleagues with whom I served in the State Department, but also from that long line of strong and creative men and women who have served our country's diplomacy across the generations. I am humbly grateful for the tribute you offer me today.

I came into office as Secretary of State with a war going on in the Middle East and a bigger war – the Cold War – keeping the world in turmoil and keeping me busy to an extent I could hardly have imagined.

When I answered President Ronald Reagan's call to service, I also brought to the job a way of thinking developed from years of experience in government, business, and universities. I knew I would be dealing with many crises on a day-to-day basis and that for American foreign policy to succeed over time, I would have to pay attention to long-

term issues. But my experience also taught me that to succeed in these efforts, I would need the help and support of the people who were devoting their careers to the understanding and conduct of diplomacy. So I would try to strengthen the institution, to make the best use of its people, to pay attention to their careers and their aspirations to serve their country. I wanted to leave the Department of State and the Foreign Service in better shape than I found them.

In the process, I learned a few things. The Foreign Service is the custodian of our country's diplomatic experience in the world: not theories or abstractions but actual experience. Recognizing the importance of experience, I decided, as Secretary of State, to pull together a collection of books about American diplomacy. That collection is still up there in Colin Powell's office. (And I know from my tenure in that office that he doesn't have time to read those books.) The Foreign Service Institute should be the center for such works that record our nation's diplomatic experience: ideas written down that get into people's heads and can make a practical difference.

The conduct of diplomacy requires a clear understanding of what is happening and the ability to make a clear record of it and report it honestly and in depth. This may seem obvious and easy. It is not: it requires exceptional intellectual skills and qualities of character and discipline. As former Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan describes, "The true diplomatist [is] aware of how much subsequently depends on what clearly can be established to have taken place. If it seems simple in the archives, try it in the maelstrom."

Fast-moving media coverage, impressive though it may often be, is almost inevitably focused on the newsworthy. The United States must conduct diplomacy on a global scale, clearly dependent on careful reporting from posts around the world and interpretations by people on the ground who speak the language and understand cultural nuances. And, of course, results of discussions need to be written down immediately. Memories are all too often faulty or self-serving.

So we need to encourage careful record-keeping and teach and nurture that skill in the foreign service. This is no mere technical matter; in these times it takes courage, and issues of national interest may be at stake. Even in my time, if a cable came in from an ambassador with a highly critical or sensitive set of observations about the country where the ambassador was stationed, the existence of this cable would often become the subject of rumor. Relentless demands for that cable would almost inevitably follow. I fought those pressures because the release of such a cable would mean, of course, that the ambassador's role would be diminished, sometimes even ended. Nonetheless, the pulling-and-hauling has an impact. Candor in the cables inevitably suffers. Reliance on telephone diplomacy increases, with all its imprecision, vulnerability to misunderstanding, and loss to the vital diplomatic record.

More broadly in our society, whether in business or government, there is now a widespread and conscious reluctance to create records – and a disposition to destroy them if made. What I worry about is our ability to conduct our affairs with precision and to

portray history accurately if such records are not at hand and the statesman tries to rely on his or her own memory, which invariably is flawed in significant ways. A living history requires tools of remembrance. Moreover, so much of what we do today depends upon our understanding of the past. Each generation creates the record of the past for succeeding generations. If we lose that past, we are also going to lose an important key to the future. So, members of the Foreign Service, keep records.

The ability to comprehend other cultures must be central to our diplomacy. This is an area of comparative advantage for the Foreign Service. Even in this age of globalizing influences, we are finding that traditional cultures not only continue to exist but in many places are gaining greater influence. Sometimes they serve a useful role as ballast in the rough weather of globalization. At other times, they are used – sometimes badly misused – in the interests of some cause or grievance. I do not need to tell you that those who speak the local language have a greater sensitivity to cultural variations, a greater ability to comprehend mood and nuance, and a heightened capacity to convey those realities back to Washington. So the Foreign Service Institute's world-class capacity to teach language skills must be nourished and used.

We also know that language study is not enough. The field of area studies, once regarded as essential but later disparaged, needs to be given new life. When I was a dean at the University of Chicago, I developed a strong point of view about the value of experience. Yes, experience is a great teacher. Formal education should develop the ability to learn from that experience. We all have seen instances where four or five

people share an experience but only one or two of them learn much from it. For the others, that experience might as well never have happened. A key objective for the Foreign Service Institute is to provide our people with the language, analytical, and area skills they need in order to be the ones best able to learn from their experiences out there in the world.

America's need for a seasoned Foreign Service and the intelligent management of Foreign Service careers are inextricably bound together. Half of the career service will retire in the next six years. State and other departments – with the exception of the Department of Defense – have never handled the problem of intake well. Secretary Powell tells me that applications for the Foreign Service – including lots of strong minority candidates – are two to three times what they were in recent years, so here's a chance to get it right. Good training is essential – at the beginning and throughout a productive career. The Foreign Service Institute provides a real advantage, as a place where careers can be developed, enhanced through training, and provided with substantive depth. Then there is career structure, particularly the length of the Foreign Service career. We need to preserve access to senior positions, so that our finest people do not resign or retire to start their next careers just when they are coming into the peak years of performance at the top of the Service.

Careers in the Foreign Service have their risks. You can get shot at. On opposite walls of the entry hall to the Main State Building are two lists of names of officers killed in the line of duty, covering the years 1780 to 2002. We lost 209 officers. In the first

187 years of our history, we lost 83 officers. In the most recent 35 years, we have lost 126. The losses per year now are almost nine times as great as in earlier times.

All too many of those casualties were the result of acts of terror, a reality that today confronts us in more urgent terms and in greater magnitude than ever before. I want to say a few words about this acute problem, one on which I worked hard and endured the frustrations and agonies that come with death and destruction. I remember so well flying back from Pakistan on August 21, 1988, with the remains of a talented and beloved Foreign Service Officer, Ambassador Arnie Raphel. That was a sad and moving day.

The tragedy of September 11 was a riveting wake-up call for the people of America. Stunned and horrified, we saw in a flash our vulnerability. As we reacted, we also saw our strengths and we experienced a renewal of patriotism and national pride. We deepened our realization of how closely intertwined our fortunes are with developments elsewhere, sometimes far away culturally as well as geographically.

That attack was also a transforming event here and in many places throughout the world in attitudes toward terrorism. For decades, terrorism has been all too frequent, mostly in the Middle East, but also in Europe and Asia, often aimed at Americans. We saw our share of it in the 1980s, when I was in office. The pace picked up in the 1990s, by which time the capabilities and intentions of Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaida network were well known. I said in 1984, "We cannot allow ourselves to become the

Hamlet of nations, worrying endlessly over whether and how to respond." But for whatever reasons, we did not respond effectively during these past two decades. Face it: the lack of effective response encourages terrorism, not the other way around.

But now, opinion has changed. When, in that same 1984 speech, following terrorist attacks on our embassy and on the Marine barracks in Beirut and the IRA effort to blow up Margaret Thatcher in Brighton, I called for "active prevention, preemption, and retaliation," and said we "must be willing to use military force," I was disowned and dismissed by official Washington and on leading editorial pages. (After I had a chance to go over my thinking carefully with President Reagan, he said he agreed with me.)

By contrast, we all cheered – I at the top of my voice – when Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld said on the *Jim Lehrer NewsHour* on February 4 of this year:

If you think about it, we have no choice. A terrorist can attack at any time at any place using a range of techniques. It is physically impossible to defend at every time in every location against every conceivable technique of terrorism. Therefore, if your goal is to stop it, you cannot stop it by defense. You can only stop it by taking the battle to the terrorists, where they are and going after them....

When it's something like smallpox or anthrax or a chemical weapon or the radiation weapon or killing thousands of people at the World Trade [Center], then you say to yourself, "Well, if we can't stop terrorists at every location of every technique at every moment of the day or night, what must we do – just sit here and take the blows like the World Trade [Center], take the blows that biological

weapons would pose to us?" The answer is "No." You have a responsibility to defend your country. Everyone in the world knows – even the UN Charter provides for – the right of self-defense. And the only self-defense, the only effective way to defend, is to take the battle to where the terrorists are. They are planning, they are plotting, they have trained thousands of terrorists very well, and we have no choice but to find those people and root them out, as the president said, and stop them from doing what they're doing and stop countries from harboring them.

So preemption with military force is now an operative idea, with wide support. That is essential. But continuing threats are all too real, so we must not flag or be distracted in our efforts to end the use of this terrible and unacceptable weapon: terrorism.

President Bush has given us the concepts we need. This is a war, not a matter of law enforcement. States that support terror are as guilty as the terrorists. They are in the crosshairs, and the principle of state accountability is being established. Our goal is not primarily to punish and retaliate but to prevent acts of terror through intelligence that enables us to preempt and ultimately to eliminate the source. These are big and far-reaching ideas that must be kept front and center: this is a war; states must be held accountable. We are calling on states to step up to their internal responsibilities to end any terrorist presence, while saying also that we reserve, within the framework of our right to self-defense, the right to preempt terrorist threats within a state's borders. Not

just hot pursuit: hot preemption. The juxtaposition of these ideas calls for sophisticated diplomacy, clear intelligence, and the will to act with the courage of our convictions.

This war is of worldwide dimensions and must be fought on many fronts. I will identify six of them.

First, we have the front of the hinterlands, those places around the world where states have failed or where no state authority reaches. In these places, terrorists find sanctuary where they can train and plan and can emerge to strike again. Afghanistan was the main such area, but it's not the only place. You can name them as well as I, and you need more than the fingers on your two hands. We have conducted a brilliant campaign on the Afghanistan front. Afghanistan cannot now serve as a terrorist refuge and staging area. But an enormous task remains to be completed there. The fires still burn. A state must be built from the ground up and attain the legitimacy and authority to prevent the country from sliding back into terrorist hands.

Another front is in Europe and, to a degree, in our own country. In the liberal, open, welcoming democracies of the West, terrorists have been able to establish themselves, move about easily, communicate and develop their plans with little interference from the authorities, particularly in many European countries. The terrorists know that they can enjoy and employ the freedoms offered by the democratic West to plan the destruction of our liberal institutions and societies. This, too, is a matter of making the state – the democratic state – effective and accountable. We in the

democratic West have to get ourselves in order. We must enhance and better coordinate our investigative capabilities. We must change our mind-set. Our task is to prevent criminal acts, not just catch and punish after the damage is done. Through intensive intelligence-sharing and cooperative police work, the war on this front can and must be fought effectively – and within the framework of protective civil rights and proper judicial procedures.

Another front that needs our attention is that of the regimes of Arab and Islamic countries. Over the years, in the knowledge that many of the terrorists seek their overthrow above all else, these regimes have, each in its own way, made their deals with the terrorists. They have paid them off, propagandized them to focus on external enemies, or sought to use them to build up the religious legitimacy of those regimes. They have created a monster. They may have bought some time for themselves, but they are sealing their own doom if they keep on this path. Since September 11, some of them have come to their senses. These regimes have to take responsibility as states and they must be held accountable. They have to stop playing the double game. They should be encouraged and supported if they work seriously to put their states and societies on the right track. But I have to say, when money is collected to reward the families of suicide bombers, that is support for terrorism. There is no other way to describe it.

We must also look at the front where terrorists are pushing out to radicalize countries that previously had escaped the terrorist scourge. Most prominent and crucial here is Indonesia, where Jihadists have in the last several years become more visible,

active, and intimidating to the population. In the southern islands of the Philippines, terrorists have become more daring and outrageous in their hostage-taking and murders year by year. In Singapore, the discovery of a sophisticated Al-Qaida network shocked everyone, because we consider Singapore to be one of the most tightly run states in the world. Jihadist terrorism no doubt has plans for the new countries of central Asia, and for China as well.

Kashmir presents compelling issues, especially since nuclear weapons lurk in the background. The outline of a potential settlement is much easier to identify than is the process by which to get there. As elsewhere, the starting point is to hit hard against terrorism as the method of influencing policy on any side of the problem.

And now we come to the front of the Israelis and Palestinians, who confront each other violently and whose conflict captures attention virtually throughout the world. We can see that terrorist extremists have gotten their hands around the throat of the Palestinian movement. Those hands need to be wrenched away so that people with determined but constructive attitudes can emerge to take over leadership in a restructured Palestinian Authority. Strength and diplomacy must go hand in hand: fight terrorism relentlessly even as negotiations for peace get started again. We now have some developments to work with, but nothing comes easily.

I offer three thoughts.

First, in Negotiation 101, we teach a negotiator to study his opposition. You want counterparts capable of taking "yes" for an answer and of delivering on tough commitments. Saudi Arabia has led Arab states into an initiative on behalf of the Palestinians. For the first time since King Hussein bowed out in 1988, states on the Arab side are involved. So I welcome the President's and the Secretary's effort to move this initiative forward and bring this potentially important measure of state-based competence to the negotiating table. Realists recognize that progress will only come with emerging experience of commitments that are not only made but kept. Whatever the vision of a final settlement, that vision will come into being through a step-by-step process.

Second, declare a commitment to an eventual Palestinian state up front. But make clear that a proclamation does not create a functioning state. Patterns of government must be created and the legitimacy of leaders established so that properly made sovereign decisions are effective, and means of accountability for policy decisions and for handling funds are instituted. If a Palestinian state were to be established without a far-reaching reform of the present Palestinian Authority, it would be a failed state at birth. And just as a Palestinian state can hardly even begin to function effectively where citizens cannot move about from one urban center to another, so the state of Israel cannot agree to anything other than its own secure, defensible, and internationally recognized borders.

Third, realize that transformation in this tiny area is a necessity. Palestinians and others in the region now lead miserable lives without the light of hope for a better future. Israelis continue to live within the lethal environment of a hostile neighborhood. A major effort is imperative to improve the quality of life in the region: security, water, education, health, the opportunity to create the jobs on which standards of living depend. Help in the form of private as well as public initiatives is critically needed. So there is lots of work to do.

Finally there is the most important problem of all – what is in the minds of the world's people. There are still those who profess not to know the difference between a terrorist and a freedom fighter. The difference is clear. The definition of terrorism is simple and unmistakable. Terrorists use random violence on as large a scale as possible against civilian populations to make their points or get their way. Anyone who claims to be confused at this point in history will have to face up to being known as an apologist for terrorism.

We have a war to win. Every tool available must be used aggressively. The message of the Great Seal of our Republic is front and center once more. The eagle faces the olive branches to show that the United States always seeks peace, but holds onto the arrows to show that the United States understands that, if we are to be effective in seeking peace, we must be strong. The message comes from the earliest days of our Republic: strength and diplomacy go together.

The end of World War II brought a compelling opportunity to put in place a new vision of how the world would work. Looking back at the remarkably creative response to that opportunity, we see Foreign Service officers – George Kennan, Chip Bohlen, Foy Kohler, and others, notably Paul Nitze – as well as the soldier-statesman of that time, George C. Marshall, developing the ideas and the institutions that shaped the way one American generation after another engaged the world during the dangerous Cold War years. Once again, with the huge changes in world affairs since those days, punctuated by the trauma of September 11 and the shifts in attitude toward state accountability and rights to preemption, the times demand a new burst of creativity and sustained efforts to achieve needed transformation. Now the ball is in the hands of a new generation of Foreign Service Officers, under Colin Powell, today’s distinguished soldier-statesman, able to work with a president, George W. Bush, who is decisive, bold, and resolute.

So I salute the members of the Foreign Service and this center for learning the practice of diplomacy. We are lucky that you and your leaders are strong, experienced, and wise. You have lots of work to do.

Let me conclude with a story from my time in office. When an ambassador had made it through the hurdles of nomination and confirmation, I invited him or her to my office and said, “Before you can leave, you have one more test. Go over to that globe and show me that you can identify your country.” Without exception, the ambassador-to-be spun the globe and located the country to which he would be posted.

One day, the late Mike Mansfield, already many years our ambassador to Japan and an old friend from my previous times in the cabinet, came in for a visit just before he was to return to Tokyo. I told him about my little test and said, "Mike, how about you?" He and I laughed, and he went to the globe. Mike put his hand on the United States and said, "Here's my country."

In this setting dedicated to representation, always remember Mike's words. Be proud to be a citizen, let alone a representative, of the greatest country ever, the United States of America.

July 1, 2003

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Language in POTUS Speeches

I noticed in the draft of the President's speech, it suggests there is a "guerilla war" going on in Iraq. My recommendation is that we not use that word or the word "resistance."

It seems to me we should use phrases that characterize what is happening in Iraq as a combination of:

- (1) Looters who take advantage of the situation,
- (2) criminals who were released from Saddam Hussein's jails before we arrived,
- (3) the remnants of the Baath Party and the Fedayeen Saddam,
- (4) terrorists from other countries—Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, etc. (we are finding individuals who came in to help Saddam Hussein and to oppose the coalition), and
- (5) those influenced by Iran to try to disrupt what the Coalition is doing in the country.

We ought not to give those opposing the Coalition the benefit of a phrase like an "organized resistance," which has a certain favorable connotation from the French and Norwegian resistance in World War II. We ought not to call them an "underground," which has a favorable connotation from the countries occupied by the Germans in World War II. We ought not to call it a "guerilla war," which conjures up Vietnam and an organized resistance that was to some extent nationalistic.

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July 8, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Report on Iraq

John Hamre, the Deputy Secretary of Defense who served in the last administration, is now running the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. CSIS and the Association of the U.S. Army conducted a two-year study on post-conflict reconstruction. Their study was generic, but I requested that they visit Iraq and apply the knowledge they gained in their study to Iraq. The attached is a preliminary report on their recent visit to Iraq.

While it is critical in some important respects, I feel they did an excellent job, and it struck me that it would be worth your time to read it.

Needless to say, we will be acting on many of their recommendations.

Very respectfully,

Attach.

July 3, 2003 John Hamre memo and report re: "Preliminary Observations Based on My Recent Visit to Baghdad"

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CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

1800 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

Telephone (b)(6)

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FAX COVER SHEET -

DATE: July 3, 2003

TO: Lauren Haber

FAX: (b)(6)

PHONE: [Redacted]

FROM: John Hamre

NUMBER OF PAGES: 10 (including cover page)

MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL MEMO TO UNDERSECRETARY FEITH VIA LAUREN HABER

Lauren,

Attached is Dr. Hamre's Memo to Amb. Bremmer and Undersecretary Feith. Dr. Hamre asked me to inform you that besides the copy sent to Amb Bremmer, these are the only two copies of this document that exist. He has instructed me to destroy this copy on my end as soon as it is sent. Please contact me at the number listed below when you receive this. Thanks.

Sincerely,

Francis J. DuFrayne

Francis J. DuFrayne
Administrative Assistant
Office of the President
Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K Street, NW
Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006

(b)(6)

fdufrayne@csis.org

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~~Close Hold~~CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND
THE ADMINISTRATOR, COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

From: John Hamre

Subject: Preliminary observations based on my recent visit to Baghdad

At your invitation, my colleagues and I visited the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. My colleagues remain in Iraq. I am taking this opportunity to relay provisional observations based on our extensive conversations in Baghdad. My colleagues are continuing their interviews in outlying cities, thanks to the support of the CPA. When they return, we will prepare a final report and submit it to you.

Before I begin, let me thank the CPA for the superb support we received during our stay. Administrator Bremer invited me into his morning conference meetings and instructed all senior representatives to support our visit. We were given unfettered access to individuals and offices. During my four days, I personally interviewed over 80 individuals.

This preliminary report is intended only for your use. I have attached a second report that contains the points that I would make publicly, if you authorize me to offer public remarks. As we indicated at the time you invited us to make the trip, we consider ourselves as informal consultants to you. We will make no public report unless you authorize it.

Key Findings

We cannot fail in our mission to rebuild a free and democratic Iraq. But our success is not guaranteed. The CPA under Ambassador Bremer is making astounding progress. But the security situation is difficult and getting more so.

The CPA is confronting a much more difficult problem than a traditional post-conflict reconstruction challenge. Iraq is also a completely failed economy. The CPA is confronting the equivalent of both a defeated Germany in 1945 and a failed Soviet Union in 1989.

The active sabotage of Saddam loyalists is amplified by the fragile infrastructure of Iraq. A well-placed attack can create consequences felt throughout the city or even the country.

The CPA faces three inter-related problems that have to be solved together—security, electricity and petroleum production. These three are inextricably tied. The

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11-L-0559/OSD/21099

lack of security is permitting Saddam loyalists and criminal elements to plunder both the electric system and the petroleum industry. Interrupted electric service undermines public confidence in the competence of the CPA, and interrupts petroleum production, undercutting the revenue base that will be required to rebuild Iraq. In short, if the security situation is not fixed, the entire rebuilding process will fail. The electric grid and the petroleum industry are already failure-prone. So the danger posed by active hostile elements is amplified.

The CPA is making astounding progress, but it lacks the forces, the money and the flexibility to do the job. The next 6 months are crucial.

Security Forces. There are not enough composite security forces to stop the plundering and sabotage of the country. America cannot solve this problem. Ultimately, Iraqis have to take responsibility for stopping the plundering and the sabotage. But they are not likely to have the competence to do that in the near term. Therefore, security must be the central focus of American efforts. (See "Security Forces" below.)

Money. The CPA is budgeting to the resources available, which is currently \$5.9 billion. I was impressed to see a solid, if somewhat rudimentary, budgeting process in place. But those resources are inadequate for the challenges at hand, and there are serious inefficiencies imposed by the restrictions imposed on the CPA. (See "Money" below.)

Flexibility. The CPA is badly handicapped by a "business as usual" approach to the mechanics of government, such as getting permission to spend money or enter into contracts. You cannot underestimate the difficulties this is posing to the CPA and the reconstruction efforts. (See "Flexibility" below.)

We appreciate the enormous difficulty of creating a viable long-term political governance process for Iraq. We believe the process outlined by Ambassador Bremer is sound. The Iraqis are not at all ready for a complex process like that required to draft a constitution and elect a government. But the demand for quickly getting Iraqis invested in the political transformation of Iraq places a high priority on the governance council. While security is the pre-eminent challenge facing the CPA, governance can't lag because it becomes the key to getting Iraqis invested in rebuilding their own country, including long-term security. (See "Governance Issues" below.)

The CPA is building democracy from the top down, while JTF7 is building democracy from the bottom up. These are not sufficiently coordinated. While relations between Administrator Bremer and JTF Commander Sanchez are excellent, there is significant friction at lower levels. Co-locating JTF7 with the CPA is an excellent step, but there are a few additional steps that should be taken. (See "Civilian-Military Relations" below.)

Finally, the energy and enthusiasm in the CPA is remarkable. The sense of mission, dedication and destiny among the CPA staff is great. As I said, the progress has been nothing short of remarkable. But there are areas that could be improved (see "Administrative Improvements" below.)

Security Forces

When Saddam loyalists choose to attack U.S. forces, they lose. So they are developing other tactics. They continue to take opportunistic shots at military forces. But it now appears they are organizing their attacks against critical infrastructure and civilians. We have adequate forces to engage the enemy if they engage us. But the country lacks the security forces to protect critical infrastructure and critical civilian support elements.

I think it would be a mistake just to throw in U.S. military forces, though somewhat more capability is probably needed. We need a much more comprehensive solution. There are four broad categories of security resources:

- **Iraqi Forces.** I saw the new Iraqi MP forces, and I am told that they are well received in Iraqi neighborhoods. You are half-way to your goal of recruiting 60,000. Iraq probably needs many more than that given the continuing plundering and sabotage against fixed targets, but that requires more money to resource a larger force than you currently have. Walt Slocombe has a good plan for the new Iraqi army. But this is 18-24 months off and doesn't address your near-term security woes. There are indications that the working relationship between the Iraqi police force and U.S. military forces needs attention.
- **Coalition Contributions.** This will help, but on a confidential, off the record basis, no one there felt it would help much. Indeed, the main worry I heard was that the Saddam loyalists are likely to attack coalition military forces early to test their will and sow dissention internationally. Several in the military felt we would have to divert some of our forces for force protection for the new coalition forces. It is still very valuable to cite coalition contributions, but their actual military capabilities are being questioned.
- **Contract Security Forces.** I think you could rapidly expand security by permitting contracted security forces at point locations. I was told that this is proceeding on an uneven basis. U.S. military authorities understandably don't want to see private militias throughout the country. But this can be normalized if there is a policy on standardized uniforms and identification. This is your fastest way to expand security for low-risk installations.
- **U.S. Military.** Frankly, I was worried to see the fatigue in our forces. They are very tired. The enthusiasm one sees in the CPA personnel is contrasted with the fatigue I saw in the military. You need to seriously address rotation

policy and R&R policy quickly, but I didn't get into this adequately to offer any suggestions.

I understand your reticence to add more forces to the theater. There are political elements in Washington who want to jump on that to score political points. If I am asked about this, I will say that I think we need to sustain our present force levels, and that we need to put first priority on expanding Iraqi forces, coalition contributions and contract forces for fixed low-risk installations. But I honestly believe we need to bring in more forces. You don't have enough forces to undertake patrols today and support the high-value missions that the CPA needs to undertake, plus defend fixed installations. For the next six months the most reliable source of augmented security will be US forces. The next 6-9 months are crucial.

I think you can make the case that you don't need more "victory forces" (VFOR), but the victory phase and the stabilization phase have overlapped because of the continuing activities of Saddam loyalists. I would argue that while you sustain the VFOR force during mop-up operations, you could bring in the "stabilization force" (SFOR) now for areas in the north and south that are ready for it while you concentrate your VFOR forces for the central hot zone.

Again, I will avoid saying any of this publicly, but I ask you to seriously consider finding additional troops to help over the next 6-9 months.

Money

I was surprised to find a budget process in place. It is rudimentary, but it is an incredible accomplishment this early in such a complex environment. The budget, however, is a cash-flow analysis, and major elements are not included. (For example, your electricity ministry is going to recommend an investment of \$1.5 billion/year for four years just for power generation, and an additional \$500 million/year for transmission upgrades. None of that is included in your budget.) The petroleum revenue assumptions are relatively conservative, but that is wise given the continuing attacks on the infrastructure. Frankly, if the security problems persist for the next 6-9 months, those revenue numbers will look optimistic.

Privately most of your advisers believe you will run out of money in 9-12 months. You need to look into this now, because you still have time to get the numbers right while the Congress is working on the FY04 appropriations. If you wait until next year, it will be harder to get a supplemental next spring/summer when the election season is underway, so I would try to get it appropriated this fall.

Flexibility

I was astounded to hear the constraints your lower level folks live with to get money and contracts. It is taking up to 10 days for OMB to approve fund requests after you approve them. They are asking for a level of detail which, frankly, I think is indefensible. The greatest constraint you have is on so-called "vested" funds. This is sufficiently debilitating to be worth taking to the President. I would especially establish the precedent now, since OMB is likely to hound your folks even more on any appropriated funds, and you will need more appropriated funds next year. So I would take this opportunity to get OMB off your back now when the White House knows that we have problems in Iraq and need to give the CPA Administrator all the flexibility he needs.

Another area of limitation is in the area of contracts. I heard more complaints about contracting than anything. Ambassador Bremer told me that there is now an Army contracting office in theater. Maybe this has not yet been felt by lower-level CPA offices yet, but contracting has been a significant problem to date. I spoke with company representatives who indicated that their headquarters were planning to pull them out of theater if contracts were not let soon. Right now each of your ministries is doing its own thing. This amplifies the chance for error in addition to the obvious inefficiencies it presents. You will have better control and responsiveness with in-theater capabilities. I would check to see how well this is working and whether the Army contracting office is meeting your needs.

For both of these, you are living with the mechanics of government that proceed under a "business as usual" approach. This isn't adequate for the urgency of the situation.

Governance Issues

As I said above, our team has studied many models for the governance question that is always at the heart of any post-conflict reconstruction challenge. We think your formula for putting first priority on creating a near-term governance council with a follow on constitutional process as right for the circumstances.

While our team will have more to say on this, one thing we would recommend with our governance council is that you find a way to get provincial representatives to participate as observers. I know that you are already having great challenges to recruit the governance council, but after you get that set, we think getting regional representatives early will help with the top-down, bottom up disconnect noted below.

I suspect that this will be an area where we will have more to say when the team returns.

Civilian-Military Relations

It was a very good decision to co-locate JTF-7 with CPA. Administrator Bremer and LTG Sanchez clearly have a good working relationship. But there are still

considerable tensions. Many are the lingering problems created when ORHA was first set up and effectively subordinated to Centcom land forces at Camp Doha. But that is getting better.

The real problem is that the reality of post-conflict reconstruction on the ground is different from the policy formulation at the top. CPA is too far removed from the challenges on the ground to be able to address all those questions when they come up, and the military feels it understands the problems better than CPA civilians.

I believe Ambassador Bremer has sent in a request to get CPA civilians assigned to the field, effectively as political advisers (POLADs). But I understand that this request is hung up on wrangling over personnel levels. The disconnect between field and headquarters is real, and serious. It is diverting too much of precious management time and talent sorting out problems after the fact. A modest investment in POLADs in the field would help CPA make more reasoned policy decisions, and help the military understand the reason for and direction of CPA policy choices.

Administrative Improvements

You have recruited a remarkable group of individuals as senior advisers. But as one of them said to me "we are like an all-star baseball game—great players but not really a team."

The daily staff meetings are a major contribution to team development. And the new budget process, while always contentious, will be valuable in helping the individuals understand the "whole" and not just their piece of the whole.

I understand that Ambassador Bremer has initiated a plan to secure military assistants for the senior advisers, at least for your power ministries. Everyone who works in the Pentagon knows how crucial the military assistants are. They amplify the effectiveness of the principle by undertaking triage on the array of problems that confront the principle. Ambassador Bremer has an executive secretariat, but adding military assistants would do wonders for improving the efficiency of the CPA leadership. Military assistants would also be very helpful as points of contact for the JTF7. This is an urgent requirement, in my view, and I hope that you can direct the military departments to quickly meet the CPA Administrator's request for military assistants.

Conclusion

These are my preliminary observations. When the rest of my team returns, we will prepare a more thoughtful report for you. They are especially concentrating on the complex governance challenges.

I have already received a request from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to testify concerning my observations from the trip. I have attached the key points I would propose to make in a public setting.

PUBLIC TALKING POINTS CONCERNING VISIT TO IRAQ

- CSIS and the Association of the U.S. Army conducted a 2 year study on post-conflict reconstruction. The study was "generic", but we applied it to Iraq in the publication "A Wiser Peace" which was published in January.
- Based on the study, Secretary Rumsfeld and Ambassador Bremer invited us to Iraq to provide assistance to the CPA as it assesses ongoing operations.
- I spent five days in theater, and my colleagues will spend a total of 11 days. These talking points reflect only my preliminary observations and could be changed after I consult with the full team.
- Ambassador Bremer and the CPA provided superb support for our visit. We were given unfettered access to individuals and offices. I personally interviewed over 80 individuals.

Key Findings

- We cannot fail in our mission to rebuild a free and democratic Iraq. But our success is not guaranteed.
- The CPA under Ambassador Bremer is making astounding progress. But the security situation is difficult and getting more so.
- The CPA is confronting a much more difficult problem than a traditional post-conflict reconstruction challenge. Iraq is also a completely failed economy. The CPA is confronting the equivalent of both a defeated Germany in 1945 and a failed Soviet Union in 1989.
- The active sabotage of Saddam loyalists is amplified by the fragile infrastructure of Iraq. A well-placed attack can create consequences felt throughout the city or even the country.
- The CPA faces three inter-related problems that have to be solved together—security, electricity and petroleum production. These three are inextricably tied. The lack of security is permitting Saddam loyalists and criminal elements to plunder both the electric system and the petroleum industry. Interrupted electric service undermines public confidence in the competence of the CPA, and interrupts petroleum production, undercutting the revenue base that will be required to rebuild Iraq. In short, if the security situation is not fixed, the entire rebuilding process will fail. The electric grid and the petroleum industry are already failure-prone. So the danger posed by active hostile elements is amplified.

- The CPA is making astounding progress, but it lacks sufficient forces, money and flexibility to do the job. The next 6 months are crucial.
- Security Forces. There are not enough composite security forces to stop the plundering and sabotage of the country. America cannot solve this problem. Ultimately, Iraqis have to take responsibility for stopping the plundering and the sabotage. We have four ways we can expand security forces.
 - Iraqi indigenous forces. There has been good progress in recruiting indigenous police forces, but we need to expand even the goal. This will require more funds than are available to the CPA, however.
 - Coalition contributions. These are welcome, but require considerable coordination and augmentation which will be another mission for our US forces.
 - Contract security forces. The fastest and easiest way to expand security capabilities would be to let U.S. contractors hire site security guards for low-risk facilities. I understand why the U.S. military does not want to see private militias in Iraq where there is already a complex security environment. But these forces can be made uniform in appearance and rules of engagement to minimize the security worries for our forces.
 - U.S. Forces. We need to sustain our current force structure, but we need to urgently address the fatigue I saw in our forces.
- Money. The CPA is budgeting to the resources available, which is currently \$5.9 billion. I was impressed to see a solid, if somewhat rudimentary, budgeting process in place. But those resources are inadequate for the challenges at hand. I believe the CPA needs supplemental appropriations to get through fiscal year 2004, and this needs to be appropriated this fall.
- The CPA is badly handicapped by a "business as usual" approach to the mechanics of government, such as getting permission to spend money or enter into contracts. We need to adopt procedures that are realistic for the challenging environment facing Administrator Bremer and his team.
- Creating a viable long-term political governance process for Iraq is crucial. Iraqi society is too traumatized and fractious to undertake a complex process like that required to draft a constitution and elect a government. Administrator Bremer has established a process to create a near-term governance council while the foundations for a follow-on constitutional process are being set. We think this is the right approach. The governance process cannot lag, however, since that is crucial for getting Iraqis to take ownership for their own country, including providing security.

- The CPA is building democracy from the top down, while JTF7 is building democracy from the bottom up. Both are essential, though at present these efforts are not sufficiently coordinated. Administrator Bremer is aware of this problem and has taken concrete steps to fix it.
- The energy and enthusiasm in the CPA is remarkable. The sense of mission, dedication and destiny among the CPA staff is great. The progress has been nothing short of remarkable. At the same time the fatigue in our troops is worrying. This must be addressed.
- We cannot fail in our mission to build a free and democratic Iraq. But success is not guaranteed. This is going to be a very difficult process and it will take years. The length of time required to accomplish our goals is inversely related to the resources we put to the task now. If we skimp on money and manpower, we are likely to be in Iraq longer.



United States Department of Defense

Speech

On the web: <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2003/sp20030707-secdef0362.html>

Media contact: media@defenselink.mil or +1 (703) 697-5131

Public contact: <http://www.dod.mil/faq/comment.html> or +1 (703) 428-0711

CENTCOM Change of Command

Remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, CENTCOM Headquarters, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, FL, Monday, July 7, 2003.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Good afternoon, General and Mrs. Franks, General and Mrs. Abizaid, General Mike DeLong, distinguished Ambassadors, thank you so much for being with us here today. Congressman Jim Davis, the distinguished and talented vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Pete Pace. I welcome all of the distinguished guests here today, and I particularly want to greet the senior enlisted leaders, and ladies and gentlemen. What a privilege it is to be able to salute the men and women of U.S. Central Command. From the Horn of Africa to the mountains of Afghanistan and the heat of Iraq, troops of this command are serving the cause of freedom with dedication and distinction. We thank each of you for all that you do for our country.

And my thanks to our coalition partners. There are representatives here at CENTCOM of more than 50 nations, clear evidence that we are, indeed, engaged in a global war on terror. Thank you, each of you, for your friendship and your steadfastness.

When war comes, you look for certain special qualities in the people you'll be working with. General Tom Franks embodies those qualities: strength, experience, a keen mind, energy, honor, good humor and a deep loyalty to his troops and to his country. Tom Franks is truly a soldier's soldier.

After the attacks on September 11th, General Franks and his team responded. They quickly developed a plan for a new set of challenges, and then skillfully led coalition forces in overthrowing the Taliban regime in their rugged, landlocked stronghold. This year again, Tom Franks crafted an innovative war plan. And again, his team brilliantly led coalition forces, fighting their way to the regime's doorstep in Baghdad in a matter of weeks.

And even with the large and growing number of forces on the Iraqi border, General Franks achieved something seemingly impossible: tactical surprise. That surprise, and the speed and flexibility of his plan, helped to remove a brutal regime in less than a month, without massive loss of civilian life, without tens of thousands of refugees fleeing their country, without Iraq striking its neighbors with Scud missiles, and without the destruction of roads, bridges, dams and oil fields. Remarkable accomplishments.

But Operation Iraqi Freedom was more than successful. It was also transformational. Because of the leadership of his fine team, it was joint. In past wars, the services and coalition partners essentially tried to deconflict from each other, to stay out of each others' way, but in Iraq,

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<http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2003/07/07/20030707-secdef0362.html>

because the services functioned in a truly joint manner, there was a leverage that was distinctly different, an ability to project power with speed and precision the likes of which had not been seen.

Tom Franks and his team stand as our nation's -- indeed the world's most joint warfighters. The team in Operation Iraqi Freedom developed joint warfighting in ways that will change how our forces train and fight for many years to come. So General Franks may be leaving the service, but his service will have lasting impact on the U.S. armed forces for many decades.

General Tom Franks, you have my respect. You have my friendship. We wish you and your lovely Cathy the very best in the years ahead.

Now we turn to General John Abizaid. I know of no one more qualified to follow in Tom Franks' very large footsteps. John Abizaid brings an extraordinary combination of talent and experience to this critical post. Army Ranger, Grenada, the Gulf War, Bosnia, and, more recently CENTCOM deputy during Operation Iraqi Freedom. An Arabic speaker. He's the leader for the 21st century.

Coalition forces have now removed two terrorist regimes from power. These were two difficult battles in a long and dangerous struggle: the global war on terror, a war that will not be over soon.

The liberation of Afghanistan and of Iraq is complete. Those two regimes have been removed from power and will not be permitted to return. But the war against terrorism, against the remnants of those two regimes, in Afghanistan and Iraq, and indeed, against terrorists across the globe, continues. And it will go on for some time.

As President Bush, our commander in chief, put it last week, from the beginning, we have known the effort would be long and difficult and that our resolve would be tested. We know that sacrifice is unavoidable. We will not be distracted, and we will prevail.

Each day our troops, young men and women, risk their lives voluntarily across the globe to defend us from terror. They deserve our country's best leadership. They have had the best leadership in General Tom Franks and his superb team, and they will have the best under General John Abizaid.

Tom Franks, congratulations. Godspeed to you and Cathy. And General John Abizaid, do our country proud, as we know you will.

And may God bless the United States of America.

(Applause.)

STAFF: Ladies and gentlemen, General Tommy R. Franks, United States Army.

GEN. FRANKS: (Cheers, applause.) Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, sir, thank you. (Applause continuing.) Thanks to all of you.

How about that Ms. Rebecca Lynn Howard? Have you ever heard anything like that in your life? (Applause.)

Well, I'm terribly proud of the United States Army Band. Thanks a lot for being here. Very proud of this color guard, also. (Applause.)

And to my friend, General Michael Rifle DeLong, commander of troops, thanks a lot for not only what you have done, Mike; thanks for what you're doing standing there and honoring us today. You're, in fact, quite special. And Command Sergeant Major Dwight Brown, my

wingman, thanks for the years, thanks for the great work with all these magnificent troops.

Mr. Secretary, thanks for your leadership, thanks for your friendship, thanks for your morality, thanks for caring. Sir, thanks for being here today to officiate in this ceremony.

Ambassadors, excellencies, distinguished guests, coalition members, from, as the secretary said, more than 50 countries, members and family members of the United States Central Command, thanks to all of you for being here today to witness the assumption of command of General John Abizaid.

To my family members, from the Franks clan, and the Carleys, and the Ellises and the Mahers, the Wilsons, the Matlocks, my aunt, Ms. Pauline Borges, who turns 82 years young today, God bless, and thanks to you for being here with us as well. Cathy and I are simply delighted to be able to get together with family.

To all of you, thanks for your love, your support, your service to nation, indeed, your patriotism. We're honored by your presence, and I'm honored to stand by John Abizaid, the man who brings the right stuff to this work, to this magnificent organization.

John and Kathy, we're proud of you. We call you friends. This is your day.

To Cathy Franks, today is the day. (Laughter, applause.) In fact, today is the day that I make myself an honest man, having told my wife 34 years ago that I was going to leave the United States Army. (Laughter.) Today I'm an honest man.

Cathy, thanks for your love, your support. And as Secretary Rumsfeld said, thanks for your service to this nation. Man has no greater treasure than family. You're the best. And I'm a lucky guy.

What I'd like to do now, even though it is a bit redundant, is in cavalry tradition, I would like to ask that a dozen long-stemmed yellow roses be presented to Cathy, as well as bouquets to the previous generation: her mom, Ms. Gaynelle Gray; to our daughter, the next generation, Jackie Matlock; and to our granddaughter, Anne Katherine. (Applause.)

Today is a very stressful time for me. When I woke up this morning, I had a Boeing business jet, several aides, several sedans, and now I'm worrying about how in the hell I'm going to get home. (Laughter, applause.)

It's been an exciting three years, as the secretary described it. When we arrived, the Taliban and al Qaeda controlled Afghanistan, and Saddam Hussein ruled Iraq with an iron hand. What a difference 22 months makes. (Applause.)

Twenty-two months ago, the United States of America -- in fact, the free world -- looked into the face of evil. We came on that day to recognize our vulnerability, and the world came to recognize America with attitude.

As President Bush said recently, bring it on. That's been the attitude of this command, of this country, of the members of this powerful coalition, for some 22 months. And we'll still stand, and we'll still say it. Rough road behind, rough road ahead. Bring it on.

Our nation's changed. We've been blessed with leadership that evidences character and moral courage, depth of resolve seldom seen. We see in our country today the evidence of a core value that, in my view, was dormant for a time: patriotism, a core value; constant, deep patriotism by those who salute the flag and by those who wave the flag.

And we see love, we see appreciation, and we see caring. We see support for our men and

women in uniform -- selfless men and women, who continue today to answer the call. We mourn the loss of those who have given their lives in the cause of freedom. In fact, we join families and loved ones who celebrate the contributions which they have made to all of us today and freedom-loving people around the world as we enjoy the blessings of liberty.

I look across this audience, and I looked across the faces of my friends during the reception, and I see the power of America. I see patriots from every walk of life, and I see patriots from every corner of this country. Some have worn the uniform. Some in our most senior military capacities wear the uniform today. Such respect I have for all of you -- men, women, children who support America, patriots who support the troops, from Secretary Don Rumsfeld to the Bayshore Patriots; to national, state, local leaders; members of foundations which support our troops, FISHER and INTREPID; to Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, my friend from United Arab Emirates; ambassadors; troopers; friends, old and young; all of you who have given so much and asked so little. Friends like Wayne Newton, the heart of USO and CAT (ph). Thanks for being here, Wayne. To Mr. Robert DeNiro, Mr. Neal McCoy, to members of the Tampa Bay Buccaneers and the Storm, world champions from Tampa, America. Thanks for being here. You honor us so.

To my friends from as far back as enlisted days and officer candidate school, and from as recently as the past few months as we have served together. Jack Keane, thanks for being here. Pete Schoomaker, thanks for being here. God bless you, and thank you. So many more.

I said recently that America stands at a crease in history -- 225-plus years behind us, we ask ourselves, what will the next 225 years bring? We're reminded every day by the loss of brave men and women who serve in the global war on terrorism that freedom isn't free. And I'm frequently asked by members of the media, is the prize we seek in the global war on terrorism worth the price that we're having to pay for it? And I have answered, and I'll continue to answer, "You bet," because the prize we seek in this time in history is a way of life.

It's called freedom, liberty. Indeed, it's about kids, grandkids, generations as yet unborn. Freedom is worth whatever it takes. Future generations, I predict, will continue to pay the price for freedom in this wonderful, this magnificent experiment we call democracy. In the words of the poet, miles to go before we sleep.

When we ask ourselves what does it cost, is it worth the cost, I'm reminded of a comment recently by Coach John Gruden of the Buccaneers, when he said, "Sometimes you think about things like this, and you recognize that all it takes is all you've got." (Pause.) Powerful. Powerful comment. All it takes is all you've got.

Men and women in uniform, we are so proud of you and your service around the world -- in Afghanistan, in Iraq, perhaps in places yet unknown, the global war on terrorism. Indeed, we'll go the miles. Patriots and soldiers will pay the price. And as we are today, we will be ever in their debt. We'll remember, to be sure, the more than 300 who have given their lives on battlefields since 9/11/01. But we will never forget the 3,000 who lost their lives on 9/11/01.

John Abizaid, Kathy, members of the Abizaid family, we're honored to stand with you. We will be with you as you remember. The United States Central Command is in good hands. America is in good hands.

As Cathy and I close this chapter, I have asked Mr. Neal McCoy to help me express to you what Cathy and I think of all of you.

With that, Neal, if you would, please? And I'll close by saying may God continue to bless

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America. (Applause.)

(Musical interlude.)

GEN. ABIZAID: Thank you. I promise I won't sing. (Laughter.) I know my family is very thankful for that, especially my brother Art over there. Mr. Secretary, thanks, sir, for being here. General Pace, thank you, sir. General Franks, Mrs. Franks, Mike DeLong, thank you for leading this great formation and thank you Mike for being my wingman during the war. I can't think of a finer Marine or a finer person that serves anywhere in this armed forces.

(Applause.) Members of the coalition, leaders of the great state of Florida and the city of Tampa, especially the city of Tampa. I want you to know that I attended the third victory in a row for the Devil Rays the other night, and I believe that my being there made it happen.

(Laughter, applause.)

You notice I didn't go yesterday. (Laughter.)

Distinguished guests, men and women of Central Command, thank all of you for being here today.

My friends and family traveled from all parts of the country to be here. My son-in-law came in from Afghanistan 24 hours ago. My son came about a week ago, from Korea; my daughter from Qatar; and my family from all over the place. I know they came for two reasons. The number-one reason is to see the media stars, the secretary of Defense and General Franks. The number-two reason is, they heard Robert De Niro was going to be here. (Laughter.) And the number-three reason was one of utter surprise that I'm standing up here. (Laughter.)

Tradition dictates that the incoming commander makes brief remarks, and I shall adhere to that tradition.

To the soldiers of the great Army Band, thank you very much.

Today one of America's greatest soldiers turns over command. General Franks, thank you for your extraordinary service to the nation in both peace and war. The highlight of my professional life, sir, has been to serve as your deputy during an unprecedented campaign. Thank you for your leadership and confidence.

Cathy Franks, thank you for setting the example of dedication and compassion. Your care and concern for our families over the years inspires all of us.

The Franks will be sorely missed at CENTCOM. Good luck to you, sir. Good luck to you, Cathy. Godspeed to you and your family.

The greatest honor for any soldier is to command the sons and daughters of America. It is a particular honor to embark upon this command in time of war. All of us here today are both mindful of and thankful for the sacrifices of our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines who serve so proudly throughout CENTCOM's area of responsibility. Some of these young people are fighting and winning campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, with skill and courage, while still others serve proudly in countless other missions on the air, on the land and at sea. They endure the hardship of duty far from home with the quiet professionalism which is the hallmark of our military forces.

We can never forget that some have made the ultimate sacrifice. Words alone can never adequately reflect our thanks, nor reflect our admiration for the devotion to our nation and its ideals.

Yet we know their work is not done, and we understand that there may be equally tough and

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arduous campaigns ahead. Today we ask our servicemen and -women to help stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan. We know that this work is difficult, and we know that this work is dangerous, but we know they can do it, and they can do it better than anyone on Earth.

We know success there will require not only military muscle but the focused economic, political, intelligence and diplomatic efforts of the United States and of our friends and allies in the region and throughout the world. We also know that the ultimate success will rest in the hands of courageous Iraqis and Afghanis, who will lead their people to a better future.

Just as our fathers' generation found patience, courage and tenacity to endure a long and costly global war for the survival of our way of life, so must our children's generation bear the burden of defeating those who have brought war to our own homeland.

Mr. Secretary, CENTCOM will continue to take the fight to the enemy on his ground. We will continue to do our work with our friends and allies to defeat our mortal enemies. We will defeat these terrorists who kill innocents. We will defeat these murderers who spare no faith. We will continue to respect and value the diverse and rich cultures of the many peoples of our proud region. We will continue our efforts to provide stability in Afghanistan and Iraq. But we know the war against terror that has been thrust upon us is a war without borders and a war that requires the application of all our might.

Let me close by thanking all of you for coming today. But most importantly, let me close by thanking all of our servicemen and -women for their devotion to duty. It is their untiring efforts that will preserve the freedom we so rightly cherish. It is their willingness to endure hardship in faraway, hostile places that lets our children sleep peacefully at home. In the course of my duties at CENTCOM, I've had the opportunity to see and talk to our troops in places as far removed as Tampa and Baghdad, Kabul and Mosul. It is their optimism, their professionalism and their unwavering courage that makes me certain that victory is assured.

God bless our president, God bless the secretary of Defense, our men and women, both civilian and military, who serve their families, and our great nation. (Applause.)

<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2003/sp20030707-secdef0362.html>

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<http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/...> 7/9/2003

July 9, 2003

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

CC: Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)
Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
Honorable George Tenet
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Mobile Telephony

Attached is an announcement on mobile telephony in Iraq that might be of interest.

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Attach.

7/5/03 Bremer memo to SecDef re: Announcement on Mobile Telephony

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July 8, 2003

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MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

FROM: Paul Bremer <signed>

SUBJECT: Announcement on Mobile Telephony

We have all considered it urgent to provide Iraq with modern telecommunications. We have a program under way to reestablish land lines. Now we need to bring in mobile telephony allowing the country to leapfrog the older technology.

The matter is urgent. We hope to establish the Governance Council within a week and I want them to be able to announce some big "wins" early. This will establish the Council's credibility and show its influence on events affecting everyday lives.

So on Thursday I intend to inform some members of the Council that we propose that the Council announce immediately after its establishment that we are calling for bids on a mobile phone system. The bid will be for a limited duration contract (18-24 months); call for three regional licenses; be technology neutral but require compatibility with in place regional systems; allow for foreign direct investment; and be awarded through an added value award process.

The regional approach will allow for later expansion into nationwide licenses and force bidders to apply for at least two regional licenses, though we would note that we intend to choose a different operator for each region. The value added bidding process will ensure that we get the needed technical solution and avoid going just for the highest dollar. We will have to change, or suspend, Iraqi law to allow for foreign direct investment, which is doable; and this will require the endorsement of the Governance Council.

This process will allow us to have mobile communications in place in early September. I recognize other agencies in Washington have an interest in this project. I share their interest. But we have to move along now. So unless you instruct me otherwise, I will take this up with some interested Council members on Thursday when I am meeting them on other matters.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JUL 14 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U.S. Military Presence in Iceland

- I request your support to sign an Execute Order that will withdraw fighter aircraft, search and rescue helicopters, and support tankers from Iceland.
 - The fighters do not provide the defense capabilities the Government of Iceland purports. The fighters do not have shoot down authority, are not usually armed, and are not on strip alert.
 - It is unwise to have a defense relationship premised on a false Icelandic belief that U.S. fighter aircraft in Iceland are on 24-hour strip alert – a premise the Icelandic government is asking us to sustain.
- In considering this request, several additional points should be kept in mind:
 - We need these assets elsewhere.
 - There is no legitimate requirement for these assets in Iceland.
 - We have made concrete, creative proposals for a new and relevant defense relationship and presence in Iceland.
 - Icelandic officials have rebuffed our proposals and efforts to have a constructive dialogue, believing they can engineer Presidential intervention to keep the fighters in Iceland.
 - A sizeable U.S. presence would remain in Iceland after these assets are withdrawn including P-3s, 1200 military personnel plus dependents, and the Iceland Air Defense Radar System.
- Since December 2002, we have reaffirmed our commitment to the 1951 Defense Agreement with proposals that would:
 - Expand our military exercise program in Iceland;
 - Explore options for training deployments for a range of air and ground assets;



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- Encourage participation in EUCOM activities; and,
- Expand U.S. Iceland defense cooperation through non-military resources from the Departments of State, Justice, Treasury, Homeland Security, etc. allowing Iceland to take responsibility for the non-military aspects of its national defense.
- A U.S. interagency briefing team again presented these creative and robust ideas to Icelandic officials on June 23.
 - The Icelanders responded by threatening to invoke Article VII of the 1951 Defense Agreement which would bring to NATO a review of the 1951 U.S.-Iceland Defense Agreement.
 - This is the third time they made this threat.
 - On June 30, the Government of Iceland said it would not participate in further discussions until the U.S. has a new approach, namely that the fighters are staying in Iceland.
- I believe the only way Iceland will accept the realities of the new security environment and a new defense relationship is to go forward with the Execute Order to withdraw the aircraft.



Attachment: Key Elements of the U.S. Defense Proposals to Iceland

U.S.-Iceland Engagement

- **December 2002:**
 - DoD provided briefings to Government of Iceland officials.
 - DoD notified Icelandic officials U.S. would withdraw F-15s in Spring 2003.
- **January – May 2003**
 - *January: Iceland issues Pro Memoria; equates withdrawal to abrogation of 1951 Defense Agreement*
 - *March: Iceland conditions further talks on U.S. response to Pro Memoria.*
 - EXORD delayed from 1 March to 1 June execution.
 - *April: Iceland says “No” to U.S. efforts to continue discussions.*
 - *May: U.S. restates privately to Iceland Foreign Minister intention to withdraw aircraft.*
 - *Iceland Prime Minister requests assistance/intervention by Lord Robertson.*
 - EXORD delayed from 1 June to 10 July execution.
- **June 2003**
 - *June 5: U.S. officials deliver letter from President to Prime Minister, reaffirm aircraft will be withdrawn in Summer.*
 - *Absence of specific mention of fighter withdrawal and specific date leads Icelandic officials to conclude (and state in the media) that U.S. not serious about removing the F-15s.*
 - *June 23: U.S. interagency delegation travels to Iceland, delivers creative and robust proposals for a new defense relationship with Iceland.*
 - *Icelandic officials vent frustrations but do not offer proposals/counter proposals. Reaffirm position that fighter aircraft minimum acceptable defense for Iceland.*
 - *June 30: Government of Iceland rebuffs further talks with U.S. until U.S. has new proposals.*
- **July 2003**
 - July 10: EXORD postponed pending Presidential authorization.

Proposal: U.S. Defense of Iceland


- Information:
 - U.S. maintains Iceland Air Defense System (4 radar sites, 1 control center)
 - Provides continuous battlespace situational awareness
 - Provides informational linkage with regional partners (intell sharing with Northern Region Allies and NORAD)

- Preparation:
 - Exercise and training program demonstrates U.S. capabilities to return to Iceland during increased threat levels and/or respond to surprise incidents.

- Response Capabilities:
 - Tailored to threat; could include fighter aircraft, troops, etc. as appropriate

Proposal:

U.S.-Iceland Security Cooperation



- **Military Cooperation**

- **Exercises:** Maintain exercise program and shift biennial exercise to annual exercise.
 - Annual average of 59 days of exercises.
 - Exercises bring U.S. forces and equipment to Iceland.
- **Training:** Potential for EUCOM to encourage, facilitate training deployments to Iceland;
 - USAFE already exploring opportunities for combat aircraft training in Iceland; could facilitate other types of aircraft too.
 - With Iceland permission, other types of assets could deploy to Iceland for training including Patriots, Stingers, AEGIS ...
- **EUCOM Activities:** Opportunities for combined education, training, military contacts, humanitarian assistance, and defensive preparations.
 - Incumbent upon Government of Iceland to engage with EUCOM.


- **Non-Military Cooperation**

- Dept. of State: Anti-terrorist training.
- Dept. of Homeland Security: Homeland defense, disaster assistance, emergency preparedness, Customs.
- Dept. of Justice: Law enforcement.

July 14, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Warner Codel

Mr. President—

Attached is a copy of a report by Steve Cambone on the Senator Warner Codel trip to Iraq, which I thought you might find of interest.

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Very respectfully,

Attach.
7/7/03 Warner Codel Trip Report

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7 July 2003, 0800

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Larry Di Piro
7/9

FROM: STEVE CAMBONE *SC*

(L)
to Greer?

SUBJECT: WARNER CODEL TRIP REPORT

Summary

I believe that the Warner CODEL (names and itinerary are attached) left Iraq with firsthand knowledge of the terror and pain Saddam Hussein inflicted on the Iraqi people.

The members left with a far deeper appreciation for the scope of the task before the United States and its coalition partners in putting Iraq on its feet.

They left with a sense that the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and CJTF-7 are making remarkable progress in their respective tasks and that the two are working in concert toward a common goal.

They left with insight into the problems of looting, criminal activity, and what Jerry Bremer calls "political sabotage" and the political, economic, and military measures being taken to address those problems.

I believe Members left Iraq committed to staying the course. Each is convinced that failure would be a major, strategic blow to U.S. interests in the region, as well as globally.

Particular Issues

Individual Members did express particular concerns, however:

- o The sufficiency of U.S. troop numbers in light of the wide range of missions they need to perform (Levin, Reed)
- o A desire to expand the coalition to reduce U.S. exposure and draw more countries into support for Iraq's recovery (Levin)
- o The need to inform the U.S. public that the war has not ended, and that success will require "lots of troops for a long time" (Levin, Rockefeller, Collins, Nelson)

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- o The need for a near-term decision on troop rotation policy, especially as the multinational divisions stand up (Warner and others)
- o The need to improve human intelligence for stability operations broadly and to resolve the question of the status of Hussein and his sons (Roberts)
- o Language skills improvements in the U.S. military, and in DIA in particular (Roberts)
- o The belief that the United States is not telling the story of its efforts and successes well—neither to the Iraqis, the American public, nor the world. All members view this as a political campaign and are willing to “buy time” if the free media won’t cover the story.

Broader Issues

WMD. Briefings by MG Dayton and Dr. Kay assured Members that we now have a good approach to identifying Iraq’s WMD programs and weapons. Senator Roberts told me he came on the trip skeptical and was now far more confident that the DoD/DCI would succeed.

Saddam Hussein. Discussions at CENTCOM forward and in Basra, Baghdad, and Kirkuk reinforced the Members’ view that killing or capturing Hussein, or proving he is dead, is essential but not sufficient to success in getting Iraq on its feet.

Regional Variability. Members now appreciate the stark differences among Iraq’s regions. The south and north were battered by Hussein. In Basra, conditions are deplorable as a result. In the north, the loss of economic potential is evident. In neither region has the suffering been increased by the war. In the center of the country, the war has brought dislocation. This is primarily due to the political and economic consequences of the regime’s removal, not to war damage.

Oil. BG Crear (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) briefed in Basra. He has made enormous progress in bringing the South Company’s refinery on line. Members noted how well he worked with the Iraqis and how much pride the Iraqis took in bringing their refinery back on line. On the day we were in Basra, loading was completed of the first two million barrels for export. I took the occasion to explain why the UN resolutions of May 7 were essential to not only oil export, but also relieving the shortages in gas and propane.

Electricity. I believe that Members concluded that looting (in the south) and “political sabotage” in the center and north are prohibiting a return to pre-war

levels. The best situation is in the north; that region is now at about pre-war levels, at about 50 percent of actual capacity.

Police. Members understand how difficult it is to hire and train police. They also know how important police are to stability and the eventual drawdown of U.S. forces. The greatest success is being experienced in the north.

Political Reform. Ambassador Bremer laid out his plan. Members were sympathetic to the difficulties he faces and were generally approving of the approach. I believe they understand Bremer's determination to make the Iraqis make their own political system.

Two concerns, however, were raised. First, should the exile groups be involved? Second, does Iraq need a "strong face"? Bremer made it clear that the exiles play a legitimate role in Iraqi politics. He did not promise a perfect democracy, but one in which both representation and process would be fair.

Iraqi Nationalism. LTG Abizaid, Bremer, MG Odierno (Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division), and MG Petraeus (Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division) all expressed the view that a level of nationalism existed among Iraqis. Each believes it can serve as a positive element in building a new Iraq, integrated from north to south.

Personal Observations

Personnel. Abizaid and LTG Sanchez are leaders. Abizaid has a strategic perspective on his mission as it relates to Iraq. Sanchez is tied closely to Bremer and, by all appearances, has given his subordinate commanders freedom to adapt his guidance to their circumstances.

Odierno and Petraeus are smart, confident, and leaders. Both are articulate. Both have entrusted their subordinates with important roles in designing and executing the mission in the north.

MG Wald (UK 1st Armored) seems less intimately connected to Bremer and Sanchez. In part, this is a function of distance. In part, however, I think he reflects a somewhat different UK view on how to proceed. My sense is that he sees his area of operations as having distinct needs that should be met on a timetable of his choosing. Wald seems to be chafing under Bremer's direction. I cannot judge the merit of Wald's case, but the relationship bears watching.

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Crear is first-rate. The Iraqis respect him, and he, them. His work is critical to our success, and he approaches it with a calm determination that is palpable and, I think, infectious.

New Baghdad Chief of Station. He is going to Baghdad from the chief of station job in Kuwait. He is young and appears capable.

Morale. Troop morale is high. Sanchez and Odierno both said that more certainty on unit rotations would help. Within reason, both said, the issue from the troops is not how long they would stay, but when they were likely to go home. Neither thought it to be a problem now, but it could develop over the summer. I know that CJCS owes you a plan by mid-July. As soon thereafter that you can provide Sanchez guidance, the better. We also need a close look at how the National Guard/military reserve units should be employed.

Iraq Survey Group (ISG). Dayton and Kay are working well together. Kay has a number of useful leads on the WMD program. Kay is working a "quick strike" agenda, looking to validate the fact of a program.

That validation will need to be supplemented and extended by additional work over the next year or two to establish the scope of the program, the proliferation network of which Iraq was a part, the recovery and destruction of the materials that are remaining, and the re-education and re-employment of scientists.

I will begin immediately to work out the plans for this longer-range effort.

Funding. Petraeus argued that, in the current effort of reconstruction—political and economic—"money equals ammunition." In his view, the north is set for success, but only if reconstruction money is available. A failure to get money into the system (and, in Petraeus' view, into the north in particular) by this fall will squander progress already made. I believe we should revisit, on a case-by-case basis, the existing policy that calls for using U.S. money last. While correct in principle, we should not let bureaucratic delays in accessing and allocating Iraqi money to jeopardize success.

Communications Strategy. Neither the CJTF-7 (and its subordinate commands) nor the CPA are effectively telling the story of their individual and combined efforts. It is essential that a communications director be appointed for OIF and sent forward to Baghdad. A deputy director should be based in Washington. Given the importance Members placed on this, we might enlist their aid in finding a good candidate. I have discussed this with DiRita.

We have done so.

D.H.

Additional Items

Intelligence Review. Roberts intends to hold three hearings by the August recess:

- o George Tenet, on intelligence before the war
- o Doug Feith, on his “intelligence cell”
- o Kay and me, on the ISG.

His objective with respect to intelligence before the war is to show consistency of estimates. With respect to Feith, Roberts wants to demonstrate that a three-man cell is not a threat to the integrity of the intelligence process. He wants Kay to reassure Members on the state of the WMD discovery effort.

Pre-war Planning. Senator Nelson has asked Feith for information on pre-war planning. Nelson believes that much of what actually happened could have been predicted. He would like Feith to take him through assumptions, etc. I have spoken with Ryan Henry, who is preparing a reply.

CODEL (MEMBERS):

John Warner (R-VA); Chairman, SASC; Member, SSCI
Carl Levin (D-MI); Ranking Member, SASC; Member, SSCI
Pat Roberts (R-KS); Chairman, SSCI; Member, SASC
John D. Rockefeller (D-WV); Vice Chairman, SSCI
Susan Collins (R-ME); Member, SASC
Jack Reed (D-RI); Member, SASC
Ben Nelson (D-NE); Member, SASC
Mark Dayton (D-MN); Member, SASC
John Cornyn (R-TX); Member, SASC

ITINERARY

Sunday, 29 June

Doha, Qatar
CENTCOM Forward
MG Dayton, Iraq Survey Group

Monday, 30 June

Basra, Iraq
Working lunch with UK Commander and staff
Windshield tour of Basra
Meet representative of Recovery of Iraqi Oil Program
Meet with NGO representatives
Kuwait
US Embassy Country Team Brief

Tuesday, 1 July

Baghdad, Iraq
CJTF-7 Brief including Corps of Engineers brief and JTF-20 Brief
Working lunch with Ambassador Bremer
Meet with MG Dayton and Dr. Kay on ISG matters
Windshield tour of Baghdad
Inspect mass grave site
Tour Babylon ruins
Meet soldiers from home states


Wednesday, 2 July

Kirkuk, Iraq
Informal lunch with troops
Brief by CG, 4th Infantry Division; CG, 101st Airborne Division
Windshield tour of Kirkuk
Tour oil field

July 16, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: War of Peace

Mr. President—

Attached is an interesting paper by the High Representative in Bosnia.

You may recall we urged that his predecessor be moved out and this individual, Lord Paddy Ashdown, be his replacement.

The attached paper is his remarks last month about the importance of, as he quoted Kipling, "the savage war of peace" and, as he quoted Winston Churchill, "the sinews of peace."

It is clear that the international community and the U.S. Government have not been organized, trained or equipped to deal with the world as it now exists. We will have to keep working to get organized, trained and equipped to do this new job.

Very respectfully,

Attach.

6/19/03 Ashdown speech to International Rescue Committee

DHR:dh
071403-32

Bosnia

16 Jul 03

W00828 /03

Embargo: 1800 hrs BST, 19 June 2003

**SPEECH BY THE RT HON PADDY ASHDOWN, HIGH
REPRESENTATIVE IN BOSNIA AND HERZGOVINA, TO THE
INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE, LONDON, 19 JUNE
2003**

'Broken communities, shattered lives: winning the savage war of peace'

Introduction

Last week, my wife Jane and I spent a night with a displaced Bosnian family in their home near Visegrad.

It's a breathtakingly beautiful spot, high in the mountains, with the Drina river tumbling through the valley a couple of thousand feet below.

Together with our hosts for the night – the Setkic family - we sat sipping tea, watching the sun go down, barely noticing the clouds gathering menacingly on the horizon. The Setkics live in a now decrepit UNHCR tent.

Within a few minutes, we were in the middle of one of the most severe hail storms I have seen.

The hail stones went straight through the canvas of the tent, punching holes in it as though it had been strafed by machine gun fire. We were in for a damp night.

Ahmed and Sibisa Setkic, in their mid-seventies, are refugees from Sarajevo, two of the 2 million refugees and internally displaced spawned by the Bosnian war. For Ahmed, this is the third time his house has been burned down. The first was in 1941 by the Germans. The second was 1944 by the Ustase; and then in 1992, by the Serbian paramilitary warlord, Arkan. He was the worst. He left nothing behind him alive - neither woman, nor child nor animal.

Nevertheless, two years ago Ahmed moved back, cleared his land, planted meagre crops, cleaned his house and started patiently scraping together the

resources to rebuild it. And they are still at it, eight years after hostilities ceased.

Ahmed and Sibisa's plight, like that their country, no longer features on our television screens or on the agenda of key international meetings.

The world's attention has moved on.

First there was Kosovo, then East Timor, then September the 11th, then Afghanistan and now Iraq.

