

~~FOUO~~

SEP 28 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: ADM Blair's Testimony to Senate Appropriations Committee

Attached is the statement by ADM Dennis Blair before the Senate Appropriations Committee on Intel Reform. It is well worth reading. The first sentence says it all.

Attach.  
9/21/04 ADM Blair's Statement before the SAC

DHR:ss  
092704-29

350.09

28 SEP 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 14794-04

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Senate Appropriations Committee Testimony

21 September 20, 2004

Senator Stevens, members of the Committee.

( ( ( When planning or conducting a military operation, intelligence is one of the absolute key supporting functions – like ammunition, transportation and communications. ( ( (

Perhaps in the past intelligence capabilities funded by the National Foreign Intelligence Program – NFIP – primarily supported national-level policy makers. No more. NFIP programs provide intelligence support that is integral to military planning and operations at the tactical level. The National Security Agency and the National Geospatial Information Agency are combat support agencies. They are involved with military plans and operations from the early stages – intelligence preparation of the battlefield – through all stages of conflict. I recommend that their operations, funding, personnel policies and effectiveness continue to be determined primarily by the Secretary of Defense, then integrated with other intelligence programs by the National Intelligence Director.

To me it makes no sense for an official outside the Department of Defense to determine DoD requirements, then to provide funds to DoD, then to monitor programs. That would be like the Department of Transportation deciding what kind of and how many trucks DoD needs, then providing funding to the Department and monitoring truck usage.

I strongly favor a powerful National Intelligence Director who is not the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. That Director should have a large and competent requirements, programming and budgeting staff, comparable to the Joint Staff, PA&E and the Office of the Comptroller in the Defense Department. However the Department of Defense should originate the programs of DoD combat support agencies as a part of building the Defense capabilities this country needs. The NID, assisted by a competent staff, should then integrate the requirements of all government customers and providers of intelligence. In many cases DoD combat support agencies will be collecting intelligence of use to others besides the

350.09

285ep04

armed forces. The NID needs to ensure that these capabilities are included and integrated.

In case of strong differences between the NID and the Secretary of Defense, the issue should be taken to the White House for solution. With a strong and capable staff providing data-based recommendations, the NID should have no fear about seeking these decisions.

But what about the current war on terrorism – can't we do better? Isn't good, shared intelligence the key to success?

Yes, if we put someone besides an intelligence official in charge of planning and conducting that war.

Intelligence works when it is driven by commanders and operators or by officials with line responsibility. It does not work when it is generating its own objectives and requirements. To assign a National Counter Terrorism Center reporting to the NID the responsibility for planning the war on terrorism is like making a football team's scouts the head coach. A head coach wants tremendous scouts – he wants to know everything possible about the opposing team – on game day he wants the scouts up in the spotter's booth predicting what the opposing team's next play will be – but it is the coach who must call the plays. He knows what his players can and cannot do, not the scouts – he knows what other games he must play – not the scouts.

The fastest way to fix intelligence in the war on terrorism is to designate the head coach. Right now we have a committee conducting the war - the CIA is conducting part of the war, DoD is conducting part of the war, FBI is conducting part of the war, DHS is conducting part of the war, the Departments of State and Treasury are conducting other parts. The results are predictable. Our adversary is moving faster than we are, we are missing opportunities in internal friction, and the intelligence services are doing their best, particularly the TTIC, but they are doing it in a vacuum, rather than as part of operations to defend against and destroy terrorism. It may be that we need several teams to win this war – one for the United States headed by DHS, several joint interagency task forces overseas headed by either DoD or CIA officials. But right now we have none.

There are many other aspects of current intelligence reform proposals that are good – improving sharing, upgrading networks, increasing professional standards. However I strongly recommend against two proposals in various bills:

-To give the NID overall responsibility for the NFIP budget activities in the Department of Defense;

-To place the NID in charge of developing the strategy for the war on terrorism.

Thank you, and I would be happy to answer questions.



~~FOUO~~

September 27, 2004

TO: Lt Gen Mike Hayden  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Materials to Steve Cambone

I notice I am receiving some materials out of your organization on a regular basis that Steve Cambone is not receiving. How is that decision made and who can we talk to to assure Steve Cambone receives the same materials which are sent to me?

*312*

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092704-27

.....  
 Please respond by 10/4/04

*27 Sep 04*

OSD 14796-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/44370

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

COLLECTOR'S COPY

September 2, 2004 2:40

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
Doug Feith

848

CC: Gen. Pete Pace  
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: "Preparation of the Battlespace"

I am concerned that the old phrase "preparation of the battlespace" may no longer be appropriate terminology for a variety of reasons, including potential inaccuracy and misimpressions that it can convey.

Please think through what terms may be more appropriate in today's world. In the GWOT, the entire world is the "battlespace" in the old sense, and it can be harmful to telegraph U.S. "preparation."

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
1990204-1

.....  
Please respond by 9/17/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 14817-04



September 27, 2004

TO: GEN John Abizaid

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace  
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meet the Press

Nice job on Sunday doing "Meet the Press." You told the story honestly and accurately, and came across well. Thanks for taking the time to do it.

DHR:ss  
092704.30

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*000.77*

*27 Sep 04*

OSD 14844-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44372

July 26, 2004

TO: Ryan Henry  
CC: Pete Geren  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: ICRC Visit

3836

Here is another ICRC cable you should **look** into.

Thanks.

**Attach.**  
**AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD** Cable **O2410562JUL 04**

DHR:dh  
072604-24

.....  
Please respond by 8/6/04

26 Jul 04

OTTUZYUW RUEHGBA0239 2061056-UUUU--RUEKNMA  
ZNR UUUUU ZZH  
O 241056Z JUL 04

~~FM~~ AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD  
~~TO~~ RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0350  
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC  
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC  
RUCAACC/CDR USCENCOM MACDILL AFB FL  
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0008  
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

*T. Beren*

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000239

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A  
TAGS: DREL, ICRC, PTER, IE

(b)(3):10 U.S.C. § 130c

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

SECDEF: X DEPSEC: / EXECSEC: / FILE: \_\_\_\_\_  
C&D: / CCD: / CABLE CH: \_\_\_\_\_  
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USDI: / PER SEC: \_\_\_\_\_ COMM: \_\_\_\_\_

*NAGELMAN /  
WAXMAN /  
HENRY /*

*DIR, JS /*

\*\*\* UNCLASSIFIED \*\*\*

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


\*\*\* UNCLASSIFIED \*\*\*

\*\*\*\*\* This Message Has Been Altered \*\*\*\*\*

Page 2 of 4

(b)(3):10 U.S.C. § 130c



\*\*\* UNCLASSIFIED \*\*\*

11-L-0559/OSD/44375

(b)(3):10 U.S.C. § 130c

NEGROPONIE

SECDEF V2

ACTION

(U, 6, 8)

1

INFO CHAIRS(\*) CHAIRS TESTBED(\*) SECDEF C(1)  
SECDEF-C(\*) ASD:PA-SMTP(\*) DIR:PAE-RAM(\*)  
ESC-SMIP(\*) ESC AGENT ALL TRF(\*) SECDEF WASH DC(\*)  
OSDOMMIPRDA(\*) OSDONSIPRDA(\*)  
+JCP EMAIL CUSTOMER//CHAIRS//  
+USDP

CJCS V6

ACTION

(U, 8)

2

INFO CHAIRMAN DISTRIBUTION REQUIRED(\*) SJS-C(\*)  
SJS-C(1) NMCC:CWO(\*) CMAS(\*) J3(\*) CMAS(1) J5(\*)  
J4 LRC(\*) JSAMS(\*)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED

3

\*\*\* UNCLASSIFIED \*\*\*

11-L-0559/OSD/44376

July 16, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Pete Geren  
Matt Latimer  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Detainee Statement

383.6

Where is the latest draft of the overall detainee statement? We need to start pulling the threads together.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071604-4

.....  
Please respond by *9/21/04*

165010V

July 16, 2004 MEMO TO SECDEF from Di Rita

Attached is the draft statement on Detainee operations that we are attempting to validate by everyone who is in a position to validate it.

The first sentence is solid.

The second sentence is solid for Iraq, and we are confirming that it is solid for Afghanistan and Guantanamo.

This statement will leave some people wanting more, but when it is bulletproof we will be able to use it.

**DRAFT STATEMENT ON DETAINEE OPERATIONS AND THE  
ICRC**

**The International Committee of the Red Cross has access to all  
Defense Department detention operations.**

**All detainees in (Iraq, Afghanistan and GTMO) have been  
assigned Internment Security Numbers and are registered with  
the ICRC.**

**DRAFT**

July 28, 2004

TO: Pete Geren  
CC: Paul Butler  
Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Response on Torture

383.6

When people write expressing concern about torture and abuse, we ought to have a packet of unclassified materials that we can send them that show what has been authorized, why what was authorized was not torture, that it was humane, and that it was within the law.

We also need to point out that any activities that occurred that were not authorized have been or are being investigated and, where appropriate, prosecuted.

The materials need to be bullet-proof.

I would like it within a week.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072804-5

.....  
Please respond by 8/5/04

28 July 04

July 28, 2004

SUBJECT: Policy v. Legal

We have to decide if we want to address the Department of State on a policy basis as opposed to a legal basis on some of these issues.

DHR:dh  
072004-14

040 STATE

28 JUL 04

September 29, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Individual Ready Reserve Call Ups

326

At the present time the Army has been authorized to call up roughly 6500 Individual Ready Reservists (IRR). My understanding is that the Army currently has called up nearly 4000, thus far. Of those already scheduled to report, roughly three-fifths have shown up for duty.

Background:

- Each of the services has Individual Ready Reserves.
- Everyone who serves in the military today is a volunteer.
- Each volunteer incurs an eight-year obligation, either on active duty, in the Selected Reserve, or in the Individual Ready Reserve; or a combination thereof.
- If on active duty or in the Selected Reserve – training every month – the Army knows their addresses, phone numbers, medical condition and skill proficiency.
- If in the Individual Ready Reserve, the Army may not know their current addresses and phone numbers, skill proficiency, physical condition, or personal circumstances.

29 SEP 04



Therefore, when Individual Ready Reservists are called up, it is expected that only about two-thirds will show up ready to serve and that there will be special situations with respect to the remainder.

By "situations," I refer to the fact that a few may be dead, a few in jail, some in the hospital or physically incapacitated; some may have moved and we may have incorrect addresses. Some may have personal circumstances that make it impossible for them to come on active duty. For example, the Department has exempted several IRR members because they hold civilian positions considered more critical to national security.

In any event, there are a lot of good reasons why the Army will not get 100% when they call up the Individual Ready Reserves, and they know that. It is no surprise. A number of exemptions have already been issued.

I am told there are eight individuals whom we know received their notices and have not responded. These eight cases are currently being reviewed. The Army reports that an IRR member ordered to active duty over a year ago was declared AWOL last June.

AWOL determinations will be reviewed by senior Army officials before they are made.

DHR:ss  
092904-7

SEP 30 2004

TO: Ken Krieg  
Michael Bayer  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: SEC

040

Please think through how we can connect the Service Secretaries again and get something like the SEC, or a redesigned SEC, functioning.

We need to link them, and we need *to* include them more. And I need to get better connected to them.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092804-12

.....  
Please respond by 10/15/04

OSD 14965-04

30 Sep 04

720

August 27, 2004

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2004 SEP 3 11:11:01

O: Ray DuBois  
C: Gen. Dick Myers  
ROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
UBJECT: Firing Range in Yuma

Yuma a question was raised about illegal immigrants coming into the firing range, putting themselves at risk and inhibiting our training.

Please look into that.

Thanks.

HR:dl  
12704-9 (to computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 9/17/04

684

27 Aug 04

OSD 15010-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44385



ACQUISITION  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

OFFICE OF THE  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

701 SEP 23 AM 11:41

## INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. Raymond F. DuBois, DUSD(I&E)

SUBJECT: Firing Range in Yuma

*Ray DuBois 9/20/04*

In the attached snowflake, dated August 27, 2004, you requested information about illegal immigrants coming into the Yuma firing range, putting themselves at risk and inhibiting training. Discussions with the Marine Corps, the Department of Interior and Department of Homeland Security yielded the following information.

- Tab A is an Info Memo from the Commandant of the Marine Corps describing impact on training on the Goldwater Range from undocumented aliens in the Yuma region entering the range. The problem has been exacerbated by increased enforcement along the border east and west of the Goldwater Range. The range has been closed 208 times from May through July 2004 with 733 training hours lost.
- Inter-departmental and inter-agency coordination is currently worked at the regional level through the Borderland Management Task Force. The Commandant calls for the establishment of inter-departmental (with Department of Homeland Security and the Department of the Interior) strategic coordination task force under the DoD Range Sustainment Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT). The OIPT is co-chaired by the DUSD (I&E), DUSD(Readiness), and the Principal Deputy Director Office of Test & Evaluation.
- ODUSD(I&E) staff have initiated contact with Department of the Interior and Department of Homeland Security headquarters staff to identify the appropriate points of contact for further coordination as required to support the Commandant. Formal coordination will occur through the existing Range Sustainment Working IPT process, with the Marine Corps leading the staff working group.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Jan Larkin, (b)(6)




OSD 15010-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44386

August 27, 2004

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 SEP 20 AM 11:41

TO: Ray DuBois  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Firing Range in Yuma

In Yuma a question was raised about illegal immigrants coming into the firing range, putting themselves at risk and inhibiting our training.

Please look into that

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
082704-9 (is computer).doc

.....  
Please respond by 9/17/04

OSD 15010-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44387



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
2 NAVY ANNEX  
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775

IN REPLY REFER TO

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General M. W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps

Hagee 9/15

SUBJECT Undocumented Aliens Aboard Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Yuma  
Training Ranges

- MCAS Yuma is responsible for 1.2M acres of land that encompasses the **Barry M. Goldwater Range**. The Goldwater Range shares a 37-mile border with Mexico. The Border Patrol, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and DoD all have statutory and regulatory interests in activities occurring aboard the Goldwater Range. An area map is contained in Tab A.
- Heightened Border Patrol and Immigration and Customs Enforcement activity (both under Department of Homeland Security) in Tucson, San Diego, and El Centro has resulted in increased smuggling of aliens in the less resourced Border Patrol's Yuma sector (Goldwater Range inclusive).
- Snapshot of Border Patrol Yuma sector (as of Jun 04): Over 86,000 alien apprehensions; 1,183 of those aliens from 47 countries (other than Mexico); 25 alien heat related deaths (11 were aboard the Goldwater Range); 2<sup>nd</sup> quarter alien apprehensions up 81%; MCAS Yuma detains approximately 260 aliens per month.
- During the last 12 months, aliens and other trespassers have significantly interrupted training by causing closure of the Goldwater Range 208 times, ranging from 20 minutes to 10 hours per closure. These range closures averaged one per day from May through July 04 and totaled 733 DoD training hours lost to date.
- The DoD Overarching Implementation Process Team (OIPT) on Range Sustainment should formally establish a coordination task force with senior officials from the Departments of Homeland Security and Interior in order to strategically coordinate decisions that affect the missions of each Department near international borders.

COORDINATION: NONE.


Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Major John M. Manson (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/44388

# MCAS Yuma & Goldwater Range



August 27, 2004

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 SEP 30 AM 11:50

O: Ray DuBois

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Land Exchanges in Arizona

talked to Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano when I was in Phoenix this past week. She indicated she had talked to Secretary of Interior Gayle Norton about working with **BLM** and DoD to do land exchanges around several military bases in Arizona. It sounded like a **good** idea to me.

Please look into it and get back to Dennis Burke, her chief of staff, to get more information from him.

Thanks.

HR:db  
12704-F1 (is computer).doc

.....  
Please respond by 9/24/04

601

27 Aug 04

OSD 15011-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44390





OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

2004 SEP 30 21 11: 42

INFO MEMO

ACQUISITION  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. Raymond F. DuBois, DUSD(I&E)

*Ray DuBois 7/20/04*

SUBJECT: BLM and DoD Land Exchanges in Arizona

In the attached snowflake dated August 27, 2004, you outlined your conversation with Arizona Governor Napolitano on land exchanges around several military bases involving the Department of Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Department. An update on our effort follows.

- In July 2004, the Department of the Interior was briefed by the Olympia Group, a private development group based in Scottsdale and Las Vegas. Olympia officials plan to acquire land from multiple landowners under the flight path immediately outside Luke Air Force Base and exchange these consolidated private tracts with developable land managed by Interior's BLM. Olympia currently has under contract approximately 6,000 acres owned by 17 landowners.
- A land exchange of this nature would require Federal legislation. Senator John McCain and Senator Jon Kyl, along with Congressman Trent Franks, have been approached by the Olympia Group to introduce such legislation.
- Interior's initial response was that there is no direct benefit for the BLM to pursue these types of exchanges, but they are willing to work such projects in pursuit of the appropriate broader National interest.
- DUSD(I&E) staff contacted and discussed the proposal with Governor Napolitano's staff. Additional information was requested and will be forwarded by the Governor's staff.
- DUSD(I&E) will continue to work with the Air Force, Department of Interior, and Governor Napolitano's office to determine the current status of the proposal, track any new Federal land exchange legislative proposals, and explore ways to take advantage of this opportunity, if appropriate.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared by: Bruce Beard, (b)(6)

\* R- ARIZONA, LUKE AFB in his District,



OSD 15011-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44391

August 27, 2004

STATE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 SEP 30 AM 11:50

TO: Ray DuBois

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Land Exchanges in Arizona

I talked to Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano when I was in Phoenix this past week. She indicated she had talked to Secretary of Interior Gayle Norton about working with BLM and DoD to do land exchanges around several military bases in Arizona. It sounded like a good idea to me.

Please look into it and get back to Dennis Burke, her chief of staff, to get more information from him.

Thanks.

DR:dh  
2704-11 (in computer).doc

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

9/24/04

OSD 15011-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44392

September 29, 2004

TO: GEN Leon LaPorte  
Gen John Handy  
  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. Rumsfeld*  
  
SUBJECT: Medical Transport of Korean Boy

S  
80

Leon, it was a good idea to take that young Korean boy home on your aircraft; and John, nice job working out the complexities of the transport.

Those kind of humanitarian gestures mean a great deal. Thanks for thinking of it.

DHR:ss  
092904-3

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 15081-04


295204

~~FOUO~~

September 29, 2004

TO: GEN Leon LaPorte  
Gen John Handy

CC: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Medical Transport of Korean Boy

Leon, it was a good idea to take that young Korean boy home on your aircraft; and John, nice job working out the complexities of the transport.

Those kind of humanitarian gestures mean a great deal. Thanks for thinking of it.

DHR:ss  
092904-3

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 15081-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/44394

September 29, 2004

TO: RADM Adam Robinson  
CC: Gordon England  
ADM Vern Clark  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Visit to Bethesda

The visit I made to Bethesda Naval Hospital was extremely well run. You and the team out there made excellent use of our time, and I was particularly impressed with the evident care provided to our wounded Marines.

You are clearly running a first-class hospital – thanks for all you are doing.

DHR:ss  
092904-9

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

33550

27 Sep 04

OSD 15082-04

~~FOUO~~

file

September 30, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: SOUTHCOM's Haiti Request

Please get back to me on what SOUTHCOM'S request is for an assessment team in Haiti and let's look at it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092904-5

.....  
Please respond by 10/8/04

Haiti

Sir,  
Response attached.  
*VR*  
LtCol Lengyel  
9/30

30 SEP 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 15136-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44396

720

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY

September 21, 2004

2004 OCT -1 PM 2:37

TO: Steve Cambone  
CC: Ryan Henry  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: HUMINT Effort in QDR.

We ought to think about a major HUMINT effort in the QDR.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092004-30

.....  
*Please respond by* 10/15/04

OSD 15174-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/44397

SEP 22 2004

~~SECRET~~  
REF ID: A66666

TO: Ryan Henry  
VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA


SUBJECT: Item for the QDR

One of the QDR items should be:

- How do we leverage the National Guard?

Thanks.

DHR:js  
092104-5



*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

OSD 15175-04



~~TOP SECRET~~

file

KK's  
copy

October 25, 2004

TO: Ken Krieg  
CC: Ryan Henry  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: QDR Item

Here's a memo from me to Dick Myers and his response. I agree, this has got to be part of the QDR. I assume you agree.

Thanks.

Attach:  
9/27/04 SecDef Memo to Gen Myers re: Idea for QDR  
10/22/04 *Gen* Myers Memo to SecDef re: Capability to build Security Forces in Other Countries

DHR:ss  
102304-9

.....  
Please respond by 11/12/04

~~SECDEF~~  
YES,

RYAN HAS THAT ON

*DR* 10/24

LIST.

KJK

10/26/04

cc RYAN HENRY

~~TOP SECRET~~

11-L-0559/OSD/44399

U 15/76-04

~~FOUO~~

September 27, 2004

868

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
CC: Ryan Henry  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Idea for QDR

One of the things that came up in the Combatant Commanders Conference ~~was~~ the need for DoD to have people capable of building security forces in other countries.

Should we push that issue into the QDR?

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
692704-20

.....  
Please respond by 10/15/04

*DR 10/25*

*Sir,  
Response attached.*

*v/r  
Lt Col Lengyel*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 15176-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44400



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CH-2133-04:05  
22 October 2004

DA 10/25

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 10/21*

SUBJECT: Capability to Build Security Forces in Other Countries

- **Question.** "One of the things that came up in the Combatant Commanders Conference was the need for DoD to have people capable of building security forces in other countries. Should we push that issue into the QDR?" (TAB)
- **Answer.** Yes. Given the challenges facing the United States now and in the future, the Department of Defense will require some capability to build security forces in other countries. The QDR should consider this issue within the broader force sizing and interagency context.
- **Analysis**
  - Training foreign security forces is tied directly to increasing the capability of US allies and other potential coalition partners, improving our ability to conduct multinational operations and to prevail against adversaries.
  - Currently, training of foreign security and police forces includes programs executed by at least seven different departments, agencies and coalition partners. The President's Global Peace Operations Initiative begins to address the problem and we should continue to support it.
  - **Our** analysis during the QDR should address DOD's role as part of the overall US government effort and how we can most efficiently and effectively train security forces.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:  
As stated

copy to:  
USDP

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director J-5 (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/44401

OSD 15176-04

~~FOUO~~

**INFORMATION RETENTION**

September 27, 2004

2004-09-27 15:10:00

TO: Gen Dick Myers

CC: Ryan Henry

*cc: Jim Thomas*

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Idea for QDR

One of the things that came up in the Combatant Commanders Conference was the need for DoD to have people capable of building security forces in other-countries.

Should we push that issue into the QDR?

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092704-20

.....

Please respond by 10/15/04

OSD 15176-04

~~FOUO~~

**INFORMATION RETENTION**

28-09-04 15:10 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/44402



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-PI-33-04

22 October 2004

2004 OCT 22 05:05

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RBMY 10/21

SUBJECT: Capability to Build Security Forces in Other Countries

- **Question.** "One of the things that came up in the Combatant Commanders Conference was the need for DoD to have people capable of building security forces in other countries. Should we push that issue into the QDR?" (TAB)
- **Answer.** Yes. Given the challenges facing the United States now and in the future, the Department of Defense will require some capability to build security forces in other countries. The QDR should consider this issue within the broader force sizing and interagency context.
- **Analysis**
  - Training foreign security forces is tied directly to increasing the capability of US allies and other potential coalition partners, improving our ability to conduct multinational operations and to prevail against adversaries.
  - Currently, training of foreign security and police forces includes programs executed by at least seven different departments, agencies and coalition partners. The President's Global Peace Operations Initiative begins to address the problem and we should continue to support it.
  - **Our** analysis during the QDR should address DOD's role as part of the overall US government effort and how we can most efficiently and effectively train security forces.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

copy to:

USDP

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director J-5; (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ OSD 15176-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44403

~~FOUO~~

TAB

September 27, 2004

868

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
CC: Ryan Henry  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Idea for QDR

One of the **things** that came up in the Combatant Commanders Conference was the need for DoD to have people capable of building security forces in other countries.

Should we push that issue into the QDR?

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092704-20

.....  
Please respond by 10/15/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/44404

OSD 15176-04

**INFORMATION RETENTION**

September 27, 2004

SECRET  
2004-09-27 13:15

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
CC: Ryan Henry *cc: Jim Thomas*  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Salafist Factor

If the center of gravity of the global struggle against extremists is the Salafist financial network and the Salafist spiritual network, then the **USG** needs to have plans to deal with them.

First, do you folks agree that is the case?

If so, what do you propose by way of a plan to deal with it?

Shouldn't the U.S. have a major program to fund moderate schools? Should that be part of the QDR effort?

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092704-19

.....  
Please respond by 10/15/04

0 SD 15177-04



In reply refer to ES-0898 & 04/013054-ES

~~FOUO~~

September 28, 2004

REC-10

SEP 29 11 30 07

TO: Ryan Henry  
CC: Steve Cambone  
Ken Krieg

SUBJECT: Draft of QDR

Please **give** me a draft (in bullet points) of what you think the QDR should include; what we hope to get out of it; and what it should and should not be.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092804-5

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

OSD 15178-04

~~FOUO~~

29-09-04 11:17 3255

11-L-0559/OSD/44406



September 30, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace

cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
David Chu  
VADM Tim Keating  
ADM Ed Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: System for Managing Force Rotation

3202

It would be helpful to have a briefing showing me the system for managing force rotation that was in place in 2001 when we arrived, as well as the current system we are using. It seems to me we are still using an industrial-age approach and are not fully single-sourcing through JFCOM.

My suspicion is that there is still considerable room for growth, and it would be interesting to see your plans for further consolidation and improvement.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
093004-14

.....

Please respond by 10/21/04

3052404

OSD 15186-04

October 1, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
GEN John Abizaid  
GEN George Casey  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Note from Mike De Long

IRAQ

Attached is a note from Mike De Long that might be of interest.

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/30/04 Memo to SecDef from Mike De Long

DHR:ss  
100104-8

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 15187-04

10CT04

30 September 2004

Memorandum for Secretary of Defense

Sir,

Lt Gen (Ret) Mike De Long called at 2:30 pm. He returned from Iraq yesterday and offered the below listed points for your consideration. If you would like more elaboration, or have any questions, he is available, and we can arrange a call.

He had numerous meetings with important tribal leaders, and heads of several Iraqi corporations. They gave him several insights. Generally, their view of the importance of the coming elections is the same as PM Allawi's. There are a few additional views.

They feel that between 13 – 16 out of the 18 provinces in Iraq are ready for the elections, want them, and will hold them relatively successfully. The others are problematic. The leaders feel that if elections are held, and any of the provinces are left out, it will cause such a feeling out alienation that it could lead to a civil war. They were adamant that all provinces need to participate.

Next, they urged the U.S. and the Coalition to at strongly to crush the insurgents. The use of force in the right cause is respected, and any backing off, or moderation will only be cause for problems later.

Lastly, given a choice, the leaders do not want any expatriates in the government. They respect Allawi, but really want someone like themselves, that stuck it out under Saddam. They resent the outsiders, even the good ones.

Very Respectfully,



COL B

11-L-0559/OSD/44409

~~FOUO~~

October 1, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
GEN John Abizaid  
GEN George Casey

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Note from Mike De Long

Attached is a note from Mike De Long that might be of interest.

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/30/04 Memo to SecDef from Mike De Long

DHR:ss  
100104-8

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 15187-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/44410

30 September 2004

Memorandum for Secretary of Defense

Sir,

Lt Gen (Ret) Mike De Long called at 2:30 pm. He returned from Iraq yesterday and offered the below listed points for your consideration. If you would like more elaboration, or have any questions, he is available, and we can arrange a call.


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Next, they urged the U.S. and the Coalition to at strongly to crush the insurgents. The use of force in the right cause is respected, and any backing off, or moderation will only be cause for problems later.

Lastly, given a choice, the leaders do not want any expatriates in the government. They respect Allawi, but really want someone like themselves, that stuck it out under Saddam. They resent the outsiders, even the good ones.

Very Respectfully,



COL B

11-L-0559/OSD/44411

FOUO

SEP 21 2004

September 21, 2004  
ES-0825  
I-04/012624

0005

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM:

SUBJECT: Department of Treasury and Department of Justice Participation and Progress in GWOT

Please get back to me with a sense of how Treasury and Justice are doing with their tasks in the GWOT. At the Combatant Commander's Conference, it was clear that we don't have an accurate sense of how they are doing in stopping funding streams and working other interagency pieces that belong to those two departments.

If we can understand what they are doing and how much progress they are making, perhaps we could encourage them to do even more.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092004-17

.....  
Please respond by 10/15/04

2/5e/04

FOUO

OSD 15196-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44412

SECRET  
2004 09 23 - 1 PM 1:27


500 S

**Policy Executive Secretariat Note**

October 1, 2004

Captain Marriott,

On September 23, USDP Feith sent the attached memo to Steve Hadley. (tab 1) He will organize the briefings.

  
June Bartlett  
Deputy Director  
Policy Executive Secretariat

1 OCT 04

OSD 15196-04

21 SEP 04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR STEVE HADLEY

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *DJF 09/23/04*

SUBJECT: Justice and Treasury GWOT Efforts

At our recent Combatant Commander's conference, some of the Combatant Commanders asked how Justice and Treasury are doing with their efforts in the Global War on Terrorism.

It might be a good if they briefed their efforts at an upcoming Deputies Committee meeting.

Thanks.

*— and then briefed the PC.*

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/44414



~~FOUO~~

September 24, 2004  
09:07:00

September 24, 2004  
ES-0975  
I-04/012866

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Jim Haynes  
Tom O'Connell

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: [Redacted]

SUBJECT: Process for Handling High Value Detainee Release Requests

We will shortly begin to receive recommendations from GEN Casey and the Iraqis to release a number of the high value detainees.

Please set up a process in the building that evaluates each situation and provides recommendations to me in a measured way.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092404-7

.....  
Please respond by 10/8/04

OSD 15197-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/44415



~~SECRET//NOFORN ATTACHMENT~~

June 14, 2004

EF-9872

I-04/008049

TO: Bill Luti  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. Pete Pace  
Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Afghan Security Forces

What do we do about accelerating the Afghan security forces and making sure the budget is right?

Thanks.

AR 21 MINISTERS

DHR:dh  
061404-29

OSD 15261-04

.....  
Please respond by 7/9/04

**Policy Executive Secretariat Note**

August 4, 2004

Captain Marriott:

Mr. Feith handed a copy of the attached brief to the SecDef yesterday afternoon, 3 August.

JR.  
*June Bartlett*

June Bartlett  
Deputy Director  
Policy Executive Secretariat

11-L-0559/OSD/44417

~~SECRET//NOFORN ATTACHMENT~~

14 June 04

August 25, 2004

Aug 25 17

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Kissinger Transcripts

Please check with the White House Counsel on paragraph six of this memo concerning the Kissinger transcripts and get back to me.

Thanks.

Attach:  
8/17/04 William Rogers e-mail to Kissinger

DHR:dh  
082504-1 (as computer).doc

.....  
Please respond by

9/3/04

OSD 15347-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44418




DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600



INFO MEMO

October 4, 2004 9:00 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II 

SUBJECT: Kissinger Transcripts

- You asked me to check on the release of transcripts of Dr. Henry Kissinger's telephone conversations with or about you. (Tab A)
- The transcripts were made when Dr. Kissinger served in the Nixon and Ford Administrations.
- Nixon-era transcripts.
  - Most of these transcripts were released by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) on May 26, 2004.
  - Only those conversations mentioning national security information that is still classified were withheld. No privileges were asserted.
  - The released transcripts included a few telephone conversations with you and several more conversations about you. NARA reported that no telephone conversations with or about you were withheld.
- Ford-era transcripts.
  - Although a final decision has not been made on whether to release these transcripts, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and White House Counsel (WHC) have concluded that Dr. Kissinger's telephone conversations with or about you (and other members of the President's Cabinet) should be withheld as privileged under the Freedom of Information Act.
  - The Department of State is currently cross-referencing the portions of transcripts released in Dr. Kissinger's memoirs with a list of transcripts DOJ and WHC have recommended be withheld to ensure a privilege is not claimed for transcripts already released publicly.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments: As stated.

Prepared By: Christine S. Ricci, Associate Deputy General Counsel (LC) (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/44419

OSD 15347-04

**A**

HENRY A. KISSINGER

Dear Tom -

After our brief and very  
conversation with Joyce I have asked  
Bill Rogers to run up the status of  
the Celano we discussed. I am enclosing  
his report based on his runny together  
with a trusted ex-Foreign Service Officer  
of the material.

I expect no media interest  
but should tell he you can be  
sure that I will respond in a manner  
& complexity my very high regard  
for you as a public servant and  
my affection for you as a person and  
a friend.

Warm regards

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR - 350 PARK AVENUE - NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 (b)(6)

A-127-4

AUG 17 2004

Jesse Incao

From: William\_Rogers@aporter.com  
 Sent: Tuesday, August 17, 2004 1:49 PM  
 To: jincao@kmaglobal.com  
 Subject: Draft Revised Note Re phone notes Rumsfeld

Dear Henry:

You asked that I sum up the situation with respect to your telcons.

1. The collection now being made public includes both your White House conversations as Security Adviser and your State Department conversations as Secretary. In other words, everything -- with sizeable gaps -- from January 1969 to January 1977.

2. National Archives has already released the Nixon material, after culling out personal and security matters. Archives put the telcons in its public reading rooms several months ago. The release was required by, and followed carefully, the special Nixon records legislation. There has been a good deal of interest in the papers, but precious little media notice.

3. The State Department will make the telcons for your tour as Secretary available for FOIA release within the next few days. Like the National Archives, State has also culled out personal and classified material.

4. References to Rumsfeld in this second instalment of papers are of two types: First, your conversations directly with him. These are a small fraction of the 8,000 pages. I would characterize them as businesslike and professional -- not suggesting a particularly intimate friendship, but certainly not personal or confrontational.. Second are occasional comments to others touching on Rumsfeld's policy positions, for example his role in blocking the extension of SALT.

5. More broadly, I doubt that this second instalment covering your term as Secretary of State will cause any greater public sensation than the first.

6. In any event, I am now advised by the State Department -- I have had no direct link to the White House on this -- that it is unlikely that the conversations with or related to Rumsfeld will be made public. The White House has told State to withhold "for review by the WH/DOJ any transcripts containing any mention of the White House or the NSC, including discussions with or about persons who were either at the WH/NSC at the time the transcripts were made or with or about persons who are now senior officials of the current administration." State did not ask for my views as to this request.

I would, of course, be pleased to respond to any further questions.

Regards,

Bill

-----  
 This communication may contain information that is legally privileged, confidential or exempt from disclosure. If you are not the intended recipient, please note that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. Anyone who receives this message in error should notify the sender immediately by telephone or by return e-mail and delete it from his or her computer.  
 -----

William Rogers

William\_Rogers@aporter.com

1

A-129-5  
 TOTAL P.03

11-L-0559/OSD/44422





PERSONNEL AND READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

ACTION MEMO



October 6, 2004 - 10:00 AM

DEPSEC Action

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, USD(P&R)  
SUBJECT: Nomination of MG Odierno for ACJCS - SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- You asked about the progress on MG Odierno's nomination and confirmation during this session of Congress
- The background is as follows:
  - The Certification and Nomination arrived at the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on 23 September.
  - We replied to the questions posed by the SASC on 30 September.
  - MG Odierno met with the SASC on 5 October.
  - Secretary Brownlee talked to both Majority and Minority Staff Directors in reference to this issue yesterday.
- The sense is that the meeting with MG Odierno and the SASC went well. In fact, barring any disagreement from the Minority, they are expecting the nomination to move this week.

RECOMMENDATION: If there is no action by Wednesday evening, I recommend that you call the Chairman.

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Major Jered Helwig (b)(6)

SECDEF DECISION:

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

OTHER: \_\_\_\_\_

TSA SD	
SRMA SD	
MA SD	2/17
EXEC SEC	M 10/6



11-L-0559/OSD/44423

OSD 15445-04


Sec Def called Sen W on Wed PM. Indications were good. v/r Jim S. VACM

407

October 4, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Powell Moore  
Charlie Abell

cc: Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace  
Les Brownlee  
GEN Pete Schoomaker

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Nomination of MG Odierno for ACJCS

We need *to* find out what must happen to ensure Ray Odierno is confirmed during this session of Congress. If I need to make calls, go to the Hill, or do anything else, please let me know.

This is an important nomination: and we need to get it through the process without creating an unhelpful precedent. Please let me know what I need to do.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
100-04-11

.....  
*Please respond by*

FOUO

October 4, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Powell Moore  
Charlie Abell

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace  
Les Brownlee  
GEN Pete Schoomaker

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Nomination of MG Odierno for ACJCS

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This is an important nomination, and we need *to* get it through the process without creating an unhelpful precedent. Please let me know what I need to do.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
100404-11

.....  
Please respond by 10/6/04

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/44425

OSD 15445-04

October 6, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Greenville Herald Banner Request

000.71SD

Let's set up a phone call with Melva Geyer of the *Greenville Herald Banner*.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/5/04 Memo from Powell Moore to SecDef re: Interview Request  
~~SECDEF LETTER TO CONG. HALL~~

DHR:ss  
100604-4

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

6 OCT 04

6 OCT 04

600T04

SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL

Print Date: 2/1/2005

DOCUMENT TYPE: FRONT OFFICE DOC ATTACHMENT:  
 OSD CONTROL OSD 15504-04 DOC 10/6/2004 DOR 2/1/2005 SIGNATURE CASE:  
 FROM SECDEF RUMSFELD TO TSADIRITA  
 SUBJECT GREENVILLE HERALD BANNER REQUEST  
 KEYWORDS DI RITA, I. SNOW FLAKE  
 COMMENTS CAF - NO OTHER DISTRIBUTION WITHOUT FRONT OFFICE APPROVAL.  
 FN 000.7150 SEC U OCN 100604-4  
 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS OSD 15561-04 OSD 15538-04  
 STATUS CODE DECISION DECISION DATE PRIORITY ACTION REPORT:  
 AGENCY ACTION ASSIGNED SUSPENSE DOC SUSPENSE:  
 SUSPENSE COMPLETE ACD COORDINATION  
 PAGES 1 ENCLOSURES 0  
 SUSPENSE STATUS

PACKAGE VIEW:  
 FRONT OFFICE DOC  
 ACTION MEMO  
 FRONT OFFICE DOC

CREATED BY: reynolds

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LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

R+R

UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION MEMO

October 5, 2004, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: SECDEF Interview Request

- SECDEF comment on childhood near-drowning incident.
- Rep. Ralph Hall contacted my office to ask that you speak to a reporter for his local paper. It seems that his constituent, Bill Salamon, claims that his father, Bud Salamon, saved your life in 1937.
- Melva Geyer writes for Rep Hall's district paper, the *Greenville Herald Banner*. She would like you to acknowledge the incident and "any other comments he might like to make or reaction to the resurrection of this memory." An article from the time is attached.

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef agree to the interview.

COORDINATION: NONE

SECDEF DECISION:

Approve: \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove: \_\_\_\_\_

Comment: \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment:  
As stated

OSD 15504-04

Prepared By: Claude Chafin, Special Assistant for Communications, ASD Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/44428

000.7150

SECRET

600704

# Daily News - Index

EVANSTON, ILLINOIS, WEDNESDAY, JULY 28, 1937

Page 1

Year No. 176 Official Newspaper of the State of Illinois

## BUD' SALAMON SAVES 3 CHILDREN

# Rescues 3 From Lake in as Many Minutes

Edgar ("Bud") Salamon, who during the Fall, plays halfback with the Blue Ridge "perp" school down in North Carolina and in Summer does life-guarding at the Lee st. beach in Evanston, became a hero three times today in as many minutes.

Young Salamon, who lives at 927 Madison st., Evanston, was on duty in his lookout pinnacle when he saw Donald Rumsfeld, 5, sinking in the water a hundred feet off shore.

The life guard plunged in, brought Donald to shore, emptied the water out of him, restored his breathing and handed him over to

his frantic mother, Mrs. George Rumsfeld, of 1302 Judson av. Evanston.

Scarcely had he relinquished one youngster than another near-drowning required his attention. He swam furiously out to where a sand cavity had caused a nine foot depth and rescued Nancy Belcher, 8, of 1213 Michigan av. EVANSTON.

Salamon's third rescue followed immediately. Joanne Rumsfeld, Donald's 7-year-old sister and the Belcher girl's playmate, had slipped into the same sand cavity death trap and was almost drowned when Salamon reached her.





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

The Honorable Ralph Hall  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Congressman,


Thanks so much for calling Powell Moore about the article from 1937 that features Mr. Bill Salamon, the father of your constituent.

It's all true! I remember it – it did in fact happen.

We would be happy to touch base with Melva Geyer of the *Greenville Herald Banner* and will do so.

Best regards,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "D. R. ...". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "D" and a long horizontal stroke.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

OCT 6 2004

The Honorable Ralph Hall  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Congressman,

Thanks so much for calling Powell Moore about the article from 1937 that features Mr. Bud Salamon, the father of your constituent.

It's all true! I remember it – it did in fact happen.

We would be happy to touch base with Melva Geyer of the *Greenville Herald Banner* and will do so.

Best regards,

335SD

6 OCT 04

OSD 15501-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44432

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

OCT 6 2004

The Honorable Ralph Hall  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Congressman,

Thanks so much for calling Powell Moore about  
the article from 1937 that features Mr. Bill Salamon, the  
father of your constituent.

WRONG  
NAME

It's all true! I remember it - it did in fact happen.

We would be happy to touch base with Melva  
Geyer of the *Greenville Herald Banner* and will do so.

Best regards,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. R. Hall". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style. A long, thin diagonal line is drawn across the entire page, passing through the signature.

11-L-0559/OSD/44433

# Daily News - Index

EVANSTON, ILLINOIS, WEDNESDAY, JULY 26, 1934

PAGE

Official Newspaper of the State of Illinois

## BUD' SALAMON SAVES 3 CHILDREN

FOR  
FILES

11-L-0559/OSD/44434

# Rescues 3 From Lake in as Many Minutes

Edgar ("Bud") Salamon, who, during the Fall, plays halfback with the Blue Ridge "perp" school down in North Carolina and in Summer does life-guarding at the Lee st. beach in Evanston, became a hero three times today in as many minutes.

Young Salamon, who lives at 927 Madison st., Evanston, was on duty in the lookout pinnacle when he saw Donald Rumsfeld, 5, sinking in the water a hundred feet off shore.

The life guard plunged in, brought Donald to shore, emptied the water out of him, restored his breathing and handed him over to

his frantic mother, Mrs. George Rumsfeld, 615 So. Jackson st., Evanston.

Scarcely had he dispatched one youngster than another was drowning, requiring three minutes. He swam quickly out to where a sand cavity had caused a shallow depth and rescued Harry Bell, 8, of 1215 Michigan st., Evanston.

Salamon's third rescue came immediately. James Belcher, Donald's 3-year-old nephew, saw Belcher girl's playmate sink and fled into the water to save her. He died. Her mother, Mrs. Belcher, saw her drown and was rescued by Salamon.



**Bud Selamon of Evanston Ill. Saves three children from drowning in Lake Michigan in July of 1937. The children are L-R Joan Rumsfeld 7, Donald Rumsfeld 5, and Nancy Belcher 8. Donald Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense)**

720

~~FOUO~~

SEP 22 2004

863

WORTHCOM

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Ed Eberhart

I think Ed Eberhart is right -- he should go from 96 to **48** hours. Is that going to happen?

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092104-10

.....  
Please respond by 9/27/04

225204

~~FOUO~~

OSD 15507-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44437

October 7, 2004

TO: Ashley Kavanaugh

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Card for POTUS

Ashley,

Attached is a card from the Chinese-American woman who cuts my hair -- she is a big fan of the President.

Thanks.

Attach.

9/13/04 Note from Sou Ing Ly to POTUS

DHR:ss  
100704-2

33523

100704



MR. PRESIDENT & FIRST LADY

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/44441

SEPT 13-04

President & First Lady,  
It is election year,  
you've been distre-  
l busy, so do all your  
is, including me.  
ith all my heart for  
reelected. And, I  
me to be lucky enough  
r hair for the  
on. I like you and  
y very much. I  
onored if you  
d me an autographed  
- of your self.


You're a star!

I will very much appre-  
ciate your consideration

Respectfully

(b)(6)

October 7, 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: The Debate

0001

Mr. Vice President,

Joyce talked to our son Nick after your debate Tuesday evening. He said, "You know, next to dad, Vice President Cheney is the one for me!"

He's right! Good job.

Regards,

DHR:ss  
100704-3

7 OCT 04

September 29, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Draft Directives from Bill Schneider

300.8

I asked Bill Schneider and his group to draft up some directives that I could send out -- implementing some of the things he said should be implemented.

What has happened with this?

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092804-21

.....  
Please respond by 10/6/04

9/29

29 Sep 04

*DR*

SIR \_\_\_\_\_  
DRAFT  
• Directive is next  
below, ready to go  
out for coord.

• Please sign memo to  
launch.

*via Jim*

8 OCT 04

FOUO

OSD 15584-04



**OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000**



MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT  
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION  
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT  
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION

SUBJECT: Defense Capabilities to Transition to and from Hostilities

I have reviewed the recommendations of the Defense Science Board (DSB) 2004 Summer Study and am impressed with their efforts. This study provides some useful suggestions for reshaping our capabilities to exploit prewar opportunities and address postwar responsibilities. As highlighted by the DSB, the Department of Defense is part of a government-wide approach to the development of interagency capabilities critical to achieving U.S. objectives in the transition to and from hostilities.

The Under Secretary for Policy will be the focal point for implementation of DSB recommendations as captured in the attached draft directive. Please review and coordinate on the directive by October 30, 2004. You should begin identifying documents under your cognizance that need to be revised based on the new directive. In addition, identify those high priority actions that proceed from your responsibilities in the directive, but which should be undertaken separately.

Attachment  
As stated



FEDERAL RECYCLING PROGRAM

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

11- L-0559/OSD/44445



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

OCT 8 2004

300.8

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
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DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION  
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Attachment:  
As stated

SECRET

OSD 15504-04



11-L-0559/OSD/44446



**DOD DIRECTIVES SYSTEM COORDINATION RECORD**

<b>1. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (X one)</b> <input type="checkbox"/> TOP SECRET <input type="checkbox"/> CONFIDENTIAL <input type="checkbox"/> SECRET <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED	<b>2. TYPE OF DOD ISSUANCE (X one)</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DOD DIRECTIVE <input type="checkbox"/> DOD PUBLICATION <input type="checkbox"/> DOD INSTRUCTION <input type="checkbox"/> ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION	<b>3. TYPE OF ACTION (X one)</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NEW <input type="checkbox"/> CHANGE <input type="checkbox"/> REISSUANCE <input type="checkbox"/> CANCELLATION
--	--	--

**3. SUBJECT (Title of Issuance)**  
 Defense Capabilities to Transition to and from Hostilities

*(For DoD Directives, insert a maximum of 20 working days from the date this form is signed by the Originating Authorizing Official. For all other DoD issuances, no more than 45 working days should be required.)*

**3. FEDERAL REGISTER PUBLICATION REQUIRED (X one)**  
 YES     NO

**7. PURPOSE AND REMARKS (Continue on back if necessary)**

This Directive establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities to the Heads of the DoD Components for activities and operations during the transition to and from hostilities.

**3. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS (X all that apply)**  
 OMB     RCS     IRCN

**9. FORMS PRESCRIBED (X one)**    **11. PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS (X one)**  
 YES     NO    YES    NO

**12. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (X one)**  
 A - Unlimited     B - Limited     C - Classified

**13.a. ACTION OFFICER NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) (Print or type)**  
 Dr. McGinn, Jerry

**14.a. ORIGINATING AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL (Principal Staff Assistant or Principal Deputy) (Sign and print or type name)**  
 Mr. Ryan Henry

**1. OFFICE DESIGNATION**  
 PDUSD(P)

**2. COMPLETE MAILING ADDRESS**  
 2000 Defense Pentagon, Room 4F830  
 Washington, DC 20301-2000

**1. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code)**    **e. FAX NUMBER (Include Area Code)**  
 (b)(6)

**b. POSITION TITLE (Print or type)**    **c. DATE FORM SIGNED**

**3. E-MAIL ADDRESS**  
 jerry.mcgin@osd.mil

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy    October 7, 2004

**15. COORDINATING OFFICIALS (X all that apply)**  
*Only those officials authorized in writing may coordinate on DoD issuances. For guidance on appropriate signature levels, see instructions for item 16 and Chapter 7 of DoD 5025.7-M. The preprinted "X" indicates the MANDATORY COORDINATORS.*

- UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS
  - DUSD (ACQUISITION AND TECHNOLOGY)
  - DUSD (LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL READINESS)
  - DIR DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
  - ATSD NUCLEAR CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS
  - DIR DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY
  - DIR MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY
  - DIR DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
  - DIR DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY
  - DIR DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
  - DIR OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT

- ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NETWORKS AND INFORMATION INTEGRATION  
 DIR DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY
- ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
- ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
 DIR AMERICAN FORCES INFORMATION SERVICE
- GENERAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
 DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY
- INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
- DIRECTOR OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION

- UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY  
 PDUSD (POLICY)
  - ASD (HOME AND DEFENSE)
  - ASD (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)
  - ASD (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY)
  - ASD (SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT)
  - DUSD (POLICY SUPPORT)
  - DIR DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY
  - DIR DEFENSE POW/MP OFFICE
  - DIR DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

- ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT
- DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT, DSD (2 copies)  
 DIR PENTAGON FORCE PROTECTION AGENCY  
 DIR WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
- DIRECTOR FORCE TRANSFORMATION
- DIRECTOR NET ASSESSMENT
- DIRECTOR PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

- UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS  
 PDUSD (PERSONNEL AND READINESS)
  - ASD (HEALTH AFFAIRS)
  - ASD (RESERVE AFFAIRS)
  - DUSD (READINESS)
  - DUSD (PROGRAM INTEGRATION)
  - DIR DEFENSE COMMISSARY AGENCY
  - DIR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EDUCATION ACTIVITY
  - DIR TRICARE MANAGEMENT ACTIVITY
  - DIR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HUMAN RESOURCES ACTIVITY

- SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
- SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
- SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
- CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
- OTHER (Identify)  
 Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
- OTHER (Identify)

- UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)/CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
  - DIR DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY
  - DIR DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE

**16.a. COORDINATING OFFICIAL (Principal Staff Assistant or Principal Deputy) (Sign and print or type name)**

**b. POSITION TITLE (Print or type)**  
 Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy

**c. DATE FORM SIGNED**  
 October 7, 2004

**7. PURPOSE AND REMARKS (Continued)**

**INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING SD FORM 106**

**ITEM 1. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION**

Place an "X" in the appropriate box to indicate the security classification of the DoD issuance.

**ITEM 2. TYPE OF ISSUANCE**

Place an "X" in the appropriate box to indicate the type of DoD issuance.

**ITEM 3. TYPE OF ACTION**

Place an "X" in the appropriate box to indicate the type of action prescribed for the DoD issuance.

**ITEM 4. DOD ISSUANCE NUMBER**

For a new DoD issuance, leave this item blank for completion by the Directives and Records Division, WHS. For a revision, change, or cancellation of a DoD issuance, enter the existing number of the DoD issuance.

**ITEM 5. COORDINATION SUSPENSE DATE**

Enter the date that the coordination must be received by the originating OSD Component. For DoD Directives, the date must be no more than 20 working days (45 working days for all other DoD issuances) from the date this form is signed by the Originating Authorizing Official in Item 14.c.

**ITEM 6. SUBJECT (Title of Issuance)**

Enter the subject of the DoD issuance. It shall be no more than three lines in length.

**ITEM 7. PURPOSE AND REMARKS**

Enter the reason for the action and provide any supplementary or background information to support the action.

If the DoD issuance should be reviewed by DoD officials who are under the cognizance of an Under Secretary of Defense, an Assistant Secretary of Defense, or a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, make recommendations in this block.

**ITEM 8. FEDERAL REGISTER PUBLICATION REQUIRED**

Place an "X" in the appropriate box to indicate whether the DoD issuance must be published in the Federal Register. See Administrative Instruction No. 102.

**ITEM 9. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS**

Place an "X" in all boxes that apply. See DoD 8910.1-M.

**ITEM 10. FORMS PRESCRIBED**

Place an "X" in the appropriate box to indicate whether the DoD issuance prescribes or references forms.

**ITEM 11. PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS**

Place an "X" in the appropriate box to indicate whether the DoD issuance addresses matters relating to the collection, maintenance, use or dissemination of personal information regarding U.S. citizens or aliens admitted for permanent residence.

**ITEM 12. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT**

Assign an appropriate distribution statement:

- A - Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
- B - Approved for release to U.S. Government employees and their contractors; distribution is limited.
- C - Classified; distribution approved by Office of Primary Responsibility only.

**ITEM 13. ACTION OFFICER**

Enter the action officer's name, office designation, complete mailing address, telephone number, fax number, and e-mail address.

**ITEM 14. ORIGINATING AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL (Principal Staff Assistant or Principal Deputy)**

Obtain the signature of the Principal Staff Assistant or Principal Deputy. This official authorizes the coordination of the DoD issuance.

**ITEM 15. COORDINATING OFFICIALS**

Place an "X" in the appropriate boxes to indicate which DoD Components should coordinate on the DoD issuance. If the DoD issuance shall be reviewed by DoD officials who are under the cognizance of an Under Secretary of Defense, an Assistant Secretary of Defense, or a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, make recommendations in Item 7. The preprinted "X" identifies the mandatory coordinators (General Counsel, DoD; the Inspector General, DoD; and the Director of Administration and Management, OSD.).

**ITEM 16. COORDINATING OFFICIAL (Principal Staff Assistant or Principal Deputy)**

Obtain the signature of the Principal Staff Assistant or Principal Deputy. For additional guidance on the appropriate signature levels, see Chapter 7 of DoD 5025.1-M.

DoD Directives: Because Directives establish DoD-wide policy and are signed only by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense, they are coordinated at the highest level. Coordinating officials shall be the Under Secretaries of Defense or their Principal Deputies, the Chairman or Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other Principal Staff Assistants or their Principal Deputies who report directly to the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretaries or Under Secretaries of the Military Departments or a Principal Staff Secretary.

DoD Instructions, Publications, and Administrative Instructions: Coordinating officials on these issuances may include any of the officials authorized to coordinate on a DoD Directive or any other official who is designated in writing to coordinate on such issuances by a Principal Staff Assistant or Principal Deputy cited above.



# Department of Defense **DIRECTIVE**

NUMBER 3000.cc  
September 17, 2004

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USD(P)

SUBJECT: Defense Capabilities to Transition to and from Hostilities

References: (a) Section 113 of title 10, United States Code  
(b) Strategic Planning Guidance, Fiscal Years 2006-2011, March 2004<sup>1</sup>  
(c) DoD Directive 5000.59, "DoD Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Management,"  
January 4, 1994

## 1. PURPOSE

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense under reference (a), and the guidance and responsibilities assigned in reference (b), this Directive establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities for planning, training, and operations during the transition to and from hostilities.

## 2. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

This Directive:

2.1. Applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Military Departments; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Combatant Commands; the Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense; the Defense Agencies; the DoD Field Activities; and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense (hereafter collectively referred to as the "DoD Components"). The term "Military Services," as used herein, refers to the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

2.2. Provides guidance on how DoD personnel and forces plan and operate, in concert with the Department of State, other Federal Agencies, coalition forces, and international and nongovernmental organizations, during the transition to and from hostilities to achieve U.S. goals and objectives.

2.3. This Directive supersedes any conflicting portions of other DoD issuances. Such instances shall be identified to the office of primary responsibility for this directive as listed at web site <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives>.

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<sup>1</sup> The SPG is classified SECRET/NOFORN. For access to the document contact the Director, Executive Services & Communications, refer to document control number OSD 75774-04.

### 3. DEFINITIONS

3.1. Transition to and from Hostilities. As used in this directive, this phrase means the activities over periods of time, which may be measured in years, before and after conflict, or during the turbulent periods after a state fails, conducted to assist in the restoration of stability, promotion of a productive economy, and establishment of representative governments in which minority rights are respected and protected. Achieving these ends could be made less challenging by shaping activities in the years before the outbreak of hostilities, as well as exploiting the capabilities not traditional to our armed forces in the period following hostilities. These activities include, but are not limited to, stability operations, intelligence activities, and other activities such as strategic communication. These activities and capabilities may well enhance combat capabilities but are not designed for combat operations. Many of these capabilities and responsibilities may reside outside the Department of Defense. Accordingly, effective interfaces shall be established to bring these capabilities to bear on the problem at hand.

3.2. Strategic Communication. The employment of all elements of national information activities in an integrated and coordinated manner to inform or influence foreign or key audiences on the policies and interests of the U.S. Government. Strategic communication includes the activities of public diplomacy, public affairs, international broadcasting, defense support to public diplomacy, and information operations.

3.3. Stability Operations. Stability operations are military operations in concert with the other elements of national power and multinational partners, to maintain or reestablish order and promote stability. These consist of global and regional military operations that establish, shape, maintain and refine relations with other nations. Included are operations to ensure the safety of American citizens and US interests while maintaining and improving the US ability to operate with multinational partners to deter hostile ambitions of potential aggressors. Stability operations help ensure unhindered access by the US and its allies to a global economy. These operations may include a wide array of tasks from combat operations, in order to remove isolated pockets of resistance, to peace enforcement, or security cooperation activities.

3.4. Stabilization. Efforts by the U.S. Government in coordination with coalition partners and other nations, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to create a secure and stable environment and to provide for the basic human needs of the population to include food, water, sanitation, and shelter.

3.5. Reconstruction. Efforts by the U.S. Government in coordination with coalition partners and other nations, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to create a stable and self-governing polity by establishing the rule of law, rehabilitating the economy, and otherwise improving the welfare of the people.

### 4. POLICY

4.1. Well developed capabilities to plan, coordinate, and conduct operations and other activities during the transition to and from hostilities are central and essential to implementing the Defense Strategy and achieving national security objectives. Accordingly, operations during

the transition to and from hostilities shall be explicitly addressed in DoD doctrine, education, training, exercises, and operational planning, and accorded priority and attention comparable to combat operations. These DoD efforts are part of a government-wide approach to the development of capabilities to transition to and from hostilities. The U.S. Government is institutionalizing long-term, rigorous, and sustained pan-government contingency planning and integration task forces to orchestrate the planning and execution of extended campaigns using multiple instruments of national power.

4.2. The capabilities of DoD Components, including active and reserve forces, special operations forces, and intelligence capabilities, to provide Service capabilities for joint and interagency operations and other activities during the transition to and from hostilities shall be measured by relevant metrics and reported and addressed in readiness reporting systems in the same manner as the readiness of DoD capabilities to conduct combat operations.

4.3. Intelligence activities, covert operations, and activities of special operations forces supporting the transition to and from hostilities shall be jointly planned, exercised, and overseen to assure that the capabilities of intelligence assets and special operations forces are harmonized, and are adequate in quantity, quality, geographic distribution and kind to ensure achieving national security objectives.

4.4. The development and fielding of technical collection systems to obtain the intelligence information required in the transition to and from hostilities shall be managed under a separate program with an operational focus sufficient to introduce these systems to the user community in the near term. This program shall field intrusive, close in, networked systems, such as tagging, tracking and locating (TTL) systems.

4.5. DoD intelligence efforts shall make maximum use of open sources. Data and communications architectures shall be designed to support and exploit information provided through open sources.

4.6. Foreign language skill and regional and cultural expertise are essential enabling capabilities for DoD activities and operations in the transition to and from hostilities. DoD programs for assessing, training, and promoting officer, enlisted, and civilian personnel shall be strengthened to ensure that DoD requirements in these skill areas are met the same as skills for combat operations.

4.7. Support shall be provided to the Department of State and other Federal departments and agencies to develop and enhance deliberate interagency planning skills and capabilities for the preparation and conduct of stabilization and reconstruction operations. Support shall include, but is not limited to, personnel, training, exercises, and analysis.

## 5. RESPONSIBILITIES

5.1. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) shall:



5.1.1. Lead and coordinate DoD participation in, and support to, interagency deliberate planning processes and the development of interagency plans for activities and operations in the transition to and from hostilities.

5.1.1.1. Lead interagency effort to establish cross-government contingency planning and integration task forces focused on critical countries. This effort shall develop criteria for identifying countries or regions for which task forces are necessary and establish standard operating procedures for standing task forces.

5.1.1.2. In coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Regional Combatant Commanders, engage the Department of State and other federal agencies, coalition partners, nongovernmental organizations, and international organizations at early and appropriate stages in the preparation of contingency plans.

5.1.1.3. Support the establishment and operation of the Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations (OSRO) at the Department of State and participation of OSRO in the planning and exercising of contingency plans.

5.1.2. Develop and oversee DoD policy for operations and other activities during the transition to and from hostilities, including peacetime activities and activities conducted during stabilization and reconstruction. DoD policy shall include planning and operations conducted with interagency and coalition organizations.

5.1.2.1. Serve as the DoD focal point for operations and other activities during the transition to and from hostilities and represent the Department of Defense on such matters with the National Security Council, the Department of State, other Federal agencies, State and local entities, foreign governments, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations.

5.1.2.2. Lead interagency effort with the Department of Justice, the Department of State, and other federal agencies to define functional responsibilities and capabilities (both current and planned) and develop procedures for execution during the different stages of the transition to and from hostilities.

5.1.2.3. Include guidance in the Defense Security Cooperation Guidance on the pre-conflict requirements for those countries and areas with the potential for U.S. military operations.

5.1.3. Advise the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense on the adequacy of DoD capabilities to perform activities during the transition to and from hostilities, particularly in the critical areas of security, strategic communication, humanitarian affairs, and regional expertise including languages.

5.1.4. Develop and oversee policy for the implementation of DoD elements of strategic communication in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD(PA)).

5.1.4.1. Serve as the DoD focal point for strategic communication efforts, including defense support for public diplomacy, and represent the DoD on such matters with the National Security Council, the Department of State, and other Federal agencies.

5.1.4.2. In coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ensure the military plans of the Combatant Commanders incorporate strategic communication components, including public affairs and defense support for public diplomacy.

5.1.5. Coordinate with the USD(I), the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command to harmonize activities of Special Operations Forces and forces conducting covert operations or intelligence activities. In coordination with the USD(I), provide joint oversight of these activities.

5.2. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence shall:

5.2.1. Develop and oversee DoD intelligence policy and initiatives to support the transition to and from hostilities. Reform collection and analysis processes to incorporate open source information; transform all-source analysis including recruitment, training, and equipping; change intelligence procedures to include senior analytic personnel in both collection and classification decision making; and ensure that analysis is aligned with intelligence questions or problems.

5.2.1.1. Intelligence policy shall provide for nongovernmental and international organizations to have access, to the extent possible, to information that can facilitate their work, while still providing adequate protection to sensitive classified information and intelligence sources and methods.

5.2.1.2. Through the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency establish and sustain an enhanced capability to plan and execute open source analysis in support of all DoD Components. Separately identify funding for open source analysis activities in the Planning, Programming and Budget Execution process.

5.2.2. In coordination with the USD(P), provide joint oversight of Special Operations Forces and forces conducting covert operations or intelligence activities. Harmonize these activities in coordination with the USD(P), as stated in subparagraph 5.1.5.

5.2.3. Accelerate the transformation of Defense human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities to provide sustained coverage and deep penetration of sufficient countries and regions to anticipate requirements and reduce the reliance on surging intelligence assets.

5.2.4. Establish and institutionalize a major program, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), for the development and fielding of technical collection systems to obtain the intelligence information required in the transition to and from hostilities. Among other capabilities, this program shall create a discipline of TTL, and to lead and manage DoD-wide efforts to develop and implement state-of-the-art TTL capabilities. The program shall include, but not be limited to, systems and collection analysis; prototyping, production, and deployment; counter-measures and counter-

intelligence; tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination and horizontal integration; and, research and development as needed. Identify DoD requirements for TTL targets of interest, in coordination with the Combatant Commanders, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and others as appropriate.

5.2.5. Support the development, exercising, and red-teaming of intelligence campaign plans by the Combatant Commanders; and ensure that the intelligence campaign plans are properly resourced and directed to provide the information required to inform the Regional Combatant Commanders' portfolio of contingency operational plans. Direct the DoD elements of the Intelligence Community to prepare and maintain a portfolio of contingency intelligence campaign plans to support operations during the transition to and from hostilities.

5.2.6. In coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, ensure that intelligence career paths are adjusted to attract and keep in productive service the increasing quantity and quality of intelligence personnel that today's modern warfare demands not only during phases of intense combat, but especially in the transitions to and from combat, and in support of stability and reconstruction objectives. Intelligence career paths shall provide incentives for skilled personnel to develop and maintain deep and current expertise in specialized areas of importance for achieving national security objectives.

5.3. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) shall:

5.3.1. Identify and monitor, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the USD(P), the USD(I), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commanders, DoD-wide requirements for foreign language speakers and personnel with regional and cultural expertise, including requirements for foreign area officer and enlisted specialists. Develop metrics to evaluate and report individual and unit capabilities and readiness in these skills. Ensure that the portfolio of skills available to the Combatant Commanders conform to the needs of the portfolio of contingency operational plans and intelligence campaign plans.

5.3.2. Reform curricula at senior service schools, service academies, ROTC programs, advanced officer and enlisted education programs to include foreign language education and regional area expertise, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5.3.3. Expand opportunities for officer, enlisted, and civilian personnel to participate in regional and cultural education programs, including resident or on-line studies and exchange programs. Establish programs to maintain proficiency in regional and cultural affairs and language skills.

5.3.4. Expand opportunities, in coordination with the USD(P), the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for personnel from other Federal agencies to attend DoD schools to receive training in the deliberate decision-making and planning process and the preparation and conduct of stabilization and reconstruction operations.



5.3.5. Reform curricula at senior service schools and advanced officer and enlisted education programs, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to include preparation and conduct of stabilization and reconstruction operations in the transition to and from hostilities. Curricula shall include operations in the interagency and coalition environments.

5.4. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics shall:

5.4.1. Establish research, development, and acquisition programs to support DoD-wide capabilities to transition to and from hostilities. Give priority to technologies that enhance capabilities for tagging, tracking, and locating targets of interest; and force-multiplying technologies such as language translation devices and programs that facilitate operating in foreign cultures.

5.4.2. Revise acquisition processes to enable science and technology capabilities to be exploited rapidly and coherently in current operations.

5.4.3. Address modeling and simulation requirements for activities and operations during the transition to and from hostilities identified by the Commander, Joint Forces Command, in accordance with reference (c).

5.4.4. Through the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, address requirements related to the activities and operations during the transition to and from hostilities in the Defense Science and Technology planning process. Incorporate appropriate needs in the Defense Technology Area Plan and the Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan and other planning documents. Support related Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs).