But in Bosnia, the slow, unglamorous business of winning what Kipling called "the savage war of peace" continues, day in day out, year in year out; and with each step, so does the parallel task of strengthening not just the security of Bosnia, but of the region, and the wider world. ✓

The problems faced by the Setkic family in that valley on the other side of Europe demonstrate the gargantuan scale of this task; the time it takes to complete; the need for a steady and enduring application of will and resources; the vital role of the international community

They also offer a small example to politicians and policy makers around the world of what foreign policy means at the basic human level. A reminder of why, as we embark on yet another exercise in building peace after war – this time in the Middle East – we must learn the lessons of the past, and learn them quickly.

I will want to return in a moment to some of the lessons we might be able to draw from Bosnia for Iraq, and for other similar missions that inevitably will follow. But before I do so, let me say a word about how we are doing in Bosnia itself.

Progress in Bosnia

There are plenty of sceptics about.

They look at the difficulties Bosnia still faces, from getting its highly complex government structures to function, to the formidable economic challenges, to the rise of organised crime, and they conclude that it is all

hopeless. We have given it our best shot, they argue, and nothing has changed.

Nothing could be further from the truth.

Observing progress in Bosnia is a bit like watching grass grow. You have to go away and come back at decent intervals to notice it.

But, after years of heavy-duty international engagement, the country is in far, far better shape than it was when the Dayton agreement was signed. And when one considers the trauma of that war, it is frankly little short of miraculous how much has been achieved.

The worst is behind us in Bosnia and Herzegovina. With a few exceptions the issues we deal with now are not those of conflict, but increasingly the reassuringly familiar challenges of transition, which Hungary and Poland and the other new European democracies have already overcome.

We have to finish the task of course. But if we do so, and I am confident that we shall, we will have demonstrated in Bosnia that it is possible to create a durable peace, even out of the rubble of a vicious ethnic war.

Eight years ago, Bosnia lay torn shattered and near fatally wounded by a four-year war in which a quarter of a million of its four million population lay dead, as Milosevic and Tadjman bartered over its territory. Today Tadjman is dead, Milosevic is in The Hague, and their countries are focused, not on territorial expansion, but on European integration.

At the end of the war, Bosnia had three armies and over 400,000 men under arms; today there are only 16,000 soldiers left, and, by the end of this year, they will be brought under a single system of command and control.

Then, Bosnia had three secret services. By the end of this year, it will only have one.

Even after the Peace Agreement was signed, it would have been unthinkable to travel freely all over the country. Now that is taken for granted.

By the time the fighting stopped, most of the housing stock was heavily damaged. Today the bulk of it has been repaired, and all the utilities are functioning.

Eight years ago, Bosnia was in economic turmoil with no universally accepted currency. We now have a central bank, a stable currency and one of the lowest inflation rates in the Balkans.

And, perhaps the greatest achievement of all, a million of those burned, raped and brutalised from their homes have now returned. We have made a reality, in Bosnia, of a fundamental human right that elsewhere, tragically, only existed on paper– the right of refugees to return home.

We have set a standard and established a precedent. War will never be the same again. Some good has come out of evil.

So progress has been made.

If you come to Sarajevo, as thousands now do each winter for the skiing and each summer for the International Jazz and Film Festivals, you will see some bullet scarred houses to be sure. But you will also see teeming cafes and restaurants, modern homes, and all the accompanying paraphernalia of domestic European life, from garden centres to DIY stores. It's all a far cry from the days when I used to be smuggled through the tunnel and whisked down 'sniper's alley' in an armoured personnel carrier amid the thump of artillery fire, and the crack of rifle shots.

Slowly but surely, Bosnia is becoming a 'normal' country.

It may take time to do, but we are stitching back together what Winston Churchill called the 'sinews of peace'. ✓

Which is why a family like the Setkics are right to hope that they will succeed and their children will, eventually, be able return to the family home.

To be sure, Bosnia still faces huge problems – problems that appear all the more complex and intractable when viewed through the distorting lens of a three-way ethnic prism.

We have more to do, particularly to establish the rule of law and to transform the economy, which is why, when I arrived in Bosnia a year ago, I said my priorities were Justice and Jobs.

But again, out of the glare of the world's media, a lot of hard work is beginning to pay off.

After six years of intensive work, the UN has completed the Herculean task of downsizing, training and certifying the police. The new European Union Police Mission will now see the process through to completion.

We are reforming the judiciary and restructuring the court system.

Together, International and Bosnian lawyers have written new, modern criminal and civil codes that will make it easier to convict the guilty and protect the innocent.

We have beefed up our international criminal intelligence and investigation capacity to assist the police in going after the high level criminals.

And we have created a Special Chamber in the new State Court, staffed with international as well as Bosnian judges and prosecutors, to take on organised crime.

Just last month, this new Chamber took on its first case – the biggest human trafficking trial in Bosnia's history.

On the economic front, we are doing away with the existing indirect tax system, so loved by the criminal and the corrupt, in which different administrations collect different taxes, at different rates. With the help of the European Commission, we will soon have one modern, transparent tax administration to deal with Customs, Excise and a single system of VAT.

And we are tackling the big, structural, supply side reforms that all transition countries have had to tackle, from labour market reform to privatisation, from bankruptcy courts to public administration reform.

Lessons for elsewhere?

What we have seen in the last few years in Bosnia, and in the Balkans as a whole, is that it really is possible to turn things around. But it requires a marathon effort over many years.

Until recently, of course, so-called 'nation-building' was derided in some quarters as naïve and expensive international 'social work' - Hackney Council on a global scale. The reality is quite the opposite. 'Nation-building' was always a misnomer - we can't build nations, in the sense that the international community can't impose the emotional ties and patriotism that nationhood implies: those develop naturally or not at all. But we can - and we must - help failed states build governing structures that work, because if we don't, those failed states easily turn into warring states or terrorist havens. Changing regimes is not enough; we have to leave behind something better than came before. The teams now re-building Iraq, or Afghanistan, are as much part of the war on terrorism as the B52s or the carrier battle groups.

We have become good - very good - at winning the short, sharp, hi-tech wars of the last two decades. We can now do it almost by numbers.

But we are far less good at the hard, patient, resource-consuming task of building the peace that follows.

Perhaps there are signs that this time the coalition's swift victory in Iraq has started to change that.

The day after Baghdad fell, the telephones in Sarajevo were ringing hot.

My office lost count of the number of calls wanting to know what pointers Bosnia could offer for the task ahead in Iraq.

It turned out that regime change, to misquote Winston Churchill, was not the end, not even the beginning of the end of the matter in Iraq. It was merely the end of the beginning. It was plain that the next stage would, in its own way, be every bit as challenging and sometimes as dangerous: and so it is proving.

So what can our experience in Bosnia and elsewhere offer for Iraq, and for any future missions of that type?

I acknowledge, of course, that the two countries are very different.

We need to be as wary of trying to build the last peace as we should be of fighting the last war. Every situation is different.

Iraq is over ten times bigger than Bosnia. There the war lasted less than 4 weeks; in Bosnia it lasted 4 years.

In Bosnia, nearly all the houses were damaged and much of the infrastructure destroyed. In Iraq, the level of damage has been, proportionately, far less.

Four years of war in Bosnia spawned thousands of war criminals, many of whom are still at large today. Twenty-five years of the Baath party regime will have inflicted a different kind of trauma on the Iraqi people, which will have to be addressed in a different but equally resolute way.

And perhaps most importantly of all, Bosnia, rich in natural beauty, has never been rich in natural resources. Iraq on the other hand is sitting on the second largest oil reserves in the world. The financing of its reconstruction is secure in the long-term, and does not depend exclusively on international charity.

So the differences are great.

But some ingredients are common and some broad lessons worth considering.

Principles for peace-making

There are, I would suggest, seven broad principles – the seven pillars of peace making - that apply more or less universally.

The first principle is the importance of having a good plan and sticking to it. This plan needs to be drawn up, not as an after-thought, but well in advance, as an integral part of the planning for the military campaign. Because the switch from war fighting to peace-building can happen, literally, overnight.

Indeed in Iraq we have seen how the two can proceed almost simultaneously – how troops can be engaged in high intensity conflict one moment, then policing the next, then supervising humanitarian hand-outs and then, at a moment's notice, switch back to war fighting all in a matter of hours. It's very tough for them. These are new skills most soldiers are neither trained for nor used to. But they are skills soldiers are now going to have to learn, for in the early, crucial days in the savage war of peace, until the police arrive and the administrators roll in, everything depends on them.

In Bosnia, we had no such plan for civil reconstruction when the war ended. Indeed it is only in the last few months that we have finally drawn up a Mission Implementation Plan, setting out clearly what we are trying to achieve, how and by when.

It is easy in the chaotic aftermath of conflict to get buffeted from pillar to post, and to lose sight of the key strategic goals. We need to get as good at planning the post war period as we are at planning the war itself.

The second principle is the over-riding priority, as we have discovered in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Afghanistan and now Iraq, of establishing the rule of law - and doing so as quickly as possible. The first hours are crucial.

Crime and corruption follow swiftly in the footsteps of war, like a dark shadow. They seep into the space that wars leave almost as the last firing stops. If the rule of law is not established very swiftly, it will not be long before crime and corruption infect the body politic, contaminate its organs, choke off its resources and threaten its chances of recovery.

This, above all was the mistake we made in Bosnia. We oversaw some major failures at the outset, as the Sarajevo suburbs were forcibly cleared by Serb paramilitaries under the eyes of NATO peace-keepers.

We failed to quell the reprisal attacks on Serbs in the early weeks of NATO's presence in Kosovo, which has had a profound effect on the mission ever since.

And we are plainly encountering similar difficulties in Iraq, despite the heroic efforts of the troops on the ground.

It is much more important to establish the rule of law quickly than to establish democracy quickly. Because without the former, the latter is soon undermined.

In Bosnia, we got these priorities the wrong way round. Perhaps it was because we wanted to get out quickly and we thought elections would help us hand over power and go.

So we insisted on six elections in six years, with the turn-out falling at each one; but in that time we have barely been able to put six major criminals behind bars.

Now we are starting to win this battle for the rule of law in Bosnia. But it is tough, because we are fighting an entrenched enemy that reaches into every corner of politics, government and the state. And it is much tougher than it would have been if we had made the rule of law our number one task in the first year, rather than in the sixth.

The third lesson is that it is vital to go in hard from the start. On the military side, that means establishing your credibility straight away. The more robustly a peacekeeping force deals with any initial challenges to its authority, the fewer challenges there will be in the future. It means having enough troops at the outset, and scaling down as things improve. We had 60,000 in Bosnia at the start. Now there are 12,000, and next year there will be fewer.

On the civilian side, going in hard means starting off with the powers needed to get the job done, rather than having to acquire them later.

In Bosnia my predecessor, the former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt, famously arrived in Sarajevo with a briefcase full of cash, a handful of staff and that was about it. He had to beg, borrow and steal to get his mission off the ground. He worked wonders; but it was not until after he left that the international community invested his successor with the tough – some would say Draconian – executive powers that the High Representative in Bosnia now possesses.

These include the power to impose legislation and remove officials and politicians obstructing the implementation of the Peace Agreement. Before this, international officials were in the absurd position of having to negotiate

even the most minor issues with all three parties to the conflict, often with the very people who had been both the master-minds of the conflict and its profiteers.

It is better to start off with strong powers, the sooner to relinquish them, than to start with weak powers and to have, too late, to strengthen them.

The fourth principle is that it is vital to start as quickly as possible on the major structural reforms – from putting in place a customs service or reliable tax base, to reforming the police and the civil service, to restructuring and screening the judiciary, to transforming the armed forces. Long-term success always depends on these fundamental reforms: the sooner they are embarked upon, the sooner they will be completed.

It is also vital – and this is my fifth principle – that the international community organises itself in theatre in a manner that can work and take decisions. You can't re-build war torn communities by committee, nor by remote control from several thousand miles away. It has to be done by the people on the ground, and they have to be empowered – and trusted – to drive the process forward.

This may mean – as in Bosnia – more frequent use of coalitions of the willing. I happen to believe that we have stumbled in BiH on an ad hoc arrangement that works well. I report to a Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council – essentially the key countries involved in implementing the Dayton Agreement.

The Office of the High Representative was established at Dayton as an ad hoc institution charged with supervising civilian implementation of the peace agreement. The NATO-led Stabilisation Force – SFOR – has responsibility for military and security implementation.

I report twice a year, to the UN Security Council, through the UN Secretary General, but am not formally accountable to them.

The OHR was created outside the UN family as a matter of political expediency, but this arrangement has over time displayed certain advantages.

- It brings with it flexibility in operating, reporting and funding.

- It allows greater freedom of manoeuvre than is accorded to our sister organisation, UNMIK in Kosovo, which is directly accountable to UN structures and has frequently, in the past, been subject to micro management on a five thousand mile screw driver from New York
- The powers accorded to the High Representative – more sweeping than might have been accorded to a UN Head of Mission – have proved indispensable in maintaining the effectiveness of this temporary post.

These features have enabled successive High Representatives to respond quickly and decisively to a broad range of situations that have arisen in the course of peace implementation.

The sixth principle is the importance of an exceptionally close relationship between the military and civilian aspects of peace implementation. Civilians depend on the military if they are to succeed, and the military depend on the civilians: both need each others' skills. Civilian administrators need to know they can count on military support as and when they need it. They need to be able to take on extremists, confident that the military will be there to back them up. And they need the military's help, in everything from mine clearance to ensuring a safe and secure environment for tasks ranging from exhumations to refugee return. This is an area where we have made immense progress in recent years: the military are now much better attuned to the needs of the civilian administrators. The experience British and American troops have had on the streets of Banja Luka and Brcko, in everything from patrolling, to small -scale economic goodwill projects, are being put to good use in Baghdad and Basra.

The final lesson is perhaps the most important.

Indeed it ought not to be a surprise to us at all, since it proved the case after the World War II with the Marshall Plan, and it has proved the case in every major conflict since.

The fact is that building things up takes much longer than knocking them down.

That is true – literally true – of buildings, of homes, of bridges, of power stations.

But it is even more true of institutions – of professional police forces, of independent judiciaries, of courts, of civil services, of legislatures and executives, of free and responsible broadcasters and newspapers, of an active civil society.

Installing the software of a free and open society is a slow business. It cannot be done – as we initially claimed in Bosnia – in a year or so. So we should avoid setting deadlines, and settle in for the long haul. Peace-keeping needs to be measured not in months but decades. In Bosnia, after almost a decade, we are nearing success: but it has taken a huge commitment.

The last American Commander of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force in Bosnia, who became a close and much admired friend, used to have a wonderful Texan word for it.

‘What we need here’, he used to tell me ‘ is sticktoitiveness’.

That’s exactly what we need – in Kosovo, in East Timor, in Afghanistan, and in Iraq: the political will, the unity of purpose, and the sheer stamina as an international community to see the job through to lasting success.

That means staying on, and sticking at it, long after the CNN effect has passed.

Television has become very good at prodding governments to intervene; but it is less good at staying around to make sure they finish the job.

Bosnia and the EU

We have not yet finished that job in Bosnia, although we are making, as I have described, steady headway.

But finish we must.

It is often said that if we withdraw too soon, we put our whole investment at risk. And that is true in so far as it goes.

But what we really need in Bosnia is not a withdrawal strategy; it is a transition strategy. And that is, perhaps, the eighth principle. If peace-

building is to succeed, to take root, to become irreversible, it needs a political destination. For Iraq, that may be a democratic and prosperous state in a peaceful and secure Middle East. For Bosnia, it is Europe.

Bosnia, like the rest of the Balkans, is part of Europe.

What happens in that part of our continent has a direct effect in other parts of our continent.

We are in the same geographical and political boat.

So the political choice facing Europe is clear: either we export stability to the Balkan region or, as we have seen already, the Balkans will export instability to the rest of Europe.

It is as simple – and as stark – as that.

That is why, in Bosnia, and in the rest of the Balkans, the role of the European Union is of such cardinal importance.

The prospect of membership of the Union is perhaps the most powerful force available to us for projecting stability.

We have seen across Central and Eastern Europe what a transformation that prospect can bring about.

It was not inevitable, when the Soviet Empire collapsed, that its aftermath would largely be free of conflict and bloodshed.

That – with the tragic exception of the Balkans – the process was largely peaceful is due in large part to the twin stabilising influences of NATO and the European Union.

The Union has stood like a magnetic pole, towards which the ex-Communist countries from Estonia to Slovakia were able to set their compasses and steer a steady course of reform.

Today, most of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are on the very threshold of membership.

The Western Balkan are now embarking on the same journey, towards the same destination. But they do so with the advantage of having had the route charted and the dangers marked by others who have gone before.

Tomorrow, I will travel to Thessaloniki for the European Summit. That meeting, organised by the Greek Presidency, will bring together the leaders of the Western Balkan countries with their EU counterparts.

It is an important occasion, because it will offer a chance to the EU to demonstrate conclusively to the Balkan countries that it wants them to join the Union once they have met the necessary standards – no ifs, no buts.

I hope that that message will go out loudly and clearly from Thessaloniki. Because it has not always been heard – or indeed said – as clearly in the past as it might have been.

I recognise the domestic political pressures some EU governments are under on the whole question of enlargement. But Europe bears a special responsibility in the Balkans – for its past, and now for its future.

We cannot change the Balkans' history.

But we can – and we must – help to determine the region's future.

That will require leadership. It will require continued financial commitments on a substantial scale. It will mean maintaining political interest, especially as new and exciting priorities crowd the international agenda.

It will mean making sure the European Union is equipped to take decisions in real time, on issues that ultimately have a direct bearing on its own security. It will mean mobilising all the leverage at the Union's disposal, from the Stabilisation and Association process, to visa bans against those supporting indicted war criminals, to trade policy, to budgetary assistance.

We are using all these instruments much more proactively than in the past, in large part due to the tireless efforts of Javier Solana and Chris Patten, who have done more than anybody else to make the EU an effective reality in the Balkans.

But there is still room for improvement.

The process they have started has to be completed. It still takes too long for a plethora of committees in Brussels to take decisions with the speed required by people in the field. There is still too much arcane institutional theology in place of bold and decisive action. There is still too much institutional rivalry, and not enough sense of operating as a single integrated team. This all hinders, sometimes severely, but always frustratingly, the EU's ability to bring its – potentially immense – political clout to bear, even in the Balkans where there is, unlike in Iraq, a genuinely common European policy, and one that is largely shared on the other side of the Atlantic.

A final thought.

Why are we seemingly endlessly condemned to re-inventing the wheel when it comes to peace keeping? If, as I suspect, peace making is going to be a key element in the exercise of power in the modern world, is there not a case for creating some formal training facility for the world's politicians, diplomats and soldiers, which could also act as a repository of best practice and tribal wisdom in the field? Increasingly, we are finding that these are transferable skills. Just look at the CVs of the people being called on to serve in the civilian administration in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan. They crop up again and again, with good reason.

Conclusion

The challenge for us now in Bosnia is keep up the pace. To finish what we have started.

We, the international community, have made our mistakes there.

Nevertheless, we have stuck at it. And this, coupled with the courage and extraordinary qualities of the decent people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, has meant that, despite it all, we are in reach of a time when Bosnia can begin to make its own way in the world as a normal and stable country.

It would, however, be a tragedy to add to Bosnia's tragedies if the painful lessons we have learned there over the last seven years were to be ignored as we struggle with similar problems elsewhere.

For Ahmed and Sibisa Setkic, in their patched up tent on a Balkan mountainside, I believe we are at last beginning to win the savage war of peace in their small country.

I can do no better than hope that we can win that war with fewer errors and greater effectiveness for the tens of thousands of others like them elsewhere in the world.

July 16, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)
Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
Honorable George Tenet
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Intelligence



350.07

Mr. President—

Attached is an editorial from the *Wall Street Journal* that favorably mentions the "Intelligence Side Letter" that the bipartisan Ballistic Missile Commission unanimously issued in 1999 (also attached). The "Side Letter" pointed out the importance of interaction between policy makers and the intelligence community.

Given the criticism in the press, it might be useful to be aware of the bipartisan side letter.

Very respectfully,

Attach.
7/14/03 *Wall Street Journal* editorial, "Lack of Intelligence"
3/18/99 Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Intelligence Side Letter

1856102

DHR:dh
071403-41

Wall Street Journal
July 14, 2003

Lack Of Intelligence

The flap over who baked the yellowcake uranium story is so transparently political that it is tempting to ignore. But now that Democrats and other opponents of deposing Saddam Hussein are demanding a full-scale scapegoat hunt, by all means let's consider the uses and abuses of intelligence.

The charge is that 16 of the words that President Bush uttered during his January State of the Union address may have been false. Here's what he said: "The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa." We say this "may" be false, because in fact the British government continues to stand by this assertion even if the CIA does not. So what Mr. Bush said about what the British believe was true in January and is still true today.

Based on this non-lie, then, we are all supposed to believe that the entire case for going to war was false and that -- precisely what? Other than calling for someone's head, and for a Congressional probe that would give free TV time to Democrats running for President, the critics don't seem to be demanding anything specific about policy. Do John Kerry and Joe Lieberman now regret their vote to allow Mr. Bush to go to war in Iraq?

We ask that question because policy decisions are what Presidents are elected to make, and the results of those judgments are what they should be held responsible for. The case for deposing Saddam was based on a dozen years of history, U.N. resolutions and virtual unanimity in the intelligence community that he had weapons of mass destruction and programs to build more. The furor over yellowcake intelligence is a sideshow about process, and even on this point the critics are working under a mistaken assumption about how intelligence ought to work.

Michigan Senator Carl Levin, among others, seems to believe that somewhere "in the bowels of the agency" there are dispassionate analysts who scour the world for evidence and then make Olympian judgments about what is true or false. These judgments in turn are supposed to be binding on policy makers. Two callow writers at The New Republic even quoted with a straight face a CIA analyst who claimed that it was wrong for Vice President Dick Cheney to have visited Langley to inspect the Iraq evidence lest he upset the equilibrium of what is supposed to be an "ivory tower."

Anyone who believes this is naive or mischievous, and dangerously so. Intelligence is supposed to be a tool of policy, not a determiner of it. By its very nature intelligence is fragmentary and ambiguous. Analysts are supposed to look for patterns in the haystacks, form hypotheses about what they mean and then feed their best estimates to policy makers. The job of the users of intelligence is not to accept this as holy writ but to ask questions, challenge hypotheses and prod the spooks to look for other things or in other directions.

The person who has stated this most clearly is none other than Donald Rumsfeld, who included a notable Intelligence Side Letter as part of the report filed by his Commission assessing the

11-L-0559/OSD/21146

ballistic missile threat in 1999. (Mr. Levin could read it in the Green Room awaiting his many TV appearances.)

The Commission's Side Letter found that in U.S. intelligence circles "The ballistic missile and WMD threat are not normally treated as a strategic threat to the U.S., on a par with any other highest priority issues." Specifically, it blamed "senior users of intelligence" for failing "to interact knowledgeably with the producers of intelligence."

Contrary to the Ivory Tower school, the Side Letter added that, "Unless and until senior users take time to engage analysts, question their assumptions and methods, seek from them what they know, what they don't know and ask them their opinions -- and do so without penalizing the analysts when their opinions differ from those of the user -- senior users cannot have a substantial impact in improving the intelligence product they receive."

This adult view of intelligence contrasts with the Levin school, which puts an unfair burden on CIA analysts that most of them really don't want. It makes them the ultimate arbiter of facts that determine policy, turning them into "political" actors. In that sense, Joseph Wilson, the CIA consultant who last week wrote about his trip to Niger over yellowcake, is the one who has "politicized" intelligence. He is a well-known opponent of war with Iraq and clearly now wants to discredit the Bush policy after the fact.

Which brings us back to the current half-baked outrage over yellowcake. The Democratic motive has very little to do with intelligence disputes. The campaign is really about assailing Mr. Bush's credibility, which Democrats realize is his greatest asset. That's why they throw the words "lie" and "untruth" around like loose change, as if Mr. Bush had deceived a grand jury.

That's also why Terry McAuliffe's Democratic National Committee jumped on the yellowcake flap last week with an attack ad. The ad declares that "It's time to tell the truth," but the ad's video clip of Mr. Bush's 16-word State of the Union sentence omits the crucial words: "The British government has learned that..." The Democrats are themselves lying about Mr. Bush's non-lie.

The yellowcake assault is itself an abuse of intelligence, and if it extends to a full-scale probe it has the potential to damage a vital tool of U.S. security in the war on terror. Especially after 9/11 and in a world of WMD, the U.S. needs intelligence analysts willing to question their own assumptions, as well as policy makers willing to help them do it. We wish the Bush Administration would stop playing who baked the yellowcake and start explaining to Americans that intelligence is too important to be politicized.

11-L-0559/OSD/21147

Report of the

**COMMISSION TO ASSESS
THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT
TO THE UNITED STATES**

*Intelligence
Side Letter*

March 18, 1999

DONALD RUMSFELD
SUITE 408
400 NORTH MICHIGAN AVENUE
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60611

TELEPHONE (b)(6)
FACSIMILE

18 March 1999

SUBJECT: Unclassified Version of Intelligence Side Letter

On behalf of members of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, I am sending to you the unclassified version of our Intelligence Side Letter.

The classified version of this Intelligence Side Letter was developed by the Commissioners in response to requests from the Congressional Leadership. We were asked to provide observations on the extent to which the Intelligence Community is organized, trained and equipped to monitor and assess the ballistic missile threat to the United States into the 21st Century, gaps that might exist with respect to those capabilities, and any recommendations the Commissioners might have with respect to those capabilities.

In addition, the Director of Central Intelligence asked us to provide him with our observations.

We chose to provide these observations in a Side Letter to our Final Report, because our charter was explicitly limited to an assessment of the nature and magnitude of the existing and emerging ballistic missile threat to the United States. The classified version of the Side Letter was delivered to the Congressional Leadership and to the senior leadership of the Intelligence Community on 15 October 1998. Prior to its delivery, we discussed its contents at length with the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet.

11-L-0559/OSD/21149


The DCI requested that the Commissioners meet with him and the senior leadership of the Intelligence Community to discuss their observations. This meeting took place on 6 January 1999.

At that meeting the Commissioners were briefed on the steps being contemplated or taken by the DCI and the IC to address the concerns raised in our Side Letter. At that meeting the DCI agreed to the Commissioners request to review the Side Letter so that it might be declassified and released to a broader audience. The Commissioners also proposed, and the DCI agreed, to include as part of an unclassified Side Letter the main points raised by the IC in its 6 January briefing for the Commissioners.

In late 1998, the Congress provided the Intelligence Community with nearly \$3 billion in new funding. That funding was meant to address, in part, the issues raised in our classified Side Letter. The Commissioners understand that the DCI has used portions of that funding to support the initiatives he briefed to the Commissioners.

I hope this unclassified version of the Side Letter will help inform future efforts to assure that our Intelligence Community is properly organized, trained and equipped to monitor and assess the ballistic missile threat to the United States today and into the 21st Century.

Sincerely,



Donald Rumsfeld

Enclosure

**Members of
The Commission To Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat
to the United States**

**were nominated
by the**

**Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives,
the Majority Leader of the U.S. Senate and the
Minority Leaders of the U.S. Senate and the
U.S. House of Representatives**

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Chairman

Dr. Barry M. Blechman

General Lee Butler, U.S. Air Force (Ret.)

Dr. Richard L. Garwin

Dr. William R. Graham

Dr. William Schneider, Jr.

General Larry D. Welch, U.S. Air Force (Ret.)

Dr. Paul D. Wolfowitz

The Honorable R. James Woolsey

**and appointed
by the**

Director of Central Intelligence

18 March 1999

I. Introduction

A. Origin of this Letter

In the earliest days of the Commission's work, the Speaker of the House and the Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) asked the Commissioners to provide any observations we might have on the following issues:

- the extent to which the Intelligence Community (IC) is organized, trained and equipped to monitor and assess the ballistic missile threat to the United States today and into the 21st century;
- gaps, if any, which may exist with respect to current and planned capabilities;
- any recommendations the Commissioners might have with respect to the current and evolving IC capability to monitor, assess and warn relative to the threat posed by ballistic missiles.

In addition, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) asked that we provide him with any observations we might have as a result of our work in assessing the ballistic missile threat to the United States.

As the Commission went about the task assigned to it to assess the existing and emerging ballistic missile threat to the U.S. these questions were kept in mind. Among its unanimous conclusions, the Commission found that the "Intelligence Community's ability to provide timely and accurate estimates of ballistic missile threats to the U.S. is eroding."

This paper expands on that conclusion and provides observations on the questions posed by the Speaker of the House and the Chairman of the HPSCI.

In October 1998 the classified version of this letter was delivered to the Congress and to the DCI and other senior leadership of the Intelligence Community. Since then the DCI has taken measures to address issues and observations raised in the classified paper. In early January 1999 the DCI briefed the members of the commission on those measures. At the conclusion of this unclassified version of the side letter, we take note of some of the initiatives reported by the DCI.

B. Background

Before turning to specific issues, we wish to take note at the outset that the nation has long benefited from the human and technological prowess resident in its Intelligence Community. In the course of its work, the Commission was granted extensive access to these resources and drew deeply upon them. We noted numerous examples of superb analytic and technical achievements, many of which informed our work.

At the same time, as experienced users of intelligence, the Commissioners were struck by the dichotomy of the growth in the number, complexity and difficulty of the tasks assigned as a high priority to the IC over the last decade and the erosion of resources it has experienced, both human and technical, over that same period. This dichotomy was striking with respect to the complex task of assessing ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats to the nation.

We noted in our Report on such threats a number of adverse trends in the post-Cold War threat environment affecting the capability of the IC to monitor, assess and warn of ballistic missile threats:

- emerging capabilities in a larger number of hostile states;
- increased availability of relevant data, technologies and expertise to those states; and,
- more sophisticated resort to cover, deception and denial by them.

The cumulative impact of these trends, coupled with a decline in analytic resources in particular, has complicated the IC's task relative to the ballistic missile threat.

This reality alone would have been sufficient to challenge the Intelligence Community's capacity to adapt its Cold War collection and analysis models and methods to a profoundly altered threat environment. However, that challenge has been magnified by prolonged internal turbulence. The Community has been buffeted by budget cuts, isolation, excessive turnover, a decline in scientific and engineering competence, a highly-charged political atmosphere, foreign penetration of the intelligence community, and stovepiping of functions and information within the IC. Finally, for policy makers to effectively engage analysts with respect to what they know, what they don't know and what they think about the evidence they have gathered, analyzed and presented, the products need to routinely

include alternative hypotheses as to the meaning of the intelligence presented.

We observed that senior users of intelligence, in the executive and legislative branches, bear a share of the responsibility for the erosion of the IC's ability to provide timely and accurate estimates of the threat. The IC needs a clear and manageable set of priorities. The guidance provided to the IC by the executive branch in Presidential Decision Directive 35 (PDD-35) assigns a high priority to many different issues. Both the executive and legislative branches habitually task the IC on an *ad hoc* basis, driven more by contemporary issues than long-term intelligence requirements. At the same time the military Services and regional Commanders-in-Chief have become heavily dependent on IC collection and analysis resources in performance of their missions. The result is a detrimental competition within the IC for assets to respond to near-term demand and long-term requirements and between the IC, the executive branch, Congress and the military for the application of collection and analytic resources.

The erosion in the capabilities of the IC is exacerbated further by what the Commissioners observed as a failure of senior users of intelligence to interact knowledgeably with the producers of intelligence. Given the schedule of senior users, an analyst rarely has the opportunity to reflect the depth of what he or she may know on a given subject. Unless and until senior users take time to engage analysts, question their assumptions and methods, seek from them what they know, what they don't know and ask them their opinions—and do so without penalizing the analysts when their opinions differ from those of the user—senior users cannot have a substantial impact in improving the intelligence product they receive. For the process of intelligence, collection and analysis to be a self-correcting and self-improving one, like most processes it requires a feedback mechanism designed to improve the process itself. That mechanism can only be provided by knowledgeable and engaged users.

Intelligence resources (human, technical and financial) allocated to the monitoring of ballistic missile and WMD developments have declined significantly in the past five years. This has occurred despite the prominence of the proliferation issue for public policy.

II. Key Issues

A. Priority Given to Monitoring and Assessing the Ballistic Missile Threat

1. Intelligence Priorities Established by the President

Presidential Directives and the means to implement them are appropriately classified and any complete discussion is not possible at the unclassified level. The Commission found that the priorities and management arrangements creates conflicts that are often resolved to the detriment of long range strategic issue collection. The proliferation of requirements for the IC across many countries, issues and priorities assures that few topics will receive in depth coverage. The fact that so many of the requirements relate to the support of real-time operations—support to military and diplomatic operations, anti-drug and anti-nuclear smuggling, political analysis of unstable governments—assures that near-term operational issues will receive the greatest attention while longer-term strategic issues are left to be dealt with as time and resources may or may not permit.

In the Commission's view, this emphasis on near-term issues and operations needs to be moderated considerably, especially as it affects the ballistic missile and WMD threats. To provide timely and actionable warning against these threats requires long-term, in-depth studies of ballistic missile and WMD developments. Such studies require the creation of a dedicated cadre of analysts with access to collection resources. Treating the threat as one of a hundred or more high priority issues, all of which are placed on a back burner with each crisis and contingency that comes along, will not improve the capability of the IC to provide actionable warning. If near-term issue demands cannot be moderated, then additional resources must be provided so longer-term issues can and are consistently addressed.

2. Ballistic Missiles and WMD as a Strategic Threat

The ballistic missile and WMD threat are not normally treated as a strategic threat to the US, on a par with any other highest priority issues. As noted in our Report, nations intent on developing such capabilities do so for reasons of their national interest. That is not how the IC treats these threats today. In our experience, intelligence about the ballistic missile and WMD threat is sought and produced principally to support the development or enforcement of non-proliferation measures. The ballistic missiles and WMD should also be treated as instruments of state power being developed by a country for a strategic purpose, rather than as contraband traded contrary to international norms. Because ballistic missiles and WMD capabilities are treated as contraband, attention is focused primarily on the process by which technology, techniques and technicians are transferred from seller to buyer.

Because trade in this contraband is subject to sanction due to national law or international agreement, attention is often focused primarily on trying to trace the evidence of the activity to its source and determining the complicity of the seller and its government in the sale. Less attention is focused on the scope, pace and direction of a nation's programs and the technical characteristics and doctrine for the employment of completed systems.

The proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles is a global problem, with nations that are buyers of either or both often sellers of either or both as well.

Considerably less attention is given to:

- the motivations of those who seek to acquire such capabilities;
- the leverage the capability might impart to the buyer in local, regional or global affairs;
- the doctrine that the buyer might develop to guide the deployment and employment of the capability;
- the technical state, pace and potential growth paths for ballistic missile and WMD programs in countries of concern;
- the likelihood that buyers are cooperating among themselves to enhance their respective capabilities';
- the effects of foreign deception and denial activities on the ability of the US to monitor and assess the threat.

We believe that the DCI needs to direct the relevant analytic centers to assess ballistic missile and WMD capabilities as strategic programs that pose a threat to the United States. Proliferation of technology should be treated as one factor affecting the strategic calculations of a given country. The analysts in these cells need to be able to task collection assets, have access to information wherever it may be held within the IC, encouraged to challenge each other's findings and instructed to employ analytic methodologies more comprehensive than those often used in the IC. Using outside expertise should be encouraged. Creating dedicated cells is not a matter of organization alone. In addition more, and more broadly trained, analysts are needed to identify tasking requirements and opportunities, perform the required analyses, and fashion the finished intelligence.

B. Analytic Resources and IC Skill-mix

The methodology employed by the IC in collecting and analyzing intelligence on the ballistic missile and WMD threats needs to be revised. In

addition, the analytic depth of the community focused on these threats needs to be strengthened. The decline in the IC's scientific and engineering competence is one of several recent developments which have adversely affected the performance of the IC on ballistic missile and WMD developments. The combination should result in higher confidence in the ability of the IC to provide timely warning of the threat.

1. Methodological Approach

The Commissioners believe that an expansion of the analytic methodology used by the IC is needed. Intelligence assessments and estimates must be grounded in the facts. But to be useful, they cannot be limited to reporting only what is known about a particular program. This is so if for no other reason than that the date an event occurs, the date at which we learn of it, and the date on which it is reported can be separated by years, in some cases up to a decade.

Yet, in a large number of cases examined, Commissioners found analysts unwilling to make estimates that extended beyond the hard evidence they had in hand, which effectively precluded developing and testing alternative hypothesis about the actual foreign programs taking place. The Commission would urge that the IC adopt as a standard of its methodology that in addition to considering what they know, analysts consider as well what they know they don't know about a program and set about filling gaps in their knowledge by:

- taking into account not only the output measures of a program, but the input measures of technology, expertise and personnel from both internal sources and as a result of foreign assistance. The type and rate of foreign assistance can be a key indicator of both the pace and objective of a program into which the IC otherwise has little insight.
- comparing what takes place in one country with what is taking place in others, particularly among the emerging ballistic missile powers. While each may be pursuing a somewhat different development program, all of them are pursuing programs fundamentally different from those pursued by the US, Russia and even China. A more systematic use of comparative methodologies might help to fill the information gaps.
- employing the technique of alternative hypotheses. This technique can help make sense of known events and serve as a way to identify

and organize indicators relative to a program's motivation, purpose, pace and direction. By hypothesizing alternative scenarios a more adequate set of indicators and collection priorities can be established. As the indicators begin to align with the known facts, the importance of the information gaps is reduced and the likely outcomes projected with greater confidence. The result is the possibility for earlier warning than if analysts wait for proof of a capability in the form of hard evidence of a test or a deployment. Hypothesis testing can provide a guide to what characteristics to pursue, and a cue to collection sensors as well.

- explicitly tasking collection assets to gather information that would disprove a hypothesis or fill a particular gap in a list of indicators. This can prove a wasteful use of scarce assets if not done in a rigorous fashion. But moving from the highly ambiguous absence of evidence to the collection of specific evidence of absence can be as important as finding the actual evidence.

Adopting broader analytic techniques is not sufficient. The analytic depth of the IC's all-source analysts also must be improved.

2. Analytic Depth

The DCI has conducted surveys of the analytic depth of the IC. These studies sought to determine whether the IC was well positioned, in terms of education, experience, manpower and plans for growth, to meet the new requirements being placed on the IC. The studies concluded that considerable shortfalls existed.

The underlying fact is that the IC is not yet well positioned to address the ballistic missile threat today. Its analysts are relatively inexperienced, lacking technical, in-country and language skills and, if our experience is indicative, trained for the most part in non-scientific and non-technical disciplines. Improving the IC's analytic depth will take time. In practical terms this means that over the coming years, when the programs of the countries of concern are likely to reach maturity, analytic capability will lag the evolution of the threats. Analytic capability is the critical link between collection and production. It must be bolstered in the coming years if the IC is to successfully perform its mission to warn of the ballistic missile threat.

Improving analytic capability requires leadership and training, coupled with experience. Senior and middle-level management must provide the leadership and lay out a course of training. This means that they may

need to be relieved of some portion of their current responsibilities, or their numbers increased. Training takes time. To make time, the analytic force will need to be increased so that critical issues are not left unaddressed while analysts are in training. Training should include not only classroom time, but time in the field. Time in the field should include periods spent with US national laboratories and industries, in addition to time devoted to learning the history, language and culture of the countries of concern.

C. Collecting Intelligence

Collecting intelligence on ballistic missile and WMD programs is becoming more difficult. We believe the reasons for this are understood and appreciated within the IC.

1. Conventional Collection

The most evident reason for increased difficulty in collecting intelligence is denial and deception practiced by target countries. In the Commission's view, the capacity of target countries to deny and deceive the US about their intentions and capabilities is the result of a number of developments, most of which were cited in our Report:

- target countries have gained extensive knowledge of US sources and methods of collection through espionage, the willingness of the US to share intelligence, demarches, and unauthorized disclosures. Taken together, this knowledge allows target countries to conduct their activities at times and in ways that aim to frustrate US collection.

2. Special Collection

In addition to conventional means of collection, the Commissioners believe that special collection methods need attention. It is impossible to discuss these measures in an unclassified forum, but suffice to point out that the nation needs to take every possible opportunity to penetrate the security apparatus that is to be found surrounding any other nation's strategic programs.

D. Compartments

The strengthening of analytic and collection capabilities needs to be complemented by a reconsideration of the manner in which intelligence is compartmented within the IC. Three anecdotes make the point:

- the Commission received three briefings on the ballistic missiles of a country of concern before discovering critical information about the performance of systems in its inventory. It was not until receiving a briefing on an unrelated subject, however, that we discovered why the IC has ascribed those performance figures to the systems in question.
- the Commission called together analysts charged with monitoring a number of countries and functions to conduct a comparative look at ballistic missile capabilities across those countries. We discovered, however, that few of the dozen or more analysts in the room, drawn from the IC as whole, possessed the same information as the Commissioners. As a result, it was impossible to conduct a comparative look across the countries and functions.
- on more than one occasion the Commission dutifully sat through briefs only to find later we had not received accurate or complete information on the ballistic missile and WMD capabilities of countries of concern. At the end of one, two-hour briefing and after the briefers had left, a mid-level manager informed us that most of what we had heard was incorrect. He said this was because the briefers did not have access to the information contained in the compartments that we were now to be briefed into.

Protecting sources and methods of collection is one valid reason for placing information in compartments; there are others. It is our view that despite the good reasons for doing so, it can have the effect of seriously impeding the flow of information, distorting analyses and resulting in incomplete or misleading information being presented to policy makers. To be sure, a few responsible individuals in the Congress and the Executive Branch have been briefed on the correct information. So far as we know, however, these briefings have been done in a piecemeal fashion, over time and never in a manner that explicitly contrasts what is actually known with what is published. Moreover, the limited distribution of the correct information does nothing to offset the incorrect impression created in the national security establishment more broadly of the nature and magnitude of the threat.

Measures must be found that simultaneously protect US sources and methods of collection, permit analysts to make full use of the intelligence needed to do their job, and make clear to policy makers in the Legislative and

Executive Branches the differences between published intelligence products and the information held within special compartments and access programs.

E. Turbulence in Leadership

We believe that success in the Intelligence Community requires the attention, understanding, and leadership of the President and the National Security Council, down through senior policy makers. To be effective, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) needs to be an active, working participant in the senior national security team.

Beyond interest and attention at the top, reasonable continuity of leadership is critical. Excessive turbulence in leadership is harmful to U.S. intelligence capabilities. In the last 10 years, the U.S. has had five DCIs and six Directors of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Further, there have been several periods when these posts were vacant with "acting" Directors and a number of instances when appointments were announced but later withdrawn. Over the period 1988-98, the average time in position was less than two years. If a corporation changed leadership that often, it would likely be in bankruptcy and deserve it. The IC has been weakened in its influence and morale at least in part as a result of the turbulence in key intelligence leadership positions. It is the responsibility of the President as well as the Congress to assure reasonable continuity of leadership.

III. Conclusion and Recommendations

The foregoing observations include suggestions that might improve the capabilities of the intelligence community to monitor, assess and warn relative to the ballistic missile threat to the United States. In addition to these suggestions, we suggest that the Congress consider, in a bi-partisan and bi-cameral manner and in close cooperation with the leadership of the intelligence community, the following initiatives.

1. Review and as necessary re-align current U.S. collection and analysis practices and procedures in light of the new development and deployment patterns that now characterize the ballistic missile and WMD programs of countries of concern. In our view, the intelligence community is not postured appropriately to collect and analyze these patterns of activity. The conclusions and recommendations in our Report were based on the realization that these programs are notably different from the programs conducted by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. during the Cold War. Contemporary programs are characterized by extensive access to technology and expertise through the open and black markets, extensive denial and deception

practices, few (if any) visible tests, as well as underground production, storage and deployment.

The need for a review and realignment is especially acute in the area of testing. The old Soviet model, characterized by numerous tests, from well-defined locations, over an extended period of time no longer applies today. The US may not have more than a single opportunity to collect critical information on a ballistic missile or WMD test. It is essential that we get it right the first time because we cannot count on getting a second, or third, opportunity as we did

A review would include consideration of whether the US has adapted its technical and human collection assets to a little or no warning environment, whether either or both need to be updated or replaced to meet the demands of the new environment, whether new techniques for managing collection and analysis might yield higher confidence of advance warning of a test, collection of critical information and rapid and expert exploitation of the information, that data is archived and stored for use by analysts at a later date. In addition, it is critical that this short warning capability be tested and exercised on a regular basis.

2. Assess the role played by the IC's "special collectors" in providing information critical to monitoring, assessing and warning of ballistic missile and WMD threats. In our view, these special collectors provide highly significant information, critical to an understanding of foreign activity, that is not available to the IC by any other means

The assessment should focus on the quality of the information gained by each system, the character of the intelligence product that can be produced when the "take" from these systems are integrated, as was the case in the work of the Commission, whether the information can be acquired by other means with acceptable confidence, and the capacity of target countries or entities to undermine the effectiveness of the systems.

This assessment should be undertaken promptly. Decisions are being made now concerning future collection capabilities. We believe an assessment of the kind suggested here would illuminate the role of these systems and provide a rationale for assuring that the U.S. has the capabilities these systems provide, even if specific systems are replaced by new designs and new architectures.

3. Establish standards of evidence and presentation for intelligence reporting to the Congress. Standards of evidence and presentation are

needed to address the widespread and understandable concerns about the politicization of intelligence. Standards will minimize the ultimately destructive, practice of those requesting intelligence reports framing their requests in a manner that suits their purposes and impose on those who reply an obligation to provide responses without regard to the perceived policy preferences of the audience.

Standards for presentation are relatively easy to devise. Our Report lists a number, including a requirement that analysts present what they know, what they don't know and what they think, and distinguishing between them, and that they use a methodology that includes examination of alternative hypotheses.

Standards of evidence are more difficult to devise, but they are needed. They help impose rigor on analysts, make it possible to compare information from different sources and analysts far more easily, and provide the means for holding analysts as well as mid-level and senior managers accountable for the products delivered to decision makers. At the same time they can help to shield the intelligence process from the effects of what President Clinton called "fudging" by senior policy makers.

The President's recent discussion of "fudging" occurred in the context of a discussion of the effects of sanctions laws on his flexibility to conduct diplomacy. Faced with the prospect that sanctions might automatically be imposed on a nation should certain information about its activities become known, and believing the sanctions would not advance US interests, the President allowed as how he and other senior policy makers were likely to "fudge" the issue. Fudging is a phenomenon that is not restricted to avoiding to unwanted consequences of sanctions. It is an approach to intelligence related to other policy matters as well. Its practical consequence is that the information received by senior policy makers from the intelligence community may not be studied at all, if studied not be reported in full, or policy makers may refuse to hear what the IC may have to say on a subject, or policy makers may frame questions for the IC in such a way that damaging information is not brought to light.

However its effects are manifested, "fudging" has a corrupting influence on both the policy making and the intelligence communities. A symbiotic relationship between the consumer and the provider of intelligence can be easily established in which they shape their questions and answers to satisfy the needs of the moment or to avoid unwanted, unpleasant, or uncomfortable longer-term consequences.

Fudging is not a new phenomenon nor is it a practice confined to the Executive Branch. Establishing standards of evidence can help to offset inclinations to fudge by assuring those who ask questions that they will receive complete answers and imposing on the IC the requirement to provide such answers.

IV. January 1999 Meeting with DCI

On January 6, 1999, the Commissioners met with the Director of Central Intelligence and senior officials of the Intelligence Community. The Commissioners were briefed by IC staff as to the steps that the IC has taken and/or is planning to take related to issues raised both in the Commission's Report to Congress and in the classified version of this Intelligence Side Letter, which had been presented to members of the Intelligence Community some months before.

Following are highlights of the brief presented to the Commissioners by Director Tenet and senior officials of the Intelligence Community:

- The IC has expanded its analyses of ballistic missiles as regional and national threats, including examining space launch vehicle conversions that could pose a threat, the threat implications of North Korea's Taepo Dong missiles, and the extent to which Scud missile technology could be pushed to increase the threat. Some of these efforts have already resulted in classified and unclassified publications.
- The IC is involving multiple contractors, outside experts, and plans to involve former Commission members in its annual review of the ballistic missile threat, to be published this year as a National Intelligence Estimate.
- The Assistant Director Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production is conducting a study of the IC's analytic capabilities addressing many issues in The Commission's Report, including how to reinvigorate S&T analysis, expand competitive analysis and red teaming, and develop alternative scenarios and advanced methodologies.
- The Assistant Director Central Intelligence for Collection has established an interagency task force and senior review panel. They have examined collection management within the IC, identified specific deficiencies, and developed a set of recommendations for the DCI and program managers to review, including collaborative and innovative strategies to assess and enhance collection.

- The DCI stressed that future collection systems must include capabilities to counter denial and deception measures.
- The DCI will convene a panel of former senior government officials to review the IC's implementation of PDD-35.
- Principle drafters of national estimates will have full access to all relevant compartmented intelligence and the IC will review all compartmentation practices that affect intelligence production.
- The IC will ensure that presentations and reports on the missile threat provide policy makers with a clear representation of what the IC knows, what it doesn't know, what it can't know, and finally what it judges based on evidence, the lack thereof, and expertise from inside and outside the government. The IC has also become much more explicit and detailed in its discussions about warning, indicating what can and cannot be warned, noting cities that can be reached by specific missiles and payloads, and warning of the potential threats before "deployment."

The Commission is encouraged by the steps that the DCI has undertaken to implement the recommendations presented in our classified Report on the ballistic missile threat to the United States and in our Classified Intelligence Side Letter. The Commission also welcomes by the Intelligence Community's increased interest in using expertise from outside sources, including scientific and engineering experts.

July 23, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Report from Iraq

Attached is an e-mail from a person I don't know that describes his experience as an Army engineer working with the 4th Infantry Division. I think it gives you a much more accurate sense of what is going on there than the television does.

Very respectfully,

Attach.
7/10/03 e-mail

DHR:dh
072103-19

DMR

229405

11-L-0559/OSD/21166

Joyce Rumsfeld

From: (b)(6)
 To: [REDACTED]
 Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2003 12:38 AM
 Subject: SITREP(situation report) from Iraq

Thought I would send this on to some of you. It is a letter from a friend of my uncle's who is a member of his church here at home. I just did a copy and paste as I don't agree with doing "forwards of stuff that contain other peoples e-mail addresses.

(b)(6)

SITREP from Iraq

The following is a great SITREP...it is from an Army engineer working very hard in Iraq on doing all those very many difficult things necessary to enable the Iraqi people to eventually take care of themselves and allow our folks to come back home...and all we have to do back here is be patient and supportive and let all of these good people do their jobs.

(b)(6)

 OPEN LETTER TO FIRST LUTHERAN CHURCH OF RICHMOND BEACH

It has been a while since I have written to my friends at First Lutheran Church about what's really going on here in Iraq. The news you watch on TV is exaggerated, sensationalized and selective. Good news doesn't sell.

The stuff you don't hear about on CNN?

Let's start with Electrical Power production in Iraq. The day after the war was declared over, there was nearly 0 power being generated in Iraq. 45 days later, in a partnership between the Army, the Iraqi people and some private companies, there are now 3200 mega watts (MW) of power being produced daily, 1/3 of the total national potential of 8000 Mw. Downed power lines (big stuff, 400 Kilovolt (Kv) and 132 Kv) are being repaired and are about 70% complete.

Then there is water purification. In central Iraq between Baghdad and Mosul, home of the 4th Infantry Division, water treatment was spotty at best. The facilities existed, but the controls were never implemented.

Simple chemicals like Chlorine for purification and Alum (Aluminum Sulfate) for sediment settling (the Tigris River is about as clear as the Mississippi River) were in very short supply or not used at all. When chlorine was used, it was metered by the scientific method of guessing. So some people got pool water to drink and some people got water with lots of little things floating around in it. We are slowly but surely solving that. Contracts for repairs to facilities that are only 50% or less operational are being let, chemicals are being delivered, although we don't have the metering problem solved yet (...but again, it's only been 45 days).

How about oil and fuel? Well, the war was all about oil wasn't it? You bet it was. It was all about oil for the Iraqi people! They have no other income, they produce nothing else. Oil is 95% of the Iraqi GNP. For this nation to survive, it MUST sell oil. The Refinery at Bayji is at 75% of capacity producing gasoline. The crude pipeline between Kirkuk (Oil Central) and Bayji will be repaired by tomorrow (2 June).

LPG, what all Iraqi's use to cook and heat with, is at 103% of normal production

7/10/2003

11-L-0559/OSD/21167

and WE, the US ARMY, are insuring it is being distributed FAIRLY to ALL Iraqi's.

You have to remember that only 3 months ago, ALL these things were used by the Saddam regime as weapons against the population to keep them in line. If your town misbehaved, gasoline shipments stopped, LPG pipelines and trucks stopped, Water was turned off, power was turned off. Now, until exports start, every drop of gasoline produced goes to the Iraqi people. Crude oil is being stored and the country is at 75% capacity right now. They need to export or stop pumping soon, ...so thank the UN for the delay. ALL LPG goes to the Iraqi people EVERYWHERE. Water is being purified as best it can be, but at least it's running all the time to everyone.

Are we still getting shot at? Yep.

Are American Soldiers still dying? Yep, about 1 a day from my out fit, the 4th Infantry Division, most in accidents, but dead is dead.

If we are doing all this for the Iraqi's, why are they shooting at us? The general Iraqi population isn't shooting at us. There are still bad guys, who won't let go of the old

regime. They are Ba'ath party members (Read Nazi Party, but not as nice) who have known nothing but, and supported nothing but the regime, all of their lives. These are the thugs for the regime that caused many to disappear in the night. They have no other skills. At least the Nazis had jobs and a semblance of a national infrastructure that they could go back to after the war...as plumbers, managers, engineers, etc....these people have no skills but terror. They are simply applying their skills...and we are applying ours. There is no Christian way to say this,...but they must be eliminated and we are doing so with all the efficiency we can muster. Our troops are shot at literally everyday by small arms and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs). We respond. 100% of the time, the Ba'ath party guys come out with the short end of the stick. The most amazing thing to me is that they don't realize that if they stopped shooting at us, we would focus on fixing things more quickly and then leave, back to the land of the Big PX. The more they shoot at us, the longer we will have to stay.

Lastly, all of you please realize that 90% of the damage you see on TV was caused by Iraqi's, NOT by us and not by the war. Sure we took out a few bridges from military necessity, we took out a few power and phone lines to disrupt communications, sure we drilled a few palaces and government headquarter buildings with 2000 lb. laser guided bombs (I work 100 yards from where two hit the Tikrit Palace), he had plenty to spare. But, ANY damage you see to schools, hospitals, power generation facilities, refineries, pipelines, was ALL caused either by the Iraqi Army in its death throes or from much of the Iraqi civilians looting the places. Could we have prevented it? Nope. We can and do now, but 45 days ago the average soldier was fighting for his own survival and trying to get to his objectives as fast as possible. He was lucky to know what town he was in much less be informed enough to know who owned what or have the power to stop a 1,000 people from looting and burning a building by himself. The United States and our allies, especially Great Britain, are doing a very noble thing here. We stuck our necks out on the world's chopping block to free an entire people from the grip of a horrible terror that was beyond belief.

I've already talked the weapons of mass destruction thing to death...bottom line, who cares? This country was one big conventional weapons ammo dump anyway. We have probably destroyed more weapons and ammo in the last 30 days than the US Army has ever fired in the last 30 years (Remember, this is a country the size of Texas), so drop the WMD argument as the reason we came here....if we find it GREAT, if we don't, SO WHAT?

I'm living in a "guest palace" on a 500 acre palace compound, with 20 palaces with like facilities built in half a dozen towns all over Iraq, that were built for one

7/10/2003

11-L-0559/OSD/21168

man.

Drive down the street and out into the countryside 5 miles away like I have, and see all the families of 10 or more, all living in mud huts and herding the two dozen sheep on which their very existence depends...then tell me why you think we are here.

WMD? ...important..have to find 'em wherever they may be (...in Syria?), but not OUR real motivator. Don't let it be yours either.

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

4th Infantry Division

7/10/2003

11-L-0559/OSD/21169

July 23, 2003

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Oil for Food

Attached is a memo from Dov on Oil for Food that might be of interest.

Attach.

7/18/03 USD(C) memo to SecDef re: U.N. Oil for Food (OFF) Contract Audits

DHR:dh
072103-36

7/18/03

W00849 /03

23 Jul 03

11-L-0559/OSD/21170

C7/21



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

INFO MEMO

July 18, 2003, 5:42 PM

COMPTROLLER

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: U.N. Oil for Food (OFF) Contract Audits

- Under the auspices of a Policy-directed Task Force, the DCAA and DCMA have conducted a review of approved and funded Iraqi Oil for Food contracts. The team selected 700 high priority, high-dollar contracts valued at \$7 billion for review; this amounts to roughly 10 percent of the OFF contracts but about 70 percent of the dollars.
- The audit team has briefed interim findings on 312 individual contracts. Of these 312 contracts the audit team believes 172, or 55 percent, of the individual contracts are overpriced. The average amount of overpricing per overpriced contract is 22 percent. The total of potential overpricing of the 312 individual contracts is \$358.7 million. This rate of over pricing, when applied to the 700 high-priority, high-value contracts, could result in as much as \$805 million in overpricing.
- In addition, the audit team found some contracts of questionable (!) value, such as contracts for Cigarette Paper, Mercedes Benz Sedans, Sports Halls (Gymnasiums) and larger than expected quantities of spares, passenger vehicles, and other pieces of miscellaneous equipment.
- The Secretary General has the authority (Pursuant to UNSCR 1483 (2003)), to either postpone action on or negotiate adjustments in the terms or conditions of these contracts. The CPA can advise the U.N. Secretary General of any postponements or adjustments in the terms of the contracts that are believed to be warranted. If postponed, the contract amounts would be deposited into the DFI; if adjusted, the contract amounts could be used to meet current requirements.
- I believe the CPA should pursue this effort with the U.N. If CPA prefers, my office and Policy could act on CPA's behalf. I recommend you discuss this matter with Jerry Bremer.

COORDINATION: USD (P)

cc: Deputy Secretary of Defense

Prepared By: Ashley Godwin (b)(6)

July 24, 2003

IRAQ

TO: President George W. Bush

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)
Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
Honorable George Tenet
Honorable Condoleezza Rice
Dan Bartlett

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Keeping the Hill Informed

Attached is a packet of materials that will be going to every member of the House and Senate prior to the August recess.

You will note it has a card with talking points and a page on each major issue, including: the path to democracy, quality of life, international participation, security and force protection, mass graves, troop rotation, Qusay and Uday, the top 55 who have been captured or killed, and a paper on myths and facts about the coalition in Iraq. There are also references to various web sites where they can get additional information.

Finally, there is a copy of the overview Jerry Bremer has prepared of his plan for the vision to restore sovereignty to the Iraqi people.

If you hear people on the Hill say they don't know what is going on, or that nothing is happening, or that we don't have international participation, we can refer them to the packet their office received.

Very respectfully,

Attach.
Info packet

DHR:dh
072303-19

24JUL03

W00854-03

11-L-0559/OSD/21172



Iraq: The Path To Democracy


On July 13th Iraq took the first step toward representative government with the establishment of the Iraq Governing Council. The 25-person Council is broadly representative. It was selected after nationwide consultations with Iraqis. The Council is already at work.

- The Council's powers include:
 - Naming interim Ministers for each ministry, overseeing their performance their performance, and requiring testimony from them.
 - Preparing policy initiatives for CPA.
 - Organizing itself and forming commissions.
 - The Council has already formed committees on agenda, rules and procedures, and Baathist crimes against humanity.
 - The Council has also met several times in plenary session
 - Naming representatives to international organizations and conferences. The Council will appoint the heads of Iraqi missions abroad.
 - The Council has appointed a delegation to attend the Security Council session in New York this week.
 - Playing a budgetary role. The 2004 budget will be subject to the approval of the Council. The Council will be able to consider amendments to the 2003 emergency budget.
 - Proposing policies on Iraq's national security, including reform of the armed forces, police and courts.

To maintain momentum, CPA will involve Iraqi public opinion in the process of developing a constitution. The Governing Council will take the immediate lead.

The Council may appoint a Preparatory Constitutional Commission to recommend a process for drafting and approving a new constitution.

- One option is for regional assemblies to elect delegates to a constitutional convention.
- The constitution would pave the way to national elections and a new sovereign Iraqi government.



Quality of Life in Iraq

Under Saddam's regime, electrical power, sanitation and health care suffered from chronic neglect. Saddam used access to power, water and other services as tools of oppressions, deliberately limiting supplies to certain populations.

The Coalition is making considerable progress in restoring vital services to all Iraqis and rebuilding the country's economy -- all toward establishing a stable foundation for lasting security and democracy in Iraq.


- **There is no food crisis in Iraq – sufficient food stocks are in Iraq or en route.**
 - 1.2 million metric tons of food has entered Iraq; another 2.2 million metric tons will arrive by the end of October.
 - The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) continues to purchase local harvests, including 450,000 metric tons of Iraqi wheat and more than 300,000 metric tons of Iraqi barley.
- **The public health system continues to improve.**
 - Basic health care services have been restored to: 90% in the North, 80% in the South and 75% in Baghdad.
 - A **\$210 million (U.S.)** budget has been approved for the Iraqi Ministry of Health through October, which includes funding for pharmaceutical supplies and equipment, basic health care services, medical equipment, power generators for hospitals. (Saddam's regime spent only \$13 million for health care in 2002.)
- **Despite looting and sabotage, efforts to restore power in Iraq are proceeding.**
 - Power in Baghdad is generally available 3 hours on/3 hours off.
 - Power in Basra is generally available for 18 hours per day.
 - **39,000** Iraqi electrical workers are back on the job.
 - **\$294 million (U.S.)** is budgeted through December for electrical improvements.
- **Efforts continue nationally to improve the fresh water supply and sanitation services.**
 - Much of Iraq has been restored to pre-war conditions.
 - The CPA is funding **\$700,000** worth of sewage system work currently underway in Baghdad; international organizations are funding an additional **\$500,000** worth of work.
 - **\$73 million** is budgeted through December for water and sewer improvements.

Security & Force Protection

Coalition forces continue robust security patrols and military operations throughout Iraq, including joint patrols with Iraqi police and the formation of a new Iraqi civil defense corps.

- **Coalition forces continue to take the offensive against Iraqi dead-enders who are targeting the sites and symbols of the Coalition's reconstruction and stabilization successes.**
- **More than 8,200 tons of ammunition has been seized throughout Iraq -- much of which was stored by the Hussein regime in hospitals, schools and mosques.**
- **148,000 U.S. service members and more than 13,000 Coalition troops are serving in Iraq.**
- The Coalition is applying constant pressure to the enemy through offensive military operations, disruption of former Ba'athist leadership and terrorists. Recent Operations:
 - **Operation Soda Mountain (ended July 17).**
 - U.S. forces conducted **141 raids** resulting in **611 individuals captured**, including **62 former regime leaders**.
 - Captured: **4,297 mortar rounds, 1,346 rocket-propelled grenades and 635 other weapons**.
 - U.S. deaths: **None**.
 - **Operation Sidewinder (ended July 7)**
 - U.S. forces detained **282 individuals** and seized **included 96 AK-47 rifles, 3 heavy machine guns, 217 rocket-propelled grenades, 33 grenades, 200 60mm-mortar rounds, and other military equipment, documents, weapons and ammunition**.
 - U.S. deaths: **None**.
 - **Operation Desert Scorpion (Ongoing)**
 - U.S. forces conducted **6 raids** and captured **29 detainees**.
 - Captured: **\$8 million (U.S.)**, millions of Iraqi dinar, and a large sum of British pounds, British sterling and Euro.
 - The 1st Armored Division in Baghdad conducted **7 raids** and captured **9 detainees**.

- The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment set up traffic control points and recovered **2 rocket propelled grenade launchers, 1 rocket and 2 grenades.**
- U.S. deaths: **None.**
- **Operation Ivy Serpent (Ongoing)**
 - Coalition forces conducted **27 raids, captured 226 detainees, 800 82-mm mortar rounds, 50 AK-47s, 26 rocket-propelled grenades and 3 hand grenades. Six of the detainees are former regime loyalist leaders.**
 - U.S. deaths: **None.**
- **The Coalition is working with Iraqis to improve internal security throughout the country.**
 - An Iraqi civil defense corps is being raised in the next 45 days to assist U.S. and Coalition forces establishing security across Iraq.
 - **The Iraqi Militia Force** will help U.S. and Coalition forces in rooting out Saddam loyalists who have been attacking American forces and obstructing reconstruction efforts.
 - **4,000** Iraqi militiamen will be trained in the next **8 weeks**. They will train under U.S. troops, and work under U.S. command in regions around the country.
 - **500** Basra River police have been patrolling since June 19.
- **A new Iraqi army and Iraqi police forces are being trained and equipped by the Coalition.**
 - **12,000** Iraqis will be trained this year for the new Iraqi army; **40,000** in two years.
 - **58 of 89** Iraqi cities have hired police forces: **34,000** Iraqis have been hired and trained; **30,000** are currently patrolling with Coalition forces. The Coalition's goal is to train up to 61,000 Iraqi police officers.
 - The Coalition Provisional Authority has hired more than **1,000** Iraqis to guard **87** key facilities in Baghdad.



International Participation in Iraq

As of July 15th, total non-military assistance is \$2.8 billion.

- The UN reports humanitarian assistance of \$2.3 billion, of which:
 - > \$1.3 billion is pledges and contributions from the international community.
 - > \$1 billion is funded through the UN's Oil For Food program.
- In addition, several nations have made public commitments of over \$0.5 billion in assistance in excess of those reported by the UN.
- Over 36 countries, both inside and outside the coalition have made pledges or contributions. Below are the top 12 public pledges and contributions:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Dollars in Millions</u>
United States	\$565.3
United Kingdom*	\$335.1
Canada*	\$215.0
Japan	\$101.8
Australia	\$60.6
Germany*	\$56.0
Norway*	\$55.0
Denmark*	\$54.0
United Arab Em.	\$47.6
Saudi Arabia	\$36.6
Spain	\$32.3
Kuwait	\$27.5

*Government's publicly announced pledge is greater than the amount reported by the UN.

Over 45 nations have offered military forces. The United Kingdom and Poland will each lead multinational divisions.

- In addition, numerous countries have contributed to coalition combat and stability operations in Iraq with basing rights, over-flight rights, fuel, and other logistical support not included in the figures above. While the dollar values of some of those contributions has not been calculated, the assistance is enormously important.
- **19 countries and 13,273 troops in Iraq** are supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom; **14 countries** are committed to deploy another 12,000 troops.

Mass Graves in Iraq

Mass gravesites have been identified in Iraq, providing further evidence of the former regime's atrocities. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) is working to help grieving families search for lost relatives and preserve evidence for future prosecutions against the perpetrators by the new Iraqi government.

- 102 mass graves have been found.
- Estimates indicate that 300,000 victims of Saddam's regime may be buried in mass graves throughout Iraq.

The CPA is working with Coalition members, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations and local Iraqi leaders to implement the following measures:

▪ **Step One: Public Awareness and Site Assessment**

- The CPA has initiated a media campaign and is working with local and religious leaders to explain to the public why it is necessary to preserve the grave sites.
- A team of U.S. forensic experts has arrived to assess the sites and determine security needs. They will work with other Coalition assessment teams.