5.4.5. Strengthen capabilities for contracting support for activities needed during the transition to and from hostilities. Capabilities shall include immediate response and diligent oversight.

5.5. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) shall:

5.5.1. Separately identify funds and resources required to support activities and operations during the transition to and from hostilities in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution process.

5.5.2. Streamline and institutionalize procedures to enable the prompt disbursement and accountability of currency by local commanders in foreign countries in support of activities and operations during the transition to and from hostilities.

5.6. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs advise the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) on implementing public affairs elements of strategic communication programs and initiatives. Assist the USD(P) and the Regional Combatant Commanders in maximizing the effect of these critical communication capabilities.

5.7. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Network Information and Integration shall acquire sufficient communications capabilities to support all aspects of the transition to and from hostilities.

5.8. The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall:

5.8.1. Reshape forces to provide stabilization and reconstruction capabilities. These forces shall achieve the following standards:

5.8.1.1. Actively train, practice, exercise, and rehearse.

5.8.1.2. Regularly evaluate readiness and validate plans.

5.8.1.3. Available on short notice.

5.8.1.4. Establish continuity in theater.

5.8.1.5. Capable of supporting multiple concurrent cumulative operations.

5.8.1.6. Capable of operating in a range of cultures and languages.

5.8.1.7. Capable of responding to an adaptive enemy.

5.8.1.8. Participate in an active experimentation program.

5.8.2. Strengthen and maintain programs for Foreign Area Officers and Enlisted Regional Specialists to support activities and operations during the transition to and from hostilities.

5.8.3. Expand foreign language training programs to meet DoD-wide requirements for Active and Reserve Component personnel proficient in foreign languages, including personnel who would deploy with units.

5.8.4. Revise curricula in individual and unit training programs and senior service schools to meet requirements for the range of activities and operations during the transition to and from hostilities, in coordination with the USD(P&R), the USD(P), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5.8.5. In coordination with USD(P), support approved interagency requirements for personnel or assistance, as directed by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense, to develop and enhance deliberate interagency planning skills and capabilities for the preparation and conduct of stabilization and reconstruction operations.

5.8.6. Appoint a senior officer from each Military Service to lead and advocate stabilization and reconstruction initiatives.

5.9. The Secretaries of the Army and the Navy shall organize, train, and equip Army and Marine Corps Active and Reserve Components forces to conduct operations during the transition to and from hostilities. In consultation with the Commander, Joint Forces Command, explore and exercise innovative organizational constructs, e.g., modular units that combine personnel with a range of skills that support operations during the transition to and from hostilities. Stabilization and reconstruction operations will require support from combat, combat support, and combat service support capabilities.

5.10. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:

5.10.1. In coordination with the USD(P), determine the type and number of forces and other force requirements necessary for pre-hostilities, stabilization, and reconstruction.

5.10.2. Develop metrics, in coordination with the USD(P), to report the readiness of forces to perform stabilization and reconstruction operations in coordination with the Combatant Commanders and the Chiefs of the Military Services.

5.10.3. Establish a program at the National Defense University to teach deliberate planning skills in the interagency environment. The program shall enlist personnel from DoD and other federal departments and agencies and shall teach planning for the range of activities and operations during the transition to and from hostilities.

5.10.4. Implement the policies and responsibilities as specified herein and facilitate the Commanders of the Regional Combatant Commands in the implementation their responsibilities.

5.11. The Commanders of the Regional t t Commands shall:

5.11.1. Develop and maintain contingency operational campaign plans spanning the transition to and from hostilities, including activities and operation during peacetime, stabilization, and reconstruction, for their respective areas of operation. These operational campaign plans shall be supported by intelligence campaign plans that include realistic collection and exploitation plans for the timely delivery of actionable information, and metrics that enable the intelligence plans to be exercised and their readiness evaluated. Campaign plans shall also include appropriate of strategic communication elements and shall be coordinated with the respective Chiefs of Mission.

5.11.2. Designate the Combined/Joint Forces Land Component Commander as the Joint Commander for stabilization and initial reconstruction operations. This commander shall be responsible for detailed planning, exercises, and execution of stabilization operations.

5.11.3. Establish offices for regional expertise outreach to support country and regional planning and operations. These offices shall work closely with Country Teams, Directors of the Regional Centers for Security Studies, U.S. and foreign academia, think tanks and other centers of expertise, and involve experts in ongoing activities, as appropriate.

5.12. The Commander, Joint Forces Command shall:

5.12.1. Develop and publish joint doctrine for stabilization and reconstruction operations during the transition to and from hostilities. Use simulation techniques where appropriate to meet training objectives.

5.12.2. Identify required modeling and simulation capabilities and issues to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with DoD Directive 5000.59 (reference (c)).

5.12.3. Participate, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the Defense Science and Technology planning process to ensure requirements for stabilization and reconstruction operations during the transition to and from hostilities are supported by Defense Technology Objectives and Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs). Recommend sponsors for ACTDs as appropriate.

72

**Davis, Rose CIV WHS/ESD**

**From:** Munson, Mark, CIV, OSD-ODA&M  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 10, 2005 3:49 PM  
**To:** Davis, Rose CIV WHS/ESD  
**CC:** Melners, Regina, CIV, OSD-ODA&M; Wooten, Broderick, SSG, OSD-ODA&M  
**Subject:** Action Package 15666-04 on Elevating DoD Executive Issues  
**Importance:** High

Ms. Davis:

You can close that action out. Mr. DuBois was directly and personally involved in that action and it was active from May 2004 into early January 2005. However, O&MP as the lead office for the initiative working it on behalf of the DA&M was never able to reach closure. In discussions with us in January, Mr. DuBois indicated that it was dead. Sorry we didn't think to engage ESD pro-actively to close it out. Since we had worked hard on the effort and thought it had a lot of merit, perhaps we hoped it would begin breathing again. In any case, close it out.

Thank you.

Mark Munson  
O&MP/ODA&M Staff  
(b)(6)

310.1

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Davis, Rose CIV WHS/ESD  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 10, 2005 3:43 PM  
**To:** Munson, Mark, CIV, OSD-ODA&M  
**Subject:** Action Package 15666-04

Mr. Munson,  
Can you tell me if the package you prepared, "Elevating DoD Executive Issues, dated 10/07/04 still open? I am reviewing open signature packages.

Thank You  
Rosemary Davis  
WHS/ESD  
(b)(6)

OSD 15666-04

7 Oct 05

**ACTION MEMO**

5711  
2004 OCT 17 17

October 7, 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director of Administration and Management



SUBJECT: Elevating DoD Executive Issues

- In the attached snowflake, you directed us to: "... find out what the Air Force system is to elevate issues. Then come up with a proposal as to how we can implement that throughout the entire Department." After significant vetting and some modifications to my original proposal, I have reached agreement with your closest advisors.
- Accordingly, I recommend the establishment of a DoD Executive Issues Management Team as a standing organization led by a political appointee (e.g., Dick McGraw) as the Special Assistant for Executive Issues Management (SA-EIM). The team shall have an O-6 who serves as the SA-EIM's deputy and as a special assistant to the Chairman for joint issues. Three O-5s will form the main body of the team, along with one administrative assistant. The SA-EIM will have a seat at The Special Assistant's Daily Staff Meeting. For day-to-day matters, he will report to The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense; however, when the urgency of an issue dictates, he has the authority to report it directly to you and the Deputy. This process does not replace current arrangements, including sensitive-information exchanges within the senior political team.
- When an issue is raised by the SA-EIM that requires attention, it will be addressed in The Special Assistant's Daily Staff Meeting. When Joint issues are involved, the Vice Director of the Joint Staff or his designee will be invited to participate. If a special Crisis Action Team is required, it will be stood-up as appropriate.
- Six months after stand-up, we will formally review the structure and process, evaluate its effectiveness, and determine whether or not any modifications need to be made—to include disestablishment of the team. A charter for the team and process is provided at TAB A.

COORDINATION: Coordination with William Haynes, Powell Moore, Larry Di Rita, Paul Butler, Pete Geren, Dave Patterson, Mike Maples, and Dick McGraw is reflected at TAB B.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve this proposal.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments: As stated

OSD 15666-04

Prepared by: Mark A. Munson, Sr. (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/44460

**A**



# **DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXECUTIVE ISSUES MANAGEMENT TEAM**

## **1. PURPOSE**

This Charter establishes the mission, organization, membership, and functions of the Department of Defense Executive Issues Management Team (DoD EIMT).

## **2. APPLICABILITY**

This Charter applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as "the DoD Components"). This Charter shall also apply to the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense unless the Inspector General of the Department of Defense has decided that an executive issue raises a conflict of interest with Inspector General activities.

## **3. MISSION**

The mission of the DoD EIMT is to bring a more focused, reliable, and disciplined approach in elevating executive issues to the attention of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

## **4. DEFINITION**

**An** executive issue includes, but is not limited to, an incident, event, or problem at any level within the Department that could have a negative impact on the Department because of its sensitivity or egregious nature. For purposes herein, an executive issue is reported without solutions or options accompanying the report of the issue.

## **5. ORGANIZATION, MEMBERSHIP, AND STAFF**

5.1. The DoD EIMT shall be composed of 6 members:

5.1.1. Led by a full-time Special Assistant for Executive Issues Management, who shall be a senior non-career appointee, responsible for the ongoing collection, continuing review, comprehensive evaluation, and timely disposition of information on emerging, highly visible, and consequential executive issues of interest to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

5.1.2. A senior officer in the grade of O-6 shall serve in a dual capacity as the Deputy to the Special Assistant for Executive Issues Management and as a Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Executive Issues Management.



5.1.3. A permanent, full-time team, which consists of three military officers at the grade of O-5, one each from the Army, Navy/Marine Corps, and Air Force shall conduct the information gathering, analysis, and reporting. At least one team member shall be an expert on Information Technology and shall be responsible for maximizing the use of data-mining software as an aid in identifying emerging issues. Administrative assistance shall be provided by an appropriate out-sourced contractor.

5.2. The Special Assistant's Daily Staff Meeting will be the forum for the elevation of relevant executive issues identified by the DoD EIMT and shall oversee the executive issues process.

5.3. The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense will convene a Crisis Action Team when an issue of great magnitude has emerged that requires close attention and prompt action by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary. The Crisis Action Team, composed of appropriately assigned members from across the Department, shall meet until the situation has been resolved.

## 6. FUNCTIONS

6.1. The DoD EIMT, under the day-to-day management and oversight of the Special Assistant for Executive Issues Management, shall:

6.1.1. Scan all sources, including domestic and foreign media and DoD channels, with a 360-degree method of operation using a variety of tools, techniques, and processes.

6.1.2. Assemble and organize information that is accurate, factual, timely, and compelling.

6.1.3. Identify leading indicators for early warning.

6.1.4. Submit issues and reports, as required, to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense through The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense. However, when the urgency of an issue dictates, the Special Assistant for Executive Issues Management has the authority to immediately report it directly the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, in coordination with The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

6.1.5. Have access to all meetings, as appropriate, to further inform the process.

6.1.6. Provide follow-up assessments, in coordination with The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, as needed, on previously reported items.

6.1.7. The DoD EIMT shall NOT replace or supplant existing reporting arrangements and relationships between the:

6.1.7.1. Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

6.1.7.1. OSD Principal Staff Assistants and the Heads of DoD Components who report directly to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

6.1.7.2. The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

6.2. The OSD Principal Staff Assistants (PSAs) who report directly to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense shall submit a copy of their Weekly Activity Reports on Thursday of each week to the Special Assistant for Executive Issues Management.

6.3. The Heads of the DoD Components shall:

6.3.1. Provide information to the Special Assistant for Executive Issues Management, when appropriate, or promptly upon request.

6.3.2. Take action to encourage commanders or executives in the field to identify and report emerging or potential problems.

6.3.3. Promptly elevate issues to the Special Assistant for Executive Issues Management to serve as an early warning to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense that a problem has been identified with real or potential DoD-wide ramifications.

6.4. The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy secretary of Defense shall invite the Vice Director of the Joint Staff or his designee, as appropriate, to The Special Assistant's Daily Staff Meeting when executive issues are on the agenda.

## **7. ADMINISTRATION**

7.1. A weekly summary report of executive issues shall be submitted to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense via The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

7.2. The Special Assistant for Executive Issues Management shall:

7.2.1. Be nominated by the DA&M and selected by the Secretary of Defense.

7.2.2. Report to The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense for day-to-day matters.

7.2.3. Assemble and prepare reports/issues for the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and shall keep the members of The Special Assistant's Daily Staff Meeting apprised of activities appropriately.

7.2.4. Monitor the progress of follow-on actions and issues.

7.2.5. Maintain and safeguard records and ensure their appropriate disposition when they are no longer required in active files.

7.2.6. Be a member of The Special Assistant's Daily Staff Meeting.

7.2.7. Meet with the Vice Director of the Joint Staff or the Vice Director's designee, when necessary, to ensure that Joint and Combatant Command issues are being identified and addressed.

7.3. The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall nominate three candidates for their respective officer positions at the 0-5 level to serve on the Executive Issues Management Team. (The Secretary of the Navy may nominate a mix of Naval and Marine Corps officers for the Navy billet.)

7.4. The Director, Washington Headquarters Services, shall provide personnel resources and such other technical, administrative, and logistical support to the DoD EIMT, which shall be located in the Pentagon.

7.5. Six months after Secretary of Defense approval to stand up the DoD EIMT and the associated executive issues process, the DA&M shall lead a formal review of the structure and process and determine its effectiveness providing recommendations for modifications or continuance.

## **8. EFFECTIVE DATE**

This Charter is effective immediately.

**B**

**LIST OF COORDINATING OFFICIALS**  
**Department of Defense Executive Issues Team**

October 7, 2004

<b>Official &amp; Position</b>	<b>Coordinating Date</b>	<b>Status</b>
LARRY DI RITA	September 24, 2004	Substantive comments on linkage with the Joint Staff regarding Joint/Combatant Command executive issues; met w/ Mr. DuBois on 9/27; comments accepted and accommodated
POWELL MOORE	September 17, 2004	Concur
WILLIAM HAYNES	September 17, 2004	Concur w/ comments; accepted and incorporated
MG MIKE MAPLES	September 8, 2004	Concur
PAUL BUTLER		Awaiting resolution of issues identified by Di Rita and Geren.
DAVE PATTERSON	September 22, 2004	Concur
PETE GEREN	September 21, 2004	Concur w/ comments (concerned about using the Geren-Maples Group in an oversight role, since the Geren-Maples Group is not a permanently established entity and was convened to address detainee issues only); met w/ Mr. DuBois 9/21 to discuss; comments accepted and accommodated
DICK McGRAW	September 14, 2004	Concur

11-L-0559/OSD/44467

file

May 20, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Pete Geren

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Elevating Issues

Please talk to Jim Roche and find out what the Air Force system is to elevate issues.

Then come up with a proposal as to how we can implement that throughout the entire Department. I would like a first cut at it done within the next four days.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
052004-24

.....  
 Please respond by 5/26/04

SIR,  
Response attached.

v/r  
LT Col Lengyel  
9/13

11-L-0559/OSD/44468

OSD 15666-04

11-L-0559

2 May 04 4:38 PM

October 8, 2004

TO: GEN Doug Brown  
David Chu  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Special Operations Retention Initiatives

We had an interesting discussion yesterday about the need for innovative approaches in dealing with the retention of our special operations personnel.

*34/D*

Please develop new ideas along the lines we discussed, including an assessment of whether it makes sense to give our folks flexibility to go off active duty for a period to time. We need to knock down any bureaucratic barriers that stand in the way of what makes sense and provides the best overall retention rates.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
100804-15

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

OSD 15680-04

*50/08*



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

November 23, 2004, 4:14 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

*David S. C. Chu 2 Dec 04*  
SUBJECT: ~~Special~~ Operations Retention Initiatives — SNOWFLAKE(attached)

- We are working General Brown's incentive proposals for Special Operations Forces (SOF) with the Services.
- All Services agree on increasing targeted retention bonuses for SOF war fighters.
  - These will be set to achieve optimal retention levels.
  - We will seek to minimize unintended effects on other specialties and personnel.
- We are exploring all flexibilities for Service members, including special operations personnel, to leave active duty for a period of time and return.
  - A recent law change aids the seamless transition for members to and from the Reserves and active duty.
- After a review of the special operations retention analysis and incentives next week, I expect to issue instructions to the Services to initiate a robust incentives program for special operations personnel beginning on January 1, 2005.

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: C. Witschonke. (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/44470

OSD 15680-04



MODE = MEMORY TRANSMISSION

START=FEB-23 01:29

END=FEB-23 01:30

FILE NO. =488

STN NO.	COMM.	RBBR NO.	STATION NAME/TEL NO.	PAGES	DURATION
001	OK	*	(b)(6)	001/001	00:00:18

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~~FOUO~~

October 8, 2004 ✓

TO: GEN Doug Brown  
David Chu

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Special Operations Retention Initiatives

We had an interesting discussion yesterday about the need for innovative approaches in dealing with the retention of our special operations personnel.

Please develop new ideas along the lines we discussed, including an assessment of whether it makes sense to give our folks flexibility to go off active duty for a period to time, We need to knock down any bureaucratic barriers that stand in the way of what makes sense and provides the best overall retention rates.

Thanks.

DHR:m  
100804-15

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

*DR* *steib*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 15680-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44471

**CDR's PFor SECDEF SOF Retention**

1. Sir, thank you for your support of Special Operations Forces (SOF) retention initiatives. I believe the quickest and most effective retention action we can take is to get approval for our current proposal offering targeted retention bonuses to our SOF operators. We are near the finish line with this proposal, and I am requesting you approve it. We will continue to work with the OSD staff to secure funding.

2. Additionally, we are offering our troops and their families educational incentives. We inaugurated our Enlightened Warrior program which will provide "SOF-friendly" degree programs available on-line through four nationally accredited universities. We have also partnered with the University of South Florida to enable SOF personnel who are within a year of completing their undergraduate degrees the opportunity to transfer as full-time students.

3. We will also pursue additional authorities, not currently legislated under USC Title 10, to enable our headquarters to actively engage in personnel force management. The current language allows us to monitor our force, but we need authorities to actively manage our force.

4. Regarding short-term breaks in service, I am interested in the idea of sabbaticals for our troops. Our staff is researching alternatives and developing options.

5. I appreciate your active engagement in SOF retention issues. We will do what makes sense to provide the best overall retention rates.

6. Respectfully, Doug

~~FOUO~~

September 20, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *PIA*  
SUBJECT: Shooting Down of Aircraft

2004 OCT 12 PM 1:14

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

010

If we did shoot down an aircraft and it crashed in a populated area, killing people and damaging property, do we know what our legal authorities are, how people would be compensated, and what we would do about all that?

Please look into it and get back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092004-12

.....  
*Please respond by 10/22/04*

*AO Seroy*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 15800-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44473



GENERAL COUNSEL


GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

SECRET

2004 OCT 12 PM 1:12

INFORMATION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel 

SUBJECT: DoD Claims Process After Shooting Down an Aircraft

- This replies to your request, "If we shoot down an aircraft and it crashed in a populated area, killing people and damaging property, do we know what our legal authorities are, how people would be compensated, and what we would do about all this?" We do know what our legal authorities are.

- The United States is not compelled to pay compensation unless Congress and the President have waived sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity is a traditional legal principle that states that a government is immune from suit unless the government consents. In the United States, we consent by statute.

- The United States has not waived sovereign immunity for combat activities. The shooting down of an airliner by the military in defense of the United States is a combat activity. Therefore, there is no statutory authority to pay compensation after shooting down an aircraft in defense of the United States.

- In such cases, two principal options are available if the President determines that compensation should be paid. One is to use emergency and extraordinary expense funds to pay compensation. We used this option when we mistakenly bombed the Chinese embassy in Kosovo. The other is to obtain specific statutory authority to pay compensation. We used this option after 9/11.

- When statutes authorize the United States to pay Compensation for combat activities, the Military Departments investigate, adjudicate and settle claims worldwide. We have a very large, efficient and effective claims system. In some cases if a claim is not settled to the satisfaction of the claimant, the claimant may sue the United States.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared by: Jim Schwenk/DoDOGC (b)(6)



OSD 15800-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44474

~~FOUO~~

September 20, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Shooting Down of Aircraft

2004 OCT 12 PM 1:14  
OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

If we did shoot down an aircraft and it crashed in a populated area, killing people and damaging property, do we know what our legal authorities are, how people would be compensated, and what we would do about all that?

Please **look** into it and get back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092004-12

.....  
Please respond by 10/22/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 15800-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44475



June 8, 2004

300.2

TO: General Mike Hagee

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Rotation Plan

I note we are going to be meeting on Thursday.

I also understand you are going to come up and defend the 7-month rotation, as opposed to a 12-month rotation.

I would like you to be prepared to make a presentation as to how you would do a 12-month rotation if, in fact, we decide that it is necessary to get the Marines into the same rhythm as the Army. Currently, a disconnect occurs when you cannot replace each Marine with another Marine, and we end up having to bring in Army units to replace Marines. It causes a disjointed effect in the rotations.

Therefore, I would like to see your best approach as to how you would do it and what other adjustments you would make, if we asked the Marines to start using 12 months.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
060804-23

.....  
Please respond by

*6/10/04* \_\_\_\_\_

8 JUN 04

OSD 15850-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44476

TO: Mira Ricardel  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *M*  
DATE: June 2, 2004  
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan

Are you positive that the State Dept. is not going to certify Uzbekistan? If that is so, we've got to get to work on it. Get Paul Wolfowitz to talk to Hadley, and draft a memo from me to Secretary Powell and a memo to me for my POTUS file that I want to talk to the President about Uzbekistan.

Thanks.

DHR/aaz  
060204.04ts

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*6/8*

UZBEKISTAN

274004

OSD 15851-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44477

TO: Larry Lanzilotta  
 Ken Krieg

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: DoD Budget

110.01

Take a look at this note from Newt Gingrich. I think it is an idea worth exploring.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060604A.01s

*Attach: Gingrich email 11/23/03*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ *6/21*

27504

OSD 15852-04



(b)(6) CIV, OSD

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**From:** Thirdwave2@aol.com

**Sent:** Sunday, November 23, 2003 5:33 PM

**To:** (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;  
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6)jack.patterson@osd.mil

**Subject:** longterm help for the dod budget

for secdef, depsecdef  
from newt 11/23/03

longterm room for the dod budget

you should take the non military functions of retirement and medical care and see if the President would be willing to move them to Veterans Affairs.

In the long run if these numbers are going to grow in an uncontrollable way you should look at getting them out of your line and into another line.


the current system makes the defense budget look bigger than it really is in defense terms.

11/24/2003

11-L-0559/OSD/44479



TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT:

Take a look at this paper that you got a copy of originally and let's discuss it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060604F.01ts

*Attach: Thoughts and Ideas 12/1/03*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ 6/20

33350

6 JUN 04

OSD 15854-04



12/1/03

For: DR  
CC: DiRita  
12/1/2003  
Thoughts and Ideas

~~Sent from  
Dorothy Chapman to [redacted]~~

cc: L. DiRita

Bingo— On the Thanksgiving visit,

There were some interesting articles this week in the WSJournal suggesting the Bush WH is committed to 'going over the heads' of the news media to get their message directly to the people. One or two compared it to Nixon and Reagan efforts in a similar vein. Of course, we agree completely—but would urge them to figure out ways to & it rather than set off a media reaction by saying they are going to do it. The preannouncement of PR activity is always a mistake,

Spoke

To break the news concentration in Baghdad, they might consider rotating briefings among several cities. After all, the reporters are sort of captive to the US Gov't for information. If such information is offered in cities outside the Sunni triangle, they will have to follow (and may see interesting stories along the way).

The single most effective manner of communication is to provide the public with access, on something of a regular basis, to the handful of Bush Administration spokesmen with a high degree of credibility (certainly including Rumsfeld, Powell, Cheney, Rice and Wolfowitz--but there could well be others),

The most popular and effective broadcasts during the war were the daily DOD briefings by Rumsfeld and Meyers. [The Tuesday --- November 25, 2003 Pentagon briefing underlined it again.] They were carried live and rebroadcast in the evenings. No one really cared to hear Dan Rather's interpretation of what Rumsfeld had said if they could get the information directly from the source. We need to duplicate this opportunity, perhaps on a weekly basis, in a predictable time slot accessible to the public (without appearing to dictate it!). Essentially, the Administration would be bypassing the middleman in one avenue of news delivery.

DWII

Have a joint briefing every other week with Bremer from Iraq and DR / General Meyer live from the Pentagon. Bremer needs visuals (for pictures). Do it at 8 PM and capture the cable networks live.

For: DR  
CC: DiRita  
12/1/2003  
Thoughts and Ideas

At the White House Fellows annual meeting, the **most** popular panel by far **was** a wide ranging conversation between Justices Scalia and Beyer, lightly moderated by a 10th Circuit **judge** who was a former **Fellow**. Apparently this **also** had been done at a 10th Circuit **judicial** retreat and was **equally** popular. It was the interplay between the two justices that was so informative.

It is true that something like this happens each Sunday on the morning talk shows (detailed time with a top Administration spokesman without too much moderation), but it's an awkward time slot for **most** of the viewing public,

Consider instead making *two* of our **list** [Rumsfeld, Powell, Cheney, Rice and Wolfowitz-- but there could well be other] available on a **regular** weekly **basis**, perhaps for C-span, **so** that viewers would have a predictable evening **time slot** to tune in. Rather than a press conference or some other format, it **would** be the conversational interplay between them that would be the attraction--and **give** the Administration the opportunity to present its case directly to the viewing public in a low **key** manner. It would even help **disarm** gossip about feuds, **personalize** our heroes, and accomplish **all sorts** of good works.

3

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Gimmicks **like** the Deck of Iraqi **Cards** **are** tough and can be dangerous, but there must be some way to quantify (**chart**) peaceful progress in reopening **schools**, restoring electrical power, etc. Remember the Misery **Index**? **We** should coming up with a Freedom Index or a Normalcy Index.

7

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The **most** promising Iraqi improvement **is** the flow of their oil. Remember, **it was** supposed to **pay** for much of their recovery. Perhaps **we** could chart that and show how that money **is** flowing back into security and **social** improvements.

401

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Rummy and **his boss** are both branded **as** gunslingers that have no concern for the families of the **soldiers** who have given their life. I know this **is** not true but the reputation **is** widespread. Even my hard-line wife **has** doubts.

**S**uggest an event where **both** the President and Don **can show** genuine concern might help **a** lot, even if the opponents and **pundits** of the east greet **it** cynically. Then it must be followed up in some meaningful way---- over **and** over again.

401

For: DR  
CC: DiRita  
12/1/2003  
Thoughts and Ideas

**Bush should do a David Frost like interview in the US before Christmas or between Christmas and New Year's. He can either do a major network or all the cable anchors (Hume, Williams, Browne and maybe CNBC). Bush's core character and empathy will emerge. He can talk about the success of Iraq—the sacrifice—and restate his determination.**

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**A joint Bush, Rumsfeld, Powell press conference or prime time conversation would be dramatic. Critics would argue the President should not share the stage with others—that it somehow demeans the office of President. But, wouldn't this be "Bush like"? He has the confidence to have the others with him—he runs the show, takes the lead.**

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One suggestion was mooted somewhat by the President's trip to the families of fallen soldiers in Colorado three days ago. [*And the Thanksgiving trip.*] The idea was for DR and the President (and their wives?) to make a much more concerted effort to visit with and express gratitude to the families of those who have lost sons and daughters in Iraq and to those soldiers who have been wounded. RN was always very conscious of the troops, their sacrifices, and did all he could to support them and express appreciation to them. RN's trip to visit the troops in Vietnam and the homecoming event at The White House for the American POWs remain in my mind as two of the great events in RN's presidency. President Bush and DR need a sustained effort to show their fatherly sides, not just their warrior sides. Gratitude is a powerful force to inspire continued sacrifice.

7

TO: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: June 6, 2004  
SUBJECT: Ivy Football Assn. Dinner NYC

001.15D

Can you check the calendar to determine when the State of the union might be and whether there is any reason to believe that Jan. 27, 2005 is a problem.

Then get this back to me so I can make a final decision in the next month.

What are your thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060604B.02ts

Attach: Invitation/Hoover 1/27/05Ivy Dinner @ NYC

Please respond by: 6/29

6 Jun 04

OSD 15855-04



GEORGE P. SHULTZ  
DISTINGUISHED FELLOW

VIA FACSIMILE  
(703) 693-0100

HOOVER INSTITUTION  
ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE

*[Handwritten signature/initials]*

*[Handwritten initials]*

May 10, 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
U.S. Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon, Room 3E880  
Washington, D.C. 20330

Dear Don,

It is my pleasure to inform you that you have been selected as Princeton University's honoree for the Ivy Football Association dinner at The Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York on January 27, 2005. It was my honor to represent Princeton at the 2003 event, and on behalf of the Princeton Football Association, I invite you to accept this honor.

The Ivy Football Association promotes and celebrates Ivy League football. It is composed of the Ivy League football alumni associations, and it has a strong Princeton connection. Stanislaw Maliszewski, '66, founded the organization, and its current president is Cosmo Iacavazzi, '65.

The purpose of the January 27 dinner is to recognize one distinguished alumnus from each of the eight Ivy League universities who has played football, but more importantly, has distinguished himself in his chosen career. The dinner is held bi-annually, and the 2001 and 2003 dinners were huge successes. In fact, in 2003 the event had to be moved to the Waldorf Astoria from The Pierre Hotel in order to accommodate the greatly expanded guest list. At least 1100 guests are expected for the 2005 dinner.

For the first time, a portion of the proceeds of the 2005 event will help to fund the National Football Foundation and Hall of Fame's "Play it Smart Program." This program assists inner city kids by encouraging them to learn from football experiences.

The master of ceremonies will be Jack Ford, Yale, '72 (a fine defensive back), who did an outstanding job of emceeing the dinners in 2001 and 2003. Jack formerly reported for ABC News' Good Morning America, anchored his own ESPN show, Sports Reporter II, hosted NBC's Today Show, and currently co-hosts a syndicated morning talk show. Jack will introduce the honorees, and each will address the audience for about five minutes.

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
May 10, 2004  
Page **Two**

If Joyce **would** like to accompany you, the Ivy Football Association **would** be pleased to include her **as** their guest. Charlotte joined me and **had** a thoroughly **enjoyable time**.

**The** audience will consist primarily of **individuals** who have played football at the eight **Ivy League** schools **and their** spouses. Of course, you **may** talk about **anything** you like, but **I'm** sure the **audience** would be interested in hearing **how playing** football for Princeton influenced your development and how it may have contributed to **your success**.

All of the Ivy League **athletic** directors **and** head football coaches will attend the dinner, **and the Ivy Football Association** plans to invite **the** university presidents **as** well. The evening **is** a wonderful way to celebrate **and** promote Ivy League football, **as** well as to encourage cooperation **and** cohesion **among the eight institutions**.

You will be joined at **this** event by a distinguished group. **At this point**, William V. Campbell, **Chairman** of Intuit, Inc., will be Columbia's honoree; Jeffrey R. Immelt, **Chairman and CEO** of General Electric, will be Dartmouth's choice; and Charles B. Johnson, **Chairman and CEO** of Franklin Templeton Investments, will **represent** Yale. You will be **notified** of the other **four** honorees as they become **known**. I have attached lists of those **who** were honored at the first two dinners.

I encourage **you to** accept this honor **and** enjoy a memorable evening with many of your **friends**.

Sincerely yours,



George P. Skultz

Attachments



*The Ivy Football Association Dinner*

*Thursday, January 25, 2001*

*The Pierre Hotel  
New York City*

*Honorary Chairman, Governor George E. Pataki,  
Master of Ceremonies, Jack Ford of ABC News*

Honoring:

**JOE PATERNO**  
Head Football Coach  
Penn State University  
(Brown '50)

**RUSSELL F. WARREN, M.D.**  
Surgeon and Chief, New York Hospital for Special Surgery  
(Columbia '62)

**RICHARD B. LOYND**  
Chairman of the Executive Committee  
Furniture Brands International  
(Cornell '50)

**WILLIAM H. KING, Jr.**  
Partner, McGuire Woods  
(Dartmouth '63)

**DANNY M. JIGGETTS**  
Sportscaster, Fox Network  
(Harvard '76)

**JAMES S. RIEPE**  
Vice Chairman, T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc.  
(Pennsylvania '65)

**JOHN F. MCGILlicuddy**  
Former Chairman and CEO, Chemical Banking Corporation  
(Princeton '52)

**KURT L. SCHMOKE**  
Partner, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering  
(former Mayor of Baltimore, Maryland)  
(Yale '71)

*The Ivy Football Association Dinner*

*Wednesday, January 22, 2003  
The Waldorf-Astoria Grand Ballroom  
New York City*

*Governor George E. Pataki, Honorary Chairperson  
Master of Ceremonies, Jack Ford of ESPN, Yale '72*

**HONORING**

**PAUL J. CHOQUETTE, Jr.**  
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer  
Gilbane Building Company  
BROWN '60

**ALLISON F. BUTTS**  
Chief Executive Officer  
Next Wave, LLC  
COLUMBIA '64

**CHARLES F. KNIGHT**  
Chairman  
Emerson  
CORNELL '57

**HENRY M. PAULSON, Jr.**  
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer  
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.  
DARTMOUTH '68


**TOMMY LEE JONES**  
Academy Award Winning Actor  
HARVARD '69

**DAVID S. POTTRUCK**  
President and Co-Chief Executive Officer  
Charles Schwab Corporation  
PENNSYLVANIA '70

**GEORGE P. SHULTZ**  
Former Secretary of State  
Reagan Administration  
PRINCETON '42

**KENNETH L. WOLFE**  
Former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer  
Hershey Foods Corporation  
YALE '61

TO: Hon. Melvin Laird

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT:

I just once again reread your February 11<sup>th</sup> memo and found it helpful. If you have other thoughts and suggestions as we go along, please do let me have them.