▪ **Step Two: Security and Support**

- At sites such as al Hillah where extensive digging has already begun, the CPA will deploy humanitarian response teams. The teams will work with local leaders to coordinate an orderly digging process; encourage detailed examinations of personal effects; assist in implementation of a system to keep records of identified remains; implement a process for providing death certificates and conducting witness interviews; and facilitate documentation of information found at the sites.
- Military at these sites will help inform the families of the importance of careful exhumation, and provide them with water, shade, plastic bags, gloves and masks.
- At sites that have not been subject to extensive digging, the CPA will hire local Iraqis to guard the graves, and deploy humanitarian response teams to meet with families who appear at the site to explain the problems with uncoordinated exhumation and inform them of the CPA's plans to assist in identification and reburial of remains.
- Forensic investigative teams from the Coalition will follow the assessment teams to conduct exhumations of gravesites. They will be coordinated out of the CPA offices and will hire and train local Iraqis to help.

▪ **Step Three: Identification**

- The CPA will work with existing Iraqi organizations to establish an Iraqi Committee on Missing Persons (ICMP), which will collect the records of Iraqis who have disappeared and compile a national database to integrate the information with findings of the forensic investigative teams. In connection with ICMP, the CPA will create a national outreach program for families.

▪ **Step Four: Prosecution**


- Prosecution of crimes against humanity committed by the former regime will be conducted through an Iraqi-led process assisted and supported by the international community as needed.



Troops to Return Home from Operations in Iraq & Afghanistan

The Army recently announced its plans to send home troops from Iraq and Afghanistan between September 2003 and April 2004. Details below:


Force:	Return Date:	Relieved By:
<u>Operation Iraqi Freedom</u>		
3 rd Infantry Division	Sept. 2003	82 ^d Airborne Division
3 rd Armored CAV Regiment	Oct. 2003	3 rd Brigade, 2 nd ID
2 nd Brigade, 82 ^d Airborne Div	Jan. 2004	(none)
101 st Airborne Division	Feb./Mar. 2004	Coalition Division
4 th Infantry Division	April 2004	1 st Infantry Division
173 rd Airborne Brigade	April 2004	(none)
1 st Armored Division	May 2004	1 st CAV Division
<u>Operation Enduring Freedom - Afghanistan</u>		
82 ^d Airborne Division	Aug. 2003	10 th Mountain Division
10 th Mountain Division	Feb. 2004	25 th Infantry Division




Uday & Qusay Hussein Killed in Firefight with Coalition Forces

- Saddam Hussein's sons Uday and Qusay -- among the most brutal and murderous members of the former Iraqi regime -- were killed today when Coalition forces launched a raid that resulted in a six-hour firefight.
- Acting on an Iraqi tip that several former Hussein regime suspects were holed up in a house in Mosul, Coalition forces launched a raid to apprehend the former regime members.
- The six-hour operation began when Coalition forces approached the house and received small-arms fire. Coalition forces returned fire and killed four persons, including those who have since been confirmed as Uday and Qusay Hussein -- numbers 2 and 3 on CENTCOM's most wanted list -- who were identified from multiple sources.
- Uday's and Qusay's horrific acts have been well-documented in eye witness and press accounts. Since Baghdad fell, more Iraqis have stepped forward to add to the list of atrocities. These accounts include:
 - Extravagant lifestyles -- enjoying lavish marble mansions and fleets of expensive cars while their fellow Iraqis starved and went without decent medical care.
 - Uday's serial raping of women and young girls, some as young as 12.
 - Multiple murders, including reports that Uday clubbed to death his father's favorite bodyguard in 1988 and executed numerous Ba'ath Party officials.
 - Uday's torture of athletes as head of Iraq's Olympic Committee, and his torture of others -- including friends who offended him -- by beating the soles of their feet with a club called a "falaqa."
- The Coalition will continue to pursue, capture and kill dead-enders of the Hussein regime who attack or resist Coalition forces.
- With the removal of every former regime member, the Iraqi people will grow more confident that they no longer have reason to fear the brutality and oppression that characterized life under Saddam Hussein's regime.

Iraq's 55 Most Wanted





Myths and Facts about the Coalition in Iraq

- Myth:** Iraqi clerics and protestors opposing the U.S. reflect the widespread resentment among Iraqis toward the Coalition's presence in their country.
- Fact:** With Saddam Hussein's removal, Iraqis are now free to speak their minds, voice dissent and protest openly -- acts that would have earned jail sentences and torture just months ago. While thousands may protest, more than 25 million people are liberated from the rule of Saddam Hussein, and most Iraqis are helping the U.S. and Coalition rebuild their country. Thousands have become new Iraqi army service members, civil defense militiamen, policemen and electrical workers. In increasing numbers, they are also helping Coalition forces locate and capture former regime members and their weapons.
- Myth:** Why doesn't the U.S. acknowledge the need for international help in securing and rebuilding Iraq? And why do American troops outnumber those from other Coalition members?
- Facts:** The Coalition force in Iraq is an international force. There are 19 countries on the ground and 37 countries that have pledged almost \$3 billion in reconstruction assistance to the Iraqis. The U.S. has the majority of forces in Iraq because it is the world's great power right now, and with great power comes great responsibility. The U.S. has the fundamental responsibility for winning the peace in Iraq and will continue to commit the forces necessary to get the job done.
- Myth:** Recent reports say that the U.S. doesn't have adequate troop strength in Iraq.
- Fact:** There are currently 148,000 U.S. service members and more than 13,000 Coalition troops are serving in Iraq. Not only did elements of this force defeat Saddam's army in a number of weeks, they are now helping with internal security and reconstruction.
- Rather than looking at numbers, it's helpful to look at results. The force in Iraq continues to be effective at applying pressure to the remnants of the former Iraqi regime. U.S. troops are conducting operations against enemy dead-enders. Recent operations -- including Soda Mountain, Sidewinder, Desert Scorpion and Ivy Serpent -- have included 190 raids resulting in the capture of 1100 detainees, the seizure of 4,500 mortar rounds, 1600 rocket-propelled grenades, more than 1,500 rounds of ammunition and thousands of other weapons and military equipment. In addition, more than 8,000 tons of Iraqi ordnance have been secured or destroyed since the end of major combat operations.
- Myth:** The Coalition has yet to find evidence of WMD in Iraq. Evidence of Saddam's WMD ambitions will probably never be found.
- Fact:** There is currently a large team of 1,500 people who have begun operations in Iraq to uncover WMD evidence. It will take time and patience to uncover weapons that Saddam and his regime have had years to hide. Iraq is a large country that developed complex methods of denial and deception tactics to mislead the international community and U.N. inspectors about the nature of their weapons programs. But there has never been any doubt -- among U.S. officials or the United Nations, which passed 17 resolutions calling for accountability with regard to Saddam's weapons -- that the former Iraqi regime had an aggressive WMD program.

Myth: A CSIS report released July 17 was highly critical of the U.S. effort in Iraq, and made a number of recommendations that should be implemented immediately.

Fact: The CSIS was fair in characterizing the immensity of the challenge facing the Coalition Provisional Authority in rebuilding a country suffering from the effects of 35 years of oppression and neglect. It also said the upcoming months were crucial, and that full reconstruction would take a number of years. For the most part, CPA leaders agree with this assessment. First, the U.S. is already implementing many of the CSIS recommendations, such as working hard to provide security, electricity, running water, sanitation and food. It is widely understood that rebuilding Iraq is a long-term process. It's clear that given the size of the task, the Coalition will be in Iraq going to be there for a while, possibly a number of years.

The CSIS report was also positive with regard to U.S. efforts. An excerpt:

"Eleven days in Iraq left indelible images in our minds...fathers escorting young girls to school; young men waiting in long lines everywhere jobs are announced; young kids flashing the thumbs-up sign; retained Iraqi police officers directing traffic; 19 year-old American soldiers...chatting on street corners with Iraqi children; the pride and professionalism of Iraqi members of newly established town councils; [and]...the sincere efforts of civilians to forge ahead...

"As we traveled throughout the country, it was impossible not be impressed by the character and drive of the coalition forces, the dedication and enthusiasm of the CPA, the weary endurance of the Iraqi people, and the enormity of the opportunities, challenges, and risks before them all [Page 9, www.csis.org]."

Myth: Saddam's remaining supporters are launching coordinated attacks across Iraq.
Fact: Eighty-five percent of the attacks against the coalition since June 1st have been in a small area between Baghdad and Tikrit. This is the area of Saddam's traditional tribal and political support, where remnants of the old regime regrouping in squad-level attacks against our soldiers. But they present no strategic threat to the Coalition, and there is no evidence of command-and-control coordination of these attacks.

Myth: The U.S. is getting drawn into a drawn-out guerrilla war in Iraq.
Fact: The Saddam hold-outs are not guerrillas, they are dead-enders, and they don't have the support of the Iraqi people. Additionally, they are no match for the Coalition forces in Iraq who number more than 140,000 and are conducting on-going and effective operations against Hussein regime criminals. Their attacks have not held up progress in Iraq.

Why Defense Must Change

By Donald H. Rumsfeld

Congress will soon decide whether the Department of Defense is to join the rest of the world -- and many newly revamped parts of the federal government, such as the Department of Homeland Security -- in entering the 21st century.

The issue is the Defense Transformation Act, legislation designed to allow the department to, among other things, manage its personnel.

Today it takes, on average, five months to hire a federal employee, 18 months to fire one and collective bargaining with more than 1,300 separate union locals to implement critical reforms. These negotiations can take years to accomplish.

While the nation is asking tens of thousands of reserve troops to leave their jobs and their families to help fight the global war on terrorism, it is estimated that on-duty military personnel are serving in more than 300,000 jobs -- at additional cost to the taxpayers -- that could be filled by civilian workers but are not because the department doesn't have the authority to manage its civilian personnel. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, more than 80 percent of civilians deployed in the theater of operations were contractors. Why? Because a complex web of regulations prevents the Department of Defense from moving civilians to new tasks quickly. As a result, managers turn to uniformed personnel and to contractors to do what department civilians could and should be doing. A similar problem exists with respect to the hiring of new employees. While industry can offer promising applicants a job and a bonus on the spot, all the Defense Department can offer is a ream of paperwork and a promise to get back to them in three to five months.

In an era when our enemies are moving at the speed of satellites, cell phones and cyberspace, these burdensome regulations are not acceptable. The Department of Defense cannot meet the challenges of the future with an organization anchored to the past. We must be permitted to be as agile, flexible and adaptable as the forces we field in battle around the world.

The Defense Transformation Act would help provide the nation with that kind of agility and flexibility.

The new National Security Personnel System the president has proposed would reduce red tape, provide the hiring flexibility necessary to attract the best candidates quickly and competitively, and offer all employees a performance-based promotion system that rewards excellence rather than longevity. Instead of a bargaining process that requires negotiations with more than 1,300 separate local units, the new system would work with a half-dozen or more national unions, which would retain and protect all the rights of union workers but do so through a more efficient and reasonable process that would not take years to navigate.

Moreover, the new system would not only protect and ensure the fundamental rights of all civilian employees and provide improved opportunities for advancement; it would also likely increase the number of civil service opportunities and make the Defense Department more competitive with the private sector.

But the existing personnel system is not the only problem. Despite 128 studies to reform the department's acquisition process, it now takes the department double the time it took in 1975 to produce a new weapons system -- this in an age when new technologies are coming on line in months, not decades.

Today the Department of Defense uses 1,800 different and antiquated information systems to run its finance and accounting programs, ensuring that timely and accurate business management information cannot be produced.

Current laws and regulations have created a situation in which, to develop and justify a budget, we must employ thousands of people, only a fraction of whom are focused on what is really important -- namely ensuring that the money is spent as Congress and the president determine and that the spending is having the desired results.

U.S. military forces are further hamstrung by outdated environmental regulations that are impeding our ability to train and better prepare the men and women in uniform for battlefield conditions.

These are just a few of the reasons why the Defense Transformation Act is so urgently needed.

Most of the proposals we are making are simple. Over the past months we have addressed most of the problems we have the power to fix. We are reducing headquarters and management staffs, streamlining the acquisition process by eliminating hundreds of pages of unnecessary rules and red tape, and implementing a new business management structure. But most of what remains to be done cannot be done without legislative relief.

Transformation of our military capabilities depends on our ability to transform not just the armed forces and the way they fight. We must also transform the Department of Defense. Congress shares the responsibility to help reach those goals. Passage of the Defense Transformation Act is critical to bringing the department into the information age and the 21st century.



Key Web Resources

Defense Link

The latest transcripts and public announcements from the Department of Defense.

www.defenselink.mil

Defend America

The latest stories on our troops overseas. Also included; photos from Iraq, an updated casualty list, an electronic thank you card to the troops, and ideas on how to support the troops.

www.defendamerica.mil

Central Command

The latest news releases from U.S. Central Command, the "55 most wanted" and a list of captured Iraqi leadership.

www.centcom.mil

Coalition Provisional Authority

Latest news from the CPA in Baghdad. Includes access to the CPA daily and updates on the activities

www.cpa-iraq.org

USAID

Updates on reconstruction projects and humanitarian assistance. The site also includes guidance on how companies can assist in the rebuilding of Iraq.

www.usaid.gov

Prepared by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs

11-L-0559/OSD/21186

**Coalition Provisional Authority
Baghdad, Iraq**

**Achieving the Vision to Restore
Full Sovereignty to the Iraqi People**

(An Overview)



**Working Document of July 21, 2003
Not for Public Release**

11-L-0559/OSD/21187

Introduction

This progressive plan is an overview of the strategy necessary for early restoration of full sovereignty to the Iraqi people. The strategy is driven by more detailed action plans (e.g., plans for the New Iraqi Army, the police, restoring electrical power, etc.).

Our strategy has four principal objectives or 'core foundations':

- **Security** – establishing a secure and safe environment
- **Essential services** – restoring basic services to an acceptable standard
- **Economy** – creating the conditions for economic growth
- **Governance** – enabling the transition to transparent and inclusive democratic governance

These objectives are intertwined: none can be pursued in isolation. Political and economic progress depends in part on security, but should itself help to create a safer environment.

L. Paul Bremer, Administrator
Coalition Provisional Authority

Summary

Now that Saddam Hussein's regime has been removed, the Iraqi people have the opportunity to realize the President's vision of a stable, prosperous and democratic Iraq. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), in close partnership with the Iraqi Governing Council, the United Nations, and the international community, has a key role to play in the next stage of rebuilding Iraq.

This document describes the CPA's strategy for carrying out its role in this historic process. While the CPA remains the legally sovereign power in Iraq, we now have a significant partner in the Governing Council (GC) of the Interim Administration. That Council represents the voice of the Iraqi people to the CPA, and to the world. Together the CPA and the GC will forge a partnership that will guide the nation forward in its transformation.

This document is designed to direct the work of the CPA and the coalition militaries in a flexible manner that recognizes the need to retain the support of the Iraqi people in all that we do, knowing that their support is vital to our success. It is also aimed at the international community whose political and financial backing will be essential if our overall objectives are to be achieved. The plan recognizes the need for further planning in coordination with the GC as the process of rebuilding Iraq evolves. While full economic recovery will take years, the economic reform program provides a vision of a future of freedom and prosperity towards which we and the GC will work in the short term.

The plan describes key action steps within the various core elements that determine the CPA's priorities in the short, medium and long-term. From this, we can review what we have achieved and where we need to adjust. Finally, the plan will assist us and the Governing Council to allocate our resources and those of Iraq. It will also assist in attracting critical resources and capabilities from the international community.

The CPA Vision

After decades of a ruthless dictatorship, the Iraqi people can at last control their destiny and establish the conditions for a free and stable future. With the international community, the CPA will help the Iraqi people achieve the President's and Prime Minister's vision for Iraq – a free Iraq governed by a representative government chosen through democratic elections. At the core of this new Iraq is the development of a democratic, accountable, and self-governing civil society respectful of human rights and freedom of expression. The future prosperity of Iraq's citizens depends on the use of Iraqi resources to foster the development of a market-based economy. This needs to be done in a manner that is economically, socially and environmentally sustainable for the long term benefit of all Iraqi people. Furthermore, our goal is an Iraq at peace with itself and its neighbors, once again able to play a responsible role in the international community. The Coalition is firmly committed to the future of Iraq. The CPA succeeds when Iraq succeeds. Hence we will stay as long as necessary, and not a day longer. But we will not leave until we have succeeded in carrying out the President's and Prime Minister's vision. Our foundation of authority is firmly embedded in international law and in accord with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483.

The Mission

The CPA will work with the Iraqi people and the Iraqi Interim Administration to establish the conditions for a free, sovereign, democratically-elected representative government. We want to work with Iraqis to establish an Iraq that uses its resources for the benefit of its people. It should be an Iraq that is stable, united, prosperous, at peace with its neighbors and able to take its rightful place as a responsible member of the region and the international community. This Iraq must be free of weapons of mass destruction and terrorists.

The End State

The ultimate goal is a unified and stable, democratic Iraq that: provides effective and representative government for the Iraqi people; is underpinned by new and protected freedoms for all Iraqis and a growing market economy; is able to defend itself but no longer poses a threat to its neighbors or international security.

ACHIEVING THE VISION

Taking Forward the CPA Strategic Plan for Iraq

Goal

The primary goal of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) is the early restoration of full sovereignty to the Iraqi people. We seek:

“a unified and stable, democratic Iraq that provides effective and representative government for the Iraqi people; is underpinned by new and protected freedoms and a growing market economy; is able to defend itself but no longer poses a threat to its neighbors or international security.”

A major step towards that goal was taken on 13 July, with the establishment of a Governing Council of 25 Iraqis representing all major strands of Iraqi society. The Council will have substantial powers. It will appoint Iraqi Ministers and approve budgets. It will be consulted on all major policy issues and on our planning for the transfer of power to a sovereign Iraqi government.

Strategy

Our strategy has four principal objectives or ‘core foundations’:

- **Security** – establishing a secure and safe environment
- **Essential services** – restoring basic services to an acceptable standard
- **Economy** – creating the conditions for economic growth
- **Governance** – enabling the transition to transparent and inclusive democratic governance

These objectives are intertwined: none can be pursued in isolation. Political and economic progress depends in part on security, but should itself help to create a safer environment.

Security

Coalition forces will help Iraqis to eliminate the threats to their security and will remain in country for as long as they are needed. **Over time the transfer of security responsibilities to local military and police forces will determine the speed with which we can advance reconstruction and build up institutions of good governance.**

The Iraqi people are already contributing to that effort but must acquire the ability to assume full responsibility for meeting the country's security needs as soon as practicable – thus enabling the draw-down of coalition forces. Our priorities therefore include:

- Development and training of Iraqi security forces, including a new Iraqi army, new civil defense corps and an effective police force
- Development of national security and civilian oversight mechanisms
- Measures to ensure border security
- Measures to build the justice system and improve the penal system
- Ensuring that Iraq is free of weapons of mass destruction.

Essential Services

Effective delivery of basic services is a major priority for the Iraqi people and the CPA. Our program involves:

- Reconstituting the power infrastructure
- Improving water resource management
- Ensuring food security
- Improving health care – quality and access
- Rehabilitating key transport infrastructure

- Improving education and housing - quality and access
- Reconstructing the telecommunications system.

The Economy

To realize the country's full potential for economic growth, Iraq will need initially to:

- Build financial market structures
- Promote private business
- Determine the future of state-owned enterprises.

Policy work is also in progress on:

- Monetizing and phasing out subsidies, while building a social safety net
- Designing an oil trust fund
- Reform of the tax system.

Governance

Iraq has suffered from decades of tyranny. **Effective representative government, sustained by democratic elections, requires the rapid development of new frameworks and capacities, including:**

- A constitution drafted by Iraqis and approved by Iraqis
- Institutions and processes to conduct free and fair elections
- Open and transparent political processes
- Measures to improve the effectiveness of elected officials, including strengthened local government systems

- Effective and fair justice systems
- Respect for the rule of law and human rights
- Creation of a vibrant civil society.

Information

Strengthening the media is essential for the development of healthy democracy in Iraq. This will require legislation to protect free speech as well as to regulate broadcasting and promote responsible journalism. Professional bodies have a role to play in setting journalistic standards.

The transitional administration in Iraq must ensure that our policies are communicated accurately and effectively at all times to the Iraqi people. **The CPA's communications strategy is designed to get our message out in an honest, clear and timely way – and then to take account of the responses of the Iraqi people, including their expression through the media.**

Resources

It is difficult at this point to quantify the external assistance needed to support Iraq's transition to representative government and a market economy. Eastern European experience suggests that a substantial international commitment will be needed. But Iraq starts the process at a lower level of economic and political development. Its energy resources have been badly mismanaged for decades, leaving the country unable from its own resources at present to provide an acceptable living standard for its people.

Clearly, the United States and the international community and institutions must take the lead. **Only a co-ordinated international effort can bring prosperity and stability to the Iraqi people and contribute to a lasting peace in the Middle East.**

Planning

Our planning, which is a dynamic and iterative process, involves:

- An unprecedented joint civilian and military CPA/CJTF7 planning process to produce a joint strategic plan – the military contribute vitally to all key objectives
- A comprehensive and evolving plan for the short, medium and longer term, but
- Necessary flexibility to change, and to learn from experience.

Attached charts give further details of the sectoral plans being taken forward in military and Ministerial plans.

Vision for Security: *Enable Iraqis to assume responsibility for their own security environment and be secure in their own person and their property to engage in the economic and political commerce of the nation.*

SECURITY

Objective	Current Status	Future Responsibility
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Defeat internal armed threats. (CJTF-7) 2. Undermine support for paramilitaries. (CPA) 3. Deter external aggression and subversion. (CJTF-7) 4. Locate, secure, and eliminate WMD capability (CJTF-7) 5. Eliminate munitions caches, unexploded ordinance and excess military equipment (CJTF-7) (>9500 Tons of munitions) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Continue. Transfer responsibility to CPA/NMDS. 2. Continue. Begin to transfer responsibility to Iraqis. 3. Transfer responsibility for borders from CJTF-7 to CPA/Ministry on Interior (MOI). 4. Continue to locate, secure and eliminate WMD capability as needed. (CJTF-7) 5. Begin to transfer responsibility for elimination of munitions caches to CPA/ Iraqi institutions. (CJTF-7) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Continue. Transfer responsibility to Iraqis. 2. Transfer responsibility to Iraqis. 3. Transfer external security responsibility from CJTF-7 to Ministry of National Security and Defense/ Iraqi security institutions. 4. Continue to locate, secure and eliminate WMD capability. (CJTF-7) 5. Transfer responsibility of munitions caches to Iraqis. (CJTF-7)
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Provide basic law and order using Coalition forces. (CJTF-7) (3400 Patrols per day, mostly urban security) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increasing numbers of patrols in high crime areas around sensitive institutions. (CJTF-7) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Transfer responsibility for maintaining law and order to Iraqi police. (CJTF-7)

in 14 months		
<p>2. Recruit vet, train and employ local Iraqi police on joint patrols. Joint manning of local police stations. (CJTF-7) (>30,000 police on duty)</p> <p>3. Develop police training curriculum. (CPA/MOI)</p>	<p>2. Transfer responsibility for local law enforcement to local Iraqi police. (CJTF-7) (38,000 police on duty)</p> <p>3. Transfer responsibility for law enforcement planning and oversight to CPA MOI, Ministry of Justice (MOJ). (CJTF-7)</p> <p>4. Begin establishing civilian oversight of police. (CPA/MOI)</p> <p>5. Begin police training at national level training center. (MOI)</p>	<p>2. Transfer national planning oversight responsibility to Iraqi government. (CPA) (67,000 police on duty)</p> <p>3. Establish civilian policy review board. (CPA/MOI)</p> <p>4. Revise police training and continue training at national level training center. (CPA/MOI)</p>
<p>1. Conduct De-Ba'athification of security forces.</p> <p>2. Establish and begin training New Iraqi Army (NIA), Facility Protection Service (FPS).</p> <p>3. Iraq Civil Defense Corps (ICDC). First cohort, 8 Bns.</p>	<p>1. NIA Bns 2-4 trained and deployed.</p> <p>2. Long-term acquisition programs and logistical support activities established.</p> <p>3. Specialized and logistical units, armor, air and naval components.</p>	<p>1. NIA Bns 5-9 trained and deployed.</p> <p>2. Training increasingly shifted to Iraqis.</p> <p>3. ICDC folded into FPS, phased out or other disposition.</p>

SUNBELT	CENTRAL	SOUTHWEST
<p>4. Establish systematic stipend and pension payments (Iraqi military and Kurdish PeshMerga).</p> <p>5. Obtain Foreign Military Financing/International Military Education and training (FMF/IMET) allocation for FY 2004 (U.S.) + other coalition professional military education (PME) training support commitments.</p>	<p>4. FPS fully certified by MOI.</p> <p>5. Second cohort (5 Bns), third cohort, (5 Bns) ICDC deployed.</p> <p>6. Decision on future of ICDC</p> <p>7. Decision on future of paramilitaries (PeshMerga, Badr Corps).</p> <p>8. Begin IMET, other PME.</p>	<p>4. Stipends, job inventory, training for ex- paramilitaries (PeshMerga, Badr Corps).</p> <p>5. FMF- financed imports of arms begin.</p>
<p>1. Vetting system in place and tested.</p> <p>2. NIA Establishing Order, Disciplinary Order issued.</p> <p>3. Establish control over Military Industrial Companies (MIC) assets and personnel.</p>	<p>1. Begin training for national security positions</p> <p>2. Advisory commissions report.</p> <p>3. Implement decisions on MIC/SOE (State Owned Enterprises).</p>	<p>1. MNDS within ministry budget.</p> <p>2. Budget allocations and national security policy guidance originating from the Governing Council and NSC.</p> <p>3. IOM DOL job matching continues.</p>

State Dept. 06 03	Jan 04 - Jan 04	Feb 04 onwards
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Initial decisions on MIC/SOE plan to establish/restart local defense industry. 5. Brief Governing Council (GC) on initiatives. 6. Ministry Advisory Teams (Iraqis) appointed. 7. Prepare and approve FY 2004 budget. 8. International Organization of Migration (IOM)/Department of Labor (DOL) registration for employment transition program. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Plans made for integration of most military support into civil economy and in conjunction with other ministries. 5. GC approves FY 2004 (Iraqi) budget. 6. GC approves MOD plans for NIA senior staff. 7. IOM/DOL job matching program begins. 	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Re-establish Iraqi Border Guard. (CJTF-7) 2. Recruit, vet and train and employ Iraqi border guards jointly at border crossing sites (CJTF-7) (9 of 30 sites manned by Iraqis) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Transition border guard responsibility to CPA/MOI. 2. Establish national administration of border guard, customs. (CPA/MOI) (still 9 of 30 sites manned by Iraqis) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Transition border guard responsibility to Iraqis. (CPA/MOI). 2. Continue to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance of border. (CJTF-7) (all sites manned by Iraqis)

Region 10 Regional Security		
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Develop concept for PME exchanges with region and coalition. 2. Solicit PME quotas, equipment contributions and training support. 		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Permanent mutual security arrangements agreed and in place. 2. Address opportunities for possible multi-lateral mutual security arrangements within region
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Deploy international advisors on criminal justice. (CPA/MOJ) 2. Start Central criminal Court (CCC) trials. 3. Open all courthouses in Iraq. (CPA/MOJ) 4. Vet all judges and prosecutors in Iraq. 4. Introduce judge training seminars (CPA/MOJ) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Amend the order creating the CCC to allow prosecution of crimes against humanity and war crimes. (CPA/MOJ) 2. Integrate international prosecutors, judges, into CCC if CCC is unable to cope. (CPA/MOJ) 	

Penal Code		
1. Review existing penal code and draft emergency order to remove provisions that are inconsistent with human rights. (CPA/MOJ)	1. Draft emergency order to address terrorism, gangs and organized crime. (CPA/MOJ)	1. Assist in drafting a comprehensive Iraqi penal code. (CPA/MOJ) 2. Transition legislation to Iraqis. (CPA) 3. Assist in Revising the Iraqi Civil code. (CPA)
The Penal System		
1. Establish detention centers. (CJTF-7) 2. Re-establishment of jails and prisons. (CJTF-7) 3. Establish eleven prisons and detention centers. (CPA/MOJ)	1. Transition responsibility for penal system to CPA/Iraqi officials. 2. Establish juvenile detention facilities (CPA/MOJ) 3. Create Iraqi correctional service.(CPA/MOJ)	1. Develop work release, probation/parole. (CPA/MOJ) 2. Transition penal system to Iraqis. (CPA/MOJ)

Vision for Essential Services: *Restoration of Essential Services to acceptable standards, repair infrastructure necessary to return to normal and improving the social and physical infrastructures that benefits the population.*

ESSENTIAL SERVICES

State 1: Aug '03 - Dec '03	State 2: Jan '04 - Jun '04	State 3: Jul '04 onwards
Stand-up reformed ministries of Agriculture, Health, Education, Irrigation, Public Works, Transportation & Communications and Labor & Social Affairs.	Reorganize ministries.	Transition ministries to Iraqi leadership.
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Improve generating capacity to 4,000 Megawatts (from 2700 in May '03) 2. Draft policy reform through Electricity Commission. 3. Halt sabotage, stabilize & rebuild delivery infrastructure. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increase generation capacity to 5000 MW by Jan 2004. 2. Implement policy reforms with Iraqis. 3. Improve power delivery infrastructure. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Continue to build new capacity to reach 7000 MW by 2005 and 14,000 by 2009. 2. Continued enhancement of regulatory framework. 3. Continue.
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Repair damage. 2. Draft telecom regulatory framework. 3. Let mobile licenses. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Continue repair; build new capacity. 2. Implement new policies. 3. Initial mobile coverage in major cities. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Introduce advanced technologies. 2. Privatize and increase private sector investment. 3. National mobile network.

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Assure supply of critical inputs. 2. Plan research/extension service. 3. Renegotiate Oil-for-food (OFF) contracts, maintain Public Distribution System (PDS), identify transition process. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Initiate land use planning 2. Develop research/extension svc. 3. Maintain PDS, coordinate transition. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Develop land tenure and farm credit system. 2. Continue development. 3. Phase-out PDS, ensure social safety net.
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Formulate Housing Finance Strategy. 2. Titling – identify constraints. 3. Develop privatization strategy. 4. Identify construction sector delays. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Develop private sector financing 2. Modernize titling system. 3. Prepare for privatization. 4. Address bottlenecks. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Deepen private sector financing. 2. Continue to develop titling system. 3. Privatize. 4. Develop public-private partnerships.
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Restore basic health care services to 95 to 100% of pre-war levels. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Enhance primary care, prevention and wellness services. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Achieve public health benchmarks.

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Distribute revised textbooks. 2. Rehabilitate 1000 priority schools. 3. Stand-up higher education institutions. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Initiate curriculum reform at all levels. 2. Ensure availability of school supplies. 3. Grant greater autonomy and improve access. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Complete & implement reforms. 2. Continue infrastructure rehabilitations. 3. Autonomous university system.
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Assess irrigation needs, initiate priority actions. 2. Develop long-term Marshland strategy. 3. Repair and upgrade water & sewage treatment facilities. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Improve O&M, continue construction projects. 2. Pilot projects. 3. Continue repairs; expand networks. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Complete construction, ensure O&M. 2. Implement full strategy. 3. Improve quality, expand coverage, & ensure sustainability.
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Re-open airspace & airports. 2. Ensure commercial operations of port. 3. Operate railroad. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increase private sector funding. 2. Develop transition plan. 3. Repair & improve rail network. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Improve quality & safety of service. 2. Turn over all port operations. 3. Turn over to Iraqis.

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Stand up reformed ministry and transition to Iraqi leadership. 2. Develop and coordinate employment centers and vocational training institutes. 3. Eliminate discrimination by providing equal access to services and benefits to all eligible constituents. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Hire and train additional social care and employment service specialists. 2. Assess and register unemployed in national employment and training services program. 3. Complete national labor market survey, permitting effective, national management of resources that assist eligible constituents. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Reformed social care and training programs fully staffed, funded and managed. 2. Training institutes begin teaching unemployed new, marketable skills. 3. Revise programs according to eligible constituent demand, providing quick, targeted assistance to populations in need.
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Vision for Economy: *Initiate economic policy reforms that lead to a growing private sector, free of corruption and burdensome regulation, which will deliver rising living standards to the Iraqi people.*

ECONOMY

Build Financial Market Structures		
<p>1. Functioning Central Bank:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Central Bank (CB) law by early September. • Implement modern inter-bank payments by end of October. <p>2. Introducing new banknotes (announced 7 July):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Publicity campaign for distribution of new banknotes. <p>3. Transparent budgeting, accounting systems:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build into 2004 Budget (target Sept. 2004) prior to October donor conference. <p>4. Commercial banking system:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New law on commercial banking, including foreign bank entry, by late September. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promulgate Central Bank regulations for bank oversight. • Build capability to conduct independent monetary policy. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Banknote conversion October 15 – January 15 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • First drafts for 2005/2006 budgets. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promulgate regulations on commercial banking and foreign bank entry. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New regime for Central Bank oversight and regulation of banks. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop unified “Treasury” system for national budget (essential for donor/IFI confidence)

Start: 1st Q 02-03	1st Q 03-04	1st Q 04 onwards
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Complete assessment of bank solvency. • Let private management contracts on the two large state banks (Rafidain and Rasheed) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement strategy on privatization, consolidation, or liquidation of commercial banks. • Award private management contracts for state banks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Issue licenses for the entry of foreign banks.
Promote Private Business/SMEs		
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Streamline existing commercial code/regulations. 2. Reduce restrictions on investment. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Credit programs for SMEs. 2. Set up investment promotion board, one-shop shopping to inform investors. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Commercial bank intermediation of business credit.
Reform of Tax System		
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Initial measures to stabilize revenues (reconstruction tax/excises). 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Overhaul tax systems (e.g. VAT) to construct investor friendly system and stabilize revenues. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Train and establish new tax administration. Implement new tax policies.
Remove Subsidies/Target Social Safety Net		
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Quantify subsidies and implicit social support to individuals. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Oil-for-Food into cash-based ("monetized") system. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Phase removal of other subsidies (e.g. oil and electricity prices) with better-targeted safety net.

Policy Toward SOEs		
1. Small-scale privatization/leasing of competitive SOEs. 2. Hard budget constraints.	1. Assessments of larger SOEs to determine suitability for privatization or shutdown.	1. Develop Privat out SOE sales.
Design Oil Trust Fund		
1. Finalize existing proposal for oil trust fund.	1. Create a legal and financial basis for trust fund for FY2004.	1. Begin trust fu
Open Economy		
1. Permanently reduce or zero-out tariffs. 2. Trade credit facility to open in August.	1. Liberalization of transport and telecom sectors consistent with World Trade Organization (WTO).	1. In advance of address non-t
Human Resource Development		
1. Establish a national strategy for vocational and technical training, including information technology.	1. Survey market to develop a "school-to-work program."	1. Begin training

Vision for Governance: *To support Iraq's transition to a representative form of government by supporting transparent electoral processes, strengthening political institutions, increasing the effectiveness of elected officials, and promoting the rule of law.*

GOVERNANCE

<p>1. Civic education programs promoting electoral participation and democratic ideals:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Set requirements for foundations of democracy. <p>2. Development of issue based civic organizations.</p>	<p>1. Training and educational programs to support constitutional reforms and elections on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civic rights. • Respect for Human Rights. • Voter registration and participation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civic education program on constitutional referendum – promoting voter participation and constitutional legitimacy. • Civic education program on participation in elections.
<p>1. Support independent media:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Micro lending to new media outlets. • Draft media law. • Media Commission. • Startup a spectrum and content management regulatory body. • Ethics training for journalists. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Media training. • Promote media associations and a code of conduct. • Administrative bodies to arbitrate libel disputes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Viable, free and independent media.

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Support GC on authorization for creation of a Preparatory Constitutional Commission. 2. Drafting infrastructure. 3. Preparatory Constitutional Commission. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Convene a Constitutional Assembly. 2. Public participation/legitimacy campaign. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Referendum.
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. In consultation with GC support a National Electoral Commission. 2. Promote terms of work and enforcement functions for national, regional and local elections bodies. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Assessment of existing electoral infrastructure. 2. Draft model election laws. 3. Infrastructure for national, regional and local electoral commissions. 4. Set up for election commissions. 5. National voter registration drive 6. Election monitoring (OSCE). 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Support polling site locations. 2. Computers and administrative requirements for registration. 3. Elections for national legislative body. 4. Subsequent regional and local elections.

Short Term	Medium Term	Longer Term
<p>1. Support political movements :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Engage international NGOs. • Set up democracy support centers for training and party organization, and message. • Promote local and regional party organizations that support national political movements. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coalition building among parties. • Party participation in constitutional referendum. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training on electoral techniques. • Political caucuses/conventions to select candidates. • Election monitoring.
<p>1. Establish exchange programs.</p> <p>2. Leadership training.</p> <p>3. Civic advocacy training.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Providing public speaking and leadership training to women and youth. • Assisting advocacy groups with a focus on women and youth. • Promoting participation of women and youth in the constitutional process. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political training for women and youth candidates.

<p>1. Support independent political capacity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Think tanks. • Political consultants. • Pollsters. • Advertising. <p>2. Polling techniques and methodologies training.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide training on organizational sustainability • Contract with indigenous polling organizations to provide public opinion data • Develop linkages between international polling firms and indigenous organizations 	
<p>1. Raise awareness of mass Graves/Missing Persons: strengthen reconciliation.</p> <p>2. Human Rights Archive.</p> <p>3. Workshops to discuss Human Rights Commission and National Action Plan for Human Rights.</p>	<p>1. Support establishment of permanent human rights institutions.</p> <p>2. Promote an office of equal protection.</p> <p>3. Transfer evidence of human rights violations to Iraqi authorities.</p>	<p>1. Promote culture of respect for Human Rights.</p>

<p>1. Support an impartial and transparent legal system:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Central Criminal Court to prosecute human rights abuses • Property Reconciliation Facility, including voluntary resolution of property claims. • International Property Arbitration Commission. • Technical assistance to the Judicial Commission. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support development of investigative capacity. • Promote legal training for court officers. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Working Judicial System.
<p>1. Establish uniform standard for selection of local assemblies and executives</p> <p>2. Local officials training:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Constituent interaction. <p>3. Strengthen local government.</p> <p>4. Open and transparent management practices.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Professional staff development for municipal employees. • Decentralize provision of basic services. • Public hearings on budgeting and provision of services. 	<p>1. Local elections</p>

1. Appointment of Interim Ministers by Governing Council.	1. Support services to regional and local governments.	1. Provide technical advice to independent Ministries.
2. Continued De -Ba'athification.	2. Resolution of outstanding issues on dissolved entities.	
<p>1. Ethics in government, transparency and accountability of officials:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transparent government financial management practices • Training for GC staff (preparatory training materials for eventual parliamentary staff). • Constituent relations training at local, regional and national level. • Anti-corruption efforts. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote establishment of an Inspector General's office. 	

The Search for WMD and Saddam

- ✦ The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) is tasked with the search for WMD. The ISG has between 600 and 800 personnel in Iraq and is headed by former UN inspector David Kay. Their highest priority is the hunt for WMD.
- ✦ ISG has formed quick reaction teams to exploit sites indicated by intelligence.
- ✦ CPA has offered a reward of up to \$25 million for the capture of Saddam Hussein.

Quality of Life

- ✦ Electricity: currently generating 3200 MW. Pre-war level was 4000 MW. National demand is 6000MW. CPA plans to reach 4000 MW by August.
- ✦ Baghdad is receiving 1200MW. Pre-war levels were 2500 MW. Averaging 3 hours on, 3 hours off each day.
- ✦ Water: Much of Iraq is at pre-war water supply levels. There is no critical shortage of water.
- ✦ Healthcare: Iraqis continue to receive the urgent healthcare they need. There has been no major outbreak of disease in Iraq.

Security and Force Protection

- ✦ Coalition forces are on the offensive, putting constant pressure on the enemy to disrupt attacks. Coalition forces are also deterring attacks with aggressive patrolling, cordons, and raids based on actionable intelligence.
- ✦ Currently CPA has hired 32K police officers nationwide, 28K are already on the streets. The ultimate goal is 61K. The police are conducting joint patrols with Coalition Forces.

www.cpa-iraq.org

Governance

⊕ On July 13, CPA established the **Iraq Governing Council**. The Council represents the first step on the road to representative government. The 25 members represent all major groups within Iraqi society.

The Council's responsibilities include:

- ⊕ Naming interim Ministers.
- ⊕ Organizing itself. The Council has already formed commissions on agenda, rules, and Ba'athist crimes against humanity.
- ⊕ The Council may appoint a Preparatory Constitutional Commission to recommend a process for drafting and approving a new constitution.

International Assistance

- ⊕ As of July 15th total non-military assistance is \$ 2.8 billion.
- ⊕ 36 countries inside and outside the coalition have made pledges or contributions.
- ⊕ Over 45 nations have offered military forces. This does not include the numerous countries that have contributed basing rights, over-flight rights, fuel, and other logistical support.
- ⊕ There are currently 19 countries contributing 13,273 troops supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.
- ⊕ 14 countries are committed to deploy 12,000 additional troops.

Important Sites

DefenseLink: www.defenselink.mil

CPA Website: www.cpa-iraq.org

Central Command: www.centcom.mil

July 31, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Iraq Governing Council

Attached is an interesting memo from Paul Bremer on the Governing Council meeting this week.

Respectfully,

DHR:dh
073103-7

FAP

31 Jul 03

11-L-0559/OSD/21217 *W00880-03*

✓
7/31

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

30 July 2003

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: Paul Bremer <signed>
SUBJECT: July 30 Meeting with Governing Council

The Governing Council (GC) ask me to meet them today to hear news of their activities over the last ten days. Our new British envoy, Ambassador David Richmond, joined me for his first trip to the Council. The still-interim chairman, Bahr al-Ulum, opened the session by highlighting how the council had agreed to a leadership structure the previous day. The chairmanship of the council will likely rotate among the newly-established nine person committee, which is called the Presidential Body. I spoke of my successful trip to the United States, and communicated the steadfast commitment of the President, Congress, and this Administration to the political and economic reconstruction of Iraq.

We then moved swiftly to the discussion of interim ministers. The council intends to begin the process of naming ministers next week. In response to their request, I promised to provide the GC with a brief overview of the functions of each ministry, a status report on the buildings and workforce of each entity, an action plan for the next 30 or 60 days, and a summary of key policy issues. I discouraged the GC from proposing and appointing a Prime Minister to oversee the work of the ministries, stressing that the GC was in many ways a collective executive body to which the ministers would be held fully accountable. It would confuse matters and dilute the GC's authority to have a "prime minister."

The bulk of our conversation focused on the constitution. I urged the Council to make haste in appointing a preparatory constitutional commission

11-L-0559/OSD/21218

responsible for recommending how a constitutional conference would be convened. I stressed our desire for Iraqis, and Iraqis alone, to write and approve this constitution. I underscored how the Coalition understands that the constitution, and the process through which it is drafted and approved, must be legitimate in the eyes of the Iraqi people.

Many members were reluctant to separate out questions of substance from questions of process when discussing the preparatory constitutional commission. Hangovers from earlier, private GC conversations were apparent, with some members eager for the preparatory commission to declare its preference for a federal Iraqi state over a unified one. In the end, however, I left confident that the GC is on its way to appointing a commission with a purely procedural mandate.

I advised the GC to make the upcoming announcements regarding the constitution public and to ensure that any timetables set were ambitious. The Iraqi people should see that the GC is aggressively moving toward a new constitution, which will pave the way for Iraqi election and the restoration of a sovereign Iraqi government. As a whole, GC members were audibly pleased with my sense of urgency on the constitution, with one member suggesting that the GC could ask a Constitutional Conference to have a draft constitution prepared by the symbolic date of April 9th.

Members of the GC raised a wide range of other issues, including the security situation in the country and what they see as the use of excessive force by coalition forces. I briefed them on the many measures we are taking to restore and ensure security and offered further briefings by our military leaders should the council feel it necessary. The media, the electricity situation, the compensation of victims of the former regime, and the establishment of courts to try those suspected of crimes against humanity were also raised. I urged the GC to show

the Iraqi people that it was acting on their behalf. For this to be effective they need a staff and a press spokesman. Then they can “make demands of the CPA,” citing a number of areas – such as electricity – where it could be seen as proactive by asking us to develop plans for the country’s future. Whenever appropriate, in responding to GC queries or comments, I encouraged the GC to form a committee with which we could have a more detailed and sustained dialogue.

Comment: It is still early days for the GC. Its first significant hurdle – the establishment of a leadership body – was only cleared in the most clumsy way (a 9 person committee). A growing urgency among the members of the Council, however, is palpable. The fear of failure or irrelevancy could spur them to greater action in the next week, when the Council will tackle the important tasks of appointing ministers and establishing a preparatory constitutional committee. We are evaluating the “light-touch” approach we have adopted toward the GC thus far. In the absence of a dramatic uptick in council actions in the next week, we will begin to present the GC with policy issues requiring decisions, either our or theirs.

August 4, 2003

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

CC: Honorable Colin Powell (BY HAND)
Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
Honorable George Tenet
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: North Korea

Attached is a piece on North Korea that is of interest.

Attach.

Cha, Victor. "Tighten the Noose Around North Korea," *Financial Times*, July 28, 2003.

DHR:dh
081403-42

KOREAN MORTH)

W00892 /03

41 Aug 03

11-L-0559/OSD/21221

Tighten the noose around North Korea

By Victor Cha

FINANCIAL TIMES, Published: July 28 2003 20:31 | Last Updated: July 28 2003 , 20:31

The Korean war ended 50 years ago on Sunday. But the celebrations in South Korea provided a bittersweet reminder of how little the situation on the peninsula has changed since 1953.

Although deterrence has held, the fragile Korean peace is hostage to a second confrontation brewing between the US and North Korea over Pyongyang's drive for nuclear weapons. The non-proliferation agreement that averted war in the first nuclear crisis in 1994 is now in a shambles. Moreover, the recent revelations about the possible existence of a second secret reprocessing facility suggest not only that Yongbyon may be just one of many weapons-related facilities hidden in the mountains but also that Pyongyang is determined to possess nuclear capabilities no matter what.

The North Koreans therefore present an almost insoluble conundrum. The goal is nuclear disarmament; but North Korea's secret highly enriched uranium nuclear programme, which violates the 1994 agreement, puts Kim Jong-il's credibility for a negotiated solution at less than zero. Even if a bargain could be struck, verification of irreversible dismantling would require a high level of intrusion in the reclusive North - a task that would make the United Nations weapons inspectors' work in Iraq look easy. And a military strike would be futile. It would at best take out one nuclear site (but leave intact untold others) and would risk all-out war. Such a move would look more like an act of desperation by the US than a show of strength.

The option we are left with is a strategy of multilateral pressure designed to constrict the hard currency inflows to the North Korean leadership gained through sales of missiles, narcotics and other illicit goods. Critics who say that this would be pointless because the North cannot be more isolated than it already is are mistaken. The strategy's purpose is less to isolate North Korea than to make clear to the country's leadership that pursuit of the nuclear path, far from guaranteeing regime survival, will entail costs that will ultimately make the regime more insecure.

Critics are also mistaken in discounting the multilateral approach as undesirable (because, say, Pyongyang wants bilateral talks with Washington) or ineffective

(because it will be impossible to implement, for example). If Mr Kim's objective is to have both nuclear weapons and the benefits that come from auctioning off selected portions of the programmes that are producing them, the only feasible course of action is for all interested parties - not just the US - to tell the Dear Leader that he cannot have his cake and eat it. Contrary to the nay-sayers, the coalition-building process has proved more successful than anyone expected at the outset. In every important regional forum for security issues (the US- Japan-South Korea Trilateral Co- ordination Oversight Group, the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation group leaders' forum, the Association of South-East Asian Nations), members have called on the North to step back.

A strategy of multilateral constriction does not obviate the need for continued dialogue with the North. Continuing the multilateral talks that started in Beijing earlier this month is critical. The act of good-faith engagement puts the co-operation ball squarely in Mr Kim's court. Should he refuse to pick it up, or respond with threats, the talks will serve to build a more cohesive multilateral coalition for constriction. In this sense, Pentagon hawks should be no less interested in pursuing engagement than the doves.

To cite Pyongyang's continued reprocessing activities as evidence that the Bush administration's multilateralist strategy has failed and that the US has resigned itself to accepting a nuclear North Korea is to confuse cause and effect. Washington's strategy is still taking shape. The North's continued bomb-making activities demonstrate the futility of bilateral negotiations. Overtly or covertly, and regardless of whether the US negotiated a temporary freeze on reprocessing, Mr Kim's bomb-making activities would continue apace, as they do now.

As was the case in earlier administrations, no one in George W. Bush's administration is willing to accept a nuclear North Korea. And no one argues that multilateral constriction is an ideal option. Rather, at this point, it is the least worst choice in a range of bad choices.

The writer is a professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and co-author of Nuclear North Korea: a Debate on Engagement Strategies, to be published later this year

August 4, 2003

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

CC: Honorable Colin Powell (By Hand)
Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
Honorable George Tenet
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: USIA

Attached is a memo from the Joint Staff to Dick Myers on the subject of USIA that I thought might be of interest.

Anyone have any thoughts?

Attach.

7/15/03 memo to CJCS re: "USIA, Public Diplomacy and the Communications Universe"

DHR:dh
080403-41

192

4 Aug 03

W00895 /03

*Mr Secretary - A good paper on USIA background
and suggestions on a possible way ahead*

July 15, 2003

*VR Dick
✓
8/4*

Memorandum for the Chairman *M7/15*

Subject: USIA, Public Diplomacy and the communications universe

Background

It's helpful to think of the world's publics as falling into three categories: the US public (the audience for government public affairs); Everyone Else (the audience for Public Diplomacy); and those hostile to the US (a subset of Everyone Else and the target of Information Operations).

- We have a corps of communications professionals available to the government for public affairs duty, the best of whom are in the DoD, and by and large they do a good job.
- We have a vigorous and growing IO capability, which is getting better.
- A few years ago, however, we dismantled the government agency specifically responsible for Public Diplomacy, the United States Information Agency, and folded its practitioners, the United States Information Service Officers, into the Department of State.

The Way We Were: the USIA and USIS

USIA was an independent cabinet agency whose Director sat on the National Security Council when it discussed his issues, exactly in the same status as the DCI. Its headquarters in Washington had a structure similar to that of the Department of State, with regional and country desks, some functional sections, and an operations section that behaved very much like the NMCC and was fully manned 24/7. It had its own budget, its own personnel management system, and its own bureaucracy, and it coordinated closely with DoS. Its charter was to shape perception abroad of the US and its policies.

Its core folk were Foreign Service Officers who formed the US Information Service and could pursue a career from entry level through Career Ambassador. They were distributed throughout the world like regular FSOs, except that they did only public affairs/public diplomacy. The senior USIS person in each country invariably wore two hats: Counselor of Embassy for Public Affairs, coequal with the Economic, Political, and Consular department heads; and Country Director for the USIS. In the first hat he reported to the Ambassador as her PAO; in the second he reported back to the Director of the USIA very much the way ambassadors report to SecState. He had two closely linked areas of responsibility (usually he took one himself and gave the other to his deputy): Information and Cultural Affairs. As part of the first, he formed relationships with

journalists, stakeholders and influence shapers throughout the country and scheduled a sophisticated series of events designed to explain and advocate US policy. The Cultural Affairs function gave rise to the renowned American Centers, offering libraries and research facilities, exchange programs, English classes, concerts, exhibits, tailored literature, and other Americana intended to give locals a feel for what the US is like.

Consequences

The argument for consolidating USIA and State was that the bureaucracies were duplicative and the end of the Cold War obviated the need for an independent public diplomacy agency. State now has an Under Secretariat for Public Diplomacy and Public affairs (Charlotte Beers' late incumbency), but two things are different.

First, there is no longer a separate and distinct corps of USIS officers, although those specialists still exist. Suffice it to say that the military services have concluded that the quality of Public Affairs rises sharply if PAOs have their own discrete community and competitive officer category.

Second, if the USG wants to launch, stop, or alter a global communications campaign, it must task the SecState to task an Under Secretary. This puts one department in the position of having to lead other coequal departments with different responsibilities and agendas. (Ms Beers' creation of the Strategic Communication PCC was an enlightened effort to establish under White House aegis a coordinating body that could speak with supra-departmental authority.) Previously, the POTUS could simply task his USIA Director, who reported directly to him and had a massive worldwide infrastructure to make it happen.

Conclusion

The Cold War is over, but the War on Terrorists – every bit as threatening to the survival of the American experiment – is just beginning. Arguably communication is even more important to the GWOT than it was to the CW. Maybe it is worth revisiting the idea of an independent government agency with cabinet status, reporting directly to the President, populated by first rate communications professionals from the public and private sector, whose charter is to conduct a well-thought-through, flexible, long range public education program tailored to the world's diverse cultural audiences and designed to give the world a clear and truthful understanding of what we stand for and what we intend. Needless to say, because this agency's practitioners would have deep knowledge of its audiences, it could also serve as a trusted instrument of feedback for US programs and policies.

WR/VR
Hawley

August 4, 2003

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Family Day Proclamation

006

Andy—

I had lunch with Joe Califano last weekend. He is a long-time friend. Here is a note he sent me. He is anxious to have you see if it is possible for the President to make the announcement in a way that they can properly publicize it.

It sounds like it makes sense to me.

Thanks.

Attach.
8/4/03 Califano ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
080403-60

4-206-03

W00900 /03


11-L-0559/OSD/21227



The National Center on
Addiction and Substance Abuse
at Columbia University

August 4, 2003

Memorandum To: Secretary Donald Rumsfeld

From: Joe Califano 

555 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10017-6708

phone 212 841 5200
fax 212 956 8020
www.casacolumbia.org

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Frank G. Wells (1992-1994)

Following up on our brief discussion at lunch Saturday, I'd appreciate any help you can give on speeding up the Family Day presidential proclamation.

Family Day—A Day to Eat Dinner With Your Children—is the fourth Monday in September (September 22nd this year), a symbolic reminder of the importance of family dinners. CASA research has shown that the more often parents eat dinner with their children, the less likely they are to smoke, drink or use illegal drugs.

President Bush proclaimed Family Day in 2001 and 2002, and we are told it is on track for 2003. But we need to get it proclaimed before September 3rd this year.

On September 3rd, Wade Horn, the Assistant Secretary of Health and Human Services for Children and Families and I are launching Family Day at 10:00 a.m. in Washington. Family organizations from around the country will be at our event. We're unveiling public service messages from Barbara Bush and Jamie Lee Curtis and announcing that scores of governors and mayors have proclaimed Family Day. We will release new data underscoring the importance of family dinners. We want to be able to have the proclamation by that day so we can salute President Bush for his commitment in this field.

We believe this is a real plus for President Bush who is the first president to proclaim Family Day.

cc: LD, Rita

FACSIMILE

**THE NATIONAL CENTER ON ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE
At Columbia University
633 Third Avenue – 19th Floor
New York, NY 10017-6706
Main Phone (212) 841-5200
Main Fax: (212) 956-8020**

Date: August 4, 2003

To: Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, attention (b)(6)

Fax: (b)(6)

From: Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

Direct Phone: (b)(6)

Direct Fax: (b)(6)

#of Pages (including this cover): 2

Re: Sec. Rumsfeld and Mr. Califano's discussion at lunch Saturday at the Kissingers'—please see that the secretary receives it right away. Thank you.

CASA Account code: 150

The information contained in this telecopy message is intended only for the use of the individual or entity named above and may contain information that is privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under any applicable law. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, please immediately notify us by telephone and return the original message to us at the above address via the US Postal Service. Thank You.

August 4, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: North Korea

Mr. President—

Attached is an interesting article by Victor Cha on North Korea.

Respectfully,

Attach.

Cha, Victor. "Tighten the Noose Around North Korea," *Financial Times*, July 28, 2003.

DHR:dh
080403-43

KOREN (NORTH)

4 AUG 03

W00901 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/21230

Tighten the noose around North Korea

By Victor Cha

FINANCIAL TIMES, Published: July 28 2003 20:31 | Last Updated: July 28 2003 20:31

The Korean war ended 50 years ago on Sunday. But the celebrations in South Korea provided a bittersweet reminder of how little the situation on the peninsula has changed since 1953.

Although deterrence has held, the fragile Korean peace is hostage to a second confrontation brewing between the US and North Korea over Pyongyang's drive for nuclear weapons. The non-proliferation agreement that averted war in the first nuclear crisis in 1994 is now in a shambles. Moreover, the recent revelations about the possible existence of a second secret reprocessing facility suggest not only that Yongbyon may be just one of many weapons-related facilities hidden in the mountains but also that Pyongyang is determined to possess nuclear capabilities no matter what.

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The option we are left with is a strategy of multilateral pressure designed to constrict the hard currency inflows to the North Korean leadership gained through sales of missiles, narcotics and other illicit goods. Critics who say that this would be pointless because the North cannot be more isolated than it already is are mistaken. The strategy's purpose is less to isolate North Korea than to make clear to the country's leadership that pursuit of the nuclear path, far from guaranteeing regime survival, will entail costs that will ultimately make the regime more insecure.

Critics are also mistaken in discounting the multilateral approach as undesirable (because, say, Pyongyang wants bilateral talks with Washington) or ineffective

(because it will be impossible to implement, for example). If Mr Kim's objective is to have both nuclear weapons and the benefits that come from auctioning off selected portions of the programmes that are producing them, the only feasible course of action is for all interested parties - not just the US - to tell the Dear Leader that he cannot have his cake and eat it. Contrary to the nay-sayers, the coalition-building process has proved more successful than anyone expected at the outset. In every important regional forum for security issues (the US- Japan-South Korea Trilateral Co- ordination Oversight Group, the Asia-Pacific Economic Co- operation group leaders' forum, the Association of South-East Asian Nations), members have called on the North to step back.

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To cite Pyongyang's continued reprocessing activities as evidence that the Bush administration's multilateralist strategy has failed and that the US has resigned itself to accepting a nuclear North Korea is to confuse cause and effect. Washington's strategy is still taking shape. The North's continued bomb-making activities demonstrate the futility of bilateral negotiations. Overtly or covertly, and regardless of whether the US negotiated a temporary freeze on reprocessing, Mr Kim's bomb-making activities would continue apace, as they do now.

As was the case in earlier administrations, no one in George W. Bush's administration is willing to accept a nuclear North Korea. And no one argues that multilateral constriction is an ideal option. Rather, at this point, it is the least worst choice in a range of bad choices.

The writer is a professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and co-author of Nuclear North Korea: a Debate on Engagement Strategies, to be published later this year

August 6, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

Attached is the arrival message of General Pete Schoomaker as Chief of Staff of the United States Army. I thought you might like to read it.

Respectfully,

Attach.

Schoomaker, General Peter J. Arrival Message, August 1, 2003

DHR:dh
080603-13

O20 Army

6 Aug 03

General Peter J. Schoomaker
35TH CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY
Arrival Message, August 1, 2003

This afternoon I stood in the office of the Secretary of the Army and was sworn in as the 35th Chief of Staff of the Army. Thirty-four other distinguished leaders have preceded me -- well-known stewards of our Army. It is a great honor to walk in their footsteps.

Twenty-three years ago I stood in another place -- in the Iranian desert on a moonlit night at a place called Desert One. I keep a photo of the carnage that night to remind me that we should never confuse enthusiasm with capability. Eight of my comrades lost their lives. Those of us who survived knew grief ... we knew failure -- but we committed ourselves to a different future.

There were some important things we did not know about the future that night. We did not recognize that this was a watershed event -- that the military services would begin a great period of renewal that continues to this day. We did not know that we were at the start of an unprecedented movement to jointness in every aspect of our military culture, structure, and operations -- a movement that must continue. We also did not realize that we were in one of the opening engagements of this country's long struggle against terrorism -- a struggle that would reach our homeland and become known as the Global War on Terror.

Today, our Nation is at war and we are a critical part of the joint team -- an Army at war. This is not a new war. Our enemies have been waging it for some time, and it will continue for the foreseeable future. As the President has stated, "This is a different kind of war against a different kind of enemy". It is a war we must win, a war for our very way of life.

War is both a physical reality and a state of mind. War is ambiguous, uncertain, and unfair. When we are at war, we must think and act differently. We become more flexible and more adaptable. We must anticipate the ultimate reality check -- combat. We must win both the war and the peace. We must be prepared to question everything. What is best for the Nation? What must endure? What must change?

This war has demonstrated that our Soldiers, civilians, and families are up to the task. It has also provided new insights into the current operating environment. Can we sustain our high performance with our current methods of preparation? Can our Combat Training Centers better reflect the joint

context in which we will fight? Are we organized for the long haul? We must answer these questions and more.

We need to be mindful that the world has changed and it will never return to what we knew before. As my great friend, Dick Meadows, always said, "The Army ain't like it used to be -- and it never was".

Sustained engagement of our Army will be the norm, not the exception. How do we man the Army in a way that provides cohesive, high performing units in this reality of continuous engagement?

Our recent combat operations reinforce the requirements for units and echelons that are flexible and tailorable. Can we balance our force structure and develop increased modularity so as to enhance our critical role in effective joint contingency operations while maintaining our campaign qualities?

We have already shown that we have innovative and adaptive leaders. But our enemies are adapting as well. Will our development programs continue to produce leaders who can meet this challenge?

Leadership and courage are easily recognized as prerequisites at the tactical level, but they are essential at the operational and strategic levels as well. Are we developing the George C. Marshalls for the new era?

The National Guard and Army Reserve are indispensable, full members of the team. Do we have the proper mix of both active and reserve units? Are we properly balanced? Is all of our structure readily accessible to meet the requirements of this and future wars?

As we transform the Army from the current force to the future force we must ask these questions and more. While some things will change, others will not.

The American Soldier remains indispensable. Our Soldiers are paramount and will remain the centerpiece of our thinking, our systems, and our combat formations. As General Creighton Abrams taught us, "People are not *in* the Army, they *are* the Army".

We are, have been, and will remain a values based institution. Our values will not change and they are non-negotiable. Our Soldiers are Warriors of character. They exemplify these values every day and are the epitome of our American spirit. They are the heart of the Army.

As long as the United States Army has existed we have transformed -- and we always will. For four years under General Shinseki our Army has asked hard questions and made tough choices. We will continue to go where the answers to those questions take us. Our azimuth to the future is good. The Army must remain relevant and ready.

Our Army has much to be proud of. It is the preeminent land force in the world -- and continues to be respected by our friends... and feared by our enemies. We set the standard. We were part of the joint team that defeated the Taliban in Afghanistan and took down a brutal regime in Iraq. Today we are deployed and conducting contingency operations at an unprecedented pace. Our Soldiers, civilians, and their families set the standard every day for selfless service.


The Army continues to serve our great Nation well and faithfully as it has in the past. For more than 228 years, the Army has never failed the American people, and it never will.

As an American Soldier, I have never left your ranks; but it is a great privilege to wear our uniform once again.

Schoomaker

August 11, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Iraqi Governing Council

Attached are minutes Jerry Bremer sent me of a meeting of the Governing Council Committee on the subject of security in Iraq, with their resolutions and some additional information.

It struck me it might be of interest for you to see the give and take that is taking place between the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council.

Respectfully,

Attach.
8/8/03 Governing Council Committee on Security Meeting

DHR:dh
081103-4

Iraq

11 Aug 03

W00920-03

11-L-0559/OSD/21237

• **MEETING OF G.C. COMMITTEE ON SECURITY ON AUGUST 8,
2003**

Attendees

1. Mr. Masoud al-Barazani.
2. Dr. Ahmed al-Chalabi.
3. Mr. Abdulaziz al-Hakim (Mr. Bayan Jabr attended)
4. Mr. Noshewan Mostafa, representing Mr. Talabani.
5. Sheikh Ghazi al-Yawer.
6. Dr. Samir Shakir.
7. Sheikh Abdulkarim al-Mahamadawi.
8. Dr. Ayad Allawi – coordinator of the committee.

The Committee Resolutions

- 1- Security in the country is of paramount concern. Both political security (ex- regime forces and extremists) as well as breakdown in law and order should be dealt with immediately.
- 2- Support and encourage efforts by the coalition ^{and Iraqis} to improve security.
- 3- Allocation of sufficient funds to oversee security.
- 4- The formation of a very-high-level security committee between G.C. and the Coalition.
- 5- Develop and expedite formation of special courts and other judicial courts.
- 6- Formation of intelligence gathering body. (connected to point (4) above).
- 7- Support and expedite formation of civil defense corps.
- 8- Focus on all country, but give priority to Baghdad and other restless provinces.
- 9- Using information and propaganda including educating coalition military on customs and culture of the Iraqi people, and redeployed whenever possible, outside cities.
- 10- Using the ~~tribes~~ ^{local leaders} on guarding borders and main supply lines outside cities, until a comprehensive police, security and military force are established.
- 11- Using some of the existing assets in Iraqi Kurdistan ex-police and army by recruiting young officers and conscripts.

In the name of ALLAH the most merciful

Mr. General ABUZAIID the respected, Coalition Forces Commander in Iraq

And then:

There are reasons for the spread of crime in the Iraqi society, and the resistance of some people to the Coalition forces. We will mention them here, with their remedy. Before we talk about them, we would like to point out that Iraqi people are mostly Islamic, the proportion is 97% Muslims, and that Islam is truly a religion of peace, love, and mercy and believes in the freedom of religion and the freedom of thought to all people. And ALLAH – Honored and Glorified – says in the Koran: “No coercion in religion” and He says: “You have your religion, and I have mine” and he convicts violence and terrorism at the same time. As for the reasons of the crimes and the remedy, they are:

1. Speeding up of forming the government and approving a constitution, and the emplacement of a definite and short time period to end the occupation after the security is established. That (known time period) will allow tranquility to enter the spirit of Iraqi society.
2. People now are in dyer need (very poor). The hungry human in whose face all other doors are closed, will result to crime to survive. Allocating salaries – even if little – to each food ration ID card will end the crimes, or at least will limit it.
3. Finding the opportunities for work is a necessity for limiting crime. Therefore, we see the English when they occupied Iraq in 1918 they occupied people in jobs that had no particular benefit except to provide jobs for the unemployed and providing them with an income. Therefore, we see it a necessity to encourage local companies to rebuild Iraq and hire the unemployed.
4. There are many crisis in electricity, Gas, and Benzene... I see that it is necessary to speed up to conquer that challenge to add to the spread of tranquility.
5. Some of the American Forces deal too harshly with the Iraqi citizens; the result is resentment (hate) against the Coalition Forces.
6. Re-activating the legal system to make criminals pay and strike the hands of those who steal.
7. The release of the two Sheikhs: ALI BABER, the Prince of the Islamic Gathering and ALI ABD AL AZIZ, the Prince of the Islamic Movement. They resisted the old (expired) regime. They are from HALBAJAH, the city that was subjected to a criminal chemical attack from the tyrant Saddam Hussein. And to release the Dr. Sheikh AHMAD AL BALISSANI.

And God will show the right way.

IBRAHIM AL NA'MAH

MOSUL

7 Aug 2003.

(4) *Translated from Arabic Original*
11-L-0559/OSD/21239

Solutions, as I see them:

1. Re-form of the "crime fighting" division, on a temporary bases.
2. Securing the borders, especially on the Iranian side.
3. Seek the advise of (or get information from) former security men on how to successfully plan for security.
4. Rely on the practical religiously learned people; they are the ones who are working for order between the Iraqi people and the American people.
5. The persons that give you advice today are obscure and divisive (some members of the Governing Council).
6. Transfer the responsibility for security to the established parties that are already operating in the country.
7. We want educated people, and we support a "Federal" system.
8. We want the sons of the country who never left it.
9. Pay out the salaries for the Army, Police, and Security (Forces).
10. We do not want waste (could mean *alienation*) or terrorism.
11. We are your friends in humanity.