Thanks, my friend.

DHR/azn  
060604F.02ts

326

OSD 15856-04

674404

**Melvin R. Laird**  
1730 Rhode Island Avenue, NW  
Suite 212  
Washington, D. C. 20036

February 11, 2004

**Personal and Confidential**

Dear Rummy:

You **asked** me to be frank on how things are going - thought I would cover **several** items off the top of my head **and** send **them** to you on the private **fax** number you provided me.

**All-Volunteer Total Force Planning**

**Thanks** for putting me in touch with General Schoomaker. I believe my suggestions on the Reserve and Guard were as helpful to him **as** his suggestions were to me. Evidently, the General's recent study shows the preferred length of service for **Guard and Reserves** to be one full year for emergencies in a four-year period. When Dave Packard and I looked at it in connection with the establishment of the All-Volunteer Force and the Total Force Concept, eight months **was** the call-up period in emergencies in every two-year period as needed. Things have changed, but it is still within a few months. The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserves **are** somewhat different in several respects, which we discussed in detail. The Guard, Army Reserves, **and** Marine Reserves, to some extent, have not done **as well as** planned in restructuring. When I took over **as** Postmaster General **during** the Postal strike, we had a few non-regular units ready to be helpful. Thankfully, the strike did not last long. Not only were we short of Postal and Communications Reserve units, but also we were dreadfully short of police, fire, government infrastructure units, etc. These types of units do not have a great deal of appeal to the **Army** Reserves or Guard for regular or summer training exercises, but ate the type of duty which can be supplied best in times of crisis. Anyway, we had a good visit and I **am** glad you are getting the message across to our **friends** on Capitol Hill through your briefing at lunch a week ago Monday.

**Air National Guard**

The President's record of volunteering for the Air National Guard is available to **you**. This was a question discussed in a Public Affairs briefing when I was in the Pentagon. **Bush's** service in **Texas**, transfer to Alabama, and subsequent request to attend graduate school were all reviewed **after** receiving **an** inquiry. His record, which ended in **an** Honorable Discharge, should be officially disclosed. Public disclosure and transparency are the best policy. As I remember the record, **Bush** certainly did not desert; he did not go to Canada; but rather, he volunteered, served, and **then** requested **an** early **out** to attend graduate school. **Many** young people, in and out of military service, requested **an** early **out** or deferment for higher education up until the time we ended college deferments in the Nixon Administration, went to the lottery system **and** established

11-L-0559/OSD/44490

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
February 11, 2004  
Page Two

the All-Volunteer Force. Do not let anyone make this an issue to divide the military and veteran votes in November. You have the record, dates, etc.

### Iraq Briefing

You were somewhat upset with me for walking out of the briefing last year on the Middle East situation. I hope you have gotten over it. The briefing was so formalized there was no opportunity to raise questions or make suggestions, only listen. No one is required to follow **anything** we old timers say, but sometimes it does not hurt to listen. Some of us have listened to Defense Department briefings for years on the Defense Appropriations Committee – we learned a great deal of the pitfalls, all the way from Engine Charlie to seven years of the light at the end of the tunnel with McNamara.

Having spent some time in the Middle East, all the way from Turkey to Afghanistan; ~~Pakistan~~ to Iraq, and everywhere else, the briefers and your Deputy seemed to have no idea of the politics of the area. Even when I visited Iraq for the first time in 1953, as one of the youngest members of the House Appropriations Committee, the political and economic situation was quite clear. After our successful mission to save Kuwait and our failure to guarantee our friends in the North and the Shiites any degree of safety before we pulled out, the inevitability of our present problem should have been obvious. By giving the idea that it would be a cakewalk this time after we failed them the last time, was disturbing. My comments to you were honest as I thought the briefing was not based on any degree of realism or ~~firm~~ intelligence. The Defense Department should always present a guarded picture of all its proposed combat operations. As I told you in your first week in office, you can believe the third assessment report on any operation if they concur with the first two – and even then you can be disappointed.

### Intelligence Failures

Rummy, you will remember my admonition in your office in February 2001 as you just took office – appoint your own men and women to top intelligence posts. You can change most of these jobs yourself – I listened to these agencies for many years. I got a great deal of grief for changing DoD top positions, but you cannot believe the difference it made. The big three in intelligence usually spend most of their time confirming past reports. The Community would not even confirm the fact that Russians were conducting MIRV tests in 1968 when we had electronic test verification, which had not been presented first by them. The President will not win politically by defending his choice of a holdover CIA Director even if he is a good friend. The Director is in the past and the President could “die on his sword” in the future. You will recall that Kennedy fired Dulles very quickly after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Dulles read about his departure in the newspaper. I served on the Intelligence Committee in Congress when it was truly “secret” and appointed by the Speaker with only five members of the House. It does not

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
February 11, 2004  
Page Three

hurt a President to fire people for a failure he should not bare. Ike always **said**, "politics is sometimes tough, especially on your friends."

#### Cheney and Full Disclosure

Cheney's unwillingness to divulge the names of individuals meeting with **him** on energy policy continues to be a mistake. Because of his background after leaving government, transparency and full disclosure should have been his number one concern. Now as this issue is taken all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, he **will** be **further** brought into the public spotlight even to the point of embarrassing one of our friends on the Supreme Court. Dick did nothing **wrong** - he talked to the right people, but it is the **perception** of a cover up that counts. This was all unnecessary as I told Dick, Lynne and Libby from the start - they thought I **was nuts!**

#### The Election

We do not want a one-term presidency like the one we had with George, Sr. or Jerry. When talking with you last week, it seemed not to register. This is the track the Administration is on, and if we do not change course, we could be headed for defeat. **You** are the only one in the Cabinet that understands national policies and the facts of life about national elections.

Ike won big on the Korean War issues - "I will go there myself immediately after the election." George W. did not win the last election - Clinton and Gore lost it. Jerry and George, Sr. lost their re-election bids - Carter and Clinton won these elections by default. **Nixon** won **his** first election on our country's discontent with the Vietnam War (Johnson and McNamara). Nixon won his second term because of Vietnam - the fact we had removed all combat troops by Election Day from Vietnam, ended the draft, and established the All-Volunteer Force. McGovern had no place to go with his anti-defense and anti-Vietnam war message. Even then, we took McGovern seriously - we beefed up government purchase orders **from** toilet paper, cars, airplanes, trucks, tanks, etc. in the last weeks of the fourth quarter of fiscal 1973 and the first quarter of fiscal 1974. We may have done too much of this, but you can never take a national election for granted. These were all purchases approved by Congress **for** the fiscal year in question. We just moved them **up** a little earlier. I can go on and on about **why** I think **an** incumbent should never be defeated. The President has all the tools at his disposal. He must exercise them wisely and remember that the presidency is much more important **than** supporting friends. Nixon finally realized that after the second election - there would have been no Watergate exposé in his second term if he would of cleaned house (Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and others months earlier). The Presidency is too important for the President to take blame or perhaps the fall for the incompetent advice he received **from** the intelligence community or any others. **All** Presidential elections are about how the President is **perceived** as a true leader.



I


The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
February 11, 2004  
Page Four

**Another View of Perception**

I will never forget the weekend Jerry pardoned Nixon. We were partners in a two-day golf tournament at Burning Tree. (By the way, we were just one stroke behind the tournament leaders with the extra strokes our golf handicaps gave us). I left Jerry Saturday night firmly convinced he would not pardon Nixon until some of us organized a group of Senators and House Members to call upon Ford at the White House, to show for the first time public **support** to put the Nixon matter behind us. John Stennis had suggested this pardon approach to Bryce Harlow and me. He felt we could get a group of **thirty** or so to publicly call on **Nixon** after such a meeting. Instead, Phil Buchanan, Haig, and others were pressing for a dramatic pardon move to wipe the slate clean. That Sunday morning shock had a great deal to do with Jerry losing the election. Imagine my disappointment when we teed off at 12:30 p.m. that Sunday in our golf tournament. Jerry asked me what I thought of what he had done earlier that morning on the pardon. My response on the first tee was, "Jerry, I'll tell you what I **think** of it **after we finish** this round - we have a chance to **win** the tournament this afternoon, and we can discuss this after our round." The pardon was right, but the public **was** not properly prepared for the Sunday morning shock. **Thus** another case of *perception* playing a big part in a national Presidential election.

Anyway, Rummy, I have rambled around in dictating **this** note - you asked for it. Tear it up after you have read it, but remember I do **love** you and Joyce. **Your** plate is full, but by putting on an extra fill-court press, we may be saved and win in November.

Regards,



Mel Laird

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

**VIA FACSIMILE**

11-L-0559/OSD/44493

TO: Gen. Pete Schoomaker

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT:

I ran across this paper that Newt Gingrich sent to a number of people back in January '03. It struck me you might want to read it. I am sure you are aware of the kinds of comments he makes and I know you've made enormous progress, but nonetheless I thought it might be of interest to you.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060604D03ts

*Attach: Gingrich email 1.04.03 Re: Why the data you get may be wrong*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

322

6 Jun 04

OSD 15857-04



From Newt Gingrich  
cc Di Rita  
Wolflow: T2

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

**From:** Thirdwave2@aol.com  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 05, 2003 12:08 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil; John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil  
**Cc:** stephen.cambone@OSD.mil; Torie.Clarke@OSD.Mil; jaymie.durnan@osd.pentagon.mil;  
 ken.krieg@osd.pentagon.mil  
**Subject:** why the data you get may be wrong  
 for secdef, depsecdef  
 from Newt 1/04/03  
 why the data you get may be wrong

Every senior person in the Bush Administration I have talked with about the budget problems has been struck by the gap between their information and the facts I am asserting. This memo will help explain how misleading are the reports you are getting

the following memo is long but it explains better than anything I have seen why you are getting such poor quality of information and such dishonest answers about what we need and what has to change. I urge you to read it. This is a successful mid-level Army officer:

note the terrible comment

"Beware the fidelity of survey data. The atmosphere of fear in the Army is impossible to overstate. Years of conditioning to zero-defects and fear of offending have resulted in answers to survey questions that will be generally lukewarm at worst. More importantly, survey data is manipulated by the chain of command. While I was in Kosovo, yet another of a seemingly endless line of "Blue Ribbon Panels" traveled there to sound a group of captains reference retention. Prior to the arrival of the panel, the senior officers dictated that no maintenance or headquarters company commanders would participate, knowing that these are the most thankless command positions. Additionally, the senior officers further weeded by name the remaining line commanders."

FYI, a remarkably prescient letter by an Army officer responding to a CSIS study.  
 Dave

13 December 2002

Center for Strategic and International Studies  
 1800 K Street N. W Washington DC, 20006

Dear CSIS,

I read with great interest your report entitled "American Military Culture in the 21st Century." I thought you might be interested in my thoughts as I read the report.

1/6/2003

11-L-0559/OSD/44495

For your information, I am a single white male Army battalion operations officer, thirty-nine years old, no dependents. I have seventeen years of service in Korea, Europe, the Balkans and the US, to include time in the 2nd Infantry, 101st Air Assault, and 1st Armored Divisions. I also served as an observer/controller at the Joint Readiness Training Center, and have instructed at West Point and the Aviation Officer Basic Course.

1. In my opinion, Army basic training is no longer a rite of passage. I cannot write with any authority on what occurs there, but weekly I receive the graduates. New soldiers are increasingly undisciplined, rebellious, and more concerned with their rights than their responsibilities. They often have little sense of teamwork or duty. My suspicion is that the "Army of One" mentality (in place long before the phrase was coined) is teaching them to ask not what they can do for their country, but what their country can do for them. Army recruiting strategy with its offers of money and more money is where this pathology begins.

Since there is apparently little quality control in basic training, active units receive, relatively unmodified, the raw product of American Society. I would prefer to see

(A) Recruiting based on the Marine model, because one gets what one asks for. The USMC asks for young men who wish to serve their nation and challenge themselves, while the Army asks for people who want money.

(B) Even if it means a smaller Army, I would prefer to see some quality control in basic training. In short, if recruits do not meet rigid standards of ethics, behavior, and performance, they should not be allowed into the service, period.

(C) Basic training that is a tradition based and challenging rite of passage. Bottom line: Recruits must join the Army, not the other way around.

2. I do not agree that soldiers identify with the Army as the report contends. Junior officers and soldiers identify with their small units, and senior officers and NCOs with their staffs (commanders and command sergeants major excepted). I believe that the importance of service identity is overstated, and that now is the time to transition to one service.

The payoff in procurement and standardization would be immense, without damaging unit cohesion. The other side of the coin, however, is that morale is so poor and unit cohesion at the lower levels so weak due to years of over commitment, under resourcing, micromanagement, and social engineering, that morale needs some intensive shoring up. I believe there are some ways to do this:

(A) Give us back our officer and NCO clubs. They may not be efficient, but they are effective in building esprit de corps and strengthening the ever-weakening line between the ranks.

(B) Power down. Our company commanders are no longer that, but instead

- ▼ "company managers." Let's get brigade commanders and division commanding generals out of company physical training programs, and instead focused on directing their staffs to do more than crank out endless taskings which do not support battalion essential combat tasks.
  - (C) Allow units to develop and propagate unit specific symbols and insignia at the battalion level.
  - (D) Recruit regionally and field units on the now defunct COHORT model.
  - (E) Organize in multifunctional regiments on the USMC model.

3. I do not believe as the report contends that we have demonstrated military prowess in Desert Storm, Bosnia, or Kosovo. The report did not mention Somalia in this vein, a conflict that demonstrates how bad things can get when we face a resolute enemy. Therefore, the "lessons of success" learned in the Balkans and Desert Storm need some perspective.

What we have demonstrated is that because we have a lot of money, we can overcome an enemy that does not fight, or is more concerned with criminal activities than military engagements. I believe that, should we face a resolute enemy in open combat, the results would be catastrophic (Bunker Hill, Bull Run, Kasserine Pass, Task Force Smith, Vietnam, Somalia).

America, between its major wars, has a long history of demanding efficiency rather than effectiveness from its Armed Forces. Unfortunately, the Armed Forces are not IBM or Microsoft, nor are they the Department of Interior or Bureau of Weight and Measures.

Efficiency rather than effectiveness in peacetime translates to heavy casualties in the opening weeks of the next real conflict.

4. I was interested in the comment of the report that "military culture by definition must differ significantly from civil culture in a democratic society." I could not agree more, which is why I am perplexed at the Herculean efforts in the last ten years to civilianize the military.

5. Beware the fidelity of survey data. The atmosphere of fear in the Army is impossible to overstate. Years of conditioning to zero-defects and fear of offending have resulted in answers to survey questions that will be generally lukewarm at worst. More importantly, survey data is manipulated by the chain of command. While I was in Kosovo, yet another of a seemingly endless line of "Blue Ribbon Panels" traveled there to sound a group of captains reference retention. Prior to the arrival of the panel, the senior officers dictated that no maintenance or headquarters company commanders would participate, knowing that these are the most thankless command positions. Additionally, the senior officers further weeded by name the remaining line commanders.

The best survey or interview is the one in which the interviewee does not realize he

is being interviewed. If you want to know what the Army is thinking, just listen to soldiers converse in bars. Pay particular attention to junior NCOs and officers.

6. Because captain retention is so poor, Department of the Army has chosen to make captains from lieutenants at three years of service. Additionally, the selection rate for captain was this year 99%. This decision is typical of the kind of shortsighted decision making common at senior levels. The long-term result is incompetent captains, whose poor leadership creates disgruntled soldiers and NCOs who resign or do not reenlist. The captains themselves, frustrated that they cannot perform as expected, will also resign as soon as they can.

Recommend fewer officers of higher quality. If this means a smaller Army, so be it.

7. Casualty and risk aversion, euphemized in the Army as "force protection," have expanded beyond all logical proportion. In Kosovo, I actually heard a brigade commander say "The worst thing we can do here is discharge a weapon." I tend to take the more traditional view that the worst thing a military force can do is fail in its mission.

8. Commanders and other leaders within the Army are daily faced with the following conundrum: Follow the regulations, or accomplish the mission. Our penchant for risk aversion and micromanagement has done away with judgment, while regulations reproduce themselves at an alarming rate. The cynicism and stress on integrity the above conundrum creates is a huge burden.

One of the reasons junior officers join the Army is for the opportunity to exercise their judgment. If platoon leaders are not allowed to do this, why have them? Put a pile of regulations in their chairs. Soldiers requiring management can consult the regulations, judgment no longer required.

9. "Proper" race and gender relations, currently propagated in the Army by the much despised and canned "Consideration of Others" program, has guaranteed the poorest possible social climate. We have taught a generation of soldiers to see themselves not primarily as soldiers, but as African-Americans who happen to be soldiers, or females who happen to be soldiers. Worse yet, we have taught them not to be polite and respectful, but instead to carry chips on their shoulders, searching for someone to offend them. The result in the loss of unit cohesion has been devastating as soldiers are isolated in social fear. Additionally, the never-ending stream of "African-American Months" and "Asian-Pacific American Months" has done nothing more but accentuate differences. Recommend we have "American Soldier Year" and be done with it. The self-fulfilling prophecies created by racial and gender hypersensitivity are assisting in the destruction of morale.

10. Technology, as useful as it is, has helped to create slaves to perfection and intense micromanagers. The man-hours wasted on just the right color for PowerPoint presentations number in the millions, while subordinate commands



await the "perfect" operations order. Junior officers watch senior officers slave away on presentations for generals and ask themselves "Do I want to be doing that in three years?" Perhaps if the generals would refuse to accept this kind of waste, the colonels would follow suit. Additionally, nobody wants a corps commander in their tank or cockpit with them. Recommend we stop the search for real time terrestrial omniscience at the higher levels, and start trusting our subordinates again.

Human nature dictates that what can be known will be known. The question is, just who needs to know it? Does the theater commander really need a monthly report on venereal disease cases in platoon X? I think not, but he gets one by name and social security number.

11. We have entered an interesting and twisted period in military sociology when abuse is not defined by the institution or the senior, but rather by the subordinate. The ramifications of this environment are self-evident. Schofield's venerated definition of discipline is often quoted to justify this position: "The discipline which makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment." Nowhere in this statement does Schofield indicate that the private soldier should define "harsh and tyrannical."

12. The Army has long been wedded to what I have come to think of as the "Chase your tail" method of training. As we move from execution to execution, the training of subordinates suffers. We do so much so rapidly that little is done correctly. We "check the block" and move on to the next task. I recently saw a corps G-3's annual training calendar, of which he was exceedingly proud. Not a block of empty space on it. When then, do the division, brigade, battalion, and company commanders, not to mention platoon leaders and NCOs, have time to train as they wish? Either the Corps G-3 knows every platoon's training needs better than platoon leaders, or there is something very wrong. Here in USAREUR my battalion requires 397 days to meet the annual training requirements placed on us by higher headquarters.

Simultaneously, my battalion services endless garrison support taskings and those of higher headquarters to resource someone else's training. Meanwhile, company commanders are chided by general officers for not giving their soldiers predictability. One does not know whether to laugh or cry.

The solution for this problem is simple...slow down. We can do a few things very well or we can do a great many things poorly. There is no middle ground. Long ago the military developed the concept of main and supporting efforts, as well as mission essential tasks. If we would employ these concepts, everything would not be a priority, and unit focus would not shift from day to day. Movement is not necessarily progress, nor is constant reorganization.

13. The study made much of married soldiers and soldiers with dependents,

asserting that these are stabilizing influences. Apparently no one interviewed any company commander known to me, some of whom spend upwards of half their time dealing with family abuse, teens in trouble, dependent related alcohol and drug problems, unwed pregnant soldiers, single soldiers who have no plans to care for their children in the event they deploy, etc., etc. I remember several years ago a USMC general suggesting that junior Marines should not be married. He was pilloried in the press, but I think he was correct. Recommend that the services accept no first term married soldiers, and that all unwed pregnancies be immediately discharged.

14. Soldiers generally are not opposed to deployments. The problem lies in the perceived value of the deployment. If I am to ask my soldiers to separate from their dependents for six months once every two years, I must give them a good reason to do so. Police work in Kosovo is not what I consider worthy of that kind of sacrifice. We do more, but it is meaningless. I cannot overstate the cynicism that this situation creates.

15. I similarly cannot stress enough the importance of swift, bold decisions to solve these problems, or at least to acknowledge them. I am aware that the Army is a large organization averse to change. I am similarly aware, however, that many of these problems were apparent ten years ago. Executive summary after executive summary, panel after panel, committee after committee, task force after task force, with no tangible results other than new headgear (make no mistake, even the lowliest private sees that pitiful measure for what it is).

Soldiers have lost patience. Having taught at West Point, I maintain an active correspondence with dozens of junior officers I met there. I do not know one who is planning on staying in the army past his initial commitment. Company commanders are refusing second commands, and captains are refusing first commands in favor of resignation. Lieutenant colonels and colonels are also refusing commands. These actions were very rare...almost unthinkable ten years ago, yet they are all around us today. We have a problem that requires serious effort.

Our greatest threat is not criminals in Kosovo, weapons of mass destruction, or Osama Bin Laden. Our enemy is domestic: rock bottom morale. We wonder which of two unpalatable situations we face...either the senior leadership does not recognize the low morale, or they do recognize it and do not care. In my opinion, anything we do which distracts or keeps us from solving the morale problem is tantamount to rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic.

16. The report repeatedly suggests that military service is not fun anymore. There is no truer statement. Most everything we had that made the service fun has been taken away from us. The net result of the loss of fun or job satisfaction is a "workaday" attitude. I see in myself and in more and more officers a view of my service as just a job, rather than a way of life. I never thought I would see it that

way, and was surprised and saddened when I did. The Army I joined is not the Army I am in, and I believe I am betrayed. Idealism has met reality, and those two concepts are too far removed from one another.

I am aware that as I have written, my comments have become increasingly emotional and urgent. I have allowed this to happen, and you receive this letter without edit. Those of us who live in this environment day in and day out are extremely frustrated, and I wanted you to read that frustration, unvarnished.

Finally, one of the "things" that frustrates me most is the lack of survey feedback. Armies of lab coated technicians and sociologists sally forth from Washington annually to poke us, prod us, and test us. As they snap closed their briefcases, they always promise us feedback. In seventeen years, I have seen feedback twice, once when Prof. C. Moskos provided me some directly at my request, and once when I saw your report a few days ago, purely by accident. The average soldier does not demand immediate solutions. He does, however, harbor the hope that his senior leadership recognizes problems and takes positive, effective action to solve them.

Thank you for your time, patience, and study.

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: **Gingrich**

352

Here is an old Gingrich item on Peacekeeping as a Doctrine. Do you know what has happened in the intermittent period?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060604D04s

*Attach: Gingrich email 4.16.03 - Peacekeeping as Doctrine*

Please respond by:

6/21

*SecDef —*

*JAA 6/8*

- The Army's Peacekeeping Center did not close*
- It stayed open, not under the Army War College, but under the U.S. Army Training & Doctrine Command (TRADOC)*
- TRADOC is working closely w/ JFCOM concerning stability operations doctrine — and Next is involved/advising.*

*6 JUN 04*

**OSD 15870-04**

11-L-0559/OSD/44502

*6/8*



From Newt Gingrich  
cc Duran  
Craddock  
Wolfowitz

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

**From:** Thirdwave2@aol.com  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 17, 2003 1:22 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil; John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil  
**Cc:** jaymie.durnan@osd.pentagon.mil; damicorj@js.pentagon.mil; peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; giambastiani@jfc.com.mil  
**Subject:** peace keeping as a doctrine

for secdef, depsecdef  
from newt 4/16/03



peacekeeping as a doctrine

the following article about closing the Army's center for peacekeeping doctrine does raise the question who should be studying this and who should be developing the doctrine for peacekeeping.

It is obvious that we are going to continue to do peacekeeping. Some agency should own the doctrine development for this activity.

newt  
Chicago Tribune  
April 15, 2003

**Army Institute To Be Shut Down**

***Critics hit loss of training center for peacekeeping***

By Douglas Holt, Tribune staff reporter

WASHINGTON -- Even as the U.S. military grapples with the largest peacekeeping effort in a generation, the Army is shutting down its only institute devoted to such operations, prompting protests from inside and outside the Pentagon.

Since its creation in 1993 at the Army War College, the Peacekeeping Institute has struggled against a military culture that sees itself as a war-fighting machine that should leave peacekeeping to others.

But in a sign that peacekeeping skills are useful in modern conflicts, the institute's former director, Col. George Oliver, has been deployed overseas to work with the Pentagon-led reconstruction effort of Iraq.

In a March 14 memo obtained by the Tribune, Oliver pleaded with Army Secretary Thomas White to keep the center open, telling him he "made a mistake" by ordering its closing along with other staff cutbacks.

The Peacekeeping Institute, in Carlisle Barracks, Pa., will close Oct. 1. A Jan. 30

Army news release said its functions and mission will be absorbed at the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) at Ft. Monroe, Va.

A spokesman for the training command, however, said Monday that it has no plans to accept the institute's charge.

"I can tell you that no functions from the Peacekeeping Institute are being transferred to the Center for Army Lessons Learned, nor are they being transferred to TRADOC," said spokesman Harvey Perritt.

### **Rumsfeld supports closing**

Lt. Col. Gary Keck, a Pentagon spokesman, said that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld supports closing the institute. He added, however, that the decision to close the institute was the Army's.

Oliver, in his letter written five days before the war in Iraq began, said: "When the announcement came that the Institute would close, no one thought it was a good idea.

"Most felt that such an institute was needed more now than when it was formed in 1993. With the war on terrorism going on in Afghanistan and the threat of war looming in Iraq, the goal of winning the war could be overshadowed by losing the peace. PKI personnel are currently involved in efforts to 'win the peace' in both Afghanistan and Iraq," Oliver wrote.

An Army spokesman denied that the shutdown signals any reduction in the importance placed on peacekeeping but said it is emblematic of the "hard choices we have to make" in operating in as efficient a manner as possible.

Out of a \$81 billion annual Army budget, the Peacekeeping Institute ran on \$200,000 a year.

Experts said that it sends the wrong signal at a critical time in Iraq but that the move fits with the Bush administration's dislike of peacekeeping missions.

### **'It does not make sense'**

"It does not make sense," said David Segal, director of the Center for Research on Military Organization at the University of Maryland.

But Segal said the Army has performed peacekeeping missions grudgingly, whether in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina or after Hurricane Andrew.

As a candidate, Bush voiced disagreement with then-Vice President Al Gore on the

use of troops for peacekeeping. "He believes in nation building," Bush said. "I would be very careful about using our troops as nation builders. I believe the role of the military is to fight and win war and, therefore, prevent war from happening in the first place."

After the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, administration officials built a case for a pre-emptive war in Iraq to remove a threatening regime and pave the way for democracy. The administration also said the war could be managed with such precision that the Iraqi people would inherit a relatively intact country.

So far, the military has fared better at fighting than civil order. While troops immediately secured oil fields to protect them from sabotage, they were unable to protect civilian assets such as hospitals, banks and the national museum from looting.

Some experts speculate the current difficulties might reinforce the military's reluctance to take on the task of dealing with the aftermath of war.

"This may be a convenient way to carry out an agenda that I think was clear from the campaign rhetoric of this administration, which was: 'We don't do peacekeeping. We don't do nation building. We don't escort kids to school,'" said William Durch, a senior associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center, a research institute in Washington.

In the letter to Army officials, Oliver said Iraq likely will need military peacekeepers.

"The nature of security in the world today [and tomorrow] demands a large pool of well-trained professional peacekeepers," he wrote. "Today over 80 nations have peacekeeping centers, institutes and organizations dedicated to this emerging field. With PKI's closure, the United States military will be devoid of any such organizations."

22

file

801

IRAQ

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT:

Why don't you and Pete take a look at this list of general officers that we've got over in Iraq. It is hard for me to believe that this makes sense.

Why don't we see if we can't manage it better?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060604D.06ts

*Attach: GO List for Multi-National Force*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ 6/25

6 JUN 04

OSD 15871-04

	OST	LTG David H. Petraeus	Commanding General (Inbound)	USA	Multi-National Force Iraq (b)(6)
	OST	BG Andrew MacKay (CAN)	CPATT	COA	Multi-National Force Iraq (b)(6)
	CPA	LTG(Ret) Jeffrey Oster	CPA Exec		CPA Building, (b)(6)
	CPA	COL(P) Joseph Schroedel	Deputy Commander, Gulf Region Division, CPA	USA	
14	CPA	BG Stephen M. Seay	US Dep to Director CPA IRAQ	USA	
15	ISG	MG Keith Dayton	ISG	USA	Multi-National Force Iraq (b)(6)
16	CPA	BG Usher	CPA	USAC	
	<b>Other General Officers</b>				
17	GRD	MG Ronald Johnson	CG, USACE (Med-Evac'd)	USA	CPA Building, (b)(6)
	C3, MNF-I	BG Janos Isaszegi (Departed; Italy Fill inbound)	Dep C3	COA	Multi-National Force Iraq (b)(6)
18	Cmd Grp, MNC-I	BG Richard Formica	C3 (Effects)	USA	Multi-National Corps Iraq (b)(6)
	<b>Division MSCs</b>				
19	1st Infantry Division	MG John R. Baliste	Commanding General	USA	1st Infantry Division (b)(6)
20		BG Steve Mundt	Assistant Division Commander (S)	USA	1st Infantry Division (b)(6)
21		BG John Morgan	Assistant Division Commander (M)	USA	1st Infantry Division (b)(6)
22	1st Armored Division	MG Martin Dempsey	Commanding General	USA	1st Armored Division, (b)(6) (b)(6)
23		BG Mark Hertling	Assistant Division Commander (S)	USA	1st Armored Division, (b)(6) (b)(6)
24		BG Curtis Scaparrotti	Assistant Division Commander (M)	USA	1st Armored Division, (b)(6) (b)(6)
25	1st Cavalry Division	MG Peter W. Chiarelli	Commanding General	USA	1st Cavalry Division (b)(6)
26		BG Jeffery W. Hammond	Assistant Division Commander (S)	USA	1st Cavalry Division (b)(6)
		COL(P) Mike Jones	Assistant Division Commander (M)	USA	



	13th COSCOM	COL(P) James Chambers	Commander	USA	13 COSCOM (b)(6)
27	Cmd Grp, MNF-I	BG Carter Ham	MND-North CDR	USA	TF Olympia (b)(6)
28		BG Timothy J. Wright	CG, Multinational Task Force North, 88th Infantry Division (Forward)	USA	
29	I MEF	LTGen James T. Conway	Commanding General	USMC	I Marine Expeditionary Force
30		MajGen Keith Stalder	Deputy Commanding General	USMC	I Marine Expeditionary Force
31	1st MARDIV	MajGen James Mattis	Commanding General	USMC	1st Marine Division
32		BrigGen John F. Kelly	Deputy Commanding General	USMC	1st Marine Division
33	1st FSSG	BrigGen Richard Kramlich	Commanding General	USMC	1st Force Service Support Group
34	3d MAW	MajGen James Amos	Commanding General	USMC	3d Marine Aircraft Wing
	<b>Separates</b>				
35	2d Med Bde	BG James F. Reynolds	Commander	USA	2d Med Bde (b)(6)
36	ACCE	BG Robert P. Steel	ACCE	USAF	
37	Data Masked	BG Marke E. Gibson	DATA MASKED	USAF	

SJS No: 04-03939	Date/Time: 06/08/2004 17:08	SJS Date Changed: 06/14/2004 17:03	CJCS Has Seen: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
To Chief AD: <input type="text"/>	Editor: <input type="text"/>	Red Tag: <input type="checkbox"/>	Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
VCJCS Has Seen: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
Subject: SF-801/ GENERAL OFFICERS IN IRAQ			
Summary: MEMO FROM THE SECDEF TO CJCS, CC TO DEPSECDEF. "WHY DONT YOU AND PETE TAKE A LOOK AT THIS LIST OF GENERAL OFFICERS THAT WE'VE GOT OVER IN IRAQ. IT IS HARD FOR ME TO BELIEVE THAT THIS MAKES SENSE. WHY..."			
Addresses: <input type="text"/>		Keyword: RUMSFELD	
How Referred: CJCS REPLY			
Distribution: GFO, DCJCSALC		Assignment:	
Directorate: GFO		J Division: GFO	
Action Officer: GNELZI, THOMAS D, LTCOL		AO Phone: (b)(6)	
Originator Data:			
Originator: OSD/SD		Origination Date: 06/06/2004	
Originator No.: SF 060604D.06TS		Originator Phone: <input type="text"/>	
Originator Name: RUMSFELD			
Suspense Data:			
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Current J Suspense: <input type="text"/>	Originally: 06/24/2004	Time: <input type="text"/>	Chgs: <input type="checkbox"/>
Current Orig. Suspense: <input type="text"/>	Originally: 06/25/2004	Date Completed: 06/14/2004	Signed: <input type="checkbox"/>
Changes: <input type="text"/>		Who: SHELDMA	
		How Completed: BEING ANSWERED UNDER 04-03864	
Special Instructions: <input type="text"/>			

04-03864



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CH-1844-04  
15 June 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 6/15*

SUBJECT: Locations

- **Question.** "Please do get me the information on where all the generals and admirals are in Iraq." (TAB A)
- **Answer.** TAB B shows where the general and flag officers in Iraq are located.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: VADM T. J. Keating, USN; Director, Joint Staff (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/44510