Signed: Sheikh KUTABA AMMASH,

Baghdad – AL AZAMIAH.

Note: I am positively sure that the sabotage is being conducted by elements that entered from outside our borders, for instance: the BADR BDE. They are known for their criminal activities.

(5) Translated from Arabic Original
A1-L-0559/OSD/21240

August 14, 2003

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Funds for Medical Care

Attached is a response to that question you raised about Congressman Young's concern about the treatment at Walter Reed. I have talked to him about it, so I think that issue is behind us.

701

Attach.
7/11/03 ASD (Health Affairs) memo to SecDef re: Money for Medical Treatment Facilities

DHR:dh
081403-2

14 Aug 03

W00932 /03



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

JUL 11 2003

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)


SUBJECT: Money for Medical Treatment Facilities

- In your June 30, memo (TAB B), you asked if we are doing right by medical treatment facilities as a result of added workload from the war. Representative Young told you there might have been equipment that could have saved someone's life, but it wasn't up and running.
- The short answer is that we are doing right by the hospitals and funding them properly. The assertion that a piece of equipment wasn't up and running and that this resulted in the loss of a soldier's life is not correct. This issue was raised by House Appropriations Committee staff in relation to Walter Reed Army Medical Center. The Army Surgeon General confirmed the death of the soldier at Walter Reed Army Medical Center was not due to failure of an item of equipment.
- The Army requested and received supplemental funds this year to cover increased costs resulting from combat casualties at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center and Walter Reed Army Medical Center. The Navy did not request funds for Bethesda.
- I have personally visited Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Landstuhl, and Bethesda, speaking with dozens of injured service members and their families. Uniformly, they said their care has been excellent...the best.
- The Army and Navy Surgeons General confirm there are currently no unfunded requirements for the care of returning casualties, patient care technology or other patient care issues at these medical centers.

Prepared by: Nelson Ford, DASD (HB&FP), (b)(6) PCDOCS #R52033

11-L-0559/OSD/21242

August 18, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Iraq and Post-World War II Germany

Mr. President—

Attached is an interesting comparison of Iraq to post-World War II Germany, suggesting that Iraq is doing pretty well by that historical standard.

Respectfully,

Attach.
Peters, Ralph. "History Proves We're Doing Fine," *Washington Post*, July 30, 2003, p. B01.

DHR:dh
081803-27

Iraq

18 Aug 03

W00948-03

11-L-0559/OSD/21243

washingtonpost.com

History Proves We're Doing Fine

By Ralph Peters

Sunday, July 20, 2003; Page B01

In the summer of 1945, occupied Germany's cities lay in rubble. Hunger and disease prevailed, and tens of millions of displaced persons foraged to survive. Criminals thrived on the black market. De-Nazification had barely begun. That July, three months after the war's end, no one could have foreseen Germany's political future, its economic miracle and astonishing reconstruction.

During the federal occupation of the South after the Civil War, a hostile, impoverished population lived amid ruins and cholera. Deadly riots and murders were common. The terrorists of the Ku Klux Klan enjoyed far greater support among the population than do today's Baath Party dead-enders in Iraq. Attempts to achieve inclusive democracy were frustrated for a century.

By historical standards, our progress in Iraq is extraordinary. While we cannot predict the character of the future Iraq with precision -- and we must have realistic expectations -- we already may claim with confidence that we will leave the various peoples of Iraq a more humane, equitable political environment than they ever have experienced. It will then be their own to improve upon or ruin.

With unprecedented speed, we overthrew a tyrannical regime that ruled 25 million people. A few million of Iraq's citizens had personal stakes in that regime as the source of their livelihoods and privileges. Should anyone be surprised if hundreds of thousands passively resist the occupation forces and some tens of thousands are willing to engage in or support violence against the force that robbed them of their power? There is the violence of desperation, not of confidence. We face criminals, not a quagmire.

Yet the breathless media reporting of each American casualty in Iraq implies that the occupation has failed. Yes, every soldier's life matters. But we also need to keep the numbers in perspective. In one recent week, as many Americans died in a workplace shooting in Mississippi as were killed by hostile action in Iraq. The total casualties for the war and its aftermath hardly rise to the number of deaths on America's highways over a long holiday weekend. Considering the dimensions of our victory, the low level of our losses is something entirely new in the history of warfare. But the quest for daily headlines is not synonymous with a search for deeper truths.

Most of Iraq is recovering -- not only from the recent war, but from a generation of oppression. The Kurdish region is prospering, a model of cooperation, and the Shiites have behaved far better than initial worries suggested. The violence is isolated in the Sunni-Arab-minority region, a sliver of the country just west and north of Baghdad, which benefited most from Saddam's rule and has the most to lose under a democratic government. The absence of broad support for anti-coalition attacks is heartening. There is no general insurrection and there are no violent, massive demonstrations. Individual soldiers are assassinated, but our overall presence is not endangered. The resistance of die-hard elements should surprise no one but the most naïve neoconservatives in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Meanwhile, our focus on micro issues such as individual casualties or a disgruntled shopkeeper's complaints obscures our macro success, both within Iraq and beyond its borders. Change has come to the Middle East with remarkable force and velocity. The notorious "Arab street," far from exploding, is

11-L-0559/OSD/21244

the quietest it has been in decades. Syria has sharply reduced its support for terrorism as it weighs its future. In Iran, the young are encouraged by the atmosphere of change, while the bitter old men in power glance nervously at the U.S. military forces positioned to their east and west.

There is genuine if imperfect progress on the Palestinian dilemma. The necessity for American bases in benighted Saudi Arabia has faded. Arab intellectuals and journalists speak more frankly of the need for change than they have in four decades. And, depending on how the situation in Iraq develops, the United States may have the opportunity to right one of history's most enduring wrongs by fostering the establishment of an independent Kurdistan.

Instant judgments that the U.S. occupation is somehow failing, though politically gratifying to a few, are inaccurate, destructive and ill-judged. It will be at least a decade before we can read the deep results of our actions in Iraq, but the initial indications are that they will be overwhelmingly positive. By choice, we may retain a military presence there 10 years hence -- or we may be long gone. It is simply too early to say.

Ralph Peters is a retired Army officer and the author of "Beyond Terror: Strategy in a Changing World" (Stackpole Books).

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August 18, 2003

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
CC: Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Singapore and Global Crossing

I am sure Lee Kwan Yu has called others besides me. He is concerned about the Global Crossing acquisition issue. He has a serious problem, and, as a result, I believe we have a serious problem.

Are you thinking about this, and do you have any suggestions? It seems to me there ought to be a creative way to solve it.

DHR:dh
081803-44

Singapore

18 Aug 03

W00949 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/21246

August 21, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Iraqi WMD

Mr. President—

Attached is an interesting piece written by Rolf Ekeus on Iraqi WMD.

Respectfully,

Attach.

"Why Saddam's Arsenal Has Not Been Found," *London Sunday Times*, August 3, 2003.

DHR:dh
081803-29

IF
10.9

21 Aug 03

W00960 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/21247

London Sunday Times
August 3, 2003

Why Saddam's Arsenal Has Not Been Found

Before his death, David Kelly cited this article by Rolf Ekeus, the former UN inspection chief, as reflecting his own view on why Iraq's weapons of mass destruction have not been found. Ekeus argues that Iraq did not store such weapons, because they were unstable, but it had factories ready to make and dispatch them to the front at short notice

With no weapons of mass destruction as yet found in Iraq, the political criticism directed against President Bush and Tony Blair is mounting. Before the war, the two leaders publicly declared that the Iraqi regime had not only procured and produced such weapons but also still retained them with the intention to use them. This was considered a good reason for a military operation against Iraq — an outright *casus belli*.

A United Nations inspection team, before the war, and the US military, after the war, have been searching Iraq and have not come up with anything that can remotely be called weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Is it now time to join the game of blaming Bush and Blair for an illegitimate or illegal war? Let us first consider some facts.

Chemical weapons were used by Iraq in its war against Iran (1980-88). Arguably that use had a decisive effect on the outcome: it saved Iraq from being overwhelmed by a much larger Iranian army.

Furthermore, Iraq made use of chemical bombs in air raids against the Kurdish civilian population in northern Iraq. Nerve gases immediately killed many thousands of civilians. More than 100,000 later died or were crippled.

These reminders illustrate that Iraq's acquisition and use of chemical weapons were carried out in the first instance to halt Iran's possible expansion of its sphere of influence and to suppress internal opposition. The war started by Iraq in 1980 was directed against its historical enemy, Iran.

In strategic terms and over generations, Iraq/Mesopotamia had been positioned as a gatekeeper of the Arab nation against repeated Persian expansion westward, a threat that became acute after Iran's Islamic revolution in 1979. All states in the Gulf region considered Persian nationalism and expansionism a constant problem.

For Saddam Hussein, the self-promoted defender of the Arab nation, "the Iranian beasts", to quote Tariq Aziz in a conversation with me — not the United States or Israel — were the eternal enemy of Iraq.

With its population of more than 64m, Iran constituted a challenge that Iraq, with its 24m inhabitants, could not match with conventional military means. By using chemical weapons to gas and kill the "human waves" of young Iranian attack forces, the Iraqi army repeatedly saved itself from being overwhelmed.

And so it became conventional wisdom for the Iraqi leadership that only non-conventional weapons could guarantee Iraq prevailing over Iran in any conflict.

Regarding biological weapons, the UN inspection team, Unscorm, managed after four years to confirm

11-L-0559/OSD/21248

the existence in Iraq of a secret biological weapons programme.

This led in August 1995 to the defection from Iraq of Saddam's son-in-law Hussein Kamal, director of Iraq's WMD programmes. During Unscom's debriefings in Iraq after the defection, Iraqi biological weapons scientists, able to speak more openly than normal, explained that their secret work was on assignments to find means for warfare against the Iranians.

Regarding the nuclear weapons projects, the Iraqi authorities defended their systematic violation of obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty with the proposition that Iran was also active in developing nuclear weapons. Even the quite remarkable missile developments in Iraq were related to Iran. Iraq succeeded in modifying and re-engineering many hundreds of the more than 800 Scud missiles bought from the Soviet Union — increasing their range of 200-300km (128-185 miles) to 500-600km (310-370 miles), sufficient to reach Tehran.

In sum, all four components of Iraq's prohibited and secret WMD programme were motivated and inspired by its rivalry with Iran. Thus, during the Gulf war in 1991, Iraq did not use its readily available chemical weapons, stored in considerable quantities in southern Iraq, against the US-led forces.

The Iraqi leadership made clear to me that there would have been no military sense in using chemical weapons on such a fast-developing battlefield, where the enemy was highly mobile, well-trained and well-equipped for chemical warfare. In addition, the Iraqi willingness to use chemical weapons had been tempered by the promise of James Baker, the US secretary of state, to Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi foreign minister, that such a contingency would change the US war aim from the liberation of Kuwait to regime change in Iraq.

The fact that Iraq in the recent war did not counter the coalition forces, now even better trained and equipped than last time, with chemical weapons should not have come as a surprise.

The chemical weapons, like the other WMD, had been developed with another enemy in mind. But a big question remains about the puzzling absence of chemical weapons in Iraq. Detractors of Bush and Blair have tried to make political capital out of the presumed discrepancy between the assurances about Iraq's possession of chemical weapons (and other WMD) and the inability of invading forces to find such stocks. The criticism is a distortion and trivialisation of a big threat to international peace and security.

During its war against Iran, Iraq found that chemical warfare agents, especially nerve agents such as sarin, soman, tabun and later VX, deteriorated after just a couple of weeks' storage in drums or in filled chemical warfare munitions. The reason was that the Iraqi chemists, lacking access to high-quality laboratory and production equipment, were unable to make the agents pure enough.

(Unscom found in 1991 that the large quantities of nerve agents discovered in storage in Iraq had lost most of their lethal property.) Thus the Iraqi policy after the Gulf war was to halt all production of warfare agents and to focus on design and engineering, with the purpose of activating production and shipping of warfare agents and munitions directly to the battlefield in the event of war.

Many hundreds of chemical, production and process engineers worked to develop nerve agents, especially VX, with the primary task being to stabilise the warfare agents in order to optimise a lasting lethal property. Such work could be blended into ordinary civilian production facilities and activities (eg, for agricultural purposes) where batches of nerve agents could be produced during short interruptions of the production of ordinary chemicals.

This combination of researchers, engineers, know-how, precursors, batch production techniques and testing is what constituted Iraq's chemical threat — its chemical weapon. The rather bizarre political focus on the search for rusting drums and pieces of munitions containing low-quality chemicals has tended to distort the important question of WMD in Iraq and exposed the American and British administrations to unjustified criticism.

The real chemical warfare threat from Iraq has had two components. One has been the capability to bring potent chemical agents to the battlefield to be used against a poorly equipped and poorly trained enemy. The other is the chance that Iraqi chemical weapons specialists would sign up with terrorist networks such as Al-Qaeda — with which they are likely to have far more affinity than do the unemployed Russian scientists the US worries about.

In this context the remnants of Iraq's biological weapons programme, and specifically its now-unemployed specialists, constitute a potential threat of much the same magnitude. While biological weapons are not easily adapted for battlefield use, they are potentially the more devastating as a means for a massive terrorist onslaught on civilian targets.

As with chemical weapons, Iraq's policy on biological weapons was to develop and improve the quality of the warfare agents. It is possible that Iraq, in spite of its denials, retained some anthrax in storage. But it could be more problematic and dangerous if Iraq secretly maintained a research and development capability, as well as a production capability, run by the biologists involved in its earlier programmes. Again, such a complete programme would in itself constitute a more important biological weapon than some stored agents of doubtful quality.

It is understandable that the UN inspectors and, even more, the military search teams, have had difficulty penetrating the sophisticated, well-rehearsed and protected WMD programme in Iraq. The task was made infinitely more challenging by the fact that Iraq was, and still is, a "republic of fear".

Through my indirect contact with some senior Iraqi weapons scientists, I have been given to understand that the reign of terror is still in place. Outsiders who have not dealt with Iraq cannot easily understand the extent to which the terror of the Saddam years has penetrated that unhappy nation.

As long as he is not apprehended or proven dead, few if any of those involved in the weapons programme will provide information on their activities. The risk of terrible revenge against oneself or one's family is simply too great. The first point on a WMD agenda must be to create a safe environment free from the remnants of terror.

The chemical and biological warfare structures in Iraq constitute formidable international threats through potential links to international terrorism. Before the war these structures were also major threats against Iran and internally against Iraq's Kurdish and Shi'ite populations, as well as Israel.

The Iraqi nuclear weapons projects lacked access to fissile material but were advanced with regard to weapon design. Here again, competition with Iran was a driving factor. Iran, as a big beneficiary of the fall of Saddam, has now been given an excellent opportunity to rethink its nuclear weapons programme and its other WMD activities.

The door is now open for diplomatic initiatives to remake the region into a WMD-free area and to shape a structure in the Persian Gulf of stability and security. Moreover, the defeat of Saddam's regime, a deadly opponent to peace between Israelis and Palestinians, has opened the door to a realistic and re-energised peace process in the Middle East.


This is enough to justify the international military intervention undertaken by the United States and Britain. To accept the alternative — letting Saddam remain in power with his chemical and biological weapons capability — would have been to tolerate a continuing destabilising arms race in the Gulf, including future nuclearisation of the region, threats to the world's energy supplies, leakage of WMD technology and expertise to terrorist networks, systematic sabotage of efforts to create and sustain a process of peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians and the continued terrorising of the Iraqi people.

The writer was executive chairman of the United Nations Special Commission (Unscm) on Iraq from 1991 to 1997.

11-L-0559/OSD/21251

August 21, 2003

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Security Assessment on Paul Bremer

I would appreciate it if you could arrange to have the Secret Service do a security assessment on Paul Bremer as soon as possible. It is a matter of concern to us. As soon as they can do it and give us some insights, we will get to work with you or whomever to see that the proper security is provided.

My guess is that since he is a Presidential Envoy, his security could very likely be within the charter of the Secret Service, but I am not sufficiently knowledgeable to know precisely.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Regards,

DHR:dh
082103-3

Tracy

21 Aug 03

7:28 PM

TO: President George W. Bush
CC: Vice President Richard Cheney
Honorable Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: August 24, 2003
SUBJECT: **Coalition Provisional Authority - Baghdad**

Attached is a report from Paul Bremer that is of interest.

ITAG

DHR/azn
082403.01

Attached: Coalition Provisional Authority Memo 8.23.03

24 Aug 03

11-L-0559/OSD/21253

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

23 August 2003

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: Paul Bremer <signed>
SUBJECT: Saturday Meeting with the Governing Council

I asked to meet with the Governing Council (GC) today in a special session to address the agenda we set aside on Wednesday in the wake of the UN bombing. Overall, it was one of the more productive council sessions – perhaps in part due to the smaller numbers present and in part due to my efforts to stir them to action earlier in the week.

I first spoke of the draft UN resolution circulating in New York and efforts to include a timeline for restoring Iraq to full sovereignty in it. The United States was arguing that such a timetable was only for Iraqis to determine. An alternative, I suggested, would be to have the resolution invite the GC to propose a time line for Iraq's political transition. This approach would also win the GC domestic favor from Iraqis. The GC supported the adoption of this strategy.

We then spoke of foreign investment for the second time in two weeks. GC members reacted positively to the outlines of a foreign investment strategy I outlined. They did, however, express a desire for more time and information before endorsing the coalition's position. Several members articulated fears that investment from "neighboring" countries would crush small Iraqi businesses; others spoke of the need to have a better sense of how Iraq's economy would react to new technologies. We agreed on the urgency of coming to closure on this issue. Peter McPherson will speak with the Economic and Finance Committee on Monday afternoon. The committee will then make a recommendation to the council.

Several other items were discussed, including GC security precautions, nominations to a Joint Security Committee, and a new salary structure for government employees. I also congratulated the GC on the convention of the Constitutional Preparatory Committee (CPC) and asked the members reiterate to CPC members the importance of keeping to a short deadline and a narrow mandate. Finally, at our urging, the GC issued a press statement endorsing a project to launch a process for resolving property disputes among Iraqis.

11-L-0559/OSD/21254

During the next ten days that I am in Washington, CPA will move ahead as usual and submit to the GC a variety of policy proposals. Ambassador David Richmond will discuss these issues at the regular weekly meetings. It is possible that the GC will come to closure on selecting interim ministers in my absence. We will ensure that CPA is fully apprised of any steps in this direction before ministers are announced.

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: August 25, 2003
SUBJECT: **End Strength**

320.2

Mr. President,

You will recall we talked about the end strength issue. Many in the Congress are continuing to push for increases of troop end strength – our authorized troop levels.

To address the problem, I've drafted the attached memo which is a working paper. It has been provided to the senior leadership at the Department, with tasking to pursue each of these items.

I suspect you will be getting questions on this so it struck me that you might want to be aware of the text of the memo. There was an excellent article on the front page of *The New York Times* on Sunday, August 24th on it.

Respectfully,



DHR/azn
082503.14

Attached: Department of Defense End Strength Working Paper

25 Aug 03

W00978 /03

WORKING PAPER

Version #4

August 25, 2003

SUBJECT: “End Strength”—Are current U.S. military forces sufficient for the challenges facing our country? What are ways DoD can reduce the stress on the force, maintain recruiting and retention targets, and make the Department more efficient and cost effective?

Summary: The U.S. can afford whatever military force level (end strength) is determined to be necessary and appropriate for our nation’s security. The men and women in uniform are the Department’s most valuable asset. Our people—military and civilian—appreciate in value, while equipment decreases in value. It is our people who distinguish the U.S. military from other forces. For the present, analysis by the Joint Chiefs indicates that the U.S. military currently has sufficient active and reserve forces to execute its assigned missions. If at any time that is not the case, it would be DoD’s responsibility to recommend to the President appropriate adjustments. Absent analysis that indicates that U.S. forces are not able to meet their assigned missions, it would be an expensive mistake to increase the size of our forces. To the extent we increase our investment in end strength, we may likely increase risk in other key areas, such as readiness, procurement and research and development.

Background: The operational tempo of U.S. forces during the two years after September 11, 2001 has been significant. In the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom, some have called for an increase in the end strength of the U.S. military. Although this may appear to be a straightforward solution, it is neither easy nor quick. Adding uniformed personnel to the defense establishment is expensive.

- The cost is substantial over the lifetime of a service member. A number of the most costly add-ons to military pay and benefits have been for retired, not active duty personnel.
- Increased end strength has second and third order effects. The more end strength, the more force protection that is required; the more end strength, the more infrastructure that is required; the more end strength, the more pensions and healthcare for life that are required.
- It takes time to recruit, train and integrate new personnel into the Armed Forces. As a result, there is a considerable lag between when the additional personnel are recruited and the costs begin, and when the added capability is received.

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11-L-0559/OSD/21257

WORKING PAPER

- At present, all four Services' recruiting and retention goals are being met or exceeded. Whether these favorable results will continue as we move through the coming months and years remains to be seen. These key indicators must be closely watched.

The current stress on the force is very likely a "spike," and we hope it will not be permanent. In any event, that stress, as well as respect for the taxpayers' dollars, requires DoD to make every effort to achieve the most efficient use of the forces. That same respect for the taxpayers' dollars mandates that we aggressively address the alternative contractor and civilian employee cost impacts as well.

Following is, I am sure, an incomplete but illustrative list of activities DoD is currently executing and/or examining for implementation. As appropriate, we must exploit each of these areas to reduce stress on the force, both active and reserve. Though it may appear that some of these areas do not directly benefit end strength, nor assist in reducing stress on the force, in a variety of ways we believe they can have positive, indirect impact. To the extent we are successful in improving performance in these areas, it should relieve pressure on the force and likely reduce the current calls for end strength increases, or, at the minimum, reduce the size of any end strength increase that analysis might later indicate is necessary in the future.

1. Lessons Being Learned

- Contingency Plans. DoD is currently reviewing and revising all contingency plans to take account of the lessons learned thus far in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Global War on Terror. Among the lessons is the need to take advantage of the tradeoffs between numbers of people and things—"mass"—versus the increased lethality from speed, agility, precision munitions and the leverage available in the information age. "Overmatching power" is replacing "overwhelming force."
- Jointness. DoD is achieving greater jointness worldwide, so combatant commanders should be able to tailor forces creatively among the Services to gain added synergy and lethality, as in the Iraq war. Coherently joint forces create power that exceeds the sum of individual military—U.S. and international—elements.
- Training and Exercises. Training matters; joint training matters more. It creates an asymmetric advantage for U.S. forces. Training and exercises need to take account of recent real world experience.
- Global Force Management. DoD is exploring methods of replacing the concept of "forces for a specific combatant commander" with a "Global

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Force Management Availability System,” which should lead to more efficient management of the forces and the process by which they are provided to Combatant Commanders in support of their essential missions.

- **Reserve/Active Force Balance.** DoD is rebalancing the reserve components with the active components to achieve the appropriate mix for the 21st century. The task is to avoid having to call up certain specialties repeatedly for tasks we know DoD is and will continue to be called upon to execute regularly (civil affairs, etc.). The new active-Reserve mix must also be designed to enable more immediate action, as appropriate.
- **Realignment of Manpower Levels and Skill Sets.** DoD will review active and reserve components to determine how the Department can best allocate manpower levels and specific skill sets, within existing end strength limits, to best satisfy the demands of the 21st century.
- **Time on Operational Duty.** For Reserve Components, DoD will seek ways to increase the ratio of the number of months out of the total period of activation/mobilization a unit is actually performing the mission for which it was called up. We can improve on those instances where it is as low as 6 months out of a 12-month call-up.
- **Precision Weapons.** Our use of precision weapons, with greater accuracy, can maintain lethality while reducing both the operational footprint and the logistics tail, thereby reducing force requirements.
- **Deployments.** The old Industrial Age process is broken. An approach that permits only peace or war, with little or no nuance, is out of date. The process is currently being streamlined to take less time and permit more nuanced management of mobilization and demobilization, deployment and redeployment, and recovery operations.
- **Relief-in-Place.** The Services need to establish a common definition of “relief-in-place” and then implement measures to shorten the relief in place system from 45 – 60 days to a shorter period, as appropriate.
- **Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters.** The world is moving so fast that Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters are necessary. If it takes one to three months to staff up a headquarters, the wars of the future may be over before the staff is in place. Where appropriate, we must invest in and sustain surge capability.

2. People

- Military Out of Non-Military Jobs. DoD requires Congressional cooperation to pass the personnel reform legislation so it can get closure on the studies that suggest there are some 300,000 to 380,000 positions that military personnel are currently serving in that might be performed by civilians. Managers have to be freed up so they can make greater use of the civil service, rather than being forced to use military personnel or contractors because they cannot efficiently manage the DoD civilian workforce. If only one-sixth of those 300,000 positions were freed up for military duty, it would increase usable “end strength” by 50,000. We won’t know what can be achieved until the current analysis is completed.
- Core Competencies. OSD is aggressively working to move the military out of activities that are not core competencies or inherently governmental. For example, housing privatization has allowed DoD to get better value and speed modernization for the same expenditure of funds.
- Contract Employees. For shorter duration missions and missions that are not military core competencies, DoD will have to make more judicious use of contract employees. This will require that we organize so we have Congressional authority and the ability to properly engage contract assistance.
- Education. The Department is working to improve joint education to create a culture that empowers younger leaders to think beyond their parent Services for creative solutions to the challenges our nation faces.
- Coalition Forces. The U.S. must organize its alliances and relationships to increase the availability and readiness of coalition forces—the speed of their availability and the readiness of their equipment. This will require a diplomatic effort to substantially reduce the current restrictions and caveats many countries have that reduce the availability of their forces and also a long-term commitment from other countries to help finance less wealthy nations’ ability to recruit, train, deploy and sustain their forces.
- Allies. We must assist treaty partners, where appropriate, to assume greater responsibility for their defense more rapidly.
- Backfill. During a crisis, we need to arrange for other countries to backfill for U.S. troops in some of our long-term commitments, such as

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the Sinai, Iceland, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc. Additionally, the U.S. will have to tackle the tough political challenge of ending some commitments.

- Indigenous Forces. The U.S. must organize and fund to be able to use more host nation security personnel in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo to ease the burden on coalition forces. This will require Congress approving DoD's proposed "train and equip" legislation.
- Reserve Forces. DoD has established a policy whereby it will, to the extent possible, first use Reserve forces that have not recently been mobilized.
- Volunteers. DoD will continue to use volunteers from the Reserve force, to the extent available.
- Holidays. To the extent possible, DoD force mobilizations will be respectful of major holidays.
- Call-ups. DoD is revising the process so as to protect the goal of 30 days' notice for mobilization of reserve units, if at all possible, and will consider a tiered arrangement whereby some reserve units might be compensated and trained to maintain a readiness level to be available and ready for prompt deployment with a shorter call-up.
- Incentives. DoD will consider offering incentives for extended deployments.
- Peace Operations. The USG is considering a "Peace Operations Initiative" with the goal of increasing the worldwide availability of peacekeepers, peacemakers, military police, constabulary, etc. for peacemaking and peacekeeping operations.
- Intelligence. DoD is working to strengthen actionable intelligence, and improve humint in key areas of interest, by prioritization of effort and by assuring seamless exchange of information among U.S. agencies.

3. Technology

- Information Age. DoD will accelerate use of new information technologies to reduce the need for forward deployed personnel and thereby reduce the rotation rate the Services require to support a deployed person.

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- Logistics. DoD will continue to emphasize systems with smaller logistics requirements and footprint, simplified designs with fewer and more interchangeable parts.
- New Technologies. DoD will invest in technology to substitute for human force protection—sensors, intelligence, etc. Additionally, the Services will be encouraged to consider the approach the Navy is using to reduce personnel needed for ship manning (by as much as 50 percent in some cases) and invest in less manpower-intensive platforms (UAVs), and technologies and processes, in and out of the defense industry.
- Lethality. Services are working to lighten their footprint, while increasing lethality, to the extent possible.
- U.S. and Coalition Transformation. DoD will work to improve its interoperability with coalition partners through the Joint Forces Command.

4. Efficiency

- Organization of Forces. In the 21st century one size doesn't fit all. DoD will modernize the Services' force organizations to achieve improved modularity, so combatant commanders can more readily organize units to task. This should allow commanders to build capability by adding modules and right-sizing the force to their missions. The goal is to achieve greater interchangeable and combined arms effects to increase flexibility. Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters are ideally suited to integrate and operate this approach. Interchangeable divisions could provide improvements in force allocation, force rotation, and employment flexibility.
- Global reach back. DoD will organize to conduct more non-spear point activities for deployed forces back in the U.S., thereby reducing both the number of forces deployed as well as the rotation base multiple needed to maintain that number of troops forward-deployed. Organizing the Reserve Components to optimize reach back opportunities may yield significant personnel tempo savings.
- Force Allocation. OSD and the Joint Forces Command will work to be able to provide combatant commanders the joint force capabilities they need to achieve desired "effects" and "outcomes," rather than simply responding to requests for numbers of things—troops or platforms.

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- Procurement. DoD will continue to invest to achieve greater lethality per unit of force structure.
- Strategic Lift. DoD will continue investing in strategic lift to assure timely mobility, e.g., high speed transport. Leveraging new technologies in this area should also reduce the associated logistic footprint. Additionally, the Department must continue to support participation in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Act as a supplement to our national mobility capability.
- Rotation Ratio. The Services will work to find ways to reduce the rotation ratio and consider opportunities to transport crews to their equipment.
- Headquarters Layering. DoD components' reduction in the number of headquarters will free up some of the manpower currently staffing those organizations. The flattening of headquarters hierarchies is desirable and viable given existing and planned communications technology.
- Best Practices. DoD will work to move best practices from inside and outside DoD throughout the Department.
- Planning Tools. DoD is developing tools to enable it to plan more rapidly to produce more refined force requirements, both in terms of numbers and timing of their movement and arrival.
- Operational Availability. DoD will implement the appropriate JROC "operational availability" studies' recommendations.
- Strategic Warning. Intelligence capabilities will be tasked to see if it is possible and cost effective to increase strategic warning, thereby reducing the portion of the force that must be forward-deployed.
- The Right Skills. DoD will develop the ability to more rapidly adjust forces in the field, so as to put the right capabilities in the right places at the right time and to be able to make rapid adjustments as circumstances change.

5. Policy

- U.S. Foreign Commitments. DoD will continue to work to pare down long-term U.S. commitments such as the Sinai, Iceland, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc. We will advise nations at the outset that deployments are not forever and that the U.S. requires the ability to redeploy for other

WORKING PAPER

contingencies and ease of transit. DoD will also use care in adding new commitments of forces.

- **U.S. Non-Military Skills.** The USG needs to strengthen the international capability to help countries establish and execute civil implementation tasks; only if we are successful will the U.S. and coalition forces be relieved of peace operations earlier than tends to be the case, such as in Bosnia.
- **U.S. Worldwide Footprint.** DoD will work to improve the flexibility and responsiveness of U.S. forces by adjusting U.S. forward-deployed forces in Europe and Asia, by repositioning and making greater use of pre-positioned equipment to improve our capabilities for rapid deployment from the U.S. and elsewhere, and by investing in necessary infrastructure where required. DoD will consolidate locations worldwide to reduce the number of troops required for support, including force protection and, in addition, will use host nation forces, where available, to provide protection for deployed U.S. forces.

Conclusion.

In a war—in this case, the Global War on Terrorism—it cannot be “business as usual.” During a crisis, when there is an understandable spike demand on U.S. forces, DoD cannot behave as though it is “business as usual.” It isn’t. DoD needs to act promptly to reduce or stop activities such as exercises and other “business as usual” activities, as appropriate.

The task of DoD is to manage the force within acceptable levels of stress. Key measurements are recruiting and retention metrics. We must monitor all activities to see that we achieve solid progress on each of the above tasks, before taking the easy and more expensive course of increasing force levels. We owe the American people no less.

DHR:dh
Current MFRs/ End Strength

3:09 PM

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: August 27, 2003

Mr. President:

Thanks again for your hospitality in Crawford. Our folks enjoyed being there and having an opportunity to brief their Commander in Chief.

You will recall that Admiral Giambastiani and Brigadier General Conc briefed on lessons learned in Iraq. After the meeting, I asked Ed Giambastiani to prepare a brief summary of some key lessons and insights from the Iraq war. Attached is the product. I think you will find it of interest.

Respectfully,

DHR/ezn
082503.40

Attach: Operational Insights 8/22/03

IRIS

27 Aug 03

W00990-03

11-L-0559/OSD/21265

(b)(6)

Operational Insights

- **Every war is different . . . lessons from Operation Iraqi Freedom are not universally applicable**

Must account for the uniqueness of each experience: for Iraqi Freedom = our defeat of Iraq in 1991; operations over Iraq for 12 years; and, a less than capable enemy

- **Long term strategy creates the conditions for rapid and successful action**

In the case of Iraqi Freedom, the US was in region for 50 years, conducted 12 years of containment and conditioning of enemy, one year of selected interdiction and 12 years of shaping the region (intelligence, infrastructure, basing, access, over flight, etc.)

- **Leaving all options on the table creates opportunities for the U.S. and dilemmas for our enemies**

Breadth of US capabilities causes enemy to dissipate effort in too many directions . . . most enemies cannot be strong everywhere.

- **Top-down clarity of vision and common understanding of purpose empowers action, creates opportunity, generates trust and confidence, and creates unity of effort**

Political and diplomatic efforts create time and space to prepare for combat operations. Clear intent and consistent interaction create unity of purpose and freedom from distraction for the Combatant Commander

- **Operationally agile forces; flexible capabilities; and, access, basing and overflight are essential to make adaptive planning and execution a reality**

Adaptive plans need flexible and agile forces, but some things are constant: agility and flexibility are useless without a combination of access, basing, and/or overflight (examples = Turkey, Kuwait, Saudi airfields)

- **It's not the *plan*, it's the *planning* that provides the intellectual basis for adaptation**

Iterative planning creates profound knowledge that enables anticipation, tests assumptions, discovers unknowns and allows calculated risk taking

- ***Overmatching power* replaces the post cold-war construct of *overwhelming force***

Overmatching (relative to enemy at time and place of our choosing) & power (effect on the enemy) . . . reflects the focused power of networked military and government power rather than a mere preponderance of forces in an attrition based campaign.

- **The ability to act against leadership and combatants denies our enemies the ability to use the innocent as a shield**

The tools of this new American method of warfare allow action against thugs and tyrants once protected by the dilemma posed by war's indiscriminate destruction. Our ability to focus action against those who decide and those who fight reduces collateral impacts, enabling acceptable responses to enemies embedded among the innocent.

- **Knowing more than the enemy reduces risk and enables initiative**

We knew more than our opponents ever did. This created freedom to act (our actions with the 4th ID, the switching of air and ground days, etc.) and confused the enemy. The speed of our actions, enabled by our superior understanding of events, further precluded effective enemy action

- **Gain and maintain the initiative, whether on offense or defense**

Initiative is key - getting there "firstest with the mostest" is the key to victory. In Iraqi Freedom, our forces demonstrated initiative that denied the enemy success:

Offensive: rapid seizure of oil fields, speed of closure on Baghdad, and aggressive action against missile launch sites in western Iraq

Defensive: convoy security operations and Baath party headquarters strikes to dislocate the Fedayeen Saddam

- ***Speed kills*; reducing decision and execution cycles speeds the enemy's collapse**

Like being "first to market" with multiple products in multiple locations. The competition starts out behind and never catches up

- **Coherently joint forces create power that exceeds the sum of the individual parts**

To use a football metaphor, the running game creates opportunities to pass; the passing game opens holes for the running backs.

September 3, 2003

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Colin Powell
Dr. Condoleezza Rice
Honorable George Tenet

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Hungary Facility



Hungary

Attached is a note from Paul Bremer for your information.

Attach.
9/3/03 Bremer memo to SecDef re: Tszar

DHR:dh
090303-10

11-01008-03

09/13

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
Baghdad

3 September 2003

MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: Paul Bremer <signed>
SUBJECT: Tszar

For several weeks we have been planning on using a training facility in Hungary (Tszar) to accelerate standing up a full Iraqi police force of sixty six thousand officers within the next two years. Recent information has cast this option in serious doubt. Our planning was based on information that the facility was ready for use. We now understand that it will cost twenty five million dollars to bring it up to acceptable standards. In addition, we learned this week that official agreement for use of the facility will require the approval of the Hungarian Parliament; a prospect that will certainly take time and would be good only for the rest of this year when that process would have to begin again.

I have reviewed this element of our police plan and have decided to pursue other ways to accomplish this training. We are now actively examining a combination of using military bases within Iraq and exploring the possibility that earlier offers of assistance in police training in Jordan by HM might be expanded. We are moving quickly to pursue this course.


In the meantime, I have concluded that the Hungarian option is no longer viable and that we should stop all efforts to pursue it.

CC: Dr. Rice
Secretary Powell

11-L-0559/OSD/21269

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



DATE: September 8, 2003

Mr. President:

I recall you have read books by Robert D. Kaplan.

He just spent a month in the Philippines and sent me the attached email on your administration's effort known as *Balikatan '03*.

It struck me that you might enjoy reading of this success.

Respectfully,

DHR/azn
090803.44b

Attach: Email from Robert Kaplan to Secretary Rumsfeld (8/9/03)

Philippines

8 Sep 03

W01033-03

11-L-0559/OSD/21270

I just returned from over a month in the Philippines with some thoughts.

In 2002, the island of Basilan - the main island in the southern Sulu chain - was an Army Special Forces laboratory for using humanitarian relief to flush out international terrorists.

Basilan had been the lair of Abu Sayyaf guerrillas. It made sense. Basilan is a poor, largely-Moslem island that the Christian mestizo oligarchy in Manila ruled but made no effort to responsibly govern. Whether the dictator Marcos was in power or democrats like Corey Aquino, it has made no difference to these southern Moslems, who still lacked potable water and basic security from bandits and pirates. Their kids still died from meningitis, scabies, malaria, etc. Abu Sayyaf, through killings and kidnappings, drove out the doctors and teachers, closed the schools and hospitals.

PACOM, as you know, was limited by strict ROEs regarding its role in hunting down these terrorists. But the solution that it and Army SF came up with bears studying for future application:

International Islamic terrorism is, among many other things, a classic insurgency: something the U. S. military learned by trial and error how to deal with in the Philippines between 1898 and the end of the Islamic Moro rebellion in 1913, put down by Capt. John "Blackjack" Pershing. To my mind, the most important lesson of that episode in our nation's history was that in order to defeat terrorist insurgents, you must sever the link between them and the indigenous population. Only then can terrorists be isolated and destroyed.

That happened in 2002 in Basilan without firing a shot.

About a dozen SF "A" teams were deployed, with administrative "B" teams. American contractors came in. Roads were built, water wells dug. We bought locally and hired locally, right down to the aggregate for the roads. "A" teams encamped to train Filipino army units. SF team medics conducted MEDCAPS and DENTCAPS continually all over the island. Schools were built, and even a few neighborhood mosques with the help of SF teams. To call all this "soft" humanitarian relief is to see only one layer of reality.

The MEDCAPS, etc. spun the local Filipino media and intellectuals into writing nice things about the U. S. military for the first time since we lost Clark Field and the Subic Bay Naval Station. The MEDCAPS, etc. were useful venues for gathering native intelligence on local terrorists, which could then be passed on to the Filipino military. The very presence of U. S. forces, in small numbers, got Abu Sayyaf to flee the island, to more remote places. Furthermore, it accomplished something quite radical:

It shamed the corrupt Manila oligarchy into paying more attention to its own Moslem south. And it showed Filipino Moslems that everything that Abu Sayyaf said about Americans was not true. That, ultimately, is what severed the link between Abu Sayyaf and the island's inhabitants.

The Northwest Frontier of Pakistan, as I know from much personal experience, is another area long forsaken by its own government, democratic or dictatorial, it never made a difference. No insurgent can hide without some assistance from the indigenous inhabitants. I wonder what a Basilan-approach would do to improve native intelligence for us in that region, and others?

In a world where host countries regularly put restrictions on what we can and cannot do, we must more creatively use the leeway within the ROEs that we do have.

I will write all of this and much more in future books and articles, but felt that as a citizen these ideas should make it to your desk soonest.

Warmest regards,

Bob Kaplan

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: September 8, 2003

Mr. President,

Attached is an interesting article from *The Atlantic Monthly*. It is an effort by the Rand Corporation to look into the future and lay out some international security developments that are of interest.

092

It is uneven in quality, but it struck me that you might like to see it.

Respectfully,

DHR/azn
090803.01b

Attach: *The Atlantic Monthly*; pgs. 84-90

8 Sep 03

W01034-03

11-L-0559/OSD/21272

HEADLINES OVER THE HORIZON

Analysts at the RAND Corporation lay out ten international-security developments that aren't getting the attention they deserve

THE WALL

Whenever hopes for peace between Israelis and Palestinians rise, a new surge of bloodshed extinguishes them. Palestinian suicide bombings provoke Israeli military attacks, which provoke more suicide bombings, which provoke more military attacks. Now the Israelis are trying to stop the violence by building a 225-mile wall—variously consisting of concrete, barbed wire, electronic fencing, motion detectors, and trenches—that will separate the Jewish state from the West Bank. It will be completed this year and will profoundly change the geographical and political landscape of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The wall is the most ambitious attempt by Israelis to reclaim the relative quiet they enjoyed before the second intifada, which began in September of 2000 and has since subjected Israel to a relentless wave of suicide terrorism. The logic behind the wall is unassailable. Israel's other borders (with Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Gaza) are fairly well protected; none has the security problems with terrorist infiltrators that exist on the frontier with the West Bank. The Gaza Strip, for example, was a major departure point for Palestinian terrorist strikes into Israel before it was fenced off, in 1994. Since the current intifada began, no Palestinian suicide bomber has entered Israel from Gaza.

Polls show that at least 70 percent of Israelis support physical separation from the West Bank. However, many of the 200,000 Jewish settlers who live there oppose the wall, for a simple reason: once it is finished, the Israeli army will no longer provide the level of protection settlers currently enjoy. Few settlers are likely to want to remain outside the wall, given their increased vulnerability to attack; most will probably move back to Israel. Thus the wall could spell the

death of the attempt to settle Greater Israel, which encompasses the biblical lands of Judea and Samaria and includes the West Bank. It will also create a de facto international border.

The idea of the wall also makes many Palestinians unhappy, because it will not exactly follow the Green Line—Israel's pre-1967 border with the West Bank. Instead it will reach into the West Bank to embrace some nearby Jewish settlements. Palestinians consider this a land grab. In addition, the wall will further weaken the already severely damaged Palestinian economy in the short run, since entry into Israel will be more difficult. As Palestinians are forced to turn elsewhere for jobs and income, however, the impetus for a more self-reliant and robust Palestinian economy could emerge.

But the wall could also deepen Palestinian rage and enmity, of course, prompting escalated mortar and ground-to-ground missile attacks against targets inside Israel. Hamas has already launched such attacks from the Gaza Strip, and it may now do so from the West Bank. The wall could also prompt further attacks on Israelis overseas, like the suicide bombing last November of a Mombasa hotel filled with Israeli tourists and the accompanying attempt to shoot down an Israeli chartered plane. —BRUCE HOFFMAN

A SHRINKING RUSSIA

The population of Russia is getting smaller and older. In 1992 the country's population was estimated at 148 million; today the number is 145 million. That's an absolute decline greater than that in any other nation during the past decade—and some analysts predict that the number of people in Russia will drop below 100 million by 2050. The number of Russians aged fifteen to twenty-four, though temporarily growing because of high birth

rates in the 1980s, may shrink by nearly half over the next fifteen years, because of low birth rates in the 1990s. This will greatly strain a country that is already struggling to cope with a daunting array of security challenges, including controlling the world's longest borders and largest land mass, maintaining the world's largest nuclear arsenal, and reining in one of the world's most serious weapons-proliferation problems.

The security implications of this demographic change become clear when one examines its effect on Russia's military, police, border guards, and other security forces, which in coming years won't be able to fill their ranks. And more is at issue than a simple decline in numbers. Young Russian men, the population from which the military and other security agencies draw most of their personnel, are today plagued with health problems, among them alcoholism (a long-standing problem), tuberculosis (a returning scourge), and HIV/AIDS (a rapidly emerging new epidemic). The mortality rate among Russian men aged fifteen to twenty-four nearly doubled in the 1990s and is now almost three times that among American men of the same age. The rate of death from suicide, one of the leading killers of young Russian men today, is more than three times that for young American men. And many young Russians who are fit for (ostensibly compulsory) military service bribe their way out of it, leaving a force even less healthy than the military-age population as a whole.

Unlike many European states that also have shrinking populations of young people, Russia isn't currently in a position to compensate for a loss of manpower by putting more money or technology into its military and other security organs, because the country's economy and scientific sectors have suffered considerably during the past

decade. And as the country's population ages, burgeoning pension obligations will drain away resources that could otherwise have been devoted to security. Although immigration might mitigate some of the population loss and help to fill the ranks, the trend is not encouraging; immigration has plummeted from more than 1.2 million in 1994 to fewer than 185,000 in 2002. Russia could try to expand its military ranks, at least, by relying more on women soldiers, but the military's attitude toward women is hostile in many ways, and cultural adjustments simply will not come quickly.

Without enough manpower to police its extensive borders and to respond effectively to internal and external security problems, Russia could well lose its battles against smuggling, terrorism, and weapons proliferation—all threats that pose dangers far beyond Russia's borders. —*JULIE DAVANZO, OLGA OLIKER, & CLIFFORD GRAMMICH*

THE HINDU-MUSLIM DIVIDE

A defining element of Indian politics since independence has been a commitment to secularism. That commitment is now at risk from an aggressive brand of Hindu nationalism that equates Indian national identity with Hindu religious identity. The country's radical nationalists view the secular political system as a threat to Hindu identity, largely because of the power it offers India's 140 million Muslims. Weakening, or even abolishing, the secular state has therefore become part of the radical-nationalist agenda. This may force Indian Muslims—traditionally moderate and supportive of the secular state, even on the sensitive matter of Kashmir—to shift their allegiance from the state to some sort of larger international Islamic movement, as many Muslims have done in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Such a radicalization of religious identities is a matter of serious concern in a nation of a billion people that possesses the world's seventh largest nuclear arsenal and has had troubled relations with its populous and nuclear-armed Muslim neighbor, Pakistan.

Radical Hindu nationalism is already a dominant force in mainstream

Indian politics. A Hindu nationalist party, the BJP, has led the country's coalition government for five years, and extremist Hindu organizations with explicitly anti-Muslim sentiments have heavily influenced the party's agenda. Strife between Hindus and Muslims has been the predictable result. Last year a group of Muslims burned a train full of nationalist Hindus in the state of Gujarat; the attack killed fifty-eight people and led to Hindu reprisals that killed about 2,000 Muslims. An Indian tribunal investigating the massacres found that Hindu nationalist groups had methodically targeted Muslim homes and shops. It even charged that one important group, the VHP, had recruited and trained militants for the violence, and had provided them with computer printouts of names and addresses. Local and national security forces failed to respond adequately to the crisis as it unfolded: initially the state police did not intervene, and the central government only belatedly sent troops to Gujarat to restore order. Although thousands of extremist Hindus were involved in the violence, few were arrested. On the whole, the Gujarat episode has left Indian Muslims feeling neglected by the government.

The radicalization of India's Hindus and Muslims poses obvious domestic-security challenges. According to recent reports, Muslim militants based in Kashmir have been working with Pakistani groups to target the VHP and other groups in retaliation for the massacre in Gujarat. Militant Hindu groups have vowed to destroy Muslim mosques throughout India, and to build temples in their place. —*ROLLIE LAL*

AIDS AND AFRICAN ARMIES

The devastating impact of the AIDS pandemic in Africa is well known. According to the United Nations, some 28 million people in sub-Saharan Africa now live with HIV/AIDS, and in some countries the rate of HIV infection approaches 40 percent of the adult population. AIDS claimed more than 900,000 lives in southern Africa during 2001, and has left more than three million children without one or both parents. The strain on Africa's social

fabric is hard to overestimate, and the problem is finally getting widespread attention—beyond just the medical community. In January of 2000 the U.S. National Intelligence Council issued its first-ever national intelligence estimate on the global impact of infectious diseases, in which the HIV/AIDS pandemic was identified as a serious threat to U.S. national security.

One little-noted aspect of this threat will become increasingly clear in the decades ahead: AIDS is decimating the ranks of African armed forces. A 2000 survey by the Civil-Military Alliance to Combat HIV and AIDS noted that by the mid-1990s several African defense ministries were reporting significant rates of HIV infection among their armed forces. Today the militaries hardest hit by HIV/AIDS infections include those of Zimbabwe (with a 50 percent infection rate), Angola (40 to 60 percent), Tanzania (15 to 30 percent), Congo-Brazzaville (10 to 25 percent), Côte d'Ivoire (10 to 20 percent), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (40 to 60 percent), Eritrea (10 percent), and Nigeria (10 to 20 percent). In South Africa the pandemic has reached biblical proportions, with HIV-infection rates in some units of the South African National Defence Force—which happens to be the biggest peacekeeping-capable military in southern Africa—reaching as high as 90 percent. The rate of HIV infection, like the rates of infection for other sexually transmitted diseases, is two to five times as prevalent in African armies as in corresponding civilian populations. And the soldiers themselves—often prone to sexual promiscuity and illicit drug use—are a major factor in the spread of the virus, both domestically and internationally. Many of the African countries with the greatest prevalence of HIV infection are engaged in conflict of one kind or another, and rape is often a tactic or a byproduct of war.

As the pandemic claims more lives, African militaries will lose the manpower they need to carry out their missions. It will deplete many armies' officer corps, leading to a loss of command capacity, and will drain defense budgets, as unprecedented resources are channeled

to the care of infected service members. The effects of the pandemic on African armed forces are already profound. In 1999, for example, when members of numerous southern African militaries came together for a peacekeeping exercise known as Operation Blue Crane, more than 30 percent of the South African participants turned out to be medically unfit for deployment, primarily because of HIV infection.

African armies are often seen as problems, not as forces for good, but in many cases only they have been able to ensure national and regional stability. Many countries, with their armies dramatically weakened by AIDS, are likely to lose control over national security, territorial integrity, and public order. —KEVIN A. O'BRIEN

THE TEHRAN-NEW DELHI AXIS

Iran, with its Islamic regime, seems a strange ally of India, a predominantly Hindu democracy. But the two nations have been overcoming past antagonisms and developing closer ties that will affect not just Southwest Asia and the Middle East but also the United States. Their new relationship could powerfully influence such important matters as the flow of energy resources, regional and worldwide efforts to combat terrorism, and political developments in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other states in Central Asia. The consequences will not always suit U.S. interests.

Before the Islamic revolution, in 1979, Iran's ties with the West greatly vexed India, which had championed the non-aligned movement. Those concerns disappeared after the revolution, of course, but were soon replaced by concerns about Iran's support of Kashmiri aspirations and its efforts to spread Islamic revolution to other Persian Gulf states. Nevertheless, after the Cold War ended, Iran and India discovered that they shared a stake in checking U.S. global power, opposing the Taliban in Afghanistan, fighting narcotics trafficking in Asia, and developing mutually beneficial energy options.

More recently New Delhi and Tehran have found common ground in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and in the preservation of Pakistan as a

functioning state (because its collapse would pose even more of a threat to India than its survival). The two have also recognized that closer ties would help each nation meet important needs of its own: for Iran, India could be a source of technical expertise, industrial goods, and foreign investment; for India, Iran could be a much needed additional source of energy and could serve as a gateway to Central Asia (which India seeks in order to develop new markets) and as a new military flank against Pakistan. In the realm of domestic politics, too, India has strong reasons for wanting improved relations with Iran. As India witnesses a surge in Hindu nationalist politics and sentiment, it needs to signal to its increasingly marginalized and disaffected Muslim population (the second largest in the world) that it has Muslim interests in mind.

The most important milestone in the development of Indo-Iranian ties came this past January, when Iran's President Mohammad Khatami visited New Delhi as the chief guest for the Indian Republic Day parade—an honor reserved for the closest friends of India. During the visit Khatami and India's Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee signed an accord that focuses on economic, scientific, and technological ties between the two countries and that also provides a framework within which to explore a defense relationship. This new relationship began to take shape in March, in a small-scale naval exercise that Indian diplomats refer to as a "port call." Meanwhile, Iran seeks to buy arms and spare parts from India, which is steadily acquiring the capacity to manufacture a wide array of Russian military hardware, and India sees Iran as a major buyer that could help to defray the costs of this manufacturing program. —C. CHRISTINE FAIR

ANTI-SATELLITE ATTACK

Within the next five years not only Russia and China but also Pakistan, North Korea, and even Iran may acquire the ability to carry out a nuclear attack against satellites. Launching such an attack would be much simpler technically than launching a nuclear attack against a distant city; only a primitive nuclear

program and basic missile technology are required. And as the importance of satellites grows, so will the destructive potential of such an attack, adding a significant new dimension to the politics of preventing nuclear war.

An anti-satellite attack could be mounted in a variety of ways, but a high-altitude nuclear detonation would create by far the most extensive effects. It would destroy satellites near the detonation point, of course; but, more significant, it would also expand and intensify the power of the Van Allen radiation belts, clouds of high-energy particles that encircle Earth. Satellites passing through the region after a nuclear attack—among them hundreds of low-orbiting communications, weather, imaging, and scientific satellites, including the International Space Station and the Hubble space telescope—would be subjected to greatly increased levels of radiation, against which civil and commercial systems are not protected. (The satellites of the Global Positioning System are not nuclear-hardened either—but they operate in higher, less vulnerable orbits.) Such radiation would progressively degrade the satellites' solar panels and onboard electronic systems, and within months, or even weeks, after a nuclear explosion every satellite orbiting at the affected altitudes—aside from a few military systems that are protected against nuclear attack—could be disabled. It would take many months for the excess radiation trapped in the Van Allen belts to dissipate.

A nuclear anti-satellite attack would do the most harm to the United States, which owns most of the more than 250 satellites that might be affected, and which depends more than any other country on space systems. Such an attack would substantially damage the U.S. and world economies (replacing the ruined satellites could cost tens of billions of dollars, in addition to the costs of losing their services) and would seriously inconvenience the U.S. military, which relies heavily on civil and commercial satellites for functions such as communications and weather forecasting. Although no nation is likely to attack satellites as a short-term military strategy (the full effects would take too

long to accumulate), someone might well consider using the tactic as a deterrent, as a coercive threat, or to strike a painful blow against the United States and its allies without the difficulties or obvious risks of attacking a target on American soil. —KARL P. MUELLER & ELYNN D. HARRIS

DEFENSE-INDUSTRY GOLIATHS

In recent decades so many U.S. defense contractors have merged or been taken over that a few giant companies now dominate the industry. Initially companies chose to combine forces, to cope with the increasing complexity of new technologies and weapons systems; but the trend intensified significantly after the end of the Cold War, when Washington curtailed defense procurement and formally endorsed consolidation as a way to cut costs. The Pentagon today deals with a dramatically limited number of firms to research and develop new systems for defense, and it is almost certainly not giving those firms enough work to sustain their teams of engineers and managers. The consolidation of the defense industry has been so drastic, in fact, that the U.S. military—which must now be able not only to prevail in battle but also to do so quickly and with minimum loss of life—could see its vast technological superiority erode.

Virtually all major classes of defense equipment, including surface ships, armored vehicles, and helicopters, are threatened by consolidation. But nowhere is the threat more apparent than in the case of tactical aircraft systems. In the 1950s at least eleven firms had the engineering know-how and experience to design military aircraft for the Navy and the Air Force. More than forty different designs reached the flight-test stage during that decade—an average of roughly four per company. Keen intercompany competition provided the military with a rich menu of choices and the defense industry with a wealth of design and engineering experience. Today only three American companies—Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman—are capable of leading the design of a manned military

GLOBAL INSECURITY

Conflicts and international terrorism worldwide

CONFLICTS & INSURGENCIES*

Active conflict
Cease-fire but no peace treaty

ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM**

From September 12, 2001, to March 31, 2002 limited to countries with five or more incidents or deaths


■ # of incidents
● # of fatalities

*Conflicts are defined as armed and international involving two or more governments. Insurgencies are defined as armed and internal between government forces and organized groups that control sufficient territory to sustain concerted military operations. In some cases, active conflict may be restricted to small regions of the countries highlighted.

**Defined as attacks in which terrorists target a foreign interest within their immediate area of operations or enter another country to conduct an attack. These numbers do not account for insurgencies or domestic attacks. Independently administered territories and areas under serious contention (Kashmir, Israel Occupied Territories) are considered separate countries.

THE LATIN CONNECTION


In recent years South America has played host to a surprising number and variety of international terrorist groups. Al Qaeda and Hizbollah have used the border region between Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina as an operational or financial center, and the Colombian group FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) has allegedly received training from the Irish Republican Army.



aircraft, and major contracts for which they can compete will emerge only once every other decade or so. For perhaps the first time the U.S. military is relying on only one prime contractor to design and build its new tactical fighters: Lockheed Martin, an amalgamation of more than a dozen former major aerospace companies, is developing the F-22 and the F-35. If either program runs into trouble (and few programs of comparable ambition and complexity escape it), the Pentagon's fallback options will be scarce. —MICHAEL RICH, JOHN BIRKLER, & MARK LORELL

THE CARRIER SHORTAGE

As the recent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated, the United States relies more than ever on aircraft carriers to meet its military and foreign-policy objectives. The advantages of aircraft carriers are obvious: they can quickly move large air forces and their support to distant theaters of war; they can respond rapidly with tremendous firepower to changing tactical situations; they can support several missions at once, with a great number of flights per day; and deploying them in international waters requires no negotia-



SOURCES: INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, RAND AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, AND DOROTHY CHEN

tions with other nations. But the United States has no plans to expand its fleet of aircraft carriers, which numbers twelve, four of them dating back to the 1960s. (Current plans call for one carrier to be replaced about every four or five years during the coming several decades.) And even if the U.S. government decided tomorrow to add three carriers to the fleet, as the Navy has argued it should, more than a decade would pass before they would all be in service.

The United States has by far the largest fleet of aircraft carriers in the world; the United Kingdom operates

three carriers, and Brazil, France, India, Italy, Russia, Spain, and Thailand each operate one. But the numbers are somewhat misleading, because a carrier spends less than a third of its life in actual deployment; crew training, maintenance, and overhaul take up the rest. During the recent Iraq war only eight of the twelve U.S. carriers were deployable; five played important roles in the conflict, leaving only three available for action elsewhere. Simply keeping even those eight carriers deployable required that maintenance and crew-rotation plans be deferred—something

that can't be done indefinitely. If a nuclear standoff with North Korea had escalated to war, or if Israel, Japan, or Taiwan had required U.S. military assistance, or even if the United States had simply needed to project power into the Indian Ocean or the Philippine Sea, taking adequate action would have been difficult.

Can the United States afford a fifteen-carrier fleet? The price would be impressive: each carrier would cost around \$6 billion to build; operation and support for each one could be expected to cost several hundred million

dollars a year. But considering the international military and security challenges that the United States is likely to face in the years and decades ahead, twelve carriers may simply not be enough. —JOHN BIRKLER & JOHN SCHANK

THE INDUS WATER FIGHT

India and Pakistan have a long history of conflict: they have fought three limited territorial wars (in 1947, 1965, and 1999); a larger war (in 1971); and a protracted proxy war (since 1989) over the disputed Kashmir region. Now they are embroiled in a high-stakes dispute over water, an issue on which they had managed to cooperate for years. If it is not resolved, it could become a serious new source of conflict.

The dispute has its roots in the 1947 partition that split Pakistan from India. Pakistan received most of the western Punjab region, which was irrigated by canals that used water from the Indus River system. (The Indus River originates in western Tibet, flows through China and the Indian-held portion of Kashmir, and then turns south into Pakistan.) At the time of partition Sikh and Hindu farmers living in predominantly Muslim areas fled to the Indian-controlled eastern Punjab, which was relatively dry and had few canals; to address their water needs India began, in 1950, to build a canal system that diverted some of the flow from Pakistan. Eventually the World Bank and the United States brokered the Indus Water Treaty of 1960, which stipulated that India would control the eastern rivers of the Indus River system, with the remaining waters going to Pakistan. Both sides were satisfied with the treaty, possibly because it required little interaction, but it has come under increasing strain. Aquifers are being depleted, water tables are falling, waterways are severely polluted, and soils are becoming acutely saline from the overuse of underground water supplies. Yet both countries must not only maintain a supply of food and potable water for their populations but also develop the hydroelectric potential of the river system that runs through the borderlands.

In December of 2001, following the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament

(which precipitated an extensive Indian military buildup along the Pakistani border), India openly raised the possibility of revoking the treaty, as part of a strategy of coercive diplomacy with Pakistan. The Indian Cabinet Committee on Security identified the cutting of a major water supply as a threat to use against Pakistan. For its part, Pakistan began to argue that India had already effectively suspended the treaty that same month, when the Indian commissioner for the treaty severed all contact with his Pakistani counterpart and canceled a visit by Pakistani engineers.

Allowed to fester, the dispute over the Indus Water Treaty could fundamentally transform the Kashmir conflict, already one of the major threats to regional stability. Pakistani militants now operate in Kashmir; India has taken aggressive action against them; and demands are growing within India for a war against Pakistan to stop the proxy war. The Indus dispute may end up being the crisis that finally makes that pressure too much to contain. —C. CHRISTINE FAIR

URBAN WARFARE

Future adversaries of the United States will not want to fight battles on open terrain, where their forces and equipment will be relatively easy for American forces to find and destroy. The world's population is increasingly migrating toward ever larger cities, and finding and fighting a determined enemy in these new urban environments—characterized by dense civilian populations, complex indoor spaces, “canyons” between buildings, and subterranean mazes of sewers and other infrastructure—will be very difficult. Urban warfare is not new, of course; often it has been the hinge point of a conflict (consider Stalingrad in World War II and Mogadishu in 1993). It has always been challenging and costly. Yet we will certainly be seeing more of it.

Defense planners are now addressing this challenge, researching and developing new technologies, systems, and concepts that will render the urban battlefield as transparent as possible. One example is micro-air vehicles. Six inches wide or less, these could be carried in a soldier's backpack and

would provide real-time video information about a situation by flying over it or “perching and staring” at it; the vehicles would be controlled by hand-held devices that would also receive and display the images being sent back. Researchers are also working on inexpensive micro-robot scouts that could one day carry visual, auditory, chemical, and other sensors from building to building.

Another possibility is “smart dust”—tiny, cheap electromechanical sensors that could be spread through an enemy area to collect raw data on motion, sound, heat, and magnetic fields. Such devices would use lasers, micro-mirrors, and other methods to feed a hand-held device that soldiers could consult to monitor the battlefield from afar. Under consideration, too, are robotic insects that could use flapping-wing flight to carry similar sensors into, or even collect samples from, hostile areas both indoors and out. Researchers are also looking into how information might be collected from real-life insect populations and used to map threats from chemical and biological agents. Bees, whose bodies collect airborne bacterial spores during flight, naturally search wide areas and can be examined for dangerous spores on return to their hive. Indigenous insects can also be lured and trapped to identify local environmental pathogens.

Successfully developing such systems will take years or even decades, but many have already been shown to be feasible. —EUGENE C. GRITTON & PHILIP S. ANTON

The authors are all employed by the RAND Corporation. PHILIP S. ANTON is a senior information scientist. JOHN BIRKLER is a senior policy analyst. JULIE DAVANZO is the director of the Population Matters project. C. CHRISTINE FAIR is an associate political scientist. CLIFFORD GRAMMICH is a member of the Research Communications Group. EUGENE C. GRITTON is the director of the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center at RAND's National Defense Research Institute. ELWYN D. HARRIS is a senior policy researcher. BRUCE HOFFMAN is the director of the Washington, D.C., office. ROLLIE LAL is an associate political scientist. MARK LORELL is a senior political scientist. KARL P. MUELLER is an associate political scientist. KEVIN A. O'BRIEN is a senior policy analyst with RAND Europe. OLGA OLIVER is an associate political scientist. MICHAEL RICH is the executive vice-president. JOHN SCHANK is a senior operations research analyst.

September 16, 2003

TO: Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)
CC: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Personnel for Iraq

Each of you periodically tells me that the State Department has 300 people ready to go to Baghdad. I keep asking my people and Jerry Bremer what the facts are.

Attached is a memo from Jerry Bremer's person in Washington, DC, Reuben Jeffery, III, that comments on the question you two keep asking. Here it is.

Iraq

Attach.

9/12/03 Jeffery memo to SecDef re: Department of State Personnel for Iraq

DHR:dh
091603-9

16 Sep 03

W01068 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/21281

✓
9/16

September 12, 2003

TO: Secretary of Defense

FROM: Reuben Jeffery, III *FC Smith for*

CC: Deputy Secretary of Defense
Ambassador Bremer
Ambassador Kennedy
Larry DiRita

SUBJECT: Department of State Personnel for Iraq

Secretary Powell and other senior State officials continue to refer to the nearly 300 personnel ready to go to Iraq. They further imply there is a problem with DoD/CPA.

The facts of the situation are:

In early July, State canvassed all its personnel asking who would be interested in serving in Iraq for a temporary assignment. Today, State has a list of 282 candidates for assignments in Iraq. Included on State's list are 47 of its personnel currently serving in Iraq with another 22 in the pipeline, leaving an additional 213 prospects. Many of the prospects do not have the language or technical skills required by CPA. Moreover, the recruitment process is complicated by CPA's expanding requirements.

The personnel requirements for the Governance Teams are constantly evolving. CPA's most recent list identifies approximately 45 vacancies for people to serve on the Governance Teams, positions best filled by State personnel. We are working closely with State to specify the requirements, identify the appropriate candidates, and complete the processing once identified.

Important follow up actions:

- Defense (Fred Smith) is working closely with State (NEA, Kathleen Austin-Ferguson) on this issue. A meeting will take place with State Monday, September 15 to evaluate open positions against the prospects available at State.
- Weekly interagency meetings will be conducted to review personnel requirements and coordinate recruitment and processing.

11-L-0559/OSD/21282

- The personnel function within CPA is being improved and expanded. We are working to establish a fully staffed personnel office in Baghdad.
- We are implementing new computer systems to provide timely, accurate and complete information on CPA personnel requirements.
- Jerry Jones has been directed to work with CPA to identify, evaluate, and recommend individuals to fill personnel vacancies.
- We will provide you weekly updates on the personnel situation in Baghdad.

There has been an ongoing dialogue with State. To date, a number of key functions and roles have been filled with resources from State. We have a pipeline of new State personnel en route to Iraq today. Our contacts at State understand the complexities of the personnel issues involved in building the team in Iraq. We are all committed to making sure that CPA is fully manned with personnel required for the success of our efforts in Iraq.

September 17, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Michael Barone Article

Attached is an article from *U.S. News & World Report* that hits the subject of Iraq correctly.

Respectfully,

Attach.

Barone, Michael. "Iraq in Historical Perspective," *U.S. News & World Report*, September 22, 2003.

DHR:dh
091703-16

1212

17 SEP 03

W01078-03

11-L-0559/OSD/21284

For: Sec Def C 9/16
From: Peter Rodman
Excellent ✓
article. 9/17

US News and World Report

Nation & World 9/22/03

By Michael Barone

Iraq in historical perspective

Two tragic bombings in Baghdad and Najaf last month and the continuing attacks on American soldiers in some parts of Iraq have led many to call for more troops in Iraq or for Americans to withdraw. Cries are heard that we are in a Vietnam-like quagmire. Those inclined to make straight-line extrapolations from the events of a few news cycles should read some history. Margaret MacMillan's Paris 1919 shows how the Allied leaders who gathered at the peace conference in Paris were largely clueless about how to reconstruct the defeated nations after World War I. Jean Edward Smith's biography of Gen. Lucius Clay reveals that the first time he read the government's plans for post-World War II Germany was on the flight over there to take charge. William Manchester's American Caesar shows that Douglas MacArthur, however knowledgeable about the Far East, did not have clear ideas on how to rule postwar Japan. Clay and MacArthur improvised, learned from experience, made mistakes, and corrected them, adjusted to circumstances. It took time: West Germany did not have federal elections until 1949, four years after surrender; the peace treaty with Japan was not signed until 1951.

Today's media have a zero-defect standard: the Bush administration should have anticipated every eventuality and made detailed plans for every contingency. This is silly. A good second-grade teacher arrives in class with a lesson plan but adapts and adjusts to pupils' responses and the classroom atmosphere. A good occupying power does the same thing.

Good news. The media also have the wrong standard for what is news. It is news when there is a fatal accident at Disneyland and not news when there is not. But Iraq is not Disneyland. In a country that is occupied after decades of a brutal dictatorship, good news is news. Yet with only a few exceptions--see Michael Gordon's story in the New York Times on the 101st Airborne in northern Iraq--the good news is not being told. More than 6,000 Iraqi civil affairs units--local governments--have been set up. Hospitals have been reopened. A court system has been set up. Mistakes, inevitable in a chaotic world, are being corrected: A Baathist leader put in charge in Najaf was soon removed.

Reports from soldiers on the ground, circulating widely on the Internet but seldom if ever appearing in old media, indicate that the large majority of Iraqis are friendly and helpful and glad that American troops are there. Those may be anecdotes; data come from a poll conducted in August by American Enterprise in four major cities, including one in the so-called Sunni triangle. No one should dwell on the precise percentages, which are

subject to error, but by wide margins the results show that Iraqis are optimistic about the future and unfavorably disposed to Osama bin Laden, the Iranian mullahs, and, especially, the Baathist remnants. We cannot be sure exactly how Iraqis' minds are changing. But the evidence suggests they are receptive to representative democracy and hostile to Palestinians and other Arabs who supported their oppressor.

Nor do the two bombings of August prove we need many more U.S. or foreign troops. Terrorist bombings are not statistical events that can be prevented by statistically proportionate responses. That was the mistake of Lyndon Johnson and his military advisers who believed that some larger number of U.S. troops--no one was sure how many--would defeat the Communists in Vietnam. The plan must be to turn over the task of preventing criminal and terrorist violence to the Iraqis, and that is what the Pentagon and other agencies planned for in the months leading up to the war.

The plans have been adapted in response to events and circumstances, as they should be, and things are proceeding much more rapidly than they did in Germany or Japan: A new currency will be introduced October 1; the governing council has been appointed and is setting in motion a constitutional convention; and a civil defense corps of 15,000 Iraqi recruits should be in place by December. Put in historic perspective, the good things that are happening in Iraq are impressive, even if old media think they are no more newsworthy than an accident-free day at Disneyland.

Copyright

September 17, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush

CC: Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Ambassador Bremer

11/10

Mr. President—

Ambassador Bremer is scheduled to come back from Iraq this weekend and be available for hearings on the Hill next week. We will see if we can have him available to the media.

Respectfully,

DHR:dh
091703-22

17 SEP 03

W01079-03

11-L-0559/OSD/21287

September 22, 2003

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Government Shutdown

Andy—

Can the Office of Personnel Management announce a shutdown of the government without talking to DoD about our situation, Homeland Security about theirs, and others that have critical functions to perform?

Possibly we should review the procedures, given our new security environment.

Please let me know what you think.

DHR:dh
091803-1

2001

22 Sep 03

W01083 /03

September 22, 2003

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: NSTAC

Andy—

I understand the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) has been transferred from DoD to the Department of Homeland Security. I also understand it is being handled there below the Assistant Secretary level and, further, that uniformed military participation has been ended.

334

Looking at it from the DoD standpoint, it seems to us that either it needs to be reenergized and DoD participate, or else DoD ought to form a technical entity of its own as a substitute for the one that was removed from DoD.

I don't know what the logic was when those steps were taken. We were not consulted, and I am not an expert on the subject. I wonder if you could take a look at it, and see if you can find out what the logic was and how you think we might want to proceed from here.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092003-23

2258043

W01085 /03

September 24, 2003

Frage

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
CC: Honorable Colin Powell (BY HAND)
Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
Dr. Condoleezza Rice
Honorable George Tenet
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: CPA Update

Attached is a CPA update.

Attach.
9/22/03 McManaway memo to SecDef re: CPA Update

DHR:dh
092203-43

24 Sep 03

11-L-0559/OSD/21290 *W01103-03*

22 Sept 2003

C 9/22
9/22

MEMORANDUM

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld
FR: Clay McManaway <signed>
RE: CPA Update

GC Security

- General Sanchez, Jeremy Greenstock and I met yesterday in a previously scheduled meeting with the GC Joint Security Committee.
- We took advantage of the apparent increased receptivity to urge needed and previously proposed improvements in the GC structure for security of members. We also informed the committee of the status of a number of measures including additional PSD training and improved entrance procedures into the GC. We agreed to form a joint subcommittee of the GC, Ministry of Interior, and Coalition representatives to assess GC security and take appropriate action.
- I emphasized that militias will not be tolerated. The focus must be on developing Iraq's new security institutions: the Iraqi army, Iraqi police, and the ICDC. GC members reiterated their willingness to submit proposals for integrating these forces into Iraq's security institutions.
- GC members expressed great concern regarding incitement of violence by Arab satellite stations. We welcomed an initiative by the GC on this matter.
- Mrs. Hashimi remains in stable, but serious condition.

Today's attack at the UN

- CPA Police Advisor visited the scene and suspects a suicide bomber. As far as we know, two Iraqis were killed and eight were injured. FBI technical personal are supporting and Iraqi-led investigation.

11-L-0559/OSD/21291

September 24, 2003

350.0001 WH

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DL
SUBJECT: POTUS UN Talking Points

I don't see the President's talking points for the UN bilaterals, but I sure hope in every one of them he is talking to them about money and troops for Iraq and assistance to Afghanistan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
092203-37

24 Sep 03

W01104 /03

September 24, 2003

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
CC: Honorable Colin Powell (BY HAND)
Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
Dr. Condoleezza Rice
Honorable George Tenet
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: CPA Update

Iraq

Attached is a CPA update.

Attach.
9/22/03 McManaway memo to SecDef re: CPA Update

DHR:dh
092203-43

245903

W01105-03

11-L-0559/OSD/21293

22 Sept 2003

C 9/22
✓
9/22

MEMORANDUM

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld
FR: Clay McManaway <signed>
RE: CPA Update

GC Security

- General Sanchez, Jeremy Greenstock and I met yesterday in a previously scheduled meeting with the GC Joint Security Committee.
- We took advantage of the apparent increased receptivity to urge needed and previously proposed improvements in the GC structure for security of members. We also informed the committee of the status of a number of measures including additional PSD training and improved entrance procedures into the GC. We agreed to form a joint subcommittee of the GC, Ministry of Interior, and Coalition representatives to assess GC security and take appropriate action.
- I emphasized that militias will not be tolerated. The focus must be on developing Iraq's new security institutions: the Iraqi army, Iraqi police, and the ICDC. GC members reiterated their willingness to submit proposals for integrating these forces into Iraq's security institutions.
- GC members expressed great concern regarding incitement of violence by Arab satellite stations. We welcomed an initiative by the GC on this matter.
- Mrs. Hashimi remains in stable, but serious condition.

Today's attack at the UN

- CPA Police Advisor visited the scene and suspects a suicide bomber. As far as we know, two Iraqis were killed and eight were injured. FBI technical personal are supporting and Iraqi-led investigation.

September 29, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Iraq

Attached is an interesting article that says a great deal about what we are dealing with in Iraq.

Attach.
Leo, John. "Atrocities Trade-off."

DHR:dh
092903-4

W01135-03

11-L-0559/OSD/21295

JOHN LEO

John Burns, the great New York Times reporter, offers us a brutally blunt assessment of how badly Western correspondents covered Saddam Hussein's regime. His report, excerpted by the Wall Street Journal and Editor & Publisher, is spreading rapidly on the Internet and is bound to have an impact on the public's already low respect for most journalists.

The compulsively candid Mr. Burns, until recently the New York Times bureau chief in Iraq, wrote his comments for the new book "Embedded: The Media at War in Iraq" (The Lyons Press), a collection of first-person accounts by journalists in Iraq.

Mr. Burns, who has covered China, the Soviet Union, Afghanistan and Bosnia, says the terror of Saddam Hussein's Iraq was unmatched anywhere in the world, except perhaps by North Korea today. Iraq was a vast slaughterhouse, he says, but most Western reporters worked hard to keep the news from getting out because they were afraid of losing access or getting expelled from Iraq. The monstrous savagery of life under Saddam — the vast tortures and up to a million dead — was "the essential truth that was untold by the vast majority of correspondents," he writes.

Burns laid some of this out earlier in the Times — the bribes and gifts from journalists to Saddam's henchmen, with reporters turning over copies of their stories to show how friendly they were to the regime. "A rigorous system for controlling and monitoring Western journalists has been in place in Iraq for decades, based on a water-tight facade of civility," he wrote in the Times last April 20.

In his "Embedded" article, Mr. Burns is more caustic about the payoffs by journalists. He says big shots at the Information

BAGHDAD SPRAWL



Atrocities trade-off

Ministry took hundreds of thousands of dollars in bribes from TV reporters, "who then behaved as if they were in Belgium." Will these unnamed TV reporters be called to account?

As an example of evasive non-coverage, Mr. Burns cites the reluctance of most reporters to say anything about Abu Ghraib Prison, the heart of Saddam's reign of terror. Mr. Burns says he couldn't find a single colleague in journalism who had read the human-rights reports about butchery at the prison. Last October, when President Bush's pressure caused Saddam to announce a limited amnesty at Abu Ghraib, the BBC didn't think it was worth sending anyone to the prison. Mr. Burns writes: "You had the BBC thinking it was inappropriate to go there because it means that it causes trouble." Of the reporters who did go to the prison, he says, "Ninety-eight percent of them had never heard of Abu Ghraib. Had no idea what it was."

After the amnesty turned into a mob scene and a near-riot and unofficial jail break, some groups marched to the Intelligence Ministry. Mr. Burns says this was a phenomenal story, an actual protest in a terrorized land, but "some of my colleagues chose not to cover that." No use reporting real news if it's going to cause any inconvenience.

"There is corruption in our business," Mr. Burns writes. "In the run-up to this war, to my mind, there was a gross abdication of responsibility." The usual rationalization by wayward correspondents is that Saddam's horrors couldn't be reported without jeopardizing the lives of sources and reporters. CNN's chief news executive, Eason Jordan, offered that lame excuse in a notorious New York Times Op-Ed piece on April 11. It was a devil's handshake: CNN got to stay in Iraq; Saddam Hussein got good press.

Mr. Eason said he knew all about the beatings and electroshock torture. One woman who

talked to CNN was beaten daily for months in front of her father, then torn limb from limb. Her body parts were left in a bag on her family's doorstep. But CNN's viewers hadn't been told.

Mr. Burns has no patience with excuses like Mr. Eason's. He is a reporter who was jailed for six days for his reporting in China and who risked being killed by Saddam's regime in its dying days. At one point, he wondered whether he would wind up in Abu Ghraib himself.

He says of Iraq: "We now know that this place was a lot more terrible than even people like me had thought. They [reporters] rationalized it away."

Though President Bush chose to make weapons of mass destruction his principal argument against Saddam, Mr. Burns writes, "This war could have been justified any time on the basis of human rights alone. This was a grotesque charnel house, and also a genuine threat to us. We had the power to end it, and we did end it."

Even if as many as 5,000 Iraqis died in the war, Mr. Burns writes, that's fewer than would have died if Saddam's killing machine had gone on as usual during the six weeks of battle. The war should have been justified on this basis, he says, "but you'd never have known it by reading most of the coverage of the war by those correspondents."

Criticisms like this are often shrugged off as sour outbursts by conservatives who don't understand the press. What happens now that the outburst is coming from the best reporter to serve in Iraq?

John Leo is a contributing editor and columnist with U.S. News & World Report and is nationally syndicated.

September 29, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Colin Powell (BY HAND)
Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.
Dr. Condoleezza Rice
Honorable George Tenet

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Bremer's Seven Steps to Iraqi Sovereignty

1. Install an Iraqi Governing Council—accomplished July 3, 2003.
2. Iraqi Governing Council appoints a Preparatory Committee for an Iraqi Constitution—accomplished August 11, 2003. (Committee is expected to report September 30, 2003.)
3. Governing Council appoints a cabinet—accomplished September 2, 2003.
4. Preparatory Committee presents its recommendations for writing a new Constitution. Once the process is established, the Constitution will be written.
5. Iraqi Constitution is ratified by vote of the Iraqi people.
6. Democratic elections are held to elect new Iraqi national government.
7. Sovereignty is handed over to the Iraqi people by the CPA.

IRAC

DHR:dh
092203-32

W01139-03

11-L-0559/OSD/21297

298405

September 29, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Fear

Mr. President—

Attached is an “e-mail of the day” in Andrew Sullivan’s column. It is on the mark.

Attach.
9/12/03 Andrew Sullivan column

DHR:dh
092903-44

DR

29 Sept 2003

W01140-03

11-L-0559/OSD/21298

THE DAILY DISH

andrewsullivan.com

Friday, September 12, 2003

EMAIL OF THE DAY: "Why bother with Iraq? Why fight terrorism? Try this from Richard Hillary's classic WW2 autobiography written after months of surgery following being shot down.

In a train compartment on the way to Scotland Hillary asked Peter Pease, another young pilot, his reasons for fighting. 'Well, Richard,' he said, 'you've got me at last, haven't you?'

'I don't know if I can answer you to your satisfaction, but I'll try. I would say that I was fighting the war to rid the world of fear - of the fear of fear is perhaps what I mean. If the Germans win this war, nobody except little Hitlers will dare do anything... All courage will die out of the world - the courage to love, to create, to take risks, whether physical or intellectual or moral. Men will hesitate to carry out the promptings of their heart or brain because, having acted, they will live in fear that their action may be discovered and themselves cruelly punished. Thus all love, all spontaneity, will die out of the world. Emotion will have atrophied. Thought will have petrified. The oxygen breathed by the soul, so to speak, will vanish, and mankind will wither.' Peter Pease was killed in action.

Richard Hillary returned to the RAF and was killed in a plane crash during night training. He was 23."

|

October 1, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Videotaped Message for Troops

Mr. President—

It would be enormously well-received if you would be willing to videotape a message to the troops serving in Iraq.

If you agree with this idea, we will work with your communicators and Mike Gerson to come up with an appropriate script.

Respectfully,

DHR:dh
09/30/03-4

060204


1 Oct 03

11-L-0559/OSD/21300

W01147-03

3:45 PM

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: October 2, 2003

Dear Mr. President –

Attached is a column from *The Wall Street Journal* that I thought you might find interesting.

Respectfully.

DHR/azn
100203.49

Attach: *Wall Street Journal* 10/2/03, "Our War, Our Duty" by Kronman

Iraq

2 OCT 03

W01155 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/21301

Our War, Our Duty

Wall St. Journal
10/2/03

By Anthony T. Kronman

The Iraqi people will soon embark on an historic venture—the writing of a new constitution and the establishment of a democratic government based upon it. Two weeks ago, in Bahrain, I met with a group of Iraqis to discuss some of the challenges that lie ahead for them. The group included lawyers, judges, teachers, and civic leaders. Many had never traveled outside their country before and all, in one way or another, were victims of Saddam's regime.

We spoke about the difficulties the Iraqis face as they prepare to create a new constitutional regime. How will those participating in the drafting of the new constitution be selected? Should Iraq adopt a federal system and, if so, how will provincial and central powers be balanced? Can a state that guarantees the religious freedom of its citizens also embrace Islam as its "official" religion? How should the crimes of the past be addressed—through prosecution and punishment or amnesty and forgiveness?

I was impressed with the sophistication and seriousness of the Iraqis I met. But what impressed me most was a comment a young woman made to me during a coffee break. We were discussing the principle of the separation of powers. She said, "I know the separation of powers is a good thing, but to work it requires

habits of cooperation and compromise that we do not now possess. For more than 30 years, we have lived in a dictatorship. We have all had to look out for ourselves. We lack the political habits we will need for our new constitution to work. I do not doubt that the constitution will be a beautiful thing. But can it succeed before we learn the habits of self-government?"

She paused, and continued. "My worst fear," she said, "is that America will lose patience with us before we learn those habits. Will America say, 'The Iraqis are incapable of democracy and deserve whatever dictator they get'? Will America abandon us before we have learned to live with each other and our new constitution?"

Will we? The decision to go to war was perhaps mistaken. But we are now in Iraq, and, whatever one thinks about the wisdom of the decision to go to war, the question of whether we should remain is a different one.

In the common law, there is no duty to rescue a drowning man. But once one has undertaken a rescue, and gone beyond a certain point, the law imposes a duty to continue. America had no duty to come to the rescue of the Iraqi people. Others, perhaps, had as high a claim on our attention. The Iraqis are not the only suffering and oppressed people in the world. But we made our decision, and our rescue effort is now well beyond the point where a duty to continue arises.

In part, this is for practical reasons. To break off before the Iraqis have acquired the habits of self-government—and not just a new constitution on paper—would create greater risks of instability in the region and an even larger threat to our national security. But in part it is for moral reasons, too. We have assumed a responsibility for the fate of the Iraqis which we are no longer free to ignore, or to treat as something less serious than it is. We have assumed a historic responsibility and must meet it with the steadiness and patience it requires.

* * *

Let us not follow the counsel of the French, who urge a quick transfer of power and a speedy exit. Let us reject the logic of those domestic critics who say, *The war was wrong, therefore we must leave as soon as possible*. The rightness or wrongness of the war and of the foreign policy that inspired it are debatable issues. They will, quite properly, be at the center of the presidential campaign that is about to begin. But let the candidates of both parties agree that we must stay in Iraq until democracy is secure, on the ground and not just on paper—whatever the costs, and however long it takes.

This shouldn't be a partisan position. It makes practical sense. More importantly, it is now the only responsible thing to do.

Mr. Kronman is dean of the Yale Law School.

12:35 PM

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: October 2, 2003

SUBJECT: **Voices on Iraq**

I mentioned the positive remarks by those Congressmen who visited Iraq. You suggested that we make sure their comments get put out. I pointed out that *The Washington Post*, *The New York Times*, nor *The Washington Times* carried not one word about the returning Congressmen's positive comments.

As a result, we've started a newsletter, *Voices on Iraq*, where we are reporting on what others are saying and seeing.

Here is a copy.

Respectfully,

DHR/azn
100203.45

Attach: "Voices on Iraq" 10/1/03 Publication from DoD PA

Iraq

2 OCT 03



Voices on Iraq

October 1, 2003

Office of
Public Affairs

"I went to Iraq a couple of weeks ago to resolve for myself the recent contrast between gloomy news coverage and optimistic Pentagon reports of our progress. My trip left no doubt that the Pentagon's version is far closer to reality. Our news coverage disproportionately dwells on the deaths, mistakes and setbacks suffered by Coalition forces.

"Falsely bleak Iraq news circulating in the United States is a serious problem for Coalition forces because it discourages Iraqi cooperation, the key to our ultimate success or failure, a daily determinant of life or death for American soldiers.

"Finally, no better signal of our commitment to this effort could currently be provided than for Congress to quickly approve, with little dissent or dithering, the president's request for an additional \$87 billion for Iraq and Afghanistan. Of course no one wants to spend such a sum. But it is well worth it if it leads to a stable, secular representative government in Iraq, something that could immeasurably improve our future national security."

Rep. Jim Marshall
The Washington Post
October 1, 2003
[\(link to full text\)](#)

"...I believe that you will find strong support in the House to complete this mission and to do what has to be done to guarantee that those next generations of our children and grandchildren, great-grandchildren don't have to live with the fear of terrorism."

Rep. Don Young
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee
September 30, 2003

"...I had the good fortune to accompany Mr. Lewis and other members of the subcommittee on this trip (to Iraq). And I think we're doing -- doing some things very, very effectively. I would say to my colleagues, I came away convinced that we've got to have the reconstruction money, because that's going to help on security as well. I mean, when these people feel . . . that we're doing something to help them, it makes a big difference."

Rep. Norm Dicks
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee
September 30, 2003

11-L-0559/OSD/21304

"Gentlemen, one of the great frustrations, I suppose, for a lot of us is getting the truth out there. It's not a secret, but some of the information we're talking about here in this room, and those of us who were in Iraq got to see first-hand the reality, which is the glass is really more than half-full, not half-empty, and how the projects that are being undertaken there, whether they're border security projects or education or hospitals or trying to build a police force or a good military, they're not just ideas that are abstract. There are good forms of measurement that are being taken on a regular basis that show, if you charted them on a graph, these are real projects that are being successfully undertaken in partnership, walking hand in hand with the Iraqi people."

Rep. Henry Bonilla
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee
September 30, 2003

"As one who just came back with the delegation (from Iraq), I think the plan has worked remarkably well, frankly, given where we were five months ago and where the people of Iraq were five months ago and where they are today.

"And I have no doubt in my mind, as one member, that if we didn't take this stand in Afghanistan and Iraq, who knows where in the world we would be and who would be against us? So, I think this is the battleground now in Iraq for the war against terrorism."

Rep. George Nethercutt
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee
September 30, 2003

"And like many members of Congress, when I came back (from Iraq), I got on the horn this morning and called some of the parents and talked to them. And their children -- these are young people that (are) out there, in (a) hellishly hot environment -- their spirits are up. And they're doing a hell of a good job. And they know that their work there counts for something. They feel very strongly about it, and they're damn frustrated that the message isn't getting out.

"And it counts for something because this guy is gone. Yes, there's some question as to whether he's still living. And certainly whatever we've done there has sent a message to Syria. It's sent a message to the Iranian clerics. And I, for one, feel that it has opened up, I think, the possibility for some sort of road map to peace between the Palestinians and the state of Israel."

Rep. Rodney P. Frelinghuysen
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee
September 30, 2003

"A week ago, on Tuesday, as I was coming into the Capitol, I heard an ABC News report on the radio on Iraq. The news radio report said there was chaos in the streets, there was limited water, sporadic power -- the criminals ran the streets, and the Iraqis resented our presence. In my trip over the weekend I found that to be totally false. I found life going on pretty much as usual. There was traffic on the streets and marketplaces were open, the lights were on, there was water. Somebody was picking up the garbage. Hospitals were open, schools were open. I think our troops are doing a great job over there. I found the Iraqi people to be friendly."

Rep. Todd Tiahrt
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee
September 30, 2003

October 3, 2003

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Talking Points

Condi—

We need talking points on things like the David Kay presentation. I did not see it on television, and I haven't read his report. Is there some way the Administration is thinking about it?

We also need talking points on the Wilson matter. I don't know anything about it, but I get asked about it. Was his wife an operative or an analyst? I have seen it 15 different ways in the press, and I don't have the vaguest idea what is going on. Has someone sorted through that?

Thanks.


DHR:dh
100303-12

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30403

W01158-03

October 6, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: General Keane's Speech

Attached is Jack Keane's farewell address as Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. He was a soldier's soldier. It is well worth reading. He was a towering figure in the U.S. Army.

Respectfully,

Attach.
Gen. Keane's Speech

DHR:dh
100603-14

358.001

W01161-03

6 OCT 03

**Retirement Review In Honor of General John M. Keane,
Vice Chief of Staff, Army**

October 2, 2003

Good afternoon everyone. Let me start by just thanking everyone for being here. Terry and I are overwhelmed by so many of you who took the time to be here for us today as we stand our last formation. Our teammates, friends, and family are here and I can feel the warmth, the camaraderie, and the love.

Secretary Rumsfeld, thank you so much for honoring us today. Sir, I am humbled by the award and, more importantly, by your kind and generous words. We have always respected each other and we have always been straight with each other – and that is what a relationship is all about.

Sir, thank you for the insightful leadership you are providing the nation and the tough love you have brought to the Pentagon. And thank you for your support of our Army. The simple truth is that you have always respected and supported the Army and we appreciate your continued support and leadership.

GEN Schoomaker, Chief, my dear friend, thanks for hosting this ceremony and for your many kindnesses since your return. I am so proud that you are our Chief and I respect you so much for your decision to put your personal life on hold to come back to the Army you love so much. Your judgment and your leadership have already been felt throughout our Army. We are behind you 100% and we thank Cindy for letting us have you again.

The Honorable Les Brownlee – our Acting Secretary – thank you for your wise counsel and friendship. We have been like two peas in a pod and I believe that has truly helped our Army.

11-L-0559/OSD/21308

Secretary White and GEN Shinseki could not be here today, but I thank them for their leadership and support.

Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, thank you for your friendship, your help, and your enduring support of our Army.

Secretary Roche and former Secretaries Hoffman and West, thank you all for being here.

Our top military leaders, Dick Myers – our Chairman, Pete Pace – the Vice Chairman, who will join us later, and the Service Chiefs and Vice Chiefs. This is a great team and I have been privileged to work with them through the years.

Members of the Army and Secretary of Defense staffs – uniformed and civilian – what an honor to serve by your side here these last 4 years.

My fellow general officers, active and retired, to include 3 former Army Chiefs of Staff – Generals Vuono, Sullivan, Meyer, and 5 former Vice Chiefs.

Members of the Senior Executive Service, our Sergeant Major of the Army, Jack Tilley and other Sergeants Major – active and retired.

My dear friend, Walter Kaye who has given so much of himself to the Army. My ROTC summer camp bunkmate – Brian Keane. While no relation, we have been friends since 1964. My Fordham University school buddies and teammates from the *Pershing Rifles*... My school President, Father O'Hare, and his successor, Father McShane. My new friends in the private sector who are helping me transition to a new and exciting life.

My personal staff, led by my secretary, Barbara Lentini, who has provided selfless, quality service to the Army for 42 years.

Our great civilian workforce who are the unsung heroes in the Army. Our many dear friends from Ft. Bragg and Ft. Campbell. Fellow Soldiers. Thank you. Thank you for sharing this time and this place with us.

VCSA Remarks 2 OCT 03 (Pg 3 of 8)

Our family – the Keanes, Doyles, Roaches, and Comeys – who traveled from all across America to be here, thank you for sharing one more special moment with us.

My brother, who is a Vietnam veteran, served his country for 8 years and spent his last assignment with the 82nd Airborne Division and has since retired from a career in law enforcement.

Our Son, Dan who spent 25 years of his life with us and the Army. Who was in 4 high schools in 4 years. Who was torn by the loss of friends and companionship as we bounced around the Army. He has assured me that whatever pitfalls and challenges he may experience in his life, they are completely, and directly my responsibility.

He is now a computer graphics designer in the Air Force. We are so proud that he took an oath to serve his country and we are delighted – and thankful – that he loves it.

Terry Keane. I have hung out with her for over 40 years. She loves this Army and this life every bit as much as me. Terry wanted to go forward, as some of you know, and take on the next responsibility. That is so typical of her. We have made this journey together and none of this would have been possible without her love and support.

A special thanks to *Pershing's Own* and *The Old Guard*... Today would not be the same without you. You exemplify excellence and all that is good about our Army and you have never, ever let me down.

I stand before you today full of emotion, full of gratitude, and feeling so very blessed to have lived among heroes for 37 years and to have had so much love and passion for this Army and its life style. I have loved it day in and day out.

I am reluctant to tell you this, but I have never missed a day of work. I took leave, but I never called in sick. I always wanted to show up, to be with the team. It became my life and it helped define me as a person.

The family that I was born into lived a modest life, worked hard, went off to war when the nation needed them, and centered their life around family.

I lived a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural experience in New York City, which added richness to my life that I would treasure in the years to come.

My dad – a natural leader – never saw me become a Soldier, but as a former WW II Marine, he thought it was respectable that I wanted to be a paratrooper. My mom – a wonderful, kind person – was with us through the Army War College. And my Aunt Jo has been a surrogate mother for the past 20 years and has been every place we have been.

During high school, my friends helped me to decide to go on to college, and which one to go to. At Fordham University, the Jesuits do not just teach you the subject, they force you to think... and they teach you how to think while they provide you with a philosophical and ethical foundation for life. It was an intellectual toothache to be sure, but the *Jebbies* – as we affectionately call them – are wonderful men who were devoted to us, and they had a profound impact on my life.

It was The *Pershing Rifles* and Army ROTC at Fordham that got me interested in the Army as a possible career and I have maintained an association with many of them all these years.

Terry and I were married when I joined the Army and I stepped off into adult hood like so many young men – full of hope and full of anxiety. I did not know whether I could lead other men. While I had some success at Fordham, the real Army looked imposing to me. In an institution where leadership is at a premium, it is so pronounced, and the lack of it is all so obvious. So I was scared as well as excited.

We were at war and I wanted to go just like my family had. And I wanted to be with the best. So, I volunteered for the 82nd Airborne Division for my first assignment and then went off to war with the 101st. And I began a lifelong journey that would change me forever.

I quickly discovered that Soldiers do not care where their leaders come from, what their father does, where they went to school, or what kind of degree they have. The only thing Soldiers care about is; who is this leader? Are you competent... and do you care?

I had never met people like this before. Dedicated professionals, full of spirit, highly motivated with a burning desire to serve the country. They drew me in and I never wanted to leave them. And that is why I stayed a paratrooper and a Soldier throughout my adult life.

For me, it has always been about the Soldiers – being with them; being part of a team; shared experiences; incredible camaraderie; respect for each other; knowing we would be there for each other no matter what; walking into a room full of Soldiers who are strangers to you, but being completely comfortable because you know what they stand for; Being so proud to be one of the team.

Our Non Commissioned Officers are the true strength of our Army and they made me competent. And the many officers I have known – my peers, those I have followed, and some who have worked for me showed me how to lead, how to set the example, how to be demanding and establish high standards, and yet, be caring and compassionate.

We ask much of our Soldiers and they make many sacrifices each and every day. Our Soldiers do not want to die. But they are willing to and I have been in awe of that remarkable fact for every one of my 37 years in the military. They are willing to give up everything they care about in life. Everything: The opportunity to live a full life; the opportunity to be a parent and raise a family; the opportunity to have friends; the opportunity to love and to be loved.

They are willing to give up all of this, for what? They do it for one another and they do it for the simple sake of the duty. This is true honor. You cannot buy this type of devotion and we can never, ever take it for granted. And we never will.

This morning my family and I laid a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier – a place I believe is the most sacred piece of ground in America. I paid my respect for the last time in uniform to all those wonderful, precious Soldiers and civilians who we buried every single year that I have had the honor to serve. For me, it was always about them and their sacrifice will be with me forever.

We have a magnificent Army. Rebuilt after the Vietnam War, this Army helped to end the Cold War and, during the last 14 years, has deployed around the world to stop thugs from imposing their will on their people or on others.

America and its armed forces stand for what is right and good, and we are willing to take enormous risks to achieve it. Preventing people from being killed, freeing them from repression and horror, and permitting them to have a normal quality of life experience is something I have been so proud to be a part of.

I am equally proud to say the Army has never been more engaged with our teammates from the other Services and our leadership in the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense than it is today. Nobody understands better than the Army that we do not fight alone. We cannot even get to the fight – much less win it – unless we are part of the Joint team.

When one of our support units got in trouble during OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, it was a platoon of Marines that raced to their aid. The Army commander on the ground said he had barely finished speaking to the Marines before they took off on their hasty attack.

When our armor units were fighting through the fanatical resistance of Sadaam Fedayeen around Baghdad, it was Navy, Marine, and Air Force aircraft, who pounded enemy positions, exposing themselves to intense ground fire, flying so low and so close, their controllers talked to them about city blocks and intersections rather than grid squares. Our ground commanders that I met in Baghdad raved about the valor of American airmen.

Today, we are a nation at war – a nation forever changed by the attack of 9/11. For the first time in my career – and the first time since WWII – we have deployed our forces directly on behalf of the American people and our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines get it. They understand the war on terrorism is all about protecting the American people. As such, I have never seen such intensity and dogged determination to succeed.

Our troops have performed magnificently in two stunning victories in two years – two vastly different operations that demonstrate our armed forces remarkable capability. But we have more to do.

I want to tell you something about this war against terror we are fighting in Iraq and around the world. The foreign terrorists, the Baath Party sympathizers, the Islamic extremists who wantonly kill Americans and innocent people from many nations, have no idea what they are up against.

Their strategic objective is the political and moral will of the American people. They want to destroy our confidence. They think they know us because they have heard of Lebanon in '83, or Somalia in '94, or the USS Cole in 2000. They think we are morally weak and we will lose our resolve. But their knowledge is superficial and their understanding is shallow.

To understand America and Americans, they need to understand the Marne in 1918, or Tarawa in '43, Omaha Beach in '44 or the Chosin Reservoir in 1950. They need to understand that a nation that produces Alvin York and Audie Murphy; John Pershing and George Marshall; Chesty Puller and George Patton; Randy Shugart and Gary Gordon; produces heroes in every generation. They are out there now... performing every day.

Our enemies are cunning, but they are ignorant and their ignorance will be their undoing. They do not know our will, our courage, or our character.

When we say we are going to win this Global War on Terrorism we mean exactly that. We don't mean a moral victory, or victory in some abstract sense. The reality of more than 3,000 dead in New York, Pennsylvania, and in the Pentagon does not allow for such nuances.

When we say we are going to win this Global War on Terrorism, we mean we are going to destroy those who would destroy us – wherever they are in this world. We mean we are going to go wherever we have to and stay as long as we need to.

This fight will test our perseverance, our stamina, and our resolve, but I assure you, we will not be found wanting. We intend to protect America and our way of life. The people of this nation are counting on us – we will not let them down.

Saying good-bye to an organization that has defined your adult life is not easy. It is particularly difficult when that organization is fighting a war and there is much work left to do. But I have great hope for the future. I am comforted knowing that the values and ideals that I have tried to uphold are manifested in our Soldiers and leaders.

The Army will change and it will become even better. Pete Schoomaker, our leaders in the Department of Defense, and the Congress will see to it.

It has been a profound honor and a humbling experience to be a Soldier and to serve with Soldiers – to live a life among heroes and to help protect the American people and our way of life. I loved it and I will treasure it forever.

God bless each and every one of you. May God continue to care for the men and women of our Armed Forces and may God Bless this wonderful, wonderful nation, our beloved America. Thank you.

October 6, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
 Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)
 Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
 Dr. Condoleezza Rice
 Honorable George Tenet

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Iraqi Media Network Activities

Attached is an update on Iraqi media network activities, a subject everyone is intensely interested in.

Respectfully,

Attach.
 10/4/03 CPA memo to SecDef re: Update on Iraqi Media Network (IMN) Activities)

DHR:dh
 100603-36 (ts computer)

Iraq

6 OCT 03



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

DSJ004-22
10/6

October 4, 2003

FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: L. Paul Bremer III, Administrator
SUBJECT: Update on Iraqi Media Network (IMN) Activities

I wanted to advise you on a number of steps we have and will be taking to make IMN's TV programming more appealing to viewers, more professional in its approach, and more directly supportive of CPA objectives.

Among the recent developments:

- On Thursday, October 2, IMN began the first in a series of half-hour programs entitled, "Meet the Minister." Minister of Culture Mofeed al-Jazaeri discussed his goals in preserving the cultural history of Iraq and trying to revitalize Iraq's artistic and cultural communities after years of repression. Future segments will cover all 24 additional Iraqi ministries.
- This weekend, we send an initial contingent of 16 IMN employees for an intensive two-week training session at Dubai Media City on the art and craft of television production. Training will take place at state-of-the-art facilities in Dubai, with the active support of the government of Dubai.
- We are also currently hosting a multi-functional team of specialists from Dubai who are helping us select future trainees and assessing local conditions, so that all of the training our people receive in Dubai is tailored to our existing facilities and equipment.
- Also this weekend, we are having a first-ever gathering of IMN station managers from across the country. The purpose will be to explain our new programming strategy, and to discuss topics such as local program origination.
- Plans for a new programming schedule are on track. Special Ramadan programming will begin on or about October 26, when Ramadan begins, and, at the request of the Secretary of State, a virtually all-new lineup of programs will debut on November 23, when Ramadan ends. That accelerated "re-launch" of IMN will replace the one we'd originally been planning for January 1st.

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Copies have gone to:
- Dep Sec Def
- OSD (PI)
- ASD (PA)

11-L-0559/OSD/21317

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- In addition to new programming, the "new IMN" will feature an expanded program day; new-look, new concept newscasts; more and better public affairs programs; more and better public affairs announcements; new faces, and a whole new on-air "look-and-feel."
- As an integral part of that, IMN TV will also take on a new name -- "Al Iraqiya." It literally means "The Iraqi" -- as in "The Iraqi TV." The name was chosen deliberately to stake out the same ground as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya -- as a major regional TV broadcaster.
- The network will have a new logo, depicting two rivers -- the Tigris and Euphrates -- and a uniquely Iraqi Arabic font, in blue and steel gray. The logo and color scheme will infuse every aspect of promotion and advertising.
- We have engaged the J. Walter Thompson advertising agency for a publicity campaign aimed at generating excitement about the new programming. It will be timed to peak for the re-launch in late November.
- In addition, we've hired an Iraqi survey firm highly recommended by the State Department to conduct two highly-focused random sample audience surveys for us, the first over the next two weeks, before Ramadan and its new program schedule, and the second in December, after all of the foregoing has taken place. Our purpose is to determine if our improvement strategies have worked, and make more changes if they haven't.
- We have also commissioned propagation field studies designed to reveal the actual signal strength of IMN transmitters in the South, where powerful Iranian cross-border signals have been a concern. Armed with the results, we will know if we need to beef up our own transmission capabilities in that region.
- We plan a similar field strength survey of the entire country to ensure we are getting our signals out loud and clear nationwide.
- Later this month, my Director of Strategic Communications will be heading to Mosul and points north to ensure that IMN signals will be restored in the north, where Saddam Hussein's propaganda from Baghdad was not welcomed. He will be co-coordinating with the 101st Airborne, whose leadership has taken an active interest in TV and radio transmission.
- We believe the UK government is on the verge of allocating some \$20 million US in order to beef up program production and transmission in Basrah and expand sports programming nationwide targeted at young males -- a particularly critical audience segment.
- We are making progress on re-starting the Iraqi Satellite Channel, on the Arabsat direct-to-home satellite. Satellite distribution is what has made Al-Jazeera such a powerful and influential channel. It's important to understand, however, that going up on this satellite will mean substantial outlays of funds -- perhaps up to an additional \$20 million dollars

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per year – because the program rights we have purchased to this point are for terrestrial broadcast only. Those contracts will be adjusted upward if we reach the larger audiences tuning in on satellite.

- Eventually, however, we will have to be on satellite. Satellite dishes are constantly sprouting on Iraqi rooftops. We estimate that in 18 months time, Iraq - like most other Middle Eastern countries – will be a satellite TV market. We need to be ready well in advance.
- There are other challenges ahead: expanding news and public affairs programming in Baghdad, Mosul and Basrah, expanding programs and public service announcements on governance and civil society, and beginning the information campaign in advance of the constitution-writing and electoral process. We believe that exposing these advances to the larger Arab world will have a profound impact. Arabs watching other Arabs go to the polls will inevitably raise the question, “Why not here?”
- Finally, and significantly, we have announced on the Defense Contracting Command’s website our intention to re-compete the IMN contract currently held by SAIC. The objective is a “world class radio and television network” to be established by the end of calendar year 2004. The successful contractor must “include the assurance that indigenous Iraqi personnel are schooled, coached, practiced and proven in the principles and techniques of their craft” – and ensure “IMN leads all mass media in providing comprehensive, accurate, fair, and balanced news and public affairs to the Iraqi people.”

I will keep you advised of significant benchmarks.

Cc: Secretary Powell
Dr. Rice

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SERIAL BROADCAST REPORT

(TUE) OCT 7 2003 16:54
SITE 12 OSD

USER NAME :
TOTAL DST. : 2stations
PAGES : 5 sheets

DOCUMENT# : 6160427-572
TIME STORED : OCT 7 16:53
TIME SENT : OCT 7 16:53
DURATION : 16sec

FIN. : 2stations

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WASH FAX COVERSHEET
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CABLES

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TIME TRANSMITTED (LOCAL)

TIME RECEIVED (LOCAL)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **OFFICE/DESK:** SECDEF **PHONE NBR:** _____

SUBJECT: IRAQI MEDIA NETWORK ACTIVITIES **FAX NBR:** (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/21320

October 14, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Soldiers

000.7

Mr. President—

Attached is a story from the Army News Service that is well worth reading.

Respectfully,

Attach.

Jewell, Sp. Lorie, "Flag Flies from Iraq to Walter Reed Patient," *Army News Service*,
September 30, 2003.

DHR:dh
101403-38

14 Oct 03

W01201 /03



Flag flies from Iraq to Walter Reed patient

By *Spc. Lorie Jewell*

September 30, 2003

WASHINGTON (Army News Service, Sept. 30, 2003) – The physical wounds of the rocket propelled grenade attack that forced doctors to amputate both of Spc. Aaron Blakely's feet are healing. But, emotional injuries haunt his recovery.

He got an unexpected shot of relief last week, though, when the first Soldiers returned from Iraq for 15 days of rest and recuperation.

Many of the desert-battle-dress-clad Soldiers went straight into the arms of waiting loved ones; others hurried to catch connecting flights home. A few dozen others caught a shuttle bus to a nearby hotel, where the manager offered free showers. Still more filed into the USO for a free continental breakfast.

Spc. John Perkins, 30, was easy to spot with an American flag draped over his backpack. He was anxious to get home to Macon, Ga., to scoop up his 5- and 3-year-old daughters and spend time with his parents. Not far behind was Pfc. Brian McJunkin, 19, eager to get to Coker Creek, Tenn. He was excited about seeing his mom and dad, but was itchy for some hunting and fly-fishing.

Their R&R would wait. Both men survived the same attack that sent Blakely, 24, to Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington. They needed to see him, to see for themselves that he's OK.

They also wanted to deliver an American flag -- a get-well gift from the rest of the guys in the mortar platoon of Headquarters Company, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, based in Vicenza, Italy.

The pair met up with Spc. Larry Burns, a fellow 503rd infantryman. Burns, a member of Company C, offered them a lift to the hospital in a stretch limousine he rented as a special treat to himself.

During the hour-long trip, the trio shared experiences. Despite daily ambushes, the guys agree far more Iraqi citizens are grateful for U.S. presence than not. Not a day goes by without some Kirkuk resident inviting them into their home for a cup of Chai tea. Or a kid runs up, yanking a uniform sleeve, wanting to shake their hand.

McJunkin and Perkins told Burns about Blakely. Of all the guys in the mortar platoon, he was the last one they would imagine getting hurt. No one was more fastidious about safety than Blakely.

The attack came at 3 a.m. June 28, when most of the men were sleeping. The round tore through the glass door of the second-floor balcony seconds after Perkins walked by the sofa where Blakely slept. McJunkin was sleeping nearby. The RPG flew about a foot above his head before slamming into the sofa.

McJunkin still has chunks of shrapnel lodged in his neck, shoulder and hands. Perkins took some shrapnel in his right side.

When they arrived at the front desk of a recovery facility on the hospital grounds, the clerk wouldn't give them Blakely's room number. He did, however, call Blakely's room and let them talk to him.



Spc. John Perkins takes a picture of himself and Spc. Aaron Blakely and Spc. Larry Burns during a limo ride to the White House. Staff Sgt. Carmen Maldonado

Perkins disguised his voice when Blakely answered. He said he was a reporter and wanted an interview. Blakely gave him the room number.

The trio sped to the room. Blakely opened the door on his knees, a bewildered look on his face when Perkins and McJunkin popped out from behind an abutting door.

An expletive slipped as Blakely realized who these two grinning soldiers were. Perkins dropped to his knees, pulling Blakely into a bear hug while jabbering a confusing greeting.

The reunion was short, just long enough for the men to hand over the flag and a few other gifts they picked up at the airport.

McJunkin reached into his pocket and took out a plastic baggie. He had one more thing to give Blakely. He saved a piece of the RPG, which he offered to his friend.

Before the mood could turn morose, Perkins said they had to get going so he could catch his flight in less than two hours. First, though, they'd have the limo driver take them by the White House.

As Blakely strapped on his new legs, McJunkin watched his friend and remembered the ambulance ride they shared a few months ago. He held Blakely's hand, trying to comfort him. And when Blakely asked him for the truth about his legs, McJunkin gave it to him. Then, they prayed together.

The limo driver maneuvered as close as he could to the White House, some distance from where the guys wanted to be for a group picture. They walked it, Blakely using a cane to help keep his balance.

At the gate, other sightseers ogled the young men. The rumpled uniforms and scruffy boots were good clues they'd come straight from the desert. Many came over to thank them for their service. One older man asked to have his picture taken with them.

Back at the limo, they snapped a few more pictures. Perkins couldn't contain his enthusiasm.

"Heeeellllloo America!" he shouted, arms open wide. "I love you!" His outburst drew a spattering of honking horns from passing cars. The others laughed, shaking their heads as the group climb into the limo.

On the way back to the hospital, the guys started their good-byes. Blakely told them how much he misses everyone, and that he loves them.

"I don't know who got the better end of the deal," said Blakely. "Me, cause I'm back in the states for good, or you guys, cause you didn't get your legs blown off."

Perkins and McJunkin didn't answer; it was a rhetorical comment, anyway.

Before they parted, Blakely stepped away from his friends for a private moment. He tried to explain what their visit means to him, how much that flag means but he couldn't find just the right words.

"It's just so unbelievable," Blakely said. "My morale has been up and down. Right now, it's up. Way up."

(Editor's note: Spc. Lorie Jewell is a journalist with the 107th MPAD, Florida Army National Guard, on active duty supporting Operation Tribute to Freedom.)

October 14, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Andy Granatelli

Mr. President—

I was walking down the street recently, and Mr. and Mrs. Andy Granatelli stopped me. They expressed their strong support and respect for you and what you are doing for the country.

Attached is a background sheet on Andy Granatelli.

Respectfully,

Attach.
Bio on Andy Granatelli

DHR:dh
101403-33

335 SD

14 OCT 03

W01202-03



Andy Granatelli

(1929-)

It's hard to know where to start with Andy Granatelli. He combined business acumen and salesmanship to produce so many varied careers, some of which seem downright unbelievable, that each one would stand as a Horatio Alger epic in its own right.

In 1948, he passed his driver's test at Indy using his good friend Bill France, Sr.'s helmet. Soon thereafter, he was Vice Chairman of NASCAR. He was President of the "Hurricane Racing Association, Inc.'" and also promoted hot rod and stock car races throughout the Midwest with the biggest quarter mile crowds ever, 89,560 people at Soldiers' Field in Chicago. As Chief Driver and Engineer at Studebaker Racing, he set over 400 world land speed records. At the age of 62 in his street legal passenger car, he drove to an amazing record of 241.731 mph on pump gasoline. He took the immortal

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Novi racing engine and increased the horsepower from 450 to 837. He also designed the Chrysler 300 engine, the Cadillac Eldorado engine and the Studebaker Avanti, R I, II,III and IV engines. He was responsible for starting March Works, which is a Formula land II car constructor. He designed, built and raced the world famous Indianapolis turbine engine cars in 1967 and 1968, and his race cars have won the Indianapolis 500 twice. His business accomplishments are still buzzed about in financial circles. He took an unknown company called Chemical Compounds, changed it's name to STP, and in nine years it zoomed from seven to over 2,000 employees. He made STP a household word.

Granatelli went to Indianapolis with the Turbine car with Parnelli Jones as his driver. Jones led 197 laps of the 200-lap race until a gear bearing failed. Afterward, USAC banned the car.

In 1969, Granatelli teamed up with Mario Andretti to win his first Indianapolis 500. He won it again in 1973 with Gordon Johncock as his driver. Granatelli brought STP sponsorship to Petty Enterprises and Richard Petty, who of course, won immediately and often. That relationship, the STP-Petty union, one of the longest associations in all of motorsports.

Other great drivers that drove for Granatelli were Freddie Agabashian, Chris Amon, Buddy Baker, Neil Bonnett, Jim Clark, Wally Dallenbach, Larry Dixon, Pat Flaherty, Graham Hill, Jim Hurtibise, Steve Krisiloff, Nikki Lauda, Joe Leonard, Freddie Lorenzen, Art Malone, Jim Malloy, Jimmy McElreath, Ronnie Peterson, Art Pollard, Sam Posey, Jim and Dick Rathmann, Jochen Rindt, Paul Russo, Swede Savage, Joe Seiffer, Dick Simon, Mike Spence, Chuck Stevens, Al and Bobby Unser and Greg Weld.

A racer, a car owner, designer, businessman, promotional genius, an automotive expert, Granatelli proved to be all of these things. His face isn't seen at the tracks any more, but he is still a successful business entrepreneur in California. Really, though, one doesn't have to see to know him. Just look around. Soon you'll see the letters, "STP". And they will always call him "Mr. 500."

11-L-0559/OSD/21326

October 14, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Iraq

Mr. President—

Some weeks ago we decided to send to Iraq a number of the ex-military people, “talking heads,” who are on television frequently.

Since they have returned, they have been on television a great deal reporting on what they saw. Attached is an e-mail from one of them that I thought you might find of interest.

Respectfully,

Attach.
10/1/03 Cowan e-mail, “Brief Iraq Trip Report”

DHR:dh
101403-10

Iraq

14 OCT 03

W01203-03

11-L-0559/OSD/21327

From one of the military talking heads who went to Iraq. he's works for Fox. *high*

Baier, Bret

From: Bill Cowan (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, October 01, 2003 11:31 AM
To: New, Tara; Gandhi, Sapna; Krycinski, Paulina; Guzman, Paul; Skrzenski, Mike; Abernathy, Megan; Singerman, Matt; Sturgis, Lisa; Luhn, Laurie; Rosenberg, Kim; Bell-Simensky, Kim; McDorman, Major Ken; Dudonis, Ken; Fishel, Justin; Huber, John; Kirschner, Jodi; Henneberg, Molly; Balog, Flora; Primmer, Erin; Nagle, Erin; Spinato, Eric; Grannum, Donovan; Brandi, Dianne; Persaud, Deoram; Asman, David; Newdel, Cynthia; Heridge, Catherine; Baier, Bret; Burkholder, Amy; Alan Nathan
Subject: Brief Iraq Trip Report

All: NO RESPONSE NECESSARY OR EXPECTED. JUST PASSING ON MY OBSERVATIONS.

As a follow up to my fast-paced but productive trip to Iraq last week, I thought I'd pass on a few short observations. The trip was sponsored by the DoD in an effort to show some of us talking heads and editorial page scribes what is really going on. Although skeptical of what I might see and learn, I came back very optimistic about progress in some areas, and somewhat pessimistic about progress in others.

First, the good news. We traveled to Mosul (the 101st Airmobile), Tikrit (the 4th Infantry), and Hillah (the Polish-led multinational division). In the hinterland, we saw the military units working side-by-side with Iraqi counterparts, many of whom we met.

This is where the rubber hits the road. In Mosul, Major General Patraeus has spent somewhat over \$24 million on 3,200 projects with the locals. As he puts it, "money is ammunition." The day before we arrived, he and his Iraqi counterpart had been in Turkey negotiating an oil for electricity deal. A few days before that they had been in Syria negotiating the opening of a border crossing for trade. Patraeus is focused on empowering the locals through re-building the economy while providing security and setting the framework for government operations. He and his staff are constantly on the move with their Iraqi counterparts and tribal, religious, and business leaders. The Iraqis we met were grateful for what we've done, and hopeful for their future.

The same is true in Tikrit, where Major General Odierno is tackling the same issues, combined with being in the heartland of Saddam's home town. What was most striking about his operations is the steadily increasing number of locals coming forward with information about the bad guys. That alone is a demonstration of success. Some nights before our visit, his troops had conducted 32 simultaneous raids in the middle of the night against individual targets inside the city. The raids netted 19 of the key suspects on his target list, without any casualties on either side.

Bottom line for our forward deployed forces is that they are involved directly on a day-to-day basis with the Iraqi people. Their accomplishments are little noted, but this is where we will win or lose the war. Iraq might end up with the finest constitution ever conceived, but lacking the willing support of every day Iraqis, it may never accomplish anything. The front-line military units are building the support through tireless efforts at the grass roots level. Everywhere we flew, children would come running out of homes when they heard us to wave at the helicopters. That's NOT a small thing.

Now the bad news. From my perspective, the CPA is pretty distant from the rest of the

country. Worse yet, I get no sensing that Bremer or most of his key staff have any experience whatsoever in dealing with the basic issues which will lead to success. It's one thing to buy the gum for Iraqis, another thing to tell them how to chew it, and a third thing to chew it for them. The CPA is doing the latter. As long as the CPA maintains its stranglehold on what Iraq is up to and where it's going, everyday Iraqis will fail to understand that the country is really theirs. Even key military commanders bemoaned some of the decisions coming down from the CPA as being totally disconnected from the path to success. It's important to realize that most of the military commanders have substantial experience in nation building and peacekeeping, most particularly from Bosnia.

For some reason, the CPA has refused to become engaged with the tribal leadership of the primarily Sunni Al Anbar region, which encompasses almost 1/3 of the country, including the Sunni Triangle. No one from the Al Anbar is a member of the Governing Council, and their exclusion has left them disenfranchised (as noted by military and mid-level CPA personnel). Until they are brought in, it's reasonable to assume that the security situation in their area will remain fragile. Including them and ensuring them that they have some role in Iraq's future will in all likelihood alleviate some, but not all, of the problems there.

Finally, the \$87 billion request, developed in Baghdad and the Pentagon, could probably stand some serious scrutiny. As example, when the local Iraqis approached General Patraeus in Mosul and asked for his help in restarting a cement factory, he asked American contractors what it would take. Their answer was \$23 million and two years, far outside what he could afford. Instead, he gave the Iraqis "some tens of thousands of dollars", and they had it up and running in weeks. That factory is now a major employer, producing between one and two thousand tons of cement PER DAY! I'm a former Senate staffer who worked Appropriations issues. A little scrutiny is always the right thing to do.

Bottom line – Again, my trip was fast paced, so I didn't see and learn all I'd like to have.

But, I think we're winning and will continue to do so as long as the regional military commanders are empowered. It's their efforts with locals which will determine our long-term success. If I had a single recommendation which I thought might make an enormous difference, it would be that the CPA's roles and responsibilities be reviewed with the thought of the military leadership being established as an equal entity, not a subservient one. Too many CPA decisions are being made in the emerald palace with little thought or understanding of how they affect where the rubber hits the road.

I hope there's something here of value for you.

NO RESPONSE NECESSARY NOR EXPECTED. JUST PASSING ON MY OBSERVATIONS.

Resp'y,

Bill Cowan

October 14, 2003

TO: Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Interview

Attached is the *Wall Street Journal* article that caused such a flap. I can't see anything wrong with it. Indeed, I can't see why Nick would not have wanted him to give the interview.

Attach.
Gonzalez, "The Quiet American," *The Wall Street Journal*, September 25, 2003.

DHR:dh
101403-39

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14 OCT 03

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 **OpinionJournal**
from THE WALL STREET JOURNAL *Editorial Page*

[PRINT WINDOW](#) [CLOSE WINDOW](#)

ACROSS THE POND

The Quiet American

Meet the man who sold Europe on missile defense.

BY MICHAEL GONZALEZ

Thursday, September 25, 2003 12:01 a.m.

BRUSSELS--The Bush administration is often presented as arrogant and unilateralist, probably because successes are kept quiet. Much happens behind the scenes, however. Jacques Chirac's growing isolation in Europe has much to do with White House diplomacy, for example. The same with "star wars."

Remember missile defense? It was a grave threat to world peace and another sign that George W. Bush was a dangerous cowboy, right? Those were the European headlines two years ago. Today you hear not a peep about it. And yet, a first-generation shield may soon have to counter the threat posed by North Korea. Why has it ceased to be "news"?

One important reason is a relatively unknown senior U.S. official who set up camp in NATO's sprawling compound here two years ago. Ambassador Evan Galbraith may have flown under the radar, but he carried a heavy payload. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld sent him as his personal representative to Europe. His mission was to quietly wheel and deal to get missile defense off the front pages and into the planning stages.

That he's done so is important and valuable, to be sure, but not as much fun to tell as how he's done it. It was pretty much the same strategy he used to help convince Francois Mitterrand to throw his weight behind the deployment of intermediate-range missiles to protect Europe (yes, Mr. Galbraith had a hand in that too, as U.S. ambassador to Paris in the early 1980s). As Mr. Galbraith told me in a long-ranging interview at his office, he basically works with human nature, not against it.

"Mitterrand was a scoundrel, in many ways," remembers the still impish-looking Harvard and Yale man, who's also had stints as journalist, investment banker, a member of the board of "a bunch of French companies" and a CIA analyst. "He was trying to marginalize the Communists. And I thought that this might contribute to that."

This was getting the newly elected President Mitterrand to support the deployment in Europe of Pershing II and Tomahawk cruise missiles, a Western response to the Soviets' recently erected SS-20s. The Reagan administration was facing hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in the streets marching against standing up to the Russians. It was the first test of the entire '80s generation of leaders.

Mr. Galbraith had been introduced to Gov. Ronald Reagan by William F. Buckley. After ascending to

11-L-0559/OSD/21331

the presidency, Mr. Reagan remembered Van as the "only guy I know who speaks French," so he hired him as ambassador to Paris in 1981. He got to speak French often, with Mitterrand, as he made the U.S. case for getting the French president on board.

Mitterrand, rogue though he was, had foresight sorely lacking in Paris these days. On the 20th anniversary of the Franco-German treaty in 1983 he surprised the Bundestag--especially his socialist friends there--by saying that when he looked east he saw missiles, but when he looked west he only saw pacifists. The appeasement movement never recovered.

If selling the Pershings and Tomahawks was his job then, selling missile defense in his present incarnation is almost a vocation. "The reason I took this job is that I was always interested in missile defense."

Ambassador Galbraith starts out with the conviction that missile defense (using missiles to shoot down incoming missiles) is an "antiproliferation device." A system that is predictable "will be enough to dissuade people from going into the business" of making offensive weapons. "What's the use of going into the business if we can shoot them down?" he asks. "The maritime component will be designed to go wherever the threat is, and North Korea will be the first obvious object."

He knew Mr. Rumsfeld professionally and socially, and the two decided soon after the 2000 elections that the Brussels job was perfect for Mr. Galbraith. He had been on the board of the French defense contractor Lagardere and knew Europe from the inside.

Once appointed (his official title is representative for the secretary of defense in Europe), Mr. Galbraith "developed a strategy." It was to bring European defense contractors into the inner U.S. circle, "so that they could participate in the development of the missile-defense business." They would be attracted to do so "because there's a lot of big bucks." About \$8 billion, give or take a nickel.

The plan got underway at a dinner at the Moulin Lindekemale in Brussels on Nov. 13, 2001, which was attended by representatives of such companies as EADS, Europe's largest defense conglomerate, Italy's Finmeccanica, Britain's BAE Systems and France's Thales. Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon from the U.S. were also represented. Leading discussion, as courses arrived, were Mr. Galbraith and U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, the Director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency. According to one of the private-industry reps there, the dinner was a success.

"We described what we would like to do with them," says Mr. Galbraith. He says he explained that getting around U.S. technical transfer rules would not be easy, but "we were going to help them try to do that so they could play a meaningful role in our development of our own system."

The key was to get these defense contractors to "go to their own governments and lobby for the right to do it. I always thought they would do a much better job about lobbying for missile defense than we, the U.S. government, could."

"It's just like in the U.S. The defense industry is very good at lobbying Congress and the U.S. administration. Anyway, they went off and did it. They lobbied their governments and they all received permission. It wasn't announced from the tallest flag pole. . . . I started hearing back from people in December."

"The European governments quietly began to soften and had to almost totally abandon their

criticism of our missile defense efforts and our willingness to abandon the ABM treaty. . . . The ABM, we heard ad nauseam, was the pillar stone of our defense, and if we got rid of it we were opening ourselves up to an arms race, and all sorts of proliferation and so forth."

Getting the Europeans on board paid dividends for the White House at home. "The detractors of missile defense within the Congress cited ritualistically the European attitude to missile defense as a reason why it was a poor idea. Europeans were looked upon as an authority. . . . Well, we denied them this authority by getting the Europeans involved."

Progress on European involvement has hit a snag of late because the U.S. bureaucracy is stalling things on the tech transfer side, he says. "We're disappointed at the speed with which this has developed after the fact."

"This is an area I've decided to stick my nose back into," he warns. "I'm trying to devise some kind of way by which we can cut the Gordian knot . . . without going through the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy is real."

His job has given Ambassador Galbraith a vantage point that has also allowed him to understand the opposition of some European governments to the Iraq war. "I know a fair amount about what they can or cannot do, and I know there's a lot of things they can't do."

"If you can't project power, like we project it with an American aircraft carrier battle group," he says, "your tendency is that you don't want it to happen. If you can't do it, you don't want anyone else to do it. You resort to appeasement, to wimpishness."

Undiplomatic words, perhaps, but they come not from a Europe-basher but from someone who understands America's allies and who has their best interests at heart. He's demonstrated that by getting the allies to work together on an important project, ending squabbles. Why we don't have a Galbraith working on Kyoto and other divisive European hang-ups is a mystery.

Mr. Gonzalez is deputy editorial page editor of The Wall Street Journal Europe.

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PRINT WINDOW CLOSE WINDOW

October 15, 2003

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Cartoon

You ought to keep this one for your scrapbook.

Attach.

October 14, 2003 *Daily News*, p. 20.

DHR:dh
101503-29

335 03

15 Oct 03

W01205-03

11-L-0559/OSD/21334



October 16, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Patriotism

Mr. President—

Attached is an e-mail that I received from General Pete Schoomaker. It is a wonderful statement and an example of the courage and patriotism of not just the men and women in uniform, but their families and friends as well.

Respectfully,

Attach.
10/12/03 e-mail

DHR:dh
101603-9

293

W01217 /03

16 Oct 03

11-L-0559/OSD/21336

Schoomaker, Peter J GEN CSA

From: Bruno, Daniel V COL GOMO
Sent: Sunday, October 12, 2003 12:04 PM
To: Peter J. GEN Schoomaker (E-mail)
Cc: George W. Casey Jr LTG (E-mail)
Subject: Funerals
Importance: Low

Roger, Dani Fully understand...but we/I want to do each one that is feasible...shoot, if there was a day between these two funerals (Torres and Scott), I'd be fighting to be the rep at both.

Wish all Americans could have seen the PFC Evan O'Neill funeral last Thursday in North Andover, Massachusetts. Tiny New England village. PFC O'Neill was the 19 year-old son of a 101st ABN multi-tour Vietnam Vet NCO...BSMw/V, two PH's himself...and now the local firefighter Lieutenant and the new President of the local VFW.

Two bagpipe and drum formations...almost a thousand people...Governor of MA, Mitt Romney, MA TAG in attendance...hearse slowly went thru a flag-draped town led by two of our troopers from O'Neill's outfit, and an honorary pall bearer group of local veterans...followed by two pipe and drum formations and uniformed firefighters and police in formations...procession was at least a mile long. Graveside, pipes and drums played Amazing Grace, 10th Mountain Div firing detail and bugler rendered honors. Eulogies by the mother and father (read by a VFW buddy), O'Neill's fiancé, and the MA ARNG Senior Chaplain. When I presented Mr. O'Neill his son's BSMw/V, he said to me, "Climb to Glory, sir, To the Top!" ...and when I presented the colors a brief time later, the father stood, saluted the colors before taking them, and remarked that it was his honor to receive them.

As the parents were climbing into their vehicle to take them to the post-ceremony event, Evan's high school football team seemed to come out of nowhere -- teenage boys in football jackets and their girlfriends -- and presented the mom and dad with a signed game ball.

The message from O'Neill's parents was clear: Mourn our loss, but be proud of Evan's Service, and never forget his sacrifice: it was for all of us. Incredible patriotism in this little corner of our country.

I was proud to be part of it. Damn proud.

Thanks for the note; and appreciate the coordination efforts by you and your folks.

Best regards,

Snowflake

October 16, 2003

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld. 

SUBJECT: Cartoon

Here are some more cartoons for your scrapbook.

Attach.
Cartoons

DHR:dh
101603-8

000.7

W01218 /03

16oct03

11-L-0559/OSD/21338




"UH, THANKS, RUMSFELD AND NOW, WITH HER RENAISSANCE OF THE HOW-TO-RUN POSTWAR IRAQ CONCERTO..."
By Mike Thompson. Reprinted from the Associated Press.

Commentary

OCT 12
2013

THE DAILY TIMES



11-L-0559/OSD/21340

October 21, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Sadr

This is a "first report" (and therefore subject to later adjustment):

Last evening at 6:30 p.m. (EDT), the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), with the Iraqi police, delivered an ultimatum to those located at the Mukhaym Mosque in Karbala.

At 6:53 p.m., roughly 15-20 individuals in the mosque surrendered to the ICDC. At 7:12 p.m., the remainder of the individuals, some of whom attempted to escape, including a Sadr lieutenant, Kethemial-Nasiri (Al Nasiri), surrendered to U.S. forces and Iraqi police. A follow-up search of Al Nasiri's house yielded four additional detainees and weapons, including a heavy machine gun. A total of 59 individuals are currently being questioned.

The Sadr lieutenant they were looking for, Kadhemi, was not there, but they have received information about him which might be useful. Intelligence they are getting says there are weapons stored in other mosques.

There are no reports of unrest or violence as a result of the apprehension. The feedback they have received thus far in Karbala seems to be mostly positive.

General Sanchez reports that the Polish division and the Bulgarians on the ground have gathered strength from the success of the action and from the feedback on it. Sanchez intends to underline the work of the ICDC and the Iraqi police to indicate their confidence and credibility.

Respectfully,

DHR:dh
102103-15

Iraq

21 OCT 03

11-L-0559/OSD/21341

October 23, 2003

TO: Stephen Hadley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: North Korea

Steve—

I am little confused about what I am reading in the press and the cables about the President's comments on North Korea. Could you please get me a copy of the talking points or a memo of who he talked to, so I know what went on and have it clear in my head?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102303-18

KOREAN (DDP 74)

W01241 /03

22. 0. 103

11-L-0559/OSD/21342

October 28, 2003

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Joshua Bolten
Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Defense Authorization Bill

110.01

If we end up with a defense authorization bill that has the civil service and environmental reforms that we have worked so hard to achieve—or something reasonably close to those provisions—we may want to consider a high profile bill signing here or at the White House with the relevant members of Congress, etc.

Tom Davis in particular has been a stalwart on the civil service reforms, and highlighting the impact of the legislation and the principal players seems worthwhile.

Thanks.

DHR:db
102803-1

28 OCT 03

October 29, 2003

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Iran

Iran

I asked Colin about the announcement yesterday by Rich Armitage that we have agreed to start talking together to Iran. He says it is an interagency-cleared position. I do not believe I have heard about it. Could you please tell me what it is about?