TAB A

8:39 AM

TO: Gen. Pete Pace  
CC: Gen. Richard Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: June 2, 2004  
SUBJECT: Locations

**CJCS HAS SEEN**

**JUN 03 2004**

Please do get me the information on where all the generals and admirals are in Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR/azm  
060204.07

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*6/10*

'04 JUN 6 PM 1:34

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/44511

USCENTCOM G/FO LOCATION IN IRAQ

**Multi-National Force - Iraq**

Position Title	Grade	Service	Incumbent Name	Location	Remarks
Commander	9/10	USA	LTG Sanchez	Baghdad, Iraq	Replacement to arrive 30 Jun
DCG	9	Coalition	Coalition-LTG McColl	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCG (Embassy based position)	8	USA		Baghdad, Iraq	MG Stratman, USA arrives 30 Jun
DCG	8	Coalition	Coalition-AirCmdr Jones (UK)	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCG Detainee Ops	8	USA	MG Miller, G	Baghdad, Iraq	
Chief of Staff	8	USMC	MajGen Weber	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCS Intel	8	USA	MG Fast	Baghdad, Iraq	BG DeFritas, USA arrives Aug
Deputy Intel	7	Coalition	Coalition	Baghdad, Iraq	UK Fills
DCS Ops	8	USA	MG Miller, T.	Baghdad, Iraq	Replacement BG Fil arrival TBD
DCS Ops	8	Coalition	Coalition - MG Molan (Aus)	Baghdad, Iraq	
Deputy C3	7	Coalition	Coalition	Baghdad, Iraq	Italian fill (BG Isaszegi departed)
Dep Dir, Ops/CICB	7	USA	BG Kimmit	Baghdad, Iraq	Brig Gen Lessel, USAF arrives 1 Jul
DCS Strategy, Policy & Plans	8	USAF	MajGen(S) Sargeant	Baghdad, Iraq	
Deputy Pol/Mil	7	Coalition	Coalition	Baghdad, Iraq	
Coalition Ops	7	Coalition	Coalition	Baghdad, Iraq	
C4I	7	USAR	MG Detamore	Baghdad, Iraq	Replacement requested for 1 Aug
DCS Log	8	USA	BG West	Baghdad, Iraq	MG Minetti, ARG arrives 15 Jul
C7/DCG Eng	8	USA	MG Johnson	Baghdad, Iraq	BG Bostick arrives July
C9	7	USAR	BG Davidson	Baghdad, Iraq	

CDR, Air Cbt Contingency Element	7	USAF	Brig Gen Steel	Baghdad, Iraq	
MND-North Cdr	7	USA	BG Ham	Mosul, Iraq	TF Olympia
CG MNTF North, 88th Inf Div (Fwd)	7	USARG	BG Wright	Mosul, Iraq	

DCG/OST-I	9	USA	LTG Patraeus	Baghdad, Iraq	
CMATT	8	USA	MG Eaton	Baghdad, Iraq	BG Schwitters arrives 20 Jun
CPATT	8	Coalition	Coalition - BG MacKay	Baghdad, Iraq	

Ch, Iraq Survey Group	8	USA	MG Dayton	Baghdad, Iraq	BGen McMenamin, USMC arrives 15 Jun
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**Multi-National Corps - Iraq**

Cdr, MNC-I	9	USA	LTG Metz	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCG	8	Coalition	Coalition - MG Graham (UK)	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCG	8	Canada	MG Natynczyk (Can)	Baghdad, Iraq	

**USCENTCOM G/FO LOCATION IN IRAQ**

Chief of Staff	7	USA	BG Troy	Baghdad, Iraq	
C3	7	USA		Baghdad, Iraq	Requirement TBD
C3 (Effects)	7	USA	BG Formica	Baghdad, Iraq	
C7	7	USA	BG Pollman	Baghdad, Iraq	

Position Title	Grade	Service	Incumbent Name	Location	Remarks
CG, 1st Armored Div	8	USA	MG Dempsey	Al Hillah, Iraq	
ADC, 1AD	7	USA	BG Hertling	Al Hillah, Iraq	
ADC, 1AD	7	USA	BG Scaparrotti	Al Hillah, Iraq	
CG, 1st Infantry Div	8	USA	MG Batiste	Tikrit, Iraq	
ADC, 1ID	7	USA	BG Mundt	Tikrit, Iraq	
ADC, 1ID	7	USA	BG Morgan	Tikrit, Iraq	
CG, 1st Cavalry Div	8	USA	MG Chiarelli	Baghdad, Iraq	
ADC, 1st Cav	7	USA	BG Hammond	Baghdad, Iraq	
ADC, 1st Cav	7	USA	BG Jones	Baghdad, Iraq	
CG, 13th COSCOM	7	USA	BG Chambers	LSA Anaconda, Iraq	
CG, 2d Med Bde	7	USAR	BG Reynolds	Baghdad, Iraq	
CG, I MEF	9	USMC	LtGen Conway	Al Asad, Iraq	
DCG I MEF	8	USMC	MGen Stadler	Al Asad, Iraq	
CG, I MarDiv	8	USMC	MGen Mattis	Ar Ramadi, Iraq	
ADC 1stMarDiv	7	USMC	BGen Kelly	Ar Ramadi, Iraq	
CG, 1st FSSG	7	USMC	BGen Kramlich	Al Tagaddum, Iraq	
CG, 3d MAW	8	USMC	MGen Amos	Al Fallujah, Iraq	

**Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)**

OSAMOD

Position Title	Grade	Service	Incumbent Name	Location	Remarks
Spl Asst to LTG(Ret) Oster	7	USMC	BGen Usher	Baghdad, Iraq	Backfill not required
DCdr, Gulf Region Engr Div	7	USA	COL(P) Schrodel	Baghdad, Iraq	
US Dep to Dir, CPA Iraq	7	USA	BG Seay	Baghdad, Iraq	

TAB C

COORDINATION

USA	COL Bruno	8 June 2004
USAF	Capt McKaskill	4 June 2004
USMC	Maj Sylvester	4 June 2004
USCENTCOM	LtCol Moscovic	8 April 2004

Tab C

11-L-0559/OSD/44514

6/22  
7257

720

In reply refer to EF-9822 & 04/007757-ES

EF-9822

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: Singapore

<sup>p.s.</sup>  
The Ambassador to Singapore says there is a serious disconnect between the Policy shop and the S&T DSCC folks. He thinks we ought to be able to do better by Singapore than we are doing.

Do you know anything about it? Please look into it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060604B.07ts

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

6/25

6/24

TO See Def

Paul Butler

6/23

Sir,  
Response attached.  
vr/CDR Nosenzo  
6/24

OSD 15872-04

08-06-04 15:24 IN

Singapore

627404



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

05/24

DepSecDef  
USD(P) *[Signature]* (P) 4/21  
I# 04/007757-ES

INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY  
AFFAIRS

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
(Mr. Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6)) *[Signature]* 18 JUN 2004

SUBJECT: Snowflake Regarding Comments by U.S. Ambassador to Singapore

- You asked for Policy's thoughts on comments that Ambassador Lavin made regarding "S&T DSCC". Amb Lavin meant to refer to ISA/DSCA, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which oversees security cooperation and foreign military sales.
- I spoke with Amb Lavin, who clarified that:
  - He did not mean to imply there was a serious disconnect between Policy and DSCA (which, as I reminded him, is part of Policy); and
  - He advocated giving "Singapore a piece of candy each year" to be symbolic of and to incentivize our close bilateral relationship, citing the early release of the Longbow as an example of a case coordinated through and timed by Policy.
  - He cited the AIM-9X as something we should offer Singapore to enhance the F-15 package in an upcoming fighter competition with Eurofighter and Rafale.
- My response and recommended position on this issue are:
  - The system governing the transfer of arms for Singapore is cumbersome, but the cases of AMRAAM and Longbow showed that we could make the system work for a priority country like Singapore.
  - We should do our best to expedite the process in the future, starting with the AIM-9X/F-15 case.

Attachments:

Tab 1: SecDef question

Tab 2: Coordination

Prepared by: Elizabeth Phu, ISA/AP, (b)(6)



21-06-04 09:27 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/44516

COORDINATION

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, ISA  
(Peter C.W. Flory)

TDY

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, ISA/AP  
(Richard Lawless)

AP RPL 10 Jan

Principal Director, ISA/AP  
(John Allen)

10 Jan

Director, Middle East, Asia, North Africa/DSCA  
(Ed Ross)

Copy provided



June 9, 2004

TO: The Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales

cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Document and E-mail Request

USAT

I know you are aware of the request by the Senate Armed Services Committee and by Senator McCain for a series of documents and e-mails relating to the Boeing tanker-lease proposal.

The Department sent the attached letter to Senator Warner, which he has shown to Senator McCain. It is my understanding that Senator McCain was dissatisfied with our proposal and is considering asking for the Senate Armed Services Committee or the Senate Commerce Committee to subpoena the Department of Defense to produce the documents and e-mails Senator McCain requested in his letter, which I have also attached.

My plan is to be as cooperative as we can be. Senator McCain is holding up a number of the President's DoD nominations. It is increasingly difficult to run the Department with so many key open positions, and particularly during a war.

The only reason I would not be fully cooperative is if the President decided it was a matter of privilege. I am at the point where I believe the interests of the Department and, absent advice to the contrary, the interests of the Administration are that we provide these materials to the Committee. Please let me know if you agree; and, if not, which documents the President wishes to withhold.

Please let me know if it is appropriate for me to proceed in a manner that is consistent with what I see as the interest of the Department of Defense and, I believe, the interest of the Administration.

Sincerely,

Attachments a/s

DHR:dh  
060704-7

9 Jun 04

OSD 15873-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44518



C6/10

June 8, 2004  
I-04/007774  
EF-9832

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: More Coalition Forces

Are we going to get the new Iraqi government to ask for more Coalition forces?

I think we ought to do it, and we ought to do it formally. We ought to get the State Department to ask them to do it, and we ought to ask them to do it when our team goes out there.

We ought to want more Coalition forces, so we can relieve the pressure on our forces.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
060804-18

.....  
Please respond by 6/25/04

→SD 6/9/04 *DF* 6/14

We are working this matter in three ways:

1. I'll reinforce this message with CPA (Bremer).
2. We'll push in the Coalition Working Group, an interagency group that meets daily and gets diplomatic cables and other efforts done.
3. DSD will raise with Iraqis on his trip. *2-2-14* Doug Feith

OSD 15874-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44519

TEN 6/10



3:23 PM

TO: Paul Butler  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: June 1, 2004  
 SUBJECT: **SecDef Correspondence**

*312*

Find out if I am sending a letter to the family of every person who was killed since I have been Secretary of Defense and if I am sending a letter to everyone who retires after 20 or 25 years.

I would like to see the letters if they are being sent and if not, I would like to start doing it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
 060104.34

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ *6/14*

*15 Jun 04*

**OSD 15875-04**

4:29 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: June 1, 2004  
SUBJECT: Economic Points

Why don't you circulate this economic information around to the inter-agency.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060104.43

*Attach: Economic Points/Jeffery email 5/27/04*

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ *6/12*

*TRM*

**OSD 15882-04**

*19 Jun 04*

11-L-0559/OSD/44521

1. 5/27

**Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD**

**From:** Jeffery, Reuben CPA [Reuben.Jeffery@osd.mil]  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 27, 2004 1:09 PM  
**To:** Helmick, Frank BG OSD; Ganyard, Stephen COL OSD  
**Cc:** Craddock, John J Lt Gen OSD; Butler, Paul CIV OSD  
**Subject:** FW: Economic Points

U

fyi-some good news. rj

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Fleischer, Michael Mr. (CIV) [mailto:fleischerm@orha.centcom.mil]  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 27, 2004 1:00 PM  
**To:** Jeffery, Reuben CPA  
**Subject:** Economic Points

Although you'd never know it, the Iraqi economy has been improving steadily for months.

- Unemployment, put at over 60% in the aftermath of the war, had dropped by early 2004 to about 28%. A recent survey in some of the big cities indicates that fewer than 10% of households have no one working. Some of the employment gain is related to government spending but much stems from private enterprise, largely Iraqi or Iraqi expatriates. It is not clear how the events of recent weeks have affected the economy's generation of jobs, but there is reason to think that job creation has fundamental strength and will continue
- A consumer led expansion has been driving the economy almost since war's end. At first, consumers snapped up goods like satellite dishes. Then came consumer appliances and cars. Now, the range of goods has expanded to include toys, bicycles, motor scooters, home and office furniture, and, increasingly, luxury items. On one block in Karradah there is a store selling elegant clocks and lamps of all kinds. There is no sign that consumer demand is flagging.
- Businesses too are spending. Factory managers are hiring. Shop owners are renovating their stores and new commercial buildings are rising from the ground up. This business investment is being fueled by an entrepreneurial community, including many wealthy exiles, who see opportunity on Iraq's near horizon. The return of the exiles, with their money, is especially encouraging. Their confidence, borne of a more intuitively accurate sense of ground truth in Iraq than we can have, is a solid indicator of hope for the future.
- The macro-economic forces in Iraq are favorable. The bulk of the reconstruction spending has not yet rolled into the economy. Its effect will be enormous and positive. Six months from now we will be talking about shortages of skilled Iraqi labor and in 18 months most every Iraqi who wants a job will have one. As reconstruction efforts tail off over time, foreign investment will pick up the slack. Even in the face of uncertain security, seminars and presentations to international firms with an interest in Iraq continue to be full.
- The coalition continues to work with a large number of Iraqis with ambitious business ideas. These people almost never mention the issues in Najaf, Karbala, and Kufa, and they never mention Abu Ghraib. Rather, they speak of expanding markets and Iraq's future role in the world or regional economy. They truly demonstrate that in most parts of the country, the doors are open for business.
- The CPA itself continues to work every day with Iraqi counterparts dedicated to all aspects of Iraq's new civil society: rebuilding its power and water systems, performances by the Iraqi Symphony, launching housing construction projects, making micro-loans (including the first in the Fallujah area). Events have the past two months have been distressing but they have not stopped the Iraq's advance toward a better future.

Reuben - let me know if this isn't what you were looking for and I will go back at it.

Regards,

5/27/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/44522

7:05 AM

TO: Steve Cambone

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 2, 2004

SUBJECT: **9/11 Commission**

*F*

Keep me posted on how we are going to get the 9/11 Commission thing turned around. Should we start meeting with some of those Commissioners again individually? We can't let it go forward like that.

Thanks.

*0005*

DHR/azn  
060204.01

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ *6/12*

*29 June 04*

**OSD 15884-04**

9:34 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 2, 2004

SUBJECT: **Istanbul Summit**

For the Istanbul Summit, has the United States been asked to provide any security with respect to the air cover? I am surprised if we haven't, given the fact that the effort we made in Prague was so necessary. I am surprised it is not necessary for Istanbul. What's the story?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060204.13

*NATO 337*

*6/10*

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*2 June 04*

**OSD 15886-04**



720  
**UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



PERSONNEL AND  
 READINESS

**ACTION MEMO**

October 8, 2004; 4:15 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

*David S. C. Chu 8 Oct 04*  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 (Signature and Date)

210(3+4)

SUBJECT: Longer Tours—and Longer Tenure—SNOWFLAKE

- You asked for a proposal initiating action on your desire that senior officers serve longer tours (Tab B).
- I believe three steps will accomplish your objective:
  1. Announce that you expect most four-star officers to serve at least four years in their posts (Tab C lists four-star posts, and average tenure over the past decade).
  2. Confer with the Service Secretaries and Chiefs on the three-star posts that should likewise carry a tenure of three or four years, with the balance assumed to be two-year tours (Tab D lists three-star posts, nominating as four year candidates those that are normally "capstone" posts—i.e., last post of career).
  3. Invite the Service Secretaries and Chiefs to provide you with a similar list for one and two-star officers, for your review and approval.
- This is a simple approach, to begin changing our culture. Actual tours may vary somewhat from the new norms—and you may want some to be of intermediate length. As such a system is implemented, it will be critical to encourage prompt retirement of those not advancing, and to assure those staying longer will be properly compensated. (The latter requires statutory change and will require your personal backing. We have already failed twice to persuade Congress.)
- Memoranda to initiate this action are attached for your consideration.

8 Oct 04

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the memorandum to the Service Secretaries and CJCS at Tab A.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Lt Col Lernes Hebert, (b)(6)

20 SEP 04



**TAB**

**A**





**THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

**MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHIEFS OF SERVICES**

**SUBJECT: Expectations for the Tenure of Senior Officers**

Senior officers must enjoy sufficient tenure in their posts to be effective. They must have sufficient time to size up what is to be accomplished, to develop the appropriate plans to put those plans into effect, and to see them through to success.

Regrettably, the data I've seen suggest that the average time in post for our flag officers is frequently less than two years. This is too short.

As we plan for the future, we should assume that those confirmed for a four-star post will typically serve at least four years in that position. This should likewise be the expectation for several of our three-star posts, and I will be meeting with you to discuss the posts where longer tenure could be meritorious. A list of three-star billets with recent tour averages is provided to aid in this review.

I invite you to provide me, in advance of our meeting, but no later than November 1, 2004, your recommendations on tenure length for the one and two-star posts in your domain. I will ask the Chairman and Combatant Commanders for their recommendations on joint positions.

cc: CJCS



11-L-0559/OSD/44527



**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Tenure of Senior Officers in Joint Assignments

We must give senior officers assigned to joint posts sufficient tenure to be effective. Regrettably, the data I've seen suggest the average is often less than two years. For some operational posts this may be acceptable. But in other cases this will not be enough time to size up the situation, decide what must be accomplished, and see the plans through to success.

In consultation with the Combatant Commanders, I would like your recommendations on the tenure we should expect for those officers occupying joint assignments in the grades of O7 through O9. I look forward to discussing these recommendations with you at your earliest convenience.

cc: Combatant Commanders



11-L-0559/OSD/44528

# Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Director, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment, J-8, Joint Staff	Joint/External	21	1.8	4
DUSD for Military Personnel Policy	Joint/External	22	1.8	3
Principal Deputy Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense	Joint/External			4
Director, Missile Defense Agency	Joint/External	14	1.2	4
Director, Defense Information System Agency and Manager, National Communications Systems	Joint/External	31	2.6	4
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency	Joint/External	32	2.7	4
Director, Defense Logistics Agency	Joint/External	36	3.0	4
Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency	Joint/External	40	3.3	4
Director, National Imagery and Mapping Agency	Joint/External	28	2.4	4
Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service	Joint/External	42	3.5	4
Chief of Staff, United States European Command	Joint/External	29	2.5	4
Director for Logistics, J-4, Joint Staff	Joint/External	29	2.4	3
Director of Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems, J-6, Joint Staff	Joint/External	23	1.9	3
United States Military Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee	Joint/External	33	2.8	3
Deputy Chairman, NATO Military Committee	Joint/External	33	2.8	3
President, National Defense University	Joint/External	34	2.8	3
(Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support, Central Intelligence Agency	Joint/External			3
(Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	Joint/External	19	1.6	2
Director, Joint Staff	Joint/External	16	1.3	2
Director for Operations, J-3, Joint Staff	Joint/External	22	1.8	2
Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5, Joint Staff	Joint/External	20	1.7	2
Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff, United States Central Command	Joint/External	18	1.5	2
Deputy Commander, United States Joint Forces Command	Joint/External	20	1.7	2
Deputy Commander, United States Northern Command/Vice Commander, United States Element, North American Aerospace Defense Command	Joint/External			2
Deputy Commander, United States Pacific Command	Joint/External	14	1.2	2
Deputy Commander, United States Special Operations Command	Joint/External	15	1.3	2
Deputy Commander, United States Strategic Command	Joint/External	19	1.6	2
Deputy Commander, United States Transportation Command	Joint/External	27	2.2	2
Cdr, JSRC Center [Cdr, Land North]	Joint/External	18	1.5	2
Deputy Commander, Joint Sub Regional Command Center, Allied Command Europe [Dep Cdr, Land North]	Joint/External	37	3.1	2
Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense	Joint/External			2
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Deputy National Security Advisor	Joint/External			2
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Intelligence and Warfighting Support	Joint/External			2
Superintendent, United States Air Force Academy	Air Force	40	3.3	5
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	31	2.6	4
Deputy Chief of Staff, Installations and Logistics, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	21	1.8	4
Surgeon General of the Air Force	Air Force			4
Chief of Air Force Reserve and Commander, Air Force Reserve Command	Air Force			4
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Department of the Air Force	Air Force			4
Director, Air National Guard	Air Force	63	5.3	4
Commander, Air University	Air Force	33	2.8	4
The Inspector General of the Air Force, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force	Air Force	26	2.2	3
Vice Commander, Air Education and Training Command	Air Force	36	3.0	3
Vice Commander, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	20	1.7	3
Commander, Aeronautical Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command				3
Commander, Electronic Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	26	2.2	3
Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command	Air Force	48	4.0	3
Commander, Space and Missile Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	24	3.9	3
Commander, Eighteenth Air Force, Air Mobility Command	Air Force	47		3
Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command	Air Force	30	2.5	3
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force	Air Force			2
(Deputy Chief of Staff, Warfighting Integration, Headquarters United States Air Force				

# Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	16	1.4	2
Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	15	1.3	2
Vice Commander, Air Combat Command	Air Force	16	1.3	2
Commander, Eighth Air Force, Air Combat Command	Air Force	29	2.4	2
Commander, Ninth Air Force, Air Combat Command and Commander, United States Central Command Air Forces	Air Force	29	2.4	2
Commander, Twelfth Air Force, Air Combat Command and Commander, United States Southern Command Air Forces	Air Force	18	1.5	2
Vice Commander, Air Mobility Command	Air Force	18	1.5	2
Vice Commander, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	21	1.8	2
Commander, United States Forces Japan and Commander, Fifth Air Force, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	28	2.3	2
Deputy Commander In Chief, United Nations Command Korea; Deputy Commander, United States Forces Korea; Commander, Air Component Command, Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command; and Commander, Seventh Air Force, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	27	2.3	2
Commander, Alaskan Command, United States Pacific Command; Commander Eleventh Air Force, Pacific Air Forces; and Commander, Alaskan North American Defense Region	Air Force	24	2.0	2
Vice Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	25	2.1	2
Commander, Allied Air Forces South and Commander, Sixteenth Air Force, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	23	1.9	2
Superintendent, United States Military Academy	Army	60	5.0	5
Chief of Engineers/Commanding General, United States Army Corps of Engineers	Army			4
Commanding General, Third United States Army/Commander, United States Army Forces Central Command	Army	34	2.8	4
Commanding General, First United States Army	Army	27	2.2	4
Commanding General, Fifth United States Army	Army	26	2.2	4
Commanding General, United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command	Army	47	3.9	4
Commanding General, United States Army Combined Arms Center	Army	27	2.3	4
Deputy Commanding General, for Initial Entry Training/Commanding General, United States Army Accessions Command, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army			4
Commanding General, United States Army Medical Command/The Surgeon General, United States Army	Army			4
Commanding General, United States Army Pacific	Army	28	2.4	4
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, United States Army	Army	25	2.1	4
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, United States Army	Army			4
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, United States Army	Army			4
Military Deputy/Director, Army Acquisition Corps, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)	Army			4
Chief Information Officer/Deputy Chief of Staff, G-6, United States Army	Army			4
Military Deputy for Budget, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller)	Army	24	2.0	4
Chief, Army Reserve	Army			4*
Director, Army National Guard	Army			4
Commanding General, Eighth United States Army and Chief of Staff, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea	Army			3
Commanding General, I Corps and Fort Lewis	Army	30	2.5	3
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, United States Army	Army			3
Inspector General, Office of the Secretary of the Army	Army	31	2.6	3
Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Materiel Command	Army	9	0.8	2
Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg	Army	28	2.4	3
Commanding General, III Corps and Fort Hood	Army	31	2.6	2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Forces Command	Army			2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army	22	1.8	2
Commanding General, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army	Army	24	2.0	2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army	Army	23	1.9	2
Commanding General, United States Army Special Operations Command	Army	27	2.3	2
Director of the Army Staff	Army			2
Director, Futures Center, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army			2
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, United States Army	Army	18	1.5	2

# Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Chief, National Guard Bureau	Amy/AF			4
Commander, Marine Forces Reserve	Marine Corps	21	1.7	4
Deputy Commandant, for Programs and Resources, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	27	22	4
Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	24	2.0	4
Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Pacific; commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific; and Commander, Marine Corps Bases Pacific	Marine Corps	21	1.7	3
Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Atlantic; Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic; Commander, United States Marine Corps Bases Atlantic; Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Europe; and Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces, Southern Command	Marine Corps	26	2.1	3
Deputy Commandant, for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	32	2.7	3
Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command	Marine Corps	21	1.8	3
Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	19	1.6	2
Deputy Commandant for Aviation, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	27	2.3	2
Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force	Marine Corps	21	1.7	2
Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force; Commanding General, Striking Force Atlantic	Marine Corps	19	1.6	2
Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force; Commander, Marine Corps Bases, Japan; and Commander, Marine Forces Japan	Marine Corps	18	1.5	2
Superintendent, United States Naval Academy	Navy	39	3.3	5
Commander, Naval Air Systems Command	Navy	40	3.3	4
Commander, Naval Network Warfare Command	Navy			4
Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command	Navy	41	3.4	4
Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and Surgeon General	Navy			4
Chief of Naval Reserve	Navy	43	3.5	4*
Commander, Military Sealift Command	Navy	25	2.1	3
Commander, Naval Air Force, United States Atlantic Fleet	Navy	29	2.4	3
Commander Naval Air Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	31	2.6	3
Commander, Naval Education and Training Command	Navy			3
Inspector General, Department of the Navy	Navy	32	2.7	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Atlantic Fleet	Navy	38	3.2	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	30	2.5	3
President, Naval War College	Navy	43	3.6	3
Director for Material Readiness and Logistics, N4, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	32	2.7	3
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower and Personnel, N1, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief, Naval Personnel	Navy	32	2.7	3
Director of Naval Intelligence, N2	Navy			3
Commander Submarine Force, United States Atlantic Fleet and Commander, Submarine Allied Command, Atlantic	Navy	31	2.6	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	28	2.3	3
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations, N3/N5, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	17	1.4	2
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Requirements and Assessments, N8, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	23	1.9	2
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs, N6/N7, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (pending)	Navy	23	1.9	2
Director, Navy Staff, N09B, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	19	1.6	2
Commander, SECOND Fleet	Navy	22	1.8	2
Commander, SEVENTH Fleet	Navy	23	1.9	2
Commander, SIXTH Fleet and Commander, Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe	Navy	20	1.6	2
Commander, THIRD Fleet	Navy	28	2.4	2
Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, United States Atlantic Fleet/Fleet Forces Command	Navy	15	1.3	2
Commander, United States Naval Forces, Central Command and Commander, FIFTH				

11-L-0559/OSD/44531

\*Statutory Tour Length

**TAB**

**B**

9/21/04

FOUO

SEP 20 2004

OFFICE OF  
OPERATIONS  
SEP 21 10 41 AM '04

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Two Major Initiatives

I plan to put forth a major initiative with respect to longer tours for people and, for those that are successful, somewhat longer service.

I am also going to put forth a major initiative for Standing Joint Headquarters, so that when we have to fight a next war, we will have the headquarters set up, and won't end up with the headquarters half-filled when the war is over. I have been pushing this for three years, but the resistance is powerful.

We need to get both of them done. Please get back to me with proposals.

Thanks.

Attach.  
CJTF-7 Joint Manning Timeline (2 pages)

DHR:ss  
091304-25

.....  
*Please respond by* 10/29/04

FOUO

TAB

C



# Proposed Tour Lengths--O-10 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Commander, US Central Command	Joint/External	36	3.0	4
Commander, US European Command	Joint/External	37	3.1	4
Commander, US European Command	Joint/External	32	2.7	4
Commander, US Joint Forces Command	Joint/External	29	2.4	4
Commander, US Northern Command	Joint/External			4
Commander, US Pacific Command	Joint/External	33	2.8	4
Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/Commander, United States Forces Korea	Joint/External	36	3.0	4
Commander, US Southern Command	Joint/External	20	1.7	4
Commander, US Special Operations Command	Joint/External	34	2.8	4
Commander, US Strategic Command	Joint/External	28	2.4	4
Chairman of the JCS	Joint/External	48	4.0	2*
Vice Chairman of the JCS	Joint/External	35	2.9	2*
Chief of Staff, USAF	Air Force	36	3.0	4*
Commander, Air Combat Command	Air Force	25	2.1	4
Commander, Air Education and Training Command	Air Force	27	2.2	4
Commander, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	34	2.8	4
	Air Force	26	2.2	4
Commander, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	24	2.0	4
Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	24	2.0	4
Vice Chief of Staff, USAF	Air Force	25	2.1	3
Commanding General, US Army Materiel Command	Army	30	2.5	4
Commanding General, US Army Forces Command	Army	18	1.5	4
Commanding General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army	36	3.0	4
Chief of Staff, USA	Army	49	4.1	4
Commanding General, USA Europe and Seventh Army	Army	31	2.6	3
Vice Chief of Staff, USA	Army	20	1.7	3
Commandant of the Marine Corps	Marine Corps	48	4.0	4
Assistant, Commandant of the Marine Corps	Marine Corps	25	2.0	3
Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (SEA-08)	Navy	72	6.0	8*
Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	42	3.5	4*
Commander, US Atlantic Fleet	Navy	25	2.1	4
Commander, US Naval Forces, Europe	Navy	30	2.5	4
Commander, US Pacific Fleet	Navy	30	2.5	4
Vice Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	22	1.8	3

\*Statutory Tour Length

11-L-0559/OSD/44535

**TAB**

**D**

# Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Director, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment, J-8, Joint Staff	Joint/External	21	1.8	4
DUSD for Military Personnel Policy	Joint/External	22	1.8	3
Principal Deputy Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense	Joint/External			4
Director, Missile Defense Agency	Joint/External	14	1.2	4
Director, Defense Information System Agency and Manager, National Communications Systems	Joint/External	31	2.6	4
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency	Joint/External	32	2.7	4
Director, Defense Logistics Agency	Joint/External	36	3.0	4
Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency	Joint/External	40	3.3	4
Director, National Imagery and Mapping Agency	Joint/External	28	2.4	4
Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service	Joint/External	42	3.5	4
Chief of Staff, United States European Command	Joint/External	29	2.5	4
Director for Logistics, J-4, Joint Staff	Joint/External	29	2.4	3
Staff	Joint/External	23	1.9	3
United States Military Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee	Joint/External	33	2.8	3
Deputy Chairman, NATO Military Committee	Joint/External	33	2.8	3
President, National Defense University	Joint/External	34	2.8	3
Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support, Central Intelligence Agency	Joint/External			3
Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	Joint/External	19	1.6	2
Director, Joint Staff	Joint/External	16	1.3	2
Director for Operations, J-3, Joint Staff	Joint/External	22	1.8	2
Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5, Joint Staff	Joint/External	20	1.7	2
Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff, United States Central Command	Joint/External	18	1.5	2
Deputy Commander, United States Joint Forces Command	Joint/External	20	1.7	2
Deputy Commander, United States Northern Command/Vice Commander, United States Element, North American Aerospace Defense Command	Joint/External			2
Deputy Commander, United States Pacific Command	Joint/External	14	1.2	2
Deputy Commander, United States Special Operations Command	Joint/External	15	1.3	2
Deputy Commander, United States Strategic Command	Joint/External	19	1.6	2
Deputy Commander, United States Transportation Command	Joint/External	27	2.2	2
Cdr, JSRC Center [Cdr, Land North]	Joint/External	18	1.5	2
Deputy Commander, Joint Sub Regional Command Center, Allied Command Europe [Dep Cdr, Land North]	Joint/External	37	3.1	2
Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense	Joint/External			2
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Deputy National Security Advisor	Joint/External			2
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Intelligence and Warfighting Support	Joint/External			2
Superintendent, United States Air Force Academy	Air Force	40	3.3	5
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	31	2.6	4
Deputy Chief of Staff, Installations and Logistics, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	21	1.8	4
Surgeon General of the Air Force	Air Force			4
Chief of Air Force Reserve and Commander, Air Force Reserve Command	Air Force			4
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Department of the Air Force	Air Force			4
Director, Air National Guard	Air Force	63	5.3	4
Commander, Air University	Air Force	33	2.8	4
The Inspector General of the Air Force, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force	Air Force	26	2.2	3
Vice Commander, Air Education and Training Command	Air Force	36	3.0	3
Vice Commander, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	20	1.7	3
Commander, Aeronautical Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	26	2.2	3
Commander, Electronic Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	48	4.0	3
Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command	Air Force	24	2.0	3
Commander, Space and Missile Systems Center, Air Force Materiel	Air Force	47	3.9	3
Commander, Eighteenth Air Force, Air Mobility Command	Air Force			3
Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command	Air Force	30	2.5	3
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force	Air Force			2
Deputy Chief of Staff, Warfighting Integration, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force			2

# Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	16	1.4	2
Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	15	1.3	2
Vice Commander, Air Combat Command	Air Force	16	1.3	2
Commander, Eighth Air Force, Air Combat Command	Air Force	29	2.4	2
Commander, Ninth Air Force, Air Combat Command and Commander, United States Central Command Air Forces	Air Force	29	2.4	2
Commander, Twelfth Air Force, Air Combat Command and Commander, United States Southern Command Air Forces	Air Force	18	1.5	2
Vice Commander, Air Mobility Command	Air Force	18	1.5	2
Vice Commander, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	21	1.8	2
Commander, United States Forces Japan and Commander, Fifth Air Force, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	28	2.3	2
Deputy Commander In Chief, United Nations Command Korea; Deputy Commander, United States Forces Korea; Commander, Air Component Command, Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command; and Commander, Seventh Air Force, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	27	2.3	2
Commander, Alaskan Command, United States Pacific Command; Commander Eleventh Air Force, Pacific Air Forces; and Commander, Alaskan North American Defense Region	Air Force	24	2.0	2
Vice Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	25	2.1	2
Commander, Allied Air Forces South and Commander, Sixteenth Air Force, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	23	1.9	2
Superintendent, United States Military Academy	Army	60	5.0	5
Chief of Engineers/Commanding General, United States Army Corps of Engineers	Army			4
Commanding General, Third United States Army/Commander, United States Army Forces Central Command	Army	34	2.8	4
Commanding General, First United States Army	Army	27	2.2	4
Commanding General, Fifth United States Army	Army	26	2.2	4
Commanding General, United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command	Army	47	3.9	4
Commanding General, United States Army Combined Arms Center	Army	27	2.3	4
Deputy Commanding General, for Initial Entry Training/Commanding General, United States Army Accessions Command, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army			4
Commanding General, United States Army Medical Command/The Surgeon General, United States Army	Army			4
Commanding General, United States Army Pacific	Army	28	2.4	4
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, United States Army	Army	25	2.1	4
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, United States Army	Army			4
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, United States Army	Army			4
Military Deputy/Director, Army Acquisition Corps, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)	Army			4
Chief Information Officer/Deputy Chief of Staff, G6, United States Army	Army			4
Military Deputy for Budget, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller)	Army	24	2.0	4
Chief, Army Reserve	Army			4*
Director, Army National Guard	Army			4
Commanding General, Eighth United States Army and Chief of Staff, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea	Army			3
Commanding General, I Corps and Fort Lewis	Army	30	2.5	3
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, United States Army	Army			3
Inspector General, Office of the Secretary of the Army	Army	31	2.6	3
Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Materiel Command	Army	9	0.8	2
Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg	Army	26	2.4	3
Commanding General, III Corps and Fort Hood	Army	31	2.6	2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Forces Command	Army			2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army	22	1.8	2
Commanding General, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army	Army	24	2.0	2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army	Army	23	1.9	2
Commanding General, United States Army Special Operations Command	Army	27	2.3	2
Director of the Army Staff	Army			2
Director, Futures Center, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army			2
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, United States Army	Army	18	1.5	2

# Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Chief, National Guard Bureau	Army/AF			4
Commander, Marine Forces Reserve	Marine Corps	21	1.7	4
Deputy Commandant, for Programs and Resources, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	27	2.2	4
Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps				4
Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Pacific; Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific; and Commander, Marine Corps Bases Pacific	Marine Corps	21	1.7	3
Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Atlantic; Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic; Commander, United States Marine Corps Bases Atlantic; Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Europe; and Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces, Southern Command	Marine Corps	26	2.1	3
Deputy Commandant, for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	32	2.7	3
Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command	Marine Corps	21	1.8	3
Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	19	1.6	2
Deputy Commandant for Aviation, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	27	2.3	2
Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force	Marine Corps	21	1.7	2
Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force/Commanding General, Striking Force Atlantic	Marine Corps	19	1.6	2
Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force; Commander, Marine Corps Bases, Japan; and Commander, Marine Forces Japan	Marine Corps	18	1.5	2
Superintendent, United States Naval Academy	Navy	39	3.3	5
Commander, Naval Air Systems Command	Navy	40	3.3	4
Commander, Naval Network Warfare Command	Navy			4
Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command	Navy	41	3.4	4
Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and Surgeon General	Navy			4
Chief of Naval Reserve	Navy	43	3.5	4*
Commander, Military Sealift Command	Navy	25	2.1	3
Commander, Naval Air Force, United States Atlantic Fleet	Navy	29	2.4	3
Commander Naval Air Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	31	2.6	3
Commander, Naval Education and Training Command	Navy			3
Inspector General, Department of the Navy	Navy	32	2.7	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Atlantic Fleet	Navy	38	3.2	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	30	2.5	3
President, Naval War College	Navy	43	3.6	3
Director for Material Readiness and Logistics, N4, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	32	2.7	3
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower and Personnel, N1, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief, Naval Personnel	Navy	32	2.7	3
Director of Naval Intelligence, N2	Navy			3
Commander Submarine Force, United States Atlantic Fleet and Commander, Submarine Allied Command, Atlantic	Navy	31	2.6	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	28	2.3	3
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations, N3/N5, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	17	1.4	2
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Requirements and Assessments, N8, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	23	1.9	2
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs, N6/N7, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (pending)	Navy	23	1.9	2
Director, Navy Staff, N09B, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	19	1.6	2
Commander, SECOND Fleet	Navy	22	1.8	2
Commander, SEVENTH Fleet	Navy	23	1.9	2
Commander, SIXTH Fleet and Commander, Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe	Navy	20	1.6	2
Commander, THIRD Fleet	Navy	28	2.4	2
Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, United States Atlantic Fleet/Fleet Forces Command	Navy	15	1.3	2
Commander, United States Naval Forces, Central Command and Commander, FIFTH Fleet	Navy			2

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\*Statutory Tour Length

9/21/04

FOUO

SEP 20 2004

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Two Major Initiatives

*Handwritten notes on right margin*

I plan to put forth a major initiative with respect to longer tours for people and, for those that are successful, somewhat longer service.

I **am** also going to put forth a major initiative for Standing Joint Headquarters, so that when we have to fight a next war, we will have the headquarters set up, and won't end **up** with the headquarters half-filled when the war is over. I have been pushing this for three years, but the resistance is powerful.

*210 (344)*

We need to get both of them done. Please get back to me with proposals.

Thanks.

Attach.  
CJTF-7 Joint Manning Timeline (2 pages)

DHR:ss  
091304-25

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

*Joseph*

FOUO

# Proposed Tour Lengths--O-10 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Commander, US Central Command	Joint/External	36	3.0	4
Commander, US European Command	Joint/External	37	3.1	4
Commander, US European Command	Joint/External	32	2.7	4
Commander, US Joint Forces Command	Joint/External	29	2.4	4
Commander, US Northern Command	Joint/External			4
Commander, US Pacific Command	Joint/External	33	2.8	4
Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/Commander, United States Forces Korea	Joint/External	36	3.0	4
Commander, US Southern Command	Joint/External	20	1.7	4
Commander, US Special Operations Command	Joint/External	34	2.8	4
Commander, US Strategic Command	Joint/External	28	2.4	4
Commander, US Transportation Command	Joint/External	33	2.7	4
Chairman of the JCS	Joint/External	48	4.0	2*
Vice Chairman of the JCS	Joint/External	35	2.9	2*
Chief of Staff, USAF	Air Force	36	3.0	4*
Commander, Air Combat Command	Air Force	25	2.1	4
Commander, Air Education and Training Command	Air Force	27	2.2	4
Commander, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	34	2.8	4
Commander, Air Force Space Command	Air Force	26	2.2	4
Commander, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	24	2.0	4
Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	24	2.0	4
Vice Chief of Staff, USAF	Air Force	25	2.1	3
Commanding General, US Army Materiel Command	Army	30	2.5	4
Commanding General, US Army Forces Command	Army	18	1.5	4
Commanding General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army	36	3.0	4
Chief of Staff, USA	Army	49	4.1	4
Commanding General, USA Europe and Seventh Army	Army	31	2.6	3
Vice Chief of Staff, USA	Army	20	1.7	3
Commandant of the Marine Corps	Marine Corps	48	4.0	4
Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps	Marine Corps	25	2.0	3
Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (SEA-08)	Navy	72	6.0	8*
Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	42	3.5	4*
Commander, US Atlantic Fleet	Navy	25	2.1	4
Commander, US Naval Forces, Europe	Navy	30	2.5	4
Commander, US Pacific Fleet	Navy	30	2.5	4
Vice Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	22	1.8	3

\*Statutory Tour Length

11-L-0559/OSD/44541



# Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Chief, National Guard Bureau	Army/AF			4
Commander, Marine Forces Reserve	Marine Corps	21	1.7	4
Deputy Commandant, for Programs and Resources, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	27	2.2	4
Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	24	2.0	4
Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Pacific; Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific; and Commander, Marine Corps Bases Pacific	Marine Corps	21	1.7	3
Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Atlantic; Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic; Commander, United States Marine Corps Bases-Atlantic; Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Europe; and Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces, Southern Command	Marine Corps	26	2.1	3
Deputy Commandant, for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	32	2.7	3
Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command	Marine Corps	21	1.8	3
Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	19	1.6	2
Deputy Commandant for Aviation, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	27	2.3	2
Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force	Marine Corps	21	1.7	2
Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force/Commanding General, Striking Force Atlantic	Marine Corps	19	1.6	2
Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force; Commander, Marine Corps Bases, Japan; and Commander, Marine Forces Japan	Marine Corps	18	1.5	2
Superintendent, United States Naval Academy	Navy	39	3.3	5
Commander, Naval Air Systems Command	Navy	40	3.3	4
Commander, Naval Network Warfare Command	Navy			4
Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command	Navy	41	3.4	4
Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and Surgeon General	Navy			4
Chief of Naval Reserve	Navy	43	3.5	4*
Commander, Military Sealift Command	Navy	25	2.1	3
Commander, Naval Air Force, United States Atlantic Fleet	Navy	29	2.4	3
Commander Naval Air Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	31	2.6	3
Commander, Naval Education and Training Command	Navy			3
Inspector General, Department of the Navy	Navy	32	2.7	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Atlantic Fleet	Navy	38	3.2	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	30	2.5	3
President, Naval War College	Navy	43	3.6	3
Director for Material Readiness and Logistics, N4, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	32	2.7	3
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower and Personnel, N1, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief, Naval Personnel	Navy	32	2.7	3
Director of Naval Intelligence, N2	Navy			3
Commander Submarine Force, United States Atlantic Fleet and Commander, Submarine Allied Command, Atlantic	Navy	31	2.6	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	28	2.3	3
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations, N3/N5, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	17	1.4	2
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Requirements and Assessments, N8, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	23	1.9	2
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs, N6/N7, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (pending)	Navy	23	1.9	2
Director, Navy Staff, N09B, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	19	1.6	2
Commander, SECOND Fleet	Navy	22	1.8	2
Commander, SEVENTH Fleet	Navy	23	1.9	2
Commander, SIXTH Fleet and Commander, Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe	Navy	20	1.6	2
Commander, THIRD Fleet	Navy	28	2.4	2
Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, United States Atlantic Fleet/Fleet Forces Command	Navy	15	1.3	2
Commander, United States Naval Forces, Central Command and Commander, FIFTH Fleet	Navy			



# Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Director, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment, J-8, Joint Staff	Join/External	21	1.8	4
DUSD for Military Personnel Policy	Join/External	22	1.8	3
Principal Deputy Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense	Join/External			4
Director, Missile Defense Agency	Join/External	14	1.2	4
Director, Defense Information System Agency and Manager, National Communications Systems	Join/External	31	2.6	4
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency	Join/External	32	2.7	4
Director, Defense Logistics Agency	Join/External	36	3.0	4
Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency	Join/External	40	3.3	4
Director, National Imagery and Mapping Agency	Join/External	28	2.4	4
Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service	Join/External	42	3.5	4
Chief of Staff, United States European Command	Join/External	29	2.5	4
Director for Logistics, J-4, Joint Staff	Join/External	29	2.4	3
Director of Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems, J-6, Joint Staff	Join/External	23	1.9	3
United States Military Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee	Join/External	33	2.8	3
Deputy Chairman, NATO Military Committee	Join/External	33	2.8	3
President, National Defense University	Join/External	34	2.8	3
Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support, Central Intelligence Agency	Join/External			3
Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	Join/External	19	1.6	2
Director, Joint Staff	Join/External	16	1.3	2
Director for Operations, J-3, Joint Staff	Join/External	22	1.8	2
Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5, Joint Staff	Join/External	20	1.7	2
Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff, United States Central Command	Join/External	18	1.5	2
Deputy Commander, United States Joint Forces Command	Join/External	20	1.7	2
Deputy Commander, United States Northern Command/Vice Commander, United States Element, North American Aerospace Defense Command	Join/External			2
Deputy Commander, United States Pacific Command	Join/External	14	1.2	2
Deputy Commander, United States Special Operations Command	Join/External	15	1.3	2
Deputy Commander, United States Strategic Command	Join/External	19	1.6	2
Deputy Commander, United States Transportation Command	Join/External	27	2.2	2
Cdr, JSRC Center [Cdr, Land North]	Join/External	18	1.5	2
Deputy Commander, Joint Sub Regional Command Center, Allied Command Europe [Dep Cdr, Land North]	Join/External	37	3.1	2
Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense	Join/External			2
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Deputy National Security Advisor	Join/External			2
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Intelligence and Warfighting Support	Join/External			2
Superintendent, United States Air Force Academy	Air Force	40	3.3	5
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	31	2.6	4
Deputy Chief of Staff, Installations and Logistics, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	21	1.8	4
Surgeon General of the Air Force	Air Force			4
Chief of Air Force Reserve and Commander, Air Force Reserve Command	Air Force			4
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Department of the Air Force	Air Force			4
Director, Air National Guard	Air Force	63	5.3	4
Commander, Air University	Air Force	33	2.8	4
The Inspector General of the Air Force, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force	Air Force	26	2.2	3
Vice Commander, Air Education and Training Command	Air Force	36	3.0	3
Vice Commander, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	20	1.7	3
Commander, Aeronautical Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	26	2.2	3
Commander, Electronic Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	48	4.0	3
Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command	Air Force	24	2.0	3
Commander, Space and Missile Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	47	3.9	3
Commander, Eighteenth Air Force, Air Mobility Command	Air Force			3
Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command	Air Force	30	2.5	3
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force	Air Force			2
Deputy Chief of Staff, Warfighting Integration, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force			2

# Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	16	1.4	2
Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	15	1.3	2
Vice Commander, Air Combat Command	Air Force	16	1.3	2
Commander, Eighth Air Force, Air Combat Command	Air Force	29	2.4	2
Commander, Ninth Air Force, Air Combat Command and Commander, United States Southern Command Air Forces	Air Force	18	1.5	2
Vice Commander, Air Mobility Command	Air Force	18	1.5	2
Vice Commander, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	21	1.8	2
Commander, United States Forces Japan and Commander, Fifth Air Force, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	28	2.3	2
Deputy Commander In Chief, United Nations Command Korea; Deputy Commander, United States Forces Korea; Commander, Air Component Command, Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command; and Commander, Seventh Air Force, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	27	2.3	2
Commander, Alaskan Command, United States Pacific Command, Commander Eleventh Air Force, Pacific Air Forces; and Commander, Alaskan North American Defense Region	Air Force	24	2.0	2
Vice Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	25	2.1	2
Commander, Allied Air Forces South and Commander, Sixteenth Air Force, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	23	1.9	2
Superintendent, United States Military Academy	Army	60	5.0	5
Chief of Engineers/Commanding General, United States Army Corps of Engineers	Army			4
Commanding General, Third United States Army/Commander, United States Army Forces Central Command	Army	34	2.8	4
Commanding General, First United States Army	Army	27	2.2	4
Commanding General, Fifth United States Army	Army	26	2.2	4
Commanding General, United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command	Army	47	3.9	4
Commanding General, United States Army Combined Arms Center	Army	27	2.3	4
Deputy Commanding General, for Initial Entry Training/Commanding General, United States Army Accessions Command, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army			4
Commanding General, United States Army Medical Command/The Surgeon General, United States Army	Army			4
Commanding General, United States Army Pacific	Army	28	2.4	4
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, United States Army	Army	25	2.1	4
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, United States Army	Army			4
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, United States Army	Army			4
Military Deputy/Director, Army Acquisition Corps, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)	Army			4
Chief Information Officer/Deputy Chief of Staff, G6, United States Army	Army			4
Military Deputy for Budget, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller)	Army	24	2.0	4
Chief, Army Reserve	Army			4*
Director, Army National Guard	Army			4
Commanding General, Eighth United States Army and Chief of Staff, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea	Army			3
Commanding General, I Corps and Fort Lewis	Army	30	2.5	3
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, United States Army	Army			3
Inspector General, Office of the Secretary of the Army	Army	31	2.6	3
Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Materiel Command	Army	9	0.8	2
Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg	Army	28	2.4	3
Commanding General, III Corps and Fort Hood	Army	31	2.6	2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Forces Command	Army			2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army	22	1.8	2
Commanding General, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army	Army	24	2.0	2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army	Army	23	1.9	2
Commanding General, United States Army Special Operations Command	Army	27	2.3	2
Director of the Army Staff	Army			2
Director, Futures Center, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army			2
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, United States Army	Army	18	1.5	2

June 22, 2004

TO: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: AUSMIN

*Done - 6/23*

*Australia*

Please tell me what time the Australian Ministerial meetings are on July 7.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
062204-4

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*To SecDef*

*Attached is a draft itinerary I received from. I'm told Australians appreciated opportunity to host a dinner but declined and are happy with ending the Ministerial quickly.*

*Paul*

**Paul Butler**  
*6/22*

*gajunoy*

**OSD 15890-04**

*TN 6/23*

6/22  
143

Rev 3: 6/18/04 8:20 AM

**DRAFT Agenda  
AUSTRALIA-U.S. MINISTERIAL MEETING  
JULY 7, 2004  
WASHINGTON, D.C.**

**Wednesday, July 7, 2004**

**Session I: War on Terrorism (0900-1045)**

- Welcoming Remarks (Secretary Powell) 0900-0905
- Iraq (U.S. lead) 0905-0940
- CT Cooperation in Southeast Asia (Australia lead) 0940-1005
- Nonproliferation 1005-1045
  - Proliferation Security Initiative (Australia lead)
  - President's NP initiatives (Global Partnership) (U.S. lead)
  - Iran/IAEA (U.S. lead)

**Break (1045-1055)**

**Session II: North Asia (1100-1145)**

- China-Taiwan (Australia lead) 1100-1120
- Korean Peninsula (U.S. lead) 1120-1145

**Working Lunch (1145-1315)**

- Indonesia (Australia lead) 1215-1230
- Southeast Asia Security
  - Regional Maritime Security Initiative (U.S. lead) 1230-1245
  - Five Power Defense Arrangement (Australia lead) 1245-1300
- Other topic(s), as desired 1300-1315

**Session III: Bilateral/Alliance Issues (1320-1500)**

- Global Posture Review (U.S. lead) 1320-1340
  - Joint Combined Training Center
  - Special Forces
  - Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR)/C4
  
- Interoperability Study, Phase II (Australia lead) 1340-1400
  - Combined Review and Implementation
  - Releasability and Disclosure Issues
  
- Defense Materiel Issues (Australia lead) 1400-1440
  - Joint Strike Fighter update
  - Aegis system
  - ITAR Exemption
  - Trade and Buy America
  
- Missile Defense (U.S. lead) 1440-1500

**Signing Ceremony (1515-1525)**


- Missile Defense Framework MOU signing ceremony
- Statement of Interoperability signing

**Joint press availability (1530-1600)**

FOUO

SECURITY INFORMATION  
721 OCT 13 AM 10:24

OCT 06 2004

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Recruiting

How are you going to **fix** this problem where you have uneven performance by different states that shows we end up with weak recruiting?

Thanks.

Attach.  
USD(P+E) Memo to SecDef 9/20/04  
DHR:ss  
100504-9

.....  
\_\_\_\_\_

~~FOUO~~

OSD 15894-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44548



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

10 OCT 2004 10:00 AM

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

October 13, 2004 – 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*  
*13 Oct 04*

SUBJECT: Uneven Guard Recruiting — SNOWFLAKES

- You asked how we might deal with uneven state recruiting performance for the National Guard, to preclude adverse effects on our overall national capability (Tab A).
- The overall objective, of course, is to meet strength goals. A state with weak recruiting could still meet its goal through improved retention.
- For that reason, we will focus on jurisdictions with persistent shortfalls in end strength. Preliminary analysis produces nine candidates: Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maryland, Virginia, and Virgin Islands.
- I have asked that a plan be developed by Thanksgiving that would give us a “way ahead” on reductions in states with both weak recruiting and persistent end-strength shortfalls. Our goal would be to start making adjustments early in the new year. We will work with Ray DuBois on any BRAC implications (Tab B).
- This is also an opportunity to rebalance, by taking reductions in areas where we have generous capacity, and adding units in skills that are in short supply.

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock, (b)(6)

cc: Mr. DuBois



OSD 15894-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44549

**TAB**

**A**



FOUO

SECURITY INFORMATION  
2004 OCT 13 AM 10:24

OCT 06 2004

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Recruiting

How are you going to **fix** this problem where you have uneven performance by different states that shows we end **up** with weak recruiting?

Thanks.

Attach.  
USD (P&R) Memo to SecDef 9/20/04  
DHR:SS  
100504-9

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

FOUO

OSD 15894-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44551



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

SECRET

2004 SEP 28 PM 6:14

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

September 28, 2004 - 5:00 PM

Paul Butler

9/29 fwb

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

*[Handwritten signature]*

SUBJECT: Current Recruiting and Retention Results

- Active recruiting continues to meet quality and quantity goals (Tab A). But the Army FY 2005 Delayed Entry Program ("reservations") is about half the preferred size. The Army is deploying additional recruiters and using existing bonus authority more aggressively. We will know in about two months if these steps are sufficient to sustain needed results. In the meantime we are looking at expanding other programs (e.g., Blue to Green).
- Reserve recruiting is satisfactory except for the Army National Guard (Tab B). Indeed, the Air National Guard had a banner month in August (130% of goal) and may therefore make its number for the full year. The Army National Guard will fall short about 5,000. We will be focusing on state by state results, and accelerating restructuring from states with weak recruiting to those with stronger recruiting, among other actions.
- Active retention: Navy and Air Force retention rates reflect force shaping initiatives aimed at balancing manpower skills and assisting with force reduction. All active components continued to experience retention success through August of FY04 (Tab C).
- Reserve attrition continues to be favorable (Tab D). Survey results predict worse attrition in the future, but it has not yet occurred. New bonus authority in the House version of the authorization bill would help significantly.



RECOMMENDATION: INFORMATION ONLY

Attachments :  
As stated

TSA SD	9/29
SRMA SD	
MA SD	8/25 7/25
EXEC SEC	8 9/29

Prepared by: CAPT Wellock (b)(6)



OSD 14845 - 04

11-L-0559/OSD/44552


**TAB**

**B**

FOUO

10/6/04 16#  
NDP

OCT 06 2004

TO: Les Brownlee  
David Chu  
CC: Ray DuBois  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Adjusting of Guard and Reserve Units

Please be sure to talk to Ray DuBois about how you plan to adjust the Guard and Reserve Units to fit recruiting and how that might link to BRAC.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
100504-19

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/44554

29  
June 24, 2004

DAONAVY

TO: Gordon England  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: H.T. Johnson

OK

Thanks for your note about H.T. Johnson. I understand Mike Wynne is talking with him about how we might keep him engaged.

Thanks.

Attach.  
6/23/04 SecNav memo to SecDef  
6/22/04 ASecNav(I&E) ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
062404-5

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 15897-04

29JUN04

1/23  
1615

June 23, 2004

To: SECDEF  
Fr: Gordon England  
Re: HT Johnson

Mr. Secretary,


Attached is a letter of resignation for Mr. HT Johnson, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for I&E. HT has been planning to resign for some time, but he is more than willing to forego other opportunities and serve in a non-PAS but leadership position to manage the DoD BRAC process. As you may be aware, HT Johnson is a retired **four-star** Air Force general and served on the 1993 BRAC Commission. He is quite likely the most capable person in the DoD to run the BRAC.

In my judgment, BRAC is somewhat like the National Security Personnel System, meaning it is at least as complex as designing an aircraft carrier, but with much greater implications for the Department. I strongly urge your personal consideration to have HT Johnson perform this responsibility for you. Timing is important as HT will be leaving on July 16 unless a BRAC leadership role is available.

Thanks.

Gordon 

Eric.



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT  
1000 NAVY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

June 22, 2004

Memorandum Thru the Secretary of the Navy, 1000 Navy Pentagon,  
Washington DC 20350

For the Secretary of Defense, 1000 Defense Pentagon, Washington DC  
20310

Subject: ~~Letter~~ of Resignation

I have thoroughly enjoyed working for you and Secretary England but it is time for me to move on to other endeavors. Consequently, I am forwarding this copy of my resignation to the President. It has been a distinct pleasure and an honor to serve as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Environment). The experience has had a profound and lasting effect on me.

I have the utmost respect and admiration for the noble men and women who serve this great Nation. It has been a privilege to serve you, the Administration, and the Nation.

*Hansford T. Johnson*  
Hansford T. Johnson

11-L-0559/OSD/44557

7/13/04

720

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

June 24, 2004

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Questionnaire

Let's make sure with Senator Warner that if we do send up Fran Harvey for Army, and switch him out of the communications job, that they won't require a new questionnaire that he will have to fill out. Please see if that is the case, on a confidential basis.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
062404-11

.....  
Please respond by 6/30/04

ExecSec

R & N  
close out snowflake.

230.02

24 Jun 04

OSD 15898-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/44558





LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

July 2, 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
For Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Powell A. Moore".

Subject: Response to Snowflake regarding Questionnaire

- Fran Harvey will be allowed to submit the questionnaire that he submitted last November, unless there have been changes and these changes should be included in the resubmitted questionnaire. Moreover, there undoubtedly is a new tax return for calendar year 2003 for which the Committee will ask.
- Concerning the advance policy questions, the advance policy questions for the position of Secretary of the Army will be different than ones for the Assistant Secretary of Information and Network Integration. New responses will be requested.

Attachment:  
SECDEF Snowflake 062404-11

11-L-0559/OSD/44559

6/26/04

June 26, 2004

334250

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. Pete Pace  
Doug Feith  
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: PCs and NSCs on Iraq

We regularly have PCs and NSCs on Iraq, where the Pentagon always briefs. There is a great deal more going on in Iraq beyond security, including governance, essential services, the economy, the diplomatic side of keeping our coalition partners in the game, getting additional partners, solving the MEK issue, progress in developing the ministries, plans for the elections, solving the Kurd displacement issues, etc.

We ought to suggest to the NSC when they try to schedule Iraq briefings with DoD briefing that other departments should put together briefings on other subjects of interest. We need to make it clear that Iraq is not simply a security issue.

Thanks.

D:\R\da  
062504-1 (is computer).doc

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

6/28/04 *Del 7/1*

~~FOUO~~ *SD*  
I've had better luck pushing for such non-DoD briefings at DC meetings than at PC or NSC meetings. I'll continue to work this with Hadley.

*Doug Feith*  
OSD 15899-04

26JUN04

no

file

June 29, 2004

I-04/008917  
ES-0006

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT ASEAN

The intel suggests we ought to strengthen our relationships with the ASEAN countries.

Please give me a list of them, and tell me what we are doing with them and what we might do in addition.

Thanks.

DHR: dh  
062904-1 (ts computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 7/12/04

J 8/30  
DA 8/30

Sir,  
Response attached.  
v/r,  
Lt Col Lemmyel 8/30

OSD 15900-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44561

09  
W

29 Jun 04

AUG 24 2004 8/30

DepSecDef  
USD(P) *fa*  
I# 04/008817-ES  
ES-0006 *8/27*

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
(Mr. Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6)) *26 AUG 2004*

SUBJECT: Snowflake Regarding Strengthening Relations with ASEAN (U)

- (U) You asked what are we doing with the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and what more we might do.

**Background:**

- ASEAN was established in 1967.
- Its founding members: Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia.
- Brunei joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995.
- Laos and Burma joined in 1997. Cambodia became a member in 1999.

**US Relations with ASEAN Core Countries:**

- (U) **Thailand:** Thailand, a treaty ally, has deployed troops to OEF and OIF. Thailand is considering leaving a "remnant" of its troops behind when their second deployment to OIF ends in September. State and DoD are looking for ways to support this through the use of FMF to underwrite the upgrading of Thai peacekeeping training facilities.
- (U) **The Philippines:** We are re-assessing defense relations with the Philippines in the wake of Manila's decision to withdraw its troops from Iraq. *YOU'VE BEEN FORWARDED A SEPARATE MEMO ON THIS SUBJECT.*
- (U) **Singapore:** A crucial friend that has provided critical facility access. We are developing a bilateral Strategic Framework Agreement.
- (U) **Malaysia:** Under PM Abdullah Badawi, who succeeded Mahatir in late 2003, bilateral relations have improved. We should keep defense relations professional and low key ~~is~~ and support Malaysian efforts to promote moderate Islam.
- (U) **Indonesia:** Recent cooperation with the FBI investigations of the Timika murders opens the possibility of expanding mil-mil ties with Indonesia.

### US Relations with "New" ASEAN Members:

- (U) **New Members** - Burma, Laos, and Cambodia joined ASEAN largely as the result of Malaysia's desire to include all the Southeast Asian countries (including Burma) in the Association in time for the 50<sup>th</sup> founding anniversary.
- (U) **Vietnam:** Bilateral defense relations are improving. A second USN ship visit was conducted in July/August 2004.
- (U) **Cambodia:** After consulting select lawmakers and Hill staffers, we are prepared to recommend restoring low-level military-to-military activity focused on counterterrorism assistance.
- (U) **Laos:** U.S.-Lao relations have improved. Laos signed an Article 98 Agreement in December 2003, continues to cooperate in POW/MIA operations, poppy eradication and controlling amphetamine production, and has assisted with regional CT efforts and acceded to some CT conventions.
- (U) **Burma:** U.S. relations with Burma remain tense in the wake of Burma's refusal to release Aung San Suu Kyi and recognize the 1990 election results. Burma is slated to take the ASEAN Chairmanship in 2006, a potential embarrassment for ASEAN. The U.S. should continue to work with ASEAN to bring pressure on Burma.

### What More Can Be Done:

- (U) With the "core" countries, we are seeking expanded training opportunities, consolidating access arrangements, and sustaining and expanding commitments to supporting OIF.
  - In the case of the Philippines, we are reevaluating our military relationship in the wake of the Philippines withdrawal from Iraq. We will have a "way ahead" paper to you shortly. *(Sent August 27, 2004)*
- (U) With "new" members, the potential for expanding defense relations is limited either by the nature of the regime (e.g., Burma) or by the limited potential for meaningful defense relations (e.g., Laos).
- (U) The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a security forum established under ASEAN in 1996, has also recently established an annual Security Policy Conference for Vice Minister-level defense officials.
  - The U.S. is a full member of the ARF. OSD should plan to play an active and ongoing role in this new conference, including sending a senior OSD official to the inaugural Security Policy Conference in Beijing in October.

REVIEWED BY:

PD, ISA/AP A 16 Det

DUSD/AP A 16 RPL 16 Det

PDASD/ISA [Signature]

COPY TO:

Joint Staff J-5 APAC

7/2  
11:30

June 30, 2004

Paul Butler "See Det"  
↗

PWB

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: Congressman Hunter's Legislation

Please make sure we get a copy of Duncan Hunter's legislation on being able to acquire materials fast. Apparently it passed the House.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
063004-7

.....

Please respond by 7/2/04

DA 7/8

Sir,  
Response attached.  
W/CDR Wosenzo  
7/7

C7/7

400.13

3030000

7/2  
1430

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

8/12/04



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

July 2, 2004 11:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

Subject: Response to SECDEF Snowflake regarding Congressman Hunter's Legislation,  
# 063004-7

- Attached is H.R. 4323, an Act to amend title 10, United States Code, to provide rapid acquisition authority to the Secretary of Defense to respond to combat emergencies.
  - The House passed it on June 14, 2004.
- 400, 3

Attachments:  
SECDEF Snowflake  
H.R. 4323

11-L-0559/OSD/44566

274 3



108th CONGRESS

2d Session

**H. R. 4323**

**AN ACT**

To amend title 10, United States Code, to provide rapid acquisition authority to the Secretary of Defense to respond to combat emergencies.

HR 4323 EH

108th CONGRESS

2d Session

**H. R. 4323**

---

**AN ACT**

To amend title 10, United States Code, to provide rapid acquisition authority to the Secretary of Defense to respond to combat emergencies.

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

**SECTION 1. RAPID ACQUISITION AUTHORITY TO RESPOND TO COMBAT EMERGENCIES.**

(a) IN GENERAL- Chapter 141 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

**Sec. 2410p. Rapid acquisition authority to respond to combat emergencies**

(a) **RAPID ACQUISITION AUTHORITY-** The Secretary of Defense may rapidly acquire, in accordance with this section, equipment needed by a combatant commander to eliminate a combat capability deficiency that has resulted in combat fatalities.

(b) **PROCESS FOR RAPID ACQUISITION-** Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of Defense shall develop a process for the rapid acquisition authority provided by subsection (a) and submit to Congress a detailed explanation of the process, including procedures to be followed in carrying out the process. The process shall provide for the following:

(1) A requirement that the process may be used only to acquire the minimum amount of equipment needed until the needs of the combatant commander can be fulfilled under

existing acquisition statutes, policies, directives, and regulations.

'(2) A goal of awarding a contract for the equipment within 15 days after receipt of a request from a commander.

'(3) In a case in which the equipment cannot be acquired without an extensive delay, a requirement for an interim solution to minimize the combat capability deficiency and combat fatalities until the equipment can be acquired.

'(4) Waiver of the applicability of all policies, directives, and regulations related to--

'(A) the establishment of the requirement for the equipment;

'(B) the research, development, test, and evaluation of the equipment; and

'(C) the solicitation and selection of sources, and the award of the contract, for procurement of the equipment.

'(5) Such other procedures or requirements as the Secretary considers appropriate.

'(c) WAIVER OF CERTAIN STATUTES- For purposes of exercising the authority provided by subsection (a) with respect to equipment, laws relating to the following shall not apply:

'(A) The establishment of the requirement for the equipment.

'(B) The research, development, test, and evaluation of the equipment.