DHR:dh
102903-24

29 OCT 03

W01267 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/21344

October 30, 2003

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Policy on ESDP

092

I understand you have a memo from Downing Street on ESDP. I would like to see it.

In addition, you will recall the memo I sent to the President indicating that I think the U.S. Government needs to pull together a single policy on ESDP. I did not mention it in my memo to the President, but I was told the Prime Minister's office came away from a conversation with you with the impression that it was acceptable to the U.S. for the Prime Minister to compromise on ESDP. As you know, the Prime Minister is already doing so. If that is not the President's position, you may want to find a way to correct it.

In any event, I think we ought to get a single U.S. Government policy.

DHR:dh
102903-22

30 Oct 03

W01268 /03

November 6, 2003

TO: Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Jim Roche

AI—

I went up to see Senator Warner yesterday to try to get Jim Roche confirmed. He told me he called you and that you agreed with him. We are trying to work him, and if he feels he can go around us to you, it makes life difficult for us.

Here is a copy of a memo from our Inspector General, who met with Senator Warner, and you will notice the first paragraph.

Attach.

11/5/03 IG memo to SecDef re: "Feedback from 11/4/03 Meeting with Chairman Warner, et.al."

DHR:dh
110603-10

020 Army

6 Nov 03

W01287 /03

DoD IG MEETING NOTES

(11/4/03 Meeting with Chairman Warner, et al.)

- Chairman Warner began by recounting the constitutional nature of the Senate's "Advice and Consent" duty, indicating his reservation about moving forward with the Roche nomination while my "investigation" [sic] is incomplete. He indicated that he had spoken with Judge Gonzalez, who agreed with his concerns, and that the White House "would not intervene" (or words to that effect). He added that if Secretary Rumsfeld still wants a vote, he would take it to the full committee, which might result in further hearings. If that occurred, Chairman Warner urged those Senators present to be just as frank in expressing their concerns as they were today.
- I respectfully clarified the distinction between an Inspection and an Investigation (the latter requires an allegation of wrongdoing by a named person), reiterating that: (a) I am not investigating Secretary Roche because nobody has made an allegation that he violated a prescribed standard around which I can properly focus an IG investigation (the closest thing to such an allegation is a finding in the Fowler Report that "Air Force leadership had increasing cause for alarm, and should have aggressively changed the culture that allowed abuses to occur," implying but not stating that Secretary Roche and/or General Jumper should have known earlier); and (b) based on an almost complete Inspection, although I can never prejudge the outcome, I do not expect to uncover any evidence to support such an investigation of Dr. Roche.
- When pressed by Chairman Warner on how I thought he could move forward with the Roche nomination before I concluded my Inspection, I replied that it would be an "intelligent risk." Based on atmospherics, the "intelligent risk" theme appeared to resonate with Chairman Warner and, I sensed, all of the other members present except Senators Collins and McCain, and perhaps Senator Cornyn (who said he was "not inclined to assume such a risk" (or words to that effect)).
- Senator Sessions was most vocal in her opposition to moving forward at this time. She indicated "serious concern" that apparently without ever having seen her letter of October 21, 2003, which she described as forwarding a "devastating indictment," I had sent my October 24, 2003, letter to Chairman Warner, concluding that "the evidence at this time does not establish that Secretary Roche either had – or should have had – sufficient knowledge of the situation [at the Air Force Academy] during the period from his confirmation in 2001 through January 2003 to justify any stronger leadership action on his . . . part prior to January 2003." I believe I was able to assuage her concern; during the meeting, Deputy IG Jerry Hansen confirmed that we had received her letter and were proactively considering everything she had sent us.
- In response to my description of the constitutional "due process" my IG investigators provide to all senior officials, and my own commitment to safeguard that due process, Senator Sessions volunteered that as a prosecutor he fully understood that investigations must be "based upon credible allegations of misconduct based upon violations of laws or regulations -- not upon vague complaints about what he should have known" (or words to that effect).
- In addition to Senator Sessions, Senators Allard and Inhofe expressed support for moving forward with the Roche nomination.

November 4, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: 1946 Articles

Mr. President—

Some light reading from 1946 about how the United States botched the German occupation. The first is from *Saturday Evening Post*, and the other one was written by John Dos Passos, a correspondent for *Life* magazine.

Germany

Respectfully,

Attach.

Bess, Demaree. "How We Botched the German Occupation," *Saturday Evening Post*, January 26, 1946.


Dos Passos, John. "Americans Are Losing the Victory in Europe"

DHR:dh
110403-16

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

11 Nov 03

W01288 /03



11-L-0559/OSD/21349

Saturday Evening Post
January 26, 1946

How We Botched the German Occupation
By Demaree Bess

Berlin

Everywhere I've traveled recently in Germany I've run into Americans, ranging from generals down to privates, who ask perplexedly, "What are we Americans supposed to be doing here? Are we going to take over this place and stay here forever?"

Judging by reports received here from the United States, this perplexity of Americans in Germany is matching by the perplexity of Americans at home. We have got into this German job without understanding what we were tackling or why. Imagine how incredulous we would have been if anybody had told us---even so recently as five years ago---that hundreds of thousands of Americans would be camped in the middle of Europe in 1946, completely responsible for the conduct and welfare of approximately 20,000,000 Germans?

How does it happened that even some of our topmost officials in Germany admit that they don't know what they are doing here? The answer can be expressed, I believe, in one word---secrecy. . . .

Mr. Stimson probably has had more experience in international affairs than any other American. Before being appointed to head the War Department for the second time, he had also served as Secretary of State and had been Governor General of the Philippines. Thus he was familiar with the military requirements, the political implications and the practical problems involved in administering an alien and distant territory under wartime conditions. Mr. Hull, appreciating the value of Mr. Stimson's experience in world affairs, was inclined to defer to his judgment in most of the matters under dispute. Mr. Morgenthau, on the other hand, gradually became the chief spokesman for the advocates of an American-imposed revolution in Germany.

His so-called Morgenthau plan, which has since been widely publicized, was not just the personal policy of the former Secretary of the Treasury. It combined the ideas of a sizable group of aggressive Americans which included some conservative big businessmen as well as left-wing theorists. The group supporting Mr. Morgenthau's ideas included Americans of all races, creeds and political beliefs. It is doubtful whether Mr. Morgenthau could recall today the source of some of the most explosive ideas which he gradually adopted.

However that may be, the Cabinet committee soon found itself in disagreement, with Secretaries Stimson and Hull on one side and Mr. Morgenthau on the other. Hints of this disagreement leaked out at the time and the issue was represented as a "hard peace" versus a "soft peace," but actually that was not the issue at all. In fact, the major disagreement then was over the question of procedure, and did not directly concern long-term economic and financial policies. The three Cabinet members were equally anxious to make sure that Germany should be deprived of the means for waging another war, but Secretaries Stimson and Hull were determined not to bite off more than we could chew at one time. They wanted to reduce the original occupation plans to the simplest possible form, with three primary objectives in mind: (1) agreement by all the Allies upon a joint occupation; (2) provision of some hope for the German people that they might develop a decent life for themselves once they became completely demilitarized; and (3) the obligation not to burden the American people with more commitments than they might later prove willing to accept.

While these discussions were proceeding, however, Mr. Morgenthau became convinced that we should go into Germany with a complete blueprint, worked out in exhaustive detail, providing for an economic and industrial revolution so drastic that it would affect not only Germany but almost every other country in Europe. He wanted us to adopt this blueprint for ourselves and to use every conceivable means to pressure upon our Allies to get them to accept it. Whenever he was outvoted in the Cabinet committee, he had the immense advantage---as an

intimate friend of Franklin D. Roosevelt---of being able to go through the side door of the White House and sell his ideas directly to the President. . . .

The French, unconvinced that the atomic bomb has opened an entirely new era, are insisting upon establishing buffer states between themselves and Germany. To this end, they're trying to make a friend of the Germans in their zone and to encourage them to organize separatist movements.

The British, conscious, of the broader aspects of Western Europe's economic situation, are devising schemes to revive German economic life in their zones, particularly in the Ruhr. In order to provide immediately for some of the things which Western Europeans so urgently require, they're trying to establish some kind of international combine to operate Ruhr industries and coal mines---a proposal which they compare to the Tennessee Valley Authority.

The Russians, grappling with the enormous tasks of reconstructing their own war-wracked homeland, are carrying off from their zone all the machines and tools and animals which they can use in Russia. While the Russians reduce the labor surplus in their zone by sending skilled German workers to Russia, they also encourage the remaining Germans to revive political and economic life with due attention to Russian models.

It is only in the American zone that the "pastoral economy" is emerging, which some Americans had visioned for the whole of Germany. Although the Potsdam Declaration technically superseded the American directive JCS 1067, in practice this directive never has been superseded, so far as Americans are concerned. We still are committed to apply in our zone a blue print which was designed for the whole of Germany, but which was never accepted by any of our Allies. This directive is chiefly concerned with tearing things down rather than building things up, and in the absence of any common policy for the whole of Germany, our particular zone is threatened with "planned chaos."

No wonder so many Americans are asking, "What are we doing in Germany?" They can see that the Russians and British and French are initiating projects which promise some direct benefits to them in their zones. But when they look at our zone they see only headaches. These peculiar problems of the American zone will be discussed in a subsequent article.

AMERICANS ARE LOSING THE VICTORY IN EUROPE

DESTITUTE NATIONS FEEL THAT THE U.S. HAS FAILED THEM

by JOHN DOS PASSOS

Novelist John Dos Passos spent three months in Europe as a correspondent for LIFE, which recently printed his report on the Nürnberg trials. Just back in the U.S., Author Dos Passos here sums up his impressions of the Continent.

11-L-0559/OSD/21352

We are in a cabin deep down below decks on a Navy ship jam-packed with troops that's pitching and creaking its way across the Atlantic in a winter gale. There is a man in every bunk. There's a man wedged into every corner. There's a man in every chair. The air is dense with cigarette smoke and with the staleness of packed troops and sour wool.

"Don't think I'm sticking up for the Germans," puts in the lanky young captain in the upper berth, "but..."

"To hell with the Germans," says the broad-shouldered dark lieutenant. "It's what our boys have been doing that worries me."

The lieutenant has been talking about the traffic in Army property, the leaking of gasoline into the black market in France and Belgium even while the fighting was going on, the way the Army kicks the civilians around, the looting.

"Lust, liquor and loot are the soldier's pay," interrupts a red-faced major.

The lieutenant comes out with his conclusion: "Two wrongs don't make a right." You hear these two phrases again and again in about every bull session on the ship. "Two wrongs don't make a right" and "Don't think I'm sticking up for the Germans, but..."

The troops returning home are worried. "We've lost the peace," men tell you. "We can't make it slick."

A tour of the beaten-up cities of Europe six months after victory is a mighty sobering experience for anyone. Europeans. Friend and foe alike, look you accusingly in the face and tell you how bitterly they are disappointed in you as an American. They cite the evolution of the word "liberation." Before the Normandy landings it meant to be freed from the tyranny of the Nazis. Now it stands in the minds of the civilians for one thing, looting.

You try to explain to these Europeans that they expected too much. They answer that they had a right to, that after the last war America was the hope of the world. They talk about the Hoover relief, the work of the Quakers, the speeches of Woodrow Wilson. They don't blame us for the fading of that hope. But they blame us now.

Never has American prestige in Europe been lower. People never tire of telling you of the ignorance and rowdy-ism of American troops, of our misunderstanding of European conditions. They say that the theft and sale of Army supplies by our troops is the basis of their black market. They blame us for the corruption and disorganization of UNRRA. They blame us for the fumbling timidity of our negotiations with the Soviet Union. They tell us that our mechanical de-nazification policy in Germany is producing results opposite to those we planned. "Have you no statesmen in America?" they ask.

The skeptical French press

Yet whenever we show a trace of positive leadership I found Europeans quite willing to follow our lead. The evening before Robert Jackson's opening of the case for the prosecution in the Nurnberg trial, I talked to some correspondents from the French newspapers. They were polite but skeptical. They were willing enough to take part in a highly publicized act of vengeance against the enemy, but when you talked about the usefulness of writing a prohibition of aggressive war into the law of nations they laughed in your face. The night after Jackson's nobly delivered and nobly worded speech I saw them all again. They were very much impressed. Their manner had even changed toward me personally as an American. Their sudden enthusiasm seemed to me typical of the almost neurotic craving for leadership of the European people struggling wearily for existence in the wintry ruins of their world.

The ruin this war has left in Europe can hardly be exaggerated. I can remember the years after the last war. Then, as soon as you got away from the military, all the little strands and pulleys that form the fabric of a society were still knitted together. Farmers took their crops to market. Money was a valid medium of exchange. Now the entire fabric of a million little routines has broken down. No one can think beyond food for today. Money is worthless. Cigarettes are used as a kind of lunatic travesty on a currency. If a man goes out to work he shops around to find the business that serves the best hot meal. The final pay-off is the situation reported from the Ruhr where the miners are fed at the pits so that they will not be able to take the food home to their families.

"Well, the Germans are to blame. Let them pay for it. It's their fault," you say. The trouble is that starving the Germans and throwing them out of their homes is only producing more areas of famine and collapse.

One section of the population of Europe looked to us for salvation and another looked to the Soviet Union. Wherever the people have endured either the American armies or the Russian armies both hopes have been bitterly disappointed. The British have won a slightly better reputation. The state of mind in Vienna is interesting because there the part of the population that was not actively Nazi was about equally divided. The wealthier classes looked to America, the workers to the Soviet Union.

The Russians came first. The Viennese tell you of the savagery of the Russian armies. They came like the ancient Mongol hordes out of the steppes, with the flimsiest supply. The people in the working-class districts had felt that when the Russians came that they at least would be spared. But not at all. In the working-class districts the troops were allowed to rape and murder and loot at will. When victims complained, the Russians answered, "You are too well off to be workers. You are bourgeoisie."

When Americans looted they took cameras and valuables but when the Russians looted they took everything. And they raped and killed. From the eastern frontiers a tide of refugees is seeping across Europe bringing a nightmare tale of helpless populations trampled underfoot. When the British and American came the Viennese felt that at last they were in the hands of civilized people. But instead of coming in with a bold plan of relief and reconstruction we came in full of evasions and apologies.

U.S. administration a poor third

We know now the tragic results of the ineptitudes of the Peace of Versailles. The European system it set up was Utopia compared to the present tangle of snarling misery. The Russians at least are carrying out a logical plan for extending their system of control at whatever cost. The British show signs of recovering their good sense and their innate human decency. All we have brought to Europe so far is confusion backed up by a drumhead regime of military courts. **We have swept away Hitlerism, but a great many Europeans feel that the cure has been worse than the disease. [Emphasis mine]**

The taste of victory had gone sour in the mouth of every thoughtful American I met. Thoughtful men can't help remembering that this is a period in history when every political crime and every frivolous mistake in statesmanship has been paid for by the death of innocent people. The Germans built the Stalags; the Nazis are behind barbed wire now, but who will be next? Whenever you sit eating a good meal in the midst of a starving city in a handsome house requisitioned from some German, you find yourself wondering how it would feel to have a conqueror drinking out of your glasses. When you hear the tales of the brutalizing of women from the eastern frontier you think with a shudder of those you love and cherish at home.

That we are one world is unfortunately a brutal truth. Punishing the German people indiscriminately for the sins of their leader may be justice, but it is not helping to restore the rule of civilization. The terrible lesson of the events of this year of victory is that what is happening to the bulk of Europe today can happen to American tomorrow.

In America we are still rich, we are still free to move from place to place and to talk to our friends without fear of the secret police. The time has come, for our own future security, to give the best we have to the world instead of the worst. So far as Europe is concerned, American leadership up to now has been obsessed with a fear of our own virtues. Winston Churchill expressed this state of mind brilliantly in a speech to his own people which applies even more accurately to the people of the U.S. "You must be prepared," he warned them, "for further efforts of mind and body and further sacrifices to great causes, if you are not to fall back into the rut of inertia, the confusion of aim and the craven fear of being great."

November 11, 2003

TO: Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Contacting Combatant Commanders

My understanding is that the NSC is making direct calls to the offices of combatant commanders, like Abizaid, to tell them that they need to be on a secure video or at meetings. That is not the way things should be done.

Please have your folks conduct any business with combatant commanders or their subordinates through John Craddock in my office.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111103-12

334 NSC

11 Nov 03

W01300 /03

2:30 PM

TO: Honorable Andy Card
CC: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
Mike Gerson
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: November 24, 2003
SUBJECT: **Reviewing Presidential Remarks**

The President spoke today at the Department of Defense.

As is sometimes the case, I did not have an opportunity to review his remarks.

It seems to me that if the President is going to speak on a subject relating to the DoD, it could be helpful if I or one of my senior associates had an opportunity to see what he was being advised to say.

Often when I am with him, he asks me if I have had a chance to see his draft remarks and often I have to say no. Why don't we try to get the system wired in a way that I can have a chance to see what he is being advised to say on national security matters.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112403.20

W01364 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/21357

8:36 AM

TO: Honorable Andy Card

CC: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
Mike Gerson

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: November 24, 2003

SUBJECT: **Presidential Visit to Ft. Carson**

333WH

We did not see anything that the President was planning to say at Ft. Carson.

The system seems to be broken.

Please fix it so we can be helpful.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
112403.22

W01371 /03

24 NOV 03

December 4, 2003

TO: Mark Gerson
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Global Presence

350.001

Attached is an excellent speech by Doug Feith that lays out what we are doing on global presence. I think you might find some of the thoughts helpful in fashioning the President's remarks.

Regards,

Attach.
Doug Feith's December 3 Speech

DHR:dh
120403-11 (to computer)

W01399 /03

4 Dec 03



United States Department of Defense

Speeches

On the web: <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2003/sp20031203-0722.html>

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Updated:

Transforming the U.S. Global Defense Posture

By Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith, to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., Wednesday, December 3, 2003.

I am pleased to be back here under the sponsorship of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. I thank your President, John Hamre, for the Center's hospitality and for his personal continuing contributions to U.S. national security policy.

The Policy organization at the Pentagon does two main kinds of work. There are the day-to-day tasks – drafting instructions for negotiators, for example, or working a coalition issue in the war on terrorism, conducting defense talks with other countries or responding to a civil war in Liberia. This topical work tends to attract the most attention from the Congress, the press and the public.

But some of the most important work we do grabs few headlines. This is the longer-term thinking about U.S. defense strategy, which is the Policy organization's second major line of effort.

From the moment President Bush came into office, he has asked the Defense Department how best to position the United States in the world for the decades ahead. He and Secretary Rumsfeld have a demanding appetites for strategic thought – that is, large ideas, broad in scope, that set courses that can run many years into the future.

The name given to this effort is "transformation," because the President is determined that the Defense Department think boldly and remake itself thoroughly, changing the way we:

- Train and equip our forces,
- Use them, for combat, stability operations and otherwise,
- Position those forces around the world,
- Work with allies and partners, and
- Conduct procurement and other business activities.

Some people think of "transformation" narrowly as a matter of using new technologies to produce better weapons. But the concept is more comprehensive.

11-L-0559/OSD/21360

<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2003/sp20031203-0722.html>

12/5/2003

A key facet of transformation is realigning our global defense posture – that is, updating the types, locations, numbers, and capabilities of our military forces, and the nature of our alliances. That's the aspect of transformation I want to talk with you about today.

Even before 9/11, President Bush said that the security threats of the future would differ from those of the Cold War era – that they required a different way of thinking and of organizing our defenses. He campaigned on a platform of transformation. Since the Soviet empire collapsed, he observed, the world changed far more radically than our own defense doctrines, institutions, equipment and alliances had changed.

I can report that the United States has made progress toward transformation during the Bush Administration.

First, we've transformed our relationship with Russia. We've recognized that the hostility that characterized US-Soviet relations during the Cold War has ended, hostility that was enshrined in the doctrine of "mutual assured destruction" and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Accordingly, along with the hostility, we've set aside that morally dubious doctrine and that out-dated treaty. We're cooperating with Russia in many fields. And Presidents Bush and Putin agreed formally to make unprecedented cuts in their nuclear arsenals. At the beginning of this Administration many commentators voiced anxiety about the risks of US-Russian tensions over arms control, NATO expansion and other issues. This is now a non-issue.

Second, we are transforming our Alliances. Today, we have an enlarged NATO with increasing (though still far from adequate) capabilities, a good plan for streamlining NATO's command structure, a new NATO Four-Star Command focused specifically on military transformation and an affirmative answer once and for all to that old chestnut – can NATO take on a mission "out of area." NATO has taken on command of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and NATO assisted Poland in assuming command of a multinational division responsible for stabilizing a portion of southern Iraq.

Likewise, we are developing a more robust US-Japanese alliance, an up-to-date US-South Korean alliance, and a strengthened U.S.-Australian alliance. Our key Asian and Pacific allies are investing in new technologies, playing roles in Afghanistan and Iraq, coordinating with us regarding global and regional threats, such as the North Korean nuclear program, and working with us to rationalize the US troop "footprint" in their countries to keep the alliances sustainable and capable well into the 21st Century.

And, of course, we are transforming US military capabilities – strategies, technology and organization, as well as hardware.

As we have transformed deterrence and our alliances, we want to transform our global posture. Our current posture as John Hamre mentioned, still reflects in many ways the mentality and reality of the Cold War era, during which US forces deployed forward were defensive, tripwire units that were expected to fight near where they were based. The kind of forces used for that mission are not the agile, fast, lean forces we need for the future.

Our forces overseas should not remain positioned to fight the Cold War. In the

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immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union's demise, we reduced the numbers of US troops deployed forward. But they remained concentrated in their Cold War locations, from which they have had to be deployed to deal with crises elsewhere -- in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, Central Asia and other locations. Key premises underlying our forward posture have changed fundamentally: We no longer expect our forces to fight in place; rather, their purpose is to project power into theaters that may be distant from when they are based.

We are revising our thinking about forward deployed forces in light of our new strategic circumstances. The 9/11 terrorist attack literally brought home to us how dangerous those circumstances can be:

Terrorists as well as rogue states can command formidable destructive power, including through access to chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, but also by targeting the critical infrastructure on which advanced industrial societies rely:

- U.S. and friendly territories are vulnerable.
- The proliferation of chemical, biological nuclear weapons and missiles continues.
- Ungoverned areas serve as breeding grounds for global terrorism.
- Threats from these sources may require immediate military responses.

President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld directed a reexamination of US forward deployments that is free of old orthodoxies and takes the long view. We are aiming to achieve the most basic and comprehensive review of the nation's global defense posture since the United States became a world power.

In the immediate post-World-War-II period, Dean Acheson had a sense that his work was creating institutions that would last a long time; he made that point by entitling his memoirs Present at the Creation. President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld likewise are thinking about the relatively distant future. In developing plans to realign our forces abroad, they are not focused on the diplomatic issues of the moment, but on the strategic requirements and opportunities of the coming decades.

Let's be clear about what we are and what we are not aiming to achieve through transforming our global defense posture:

We are not aiming at retrenchment, curtailing U.S. commitments, isolationism or unilateralism. On the contrary, our realignment plans are motivated by appreciation of the strategic value of our defense alliances and partnerships with other states.

We are aiming to increase our ability to fulfill our international commitments more effectively.

We are aiming to ensure that our alliances are capable, affordable, sustainable and relevant in the future.

We are not focused narrowly on force levels, but are addressing force capabilities.

11-L-0559/OSD/21362

We are not talking about fighting in place, but moving to the fight.

We are not talking only about basing, we are talking about the ability to move forces when and where needed.

In transforming the US global defense posture:

We want to make our forces more responsive given the world's many strategic uncertainties.

We want to make our military presence increasingly rotational with the emphasis, as I've noted, on the capabilities of forces rather than their numbers.

We want to benefit as much as possible from the strategic repositioning of equipment and support.

We want to make better use of our capabilities by thinking of our forces globally, rather than as simply regional assets.

We want to be able to bring more combat capabilities to bear in less time, that is, we want to have the ability to surge our forces to crisis spots from wherever our forces might be.

Strengthen Allied Roles

It bears reemphasizing: Our military forces, both forward deployed and based at home, are only part of our military capability. Another part is rooted in the network of alliances and security relationships we have created with other nations. When the United States acts in the world, we don't act by ourselves, but as a part of a community of states. That network of friendships and alliances is a valuable element of this community. The network's composition and nature have changed over the years as strategic circumstances in the world have changed. To surmount such problems as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and failed states, we need to organize differently and increase our capabilities. Realigning the US global defense posture is an essential part of what we need to do.

Understanding of our realignment plans should help lay to rest the accusations that the US favors "unilateralism" in national security affairs. Our plans will help ensure that the US has the defense resources and relationships in place to allow us to work with allies and friends in the future. It will make those relationships affordable and usable, that is to say, relevant.

Our intent is to expand existing security relationships, and develop new ones. We want to build partnerships that manage concerns, ensure compatibility among forces, and facilitate intelligence sharing. In some cases US forces will be in a supporting role, in other cases, US forces will be supported. For example, we were in a supporting role when West African ECOWAS forces intervened recently in Liberia and when Australian forces did their peace operations in East Timor. Examples of support for U.S. forces include NATO ISAF forces in Afghanistan, and the role British and Polish forces have taken in commanding multinational divisions in Iraq.

11-L-0559/OSD/21363

Changes in the U.S. global posture also aim to help our allies and friends modernize their own forces, strategies and doctrines. As we discuss the US realignment with them, we are discussing cooperative transformation efforts. The new NATO Response Force and Allied Command – Transformation in Norfolk are examples of combined allied transformation efforts.

Realigning the U.S. posture will also help strengthen our alliances by tailoring the physical US "footprint" to suit local conditions. The goal is to reduce friction with host nations, the kind that results from accidents and other problems relating to local sensitivities. Removal of the U.S. Air Expeditionary Wing from Prince Sultan Air Base, for example, should help improve our relations with the Saudis, and relocating U.S. forces south and out of the densely-populated Seoul area in Korea will help remedy various problems with the Korean public while serving other important military purposes as well.

Contend with Uncertainty

Our new posture emphasizes agility to respond to changing circumstances. Intelligence is never perfect, so we need to be able to hedge against errors regarding emerging threats. We need to plan, but we must plan to be surprised. Our forces will be deployed forward in regions selected to enable them to reach potential crisis spots quickly. We also want to maintain familiarity with various parts of the globe.

Focus Across Regions as well as within them

In the Cold War, we focused on threats to specific regions. Now we are dealing with threats that are global in nature. So global strategies and actions are required. President Bush's Proliferation Security Initiative is an example of a global strategy for dealing with the spread of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and missile-related materiel and technology. We need to be positioned properly – with the right forces, the right relationships and the right authority – to execute that strategy. In addition, we want to develop our capacity to project power from one region to another – threats don't respect the administrative boundaries of the Defense Department's Unified Command Plan.

There is value in developing support capabilities away from front lines – relying on so-called "reachback" technology. For example, intelligence support, including battle damage assessment, can be provided from outside the theater of operations. We also may be able to increase our use of "reachback" capabilities of our allies and friends.

Develop Rapidly Deployable Capabilities

Because our forward-deployed forces are unlikely to fight where they are based, our key goal must be to make those forces rapidly deployable to the relevant areas as events require.

We can project power in a rapid manner, whether from bases in the US or overseas, but it is helpful to have support infrastructure overseas. Examples of an expeditionary approach to warfighting that drew upon such infrastructure include Kosovo, a case of power projection within a region, in pursuit of regional stability and in concert with regional allies, and Afghanistan, a case of global power projection, in which forces

11-L-0559/OSD/21364

flowed into Central Asia from US, European, and Asian theaters. We are encouraging allies to establish deployable – truly usable – headquarters and forces. We intend to increase combined training for expeditionary operations, for example, to encourage Allied participation in so-called "high-end" U.S. exercises

For this deployability concept to work, US forces must be able to move smoothly into, through, and out of host nations, which puts a premium on establishing legal and support arrangements with many friendly countries. We are negotiating or planning to negotiate with many countries legal protections for US personnel, through Status of Forces Agreements and agreements (known as Article 98 agreements) limiting the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court with respect to our forces' activities. And we are putting in place so-called cross-servicing agreements so that we can rapidly reimburse countries for support they provide to our military operations.

Focus on Capabilities, Not Numbers

Military capabilities have increased stunningly over the past decade as a result of technology and innovations in tactics. Our wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown the world how relatively small forces can have large, strategic effects. A single fighter/bomber sortie now hits multiple targets, whereas in the past, multiple sorties were required to hit a single target. Small teams of Special Forces and Marines, supported by flexible close air support and often operating together with indigenous forces, were able to accomplish missions in Afghanistan and Iraq that in the past would have required brigades or divisions. Old military thinking about numbers has been overtaken thoroughly by events. Longstanding notions about ratios of offensive versus defensive forces and about how much can be accomplished by a certain number of troops or of platforms have had to be revised wholesale.

Military and political leaders around the world are just beginning to absorb the lessons of the recent fighting and to appreciate why US officials emphasize military capabilities as opposed to numbers of forces. These lessons have an important bearing on our global posture realignment. Our key purpose, as I've noted, is to push increased capabilities forward, which is crucial to the security of the United States and our allies and friends. That purpose does not require that we push additional forces forward. In fact, we can now have far greater capabilities forward than in the past with smaller numbers of forces. We want to ensure that our allies and friends recognize that, in transforming our posture, we are strengthening our commitment to secure our common interests, even in those places where we may be reducing forces levels.

Conclusion

Last week, President Bush announced that we would "realign the global posture of our forces to better address" the new challenges we face and would be consulting around the world on this matter. I have discussed the principles and purposes of our realignment work. But I want to stress that no final decisions have been made.

So the consultations that the President announced last week will be real consultations – all the decisions the President will eventually make will depend on the inputs we receive in the course of these consultations. How our partners react to our ideas is important to us, as are the steps they are willing to take to advance our common security interests

11-L-0559/OSD/21365

through host-nation support and other means.

Indeed, the consultations in and of themselves are an element of our global posture. They help strengthen our relationships by harmonizing our thinking and our assessment of threats and military requirements. They give us an opportunity to explain the rationale of our global realignment – such as our focus on capabilities rather than numbers.

In their recent trips to Asia and Europe, Secretaries Rumsfeld and Powell began to describe our efforts. Next week, my colleague Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman and I will carry forward the consultations, which will over time include US allies and partners in every region of the world. This is a global initiative, and our consultations will be global.

Our friends and allies are sensitive to changes in the US overseas posture. That is why we are consulting with them before the President or Secretary Rumsfeld makes any decisions on changes. Whatever improvements in military effectiveness the actual posture decisions produce, they will serve our interests fully only if they also help sustain and strengthen our ties with our friends, allies and partners around the world. We are confident that they will.

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L-0559/OSD/21366

11-

Snowflake

December 4, 2003

TO: Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Dedication of Afghan Road

I saw Zal in Afghanistan. He said Karzai and others are going to open and dedicate the Afghan road on December 16, I believe. He wondered if somebody could be designated as the President's representative at that event, since the President was so interested in it and since Karzai feels it is such a significant thing.

It might be a nice thing to have the Secretary of Commerce or another Cabinet Secretary go over and do that.

DHR:dh
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11-L-0559/OSD/21367

December 15, 2003

China (nats)

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Taiwan

I have looked at that Taiwan issue, and I don't feel I am the appropriate person to send the letter to Taiwan. It either ought to be in a military channel, since it is an exercise, or it ought to be at the Department of State level.

DHR:dh
121503-17

15 Dec 03

NO 1437 / 03

9:33 AM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. Rumsfeld*
DATE: December 13, 2003
SUBJECT:

China (rats)

Paul Wolfowitz is prepared to deal with:

1. Law of the Sea paper;
2. The PRC paper; and
3. The Taiwan exercise.

He's been working them and he will talk to you or Steve Hadley whenever.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
121303.12

13 Dec 03

W01449-03

December 16, 2003

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
CC: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Referring to the "Plan"

IRAQ

Attached are some remarks I have been making that talk about planning for post-war Iraq.

With opponents saying we had no "plan," it is important that we keep referring to our "plan."

Here are some remarks I made recently at the American Enterprise Institute that show we had a plan, what it was, what we accomplished and how it compared with Germany.

Attach.
12/11/03 Remarks to American Enterprise Institute Board of Trustees

DHR:dh
121503-8

16 Dec 03

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11-L-0559/OSD/21370

**AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
BOARD OF TRUSTEES BREAKFAST
DECEMBER 11, 2003**

Good morning. Thank you, Chris [DeMuth], for your leadership of AEI. It is a pleasure to be with you.

I'm here to listen. I want to hear what is on your minds, so I will make a few comments and then respond to questions.

I returned this Sunday from Iraq and Afghanistan. I know several of you here today have participated in recent DoD trips to Iraq, and have had the chance to see for yourselves the situation on the ground. It is certainly different than is reported back home.

Each time I have returned since liberation -- five times to Afghanistan and three times to Iraq -- I see more signs of progress in both countries.

Consider what the courageous civilian and military personnel in Iraq have accomplished in just 7 months:

- Our plan called for the establishment of an Iraqi cabinet of ministers. The coalition did it in four months. It took 14 months in post-war Germany.
- The plan called for the establishment of an independent Iraqi central bank. The coalition did it in two months. It took three years in post-war Germany.
- The plan called for the establishment of a new Iraqi currency. New Iraqi dinars began circulating in five months. It took three years in post-war Germany.
- The plan called for the establishment of a new Iraqi police force. The coalition accomplished it in two months. It took 14 months in post-war Germany.
- The plan called for the establishment of a new Iraqi army. The first battalion had completed training in less than five months. It took 10 years in post-war Germany.
- The plan called for rebuilding Iraq's hospitals and clinics. Today all 240 Iraqi hospitals and 95 percent of Iraq's 1,200 medical clinics are open.
- The plan called for getting electric power production up to prewar levels. By October 6th, production had reached 4,518 megawatts, surpassing prewar levels.
- The plan called for getting the Iraqi justice system up and running. Today, some 400 Iraqi courts are back in operation.
- The plan called for the establishment of a free press. Today, some 170 newspapers are being published.

- The plan called for getting Iraq's education system up and running. Today, 5.1 million Iraqi students are back in the classroom, 51 million new textbooks have been issued, and 97,000 Iraqis applied to attend college for the 2003 fall semester.

The Coalition has done all this, and more, under fire -- not in a peaceful country, but rather in a country where regime dead-enders are still violently trying to stop this progress.

Consider security: In less than six months, we've gone from zero Iraqis providing security for their country to more than 160,000 Iraqis under arms.

On Saturday in Baghdad, I had the opportunity to observe the training of several hundred new recruits in the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps. They are impressive -- and courageous.

More than 110 Iraqis have given their lives in the fight against the terrorists. Yet, despite the dangers, more and more Iraqis are stepping forward to serve.

In Kirkuk, General Odierno reports that nearly all crime in the city is now being dealt with by the 2,200 Coalition-trained Iraqi police. Joint patrols have largely ended, and Iraqis have stepped forward to patrol on their own.

There is a city jail and a functioning Iraqi court system -- so Iraqis now handle crime from arrest, to trial, to sentencing.

As Iraqis take on more responsibility, the U.S. presence in the city has gone from three battalions to just 150 soldiers, with our remaining forces assisting in various types of reconstruction.

Meanwhile, Coalition forces continue taking the battle to the terrorists. In Kirkuk, after four weeks of intensified operations, General Odierno told us that attacks have gone down from twenty to about six a day. Other commanders report similar declines. It's too early to call it a trend, but it is encouraging.

The terrorists are turning increasingly to stand off operations, using mortars and improvised explosive devices, which are less effective. The Commander estimates the success rate of terrorist attacks in his area of responsibility is about 5%.

That is not to say that the attacks are over. They are not. But our forces will remain on the offense.

In Afghanistan, signs of progress are everywhere. Micro-businesses are flourishing. The highway linking Kandahar to Kabul is finished, and the road linking Kabul with Mazar is near completion. Ministry of Defense reforms have been initiated. Demobilization of militias is beginning. There is high growth and little or no inflation. President Karzai believes Afghanistan has turned a corner.

In both countries, Coalition forces are fighting the terrorists so we do not have to deal with them later here in our cities and on our streets.

As the President has said, we will stay as long as necessary to finish the job. The exit strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan is success. The troops I meet are in good spirits. They know what they are doing is *important* -- to those 50 million Afghans and Iraqis that have been liberated and to ours. I have every confidence in them.

With that, I'll stop and respond to some questions.

###

December 17, 2003

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: PC Meetings

Condi—

We seem to have fallen into a practice where your staff periodically asks that one of the combatant commanders or subcommanders participate in a PC.

Dick Myers, Pete Pace and I have discussed this issue. We are uncomfortable with that practice, given that the statutory military advisors to the NSC are the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Needless to say, when the President would like a combatant commander or subcommander to participate in a National Security Council meeting, we arrange it. However, with respect to PCs, I suggest we go back to the normal practice of having the Chairman or the Vice Chairman represent the uniformed military in PCs.

DHR:dh
121503-21

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17 Dec 03

NO 1452 / 03

December 22, 2003

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Sistani

Attached is an interesting piece on Sistani.

Attach.
Paper on Sistani

DHR:dh
122203-10

Iraq

28 Dec 03

WD1479 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/21375

1/22

Confronting Sistani should be done in a diplomatic way by sticking to our position. Amb. Bremer has already issued his own "farwa" calling for selecting the transitional national assembly through the caucus process, and this decision has found favor with the majority of Iraqis, who want to see their nation recover its sovereignty soon. More importantly, we do not want to demonstrate any hesitation when setting policy or set a precedent and have to coordinate our policy in the future through Sistani, or any cleric [stand firm in our position of separation of church from state].

According to our sources incountry, the Shi'a in the Heartland respect Sistani and his views, but they do not follow him blindly and are not, in any sense of the term, a monolithic bloc. The analogy would be like American Catholics (of which I am one) relating to the Pope: they listen respectfully to what he has to say and then make up their own minds. Among the Shi'a, "ijtihad" or the right of independent reasoning is a treasured value. Moreover, in the largely tribal society here, the traditional leadership strongly supports the separation of the religious and political spheres, largely out of concern that politics not be allowed to corrupt religious belief and practice. They feel strongly that the Iranian revolution has led to such a corruption of Shi'ite belief there, and they want to avoid Iran's mistakes.

To the extent that Sistani limits his pronouncements to religious matters, the tribal shaykhs who form the core of his power base support him more; to the extent that he speaks out on political matters, they support him less. Indeed, some of our most influential interlocutors are insisting that we disregard Sistani's statements about the political process, on the grounds that we in the coalition should back the separation of religion from politics. The growing popularity of Sayyed Farqat al-Qizwini in Hillah for example is due in large measure to his support for the separation of religion and politics and the establishment of a democratic system that would allow Shi'a tribal leaders to run for office.

There is also a growing feeling that Iraq's Shi'a need an Iraqi religious leadership as opposed to the current situation, in which most of the senior ayatollahs are in fact citizens of foreign countries. Sistani himself holds an Iranian passport and has only an Iraqi residence card. He is not an Iraqi citizen, and he was born in Iran, not Iraq. These facts are being increasingly discussed in the mudhifs [Iraqi guest house], coffee shops, and mosques here. Qizwini's descent from a long line of Iraqi ayatollahs is strengthening his appeal vis-à-vis Sistani.

As has always been the case since Liberation, by the way, the views of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and the SCIRI movement he heads are greeted with great skepticism here, due to the suspicions aroused by his longstanding Iranian connections. Hence, his call for electing the assembly rather than selecting it is not finding much support. It would be a grave error to confuse public opinion in al-Hakim's fief in Najaf or even in Sadr City with the views of the Shi'ite Heartland.

Another point of note: to local Iraqis, the procedure CPA is proposing qualifies as an "election" under their understanding of the Arabic word "intikhabaat," which encompasses both direct voting and the kind of caucus process we are planning.

Most Iraqis in the south want a sovereign Iraqi government to be formed soon. That said, they want the coalition to retain a strong military, diplomatic, and economic presence in their country. The sooner we reach that point, the better off we and Iraq will be. There is no patience here with the notion of taking another 14 to 18 months to conduct a census and voter registration, draft a permanent constitution, and then hold elections in mid-2005. If we drag things out that long, the results could be disastrous.

In sum, we should follow the Shia example by treating Sistani and his ideas with respect, while sticking to our plan.



~~FOUO~~

December 31, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Donald Rumsfeld*

SUBJECT: Article by Victor Davis Hanson

ITSA

Mr. President,

Attached is an article I hesitated to send to you, but when we talked on the phone yesterday, this subject came up. Fortunately, there are thoughtful folks who agree with what we are doing and are willing to put it down on paper with some historical context.

I believe you read some of Victor Davis Hanson's books.

Happy New Year.

Respectfully,

Attach.
 12/23/04 National Review article by Victor Davis Hanson

DHR:as
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31 DEC 04

~~FOUO~~

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Victor Davis Hanson
NRO Contributor



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December 23, 2004, 8:21 a.m.


Leave Rumsfeld Be

He is not to blame for our difficulties.

The *Washington Post* recently warned that doctors are urging interested parties of all types to get their flu shots before the "scarce" vaccine is thrown out. But how is such a surfeit possible when our national media scared us to death just a few months ago with the specter of a national flu epidemic, corporate malfeasance, and Bush laxity? That perfect storm of incompetence and skullduggery purportedly combined to leave us vulnerable to mass viral attack. So how can the *Post* now characterize something as "scarce" that is soon to be discarded for a want of takers? Was there too much or too little vaccine?

The answer, of course, is the usual media-inspired flight from reason that overwhelms this country at various times — hype playing on our fears and groupthink to create a sudden story when there really is none. And now with the renewed attack on Donald Rumsfeld we are back to more of the flu-shot hysteria that has been so common in this war. Remember the pseudo-crises of the past four years — the quagmire in week three in Afghanistan or the sandstorm bog-down in Iraq?

Let us not forget either all the Orwellian logic: Clinton's past deleterious military slashes that nevertheless explained the present win in Afghanistan, or his former appeasement of bin Laden that now accounts for the successful doctrine of fighting terror. Or recall the harebrained schemes we should have adopted — the uninvited automatic airlifting of an entire division into the high peaks of Islamic, nuclear Pakistan to cut off the tribal fugitives from Tora Bora? Or have we put out of our memories



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- Buy it through**

PHOTO DAY

Dennis: Holiday (Thanksgiving)
12/23 12:57 p.m.

the brilliant trial balloons of a Taliban coalition government and the all Islamic post-Taliban occupation forces?

So it is with the latest feeding-frenzy over Donald Rumsfeld. His recent spur-of-the-moment — but historically plausible — remarks to the effect that one goes to war with the army one has rather than the army one wishes for angered even conservatives. The demands for his head are to be laughed off from an unserious Maureen Dowd — ranting on spec about the shadowy neocon triad of Wolfowitz, Feith, and Perle — but taken seriously from a livid Bill Kristol or Trent Lott. Rumsfeld is, of course, a blunt and proud man, and thus can say things off the cuff that in studied retrospect seem strikingly callous rather than forthright. No doubt he has chewed out officers who deserved better. And perhaps his quip to the scripted, not-so-impromptu question was not his best moment. *But his resignation would be a grave mistake for this country at war, for a variety of reasons.*

First, according to reports, the unit in question had 784 of its 804 vehicles up-armored. Humvees are transportation and support assets that traditionally have never been so protected. That the fluid lines in Iraq are different not just from those in World War II or Korea, but even Vietnam, Gulf War I, Mogadishu, and Afghanistan became clear only over months. Yet it also in fact explains why we are seeing 80 to 90 percent of these neo-Jeeps already retrofitted. In an army replete with Bradleys and Abramses, no one could have known before Iraq that Hummers would need to become armored vehicles as well. Nevertheless all of them will be in a fleet of many thousands in less than 18 months. Would that World War II Sherman tanks after three years in the field had enough armor to stop a single *Panzerfaust*. At war's end German teenagers with cheap proto-RPGs were still incinerating Americans in their "Ronson Lighters."

Second, being unprepared in war is, tragically, nothing new. It now seems near criminal that Americans fought in North Africa with medium Stuart tanks, whose 37-millimeter cannons ("pea-shooters" or "squirrel guns") and thin skins ensured the deaths of hundreds of GIs. Climbing into *Devastator* torpedo bombers was tantamount to a death sentence in 1942; when fully armed and flown into a headwind, these airborne relics were lucky to make 100 knots — not quite as bad as sending fabric Brewster *Buffaloes* up against *Zeros*. Yet FDR and George Marshall, both responsible for U.S. military preparedness, had plenty of time to see what Japan and Germany were doing in the late 1930s. Under the present logic of retrospective perfection, both had years to ensure our boys adequate planes and tanks — and thus should have resigned when the death toll of tankers and pilots soared.

Even by 1945 both the Germans and the Russians still had better armor than the Americans. In the first months of Korea, our early

Robbins: You Have to Believe
12/23 12:33 p.m.

Novak: The Power of Christmas
12/23 11:43 a.m.

Woodlief: My Christmas Story
12/23 11:39 a.m.

Kaza: Kaza: A Merry Corporate Christmas 12/23
11:09 a.m.

Levin: RE: Mark R. Levin, A Great But Misguided American 12/23
10:41 a.m.

Derbyshire: 2004 Sing Along 12/23
10:33 a.m.

Q&A: Good Stuff
12/23 9:57 a.m.

Norman: A Christmas Brawl
12/23 9:54 a.m.

Loconte: They All Want Him... 12/23
9:51 a.m.

Basham: All Secure at Christmas 12/23
9:45 a.m.

Campbell: What Child Is This?
12/23 9:42 a.m.

Goldberg: Down With the French!
12/23 9:38 a.m.

Tammy: The Savings-Rate Myth 12/23 9:31
a.m.

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squadrons of F-80s were no match for superior Mig-15s. Early-model M-16 rifles jammed with tragic frequency in Vietnam. The point is not to excuse the military naiveté and ill-preparedness that unnecessarily take lives, but to accept that the onslaught of war is sometimes unforeseen and its unfolding course persistently unpredictable. Ask the Israelis about the opening days of the Yom Kippur War, when their armor was devastated by hand-held Soviet-made anti-tank guns and their vaunted American-supplied air force almost neutralized by SAMs — laxity on the part of then perhaps the world's best military a mere six years after a previous run-in with Soviet-armed Arab enemies.

Third, the demand for Rumsfeld's scalp is also predicated on supposedly too few troops in the theater. But here too the picture is far more complicated. Vietnam was no more secure with 530,000 American soldiers in 1968 than it was with 24,000 in 1972. How troops are used, rather than their sheer numbers, is the key to the proper force deployment — explaining why Alexander the Great could take a Persian empire of 2 million square miles with an army less than 50,000, while earlier Xerxes with 500,000 on land and sea could not subdue tiny Greece, one-fourth of Persia's size.

Offensive action, not troop numbers alone, creates deterrence; mere patrolling and garrison duty will always create an insatiable demand for ever more men and an enormously visible American military bureaucracy — and a perennial Iraqi dependency on someone else to protect the nascent democracy. Thus if the argument can be made that Rumsfeld was responsible for either disbanding the Iraqi army or the April stand-down from Fallujah — the latter being the worst American military decision since Mogadishu — then he deserves our blame. But so far, from what we know, the near-fatal decision to pull-back from Fallujah was made from either above Rumsfeld (e.g., the election-eve White House) or below him (Paul Bremer and the Iraqi provisional government).

In truth, the real troop problem transcends Iraq. Our shortages are caused by a military that was slashed after the Cold War and still hasn't properly recouped to meet the global demands of the war against Islamic fascism — resulting in rotation nightmares, National Guard emergencies, and stop-order controversies. The amazing victories in Afghanistan and Iraq not only set up unrealistic expectations about the ease of implementing post-bellum democracy among tribal Islamic societies, but also allowed the public, the Congress, and the president not to mobilize to confront the strategic challenges facing the United States that now pose a more serious threat than did the 1980s Soviet Union.

We are left with an unhinged nuclear dictatorship in North Korea



threatening an increasingly appeasing and pacifistic South. Taiwan could be swallowed up in days or destroyed in hours by a bullying, resource-hungry China staking out a new co-prosperity sphere in the Pacific, one every bit as ambitious as imperial Japan's. Iran's nukes will soon be able to hit a triangulating Europe, and Islamists seek our destruction at home while we implement liberal governments in Iraq and Afghanistan.

All this peril came on us suddenly and without warning — at a time of recession and following the vast arms cuts of the 1990s, a trillion in lost commerce and outright damage from 9/11, oil spikes, huge trade deficits, increased entitlements, and tax cuts. If Mr. Rumsfeld is responsible for all that, perhaps then we can ask him to step aside as culpable for our present absence of enough soldiers in the U.S. military.

In reality, he has carefully allotted troops in Iraq because he has few to spare elsewhere — and all for reasons beyond his control. If Senator Lott or kindred pundits first show us exactly where the money is to come from to enlarge the military (tax hikes, cuts in new Medicare entitlements, or budgetary freezes?), and, second, that Mr. Rumsfeld opposes expanding our defense budget — "No, President Bush, I don't need any more money, since the Clinton formula was about right for our present responsibilities" — then he should be held responsible. So far that has not happened.

Fourth, we hear of purportedly misplaced allocations of resources. Thus inadequate Humvees are now the focus of our slurs — our boys die while we are wasting money on pie-in-the-sky ABMs. But next month the writs may be about our current obsession with tactical minutiae — if Iran shoots off a test missile with a simultaneous announcement of nuclear acquisition. So then expect, "Why did Rumsfeld rush to spend billions on Humvee armor, when millions of Americans were left vulnerable to Iran's nukes without a viable ABM system come to full completion?"

Fifth, have we forgotten what Mr. Rumsfeld did right? Not just plenty, but plenty of things that almost anyone else would *not* have done. Does anyone think the now-defunct Crusader artillery platform would have saved lives in Iraq or helped to lower our profile in the streets of Baghdad? How did it happen that our forces in Iraq are the first army in our history to wear practicable body armor? And why are over 95 percent of our wounded suddenly surviving — at miraculous rates that far exceeded even those in the first Gulf War? If the secretary of Defense is to be blamed for renegade roguery at Abu Ghraib or delays in up-arming Humvees, is he to be praised for the system of getting a mangled Marine to Walter Reed in 36 hours?

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A 30-6

And who pushed to re-deploy thousands of troops out of Europe, and to re-station others in Korea? Or were we to keep ossified bases in perpetuity in the logic of the Cold War while triangulating allies grew ever-more appeasing to our enemies and more gnarly to us, their complacent protectors?

The blame with this war falls not with Donald Rumsfeld. We are more often the problem — our mercurial mood swings and demands for instant perfection devoid of historical perspective about the tragic nature of god-awful war. Our military has waged two brilliant campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. There has been an even more inspired postwar success in Afghanistan where elections were held in a country deemed a hopeless Dark-Age relic. A thousand brave Americans gave their lives in combat to ensure that the most wicked nation in the Middle East might soon be the best, and the odds are that those remarkable dead, not the columnists in New York, will be proven right — no thanks to post-facto harping from thousands of American academics and insiders in chorus with that continent of appeasement Europe.

Out of the ashes of September 11, a workable war exegesis emerged because of students of war like Don Rumsfeld: Terrorists do not operate alone, but only through the aid of rogue states; Islamicists hate us for who we are, not the alleged grievances outlined in successive and always-metamorphosing loony fatwas; the temper of bin Laden's infomercials hinges only on how bad he is doing; and multilateralism is not necessarily moral, but often an amoral excuse either to do nothing or to do bad — ask the U.N. that watched Rwanda and the Balkans die or the dozens of profiteering nations who in concert robbed Iraq and enriched Saddam.

Donald Rumsfeld is no Les Aspin or William Cohen, but a rare sort of secretary of the caliber of George Marshall. I wish he were more media-savvy and could ape Bill Clinton's lip-biting and furrowed brow. He should, but, alas, cannot. Nevertheless, we will regret it immediately if we drive this proud and honest-speaking visionary out of office, even as his hard work and insight are bringing us ever closer to victory.

— *Victor Davis Hanson is a military historian and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. His website is victorhanson.com.*

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~~FOUO~~

December 31, 2004

TO: Gen Pete Pace
 CC: Gen Dick Myers
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Possibilities for the Team

I got a call from Antonio Martino, the MOD of Italy. He said he's got a retired three star who has been in Iraq, speaks perfect English, who is excellent, and he'd like to put him on the team. He also has a brigadier general who does not speak English, but is very good. He is Carabinieri and he's very good on the mafia aspect of it, and he thought maybe he should send both of them. Why don't you talk to Gary Luck and see what they think?

Italy

I
 DHR:ms
 123104-9 (ts)

.....
 Please respond by _____

31 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21383

OSD 00002-05

~~FOUO~~

DEC 21 2004
I-04/017321
ES-1771

TO: Ken Krieg
Ryan Henry

FROM:

SUBJECT: Ed Giambastiani's Views on the QDR

Have you taken into account Ed Giambastiani's views on the QDR?

Thanks.

Attach.

12/17/04 ADM Giambastiani memo to SecDef re: QDR Issues

DHR:ss
122004-41

.....
Please respond by 12/29/04

~~FOUO~~

22-12-04 08:10 0458

11-L-0559/OSD/21384

OSD 00017-05



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMMANDER
U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND
1362 INTRECHER AVENUE SUITE 280
NORFOLK, VA 23511-2868

08-17/20

17 December 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Issues

I appreciate the opportunity to provide you my thoughts on key issues for consideration during the upcoming QDR. The following issues are proposed for study in the 2005 QDR to move toward a coherently integrated Department of Defense.

- **Integrate Tactical Aviation Across DOD**
 - DoD should integrate tactical aviation capabilities to eliminate excess capacity.
- **Integrate Ground Forces Across DOD**
 - DoD should assess overall ground requirement (Army, USMC, Special Operations) to deliver the proper military capability.
- **Improve Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) for the Joint Warfighter**
 - Operational commanders require a timely, adaptive, and responsive capability.
 - DoD should deliver a flexible, persistent, and responsive ISR capability that balances space-based, theater-based, and organic assets.
- **Review Special Operations Forces Capabilities and Force Structure**
 - Call out Special Operations Forces force structure separately in the QDR when assessing Service and Joint force capabilities
 - Integrate Special Operations Forces capabilities with conventional forces in joint warfighting concepts, planning, and joint training.
- **Develop Special Access Program Concepts to Inform DOD's Acquisition Strategy**
 - Special access program concepts are not included within Joint Operating Concepts and therefore they are not translated into an acquisition strategy.
- **Implement Goldwater-Nichols Type Reforms for Acquisition**
- **Formalize Joint Processes and Authorities for Oversight and Management of the Acquisition of All Command and Control Systems**

The following subjects, although more narrow in scope, should also be addressed in QDR 2005:

- **Charter Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) at each Combatant Command with adequate manning resources from across the US Government**
 - Implement an operational JIACG at each regional combatant command with Interagency and DoD agency personnel to execute plans in consonance with approved policies.
- **Increase the Level of Effort in Combating Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)**
 - While we have made progress in this area since my last report to the Chairman, we haven't gone far enough.
 - IEDs are the "weapons of precise destruction" that the US and its Allies will face for decades to come. We need a "Manhattan Project"-like program to tackle this threat.

QDR 2005 should focus on a small number of key issues such as those forwarded above.


E. P. GIAMBASTIANI
Admiral, U.S. Navy

~~FOUO~~

ES-1693
04/016918

December 14, 2004

TO: Ken Krieg
Ryan Henry

SUBJECT: QDR Items from Paul Wolfowitz

Let's make sure Paul Wolfowitz's QDR items are featured.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/12/04 DSD Memo to SecDef re: QDR Issues

DHR:as
121404-11

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 00018-05

15-12-04 A10:56 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/21386

~~FOUO~~

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: December 12, 2004

CC: General Myers
General Pace
Ryan Henry
Ken Krieg

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz *PW*

SUBJECT: Request for QDR Issues

Don,

The following are my proposed Top 5 QDR issues, in more or less priority order:

1. What capabilities does the Department (and the **USG**) need to have **for** counterinsurgency warfare (as opposed to peacekeeping):
 - Focus particularly on: intelligence issues **and** on building capacity of indigenous security forces (including funding, training and language capabilities).
2. What is the right balance of **risks** between capabilities needed **for** the Global **War** on Terrorism **and** capabilities needed to manage the emerging military competition in East **and South** Asia.
3. **What** capabilities should DoD have for homeland security, particularly to prevent or deal with a catastrophic attack
 - Particular emphasis on biological terrorism.
4. Persistent surveillance is taking precision targeting to a new level.
 - What capabilities should we have in manned, unmanned and space systems for persistent surveillance;

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21387

~~FOUO~~

- What changes are needed in organization, decision processes, force capabilities, etc. to properly exploit this development.
5. What is the right balance of investment in tac air relative to other DoD needs.

~~FOUO~~

DEC 28 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
 cc: *Paul Butler*
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Art Cebrowski

020 FTJ

Please draft a note to Art Cebrowski, then return this letter to me and let's talk about it at Roundtable some morning, how we ought to move forward.

Thanks.

Attach.
 12/22/04 Letter from A.K. Cebrowski to SecDef

DHR:ss
 122704-11

.....
 Please respond by 1/7/04

28 Dec 04

SIR —

Draft letter
 at tab. I'll
 tickle the topic
 for personnel meeting
~~FOUO~~ + roundtable.

22 Dec 04

11-L-0559/OSD/21389
 OSD 00054-05
✓ R [Signature]

Vice Admiral Art Cebrowski, USN (Ret)
Director, Office of Force Transformation
Address

OK

Dear Art,

With both regret for your departure and admiration for your accomplishments, I accept your request to be relieved of duties as Director of Force Transformation on 31 January 2005.

You can be justifiably proud of all you have done for the Department and the Nation, and your work to embed the idea of transformation into the Department's efforts will endure – especially your vision of Network-Centric Warfare.

I wish you the very best in the time ahead, and thank you for a job well done.

11-L-0559/OSD/21390



FORCE TRANSFORMATION
OFFICE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

QW 12/27

December 22, 2004

020 FTD

Dear Mr. Secretary,

This letter is to request that I be relieved of my duties as Director, Force Transformation as of 31 January, 2005.

Working under your dedicated leadership in pursuing the President's transformation objectives has been rewarding and professionally satisfying. However, I must step aside due to personal commitments and health issues.

The Office of Force Transformation is successful for several important reasons. First, without your personal strong commitment to leadership of transformation the task would be impossible. Second, we report directly to you and the Deputy, and you allow us to work outside the normal course in an organizational arrangement that protects powerful ideas from bureaucratic tyranny. Finally, we have assembled a small, but talented inter-disciplinary team, both uniformed and civilian. And we have built a virtual team of vast dimensions. While there is much to be done, the accomplishments of the office are what we had hoped from the beginning. For example:

- Transformation is now integral to national strategy and DoD corporate strategy.
- Network-Centric Warfare has emerged across the Department as the theory of war for the information-age and well supported by rigorous analysis.
- The culture is changing. Transformational leadership chairs and research projects have been established across the war colleges and service academies

22 DEC 04

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- Powerful new concepts are in prototype or experimentation, including a new business model for space, Sense and Respond Logistics, controlling engagement timelines in urban combat, high speed distributed capabilities for naval forces, redirected energy for both lethal and non-lethal applications, and many others.

Our latest assessment of the Transformation Roadmaps is encouraging. I will provide you with an overall strategic transformation appraisal soon.

My interest in advancing national security policy and the President's transformation agenda is enduring. I hope to be able to continue to contribute in some capacity.

Sincerely,



A. K. Cebrowski

Director, Force Transformation

cc:
Deputy Secretary of Defense



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JAN 3 2005

020 FTD

Vice Admiral Art Cebrowski, USN (Ret)
Director, Office of Force Transformation
Room 3A287
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Art,

With both regret for your departure and admiration for your accomplishments, I accept your request to be relieved of duties as Director of Force Transformation on January 31, 2005.

You can justifiably be proud of all you have done for the Department and the Nation. Your work to embed the idea of transformation into the Department's efforts will endure – especially your vision of Network-Centric Warfare.

I wish you the very best in the time ahead. Thank you for a job well done.

Sincerely,

3 JAN 05

22 DEC 04

OSD 00054-05

11-L-0559/OSD/21393

January 3, 2005

TO: **Vice** President Richard B. Cheney
Dr. Condoleezza Rice
Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Report

We have all been concerned about the absence of a fully-coordinated, comprehensive U.S. Government strategic communications effort. And we have all been concerned about the resulting strong opposition to U.S. efforts in the world. Because of those concerns, some ten months ago I invited Dr. Ed Feulner, Mr. Joe Duffey and Mr. Lewis Manilow to dinner. They had been active in the U.S. Information Agency's Advisory Board over the past several decades, prior to its being abolished.

Attached is a private report to me they prepared as a result of that discussion. I found it interesting.

Attach.
11/2/04 Private Report to the Secretary of Defense

DHR:dh
010305-5

311

3/1/05

1/2/05

OSD 00076-05

*Private Report to the
Secretary of Defense*

311

Submitted Respectfully by:
Joseph Duffey
Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.
Lewis Manilow

November 2004

1 ready

11-L-0559/OSD/21395

00076-05

Executive Summary

To win the War on Terror, the United States must capture, **kill**, or deter more terrorists than our extremist allies can win over to their side. Moreover, it is crucial that we convince a significant number of people to be actively on our side. As such, the challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and central component of the War on Terror. Dozens of studies offering prescriptions for the deficiencies in America's foreign communication effort have **already** been produced. This paper does not seek to add to this cacophony of voices. Rather, we present two substantial and vital recommendations, which will allow America to bring to bear the full force of the greatest communications society in the history of the world to *the* challenge of shaping hearts and minds and changing viewpoints in the War on Terror.

It is important to note from the start, however, that any attempt at changing the attitudes and behaviors of foreign publics towards the United States is futile unless it enjoys the full support of the President. Just as the President serves as commander-in-chief of the United States military, he must similarly view himself as the lead spokesman for the United States to the citizens of foreign nations beyond foreign government leaders. This role must be a priority commitment that is followed through on a day-to-day basis and is an integral component of each of the President's decisions.

In order to communicate with foreign publics in a manner that changes attitudes and behavior towards America, the United States government should:

1) Establish a Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis

OBJECTIVE: Listen, ask questions, and analyze foreign public opinion as well as test the effectiveness of various USG messages.

It is startling how little the U.S. government (USG) currently engages in public opinion polling and how irrelevant much of the research it does do is. An effective public diplomacy effort must monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and then inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. By listening to the opinions of various groups and tailoring our message and – to an

appropriate degree – our policies to the information they we giving us, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world.

Winning the War on Terrorism will require unprecedented use of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and communications resources. To this end, the Administration should establish a private sector institution **similar** to RAND charged with gathering the information required by the USG to advance America's position in the communications aspect of the War on Terror.

The mission of this "Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis" (CFOA) will be to use the resources and capabilities of the United States of America to fully engage in a long-term market research effort aimed at better understanding foreign public opinion. It will be tasked with contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, ask questions, and analyze foreign public opinion in a manner that is not being done today, as well as test the effectiveness of various USG messages. Crucially, **CFOA** would only provide the research product – coordination of **message** and broad strategic decisions must be made through the National Security Council, the Departments of State and Defense, and relevant agencies.

2) Prepare the Government Bureaucracy to Apply Information

OBJECTIVE: Provide senior policy makers with immediate input so they are aware of the effect an impending policy action or statement will have on foreign public opinion.

Because the USG has so many official messengers, the need to have **all** of them singing off the same sheet **is** especially important. **CFOA** will provide the data that allows America to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly reevaluate and refine the U.S. government's message into the future. The USG must create a mechanism by which it can utilize **this** information effectively.

As such, a new staff position on the National Security Council should **be** created and charged with coordinating the U.S. government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with providing senior policy makers with immediate input based on **CFOA** data so that they **are aware** of the effect an impending policy action

or statement will **have** on foreign public opinion. Further, a senior interagency group should be created that brings the **NSC** staff member charged with the U.S. government's foreign public opinion programs **together** with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, all other relevant members of the Executive Branch, and other participants on an ad hoc **basis**.

A dialogue between America and the rest of the world must be seen as a **long-term** commitment central to America's **vital** national interest. The creation of a private institution, **performing** government contract work, charged with **constantly** measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of America's message, and the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion would give the USG the **real-time** information necessary for effective communication with the rest of the world. **Further**, bringing public diplomacy to the highest level of NSC deliberation will ensure that we communicate **our** message more **effectively** in the future.

Introduction

Shortly after the American Revolution, John Adams ~~was~~ asked who supported it and who didn't. He said about a third of the population had supported it; about a third had opposed it; and about a third was waiting to see who won. In many ways, this is the situation America is faced with today in the court of world opinion – and of particular importance in the Arab and Muslim World. The scorecard in the ~~War~~ War on Terror, however, is not simply one of battles or casualties. The simple (in theory) challenge of the War on Terror is to capture, kill, or deter more terrorists than our extremist **adversaries** can win over to their side. **As** such, the communications challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and **central** component of the war.

As the 9/11 commission bluntly stated, "The small percentage of Muslims who are fully committed to Usama Bin Ladin's version of Islam are impervious to persuasion." To win the War on Terror, America needs a **strong** policy aimed at increasing the ranks of our supporters, decreasing the small percentage of Muslims who are "impervious to persuasion," and impacting those who, while not actively supportive of extremists, have sat on the sidelines **dire** to resentment of America. Put bluntly, **America** needs to **embark** on a long-term project to improve her **standing** in the public opinion of individuals in other nations around the world.

There have **been** a number of recent studies looking at the problem of public diplomacy. **All** have acknowledged a problem exists and there is significant agreement that there must be reform of the **U.S** government's public diplomacy infrastructure.² Yet just as the **War** on Terror has required a rethinking of many aspects of American foreign policy, it similarly justifies a strategic **reevaluation** of our public diplomacy efforts. Changing foreign public opinion is not simply a matter of **allocating more** resources or reshuffling bureaucratic boxes. Rather, the U.S. government needs to consider **all** available tools of public diplomacy – old and new – and how they can be properly **targeted** at various audiences in order to reach them **effectively**.

¹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, "The 9/11 Commission Report," pg. 375.

² Studies by The Heritage Foundation (including Heritage Backgrounder 1645 as well as a section in the 2005 *Mandate for Leadership*), The Brookings Institution, The American Enterprise Institute, The Council on Foreign Relations, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency, along with the U.S. Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World have all come to the same conclusion that there is a need to improve Islamic world perceptions of the United States and that there is inadequate structure to the U.S. public diplomacy effort.

This project must be whole-heartedly embarked upon by the Administration not because it will play well in the American media or because of a philosophical commitment to Wilsonian multilateralism. Rather, it is a challenge that lies at the very core of America's own vital national interest.

I. Wow America Is Viewed Abroad

America's standing in the rest of the world has taken a beating in recent years. In the Republic of Korea, for example, 50% of respondents to a poll taken by the Pew Research Center in May 2003 have a negative view of the United States. This negative view of the U.S., however, is sharply divided based on the respondent's age: only 30% of respondents over 50 had a negative view of the U.S. while 71% of respondents between the ages of 18 and 29 view America unfavorably.³ This stark contrast suggests that older Koreans are perhaps more cognizant of the North Korean threat - and, therefore, look more favorably on the security provided by the United States - than the younger generation, and that older Koreans remember the shared sacrifices of the United States and South Korea in the 1950s.

America's standing is also highly negative in the Arab and Muslim World. A Zogby International Poll taken in March 2003 finds only 14% of Egyptians, 11% of Jordanians, 9% of Moroccans, 3% of Saudis, and 11% of citizens of the United Arab Emirates hold a favorable view of the United States.

These numbers are particularly shocking in light of the fact that in that same month Zogby found strong similarities between the citizens of the Arab World and Americans. Arabs, for example, list "Quality of Work," "Family," and "Religion" as the three most important concerns of their personal life; Americans list "Family," "Quality of Work," and "Friends" as their three most important values. "Foreign policy," seen by many as an important cause of the strained view many Arabs hold of the United States, is only the eighth most important concern for Arabs.

In addition to sharing values on a personal level, Americans and Arabs share core political values. 92% of respondents in Turkey, 92% in Lebanon, 53% in Jordan, and 79% in Uzbekistan and Pakistan feel it is important to be able to criticize their

³ "International Public Concern About North Korea," *The Pew Research Center*, August 22, 2003.

government. There is also strong support among Arabs for honest elections, a fair judicial system, and freedom of the press.⁴ The question these statistics beg is: "Why, given the amount we have in common, is the United States seen in such a negative light in the rest of the world?" While each of us could come up with a number of answers to this question – some of which might even prove accurate – the best way to reverse this troubling trend of anti-Americanism is to comprehensively study the question and formulate policy based on accurate, scientific data. Collecting these data is a crucial first step towards engaging the rest of the world in a public diplomacy dialogue.

II. If It Isn't Measured, It Won't Be Improved

It is startling how little the U.S. government currently does by way of public opinion polling. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. government only spends \$5 million annually on this type of analysis.⁵ Further, much of the research the U.S. government does fails to address important questions. For example, *The Washington Post* has reported on a draft report prepared by the State Department's inspector general on the effectiveness of Radio Sawa, a key organ of the United States government's Middle East public diplomacy effort:

The draft report said that while Radio Sawa has been promoted as a "heavily researched broadcasting network," the research concentrated primarily on gaining audience share, not on measuring whether Radio Sawa was influencing its audience. Despite the larger audiences, "it is difficult to ascertain Radio Sawa's impact in countering anti-American views and the biased state-run media of the Arab world," the draft report said.⁶

Comprehensive research into how foreign audiences feel about America, specific American policies, and how the United States can best change attitudes and behavior needs to be conducted.⁷ Doing so would require a significant increase to the miniscule

⁴ Hady Amr, "The Need to Communicate: How To Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World," *The Brookings Institution*, January 2004.

⁵ 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. 6.

⁶ Glenn Kessler, "The Role of Radio Sawa in Mideast Questioned," *The Washington Post*, October 13, 2004, page A12. The draft report was leaked to the *Post* "by a source who said he feared that the inspector general's office was buckling under pressure and would water down the conclusions."

⁷ U.S. foreign opinion polling and analysis is fragmented and poorly focused. Senior State Department managers moved USIA's Office of Research and Media Reaction out of the public diplomacy hierarchy when the agency was folded into the Department in 1999. Today, it sits in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) where it contributes more to all-source intelligence reports than to strategic communication efforts. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has contracts with Intermedia, a private firm, which conducts surveys of audience share. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) collects and assesses print,

budget public diplomacy research currently receives. This investment is essential to building an effective program.

An effective public diplomacy effort would monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and would inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. Public diplomacy experts have long sought to have public diplomacy present at the “takeoff” as well as the “crash landing” of American policy. Rather, public diplomacy should be seen as a crucial component of the aircraft itself.

At its best, information gathered by public diplomacy researchers would be passed along to policymakers in relevant agencies. As a result, policymakers would be aware of the implications of policy decisions and statements on foreign public opinion and public diplomacy officers would be able to honestly inform foreign publics that their opinions were considered – if not always agreed with – in the formation of American policy.

Clearly, American officials should be making public policy decisions based on America’s vital national interest; they should, however, recognize that it is conceivable the benefits of a policy might in fact be outweighed by the negative impact that policy has on foreign public opinion. Informing policymakers of how an issue will “play” in foreign public opinion can help them determine whether a seemingly beneficial policy will unintentionally create more terrorists than it deters, captures, or kills.

Up-to-date information on foreign publics is not only important for policy makers, but also for public diplomacy officers. With a wide variety of tools at their disposal – from visas to speeches, advertisements to interviews, and so forth – information about the people with whom they are communicating can only help public diplomacy officers in applying the correct tools to the correct audience at the right time and in the right proportion. In this way, public diplomacy research allows for a dialogue between America and the rest of the world by seeking feedback from foreign audience. Public diplomacy is not just about getting our message out, but also listening to the sentiments

radio, TV, and Internet-based publications. Some U.S. Embassies, individual military commands, and the CIA also engage in limited opinion and media research. None of these products are combined and analyzed in ways for policymakers to use. Many are available to restricted user sets. Collection takes precedence over analysis and “issue of the day” polling often trumps media content and trend assessments. See the “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication,” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Washington, DC, September 2004, p. 26-27.

of foreigners. By incorporating a serious research component into the overall public diplomacy effort of the U.S. government, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world. It is a dialogue that has been ignored for too long.

III. A Serious Reevaluation of Public Diplomacy in the War on Terror

The U.S. government might be well-advised to remember the words of MIT professor Norbert Wiener, who said "I never know what I say until I hear the response." This is certainly not the case for the U.S. government, which consistently fails to attempt to research the reasons for anti-Americanism abroad or to use research in formulating a clear communication strategy that engages foreign audiences in a dialogue. As the General Accounting Office found in its 2002 analysis of the State Department's public diplomacy efforts, "State Lacks a Strategy for Public Diplomacy Programs."⁸ America is the best in the world at market research – it is a crucial part of domestic politics – but we are notably uninformed about audiences abroad. Changing this situation must be an immediate priority of the U.S. government.

In trying to improve America's standing in the eyes of the rest of the world American public diplomacy officers need to understand that public opinion cannot be changed either solely on the basis of reason nor solely on the basis of emotion. Rather, it requires the foundation of reason to persuade people and the associated emotional relevance to motivate their decision-making and behavior. Further, the bottom line of public diplomacy ought to be changing the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics. If the end product of a particular program is only a change in mental state, it is not effective public diplomacy.

Underlying this change in behaviors is an exchange process between the U.S. (including the U.S. government as well as the private sector) and foreign audiences. To be successful, foreign audiences must believe that the ideas advocated by the United States are better than any reasonable alternative – including world views promoted by their governments, other segments of the population they are exposed to, and extremists who can often be quite persuasive. This relationship between the United States and foreign audiences can only be cultivated if the United States pursues a broad strategy that

⁸ U.S. General Accounting Office, "U.S. Public Diplomacy," September 2003, pg. 13

identifies what audiences we are trying to persuade and what tools we have at our disposal to attempt to influence these audiences as well as how and when these tools should be utilized.

In order to convince foreign audiences to support America's vision of freedom and prosperity under the rule of law (or, at the very least, oppose extremist visions of death and destruction), we must begin by identifying the different segments that exist around the world that we are trying to persuade. That is, a one-size-fits-all public diplomacy effort is less likely to be successful than one that recognizes that the arguments that are successful in the Muslim world might be different from the persuasive arguments we should highlight in Asia. Further, we might package our message differently to one religious or ethnic group within a country than we would another group. The same could be true for different age groups - older Koreans who remember the Korean War, for example, will be persuaded by a different message than their younger countrymen who only know of the war from distorted history books accounts.

Crucially, this does not mean America should be delivering contradictory messages to different groups. Not only does delivering false messages or propaganda go against many of the basic principles our country stands for, but also it would be unwise from a practical standpoint, as audiences worldwide would quickly catch on to any contradictions. Rather, America should simply recognize that our message should be delivered differently to different groups.

To spread our message, the U.S. government should employ all available tools of public diplomacy. This would include utilizing the President, the Secretary of State, and other Cabinet officers and senior government officials as well as Americans in the private sector, including teachers, students, journalists, business people, and so forth. These "public diplomacy ambassadors" can speak to foreign audiences using a variety of promotional tools such as advertisements, speeches, interviews, lectures, and educational exchanges. The key is for the U.S. government to invest in the research necessary to effectively pair a message with a messenger and a medium.

The U.S. government should also not be hesitant to use the private sector in doing research into foreign audiences and their reactions to the United States. As an Independent Taskforce sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations noted in 2003:

The "U.S. private sector leads the world in most of the **key** strategic areas required for effective public diplomacy: technology, film and broadcast, marketing research, and communications."⁹ Ultimately, effective communication with the rest of the world will require not only the tools of traditional government-run public diplomacy (though these tools will remain vital), but also the resources and expertise of the American **private** sector.

IV. Incorporating Research Into the US Government Bureaucracy

A vital part of this new framework for engaging the public opinion aspect of the War on Terror is making sure that American policy makers and advocates **have the most** accurate and up-to-date information about foreign audiences available to them **at all** times. Doing so requires two important actions from the Administration that will **allow** the **U.S.** government to bring the best work of the American public and private sectors to bear in the fight to shape the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics.

The U.S. Government should create an independent foreign public opinion institution

At the conclusion of World War II, the **Commanding** General of the Army Air Force, Hap Arnold, wrote to Secretary of War Henry Stimson:

"During this war the Army, Army Air Forces, and the Navy **have** made unprecedented use of scientific and industrial resources. The conclusion is inescapable that we have not yet established the balance necessary to insure the continuance of teamwork among the military, other government agencies, industry, and the universities. Scientific planning **must be years** in advance of the actual research and development work."¹⁰

Out of this understanding of the importance of technology research and development for success on the battlefield, representatives of the War Department, the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and **private** industry established Project RAND, the precursor of today's RAND Corporation. The Articles of Incorporation bluntly set forth RAND's purpose: "To further and promote scientific, educational, and charitable purposes, all for the public welfare and security of the United States of **America.**"

⁹ Peter G. Peterson, et al., "Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy Toward the Middle East", The Council on Foreign Relations, 2003, pg. 6.

¹⁰ The Rand Corporation. "History and Mission" (<http://www.rand.org/about/history/>)

Similarly, winning the War on Terrorism will require unprecedented use of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and communications resources. In order to best utilize those resources it is vital to insure the teamwork of the State Department, Defense Department, other government agencies, universities, and the private sector. To this end, the Administration should push for the creation of a private sector institution similar to RAND charged with gathering the information required by the U.S government to advance America's position in the ideological aspect of the War on Terror.

The mission of this "Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis" (CFOA) would be to use the resources and capabilities of the United States of America to fully engage in a long-term market research effort aimed at better understanding foreign public opinion. It would be tasked with contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, ask question, and analyze foreign public opinion in a manner that is simply not done today. There are knowledge gaps with regard to issues of anti-American sentiment and this institution would be tasked with reviewing all existing data plus contracting for any original research needed to fill remaining knowledge gaps."

There are a number of significant advantages to creating this corporation. First, the corporation's independence avoids creating bureaucratic fights over what budget the money for foreign public opinion research comes from, who controls the focus of the research, and so forth. Second, CFOA would provide a useful product for consumption across many areas of government - from the Broadcasting Board of Governors to the National Security Advisor - and keeping it independent would allow its resources to be used by a wide-may of interests. Finally, it would provide a method for coordinating different aspects of government engagement with the rest of the world while still maintaining crucial separation between various entities. That is, given how vital it is that public diplomacy be differentiated from public affairs, public relations, information warfare, and psyops, creating an independent corporation would allow each to continue to work completely in its own sphere while still having access to research when necessary.

¹¹ See the testimony of Keith Reinhard, President of Business for Diplomatic Action, Inc., before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations (August 23, 2004) for an excellent analysis of how America's communications expertise can be applied to the communication aspect of the War on Terror

Create a mechanism for using CFOA

Because *the* U.S. government has so many official messengers, the need to have all of them singing off the same sheet is especially important. Yet, over recent years, public diplomacy coordination has deteriorated.¹² CFOA will provide the data that allows America to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly reevaluate and revise that strategy into the future. The U.S. government **must** create a mechanism by which it can utilize this information effectively.

A vital first step is to make sure that someone is empowered with coordinating all activities, behaviors, and messages so that they are aligned with the U.S. government's overall communication strategy. The current Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy position is clearly not this empowered individual as he or she lacks authority over both budgets and personnel assignments. It is also vital that this individual have the ability to easily get information to the highest levels of government.

As such, a new staff position on the National Security Council should be created and charged with coordinating the U.S. government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with receiving information from CFOA and disseminating it to policy makers so that they are aware of the effect a policy action will have on foreign public opinion. This coordination does not currently exist. As the 2004 report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy states, "Along with the White House and the Department of State, nearly all government agencies engage in

¹²The former U.S. Information Agency had a Director and senior staff that coordinated with other government agencies, and a budget to accomplish its mission, even though it declined toward the end of the Cold War. Moreover, a public diplomacy coordinator position was staffed in the National Security Council during the Reagan Administration. Since President Clinton issued PDD 68 (Presidential Decision Directive on International Public Information) April 30, 1999, there has been no Presidential directive on public diplomacy. The NSC terminated it in 2001 pending a review of U.S. public diplomacy policy. Since then, the Department of Defense created and abolished the Office of Strategic Influence. The State Department has had two Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy with large gaps in service. In June 2002, the White House created the Office of Global Communications which keeps U.S. officials "on message" but does not direct, coordinate, or evaluate public diplomacy activities. And in September 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice established the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee to coordinate inter-agency activities. It reportedly met twice and has had little impact. A small inter-agency working group was created within the State Department Under Secretariat for Public Diplomacy, but lacks a budget, contracting authority, sufficient communication support, and attention from State and other Cabinet agency leaders. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," p. 25, 26.

some public diplomacy efforts. While a few structures link federal officials, coordination often does not extend to embassy practitioners.””

In order to keep all parts of the government bureaucracy moving towards the same goal, a senior interagency group (SIG) should be created that brings the NSC staff member charged with the U.S. government's foreign public opinion programs together with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, all other relevant members of the Executive Branch, and other participants on an ad hoc basis. This formal consulting mechanism would encourage closer cooperation among the various parties involved. Acting on the information provided by CFOA, this SIG would allow the relevant Under Secretaries to implement the government's long-term communications strategy.

The NSC staff member would also be responsible for ensuring that all U.S. government messengers are given the information required to effectively communicate with their audiences. Something similar to the daily "Talking Points from the Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs" or "The Global Messenger" produced by the White House Office of Global Communications should be disseminated to all U.S. government messengers as well as information that is specific to particular audiences.¹⁴ Thus, a U.S. government public diplomacy officer in the Republic of Korea should be given instructions as to what information the U.S. government communication strategy calls for him or her to communicate to young Koreans, old Koreans, businessman, opinion makers, and so forth. Once again, it is vital that each of these segments only be given accurate information from the U.S. government, but the style and tone of America's message must be fine-tuned for various foreign audience segments. Importantly, this fine-tuning must be based on continuous research.

A Serious Commitment From the President

Regardless of how well-structured the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus is, however, it will only be effective if changing foreign public opinion is signaled as a

¹³ 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. 8.

¹⁴ The effectiveness of these talking points would be drastically improved by comprehensive audience research allowing them to explain not only what America wants to say, but how it should be said as well as what questions audience segments around the world are looking for America to answer. Further, it is striking that the State Department does not appear to produce any daily talking points.

national security **priority** by the President. Just as the President serves as commander-in-chief of the United States military, he must similarly **view** himself as the lead spokesman for the United States to foreign nationals beyond foreign governmental leaders. This commitment must be made not only through public statements and **private** consultation and analysis within the White House, but also in the President's continuing contacts with Department of State officials, including diplomatic **Chiefs** of Mission. It must be a **priority** commitment that is followed through on a day-to-day basis and in each of the **President's** decisions. Foreign public opinion is no less important to *American* national security than American public opinion is to an election.

Conclusion

While one might be understandably skeptical of a proposal for "further study" of a problem, in the case of altering foreign beliefs and behavior a short pause to hammer out a comprehensive strategy is called for. The temptation of **many** in Washington - including many who have written reports on how to revitalize public diplomacy - is to **try** and rekindle the glory years of the United States Information Agency (USIA) during the Cold War. While USIA-type programs are important - and should be seen as **vital** components of the War on Terrorism - it is **far** more important for the **U.S.** government to fully understand and conceptualize a long-term communications program with the rest of the world. **America** needs to do more than broadcast our **message** to foreign audiences; we need to **listen** to their complaints and respond to them appropriately.

The framework **laid** out in this **paper** does just that. It starts with an intense stage of information gathering where American government officials - with the help of the private-sector - evaluate all of the information currently **available** and procures whatever other information is needed to accurately and fully understand foreign public opinion at a specific point in time. This baseline is then given to policy **makers**, so prior policy can be reevaluated and future policy evaluated in light of the benefits **America** gains and the cost it may or may not have on foreign public opinion. Further, this information is given to American public diplomacy and public affairs officials - under the guidance of a newly created NSC staff member chairing a SIG - who **use this** information to craft an effective, informed, and flexible communications effort for America.

Finally, this dialogue between America and the rest of the **world** – and the responsive framework established that incorporates government and the private sector – is seen as a long-term commitment. The creation of a private institution charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of **America's message**, and the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion would give the **U.S.** government the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the rest of the world.

As John Adams famously observed, “The Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people.” For a small, extremist segment of the world population values like freedom and prosperity are meaningless. Yet the vast majority of people around the globe is more interested in security for themselves and their families than war and destruction. America has a peaceful message and strives to be a force for Freedom and prosperity around the world. Yet we are doing incredible harm to ourselves by **not** advocating for ourselves effectively. As the 9/11 commission stated: “If the United States does not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic world, the extremists will gladly do the job for us.”¹⁵ Richard Holbrooke put it best, “How can a man in a cave **out** communicate the world's leading communications society?”¹⁶

American national security requires that we harness the wealth of resources we have available to communicate **with** the rest of the world. We must **speak and listen to** the rest of the world clearly, accurately, and effectively. If we do so, we will prevail.

¹⁵ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States. “The 9/11 Commission Report,” pg. 377.

¹⁶ Richard Holbrooke, “Get the Message Out,” *Washington Post*, Oct. 28, 2001, p. B7

January 2, 2004

381

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

cc: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Counterinsurgency

I read your November 11 memo on elements of successful counterinsurgency.

You are right—it is interesting.

What do you propose?

Thanks.

Attach.
11/11/03 CENTCOM memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
010204-22

.....
Please respond by 1/31/04

2 Jan 04

OSD 00108-04

CCCC

November 11, 2003

11/12
C 11/13

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FROM GEN ABIZAID

Mr. Secretary:

Counter-Insurgency

Sir, our doctrine states: "Counterinsurgency—those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency." (Joint Pub 1-02) Clearly we must integrate elements of national power in any effort to defeat an insurgency.

Attached is 'Elements of Successful Counterinsurgency' [Low Intensity Conflict) worthy of your time to digest'

V/R

John

Copy to: CJCS

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what froyok

SECDEF CABLES DISTRIBUTION	
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RB	<input type="checkbox"/>
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CABLE CH	<input type="checkbox"/>
FILE	<input type="checkbox"/>

Elements of Successful Counterinsurgency (U)

Counterinsurgency (COIN) practitioners and academic experts on insurgency generally agree on an interrelated set of prerequisites for a successful counterinsurgency strategy:

Separate the insurgent cadre from the rank and file by addressing local grievances that feed the insurgency. Calculated reforms, such as infrastructure and social service enhancements and land reform, that address material grievances are widely viewed as effective in undercutting insurgent appeal and gaining support for the government.

Strengthen the rule of law. To bolster legitimacy, experts maintain that COIN operations and policies must be legal. Emergency measures should be proportionate to the threat with appropriate legal safeguards established.

Develop a coordinated, integrated plan based on an accurate assessment of the insurgency's goals, techniques, and strategies. Successful plans blend political, judicial, administrative, diplomatic, and economic policies with appropriate security and military measures and clearly delineate roles and responsibilities.

Unify COIN management. Although experts differ over the degree of centralization necessary, all prescribe development of an organizational infrastructure capable of coordinating all aspect-civilian and military-of the COIN effort.

Demonstrate a will to win by devoting adequate resources to the COIN effort, assigning the best and brightest to work on COIN, and exhibiting a willingness on the part of the public and government to sacrifice to support the COIN effort.

Enhance political legitimacy and develop a peaceful path for political resolution. Accomplishing these goals, according to COIN experts, often requires open and honest elections.

Ensure civilian oversight and authority over military operations. Experts insist that successful COIN campaigns require that political goals take precedence over military goals if they conflict. An apolitical military, concentrating on the military aspects of the conflict, and healthy political-military relationship are required.

Control troop behavior and firepower, ill-disciplined troops using indiscriminate firepower drive the population into backing the insurgency. Precise control of firepower and troops to prevent damage and injury to the civilian population will minimize inadvertently feeding the insurgency.

Employ sound COIN tactics. An insurgency relying on low-level guerrilla tactics is best confronted, according to COIN experts, by employing unconventional strategies and tactics that emphasize small-unit operations, sustained and aggressive patrolling, and rapid-reaction forces.

Establish an effective intelligence apparatus that targets the insurgent organizational and leadership structure and shares intelligence among the military services and echelons and the police.

Employ integrated psychological operations that are tailored to domestic, insurgent, and international audiences.

Field popular militia. Firmly controlled and adequately equipped local defense forces free up regular forces and increase security for local officials and a government presence.

Eliminate the insurgents' foreign support. Through diplomacy, international information operations, and possibly military action, deny the insurgents foreign sanctuary and material assistance.

ADVANCE COPY



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

ACTION MEMO

12/19/2004 3:04 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes*

SUBJECT: Letter to Senator McCain Regarding Changes to Joint Ethics Regulation

- Attached for your signature is a letter to Senator McCain describing the recent changes to the Joint Ethics Regulation to strengthen our programs to prevent violations of conflicts of interest statutes by personnel who are leaving public service for employment by private enterprise.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the letter

COORDINATION: Legislative Affairs

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DECISION: **JAN 5 2005**
Approve and sign letter

 Disapprove

Prepared by Steve Epstein (b)(6)

*Sir,
I recommend Larry D. Rota have an opportunity to provide his views on the letter.
WJ Haynes*

2520

19 Dec 04

OSD 00202 -05

17 Dec 04



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

The Honorable John McCain
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator McCain:

I am writing to apprise you of recent changes the Department of Defense has undertaken to strengthen our programs to prevent violation of conflicts of interest statutes, particularly those dealing with the transition of DoD personnel from public service to private enterprise. *Asst*

On October 25, 2004, the ~~Deputy Secretary of Defense~~ *Department* implemented changes to three sections of DoD Directive 5500.7-R, Joint Ethics Regulation. The first change requires all senior DoD personnel (civilian and military) who file the public financial disclosure report (SF 278) to certify annually that they are aware of the disqualification and employment restrictions of 18 U.S.C. 207 (which bars certain activities after leaving public service), 18 U.S.C. 208 (which bars Federal personnel from participating in official actions that involve a private enterprise in which that employee is negotiating employment), and 41 U.S.C. 423 (the Procurement Integrity Act.) This certification, which is already in effect, also requires senior DoD officials to attest that they have not violated the above statutes.

The second change modifies the requirements for annual ethics training: adding a new requirement to expand the training on post-Government service employment restrictions included in all annual ethics training, regardless of other topics presented in that training.

The third change mandates that all DoD personnel, when leaving Federal service, receive guidance on post-Government service employment restrictions. Although many DoD commands and other organizations currently provide this guidance as part of their out-processing, this change in the Joint Ethics Regulation will require such guidance.

I am enclosing a copy of the change to our regulation along with a copy of a recent press release discussing these initiatives.

Sincerely,

Encl: As stated

11-L-0550/6 SD/21415

ANNUAL CERTIFICATION

As a member of the Department of Defense who files a public financial disclosure report (SF 278), DoD 5500.7-R, Joint Ethics Regulation (JER), requires you to certify each year that you are aware of the restrictions that three statutes place on you during your Federal service when you are negotiating employment and after you leave Federal service. You are also required to certify that you have not violated these statutes.

The statutes, with brief definitions of terms, are summarized below. If you have any questions, please contact your ethics counselor.

18 U.S.C. 208: Restrictions On Negotiating Employment:

Federal employees are prohibited from participating personally and substantially in an official capacity in any particular matter in which, to their knowledge, they, or any person or organization with whom they are negotiating or have any arrangement concerning prospective employment, have a financial interest, if the particular matter will have a direct and predictable effect on that interest.

“Particular Matter” - matters that involve deliberation, decision, or action that is focused on the interests of specific persons or a discrete and identifiable class of persons. These matters may include a contract, claim, application, judicial or other proceeding, request for a ruling or other determination, controversy, investigation, or charge. A “particular matter” could even include legislation or policy-making that is narrowly focused on the interests of a discrete and identifiable group of parties or organizations, e.g., DoD policy affecting only military aircraft manufacturers.

“Personal and Substantial” Participation – To participate “personally” means to participate directly. It also includes the direct and active supervision of the participation of a subordinate. Participation is substantial if it is of significance to the matter, and may occur through decision, approval, recommendation, investigation, or advice. One act, such as approving a critical step, may be substantial, but an entire series of peripheral acts may not be.

“Direct and Predictable Effect” - a close, causal link between **any** action taken on the matter and **any** expected effect of the matter on the potential employer’s financial interest. An effect may be direct even though it does not occur immediately, although effects on the general economy are not direct. There must also be a real, not speculative, possibility that the matter will affect the financial interest, but the size of the gain or loss is not relevant.

“Negotiating” - any discussion or communications with the organization or **an** agent, with the mutual view of reaching an agreement regarding possible employment. It is not limited to just discussing specific terms and conditions of employment in a specific position.

Please note that regulations place similar restrictions when you are seeking employment. Please also note that your disqualification remains in effect until it may be withdrawn or your participation is authorized by appropriate authority.

11-L-0559/OSD/21416

41 U.S.C. 423: Restrictions On Seeking Employment:

DoD personnel may not participate personally and substantially in a DoD procurement valued at more than \$100,000 when seeking employment with a bidder or offeror. The rules require that personnel file written disqualification statements with the contracting officer, source selection authority, and immediate supervisor. They must identify the procurement, describe the nature and specific dates of participation in the procurement, and identify the bidder or offeror and describe its interest.

DoD personnel must promptly report, in writing, to their supervisors and ethics officials, any employment contact with a bidder or offeror in a DoD procurement valued at more than \$100,000, even when they promptly reject the employment contact.

“Seeking employment” - includes inquiries regarding potential future employment, including negotiations, and responses, other than immediate and clear rejections, to unsolicited communications regarding possible employment. It does not include requesting a job application, but does include a 2-month period after forwarding a resume unless the possibility of employment is rejected prior to that time.

“DoD Procurement Valued at More Than \$100,000” - DoD acquisition, using competitive procedures and appropriated funds, for a contract in excess of the simplified acquisition threshold, currently \$100,000.

“Personal and Substantial Participation” - active and significant involvement in any of the following activities directly related to the procurement:

- drafting, reviewing, or approving the specification or statement of work;
- preparing or developing the solicitation;
- evaluating bids or proposals;
- selecting a source;
- negotiating price or terms and conditions; or
- reviewing and approving the award.

Unless and until you have received written authorization from the Head of the Contracting Authority, you will remain disqualified.

18 U.S.C. 207: Post-Government Service Employment Restrictions:

Senior Officials -

For 1 year after leaving a senior position, they may not make any communications or appearances on behalf of any other person before any officer or employee of the agency or agencies in which they served within 1 year prior to leaving the senior position, with the intent to influence in connection with any matter on which official action is sought by the other person.

For 1 year after leaving a senior position, they may not aid, advise, or represent a foreign government or foreign political party with the intent to influence any officer or employee of any Federal department or agency, or Member of Congress.

"Senior Officials" - flag and general officers, and civilian personnel whose basic rate of pay is at or above 86.5% of the basic rate for Executive Schedule Level II (at or above \$136,757 in 2004).

"Agency" -

For Presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed appointees: all of DoD, including the Military Departments and DoD Agencies.

For general and flag officers and all other covered civilian personnel: their component within DoD: the Military Departments, DISA, DIA, DLA, NGA, NRO, DTRA, and NSA. For flag and general officers assigned outside of their Military Department, their agency will include their Military Department in addition to other components in which they served during the last year of service.

Very Senior Official (Secretary of Defense) - additional 1-year ban on communications or appearances before all employees in positions on the Executive Schedule in all agencies of the executive branch.

All Personnel -

Forever after terminating Federal service, they may not make a communication or appearance on behalf of any other person before any officer or employee of any Federal agency or court with the intent to influence in connection with a particular matter in which they personally and substantially participated, which involved a specific party at the time of the participation and representation, and in which the U.S. is a party or has a direct and substantial interest.

"Specific Parties" - identifiable parties other than the Federal Government.

For 2 years after terminating Government service, Government officers and employees may not make a communication or appearance on behalf of any other person before any officer or employee of any Federal agency or court with the intent to influence in connection with a particular matter which they reasonably should have known was actually pending under their official responsibility within 1 year before they left Government service, which involved a specific party at that time, and in which the U.S. is a party or has a direct and substantial interest.

"Official Responsibility" - direct administrative or operating authority to approve, disapprove, or otherwise direct, Government actions. It includes a supervisor at any level having responsibility for the actions of a subordinate employee who actually participates in a matter.

For 1 year after terminating Government service, they may not represent, aid, or advise someone else on the basis of covered information concerning any ongoing trade or treaty negotiation in which they participated personally and substantially in their last year of Government service.

“Trade Negotiations” - those undertaken pursuant to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (19 U.S.C. 2902).

“Treaties” - international agreements that require the advice and consent of the Senate.

“Covered Information” - agency records accessible to the employee but exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.

There are exceptions to the restrictions of 18 U.S.C. 207.

41 U.S.C. 423 Post-Government Service Employment Restrictions :

For 1 year after a designated date, covered DoD personnel may not accept compensation from the prime contractor on a DoD contract valued in excess of \$10,000,000.

“Designated Date for Covered Personnel” – Date of selection or award of contract for service by procuring contracting officers, source selection authorities, members of source selection evaluation boards, and chiefs of financial or technical evaluation teams;

Last date of service on the contract for program managers, deputy program managers, and administrative contracting officers;

Date of decision for officials who personally made any of the following decisions:

- 1) to award contracts, subcontracts, or modifications of contracts or subcontracts, or task or delivery orders in excess of \$10,000,000,
- 2) to establish overhead or other rates valued in excess of \$10,000,000,
- 3) to approve issuance of a contract payment in excess of \$10,000,000, or
- 4) to pay or settle a claim in excess of \$10,000,000.

“Valued in Excess of \$10,000,000” -

contract, including all options: value or estimated value at the time of award

indefinite-delivery/indefinite quantity or requirements contract: total estimated value of all orders at the time of award

any multiple award schedule contract: estimate, unless contracting officer documents a lower estimate

Basic Ordering Agreement: value of delivery order, task order or order claims: amount paid or to be paid in settlement

negotiated overhead or other rates: estimated monetary value, when applied to the Government portion of the applicable allocation base.

They may accept compensation from any division or affiliate of the contractor that does not produce the same or similar products or services as the entity responsible for the contract.

“Same or Similar” - a product or service must be “dissimilar enough” from that under the contract to warrant use of the exception.

"Same or Similar" - a product or service must be "dissimilar enough" from that under the contract to warrant use of the exception.

I certify that I am aware of the restrictions set forth above. I further certify that I have not knowingly violated those statutes that apply to Federal personnel while they are in Federal service.

Donald H. Rumsfeld
Printed Name


Signature

Dec. 10, 2004
Date

g://socgc/1-gail/Annual Certification/doc
Rev: 12/6/2004 4:40 PM



SEARCH

Dec. 20, 2004

War on Terror

Transformation


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Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

News Release

On the Web:

<http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20041220-1882.html>

Media contact: +1 (703) 697-5131

Public contact:

<http://www.dod.mil/faq/comment.html>

or +1 (703) 428-0711

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No. 1309-04
December 20, 2004

Post-Government Service Employment Restriction Changes Announced

The Department of Defense recently modified its ethics regulation to ensure DoD personnel, when leaving federal service, do not inadvertently violate federal "revolving door" statutes.

In a memorandum dated Oct 25, 2004, Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz directed three changes to the departmental ethics regulation, DoD Directive 5500.7-R.

The first change requires senior personnel, including admirals, generals, and senior civilian officials, to certify annually that they are aware of the requirements of three statutes, and have not violated them. The three statutes bar conflicts of interests by procurement officials, all federal employees when negotiating for employment, and all federal employees after they leave the department.

The second change mandates that information on these post-government employment restrictions be included in the annual ethics training program for DoD personnel. This amplifies the current requirements for annual training.

The third element establishes a requirement that all DoD personnel who are leaving federal service receive guidance on the restrictions that will affect them during and after their transition. Many DoD organizations already provide this information as part of the personnel checkout process and briefings.

According to William J. Haynes II, the general counsel and chief ethics officer of the department, "These changes should further strengthen our program of ethics education to help DoD personnel know and appreciate how our ethics laws apply to them."

The modified regulation is available online at: http://www.defenselink.mil/dodgc/defense_ethics/

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11-L-0559/OSD/21421

11-L-0559/OSD/21422

INFORMATION FOR PRESS RELEASE ON RECENT CHANGE TO DOD
REGULATION INVOLVING POST-GOVERNMENT SERVICE EMPLOYMENT
RESTRICTIONS

POC: Steve Epstein, DoD Standards of Conduct Office, (b)(6)
epsteins@dodac.osd.mil

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Rev: 12/10/2004 10:26 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/21424



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

OCT 25 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE **MILITARY** DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM **ANALYSIS** AND EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Prevention of Violations of Post-Government Service Employment
Restrictions

This directive-type memorandum establishes additional procedures to ensure that DoD personnel are aware of and comply with statutes and regulations that apply to their transition from Federal service to private employment.

Annual Certification: Starting immediately, DoD personnel who file Public Financial Disclosure **Reports** (SF 278) shall certify annually that they are aware of the disqualification and employment restrictions of 18 U.S.C. 207 and 208, and 41 U.S.C. 423, and that they have not violated those restrictions.

Annual Ethics Briefing: DoD Components shall include training on relevant Federal and DoD disqualification and employment restrictions in Annual Ethics Briefings.

Guidance for All Departing DoD Personnel: DoD Components shall provide guidance on relevant Federal and DoD post-Government service employment restrictions, as part of out-processing procedures, to all DoD personnel who are leaving Federal service.

This memorandum is effective immediately. Changes to DoDD 5500.7-R, Joint Ethics Regulation (JER), incorporating the substance of this memorandum, shall be issued within 180 days. **Terms** used in this memorandum are defined in the JER.

Attachments
cc: Directive Division, C&D, WHS

OSD 15517-04



11-L-0559/OSD/21425

a. Civil Penalties. Individual violators may be subject to a civil fine not to exceed \$100,000. Violators, other than individuals, may be subject to a civil fine not to exceed \$1 million.

b. Administrative Sanctions. See subsection 10-300 through 10-304 of this Regulation.

SECTION 4. Annual Certification

8-400. Annual Certification. DoD employees who file the Public Financial Disclosure Report (SF 278) shall certify annually that they are aware of the disqualification and employment restrictions of 18 U.S.C. 207 and 208, and 41 U.S.C. 423 (references (b) and (c)), and that they have not violated those restrictions.

SECTION 5. DoD GUIDANCE

8-500. Appearances. DoD employees shall:

a. Ensure that the prospect of employment does not affect the performance or non-performance of their official duties;

b. Ensure that they do not communicate inside information to a prospective employer; and

c. Avoid any activity that would affect the public's confidence in the integrity of the Federal Government, even if it is not an actual violation of the law.

8-501. Written Guidance. DoD employees may obtain counseling and written advice concerning restrictions on seeking other employment from their Ethics Counselor:

a. Although the counseling and advice are given by DoD attorneys and involve the interpretation of law and regulation and rendering of legal opinion, no attorney-client or other confidential relationship is created. Communications made to an Ethics Counselor in seeking such advice are not privileged.

b. This counseling and advice is personal to the current or former DoD employee. It does not extend to the individual's business, employer, or prospective employer.

SECTION 6. REFERENCES

8-600. References

- (a) Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 2635, "Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch," current edition
- (b) Title 18, United States Code, Sections 207 and 208
- (c) Title 41, United States Code, Section 423
- (d) Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 3.104, current edition

Communications made to an Ethics Counselor in seeking such advice are not privileged.

b. Ethics counseling and advice are personal to the current or former DoD employee. They do not extend to anyone else, including his business, employer, or prospective employer.

9-501. Delegation of Authority. The DoD Component DAEO may specifically delegate authority in writing for Ethics Counselors within the DoD Component to provide written advice under 41 U.S.C. 423 (reference (e)). In any case where the local Ethics Counselor does not have the authority by written delegation, he shall provide the counseling and obtain the request for advice and necessary supporting information from the DoD employee and forward it to the DoD Component DAEO or designee who has been specifically delegated the authority in writing to issue the written advice.

9-502. Guidance for Departing DoD Employees: DoD Components shall provide guidance on relevant Federal and DoD post-Government service employment restrictions, as part of out-processing procedures, to DoD employees who are leaving Federal service.

SECTION 6. RESTRICTIONS RESULTING FROM PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES

9-600. 41 U.S.C. 423 (reference (e))

a. Restrictions. This statute restricts a former DoD employee who was a procurement official with respect to a particular procurement from knowingly:

(1) Each DoD Component is encouraged to provide 1 hour of official duty time to review a Written AEB and to supplement the written AEB, including but not limited to, verbal briefings, in person or by telecommunications, computer-based methods, or recorded means, and ethics ~~related~~ articles in command communications, newsletters, and ethics electronic bulletin board systems.

(2) An IEO described in subsection 11-300.f., above, may satisfy the requirement for a written AEB for the same *calendar year* in which given.

(3) For DoD Components that verbally brief all of their other covered employees during 1 year of a consecutive 3-year period, 1997 shall be the first year of such briefings. Thereafter, verbal briefings shall follow in 3-year increments; e.g., 2000, 2003, 2006; etc.

(4) The following exceptions to verbal AEBs may apply:

(a) The DoD Component DAEO, or designee, may make a written determination that it is impractical to provide a verbal AEB once every 3 *calendar years*, under ~~section 2638.704(d)(3)(iii)(A)~~ of reference (a) in subsection 11-100., above, An IEO described in subsection 11-300.f., above, may satisfy the requirement for this exception for the same *calendar year* in which given.

(b) DoD employees who are special Government employees, who are officers in the uniformed services who serve on active duty for 30 or fewer consecutive days, or who are designated employees (subsections 2638.704(d)(3)(iii)(B), 2638.704(d)(3)(iii)(C), and 2638.704(d)(3)(iii)(D) of reference (a)), in subsection 11-100., above, may be given written AEBs, in accordance with section 2638.704(d)(3)(i) of reference (a). An IEO described in subsection 11-300.f., above, may satisfy the requirement for this exception for the ~~same~~ *calendar year* in which given.

c. Each DoD Component shall maintain records to track that the requirements of section 2638 of reference (a) in subsection 11-100., above, including the method of training provided to covered employees, have been met.

d. DoD Components shall include training on relevant Federal and DoD disqualification and employment restrictions in Annual Ethics Briefings.

11-302. Annual Ethics Training Plans. Each DoD Agency (see definition of "Agency" in subsection 1-201., above) shall develop a written plan for annual ethics training for a calendar year by the beginning of that year, in compliance with section 2638.702(c) of reference (a) in subsection 11-100., above. The DoD Components that are not Agencies shall submit annual ethics training plans to DoD SOCO by December 31st of the prior year for approval and inclusion in SOCO's ethics training plan.

December 17, 2004

200 11-59 11-15 #5

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Status of Items

Please **find** out the status of **these** items Jim Haynes owes me.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/9/04 MFR

DHR:as
121704-7

.....
Please respond by _____

250

17 Dec 04

December 9, 2004

SUBJECT: Ethics

I am due from Jim Haynes the following:

- o **My ethics certification to sign.**
- **A statement from Larry Di Rita that has been released to the press about the changes made in our ethics procedures.**
- **A letter from me to John McCain enclosing the statement on changes in the ethics rules.**

DHR:dh
12090442



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JAN 5 2005

The Honorable John McCain
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator McCain:

I am writing to apprise you of recent changes the Department of Defense has undertaken to strengthen our programs to avoid violation of conflicts of interest statutes, particularly those dealing with the transition of DoD personnel from public service to private enterprise.

On October 25, 2004, the Department implemented changes to three sections of DoD Directive 5500.7-R, Joint Ethics Regulation. The first change requires all senior DoD personnel (civilian and military) who file the public financial disclosure report (SF 278) to certify annually that they are aware of the disqualification and employment restrictions of 18 U.S.C. 207 (which bars certain activities after leaving public service), 18 U.S.C. 208 (which bars Federal personnel from participating in official actions that involve a private enterprise in which that employee is negotiating employment), and 41 U.S.C. 423 (the Procurement Integrity Act.) This certification, which is already in effect, also requires senior DoD officials to attest that they have not violated the above statutes.

The second change modifies the requirements for annual ethics training: adding a new requirement to expand the training on post-Government service employment restrictions included in all annual ethics training, regardless of other topics presented in that training.

The third change mandates that all DoD personnel, when leaving Federal service, receive guidance on post-Government service employment restrictions. Although many DoD commands and other organizations currently provide this guidance as part of their out-processing, this change in the Joint Ethics Regulation will require such guidance.

I am enclosing a copy of the change to our regulation along with a copy of a recent press release discussing these initiatives.

Sincerely,

Attachment
cc: Honorable John Warner
Honorable Carl Levin

11-L-0559/OSD/21432

OSD 00202-05

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press
17 Dec 04

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Subject to changes based on P/B FY 2006 President's Budget Guidance Memo

FY 2006/FY 2007 Biennial Budget Estimates
Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide
President's Budget Submission Guidance

1. This guidance applies to the Operation & Maintenance, Defense-Wide (O&M,D-W) agencies.
 - a. It supplements the OUSD(C) Program/Budget memorandum, December 2, 2004, Updates of the Procurement, Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E), Construction, Operation and Maintenance (O&M), and Military Personnel Databases for the FY 2006/2007 President's Budget.
 - b. The submission date for O&M,D-W agency exhibits, **JANUARY 19, 2005**, is earlier than submission dates for other entities, to allow the O&M,D-W team time to review and compile the submission books for the total appropriation. This is in contrast to Army, Navy, and Air Force O&M appropriations, which prepare their consolidated books before submitting them to their OSD analysts.
 - c. The O&M,D-W analysts at OSD will review, mark and return the exhibits to you for editing by February 4. Fully revised, FINAL version of all exhibits is due by February 11. The OSD team will assemble and send to the printer by February 18, to meet the required March 1 delivery date to Congress.
2. Use the four-year format (FY 2004 is prior year; FY 2005 is current year; FY 2006 is budget year; FY 2007 is budget year plus one).
 - a. Include FY 2004 Supplemental in FY 2004 actuals.
 - b. Include approved PBD actions (to include FY 2005 transfers identified in PBDs).
 - c. Ensure transfers in and out are each identified on a separate transfer line. Do NOT show transfers as a program change.

Volume I exhibits (PBA-19, OP-5, OP-32, PB-31D, PB-31R), as detailed below, are due to your analyst by close of business **January 19**. These are required for the OSD staff to prepare the appropriation summary and overview data.

- Submit each exhibit as a separate Microsoft Word file, labeled as *Agencyacronym FY 2006 Exhibitname.doc* (e.g. DISA FY 2006 PBA-19.doc).
- In the event that exhibits must be revised after initial submission, add a *version number* after the *Exhibitname* (e.g. DISA FY 2006 PBA-19 v2.doc).
- Your submissions should be printer-ready.
 - a. Obtain security clearance for the submission. Please scan in the clearance document and provide it electronically along with the exhibits.
 - b. Please examine exhibits for line and page breaks, proper headers and footers, and alignments (left-align all text; right align all dollar amounts within columns).
 - c. Delete all "POC" notations. There should be no individual's name, no phone number on any exhibit.
 - d. Use CourierNew 12 throughout all documents (with exceptions for use of CourierNew 10 when absolutely necessary to fit all columns on the page).

January 5, 2005

C:\Documents and Settings\glassner\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\CLK4DB\Guidance for DW Agencies.doc

11-L-0559/OSD/21433

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Subject to changes based on P/B FY 2006 President's Budget Guidance Memo

- e. Center your agency's acronym (e.g., DISA) in the bottom margin. The O&M,D-W team will add the page numbers.

- a. **PBA-19 Appropriation Highlights:**
 - i. This introductory statement should highlight key programmatic or thematic changes that warrant attention. Note that increases/decreases *per se* are shown on the OP-5 rather than on the PBA-19.
 - ii. The goal is one page that begins and ends with a "take-away" message emphasizing the role or value the agency contributes to national defense.
 - iii. Footnote the amount of Supplemental funds received in FY 2004 and anticipated in FY 2005 at the bottom of the PBA-19 table.
 - iv. Include Title IX Supplemental funds and approved FY 2005 Supplemental requests in FY 2005 column on the PBA-19.

- b. **OP-5 Detail by Subactivity Group:**
 - 1. Prepare a single OP-5 for each agency. Now that each agency reports its entire program in a single Budget Activity, your OP-5 should reflect all the subactivities your agency previously reported in separate OP-5's.
 - ii. Integrate and incorporate the same level of detail that has been presented in multiple OP-5s in previous years.
 - iii. Section I. Description of Operations Financed: Include a summary of the key changes after the general paragraph. Group the changes if that will lead to a better understanding of what the proposed changes will accomplish.
 - iv. Section III. Financial Summary part A. Subactivity Group
 - 1. Ensure this section includes all the specific programs that have been presented in previous years, and fully accounts for your budget authority/request in all years. If there is a significant change in program funding between years, the change should be highlighted and explained in Section I. Description of Operations Financed.
 - 2. For clarity, it may be useful to create "groups" that correspond to the breakouts presented in previous budget exhibits (e.g., DLA's OP-5, Section III, Financial Summary part A. Subactivity Group list could be divided into Other Logistics Services, Other Logistics Programs, and Warstoppers. Each division has a complete list of subactivities within the division. For other agencies, there may be a Training division that corresponds to the old BA-3 OP-5, and an Operations and Administration division that corresponds to BA-4. Division titles are discretionary.)
 - V. Section III. Financial Summary part C. Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases
 - 1. Ensure that the trail includes, for each change, the previous year's baseline amount. This is a **mandatory congressional requirement**.
 - 2. Identify Supp funding separately for each change.
 - 3. Ensure that descriptions are communicative rather than cryptic. Spell out acronyms. One-liners are seldom satisfactory. Where possible, indicate the related OP-32 line number.

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Subject to changes based on P/B FY 2006 President's Budget Guidance Memo

- vi. Be sure to identify program transfers and show them in the correct section. If transfers are included in the program increases/decreases section, Congressional staffers may incorrectly interpret them as program growth and make them targets for reduction.
 - vii. Provide a measurable metric for each performance criteria described in the Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary. Provide analysis to indicate whether performance as measured is good, bad, improving, etc.
 - viii. Since OMB expects that each agency has a strategic plan from which goals and objectives flow, make reference to your agency's strategic plan as often as appropriate.
- c. OP-32 Appropriation Summary of Price/Program Growth:**
- i. Consult OMB Circular A-11 for general guidance:
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a11/04toc.html>
 - ii. Consult PBDs 604,606 and 426 for DoD-approved inflation, pay, and WCF rates. A table of approved rates will be provided separately for your convenience.
 - iii. Consult OMB Circular A-11 regarding use of object classes.
 - iv. Pay close attention to the definitions of subsets within object class 25 Other Contractual Services and crosswalk your contracts appropriately to the OP-32 lines.
 - 1. OC 25.1 is also known as Contract Advisory and Assistance Services (CAAS) (OP-32 Lines 931 Contract Consultants, 932 Management & Professional Support Services, 933 Studies, Analysis, & Evaluation, and 934 Engineering & Technical Services).
 - a. Include:
 - i. Management and professional support services,
 - ii. Studies, analyses, and evaluation, and
 - iii. Engineering and technical services.
 - b. EXCLUDE contracts for:
 - i. Financial statement audits (OC 25.2),
 - ii. Information technology consulting services that focus on large scale systems acquisition and integration or large scale software development (OC 31.0),
 - iii. Personnel appointment and advisory committees (OC 11.3),
 - iv. Operation and maintenance of information technology and telecommunication services (OC 25.7),
 - v. Architectural and engineering services as defined in the FAR,
 - vi. Research on theoretical mathematics and basic medical, biological, physical, social, psychological, or other phenomena (OC 25.5),
 - vii. Services classified in OC 25.2 Other contractual Services with non-Federal sources or 25.3 Other purchases of goods and services from Government accounts.
 - 2. Object Class 25 Other contractual Services also includes:
 - i. OC 25.2 Other Services includes contractual services with non-Federal sources that are *not otherwise classified* in OC 25, such as financial

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Subject to changes based on P/B FY 2006 President's Budget Guidance Memo

- statement audits performed by independent public auditors (OP-32 lines 926,989,991, and 998). Agencies that report more than 15% of their total OC 25 budget under OC 25.2 must, per 10 U.S.C. §2212, **submit an itemized list of contracts** with justification as backup material to the OUSD(C) O&M,D-W team. This input will be used in explanations to congressional staffers;
- ii. OC 25.3 Other purchases of goods and services from Government accounts for purchases that are not otherwise classified (OP-32 lines 600-699, 701-770,901,902, 987). Do not use this object class if a more specific object class applies;
 - iii. OC 25.4 Operation and maintenance of facilities when done by contract with the private sector or another federal account (OP-32 line 923);
 - iv. OC 25.5 Research and development contracts for conduct of basic and applied research and development (OP-32 line 989);
 - v. OC 25.6 Medical care for payments to contractors for medical care (OP-32 line 989);
 - vi. OC 25.7 Operation and maintenance of equipment when done by contract with the private sector or another federal agency (OP-32 lines 922 and 927-930);
 - vii. OC 25.8 Subsistence and support of persons for board, lodging, and care of persons (OP-32 line 998).
- v. If applicable to your agency, show the foreign currency impact in a separate column.
 - vi. Prepare a detailed listing that documents specifics of growth in 998 Other Costs and 989 Other Contracts lines.
- d. **PB-31R Personnel Summary:** follow guidance provided by Operations & Personnel point of contact (703 697-9317, Jan Soares, x 129 for civilian personnel or Kevin Lannon, x 131 for military personnel). Note that there is a new CIS Report, R19 Civilian FTE and Cost Display, that lists the direct-funded and reimbursable-funded FTEs, the personnel compensation object class amounts, and then derives average costs for direct-funded and reimbursable-funded FTEs.
- e. **PB-31D Summary of Funding Increases and Decreases:** where possible, identify the related program line shown in the OP-5 Section III. Financial Summary **part A**. Subactivity Group for each increase or decrease.
- f. **0-1 Operation & Maintenance Funding by Budget Activity** will be submitted electronically IAW guidance provided by Program & Financial Control (POCs are Manju Goel and Paul White, 703 697-0021)
4. **Contact your analyst** for additional information or explanation (table follows).

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Subject to changes based on P/B FY 2006 President's Budget Guidance Memo

Marcia Case	<u>Marcia.Case@osd.mil</u>		703 697-9317 x 137
AFIS	American Forces Information Service	0100 0100 0100	Marcia Case
DFAS	Defense Finance & Accounting Service	0100 0100 0100	Marcia Case
DHRA	Defense Human Resources Activity	0100 0100 0100	Marcia Case
DLSA	Defense Legal Services Agency	0100 0100 0100	Marcia Case
DPMO	Defense POW/MIA Office	0100 0100 0100	Marcia Case
SOCOM	Special Operations Command	0100 0100 0100	Marcia Case
	Classified Agencies	0100 0100 0100	Marcia Case

Gretchen Anderson	<u>Gretchen.Anderson(osd.mil)</u>		703 637-9317 x 120
CMP	Civil Military Programs	0100 0100 0100	Gretchen Anderson
DAU	Defense Acquisition University	0100 0100 0100	Gretchen Anderson
DCAA	Defense Contract Audit Agency	0100 0100 0100	Gretchen Anderson
DCMA	Defense Contract Management Agency	0100 0100 0100	Gretchen Anderson
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency	0100 0100 0100	Gretchen Anderson
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency	0100 0100 0100	Gretchen Anderson
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency	0100 0100 0100	Gretchen Anderson
DoDDE	DoD Dependents' Education	0100 0100 0100	Gretchen Anderson
NDU	National Defense University	0100 0100 0100	Gretchen Anderson
OEA	Office of Economic Adjustment	0100 0100 0100	Gretchen Anderson
TJS	Joint Chiefs of Staff	0100 0100 0100	Gretchen Anderson
COURT	U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces	0100 0100 0100	Gretchen Anderson
OIG	Office of the Inspector General	0100 0100 0100	Gretchen Anderson
CD/CN	Counternarcotics	0100 0100 0100	Gretchen Anderson

Keith Anderson	<u>Keith.Anderson@osd.mil</u>		703 697-9317 x 123
DSS	Defense Security Service	0100 0100 0100	Keith Anderson
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency	0100 0100 0100	Keith Anderson
DTSA	Defense Technology Security Admin	0100 0100 0100	Keith Anderson
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense	0100 0100 0100	Keith Anderson
WHS	Washington Headquarters Services	0100 0100 0100	Keith Anderson
CTR	Conventional Threat Reduction	0100 0100 0100	Keith Anderson

Cara Abercrombie	<u>Cara.Abercrombie@osd.mil</u>		703 697-9317 x 121
Volume II	Data Book Exhibits		Cara Abercrombie
PB-31Q	Manpower Changes in FTEs		Cara Abercrombie
PB-22	Major DoD Headquarters Activities		Cara Abercrombie
PB-55	International Military Headquarters		Cara Abercrombie
PB-24	Professional Military Education		Cara Abercrombie
PB-15	Advisory and Assistance Services		Cara Abercrombie
OP-34	Appropriated Fund Support for MWR Activities		Cara Abercrombie
Env-30A-C	Defense Environmental Restoration Program		Cara Abercrombie
PB-28/28A	Summary of Budgeted Environmental Projects		Cara Abercrombie
PB-34A	Revenue from Leasing out DoD Assets		Cara Abercrombie
PB-34B	Proceeds from Transfer or Disposal of DoD Real Property		Cara Abercrombie



U.S. Department of Defense
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

News Release

On the Web:

<http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?>

<http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20041220-1882.html>

Media contact: +1 (703) 697-5131

Public contact:

<http://www.dod.mil/fac/comment.html>

or +1 (703) 428-0711

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No. 1309-04
December 20, 2004

Post-Government Service Employment Restriction Changes Announced

The Department of Defense recently modified its ethics regulation to ensure DoD personnel, when leaving federal service, do not inadvertently violate federal "revolving door" statutes.

In a memorandum dated Oct 25, 2004, Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz directed three changes to the departmental ethics regulation, DoD Directive 5500.7-R.

The first change requires senior personnel, including admirals, generals, and senior civilian officials, to certify annually that they are aware of the requirements of three statutes, and have not violated them. The three statutes bar conflicts of interests by procurement officials, all federal employees when negotiating for employment, and all federal employees after they leave the department.

The second change mandates that information on these post-government employment restrictions be included in the annual ethics training program for DoD personnel. This amplifies the current requirements for annual training.

The third element establishes a requirement that all DoD personnel who are leaving federal service receive guidance on the restrictions that will affect them during and after their transition. Many DoD organizations already provide this information as part of the personnel checkout process and briefings.

According to William J. Haynes II, the general counsel and chief ethics officer of the department, "These changes should further strengthen our program of ethics education to help DoD personnel know and appreciate how our ethics laws apply to them."


The modified regulation is available online at: http://www.defenselink.mil/dodgc/defense_ethics/

<http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20041220-1882.html>

11-L-0559/OSD/21438

Via Facsimile

TO: Amb. Zalmay Khalizad

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: January 5, 2004

SUBJECT:

Congratulations on the successful work of Loya Jirga. I know your involvement made a big difference, and I thank you so much for your selfless contribution.

Please extend my warm congratulations to President Karzai on the successful role he played in moving his country forward. It is an impressive accomplishment. Also, please give him my very best wishes for the New Year.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
010504.19

Afghanistan

OSD 00245-04

5 Jan 04

~~FOUO~~

SECRET
CJCS

2015 11 11 11:08 AM
November 22, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen **Dick** Myers
Larry Di Rita
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Paper

W
||

Attached is a paper that was prepared at my request. It resulted from a dinner I had with the three authors, Joe Duffey, Ed Feulner and Lew Manilow. Please read it and let **me** know what **you** think.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/2/04 Private Report to the Secretary of Defense

DHR:ss
112204.5

.....
Please respond by 12/10/04

22 NOV 04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-2263-05

4 January 2005

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 1/4*

SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Paper

- **Answer.** In response to your request (TAB A), I reviewed the subject document. The paper correctly addresses communications shortcomings, but its solution is too conservative. The Heritage paper proposes a RAND-like, private-sector company to do necessary analysis. The long-term answer is a new agency that has the responsibility, clout and resources to attack larger communications issues. It should include robust, well-trained career public diplomacy professionals deployed worldwide to tell the US story in the local dialect and analyze the feedback. Recommend the agency's leader hold a position on the National Security Council and have an independent voice to the President.
- **Analysis.** Currently, there is an NSC advisor for communications who has his hands full doing interagency work. The proposed senior agency group is unlikely to make any difference, as two already exist: PCC for Strategic Communications and the Muslim World Outreach PCC. The private sector currently spends more than \$6 billion a year on overseas marketing; the USG spends about \$5 million on opinion surveys. This is far too little, and without definitive evidence, it is a guess as to what the US message should be. Information paper at TAB B provides more details.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Mr. Paul Hanley, OCJCS, Director of Strategic Communications,

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/21441

OSD 00278-05

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

LJES

November 22, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen **Dick** Myers
Larry Di Rita
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Paper

Attached is a paper that was prepared at my request. It resulted from a dinner I had with the three authors, Joe Duffey, Ed Feulner and Lew Meilow. Please read it and let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/2/04 Private Report to the Secretary of Defense

DHR:as
112204-5

.....
Please respond by 12/10/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21442

Tab A

OSD 00278-05

14 December 2007

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Review of “Private Report to the Secretary of Defense” on Strategic Communications

1. Purpose. To provide comments and recommendations on subject document.

2. The report’s fundamental premise is that the United States Government (USG) must do a better job of assessing foreign public opinion and using that data in message development. The report makes two primary recommendations:

- Establish a corporation for foreign opinion analysis to “listen, ask questions and analyze foreign public opinion as well as test the effectiveness of various USG messages.”
- Prepare the government bureaucracy to apply information by providing senior policy makers “with immediate input so they are aware of the effect an impending policy action or statement will have on foreign public opinion.”

3. To implement the second recommendation, the report recommends creating a new staff position on the National Security Council (NSC) to coordinate the USG overall communications strategy. It also recommends creating a Senior Interagency Group (SIG) that brings the NSC with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; representatives from the United States Agency for International Development and other relevant members to encourage closer cooperation and to help implement the USG long-term communications strategy.

4. Policy comments:

- General: Concur in the report’s premise that the challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and central component to the WOT—and that this challenge “lies at the very core of America’s own vital national interest.” The USG should greatly increase the amount of resources applied to strategic communication activities, to include foreign opinion polling. It is critical that the USG must view the dialog between America and the rest of the world as a long-term commitment and respond with strength of purpose equal to the information efforts of the Cold War.

- Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis. While any new organization that focuses on solving America's image problem is better than none at all, the recommended Defense Science Board (DSB) Center for Strategic Communications (CSC) is a better concept than the Center for Foreign Opinion Analysis (CFOA) recommended in this report. The CSC is much broader in scope, while the CFOA is focused primarily on foreign public opinion polling—something that could be achieved by increasing the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) polling budget and scope of work. The CFOA, like the CSC, would be a nonprofit, bipartisan, federally-funded independent organization similar to RAND Corporation. However, the DSB report recommends the CSC conduct polling, analysis and assessment and also develop mandated self-initiated plans, themes, products and programs (such as children's TV series and video games). The CSC would also work closely with the private sector and nongovernment organizations, foster cross-cultural exchanges, mobilize nongovernment initiatives, recruit private sector experts for short-term assignments and deploy temporary communications teams. The solution to improve America's image abroad must be matched to the magnitude of the problem—a robust CSC is the best option.
- Senior Interagency Group. Establishing the SIG as recommended in this report is appropriate. There is great need for such a group that has authority to speak for its organizations, set strategic communications objectives and priorities, commit resources and quickly adjudicate new proposals for programs and products.
- NSC Communications Staff Position. In November 2003, the NSC created a new position for the Deputy National Security Advisor for Communications. Therefore, the position recommended in the report already exists. However, the duties of this individual must be more focused on strategic, international issues, not with tactical or domestic political issues to be effective in the areas described in the report.

1/6/04

9:14 AM

TO: David Chu
Dov Zakheim
Gen. Pete Pace

cc: Marc Thiessen
Paul Wolfowitz
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 5, 2004

SUBJECT: **Increase in End Strength**

Please prepare a draft reply to the members of Congress on their End Strength letter. This is an important policy issue.

Thanks.

DHIS/azn
10504.05

Please respond by: 1/15/04

320.2

STW04

OSD 00283-04

1:58 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. John Abizaid
L. Paul Bremer
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 7, 2004

SUBJECT: **Terminology**

As we discussed, the terminology we use is enormously important. The fact that so many of our folks are talking about the situation in Iraq as a "guerrilla war," with the word "guerrilla" having a positive connotation in some people's minds, is unfortunate. So too, the use of the phrase "former regime loyalist" is unfortunate in that "loyalist" has a positive connotation. The use of the phrase "Sunni Triangle" in a negative sense is harmful to our efforts with the Sunnis.

We have to do a better job of using words that are well thought through and calculated to express exactly what we mean. The word "fanatic" has a negative connotation. The word "terrorist" has a negative connotation in most cases.

I hope you will continue thinking through what words we ought to use to describe the people who are causing us the difficulties in Iraq and come back with some suggestions that we can all then use.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
010704.16

Please respond by: _____

Iraq

7 Jan 04

11-L-0559/OSD/21446

OSD 00284-04

7/14/04


7209
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

CC 1117104
NDP

July 13, 2004

TO: David Chu

CC: Gen. Dick Myers Jim Roche
 Paul Wolfowitz Gen. Pete Schoomaker
 Gen. Pete Pace ADM Vern Clark
 Les Brownlee Gen. John Jumper
 Gordon England Gen. Mike Hagee

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: 2004 Voting

Prior to the Congressional recess at the end of next week, I would like to be briefed on the range of activities involving the military absentee voter program.

As I recall, the Department conducted a study at Secretary Cohen's direction after the last election that revealed some shortfalls in our processes.

I would like to know what progress has been made and what more needs to be done to ensure we are discharging our responsibilities in this area.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071304-1

.....
Please respond by 7/20/04




D14.35

1309/04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 00325-05

11-L-0559/OSD/21447

July 23, 2004

Friday

July 2004

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18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	31

August 2004

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15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

Ms. McGinn on Leave
DR. CHU - VACATION

7^{am}

8⁰⁰

8:15am-8:45am P&R Update(3E752)

9⁰⁰

9:20am-9:50am SD Military Voting - UCS, Service Chiefs, Service Secretaries

10⁰⁰

ISG BRAC Imperatives Meeting - Principals(3D1019)

10:00am-10:45am SD Future OIF Rotations

11⁰⁰

12^{pm}

Lunch

1⁰⁰

Hold

2⁰⁰

Car to Hill (Marvin)

3⁰⁰

SASC/SGAC Staff NSPS Briefing (SR-228 Library)

4⁰⁰

Car to Pentagon (Marvin)

PDUUSD Wrap-up

5⁰⁰

Leave for the day - Anniversary Dinner in Fairfax

6⁰⁰

12/9/04

12

August 27, 1004

file

TO: Pveil Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Senate Briefings

Do you have any record of who attended the briefings I have given in the Senate Intel Room. Have Kerry or Edwards attended? I cannot remember seeing them, although I do recall that Kerry attended one meeting at a Pentagon briefing.

Please look at both the ones we conducted at the Pentagon in a the ones we conducted in S-407 and let me know.

Thanks.

DHR dh
082604-1 IS computer doc

Please respond by 9/10/04

DR To SecDef *DR* 12/14

Paul Butler
12/13

M 12/14

350.09

27 Aug 04

NOV 23 2004

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Attendance at Op-Intel Briefings

Did we ever figure out how many of our Op-Intel briefings Edwards and Kerry attended?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
112204-27

.....
Please respond by 12/3/04



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

OSD 12/14

December 9, 2004 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
For Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to your questions about Senators Kerry and Edwards

- The information we previously gave you about participation of Senators Kerry and Edwards in ops/intel briefings is correct. We do have, however, records indicating that Senator Kerry came to the Pentagon for two meetings with you.
- On Monday morning, September 24, 2001 at 7:45 a.m. you had a one-on-one breakfast with Senator Kerry in your office. To the best of my recollection, I was the only other attendee. The meeting must have materialized at the last minute because we have nothing in our archives to indicate that a "read ahead" was prepared for you.
- He was also one of 56 Senators who came to the Pentagon in late summer and early fall of 2002. Our records indicate he was here on September 5. As you recall, we conducted a series of breakfast meetings for members of the House and the Senate on weapons of mass destruction leading up to the vote on the Iraq resolution in October of 2002. Senator Edwards received two invitations to these briefings and he did not accept either.

350.09

9 Dec 14

Attachments:

- SECDEF Snowflake 082604-1
- SECDEF Snowflake 112204-27

27 Aug 04

11-L-0559/OSD/21451

OSD 00326-05

September 1, 2004

TO: Col Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*
SUBJECT: Meeting with Ray DuBois re: Corridors

Please arrange a meeting for me with Ray DuBois to discuss corridors. I think there should be one for women, one for Hispanics, and one for Secretaries of Defense. I would like to talk to him about how we fix them; reduce the duplications.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090104-9

.....
Please respond by 9/17/04

600

1 Sept 04



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

D

INFO MEMO

ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director Administration and Management

Ray DuBois

SUBJECT: Naming and Dedication of Pentagon Corridors

I spoke w/ Powell Moore. Sen. Warner spoke against re-naming; see attached

• The following is provided in response to your request for information regarding dedicated corridors and exhibits in the Pentagon.

9 Presidents Corridor – Contains a picture and brief history panel of each U.S. President, including the current one. Location: 3A10-3C 10.

9 Corridors and exhibits dedicated to military leaders.

Arnold Corridor - Dedication date unknown. Location: 4E8.

Bradley Corridor – Dedicated June 1972. Location: 2E8.

Eisenhower Corridor – Dedicated May 1970. Rededicated in June 1985.
Location: 3E8-9.

*%
↑*

MacArthur Corridor – Dedication date unknown (1980s). Location: 3A4-5.

Marshall Corridor – Dedicated April 1976. Location: 3E4.5-5.

9 Corridors/Exhibits dedicated to groups, organizations, and other individuals.

Kruzel Exhibit - Dedicated in January 1996. Joseph J. Kruzel was a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy who died in an accident while traveling outside Sarajevo in Aug 1995. Location: 4D7-8.