'(C) The solicitation and selection of sources, and the award of the contract, for procurement of the equipment.

'(d) LIMITATIONS- The rapid acquisition authority provided by subsection (a) may be used only--

'(1) after the Secretary of Defense, without delegation, determines in writing that there exists a combat capability deficiency that has resulted in combat fatalities; and

'(2) to acquire equipment in an amount aggregating not more than \$100,000,000 during a fiscal year.

'(e) SOURCE OF FUNDS- For acquisitions under this section to be made during any fiscal year, the Secretary may use any funds made available to the Department of Defense for that fiscal year.

'(f) NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS AFTER EACH USE OF AUTHORITY- The Secretary of Defense shall notify the congressional defense committees within 15 days after each use of the authority provided by subsection (a). Each such notice shall identify the equipment to be acquired, the amount to be expended for such acquisition, and the source of funds for such acquisition.

'(g) COMBATANT COMMANDER- In this section, the term 'combatant commander' means the commander of a unified combatant command with authority for the conduct of operations in a specific area of responsibility or who otherwise has authority to conduct operations at the

direction of the President or Secretary of Defense.'.

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT- The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

'241 Op. Rapid acquisition authority to respond to combat emergencies.'.

Passed the House of Representatives June 14, 2004.

Attest:

Clerk.

**END**

*file*

June 30, 2004

TO: Eric Ruff  
cc: Larry Di Rita  
Matt Latimer  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Roger Hedgecock Interview

*7/20*  
*good*

*Larry Di Rita*  
*7/20*

*done*

*000*

Please give me a copy of the transcript of my interview with the San Diego talk show host Roger Hedgecock on June 30, and also give it to Matt Latimer.

Matt - please take a look at the transcript of this interview, and see if you can polish it up so we can use some of that material. It felt pretty good.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
063004-8

.....  
Please respond by 7/4/04


*7/22*

*Sir,  
Reply attached.  
v/r  
Lt Col Lengyel  
7/20*

*000*

OSD 15905-04

Recd 7/22

FROM: Larry Di Rita   
TO: SecDef  
DATE: July 13, 2004  
SUBJECT: Roger Hedgecock Interview

You asked for a copy of the Hedgecock transcript. I am attaching one for your review. We also provided one for Mrs. Rumsfeld earlier.

We have provided the transcript to the writing team and Matt is using the the material as he develops future products for your use.



United States Department of Defense.

## News Transcript

On the web: <http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?>

<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040630-secdef0949.html>

Media contact: +1 (703) 697-5131

Public contact: <http://www.dod.mil/faq/comment.html> +1 (703) 428-0711

**Presenter:** Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

Wednesday, June 30, 2004

### Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with Roger Hedgecock, Newsradio 600 KOGO

Q: [In Progress]... he has been prominent in a number of private-sector firms and in a number of cabinet and congressional positions throughout his lengthy career, which began back in 1957. Secretary Rumsfeld, welcome to KOGO.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, thank you very much. Actually, my career began before 1957. I was a Navy pilot back in 1954. And even before that, I lived in Coronado, California, as a young man during World War II when my father was stationed out on an aircraft carrier.

Q: Well, there you go.

SEC. RUMSFELD: [Laughter]

Q: And you know, we love to hear that because there are obviously a lot of military people in San Diego and we have been through this station doing something called "Operation Homefront" mobilizing our listeners to help military families with, what, the broken transmission, the repair of the fence, whatever it is they need, during this time when their loved ones are deployed. So I want you to know that, that we're standing behind our military families.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, I read that you were doing that and I do congratulate you and thank you for it. It's a wonderful thing that you do. And goodness knows, the families serve and sacrifice just as the men and women in uniform do and we're grateful to all of them.

Q: You bet. Secretary Rumsfeld with us. Let me get down to business here. You just got back from this NATO meeting in Turkey and I guess it's unclear to me how much, if at all, can we depend on our NATO partners with respect to any aspect of the burden we're carrying in Iraq?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, we've got I think it's 32 countries currently helping us in Iraq and I think that of those, probably 16 or 17 are NATO countries. And any numbers of others are NATO Partnership for Peace countries -- countries that are loosely affiliated with NATO. So we're really getting a good deal of support from the NATO countries individually. NATO as an institution's role in Iraq, thus far, has been restricted to helping the Polish Ukraine division in force generation and support.

But at the conference in Istanbul that I just returned from last evening, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization agreed to take an additional step with respect to Iraq and that is to provide training and equipment assistance for the Iraqi security forces, which is a good thing. It's going to be a centralized activity supported by NATO countries to assist in training and equipping the Iraqis, so that they can take over responsibility for the security of their country.

Q: And those forces, we're reading a lot today, The Los Angeles times has a couple of articles about the people

11-L-0559/OSD/44572

in Iraq willing to sign up, even though they know it's a very dangerous duty to be policemen and in the new army to take this step toward freedom. Are they really up to the task? We found in Fallujah, unfortunately, what, a couple of months ago that some of those people were not ready and, in fact, joined the insurgents when push came to shove.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, what you have is as we went from zero to 226,000 Iraqis serving in various security forces today -- some in the army, some in the site protection force, some in the border patrol, still others working with the police and others in what's called the new Iraqi National Guard. It used to be called the Civil Defense Corps. When you go from zero to 226,000 in a year, obviously, you're going to have to do some vetting that requires you to make some changes. On the other hand, we've seen an uneven situation, but I would say overwhelmingly positive.

The police and the national guard and the site protection people received varying degrees of training. The army gets the most training and the best equipment, the other security forces get somewhat less training and less equipment. So if they're up against some well-armed terrorist that have rocket-propelled grenades and AK-47s and they have small weapons and side arms and pistols, obviously, they're going to get into a difficult dust-up. And you're correct, some of them have decided that the better part of valor is to move away and try it again another day. On the other hand, the idea that has been left by some that these forces just run and hide in their barracks is just flat untrue. More than 400 of them have been killed already, so they're not sitting around with their fingers in their ear, they're out there on the front line helping to provide security for the people of Iraq and God bless them for it.

And you're quite right, not only is it a dangerous business, but these folks are standing in line to be recruited to go in all of those security services and that's a wonderful thing because they're betting on the future of their country.

Q: Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld with us. Let's talk about the size of the armed forces -- big issue here in San Diego, as I mentioned with the big military contingent in our community. We've got a situation where some of these folks have been held beyond their enlistment terms. The Reserves, of course, have been called up sometimes repeatedly. Private security people and other support contracts replacing what used to be duty done by armed forces personnel and now we've got headlines today on the recall of the Ready Reserves. You were once in the Ready Reserves; you know what that's about. Have the armed forces of the United States got enough people to do the tasks required?

SEC. RUMSFELD: We have in the active force about 1.4 million people. And in the Guard and the Reserve and if you include the Individual Ready Reserve, the people who are not training in ready units, we go up to somewhere over 2.3 million people. At the present time, we have about 200,000 in the Central Command's area of responsibility.

Now think of that. The force is stressed and we're only sustaining 200,000-plus in the Central Command region out of a total of 2 million. So the question is, well, why is that. Why is it stressful if you're sustaining a relatively small force percentage-wise and yet you find it's difficult? Well, one of the folks here, General Schoemaker, puts it this way. He says, think of rain barrel. And you've got a rain barrel filled with water. And you turn the spigot on and you can only access 10 percent of it because the spigot's up at the top of the rain barrel. See, you're only accessing a very small portion of that water.

Now the choice you have is to get a bigger barrel -- increase the size of the armed forces in this case -- or move the spigot down and figure out ways that you can have access to more of those people. And that's what we're doing. We're in the process of doing just that. We've got probably 300,000 military people who are engaged in tasks that could every bit as easily be conducted by civilians. We don't use contractors as skillfully and successfully as we probably could. We have a number of Reserve and Guard people who have either never been called up or have been called up very rarely over their entire careers. While at the same time, we have guard people that have been called up too frequently because they happen to be in a skill set that the United States, for whatever reason, didn't have on active duty.

11-L-0559/OSD/44573



So what we need to do is to manage the force smarter. We need to rebalance the reserve components – the guard and reserves -- with the active force, so that we have the right people on active duty and the right skill sets there. We need to make better use of civilians – both contractors and civilian employees – and stop over-using uniform personnel in things they need not do. And my estimate is that if we do that skillfully, we'll find that we're probably sized about right, although we do need to increase the force, when we have a crisis like we have with respect to a war in Afghanistan after September 11<sup>th</sup> or a conflict in Iraq. But we can do that. We have emergency powers and we've increased the – for example -- the army by something like 25[000] or 30,000 people over the last 2.5 years.

Q: Under any circumstances, Mr. Secretary, would a draft be necessary in the future, as you contemplate it?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, I can't imagine it. I just can't imagine it. There are people who can argue that a draft is a good thing because it gives everyone a chance to serve and understand the military and national service. Although it really never did, it never drafted women, only men, and it exempted people who were in school and people who were married and people who were teaching and a whole lot of exemptions they had. But in terms of the need of the services, goodness no, we're perfectly capable of increasing the incentives and the inducements to attract people into the armed services.

As a matter of fact, despite all the talk about the stress on the force, today we still are having very good results with respect to recruiting and retention. And we do not have a problem of attracting and retaining the people we need in the military. And if we ever did get to that point we should, in my view, do exactly what you do in the private sector and that's increase the pay and increase the incentives and the inducements, so that you can have the kind of skills and the numbers of people you need to help defend our country. We're very fortunate to have so many people raise their hand and say, "I want to volunteer to go in the United States Armed Forces," and they say, "send me" and God bless them for it.

Q: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. In a related issue, and it's a big issue here in San Diego particularly in terms of supplying the military, Congress appropriates this money and then the Pentagon through all these mysterious ways, finally gets around to buying the stuff that soldiers need. And there's been a lot of controversy about whether the soldiers out there – Marines and the soldiers – are getting the body armor, the armored Humvees, all that. And Duncan Hunter, a congressman from this area, that's a chair of the Armed Services Committee in the House, has legislation that he calls "the rapid acquisition authority" because he's so frustrated with the time it takes, the lag time between the money getting appropriated and the stuff actually getting out to the soldiers and Marines. Do you support that kind of legislation, that approach?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I have not had a chance to read that precise proposal, but Duncan Hunter, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, of course, is a very strong supporter, a stalwart supporter of the men and women in uniform and he's a former service man himself. And he has paid a great deal of attention on the subject of shortages in areas that needed to be adjusted, for example, like body armor and up-armored Humvees.

There's been a little bit of misunderstanding about the body armor. There always has been ample amounts of body armor. But from time to time, people developed new techniques and new materials that can, in fact, provide additional capabilities. And so what they developed were some inserts that would go into the body armor that the service people had. And the manufacturer of that had to ramp up and produce it. But of course, it was new. It was brand-new stuff. And as a result, there were some people out there who did not have it in the early period and they ended up having to use people who were out in the spear point of the war getting the early portions -- the early deliveries -- of these inserts for their body armor. And people who were in the rear areas did not have it. Then what happened was during the course of the war, it turned out that the rear areas were vulnerable to attacks. Convoys and combat support people were vulnerable to attacks as well. And so it's been a task of seeing that it can get out there as fast as it possibly can.

11-L-0559/OSD/44574



The Humvees, of course, also were designed to have a certain ability to resist various types of attacks. When you then decide that you want to increase that capability by adding armor to an existing Humvee's protection capability, then you have to manufacture it and you have to attach it and see that it's there. The reality is that even a tank can be destroyed, and you've seen pictures of tanks and they're fully armored, not just up-armored Humvees, but they're fully armored.

Q: Well, this issue was taken up in the opinion journal in The Wall Street Journal opinion page by Brendan Minter on Tuesday on this issue of the Hunter legislation. It passed the House. And the interesting thing was that Mrs. Pelosi abstained after criticizing this very thing, the administration not getting necessary equipment to the troops. She abstained on this bill. But it did pass 285-97 and goes over to the Senate. So I think on behalf of Mr. Hunter, although I haven't talked to him, but this rapid acquisition authority addresses an issue of bureaucratic lag time that simply is not up to -- in the minds of many people -- the need. Do you agree with that?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Oh, I do. I think basically what we have is we've had over our history since World War II basically an idea that we were either in war or we were in peace and that we were in peacetime constraints. And of course, since we don't have a declaration of war and we're not in World War III, all of those peacetime constraints and procedures and auditors and contract rules and competitive bidding, all of that pertains. And the effect of it is that you end up in a war on terror, like we're in, losing lives and yet you are still required to adhere to the rules of peacetime, because we don't have gradations of between war and peace and therefore we need to find a way to live in this 21<sup>st</sup> century where threats can come at you from the shadows and from ungoverned areas in ways that are not predictable, as they were, for example, during World War II or during the Cold War, for that matter.

Q: Secretary Don Rumsfeld, the secretary of defense. A couple of other issues I want to get to were weapons of mass destruction and the Supreme Court rulings. And so quickly, on the weapons of mass destruction, obviously, the opposition to the administration says we should never have invaded. The Bush administration lied about the WMD, never found any, never were any, etcetera, etcetera. Now, I'm reading recent reports in fairly easily accessible published accounts that Syria is holding the weapons of mass destruction or some of them, that others were destroyed, that others might still be hidden in Iraq, etcetera. What is the status on WMD? And if Syria is holding any of them and you guys know about it, how come we haven't heard about it?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, let me respond this way. The decision to go to war was a concern on the part of, first, the president, then the Congress of the United States and ultimately the United Nations that Saddam Hussein had had weapons of mass destruction, had used them on his neighbors in Iran and had used them on his own people in Iraq -- chemical weapons -- that he was known to have various other WMD programs and that he was required by the United Nations over a period of some 17 resolutions to file a declaration declaring what he had. And everyone agreed he had filed a fraudulent declaration as to what weapons of mass destruction he had. The debate as to whether to go to war was not whether or not he'd filed a fraudulent declaration. Everyone agreed to that. The only question was should you give him another chance, should you wait and go 18 resolutions or 19 resolutions, another five years or however many.

Now what's actually happened? Right now you have the Iraqi Survey Group, which is a multinational group that's out there reviewing documentation and looking at suspect WMD sites. I was with the Polish minister of defense this weekend in Istanbul, Turkey at the NATO Summit. And in the course of that, he pointed out that his troops in Iraq had recently come across -- I've forgotten the number, but something like 16 or 17 -- warheads that contained sarin and mustard gas.

Now these are weapons that we always knew Saddam Hussein had that he had not declared and they have tested them and I have not seen them and I have not tested them, but they believe that they are correct that these, in fact, were undeclared chemical weapons -- sarin and mustard gas -- quite lethal and that is a discovery that just occurred within the last period of days. If you think about -- most people remember the image of where Saddam Hussein was captured in that hole -- that pit that he was living in. That pit, that hole in the ground was probably big enough to hold chemical and

11-L-0559/OSD/44575

biological weapons sufficient to kill tens of thousands of people. And therefore, it is not hard to hide things in a country the size of California. It's quite easy to hide things. In fact, we finally found a bunch of jet aircraft that they've buried underground.

In answer to your question on Syria, there have been a lot of intelligence speculation and rumors and chatter about the fact that Saddam Hussein may have placed some of his weapons of mass destruction in Syria prior to the start of the war. Until that can be validated and proved, you'll find people in the administration not talking about it.

Q: All right. Let's talk about the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in a somewhat surprising ruling on the rights of enemy combatants has kind of put the administration in a tough spot -- because I suspect I can almost smell lines of lawyers lining up -- to file lawsuits in federal courts on behalf of these enemy combatants at GTMO and maybe otherwise, what's going to be the administration response, at least as far as Department of Defense?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, thus far, it's been silence and consideration. I was in Turkey and so I was not back here. I just came in last night and really have not had time to talk to people who have studied several decisions -- three or four. My guess is what they'll do is they will fashion a plan that will enable us to move forward in as reasonable a way as makes sense, given the fact that we are in a new -- we have new set of facts in the world. We have a large number -- small percentage wise, but a large numbers -- of tens of thousands of extremists radicals who are determined to kill innocent men, women and children using terror as their weapon of choice to terrorize the world into making it fit an image that they would want. That is to say a world that has a small handful of clerics running it, an end of nation states and bringing down moderate regimes of that religion and preventing the cultures of other nations in other parts of the world to influence what they prefer to see as the way they want life lived.

This is a very dangerous threat to the world. It's a dangerous threat because they are the kinds of people who go around cutting off people's heads and cutting off their hands and as we saw Saddam Hussein putting pliers in their mouth, pulling their tongues out and cutting them off, shoving people off the tops of buildings, filling up mass graves with tens of thousands of bodies. These are people who have little or no respect for human life and they are determined and we need to be equally determined.

The problem we've got is they know precisely what they want. They have a strategy, they have a plan. They are determined to prevent democracy from prevailing in Afghanistan. They're determined to prevent it from prevailing in Iraq. And the rest of the world is still trying to figure out what's happening. The rest of the world, we see terrorist attacks in Bali, we see it in Madrid, we see it in Turkey and in the United States and in Indonesia. But the world is still trying to sort through all this and what it really means, while the enemy knows what they're doing and they're determined to prevent the kinds of progress that is occurring in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

We need to have -- as they say in the military, a more common threat assessment in the world of the moderates, the people who were not running around trying to tell everyone else how they must live their lives. And we're in a long struggle, a serious struggle, where human life is at risk. And we need to be resolute. We need to be steadfast. We need to recognize the nexus between extremists and weapons of mass destruction means not simply 300 people can be killed or 3,000 people as on September 11<sup>th</sup>, but it means 300,000 or potentially millions of people can be killed to the extent extremists, as we've seen recently on television cutting people's heads off, to the extent those people gain access to still more powerful weapons, biological weapons, for example, or radiation weapons.

So we're in a critical time in the history of the world. We need to allow free people to come to free decisions about what it really means, but we don't have the luxury of being careless or inattentive.

Q: So with regard to these enemy combatants then, do you think these military tribunals which have been announced will begin processing these people in terms of trials? Do you think the folks at GTMO are going to be moved somewhere else? What's the response?

11-L-0559/OSD/44576

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, as I say, I'm sorry I'm just not in the position to respond. I'm not a lawyer. The lawyers are poring over these decisions trying to find out what the implications are. And at some point, there'll be policy meetings that will take the best legal judgments and come to some conclusions about what the appropriate steps might be. We have to constantly recognize that what we are are a free people and that is our essence. And we cannot give up our rights and the things we value so much, simply because we're terrorized by terrorists. We have to learn how to live in this 21<sup>st</sup> century. And that means we have to, with respect to the peacetime constraints on contracting but so, too, with laws and interpretations and procedures. We have to find a way to live in this world that protects the men and women and the children in our country. And by golly, we're determined to do that and at the same time, protect them in a way that's consistent with the values that we have and the freedom we respect so much and the thing that makes it the single most productive and free society on the face of the earth.

Q: Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld. I know you have to go. I want to ask you if you can give us an update or any information at all of a Camp Pendleton Marine who was held captive, Cpl. Wassef Ali Hassoun. What's the update on him?

SEC. RUMSFELD: As I say, I've been overseas and traveling until late last night and I would be reluctant to try to pretend that I could give you a precise update. We have people who can do that, but I'm not in that position.

Q: Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld, we appreciate your time. Thank you for your service. I have an opportunity to say that on behalf of all of us here in San Diego. And please be aware that at least in this part of the media, we are concerned about those military families in supporting them during this tough time for them, too.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, we appreciate that a great deal. And as someone who was selling newspapers at the Coronado Ferry on VJ Day in 1945, I want to say hello to all those folks out in that part of the world. It's a wonderful part of the world.

Q: Indeed, it is. Thank you very much for being with us here at KOGO.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Thank you.

Q: Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense.

<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040630-secdef0949.html>

11-L-0559/OSD/44577

<http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040630-sec...> 7/16/2004

June 15, 2004

Afghanistan

TO: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Joint Session

Colin Powell went to the Joint Session for Karzai and I didn't, and it looked bad.  
We were told he wasn't going to go.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
061504-13

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 15906-04

15 JUN 04

~~Blot~~  
6/15

FYI

9:40 a.m.

Memorandum To: SecDef

From: Mary Claire Murphy *Mary Claire*

Re: Karzai Joint Session of Congress

Just FYI,

I just got a call from Sec. Colin Powell's scheduler that late last night, Secretary Powell **DID** in fact decide to back out of the King Abdullah meeting at the WH, and re-arranged his schedule so that he could be at the Joint Session of Congress this morning with President Karzai.

June 14, 2004

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Afghan Detainees

38310

I was confused as to what Karzai was talking about in terms of detainees. He apparently was referring to the fact that it takes too long to get them processed in Afghanistan, not the GTMO folks.

Please set up a process, and tell me what you propose to do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
061404-30



Please respond by 7/16/04

15790

OSD 15907-04

720  
June 14, 2004

TO: Mary Claire Murphy

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Seating Charts

Please have your folks put down who these people are when they prepare a seating chart, so it is on the seating chart.

For example, it should show on the chart that Qasimi of Afghanistan is the Minister Advisor for Legal & International Affairs and what Salih's title is. It doesn't show it on the seating chart. It is really unhelpful. If I am looking at the seating chart, I need to know what their jobs are.

Thanks.

Attach.

Protocol read-ahead for 6/14 Karzai visit

DHR:dh  
061404-27

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 15908-04


11-L-0559/OSD/44581

Afghanistan

14 Jun 04



**READ AHEAD: HONOR CORDON, MEETING WITH  
PRESIDENT KARZAI OF AFGHANISTAN**

FROM: Ms. Mary Claire Murphy, Director of Protocol, (b)(6) 

Monday, June 14, 2004

3:00 p.m.

River Entrance/SecDef Dining Room

You have agreed to host an Honor Cordon and a meeting with His Excellency Hamid Karzai, President of Afghanistan. (See Tab 1 for read ahead from Policy.) You last met here with President Karzai February 2003.

**PARTICIPANTS:** U.S. (9) vs. Afghanistan (9), (List of participants at Tab 2.)

**SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:**

3:00 p.m. You greet President Karzai curbside, for the Honor Cordon.

You and President Karzai are escorted to the Dining Room. He will sign the guest book followed by a photo. (See Tab 3 for seating.)

3:25 p.m. Meeting Concludes. You and President Karzai will be escorted to the 911 Memorial for a brief tour.

3:35 p.m. You and the President arrive at the Memorial.

3:40 p.m. You and the President step outside of the building for a press avail near the cornerstone.

3:45 p.m. Press avail concludes. You bid President Karzai farewell and return to your (approx.) office escorted by Mary Claire Murphy and Security.

**Attachments**

- Tab 1 Read Ahead (from Policy)
- Tab 2 List of participants (from Policy)
- Tab 3 Seating (from Protocol)



**List of participants for SecDef meeting with the President of Afghanistan  
June 14, 2004**

**Department of Defense**

The Secretary of Defense  
General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Honorable Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy  
The Honorable Zal Khalilzad, United States Ambassador to Afghanistan  
The Honorable Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International  
Security Affairs  
Lieutenant General Tome Walters, Director of DSCA  
Dr. Bill Luti, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Special Plans, Near Eastern and  
Southern Asia  
Lieutenant General John Craddock, Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense  
Mr. Kurt Amend, Note taker

**Afghanistan Delegation**

His Excellency Hamid Karzai, President of Afghanistan  
His Excellency Abdullah Abdullah, Foreign Minister  
His Excellency Ali Ahmad Jalali, Minister of Interior  
His Excellency (Dr.) Zalmay Rassoul, National Security Advisor  
His Excellency SaidTayeb Jawad, Ambassador of Afghanistan (Tentative)  
Mr. Enayatullah Qasimi, Minister Advisor for Legal & International Affairs  
Mr. Amrullah Salih, National Directorate of Security  
Mr. Mohammad Umar Daudzai, Chief of Staff, Office of the President  
Mr. Jawed Ludin, Spokesperson

SECDEF meeting with President Karzai of Afghanistan

Monday, June 14, 2004 3 p.m.

SecDef Dining Room

Mr. Amend, notetaker		Mr. Ludin Spokesperson
Dr. Luti		Mr. Qasimi
Mr. Rodman		Dr. Zalmay Rassoul National Security Advisor
Mr. Feith		HE Abdullah Abdullah MOFA
SecDef		President Karzai
Gen Myers		HE Ali Ahmad Jalali Minister of Interior
Amb Khalilzad		HE SaidTayeb Jawad Afghan Ambassador
LTG Walters		Mr. Salih
LTG Craddock		Mr. Daudzai Chief of Staff

June 14, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock  
VADM Staser Holcomb, USN (Ret.)  
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Military Nominations

210

Andy Card claims that the military nominations will go out of the White House today, including Casey.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
061404-26

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*DR 6/19*

SECDEF

A bunch of noms did clear the WH on 6/14 ... 2 out of 17 ... including Casey/Cody.

There are still some critical noms there.

- Broadwater (to go to COS, EUCCOM) is the most time-critical
- John Craddock, since we need to get him confirmed in July
- DJS, J-3, J-4

OSD 15935-04

The CNO (Clark) reappointment, package having been in the SASC for months, now is critical. He must be confirmed by 7/19.

14 JUN 04

11-L-0559/OSD/44585

*YR Staser 6/15*

EF-9913  
04/008302

June 14, 2004

6/21  
2923  
Paul Butler  
PWB  
6/23

TO SecDef

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: Follow-up on Previous Foreign Meetings

0205D

When I am meeting with somebody I have met with previously, and in the previous meeting they had asked me for certain things, my briefing for the current meeting ought to explain what was asked the last time and what has happened in the intervening period.

They seem not to do that. Each one seems to start fresh.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
061404-18

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

Policy Executive Secretariat Note

June 21, 2003


C 6/23  
W 6/24

TEN  
6/23

SIR,  
Response attached.  
v/cor Nosenzo  
6/23

Captain Marriott,

Please see attached memo from Mr. Feith to Policy offices concerning "Read Aheads for Meetings with Foreign Dignitaries."

  
June Bartlett  
Deputy Director  
Policy Executive Secretariat

OSD 15936-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44586

14JUN04



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000



JUN 18 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FOR POLICY  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL  
OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND  
DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *DJF 6/18/04*

SUBJECT: Read Aheads for Meetings with Foreign Dignitaries

Reminder regarding read aheads:

Show the meeting start and end times, how to address the guest (e.g., Your Royal Highness, Mr. Minister or Mr. Smith) and pronunciations.

Using the templates as a checklist will help.

Read aheads should refer back to the previous meetings with the Foreign Dignitary. What was discussed? What is status of the action items from the previous meeting? Put background information and recommended talking points within the same set of bullets.

To do quality control properly, we need the read aheads, if possible, two days before the meeting.

Thanks.



11-L-0559/OSD/44587

720  
June 14, 2004

TO: Pete Geren  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Report on Investigative Oversight

383.6

Attached is a report on detainee abuse you should be aware of and have the appropriate people look into.

Thanks.

Attach.

6/10/04 Deputy IG ltr to SecDef re: Status of Detainee Abuse Investigative Oversight

DHR:dh  
061404-16

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

14JUN04

OSD 15938-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44588



INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

**INFO MEMO**

*SecDef -  
For your Information*

*1611  
DAG 6/14*

June 10, 2004

FOR: SENIOR MILITARY ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: L. Jerry Hansen, Deputy Inspector General

SUBJECT: Status of Detainee Abuse Investigative Oversight

- For the week ending June 4, 2004, the United States Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) reported an increase of 18 new detainee abuse investigations bringing the total to 127 investigations. Of the 127 investigations, 69 were in a facility and 58 others. Twenty-four cases were unit investigations conducted by commanders. Of the 127 investigations, 39 involved the death of a detainee - 35 in a facility and 4 others.
- For the week ending June 4, 2004, three new death investigations were reported: two involved deaths due to natural or undetermined causes, and a third occurred after an engagement between soldiers and civilians in An-Najaf. Subsequent to the engagement, two wounded Iraqis were captured. One of the injured was deemed terminal by a medic. When the medic departed, a US Army captain allegedly shot the detainee in the head, killing him. The investigation is continuing.
- Other CID misconduct investigations included 14 new assault cases and one sexual assault case (bringing the number of sexual assault cases to four). In the latter, a detainee at Abu Ghraib reported that a translator sodomized another detainee while a female soldier took photos. Investigation continues.
- The 14 new assault cases were largely initiated based on reports by detainees in Iraq. In two cases, robbery was also alleged. One case involved a Special Forces soldier in Afghanistan who was alleged to have assaulted several citizens believed to be affiliated with the Taliban. One of the 14 cases was determined to be unfounded. No new investigations were reported this week from the Naval Criminal Investigative Service or the Air Force Office of Special Investigations.
- ~~The attached chart depicts current weekly reporting to the Office of Inspector General of all investigations, inquiries, reviews, etc., concerning detainee abuse in the Department.~~

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:  
As Stated

cc: Special Assistant to SecDef (Mr. Pete Geren)

Prepared By: Jim Pavlik, Dir., Investigative Policy & Oversight, (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE~~

11-L-0559/OSD/44589

June 14, 2004

TO: ExecSec  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Charles Wick

W-3550

Recently Charles Wick sent me a letter. I would like to get it and see if I answered it. If not, I want to answer it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
06/14/04-5

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

OSD 15939-04

14 JUN 04





June 14, 2004

TO: Paul Butler  
Col. Steve Bucci  
  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
  
SUBJECT: Saleh

Yemen

When I have this Saleh man in for lunch or a meeting, I want Paul Wolfowitz, Doug Feith, Bill Luti and probably Bill Winkenwerder. If someone wants to suggest someone else to be added, we could do that.

His competence is generally in Afghanistan and Iran.

Thanks.

DHR/jh  
061404-1



*INC respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

14 Jun 04


**OSD 15940-04**

11-L-0559/OSD/44591

June 14, 2004

TO: Mary Claire

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: OSD Support for Reagan Events

You and your team really stepped up for the Reagan ceremonies this past week. It was terrific that you did it, and did it so well by all reports.

Thanks so much.

DHR:dh  
061104-10

.....  
Respond by \_\_\_\_\_

335 SD

14 JUN 04

OSD 15941-04

file

June 14, 2004

7/20  
J

330 11

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Maria Shriver

LARRY DI RITA  
7/20

I am told that Schwarzenegger's wife, Maria Shriver, does an awful lot for the military wives at Camp Pendleton and other places in California. Would you please check into that?

We should know what she is doing and whether or not we should thank her. Should other people be doing similar things?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
061104-8

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

7/22

Sir,  
Reply attached.  
v/r,  
Lt Col Lengyel  
7/20

14 JUN 04

OSD 15942-04

all 7/22

FROM: Larry Di Rita  
TO: SecDef  
DATE: July 13, 2004  
SUBJECT: Maria Shriver

We are considering events for Maria Shriver to participate in.

The attachment highlights what she has done and areas in which she is interested. We will continue to develop opportunities where she might be appropriate and helpful

She may be in Washington soon and apparently has expressed an interest in meeting with you.

OK  Write her & say I'd like to see her when she is in

Discuss \_\_\_\_\_

D. C

11/1 Sign

**Outreach to U.S. Troops**  
**Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and California's First Lady Maria Shriver**

---

**Past:**

- Governor Schwarzenegger meets with U.S. and coalition service members throughout the Persian Gulf. Schwarzenegger also showcases newest movie Terminator 3 (July 2-3,2003).
- Mrs. Shriver speaks at Specialist Pat Tillman's memorial service, HP Pavilion, San Jose, California (May 3,2004).
- Governor Schwarzenegger meets with 500+ service members (including the injured), and escaped hostage Thomas Hamill at Ramstein Air Base, Germany (May 4,2004).

**Future:**

- Mrs. Shriver intends to make issues surrounding military families, where a spouse is deployed overseas, a high priority. Two issue examples provided were:
  - (1) availability of adequate grief counseling for surviving spouses; and
  - (2) requirement that surviving spouses vacate base housing within six months.

**Upcoming USO Events Designed to Support the Troops:**

- NFL players assisting with opening of USO Center in Qatar  
Date: June 28 (T)
- Morale tour with actor Vince Vaughn  
Locations: Afghanistan, Kuwait and Iraq  
Dates: June 28-July 5
- Fourth of July tour with Wayne Newton, Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Lewis Dix and Miss USA  
Location: Korea  
Dates: July 2-5
- USO/Walter Reed visit to Manhattan (troops to receive tickets to David Letterman Show, Broadway, sporting events)  
Date: July 14
- USO musical show with the band Sugar Ray at the return of the USSS Ronald Reagan  
Location: San Diego, California  
Dates: July 22-23
- USO Gala honoring our troops with Wayne Newton  
Dates: October 14

JUN 14 2004

TO: Les Brownlee  
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

cc: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Rotations

320.2

I just got briefed by the Marines. I asked them to tell me why they should not do 12-month rotations and why they should do the 7 months they are doing.

I would be interested to hear from you as to why you think you should keep doing 12-month rotations, and, if you were to change to 6, 7, 8 or 9 months, how you would do it and what would be the pros and cons.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
061004-23

.....  
Please respond by 7/9/04

14 Jun 04

OSD 15943-04



~~FOUO~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON, DC 20310  
26 JUL 2004



MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Army Rotation Lengths

In response to your June 14, 2004, memo, while the Army would prefer to reduce deployment durations to six or nine months, the increased deployment tempo generated by shorter rotation lengths would have a negative impact on the force at this time.