African Americans in Defense of Our Nation	Location: 3A2 - 3E2
ANZUS	Location: 2A2-3
Buffalo Soldiers	Location: 2A5
Chiefs of Staff of the Army	Location: 3A5-3E5
Civil Servants	Location: 2A2-3
Correspondents	Location: 2E5-6



Hall of Heroes/Medal of Honor	Location: Pentagon Concourse
Joint Chiefs of Staff	Location: 2A8-2E8
Marine Corps Commandants	Location: 4A-E5
Military Women	Location: In Storage
Native Americans in Defense of Our Nation	Location: 2A1
NATO	Location: 2A9-10
POW/MIA	Location: 4E7-8
Secretaries of the Army	Location: 3A5-3E5
Secretaries of Defense	Location: 2A8-9
Secretaries of the Navy	Location: 4A5-4E5
Secretaries of War	Location: 2A4-5
Soldiers and Signers of the Constitution	Location: 2A4-2E4
USO	Location: Corridor 2, Ramp to Concourse
9-11 Memorial Quilts	Location: 4th Corridor, 1st floor

- The Federal government already has recognized President Ronald Reagan in a number of ways.
 - There are two major facilities in the Washington D.C. area: The Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, Washington, D.C., dedicated in 1998, and the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, renamed in 1998.
 - The Department of Defense has named the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan, commissioned 2003, and Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site, Marshall Islands, dedicated 2000, after the President.] ★

COORDINATION: None

Attachments: None

Prepared by: Ralph Newton, (b)(6)

Armstrong, Brett, COL, OSD-ATL

From: Snow, Howard, CIV, OSD-LA
Sent: Thursday, June 10, 2004 7:34 AM
To: Armstrong, Brett, COL, OSD-ATL
Subject: Warner wishes to keep "bi-partisan nature" of name for Pentagon

DEFENSE**Warner Weighs in Against Frist's Proposal to Rename the Pentagon After Reagan**

BY JOSEPH C. ANSELMO, CQ STAFF WRITER

The chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee cautioned Wednesday that renaming the Pentagon for former President Ronald Reagan might not be the best way to honor his memory.

Sen. John W. Warner, R-Va., took to the Senate floor to emphasize the importance of retaining the "bipartisan nature" of the headquarters of the U.S. armed forces.

His comments appeared aimed at heading off a proposal by Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn., to rename the Pentagon the "Ronald Reagan National Defense Building."

On June 7, Frist submitted amend-

ments to the fiscal 2005 defense authorization bill (S 2400 — S Rept 108-260) that would rename the Pentagon and the Defense Department's Missile Defense Agency in Reagan's honor.

Warner diplomatically did not directly mention Frist's amendments, but noted the rejection of a proposal to rename the building in honor of former president and five-star Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower after he died in 1969. One of the main reasons, Warner said, "is that that building stands as a symbol of the bipartisanship that must be present as we work with the men and women of the armed forces."

Warner said Congress needed to honor Reagan, but cautioned that lawmakers

"have got to give a lot of careful thought and be mindful of how we've recognized other commanders in chief . . . in terms of their contributions to the defense of the country. But we'll come up with an idea."

Warner declined to comment further after his remarks.

Frist's aides also moved to play down the amendments, saying they were filed only to put ideas on the table. An aide said the majority leader was forming a group of senators to review a wide variety of proposals to honor Reagan.

Republican lawmakers also have floated various proposals to put Reagan's likeness on the clime, the \$10 bill or the \$20 bill. ♦

Howard Snow

11-L-0559/OSD/21455

6/10/2004

~~FOUO~~

September 1, 2004

TO: David Chu
Ray DuBois

c c : Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Naval Nuclear Propulsion Director

210 Navy (344)

Attached is some material on the Director of Naval Nuclear propulsion. My instinct is that eight years is too long. I would like to get it changed so it is four years with the possibility of adding one, two, three or four years.

Please come back to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/14/04 GC memo to SecDef re: Position of Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

DHR:dh
090104-18

.....
Please respond by 10/1/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21456

OSD 00328-05

1 Series



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, O. C. 20301-1600

DH/17

INFO MEMO

June 14, 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DEPSEC _____

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, (b)(6) *WJ Haynes*

SUBJECT: Position of Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

- o At your earlier direction, Dan Dell'Orto met with the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations to obtain their views about the grade (O-10) and term of appointment (8 years) of this position.
- The Secretary of the Navy believes that any proposed change in either the grade level or term of appointment is sensitive.
 - o The grade level is significant because of the Navy's outstanding nuclear safety record.
 - o Were the grade level reduced, any subsequent safety problems likely would be attributed to that reduction.
 - o An 8-year term is unduly long and permits the incumbent to outlast at least one Administration, and possibly two.
- o The Chief of Naval Operations agreed that any proposed change in either grade level or term of appointment would be controversial and possibly particularly difficult in an election year because the submarine community would mobilize to oppose any change.
- Having a 4-star officer (although it does not have to be a submariner, it historically has been) in this position provides the submarine community with an edge over both the surface and aviation community neither of which has a Navy uniformed advocate above the two-star level.
- Interestingly, ADM Clark does not believe that either the Department of Energy or the Senate would oppose a change in this position unless the submarine community sways them.



11-L-0559/OSD/21457

11872-04

- The position as currently structured is an anachronism during a period of transition from a threat- to a capabilities-based defense and a platform centric system to an information centric system.
- Consideration should be given to a Senior Executive Service person for this position, as the Executive Order contemplates, as this would remove the position from the operations role and the submarine advocacy role.
- ADM Clark was very complimentary toward ADM Skip Bowman, the incumbent, who has handled himself as well as anyone could in this position.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, (b)(6)

11/10
1000

~~FOUO~~

September 1, 2004
I-04/011745
ES-0622

TO: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: (b)(6) Letter

000

Please have someone respond to the attached letter from (b)(6)

Thanks.

Attach.
6/23/04 Letter from (b)(6)

DHR:ss
090104-8

.....
Please respond by 9/10/04

Close this
out
PWB

Paul Butler
11/10

Policy Executive Secretariat Note

November 9, 2004

Captain Marriott,

ASD/ISA, Peter Rodman, responded to Mr. (b)(6) on October 21, 2004. A copy of the letter is attached for your records.

U
June Bartlett
June Bartlett
Deputy Director
Policy Executive Secretariat

~~FOUO~~

OSD 00329-05

11-L-0559/OSD/21459

01-00-04 10:25 1W

10-04



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2300

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AFFAIRS

21 OCT 2011

Mr. (b)(6)
Vice President of Information Technology/Student Services
Rend Lake College
Ina, IL 62846

Dear Mr. (b)(6)

Thank you for your letter on how the United States can take the offensive to "diminish and weaken the al-Qaeda tenor." Your suggestions are very helpful.

We know that al Qaeda's rationalization for terrorism is a distortion of Islam. This point carries the *most* weight coming from authorities within the Muslim world, some of whom you mention. I hope that thoughtful adherents of Islam will **speak** out more forcefully against the hijacking of this great faith by ideological extremists. Moderates like yourself are on the front lines in this struggle.

Once again, thank you for your advice and comments. I encourage you to take your message to the broader Muslim community.

Sincerely,

Peter W. Rodman

11-L-0559/OSD/21460



6/23/2004

By: (b)(6)

Vice President of Information Technology/Student Services
Rend Lake College
Ina, IL 62846

(b)(6)

I am an American/Iraqi who is working in southern Illinois. I got frustrated with being on the defensive with war against terror. I would like to see the US on the offensive side. Want to help and this is my way.

Diminish and Weaken Al-Qaeda Terror

The basis of the Al-Qaeda group's recruitment of new members - getting bigger and stronger - is based purely on religious motivation. The religious motivation is: "If you kill an infidel, you will go to Heaven? Killing infidels (non-believers) is part of a Jihad (holy war). Though most of Al-Qaeda's targets are infidels, many of their attacks have caused death to believers. The justification used for killing believers is that the believers also will go to Heaven for their cause. Most of their recruits are young in age and in an early stage of their knowledge of the Islam religion. The way to stop the growth of this group and to diminish and weaken their organization and its causes is through the use of religious motivation and reasoning.

A little background on the Islam religion - it is based on five pillars:

- The Profession of Faith
- The Five Daily Prayers
- Almsgiving
- Fasting
- Pilgrimage to Mecca

However, some followers have added Jihad as a sixth pillar. Quran is the holy book of Islam. The Quran is a record of the exact words revealed by God through the angel Gabriel to the prophet Muhammad (PBUH). Not one word of its 114 chapters (suras) has been changed over the centuries, so the Quran is in every detail the unique and miraculous text which was revealed to Muhammad (PBUH). When it comes to the Halal (permissible) and Haraam (forbidden) aspects of life, Muslims depend first on the Quran and secondly on the Hadith (saying) of the prophet Muhammad (PBUH).

Unfortunately, some Muslims such as the Al Qaeda group took the Quran as a literal explanation and followed it. The fact is that the Quran has a literal explanation but also is

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dependent on the time in which it was written. **All** Muslim Shariah (Islamic laws) are **written** on the most basic of life's issues. When an issue without a relevant Shariah arises in Muslim life in **any** country, the top Sheik (Muslim cleric) in that city, country **or** community will make a Fatwa (legal opinion concerning Islamic law) about the matter. On **certain** major issues, a group of Sheiks or Muslim organizations - and there are many of them - will make the Fatwa.

To diminish and weaken Al-Qaeda, there must be a Fatwa from one **or** more of the well-recognized Islamic organizations proclaiming that Al-Qaeda and its actions are against what Islam stands for. **This** Fatwa should be well publicized in the Middle East countries. **This** will discourage young Muslims from joining Al-Qaeda or any similar groups, and it will place considerable doubt in new recruits. This might sound simple, but I believe this is a way of fighting religion with religion.

Here are some well-known Islamic groups:

Iraq - City of Al-Najaf: Shiai majority which will put Iran in agreement
Egypt-Alazhar Mosque
Saudi Arabia-Should come from the Saudi government

Here are some Islamic organizations that may **help** in the process:

Council on American-Islamic Relations
1050 **17th** St. NW, Suite **490**
Washington, DC **20036**
Tel: (202) 659-CAIR (2247)
Fax: (202) 659-2254
Email: cairl@ix.netcom.com
URL: www.cair-net.org

Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA)

Islamic Society of North America (ISNA)

7201
~~FOUO~~ File

September 1, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Phoenix Speech

I'd like a tape of the Phoenix speech - I have not received one yet.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090104-3

.....
Please respond by 9/3/04

PH 9/1

SIR,

THERE WAS NOT A TAPE FROM
PHOENIX. I HAVE ATTACHED
A TRANSCRIPT.

v/r,
Suzanne

~~FOUO~~

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OSD 00330-05

090104-3

090104-3



U.S. Department of Defense
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

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Media contact: +1 (703) 697-5131

Public contact:

<http://www.dod.mil/faq/comment.html>
or +1 (703) 426-0711

Presenter: Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

Thursday, August 26, 2004

Secretary Rumsfeld Speech to The Greater Phoenix Leadership, Biltmore Hotel, Phoenix, AZ

SEC. RUMSFELD: Thank you very much. I thank you very much. I'm not a poet. [Laughter] I'm not even close to a poet. There's some character who took my press briefings and tried to turn them into poetry and failed. [Laughter] Thank you, folks. It's very nice to be with you. We're in an August afternoon in Phoenix and I'm delighted to see so many folks here. And I thank each of you for coming. I appreciate your being here. Bill, thank you for those words, and Mr. Mayor, a pleasure to see you. Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker and my friends from Congress here. It's always good to see you, and Congressman Flake and Congressman Heintz and Mrs. Heintz. I also was pleased to see Mrs. Stump. I don't know where she's sitting, but – there you are. Good to see you. And so many distinguished guests and public officials and members of the armed services.

I thought what I'd do is to take a few minutes to talk about some of the issues we've been hearing about and reading about and then comment on the global war on terror and then respond to questions, which I look forward to.

Last week, the president announced that we are making progress in our efforts to reposition U.S. military forces and capabilities to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The world has certainly changed markedly since the end of the Soviet Union. But military deployments and arrangements really have not changed very much. They've been reduced, but they're pretty much in place where they were when the Cold War ended.

During the Cold War, it was assumed that our forces stationed abroad would defend from static positions. This, of course, is no longer the case, and we know that. Today the enemies we face are fighting from small cells located in almost every corner of the world. And the task today is to stay on the offensive against them. We cannot know precisely where our forces may have to operate. We used to know. We used to be looking for a tank invasion from the Soviet Union across the North German plain and that's why we had so many forces in Northern Europe. So our forces today have to be flexible and they have to be agile and they have to be light and they have to be rapidly deployable, usable, not fixed, and capable of going almost anywhere in the world on short notice.

If you think about it for a number of years now or even before September 11th the DoD has been working on concepts to guide our security presence around the world. And we know that adjusting our footprint or our force posture is an essential component of our strategy. These proposed changes are designed to allow us to deploy capable forces rapidly anywhere in the world on short notice, to push more military capability forward while shifting some 60,000 to 70,000 service members and roughly 100,000 of their dependants from foreign bases to U.S. bases, creating a lighter footprint abroad, which allows us to focus on speed, precision and technically advanced capabilities, rather than simply on mass and sheer numbers, which are really increasingly formulations of the last century.

It's awfully hard for people to change and adjust to that. We've developed over my lifetime the idea that more is better and so we talk about numbers of things, ships, guns, tanks, planes, people – ignoring the reality that if you have, for example, a 10 dumb bombs and you have a smart bomb that can do what 10 dumbs can do and you reduce from 10 dumb bombs to five smart bombs, you have not reduced your capability. In fact, you've dramatically increased your capabilities. But getting people to think that way is not an easy thing. We've also, looking at our posture to help us build new relationships in the world, we've developed a number of new relationships, if you think about it, since 9/11 – Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Yemen – so many countries that we have been working with, this global coalition against terror is now something like 85 or 90 nations, probably the largest coalition in the history of mankind. And our adjustments should make it easier for the United States to work with our allies and friends on military operations to train, to operate, exercise together to complement doctrine and tactics and to exploit the new technologies with them. Our new arrangements also have the added advantage of improving the lives of U.S. military families. Deployments in a number of cases will be shorter and they'll be rotational for training and exercises often lasting weeks or months, rather than years. Military families will find somewhat more stability, fewer permanent changes of station, and as a result, less disruption in the lives of spouses and children in schools.

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<http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/...> 9/1/2004

In a political year, I suppose it's inevitable that these important proposals which we've been working on for some three years now, would lead to a discussion and that's a good thing. Some of the concerns expressed, no doubt, are well intentioned and useful. We've spent the last two years talking to our friends and allies and to members of Congress and working through these issues, proposals of such magnitude deserve examination and they deserve debate and discussion. And let there be no doubt, these are significant changes and they will affect our country's force posture for many decades to come.

At the same time, I think most reasonable observers recognize that our existing force arrangements are relics of a time long passed. We still have two heavy divisions in Germany to defend against a Soviet tank attack. Those two divisions did not help prevent September 11th. They did not prevent the hijackers from organizing and planning their attacks in Hamburg, Germany, for that matter. We've stationed thousands of U.S. troops on the border with North Korea to defend South Korea. South Korea today is a nation that is no longer impoverished. After 50 years, they are not defenseless and thanks, in major part, to the stability our alliance has provided, South Korea today is a thriving nation with a robust democracy with a vibrant economy and a modern army of some 600,000. Our commitment to that country and to peace on that peninsula remains as strong as ever and it will be going forward. In fact, our relationship with Korea is, I think, an excellent example of what changes to our global posture really can accomplish.

For some time now, we've been investing in substantial sums, taxpayers' dollars, billions of dollars in improved military capabilities that are appropriate for the situation on the Korean Peninsula. We're increasing our naval and airpower in the region and we're moving more precision weapons and increased firepower to South Korea. At the same time, we would be relocating our forces away from the demilitarized zone and where they were located in very vulnerable garrisons and cities near that zone and we'll be shifting them southward into two hubs – an air hub and a sea hub – well beyond the range of North Korean artillery.

Today we have the means and the intent to strengthen our deterrent power and our defensive capability while decreasing our overall footprint, and we're doing so, and it would be unwise not to do so. While current arrangements may be comfortable for people and familiar, both in our country and in foreign countries, our current arrangements are – let's face it, they're obsolete. And we need to deal with the world as it is, not the way it used to be, or even the way we'd like it to be. We have to deal with it as it is. Changes have to be made. They will not be made precipitously, but they will be made. And indeed, it's a plan that will be rolled out over probably as many as four, five, six, seven, eight years. We're in a fortunate position that we don't have to be a supplicant. You can go to these countries and work our arrangements and make sure that we have the right Status of Forces Agreements and access and cross-servicing agreement, and that the neighboring countries are willing to adjust to our needs to move our forces as required by the United States. As we visit with countries, we'll determine which is best by way of new arrangements, and then proceed to work out those details. As a result, there'll be no major announcement beyond what the president has announced. Rather, there will be a series of announcements that evolve as each piece of this is worked out. And we are certainly continuing to consult with Congress and with our friends and allies, as we move forward to meet our responsibility to serve the American people.

Let me make a couple of comments about missile defense. Meeting the new reality of this century also drives our approach to missile defense. In the past few weeks, up in Alaska, the first interceptor was put into the ground. By the end of this year, we expect to have a limited operational capability against incoming ballistic missiles. This represents, in my view, a victory for hope and vision over skepticism. More than 20 years ago, I was in the White House when President Reagan gathered a group of individuals and made his announcement and gave his vision for a missile defense system. Now that's long time ago. And today, roughly two dozen countries, including some of the world's most dangerous regimes, possess ballistic missiles and they are energetically working to increase the range and destructive capability of those missiles. A number of these states are estimated by the U.S. intelligence community to have nuclear, biological and chemical programs.

North Korea, for example, is working to develop and deploy missiles capable of reaching not just their neighbors, such as Japan, but our country as well. The same can be said of Iran. More countries are developing and sharing information, and I think it is notable that just recently happened with respect to Libya where they made an admission that dramatically demonstrated this point. Fortunately, their announcement was that they wish to just discontinue those programs and have been working with the United States and the United Kingdom to do so.

History has taught us that weakness is provocative. And the longer the delays in deploying even a limited defense against these kinds of facts, the greater the likelihood of an attempted or threatened strike. Additionally, without any defense against missiles, terrorists and rogue regimes could use the threat of an attack to try to intimidate America and/or our allies. As enemies continue to adapt and evolve, so must our capabilities. That's why the president directed us to pursue an innovative approach to the development and the deployment of missile defenses. Rather than waiting years, sometimes decades for a fixed and final architecture, as has been the norm with the many weapons systems, we will be deploying an initial set of capabilities that will evolve over time as technologies evolve over time.

The way ahead will have its share of ups and downs – we know that. Any development of a new technology, leading-edge technologies, has ups and downs, successes and what people call failures. I was in the pharmaceutical business and invested heavily in research and development. And folks did not just simply get up one morning to discover an important new therapy for people. They went out and they tried things that worked and that didn't work. And each thing that

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didn't work was part of that learning process and so, too, in weapons and defense systems capabilities. All cutting-edge endeavors include trial and error, but we will continue to benefit from leadership that combines vision with resolve and to simply learn from each of the so-called failures.

Let me also say a word or two about the national debate taking place with respect to the so-called reforms of the intelligence community. The 9/11 Commission has provided a useful service in my view, by surfacing some important issues and challenges and some problems. These are the decisions that the United States Congress and the executive branch, the president, are ultimately going to have to decide. Indeed, the president has already implemented a number of the commission's recommendations. And I spent Monday with him where he spent the better part of the day reviewing a number of additional thoughts and suggestions that have come up. It seems to me that this is the proper approach. Whether it's a government and a bureaucracy as large as ours and with the ramifications of change so enormous. It is true, you can carefully think about these issues and think them through carefully before implementing things. We are at war, and we need to get it right. We need to make the changes we need to make, but the old saying is the truth and that is that, to he who tears down what is falls the responsibility of putting in place something better. And it isn't the kind of thing that we want to be making many mistakes about.

Last, let me make a comment a bit on Iraq and Afghanistan. I recently returned from Afghanistan a couple weeks ago. I must say that each time I go there, I am just struck by the changes, by the improvements, by the energy you see in the streets, the activities. And I know there are some folks there's some folks here who've spent some time in Iraq and Afghanistan and the thank-you needless to say, for being willing to do that. But if you drive through portions of Afghanistan, you'll see construction is well along on the major highways which connect the major cities of that country, and which are so critically important to their economy.

The Afghan security forces are being trained and equipped and have and have acquitted themselves quite well and in several recent activities. I visited an election center on this last trip and saw a room not quite this big filled with computers and young folks, Afghans, busily working on the election and the registration process. Here's a country that has suffered terribly under Soviet occupation, has had years of drought, had a ghastly civil war and had suffered under the repression of the Taliban regime and has no real experience with democracy as such, as we think of it. And people were estimating they might get three or four million people to register for this first election, which is coming up. In fact, there are now over 10 million that have registered. And I'm told that something in excess of 40 percent of them are women. And needless to say, the Taliban didn't even let women walk around unaccompanied by men, and they didn't let them go out uncovered and they didn't let them wear colored shoes and they didn't let any of them fly kites and the idea of getting women to - willing to go out and register to vote is a striking accomplishment. The Afghans are clearly enthusiastic about these first early steps towards democracy. In Iraq, the economy is growing, the currency has been reasonably steady. We all know that people are being killed and wounded and many, many are Iraqis are being killed every week. The stock market is open, however. They fielded an Olympic soccer team. We've gone from zero to something like 220,000 Iraqi security forces of which 110,000 are properly trained and equipped and functioning. I've spent some time on the phone this morning with Gen. Casey and Gen. Abizaid, our senior military commanders there and they are impressed that they have a reasonably large number of experienced Iraqi forces that are in the Najaf area and are attempting to sort through that difficult situation with the holy shrines of the Shia faith.

Now most of the media attention this week has been on the fighting in Najaf, but it's interesting that this month we also had the Constituent Assembly council, a group conference that met elected people to serve. And in the words of at least one newspaper, it is putting Iraq on the road to a constitutional democracy. Progress is mixed. It's good with the bad. And we all recognize that. People have been killed and wounded. And it isn't easy to build a free country when terrorists are determined to try to attack every sign of success - every activity. They systematically try and assassinate a government leader or a mayor, city council members, police chiefs. They are attempting to dissuade people from joining the Iraqi Security forces, that the Iraqi security forces have people standing in line to become policemen, national guard, and regular army, border patrol, site protection and facilities protections people.

Everyone that looks at it and sees this mixture of what's taking place to do it. And clearly, the difficult and the bad is struck by just how hard it is to go from where they were - a vicious dictatorship - to something approximating a freer economic system, a free political system. And Afghanistan and Iraq are becoming free nations that differ in almost every respect from the terror regimes that they replaced. They are countries that will be assisting in the global war on terror. And to serve as examples to discredit, it gives credit to extremist ideology. And I would think to the extent they're successful, and I believe that each of those countries has a terrific crack at being successful. The effect on that region will be enormous. It is a region that needs models, it needs examples. And for all the enemies' cunning and ruthlessness, I think that those of us in this country and in the case of Afghanistan, some 26 other nations that are helping -- in the case of Iraq, some 32 countries that are offering assistance - we have an enormous advantage and that is that the great sweep of human desire is for freedom. And that is on our side, let there be no doubt. So we pray for their success and for the success of our soldiers and men and women, volunteers all, who are risking their lives to help those folks. Fifty million people between the two countries, have a crack at being free people. And their noble work of people in uniform will bring a more peaceful planet and a more secure nation for those of us here at home. And with that, I thank you and will be happy to respond to questions.

[Applause]

Now, do you have microphones? Look at that. Why does somebody stick their hand up and the mic will start

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wandering over and then we won't have to – look at this – see all kinds of hands. Terrific. Yes, sir.

Q: Can you comment on the stability of the government of Pakistan?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Yes, sir. We are – those of us in the world engaged in the global struggle against extremists are so fortunate that President Musharraf and his team are in power in Pakistan. He has, without question, one of the most difficult tasks of any governmental leader that I can think of. And he lives in a tough part of the world. He has an element within his country that obviously has tried to assassinate him on several occasions recently.

He's a courageous leader and a thoughtful leader and he is a superb partner in this global war on terror. He had troubles along his borders with Afghanistan. The Pakistan government has been aggressive in helping us deal with the al Qaeda and put pressure on them. He has tribal areas that run along that border and just as we have in our country special rules in tribal areas. So, too, there the pattern has been that the Pakistani military stayed out. And of course, it was being used as a haven for both the Taliban and the al Qaeda. And he has changed fast. He's moved forces in there and he has been working the problem. And I just am so – all of us in the United States government are so grateful that he's there and he is being successful in putting pressure on the terrorists. The more pressure that is put on the terrorists in countries like Afghanistan and others, the more difficult it is for them to recruit, the more difficult it's going to be for them to raise money, the more difficult it is for them to move money, the more difficult it is to move from place to place, to communicate with each other. Everything's harder if we have the countries that are willing to step up, and it does require people to step up. It requires physical courage and political courage. He's got large numbers of people in Pakistan who don't like what he's doing and are against it. And sometimes in our country – and Mr. Mayor, you know that – president of the senate -- when someone's against you, they run against you, they vote against you or they talk against you – that's one thing. In that part of the world, they don't just do that; they go after you. And it is a different circumstance. So I have a lot of confidence in him and the work they're doing and, as one citizen of this country and I'm grateful that he's a part of the coalition. Question.

Q: What are we doing in our country to protect our borders along Mexico and Canada where most of the terrorists have come through? I travel across the southern part of this state and into Texas. I mean, it's scary to see what I see as I'm out there and about, visiting and traveling, how easy it is to come into this country without being checked you know.

SEC. RUMSFELD: It's true all over the world that borders are a problem. They're porous – we have trouble in our country. We know that all of us can see our borders are relatively porous, not just north and south but so, too, from the oceans. And the Department of Defense is not involved in the subject of this – border guards. Now that is the Department of Homeland Security and the Coast Guard are the ones responsible for that. So I'm not an expert. I am an expert about the problems of borders – the Syrian borders of Iraq and the Iranian border of Iraq. And I know a lot about that -- a lot more than I do about your borders here. And so, too, in Afghanistan, they border with Pakistan and the border with Iran. And everyone – our country and what we're doing in those two countries – we have to do a cost-benefit ratio. To try to seal a border is a monumental task. It's a terribly expensive task. It has – and you are constantly asking yourself are you better off trying to do that or something else? And so those calculations are made by the Department of Homeland Security and by the state and local government in states that have borders. And of course, they're also made by the Department of Defense with respect to our situations around the world.

The terrorists are smart. They're not dumb. They're clever. And they prefer to stay alive, although there are certainly suicide bombers who don't prefer to stay alive. But to the extent we are successful, and go to school on them and arrange ourselves to put maximum pressure on them, they then go to school on us. And it's a dynamic constantly changing situation. And to the extent you do a better job on borders, you raise the price, raised the cost of them and then you deal with that. On the other hand, they then turn to another direction and take advantage because the terrorists can attack any place, using any technique, and it's physically impossible to defend everywhere at every moment against every technique.

I was President Reagan's Middle East envoy back in the early '80s after the Marines were killed – 241 of them in the Beirut Barracks. And of course, it was a truck bomb going into the barracks and killing all the Marines. And very soon, you began to see these barricades, the concrete barriers like it's around all buildings. Fair enough, so the terrorists saw that and they saw they couldn't get a truck through, so they're started lobbing rocket-propelled-grenades at buildings over the barriers. So the next thing, you go down to Corniche in Beirut and you look and they draped wire mesh over buildings to bounce these rocket-propelled grenades off. So the terrorists saw that and what did they do? They started hitting soft targets. People going to and from work, people at home. And those asymmetrical attacks have an infinite number of opportunities and places that they can attack or times they can attack or techniques they getting used to attack. So defense really becomes a vastly – a more expensive way to do it and less certain way to do it than offense. And that is why you simply have to find those terrorist networks and root them out where they are and deal with the countries that provide the haven for the terrorists. And that is the only way that we can have success. The second part of that equation is that you have to do defense, to be sure, or else it's easy for them. But we have to do the offense.

And the other thing we have to do is we have to look at the intake. What's going on in this world that people are successfully training other people to believe that it's in their interest to go out and kill innocent men, women and children. How do we develop a confidence in ourselves that to be sure, we're defending the American people, which is our job and we've got to do that, and then take every step to do that, and particularly, as these weapons get more powerful. But we also have to reach out and engage the world on this subject and see that we get people within countries like Pakistan, within countries like Saudi Arabia, trying to squeeze down the finances that are going into the training schools and training camps.

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And try to reduce the attractiveness of the people to come into that business of killing innocent men, women and children. It isn't enough simply to be successful in rooting them out because more come in. And so our task is big. This is not something that's going to be over in a year or two or three. This is a lot more like the Cold War that took 40 or 50 years than it is the World War II, where there'll be some final signing ceremony on the U.S.S. Missouri. This is a tough, tough task that we have got ahead of us, but we can do it. Questions, yes.

Q: Mr. Secretary, I just want to thank you for the work you're doing and the commitment that you have made public service. We really appreciate you being here. [Applause] Thank you. Two quick questions. Would you talk a little bit about North Korea and China and the impact that China potentially has on this whole equation, and also talk a little bit about Iran and some of the comments that we've read recently about what's going on there? Thank you.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Yes, sir. North Korea is a -- it's a tragedy. If you think about it, here's a country the same size as South Korea, same people and 50 years after the war, South Korea is booming. It's an economic miracle, it's successful. The people are free. And in North Korea, the -- above the demilitarized zone, if you look down from a satellite at night, it's black, with a pinprick of light in Pyongyang, the capital, and south of the DMZ, it's just brilliant light.

They've just lowered their -- within the last year or two, they lowered the height to get in the North Korean military down to the 4'10" for adults because of starvation. Under 100 pounds and you get in the North Korean military now. They've got concentration camps with tens of thousands of people from several locations. People that have tried to get out are killed. Not unlike East Germany and when we see people trying to get across the wall in Berlin.

The government is busy as probably the principal proliferator of ballistic missile technology. They're good at it. They have developed long-range ballistic missiles and they've been helping a lot of other countries develop them. They're on the terrorist list. They've engaged in terrorist acts. They are involved with the drug trade, basically the prescription drug trade -- illegal. They're involved with counterfeiting. All in all, not your first choice as a neighbor. The people are terribly repressed. They're a danger. They're a danger in two ways. They're a danger to the South Koreans and they're also a danger as a proliferator. I do not know of certain knowledge what their nuclear capability is, or their chemical or biological capability. We know they've announced -- they claim they have nuclear weapons. We know our intelligence community has assessed that they probably have two or three nuclear weapons. And they are now -- they change their story periodically and therefore are not really reliable as a gauge as to what they've got in mind. We are trying -- the United States with Russia and Japan, South Korea and China -- attempting to engage in talks with them to see if it might not be possible for them to adjust their behavior. And begin behaving in a way that is less threatening to the rest of the world. How that will work remains to be seen.

I will say this -- the partnership between the United States and South Korea is solid. The military capability of our combined countries in that part of the world is healthy. This program that we have in place under a superb commander, Gen. Leon LaPorte has been looked at by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It's been looked at by the former combatant commanders in charge of Korea and to a person, they are convinced that what we are doing is a good thing and it will not weaken the deterrent. It will not create an instability and, indeed, it will in fact, improve our military capabilities to deal with any conceivable threats in that part of the world.

Iran -- I just can't believe. When you think of that country -- intelligent people, educated people, an interesting history and they're being governed by a small handful of clerics in a manner that is notably different from all their neighbors -- most of their neighbors anyway -- and they know it. It isn't like North Korea where they control every single thing. People in Iran see television and they hear radio. People can go off the borders and come in. People from our country go into Iran and see these people. They know that they're being denied the opportunity for that country, because of its behavior with respect to nuclear development, they are being denied interaction with the rest of the world to their detriment. And when one thinks of how fast that country switched from the Shah of Iran to the Ayatollahs, one has to think that at some point in the future it might switch again. And I don't know what their behavior is going to be with respect to the International Atomic Energy Commission [sic], but it's been uneven and bumpy thus far. And you have to hope that the international community will behave in a responsible way and create sufficient pressure on that government. Again, a terrorist state that's actively involved with funding and assisting terrorists, there are al Qaeda leadership in Iran today. Iran is a country that is a principal sponsor of Hezbollah, along with Syria, where they send weapons and terrorists down through Damascus into Beirut and then into Israel. So it's a country that is off to the side with the international community and the hope is that the international community will behave in a way that will persuade them that that is not in their interest.

The one thing we know is that the problem of proliferation is a serious one. In fact, every month that goes by, as these weapons get more lethal, more dangerous, it is a more serious problem. We also know that there isn't any way in the world that one country can do much about proliferation. It is one of those things that, by definition, requires the cooperation of a lot of countries to work together to see that we behave in this planet in a rational way so that we create lots of disincentives for people can engage in those kinds of trafficking of weapons of mass destruction or missile technology. Lots of disincentives, and a lot of incentives for those countries to behave in a way that they are a part of the civilized world. It is -- I am hopeful about Iran. And you might see -- particularly the young people and women -- whose behavior is particularly restricted in Iran, serve as a force over time to help put that country on a path that makes more sense to the civilized world. Question -- way in back. I'm getting the hook. [Laughter] We'll make it the next to the last question.

Q: Thank you. In an environment, where every imperfection in the war on terror and the war against Iraq is a major

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story, in an election environment particularly and in the world's greatest democracy, how do you sustain a long-term political will necessary to fight the kind of war on terror that you're talking about where the good news is rarely heard. The progress that you've spoken of only comes out in forums like this? How do we do that long-term?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, that is just a critical central core question for our society. There is absolutely no way in the world that we can be militarily defeated in Afghanistan or Iraq, or even in the global war on terror, and I say militarily defeated. The only conceivable way that we could lose and [Inaudible] think of who wins -- is because of a calculation over time that the cost and the pain in dollars and in human lives is too great and it's not worth it. And if that balance shifted to that point, it would say to the world that there isn't a willingness to sustain that level of effort. [Inaudible] you [Inaudible] terrorism, were we to do that.

<Audio Gap>

Vietnam war, 58,000 dead. Those are large numbers and they're heartbreaking and anyone who goes out to the field in Iraq to Afghanistan, or goes to Walter Reid Hospital and Bethesda Hospital as I do. You just cannot help but think of the lives not lived, think of the wounded whose lives will be lived totally differently and not ask yourself about the cost. And then if you look down from a satellite on Korea and see what's happening today, the cost in human life today in North Korea, and the energy and the vitality and the success and the opportunities of the people in South Korea, make it worthwhile. And your question goes to democracy -- in a dictatorship, the leadership can do what they want. In a democracy, you have to lead not by command, but by persuasion. And we simply have to find the words to make sure that the people in our country and the people in our coalition and those countries understand that it is worth it, that freedom is important and that it is true that each generation needs to make that sacrifice that we talk about on Memorial Day and that time -- over time and when one looks back, you nod and say, well, my goodness, yes, that was worth it. Of course, it was. But at the time, when you see, as you point out, day after day after day, the drumbeat of negative stories about this and Afghanistan, that in Iraq and the impressions people have which are not balanced. And no historical context. When you think of what went on in Japan, how many years that took to build a democracy that became a bulwark for freedom in the Cold War. In Germany, to turn that fascist regime into a democracy -- amazing accomplishments.

Thomas Jefferson, I think, said about our country, trying to struggle from where we were to a democratic system and it took us how many years? We didn't have a constitution between 1776 and 1789, I guess. And he said, "One ought not expect to be transported towards democracy on a featherbed." And that's true. It is tough. And what's going on in Iraq and Afghanistan today is tough. And it's a bumpy road and it is not a smooth path. And what we need is -- and where do I come out in your question? I come out with we're going to make it. And why do I say that? I say it because our system works. The American people have a good center of gravity. They've got some kind of an inner gyroscope that resets itself. They can be blown by the wind and all overwhelming amount of bad news and be swayed. But down deep inside, the people of this country get it. They know that there are things that are worth fighting for. They know that the values they believe in are worth defending. And they are smart enough and wise enough over time to have the will to sustain that effort. I've got a lot of confidence in them myself. We'll make this the last question. Yes, sir.

Q: Thank you. Mr. Secretary, my name is Barry Wong. I just wanted you to know my brother's served in the Navy Seabees in Iraq from San Diego. But I just want to make a statement, Mr. Secretary, that...

SEC. RUMSFELD: No, no. This is for questions.

Q: Oh, questions. OK. It's a question, then.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Just put a question mark there.

Q: OK. I'll put a question mark there. I'm a lawyer. I can do that. But I want to applaud you for the realignment and I work with the Luke Air Force Base Fifth and the Sixth fighter wing and I just want to let you know that Luke Air Force Base is important to this community, that as you go through the base realignments that you keep the Luke Air Force Base in mind, because we love them. The business community loves them, and we want to keep Luke Air Force Base. And we want to add another mission to the joint strike fighter. We would love to have him here.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Give him the hook! [Laughter]

Q: And Mr. Secretary, isn't it true that you're interested in base realignment and interested in saving bases like Luke Air Force Base? [Laughter] [Applause]

SEC. RUMSFELD: Thank you. [Laughter] Folks, if you see somebody, you know, at an airport, or a restaurant or somewhere walking around in uniform, tell them "Thank you." [Applause]

UNKNOWN: Thank you all for being here. Thank you.

<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040826-secdef1262.html>

11-L-0559/OSD/21469

<http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/...> 9/1/2004

720
~~FOUO~~ file

September 1, 2004

TO: Gen Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Numbers

847

700

I'd like to start getting a report for everything since September 11 that combines the number who have died - killed in action, as well as non-combat deaths - and the number who have been wounded. Please show it by country (or area), and add it up. I think it is already over 1100, including Afghanistan.

It seems to me we ought to start using that number, which is more accurate.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090104-2

.....
Please respond by 9/10

VCJCS/EA DP/9

Closed at
RT on
10 SEP

Dave, FYI Also flowing
up via JSAP

Paul

11-SEP-04 10:23 AM

~~FOUO~~

10 Sep 04

September 3, 2004

TO: Dr. David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Tour Lengths

2004

I think we need to do something about tour lengths.

I am convinced one of the problems in this department -- why mistakes are made and why antiquated systems are not modernized -- is because people serve in their positions too short a time. They simply never get their arms around the challenges, problems and tasks that need to be done.

Please get back to me with some ideas as to how this can be fixed.

Be bold.

Thanks,

DHR:ss
090304-9

.....
Please respond by _____

2004

~~FOUO~~

September 7, 2004

TO: Les Brownlee

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. Rumsfeld*

SUBJECT: Investigations

I understand that the Army will brief me soon on its investigation of two detainee deaths in Bagam.

I know you share my dissatisfaction that it has taken almost two years to get to this point.

When you brief me on this latest investigation, I'd like, at a minimum, to learn such information as:

- What units were involved, and their training history?
- The leadership at Bagram at the time.
- The relevant reporting relationships.
- What other units were present in the area?
- Regarding detention facilities in Afghanistan, what policies for detention and interrogation were in place then, and what are they now?
- A history of the investigation
- What corrective actions have been initiated?

In addition, I look forward to your recommendations on how to fix the seemingly profound systemic problems in the Army identified in the Kern and Mikolashek reports.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
090304-10

.....
Please respond by 10/1/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21472

OSD 00333-05

75000

75000

September 7, 2004

TO: Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*
SUBJECT: Meeting with David Chu

Please arrange a meeting with David Chu regarding longer tours and longer service - time and position, particularly. I also want to discuss Standing Joint Task Forces.

I am convinced this is part of the problem we are having in redeployment, Joint Staff, Abu Ghraib and management of prisons, as well as in intelligence - people are simply not in their jobs long enough.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090704-5

.....
Please respond by 9/17/04

000, 050

000, 050

September 8, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Peter Pace
Lt. Gen. Skip Sharp
Col. Will Grimsley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iraqi Security Force Brief

IRIS

We delivered the Iraqi Security Force brief to the President today. I know your team worked hard over the past several weeks to sharpen and improve the material. It will be a very useful instrument as we go forward.

Thanks for the good work – now let's focus on monitoring and delivering what we promised.

DHR:ss
090804-2

.....
Please respond by _____

090804-2

September 8, 2004

TO: Pete Geren
Gen. Mike Maples

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Thank You

MEMO

In preparing for my press conference yesterday, the Geren-Maples group produced an excellent information package, which included some very sharp Q & A and a well-organized summary up front. It was very helpful – please pass along my thanks to the folks who worked on it.

As a general comment, the work of your team has been indispensable to helping the Department of Defense through some significant challenges over the past months – well done.

DHR:ss
090804-4

.....
Please respond by _____

8 SEP 04

September 8, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Arabs in Chechnya

Russia

Please do all you can to find ground truth on the media reports that there were some number of Arab militants among the Chechen forces that took hostages in Beslan.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090804-5

.....
Please respond by 9/17/04

804

September 8, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Our Korean Allies

KOREAN

We should all be looking for on-the-record places to thank the Koreans for their contributions in Iraq, particularly as they are about to become the third largest contributor of troops after the U.S. and U.K.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090804-7



Please respond by _____

8 SEP 2004

September 10, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Meeting with Chris Cox

Please talk to Chris Cox. He is going to be very involved with the Intel process and he would very much like to talk to you. I told him I would set it up. The sooner, the better because once we end up with a bill we are restricted, now we are not. And, I think your advice would be helpful to him.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091004-7

.....
Please respond by _____

11-L-0559/OSD/21478

OSD 00341-05

000, 71

10 SEP 10 2004



September 15, 2004

TO: Gen. Schoomaker
Secretary Brownlee

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Army Restructuring

020 A...

As you work to restructure our Army around the Brigade Combat Team concept, I understand we are creating light and heavy BCTs from our light and heavy divisions. Have we given thought to the interchangeability and interoperability of the units so created?

I would be interested to know how you intend to tackle this task – it is clearly central to our efforts to reshape the military in the 21st century.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091504-1

.....
Please respond by 10/10/04

15 SEP 2004

OSD 00342-05

11-L-0559/OSD/21479



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

INFO MEMO

September 23, 2004, 9:30 AM

322

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army *Brownlee*
GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, Army *S*

SUBJECT: SNOWFLAKE - Army Restructuring

- Interchangeability and **interoperability** were **fundamental** factors in developing our Infantry and **Heavy Modular** Brigade Combat Teams.
- **Standardized designs for Infantry**, Heavy and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams allow for rapid **reconfiguration** to support Combatant **Commander missions** across the entire **spectrum** of operations - they are **scaleable and tailorable**.
- **Each Brigade Combat Team** is inherently combined arms and **has numerous** capabilities (**Signal, Field Artillery, Military Police, Engineer and Sustainment**) to enable **full spectrum** operations. These **Brigade Combat Teams** are standing combined arms **organizations** that require **minimal** augmentation, if **any**.
- **Infantry, Heavy and Stryker** Brigade Combat Teams include receptacles for joint plugs to leverage **capabilities from our** sister services (e.g., joint fires) **which enhances joint interdependency** - central to our efforts in reshaping the military for **the 21st** century.

COORDINATION: U.S. Army **Training** and **Doctrine** Command

Prepared By: COL Wesley McClellan (b)(6)

23 Sep 04

15 Sep 04

OSD 00342-05

11-L-0559/OSD/21480

September 16, 2004

TO: Gen. Schoomaker
cc: Les Brownlee
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Army Tour Lengths

When we talked about your changes we also discussed the length of current Army tours - 12 months in Iraq. I believe you were going to come back to me with a proposal to shorten it to six or nine months. I would be curious to hear what your thinking is.

When you do come back, be sure you include the effect it will have upon rotations over the coming period.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091604-19

.....
Please respond by _____

165

165



~~FOUO~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, DC 20310

OCT 1 2004



MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Army Rotation Lengths

2004

In response to your September 16, 2004, memo, while the Army would prefer to reduce deployment durations to six or nine months, the increased deployment tempo generated by shorter rotation lengths would have a negative impact on the force at this time.

Army studies and operational experience have shown that in a perfect world, six months is the optimal deployment length, allowing the Army to balance its operational requirements to provide trained and ready forces to the combatant commanders against the stresses separation generates on our volunteer force. However:

- There is insufficient depth within the Army's Combat Support and Combat Service Support capabilities to reduce rotation lengths below 12 months without producing significant dwell time and remobilization violations.
- Shorter rotation lengths would affect the Army's ability to meet CENTCOM's total requirements for combat forces as well. For instance, at current commitment levels, reducing the Army's combat unit deployment length to nine months could generate a 21 brigade combat team shortfall over the next two years. This problem would only be exacerbated by shortening unit rotations to six months in duration.

Even under the current 12-month rotation policy, meeting CENTCOM's requirements for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom 04-06 will require the remobilization of 18 Reserve Component units and the premature redeployment of 61 Active Component units - measures which will impact approximately 4,000 Soldiers. This number is projected to increase to approximately 10,000 Soldiers for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom 05-07.

1 Oct 04

PETER J. SCHOOMAKER
General, US Army
Chief of Staff

R. L. Brownlee
Acting Secretary of the Army

16 Sep 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 00344-05

4090366

11-L-0559/OSD/21482

September 17, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **DR**
SUBJECT: Afghanistan and Counter-Narcotics Activity

Please get back to me on what we need to do legally to get the Department of Justice and everyone in the U.S. Government aboard on the counter-narcotics activity in Afghanistan.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091704-3

.....
Please respond by 10/4/04

17 Sep 04

September 20, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Wall Street Journal Editorial

With regards to Friday's Wall Street Journal editorial -- I don't recall ever saying we have to wait until more Iraqi troops are trained. In fact, I said just the opposite.

Gen Myers said it at a press briefing where I was present. Please check to see if that's right .

Attach.
9/17/04 Wall Street Journal Editorial re: The Enemy in Iraq

DHR:ss
092004-14

.....
Please respond by 9/23/04

4000

11-0559-21484

~~FOUO~~

September 20, 2004

TO: Jim Roche
Gen John Jumper

c c : Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Mike Wynne
Ken Krieg
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Predator and other UAV Production

Please get back to me very soon with a plan to increase production of the Predator and other UAVs, consistent with an understanding of limiting factors (industrial capacity, C2, training of operators, etc.)

Clearly, the Combatant Commanders, especially General Abizaid, can fully utilize more of them.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092004-16

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21486

OSD 00350-05

452R

09/20/04

September 24, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Rep. Thaddeus McCotter

025

Let's have Thaddeus McCotter in sometime with a group of Congressmen. He's impressive.

Thanks.

Attach.
9/23/04 Memo from SecDef re: Congressman in Briefing
Bio for Thaddeus McCotter

DHR:ss
092404-2



Please respond by _____

24 09 04

~~FOUO~~

September 23, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Congressman in Yesterday's Briefing

Please give me the name of the congressman who spoke about anarchy in yesterday's House briefing. Please give me his background sheet. He seemed like a smart guy.

Please pass his name to Powell Moore.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092304-8

.....
Please respond by _____

Sir,

The individual's name is Thaddeus G. McCotter, Rep, 11th Dist of Mich. Legislative Affairs is getting a full Bio.

VIR, COL B

ATTACHED

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21488

Thaddeus McCotter
R-MICHIGAN



Hometown: Livonia
Born: August 22, 1965;
 Detroit, Mich.
Religion: Roman Catholic
Family: Wife, Rita
 McCotter; three children
Education: U. of Detroit,
 B.A. 1987 (political
 science), J.D. 1990
Military Service: None
Career: Lawyer
Elected: 2002 (First Term)


Important Issues	Support	Oppose
Iraq use of force (10/11/02)		
Iraq Supplemental (10/17/03)	X	
Iraq Supp: Grant Vs Loan (10/16/03)	X	

GWOT Travel	Trips	Date
Iraq	1	10-11/03
Afghanistan		
GTMO		

Bases / Major Defense Industry
None

Issues and Concerns

- Met with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz in Spring 2004. He has many Caldeans in his District and suggested that they be used as translators.
- Wants the intelligence panels to have more authority over how intelligence is gathered: "Intelligence information is only as credible as the sources. If you have greater access to some of the methods and sources for the intelligence, you could make better assessments." (7/04)
- Co-sponsored - *HR 2797*, to improve the readiness of State defense forces and to increase military coordination for homeland security between the States and the Department of Defense. (8/18/03)
- A self-described conservationist.
- Major Industry in district is auto manufacturing.
- *Assistant Majority Whip.
- Committees: Budget, International Relations, Small Business.
- Won election in 2002 with 57.2% of the vote.


[Home](#)

About Thaddeus

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A life-long resident of southeast Michigan, U.S. Representative Thaddeus McCotter was elected to the 108th Congress in 2002 to represent the citizens of Western Oakland and Western Wayne Counties.

[Visit DC](#)
[Issues and Legislation](#)

Despite his status as a Freshman member, Congressman McCotter received a waiver from the Speaker of the House to serve on three key committees: the Budget Committee; the International Relations Committee; and the Small Business Committee. He was also named an Assistant Majority Whip.

[Newsroom](#)
[District](#)
[Resources](#)

Congressman McCotter has focused on preserving and promoting manufacturing and small businesses, because he knows they form the back bone of our community's economy. He has steadfastly supported Winning the War on Terror and increasing our homeland security; tirelessly fought to reduce taxes and the size and scope of government; and, most importantly, Congressman McCotter has dedicated every effort to listen to and serve his constituents.

Washington, DC
 415 Cannon House
 Office Building
 Washington DC
 20515
 202.225.8171 tel
 202.225.2667 fax

District
 17197 N. Laurel
 Park Dr.
 Suite 161
 Livonia, MI 48152
 734.632.0314 tel
 734.632.0373 fax

Congressman McCotter is a graduate of Catholic Central High School; the University of Detroit; and the University of Detroit Law School. He is a bar admitted attorney by profession. Thaddeus and Rita McCotter, a registered nurse, have three young children, George, Timothy, and Emilia. The McCotter family lives in his home town of Livonia. Congressman McCotter travels to and from our nation's capital every week to serve our community.

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11-L-0559/OSD/21490

September 24, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Ops-Intel Session and Testimony

We had a good couple of days on the Hill. The ops-intel session provided a good opportunity to get our message out, and the Global Posture Testimony – while covering a variety of topics – was likewise an excellent forum for the Department.

We all know how hard you and the LA team worked to put together over ten hours of time in front of Congress – thanks for all you do.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092404-5

.....
Please respond by _____

77002

77002

September 24, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Iraqi Borders

JRM

I would like you to put together a team of people to think about what we can do about the borders. I am convinced that if we did a curfew, UAVs or some kind of focus and imposed a penalty on people who are breaking through the borders there would be a deterrent effect.

Let's get some folks thinking about it.

Thanks.

DHR:as
092404-8

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

24 Sep 04

September 24, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Legal Authorities in Afghanistan

Please get back to me with the answer on this legal authorities question in Afghanistan if we need to go after drug labs.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092404-9

.....
Please respond by 10/1/04

Afghanistan

24 SEP 04

September 24, 2004

TO: David Chu
Charlie Abell

cc: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Tapping the Beer Keg

10/2
10/3
10/4
10/5
10/6

It is very important that we lay out, in a clear and systematic way, how we can "lower the spigot" on the various Service "beer kegs" – in other words, how can we fully tap into our available manpower to use it most efficiently.

We should be able to show where the spigot is located today and how we can lower it over what period of time, using metrics to show the progress we have made already.

We need to know the points of friction that will tend to impede our progress and the steps we need to take to accelerate this process for each of the Services.

I would like to see this brief in about 30 days. Use outside help if you think it useful.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092404-12

.....
Please respond by 24 OCT 04

10/7
10/8
10/9
10/10

September 27, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Manning for Staffs in Iraq

T-203

I would like to see us re-do the charts in the Strategic Overview that show the status of manning the staffs in Iraq. They are somewhat misleading and should be fixed.

Also, we need to make sure that decisions about the level and timing of manning those staffs is managed from here in DC, not by the Services.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092704-1

.....
Please respond by 10/1/04

September 27, 2004

TO: COL Bucci

CC: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Dates for the Calendar

Please put the following key dates on my calendar:

- Oct. 9: Afghan Elections
- Oct 9: Australia Elections
- Oct. 31: Ukraine Elections
- Jan. 2005: Iraq Elections

It would be helpful for me to have a list of these, and any other important international election dates.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092704-16

.....
Please respond by 10/1/04

September 27, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Salafist Network

If the center of gravity of the global struggle against extremists is the Salafist financial network and the Salafist spiritual network, it is interesting that I have never had a briefing by anyone in the interagency process in a PC or an NSC on what the USG battle plans are to go against those centers of gravity.

The Department of Treasury has the finances, and State should have the spiritual networks.

What do you propose?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092704-23

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

10/1
1145

~~FOUO~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

September 27, 2004

pur → To Sec Def

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Salafist Network

310.1

If the center of gravity of the global struggle against extremists is the Salafist financial network and the Salafist spiritual network, it is interesting that I have ** 1* never had a briefing by anyone in the interagency process in a PC or an NSC on what the USG battle plans are to go against those centers of gravity.

The Department of Treasury has the finances, and State should have the spiritual ** 2* networks.

What do you propose?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
082704-23

OSD 00361-05

.....

Please respond by 10/15/04

10/1/04

DR 11/11

1 OCT 04

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS
THIS DOCUMENT BECOMES

→ SD

Re: ** 1*

Re: ** 2*

On Sept 23 I sent the attached memo to Hadley. He will organize the briefings.

This is why we drafted for you the ^{attached} memo you sent to the President on creating task forces to counter ideological support for terrorism. The President hasn't yet responded to your July 30 memo. Yesterday I pushed Hadley yet again on getting going on it and I think that this time he may be able to get action. OSD 00361-05

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~
11-L-0559/OSD/21498

Doug Feith

September 28, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Ryan Henry
Andrew Hoehn
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Global Posture Execution

How do you think we ought to execute the Global Posture changes? Should we try to get a retired four-star and make him a deputy assistant secretary to work the problems?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092804-15

.....
Please respond by 10/9/04

Vertical text on the right margin, possibly a stamp or handwritten notes.

September 29, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Security Service Training

353

Please see attached memo.

What do you think?

Thanks.

Attach.
Memo "Security Service Training for Other Countries"

DHR:ss
092804-19

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

2700-10

~~FOUO~~

September 20, 2004

SUBJECT: Security Service Training for Other Countries

The U.S. Military needs to organize -- to provide security service training for other countries.

The Marine Corps ought to step up and take that role -- but we need a major effort on it -- to get funded and organized to do it.

DHR:ss
092004-32

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/21501

September 30, 2004

TO: David Chu
Powell Moore

CC: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Absentee Ballots

016,33

Immediately following the election, please start the process of redirecting the absentee ballot responsibility (The Federal Voting Assistance Program or FVAP), for everyone except the military, to the Department of State.

DoD should handle just the military, since the military is less than half the total. People think of the embassies as the logical place to be helpful on this matter.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
093004-18



Please respond by 10/29/04

016,33

10:45 AM

January 9, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM:

Donald Rumsfeld



Mr. President -

Attached for your possible interest is a note about Tom Franks saying some kind words about you.

Respectfully,

DHR/azn
010904.24

Attach: *"Former General Defends Invasion of Iraq In Speech"* Palm Beach Post,
1/7/03

335 W/H

9 Jan 04

OSD 00461-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21503

Palm Beach Post
January 7, 2004

Former General Defends Invasion Of Iraq In Speech

By Ron Hayes, Palm Beach Post Staff Writer

In the months after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, U.S. Army Gen. Tommy R. Franks led 150,000 American soldiers to war in Afghanistan and, later, Iraq.

Most of the soldiers are still there, but Franks, who retired last summer as head of U.S. Central Command, has traded his camouflage fatigues for a business suit and the lucrative lecture circuit.

Tuesday afternoon, Franks opened the 2004 Speaker Series at The Society of the Four Arts with a few hoary jokes, a passionate defense of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, sentimental references to his grandchildren, a few swipes at the media and a declaration of friendship and respect for President Bush that cynics might have heard as a ringing non-endorsement endorsement.

"It's been five months since I retired," the four-star general began, "and I've learned that if you want a car to move you have to get in the front seat."

But he soon turned serious.

"On September 11, 2001, Americans recognized our vulnerability to attack from without, and every day since then the world has come to recognize what a superpower on steroids looks like," he said.

"Saddam Hussein had a bad holiday season," Franks said with a gleeful cackle, and "Osama bin Laden, dead or alive, is not today in Afghanistan planning the next attack." However, he offered no evidence to support that assertion.

At one point, Franks criticized the media for its coverage, but later praised the policy of embedding journalists with troops in Iraq. "I do not believe we have had very much accurate reporting from Iraq since the embedded journalists left," he said. "More embedding right now would satisfy me."

As for his personal plans now that others are doing the fighting, Franks said, "Samuel Thomas (his grandson) will require a lot of knee-bouncing."

And Franks is writing a book, as well as giving lectures.

"The schedule is about the same," he quipped, "but the pay is a helluva lot better."

He was given a standing ovation.

11-L-0559/OSD/21504



January 12, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: State of the Union

Andy—

Is there any chance the Cabinet spouses can get invited to the State of the Union?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
01/12/04-30

0001

12 Jan 04

OSD 000539-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21505



January 13, 2004

TO: Gen. Leon LaPorte

CC: ADM Ed Giambastiani
Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Brief from JFCOM

Please make sure you get Ed Giambastiani's latest briefing looking at lessons learned through the Iraqi eyes. It is enormously important for you to see it in connection with your current work.

Iraq

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011304-4

.....
Please respond by 1/30/04

13 Jan 04

OSD 00560-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21506

January 13, 2004

TO: Gen. Leon LaPorte
CC: ADM Ed Giambastiani
Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Brief from JFCOM

Please make sure you get Ed Giambastiani's latest briefing looking at lessons learned through the Iraqi eyes. It is enormously important for you to see it in connection with your current work.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011304-4

.....
Please respond by 1/30/04

OSD 00560-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21507

January 13, 2004

TO: Jay Garner

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Wagee Barzani

I have Paul Wolfowitz working on the Wagee Barzani matter. Thanks so much for letting me know.

Regards,

DHR:dh
011304-12

Iraq

13 Jan 04

OSD 00562-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21508

January 13, 2004

TO: The Honorable Tillie Fowler

c c : Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Torie Clarke

What do you think about getting Torie Clarke on the Defense Policy Board?

334

DHR,jh
011304-13

13 Jan 04

OSD 00563-04



January 13, 2004

TO: Newt Gingrich

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D-*

Thanks for your suggestion on recruiting. It is helpful. I will push it.

DHR:dh
011304-9

340

13 Jan 04

OSD 00565-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21510

January 13, 2004

TO: Honorable George Tenet
CC: ADM Ed Giambastiani
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Brief from JFCOM

Please make sure you get briefed by Ed Giambastiani's people on the latest lessons learned view from the Iraqi standpoint. It is very important.

Let's talk about it after you have seen the briefing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011304-3

Iraq

13 Jan 04

OSD 00569-04

11-L-0559/OSD/21511

January 14, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: State of the Union

If there are any drafts of the State of the Union, I would sure like to see one. I am told you are already at draft #5 or #6. It would be a help to see it before it is finished.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011404-10

000.1

14 Jan 04

OSD 00607-04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JAN 14 2004

Sergeant Chnstopher Chandler, USMC
1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
Box 555564
Camp Pendleton, California 92055-5564

33550

Dear Sergeant Chandler:

Congratulations on successfully completing jump school!

Your courage and determination inspire us all.

I wish you all the best in your future endeavors.

Sincerely,

14 Jan 04

OSD 00615-04

Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD

From: Hahn GySgt Patrick T [HahnPT@mfp.usmc.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, January 13, 2004 11:42 AM
To: Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD
Cc: Sims Col Terron D; Weisz LtCol Bradley E; Gambrell MGySgt Jerry C; Nohl SgtMaj Bryan S; Hoch GySgt Frederick W; Hopkins SSgt Joshua A
Subject: RE: SecDef Letter to Appreciation to SGT CHANDLER, CHRIS T.

Ms. Generous,

Good morning, I have contacted the unit and they verified that he was inbound to them, by the time the letter arrives, he should be there.

The mailing address for Sgt Chandler is: 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
Box 555564
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055-5564

Please let us know if you need any further assistance.

V/R
GySgt Hahn
Office of the Chief of Staff
U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific
DSN (b)(6)
Comr [redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD [mailto:Monica.Gencrous@osd.pentagon.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, January 13, 2004 3:31 AM
To: 'Hoch GySgt Frederick W'; Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD
Cc: Sims Col Terron D [HQMC]; Weisz LtCol Bradley E; Gambrell MGySgt Jerry C; Nohl SgtMaj Bryan S; Hahn GySgt Patrick T
Subject: RE: SecDef Letter to Appreciation to SGT CHANDLER, CHRIS T.

Hello GySgt Hoch,

I need to propose a compromise. I am told] the Secretary would like the letter to be mailed directly to Sgt Chandler, so I need his address, please.

We are happy to send a courtesy copy through your chain of command.

Thank you,
Monica Generous

-----Original Message-----

From: Hoch GySgt Frederick W [mailto:HochFW@mfp.usmc.mil]
Sent: Monday, January 12, 2004 8:43 PM
To: Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD
Cc: Sims Col Terron D; Weisz LtCol Bradley E; Gambrell MGySgt Jerry C; Nohl SgtMaj Bryan S; Hahn GySgt Patrick T
Subject: FW: SecDef Letter to Appreciation to SGT CHANDLER, CHRIS T.

Hi Ma'am,

11-L-0559/OSD/21514

In ref to the Subject letter, the correct chain of command is as follows:

From: SecDef's address
To: Sergeant Chris T. Chandler
Via: (1) Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific
(2) Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force
(3) Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
(4) Commanding Officer, 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion

Once signed, our mailing address for the letter is as follows:

Commander
U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific
Box 64139
Camp Smith, HI 96861-4139

Let me know if you have any other questions.

V/r,
GySgt Hoch
Staff Secretary's Office
Marine Forces Pacific

-----Original Message-----

From: Weisz LtCol Bradley E
Sent: Monday, January 12, 2004 3:08 PM
To: Hoch GySgt Frederick W
Subject: FW: SecDef Letter to Appreciation to SGT CHANDLER, CHRIS T.

Gunny,

Yours for action. Thanks.

LtCol Weisz

-----Original Message-----

From: O'Neal Col Michael C
Sent: Monday, January 12, 2004 2:58 PM
To: Weisz LtCol Bradley E
Cc: Gambrell MGySgt Jerry C
Subject: FW: SecDef Letter to Appreciation to SGT CHANDLER, CHRIS T

Brad,
Contact the SECDEF's secretary and provide the necessary addressing information so that Sgt Chandler's letter is properly routed. You might also correct the Unit title line for 1st LAR while your corresponding with her. See Col Sims note about any emails that we choose to send.

S/f
Col O'Neal

11-L-0559/OSD/21515

-----Original Message-----

From: Sirns Col Terron D
Sent: Monday, January 12, 2004 11:25 AM
To: O'Neal Col Michael C
Cc: Musca Col Joseph II
Subject: SecDef Letter to Appreciation to SGT CHANDLER, CHRIS T.

Col O'Neal:

Secretary Rumsfeld would like to address a letter of congratulations to Sgt Chris Chandler upon successfully completing jump school. Sgt Chandler has a prosthetic leg. Per the info below, Sgt Chandler has orders to Camp Pendleton, 1st LAR Bn and is scheduled to report for duty around mid Jan04.

I believe it is appropriate for the Secretary's staff to address the letter for endorsement via Sgt Chandler's MARFORPAC chain of command. Please contact Ms. Monica Generous, Office of the Secretary of Defense, on (b)(6) and provide her guidance to address the letter to MARFORPAC or as you deem appropriate.

Please courtesy copy DMCS on emails to the Secretary's POC, and let me know if any other assistance is needed.

Thank you,

Colonel Terron Sims
Office of the Director Marine Corps Staff (DMCS)
DSN (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Warner Capt Gilbert A
Sent: Monday, January 12, 2004 3:07 PM
To: Tatum Sgt Patrick L
Cc: Sirns Col Terron D, Nohl SgtMaj Bryan S
Subject: RE: SGT CHANDLER, CHRIS T.

Sgt Tatum,

Sgt Chandler detached from this Headquarters during Dec 03 and is directed to report to 1st LAR for duty on or about 15 Jan 04. He is currently on annual leave, travel, etc. The official mailing address for the Command is:

1stLt Light Reconnaissance Battalion
Box 555564
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055

The Command SgtMaj (CCed above) is the point of contact for any

11-L-0559/OSD/21516

1/13/2004

other questions. As I stated above he will check into I MEF on 15 Jan 04 and will be engaged in the checking-in process for one to two days before going to 1st LAR. Additionally, it should be noted that 1st LAR is slated for deployment.

The SgtMaj's info is SgtMaj Nohl, DSN (b)(6)

Let me know if you have any questions

R, Capt Warner
Force Adjutant
MARFORLANT

Tel: (b)(6)

Fax:

-----Original Message-----

From: Tatum Sgt Patrick L
Sent: Friday, January 09, 2004 4:06 PM
To: Warner Capt Gilbert A
Cc: Sims Col Terron D
Subject: SGT CHADDLER, CHRIS T.

Sir,

As discussed on the phone, SecDef would like to write a letter of congratulations to subject name Marine. If you could please verify the Marine's Unit address. Thank you for your time in this matter.

Sgt Patrick L. Tatum
Administrative Office of the
Director, Marine Corps Staff

(b)(6)

tatumpl@hqmc.usmc.mil

11-L-0559/OSD/21517

1/13/2004

✓

Sergeant Christopher Chandler, USMC
[LtCol Sims from the CMC's office is researching Chandler's address for us.]

Dear Sergeant Chandler:

Congratulations on successfully completing jump school!

Your courage and determination inspire us all.

I wish you all the best in your future endeavors.

Sincerely,

11/2 1000
Mr. D:
FOR REVIEW
M 1/12
MONICA
→ Prep for OSD sig
M 1/13 Durnan 1/12

Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD

From: Hoch GySgt Frederick W [HochFW@mfp.usmc.mil]
Sent: Monday, January 12, 2004 8:43 PM
To: Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD
Cc: Sims Col Terron D; Weisz LtCol Bradley E; Gambrell MGySgt Jerry C; Nohl SgtMaj Bryan S; Hahn GySgt Patrick T
Subject: FW: SecDef Letter to Appreciation to SGT CHANDLER, CHRIS T.

Hi Ma'am,

In ref to the Subject letter, the correct chain of command is as follows:

From: SecDef's address
To: Sergeant Chris T. Chandler
Via: (1) Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific
(2) Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force
(3) Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
(4) Commanding Officer, 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion

Once signed, our mailing address for the letter is as follows:

Commander
U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific
Box 64139
Camp Smith, HI 96861-4139

Let me know if you have any other questions.

V/r,
GySgt Hoch
Staff Secretary's Office
Marine Forces Pacific

-----Original Message-----

From: Weisz LtCol Bradley E
Sent: Monday, January 12, 2004 3:08 PM
To: Hoch GySgt Frederick W
Subject: FW: SecDef Letter to Appreciation to SGT CHANDLER, CHRIS T

Gunny,

Yours for action. Thanks.

LtCol Weisz

-----Original Message-----

From: ONeal Col Michael C
Sent: Monday, January 12, 2004 2:58 PM
To: Weisz LtCol Bradley E

11-L-0559/OSD/21519

1/13/2004