Army studies and operational experience have shown that in a perfect world, six months is the optimal deployment length, allowing the Army to balance its operational requirements to provide trained and ready forces to the combatant commanders against the stresses separation generates on our volunteer force. However,

- There is insufficient depth within the Army's Combat Support and Combat Service Support capabilities to reduce rotation lengths below 12 months without producing significant dwell time and remobilization violations.
- Shorter rotation lengths would affect the Army's ability to meet CENTCOM's total requirements for combat forces as well. For instance, at current commitment levels, reducing the Army's combat unit deployment length to nine months could generate a 21 brigade combat team shortfall over the next two years. This problem would only be exacerbated by shortening unit rotations to six months in duration.

Even under the current 12-month rotation policy, meeting CENTCOM's requirements for Operations Iraqi Freedom 3 and Enduring Freedom 6 will require the remobilization of 18 Reserve Component units and the premature redeployment of 61 Active Component units - measures which will impact approximately 4,000 Soldiers. This number is projected to increase to approximately 10,000 Soldiers for Operation Iraqi Freedom 4 and Enduring Freedom 7.

PETER J. SCHOOMAKER  
General, US Army  
Chief of Staff

R. L. Brownlee  
Acting Secretary of the Army

3202

26 Jul 04

14 Jun 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 15943-04

June 10, 2004

TO: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Ray Reynolds

Let's get a letter off to Ray Reynolds from the Iowa Army National Guard. That is a nice e-mail he sent out.

Thanks.

Attach.  
6/8/04 E-mail

DHR:dh  
061004-17

.....  
Please respond by 6/18/04

OSD 15944-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44598

IRAQ

10JUN04



**Joyce Rumsfeld**

**From:**  
**To:**

(b)(6)

&lt;jrumfeld@mindspring.com&gt; (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Sent:** Tuesday, June 08, 2004 7:06 AM  
**Subject:** well said

**Subject:** Fw: The Real Story

This is a letter from Ray Reynolds,  
a medic in the Iowa Army National Guard, serving in Iraq:

As I head off to Baghdad for the final weeks to say thanks to all of you who did not believe the media. They have done a very poor job of covering everything that has happened. I am sorry that I have not been able to visit all of you during my two week leave back home.

And just so you can rest at night knowing something is happening in Iraq that is noteworthy, I thought I would pass this on to you. This is the list of things that has happened in Iraq recently: (Please share it with your friends and compare it to the version that your paper is producing.)

- \* **Over 400,000 kids have up-to-date immunizations.**
- \* School attendance is up 80% from levels before the war.
- \* Over 1,500 schools have been renovated and rid of the weapons stored there so education can occur.
- \* The port of Uhm Qasar was renovated so grain can be off-loaded from ships faster.
- \* **The country had its first 2 billion barrel export of oil in August.**
- \* Over 4.5 million people have clean drinking water for the first time ever in Iraq.
- \* The country now receives 2 times the electrical power it did before the war.
- \* 100% of the hospitals are open and fully staffed, compared to 35% before the war.
- \* Elections are taking place in every major city, and city councils are in place.
- \* Sewer and water lines are installed in every major city.

11-L-0559/OSD/44599

6/8/2004

- \* Over 60,000 police are patrolling the streets.
- \* Over 100,000 Iraqi civil defense police are securing the country.
- \* **Over 80,000 Iraqi soldiers are patrolling the streets side by side with US soldiers.**
- \* Over 400,000 people have telephones for the first time ever
- \* Students are taught field sanitation and hand washing techniques to prevent the spread of germs.
- \* An interim constitution has been signed.
- \* Girls are allowed to attend school.
- \* Textbooks that don't mention Saddam are in the schools for the first time in 30 years.

Don't believe for one second that these people do not want us there. I have met many, many people from Iraq that want us there, and in a bad way. They say they will never see the freedoms we talk about but they hope their children will. We are doing a good job in Iraq and I challenge anyone, anywhere to dispute me on these facts. So If you happen to run into John Kerry, be sure to give him my email address and send him to Denison, Iowa. This soldier will set him straight. If you are like me and very disgusted with how this period of rebuilding has been portrayed, email this to a friend and let them know there are good things happening.

Ray Reynolds, SFC  
**Iowa Army National Guard**  
**234th Signal Battalion**



June 10, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita

cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
Powell Moore  
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: E-mails

413.51

We are moving ahead on the e-mails. They are sorting them now. Before they go up, we are going to have to make sure that Roche knows they are going to go up, and that the people who are mentioned in the e-mails know about it.

We do not want to simply do it. We want to make sure it is done right.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
061004-16

.....

Please respond by 6/18/04

OSD 15945-04

10 Jun 04

720

file

6/14/04

TO: Ken Krieg  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Bill Schneider  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Nuc-Chem-Bio

*DR*

3 mo. 64

JUNE 9

I got briefed by the Defense Science Board ~~yesterday~~ on dealing with nuclear weapons. It is kind of a single shot, just like yours was a single shot on chemical.

In any event, it was a pretty good briefing. Bill Schneider set it up. I told him I would get him a hearing with Tom Ridge and Spence Abraham. I have talked each of them, and they both have agreed.

Would you please coordinate that, so that it happens? I would like you to see and see what their reaction is. You can call their offices, and remind them that is what I talked to them about and that they agreed they would like to see the briefing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
061004-14

.....  
Please respond by 7/9/04

Sir,

*2004 7/26*

Response attached.

OSD 15946-04


*v/r. COLB*

*7/22*

14 JUN 04

DA 7/24

July 22, 2004

To: Secretary of Defense  
From: Ken Krieg   
cc: Deputy Secretary of Defense  
Bill Schneider  
Subject: Snowflake on Nuc-Chem-Bio (attached)

Stan Szemborski and I met yesterday with Rich Wagner, chair of the DSB task force, who briefed you June 9.

We had a very good conversation on his work and agreed on exchanging data and ideas for inclusion in the follow-up work that we are doing coming out of last week's SLRG on combating weapons of mass destruction.

In particular, we had a very good discussion on thinking through how to characterize the cost-benefit and capabilities evaluation of the broader portfolio of investments on active defenses. It was an extremely worthwhile conversation.

Rich Wagner has a meeting scheduled with Secretary Ridge for next week and a meeting with Secretary Abraham in the next couple of weeks (it was originally schedule for this week, but the Secretary had to move his schedule around). I will work with Rich to make sure you get their reactions.

11-L-0559/OSD/44603



June 9, 2004

TO: Powell Moore  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Hunter-Rogers Petition

032

If we have not gotten a thank you to Duncan Hunter and Rogers and all the people on that list by now, there is something wrong with our system.

My impression is that it takes way too long to get responses to Congressional mail. Please show me what tracking system you have, how it works and what the average time for responses is.

In addition, please get to me fast with notes with respect to the Hunter-Rogers petition.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
061004-10



Please *respond* by \_\_\_\_\_

9 Jun 04

OSD 15947-04

June 9, 2004

TO: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Warner Matter

032

Please have someone contact Ray DuBois, and tell him that I need him to get back to me and tell me how we handled the matter with John Warner and the Eisenhower Corridor date.

Thanks.

DIR:dh  
061004-6

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

hounsp

OSD 15948-04



June 10, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Non-lethal Riot Agents

370.61

I need someone in your shop to craft a memo from me to the President about the non-lethal riot agents problem.

We are not able to do the things we ought to be able to do. Apparently the treaty is so restrictive that we are able to use lethal force, but not non-lethal force, which is of course an unfortunate outcome. I am sure it was not the intent of the treaty.

Let's see what we can fashion for me to begin to work on this problem.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
061004-2

.....  
Please respond by 6/25/04

107004

OSD 15949-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44606



June 9, 2004

TO: Pete Geren  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Letter from Senator Warner

1383.6

What is the status on this May 13 letter from John Warner?

Thanks.

Attach.  
5/13/04 Sen. Warner Ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
060904-23

.....  
Please respond by 6/18/04

*Closed (verbally) 6/16/04*

*SD provided with  
Congress IDW meeting  
w/ Mr. Geren & Mr. Moore  
in June 16, 2004.*

hounCb

OSD 15952-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44607

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**United States Senate**  
 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

May 13, 2004

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
 Secretary of Defense  
 1000 Defense Pentagon  
 Washington, DC 20310-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Thank you for your participation and assistance in facilitating the recent hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee concerning the mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners by certain members of the U.S. Armed Forces.

The Committee has held two important hearings, to date, but the complexity of this issue requires that more hearings be held to establish a body of fact needed for oversight by the Senate. The Committee fully understands that the availability of some witnesses and material is affected by the conduct and completion of ongoing investigations, as well as operational requirements in Iraq.

On behalf of the Committee, I request that the following officials be made available to testify, in open session, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, at an early date: Ambassador Paul Bremer, Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority; General John P. Abizaid, USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command; Honorable Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Honorable William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel, Department of Defense; Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, USA, Commander, Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7), as well as the senior Judge Advocate General Officer who was responsible for the legal review of authorized interrogation techniques; Major General George R. Fay, USA, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, U.S. Army; Major General Barbara G. Fast, Director for Intelligence, J-2, CJTF-7; Major General Geoffrey D. Miller, USA, Deputy Commander for Detainee Operations, CJTF-7; Major General Donald J. Ryder, USA, Provost Marshal General, U.S. Army; Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, USAR, Chief, Army Reserve; and Lieutenant General Stephen H. Blum, USANG, Chief, National Guard.

To date, in scheduling, the Committee has tried to meet your requirements, and we hope to continue such cooperation in arranging the earliest possible date for appearances of these witnesses. Given that some witnesses may need to remain in Iraq for operational reasons, we are open to exploring the option of video teleconferences for some hearings.

The objective of these hearings will be to document all aspects of detainee operations in Iraq, including: the policy for the treatment of detainees in Iraq; the chain of command at Abu Ghraib prison; military doctrine and procedures for the conduct of interrogations; the readiness of military units in Iraq to conduct detainee operations; the evolution of interrogation policy and procedures in Iraq, as it related to the overall security situation; and, the status of completed and on-going investigations into detainee and interrogation operations in Iraq. As the body of fact concerning the mistreatment of prisoners is assembled, the Committee may determine the need for additional military and civilian witnesses from the Department.

During the hearing conducted by the Committee on May 11, Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, U.S. Army, discussed the interrogation techniques authorized for use in Iraq. He testified that all interrogation techniques, including those requiring specific approval from higher authority before being employed, were deemed to be lawful and acceptable under the Geneva Convention. Subsequent inquiries by the Committee have determined that the evaluation of so-called "harsh approaches" has been the subject of significant discussion and legal review within the Department of Defense. The Committee requests that all legal reviews and related documentation concerning approval of interrogation techniques for use in Department of Defense intelligence gathering operations, including in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay, be provided to the Committee.

The Department has been cooperative in providing documents and materials regarding allegations of prisoner abuse in Iraq. The Committee's standing request for all relevant documentation, including International Committee of the Red Cross reports to the Department on abuse of prisoners in U.S. military custody, is important in carrying out our oversight responsibilities.

As you determine the availability of witnesses and requested materials, please have your staff coordinate with Mr. Charles W. Alsop (b)(6), of the Committee staff, to determine specific hearing dates and administrative arrangements.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter,

With kind regards, I am

Sincerely,



John Warner  
Chairman

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

June 9, 2004

383.6

TO: Pete Geren  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Letter to MG Miller

How have we handled this letter from Jane Harman to Geoff Miller? Did we do what was suggested to just refer it to Porter Goss? How did we answer it?

Thanks.

Attach.  
5/21/04 Cong. Harman Ltr to MG Miller

DHR:dh  
060904-22

.....  
Please respond by 6/18/04

Closed 6/16/04  
(verbally)

SID briefed on status  
on June 16, 2004 IOW  
meeting w/ Mr. Geren &  
MG Miller.

OSD 15953-04

920004

04619

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NANCY PELOSI, DEMOCRATIC LEADER

FROM: JAMES J. CARROLL, DIRECTOR  
FAYENCE E. MURRAY, STAFF DIRECTOR  
CHRISTINE HEALY, DEMOCRATIC COUNSEL

**U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**  
**PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE**  
**ON INTELLIGENCE**  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-8416

May 21, 2004

*SecDef -  
Have heard this  
will be in the  
press shortly*

**Major General Geoffrey D. Miller, USA**  
**Deputy Commander for Detainee Operations**  
**for Multi-National Force Iraq**  
**Commander Joint Task Force 7**  
**Headquarters Command Group**  
**CPA-APO AE 09335**

Dear General Miller:

Less than 24 hours ago, you met with the Committee to discuss detainee and interrogation policies and practices. While I appreciate your willingness to appear, I am dismayed that information emerging immediately after your briefing raises questions about the candor and accuracy of your statements.

A Pentagon briefing for reporters yesterday provided new details about the development of interrogation policy for Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. According to the briefing, as reported in today's *Washington Post*, the original policy approved by Secretary Rumsfeld in late 2002 was almost immediately challenged by military lawyers, triggering an intense, three-month debate among legal experts, intelligence officials, and others. In particular, Defense Department officials reportedly confirmed yesterday that a group of senior military attorneys sent a memo on February 5, 2003. This debate led to the issuance of new guidelines in April 2003.

In addition, press reports about the contents of the October 12, 2003 interrogation policy issued by General Sanchez, a copy of which has not been provided to us, seems to indicate a role for Military Police that goes well beyond the passive intelligence collection role that you have described.

Finally, there were also press reports yesterday evening regarding an alleged Delta Force detention facility near the Baghdad International Airport that engages in coercive interrogations.

While the substance of your briefing to the Committee cannot be publicly discussed, we depend upon your complete candor and full

*?*

NO. 826 P. 3

CENTCOM-WLNO

MAY 21 2004 5:27PM


11-L-0559/OSD/44611

Major General Geoffrey D. Miller  
May 21, 2004  
Page Two

disclosure. If information is *only* provided in response to a question that is phrased in precisely the right way, it is virtually impossible for Congress to fulfill its constitutional oversight responsibility.

I am disappointed and request a prompt explanation of the gaps and discrepancies in your presentation.

Sincerely,



Jane Harman  
Ranking Democrat

June 9, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Gingrich Memos

383.6

Please make sure all of these Newt Gingrich memos get to Geren, Maples and  
Cambone.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Gingrich memos

DHR:dh  
060904-21

\*\*\*\*\*  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

9 June 04

OSD 15954-04

cc: Bulter  
Craddock

2/15/04

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

**From:** Thirdwave2@aol.com

**Sent:** Saturday, May 08, 2004 12:59 PM

**To:** (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;  
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil (b)(6) jack.patterson@osd.mil

RJ

**Subject:** for secdef-close abu ghraib immediately-newt

from Newt  
5/08/04

close Abu Ghraig immediately

this prison is a symbol of everything wrong in saddam's dictatorship and now a symbol of american violations of the rule of law

closing it would be a significant symbolic step towards 'cleaning things up'

it should be announced immediately and done within 30 days

the closing should be a public event when the last door is closed


newt



cc: LTG Craddock  
Butler  
Di Rita

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com  
Sent: Wednesday, May 05, 2004 8:03 AM  
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;  
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6)jack.patterson@osd.mil  
Subject: we are on a slippery slope in apologizing-newt



From Newt  
5/5/04

I am very worried about the tone that is building. We are on the edge of slipping from Reaganism into Jimmy Carterism

I am submitting the following op ed today

**A SUICIDAL DOOUBLE STANDARD**  
by Newt Gingrich

The coverage of the violations of American law against Iraqi prisoners is in grave danger of setting a suicidal double standard for America and the Arab world. Americans must be very careful in explaining how we feel and what we will do. Otherwise our enemies will use our own words as an excuse to establish a suicidal double standard for behavior.

Some Americans did a terrible thing. They will be investigated and where guilty punished. We do this because we protect our own constitution and we live under the rule of law.

The incident is something to be condemned.

The process of exposing the wrongdoing, investigating the charges, having a fair and honest trial of the accused with a presumption of their innocence until proven guilty, and punishing the guilty is something we should be proud of and clear about.

Explaining our anger at these misdeeds and our determination to punish the wrong doers is appropriate. Appearing overly contrite or overly apologetic will be a big mistake.

The anti-American left is already on radio and television exploiting this as an opportunity to exploit and opportunity to condemn America.

The primary Arab media said nothing when the Syrian dictator destroyed Homma and killed 30,000 plus innocent people.

11-L-0559/OSD/44615

The primary Arab media said nothing when Saddam used poison gas on his own people and created 300,000 anonymous graves.

One CNN official wrote an article admitting that they had deliberately covered up and ignored Saddam's atrocities to retain access to Baghdad. A policy of caution which of course is not reflected in their coverage of charges against America.

The primary Arab media said nothing negative when Americans were mutilated and drug through the streets of Fallujah.

The primary Arab media said nothing negative when two gunmen ambushed a woman last Sunday in her station wagon and at point blank range methodically killed her four daughters age two to eleven, killed the eight month old baby she was carrying, and then killed her.

One American newspaper, with a half page dedicated to the allegations of brutality in Iraq, referred to the Sunday killing of a mother and five children as "violence marred the Sunday Likud election". No outrage, no shock, no horror, just another day of viciousness and brutality by our enemies.

There is a suicidal double standard building where Arab viciousness, terrorism, mutilation, and barbarism are normal behavior not to be commented on but any American error, including those we will uncover and punish ourselves, are proof of our guilt.

This is the road to Jimmy Carterism.

We should firmly state our commitment to our values, our condemnation of any American acts which violate those values and our explicit commitment to punish the guilty within a process of fairness and the rule of law.

With equal firmness we should demand of the Arab governments and the Arab media their condemnation of barbarism, brutality and terrorism in their own communities.

Finally, we should angrily reject anyone who would smear the 200,000 plus courageous decent men and women who have risked their lives for a free Iraq and a safe America. Any effort by the anti-American left of the Arab world to generalize this into a smear on America or on America's armed forces should be totally, directly, repudiated and condemned.

cc Craddock  
Butter

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

**From:** Thirdwave2@aol.com  
**Sent:** Monday, May 10, 2004 8:19 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;  
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6)jack.patterson@osd.mil  
**Subject:** urgent Tilly Fowler on Monday

from Newt 5/10/04

(C)

Urgent

you do not have time for Tilly Fowler to do an investigation and then report

you need to move Tilly front and center today so the country starts to focus on the investigation rather than the scandal

if Tilly Fowler is going to be your lead on the outside review of the prisoner scandal you should try to get her to the meeting with the President at the Pentagon today.

Time is not on our side.

The House and Senate members need to see something to get them to calm down and hold off as the bad news keeps coming.

Tilly would have real credibility on the hill. The investigations she conducted in the Clinton administration while she was still on the House Armed Services Committee and the investigations she conducted for you at the DPB can all be laid out for the press as proof of why she is the right person.

She should be:

1. built up in the press today and tomorrow
2. sent to the Hill for the week to meet with members and find out what questions they want answered
3. be given unlimited access to people and information
4. add three non-DPB prosecutors to her panel to increase credibility (the DPB is too insider for our critics to take its report as totally reliable)

5/10/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/44617

5. have a consistent press operation both in the **US** and in Baghdad

the news is going to get worst and the Republican members on the Hill will start breaking ranks this week unless they have something to cling to

Tilly can be the person who lets them have an answer back home and to the media and in the floor debates when the Democrats are attacking

This must happen early this week or the whole situation could unravel with stunning speed

you want Tilly rather than secdef to be the person answering questions on next sundays shows

then she can go do the investigation with a lot of publicity from Baghdad

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com  
 Sent: Saturday, May 08, 2004 2:59 PM  
 To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil  
 Subject: secdef from newt

Copy provided to LTG  
 Craddock only!  
 per Newt's request.

(C)

FTR

for secdef  
 from newt 5/08/04

the urgent need for a strategic plan to redefine the prison scandal

Trent Lott never understood how dangerous his situation was until it was too late.

As Speaker I never understood the corrosive power of constant hammering until I had been deeply weakened. Even when the charges were totally phony the weight of their being charged had impact and the repetition was debilitating and distanced my allies who got tired of defending me,

Dan Quayle never understood how he was being defined until the definition became unshakable.

The current moment is much more dangerous than people realize and it cannot be solved by tactical steps taken in response to events.

You have to assume that this scandal has just began.

There are active opponents of President Bush who would love to use this scandal as a method of weakening and defeating the President.

There are active opponents of American policy in Europe, the Middle East and the American news media who are delighted and invigorated by a chance to keep us on defense and to potentially define us as hypocrites and incompetents at best and willing doers of evil at worst.

There are supporters of the President who will see dumping the Secretary of Defense as an inexpensive way of saving the President.

There are Republicans in the House and Senate who have had thier feelings hurt over the last three and a half years by you and your team who will see this as an easy way of getting even.

All of these forces come together to create efforts to undermine, exaggerate, and exploit which will go on until one of four things happen:

11-L-0559/OSD/44619

5/8/2004



1. you leave and a new face is given a honeymoon;
2. the corner is turned and your visible action steps and clear explanations give you dominance over your critics;
3. the issue burns out and other issues replace it in the media's attention span;
4. the election occurs and the issue is made moot.

I assume 1 is not going to occur. I would deeply, passionately oppose your leaving because it would cripple the President with his base (it would be an act of Jimmy Carterite weakness) and it would be an historic injustice to you and a significant weakening of our national security capability at a key point in this war on terror.

The the best option is to turn the corner by taking such visible actions and explanations that your critics leave the field because they are losing.

It is very dangerous to assume that you can simply outlast the issue because it will take on a life of its own and new problems will erupt to keep you on defense.

Turning the corner requires three immediate steps in parallel:

1. create a very small strategic advisory group to think beyond each day and to develop action plans that enable you to regain the offense. This kind of group cannot have daily responsibilities and have to be tasked with redefining the entire set of issues onto terms favorable to you and the President. Three possible members of such an informal advisory group would be Randy Evans (my attorney and Hastert's attorney and a world class litigator who instinctively thinks strategically and works at regaining the offense by redefining the fight), Paul Johnson (the Washington head of Fleishmann-Hillard the most respected public relations firm in the world and the largest public relations contractor with the federal government--both Powell and Ridge recently praised their work-- and a good former House Republican administrative assistant from Michigan); and Bob Walker--now the head of Walker-Wexler and a board member of Hill and Knowlton. A small kitchen cabinet of these kind of outside strategic thinkers would give you far more options and would enrich dramatically what Dirita is trying to get done. They would also give you a lot of connectivity with realities that may not be obvious inside the Pentagon.

2. Establish a series of action items that can start rolling out Sunday night or Monday on a daily basis so you are back being in charge and getting things done. Time in the short run is not on your side and you have to reestablish a sense of command and clarity. Two examples would be closing the prison and appointing an outside civilian group of three prosecutors to review everything outside the military chain of command and ensure that the American rule of law is reestablished both for this problem and as doctrine and regulations for future occupations (prosecutors who had served in the military or graduated from the academies would be ideal).

11-L-0559/OSD/44620

3. You need to establish a mantra of determination to uncover what happened, punish the guilty, reestablish faith and trust with the Iraqi people by proving that a democracy protects the innocent and punishes the guilty and ensuring that safeguards are built to prevent this from happening in the future. Clinton developed a mantra in december 1995 of saving medicare, medicaid, education and the environment which they knew polled well and which they repeated maniacally. You need a similar mantra of guidelines you can use with the media, the congressm the public and the military and then use to communicate with Iraqis and the Middle East

These three steps would optimize your ability to start getting things under control and get back on offense

Let me know how I can help.

cc: Craddock  
Butler

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

---

**From:** Jhirdwave2@aol.com  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 11, 2004 7:02 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil  
**Subject:** for secdef-urgentfrom newt ON PACE AND RESILIENCE

for secdef  
from newt 5/11/04

(C)

### URGENT-PACE AND RESILIENCE

This is a difficult period.

you remain the most expensive and most valuable national security asset this country has.

Because the problems are going to be very complex and involve great conflict (there is an election going on at home, we have active enemies overseas, and we have a world media that loves to bash Americans so conflict is unavoidable), your health, energy, optimism and resilience are vital.

George Marshall had three heart attacks before World War Two and his doctor told him he could either learn to work a limited day and delegate like crazy or he could train his successor because after the fourth heart attack someone new would be Chief of Staff. Marshall later said this was the advice which enabled him to run a global war.

You should follow Marshall's regimen:

1. Take one full day a week off and a weekend every three weeks;
- 2, set priorities of which managing Iraq, handling the principals level national security council and dealing with the media and Congress should belong to you (you are the closer, no one else can do these three); everything else should be explicitly delegated with Wolfowitz and Myers coordinating the delegated zones;
3. outside Iraq, nes media and Congress you should only be asked to decide things which Myers and Wolfowitz can't decide.

you MUST pace yourself to retain energy and resilience

11-L-0559/OSD/44622



cc Craddock  
Butler

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

**From:** Thirdwave2@aol.com  
**Sent:** Monday, May 10, 2004 11:20 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;  
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6)jack.patterson@osd.mil  
**Subject:** immediate publicity for Fowler and the investigative mission-newt

It is vital to get Fowler in the media as soon as possible. This will move the spotlight from the pictures and problems of the past to the investigations and reforms of the future.

She should do media through the sunday shows and then we will have imprinted that we are in a new stage with a new set of leaders who are looking at everything from a fresh viewpoint.

This will embolden our allies to argue our case and it will calm down and satisfy the independents who are undecided. Because of Tilly's reputation and personality it will also calm a lot of the liberal Democrats and force them to slow down and wait for the report.

This only occurs if she is in the media enough to force through the message that we are in a new period with a new personality.

Simply appointing the DPB group and then having them disappear into an investigative mode accomplishes nothing in the near future and it is the near future that is critical.

Furthermore Tilly is a new face and a new personality and this will give the media an opportunity to be positive and interested in someone new. She will almost automatically lower the rhetoric and the intensity of the coverage.

Tilly has a very clear set of messages she can stick to. They will be very reassuring to the American people and yet will not prejudice the investigation in any way.

Her primary talking points ought to be:

1. she has done a number of investigations and there is a systematic pattern of finding the facts, exposing and prosecuting the guilty, and learning what we need to change to improve the future:
2. as a former member of Congress she will work very hard to meet the concerns of her former colleagues in the House and Senate and to ensure that when the investigation is done they will be satisfied with the report as they have been

11-L-0559/OSD/44623

5/11/2004

satisfied with other reports she has made in the past.

3. as someone who has sworn an oath to uphold the Constitution she knows full well how precious our commitment to the rule of law and our belief that every person is endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights is. She believes fully that those principles extend to anyone under American custody and she will approach these investigations with those principles in mind.

4. Schlesinger and she have been reassured that they are leading an independent investigation with full access to the facts and with full ability to learn and explore wherever it leads to. She is convince the President and the Secretary of Defense are serious about getting at the truth and she intends to be very tough in ensuring that they get the truth.

5. She fully expects to brief her former colleagues and to satisfy their interest in every aspect of this difficult problem. She is taking the time to ask their adviser and to ascertain their concerns so that when the report is done it will have more than met congressional expectations.

6. as a former elected official she realizes fully the obligation federal officials owe the American people and she will do everything she can to ensure that people look back on this period as a sad moment of failure in a great system and that they will be convinced problems have been fixed, systems have been improved, the guilty have been punished, and America is upholding its obligations to its own citizens and to people around the world. That is why she is willing to take time off from her job at the law firm to undertake this assignment for the Secretary and the President.

June 9, 2004

383.9

TO: Pete Geren  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Results of Interrogations

We ought to have something that shows the kinds of information that interrogations have produced by way of intelligence to save people's lives.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
060904-19



Please respond by 6/18/04  
Closed - 6/16/04  
*toe*

*SID provided with  
Results of interrogation  
briefing back on June 16, 2004  
DHR meeting w/ Mr. Geren  
and Mr. [unclear]*

97un04

OSD 15955-04

TO ME GEREN  
MAY 24, 2004  
8:30 AM

May 21, 2004

TO: Pete Geren  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Examples

We should try to get unclassified examples of the intelligence value that has been achieved by interrogations. Information has enabled us to capture other terrorists and to save people's lives. Let's try to do this.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
052004-37

.....  
Please respond by 5/28/04

11-L-0559/OSD/44626

## Theater Interrogation Highlights From July 03

# Theater Interrogation Operations Highlights (July 03 - May 04)

## Theater Interrogation Highlights From July 03

### Intelligence Collected

**Operational Battle:** Foreign Fighters, Scam/ACR Resisters, Terrorist Groups

**Support & Technology:** Former Regime, U.S.D. WMD capabilities, TBELD/LLI research center, AN/APAD exploitation, proliferation

**Counterintelligence:** Former Iraqi Intelligence Service, Force Protection

**Political/Military:** Iraqi Tribal Groups, Religious fundamentalist politics, Former Regime Elements

**OSI Specific Areas:** Alliances, Espionages, Third country ties, weapons, foreign fighters, financial support, and Amman/Almanjara leadership

### Intelligence Produced

Interrogation led to capture of Saddam Hussein

Discovery of weapons, weapons caches, financial support and operating bases

Over 4,000 interrogations under combat conditions resulting in 1,000+ reports since July 03.

### Key Operational Success

Top 500 Iraqi Regime, **Osama** intelligence, Central Operations (Iraqi, Saudi, Arab, Kurd, Shi'ite, Suni, Muslim, Muslim, Force Protection, Former Regime, 30 Jun 04 transfer), **Al Qaeda**

## Theater Interrogation Highlights From July 03

Date Detained	INFORMATION OBTAINED	Results - what did we do with this?
Winter 03	Detainee gave information that led to the capture of Saddam Hussein. Arrested for his support of Saddam Hussein since the fall of Baghdad. Detainee provided information on other Saddam enablers. Interrogations included interrogations of some of Saddam's wealth being smuggled into the country.  Over 70 Intelligence Reports produced.	Facilitated capture of Saddam Hussein and other Ba'ath Party officials. Interrogations of distributors of Saddam Hussein's wealth.
Winter 03	Interrogations provided the names of associates of Saddam Hussein. Also detainee stated that he related to the locations of hidden weapons caches due to his position and influence.  Over 200 Intelligence Reports produced.	Lead information to locate and destroy weapons caches.

## Theater Interrogation Highlights From July 03

Date Detained	INFORMATION OBTAINED	Results - what did we do with this?
Spring 04	Detainee was captured in association with a major, <b>known terrorist organization</b> . Detainee provided critical information on the group's communications. Detainee provided cryptographic information about other terrorist agents. Detainee has also provided information concerning the organization's financial methods and information on the structure, tactics, and messaging.  Over 70 Intelligence Reports produced.	Currently exploiting networks for intelligence on agents. Building a comprehensive understanding of this organization's role and agenda in Iraq.
Summer 04	Detainee provided general information on other previous fighters of Saddam Hussein. Reported on Ba'ath Party cells inside of Iraq. Detainee reported on former regime swing group. He believed that only 100 people in Iraq would know of WMD existence. Names were passed to Iraq Survey Group.  Over 100 Intelligence Reports produced.	Biography and location information since capture of 3 of top 50 most wanted. He provided intelligence for use in identifying former regime elements involved in oil pipeline sabotage.

## Theater Interrogation Highlights From July 03

Date Detained	INFORMATION OBTAINED	Results - what did we do with this?
Winter 04	Key leader in global terrorist organization. Provided information on media venues for various terrorist propaganda operations. Interrogations revealed high level foreign fighter support before the coalition invaded Iraq.  Nearly 30 Intelligence Reports produced.	Provided current and past terrorist network structure. Information used to target and attack the terrorist network.
Spring 04	Provided information on the activities of Muqtada al-Sadr and his organization to include the breakdown of the Office of Muqtada Al Sadr (OMS) throughout Iraq, Sadr's security procedures, OMS financing, and Sadr's key lieutenants.  Nearly 10 Intelligence Reports produced.	Aided in the capture of other members of Sadr's network, including key lieutenants.

## Theater Interrogation Highlights From July 03

Date Detained	INFORMATION OBTAINED	Results - what did we do with this?
Winter 04	Detainee is an intelligence officer from the former Iraqi Intelligence Service. He served as an agent and trainer. Detainee reported reliable on the location of Sadr's family in a third country, as well as his movement patterns and hiding places in Najaf.  11 Intelligence Reports published.	Identified leader of uprising in Fallujah. Positively identified other former regime intelligence officers.
Winter / Spring 04	Detainee is suspected of being associated with the <b>Foreigner</b> network. A foreign fighter that entered Iraq to join the jihad against coalition forces. Detainee provided information on a safe house location associated with the marshalling of foreign fighters from a neighboring country into Baghdad. Detainee claims to have met with Zarqawi on three separate occasions.  8 Intelligence Reports published.	Provided actionable intelligence in support of current operations.



**theater Interrogation Highlights** From July 03

**IIS Sponsored IED and VBIED Project**

The Explosives sections of the Iraqi Intelligence Service's (IIS), were created to supply the IIS, Saddam Fedayeen, and the Iraqi military with explosives, detonators, and the vessels used to conceal the explosives. Due to the projects specializing mainly in the creation of IEDs and VBIEDs.

Through Interrogations of the detained IIS project members, the Coalition learned of bomb making techniques that were proliferated to various anti-coalition groups in Iraq that continue to improve upon and develop these IEDs and VBIEDs.

The intelligence from the project allowed Coalition Forces to conduct raids against several bomb producing cells and to develop several countermeasures to IED employment.

June 9, 2004

383.6

TO: Pete Geren

cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Congressional Briefings on Detainees

I hope you folks are keeping a master list of all the briefings before Congress, to everybody, where we talked about detainees, including the breakfasts here.

It seems to me we are going to want to have that list and maybe get it out there soon to blunt the attack that we are not talking to Congress, we are not briefing them, and they don't know what is going on, because they do, and we should have that list. We should think about getting it into the hands of our friends up there.

Let me see what it looks like.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
060904-17

.....

Please respond by 6/18/04

9 Jun 04

OSD 15957-04





June 9, 2004

326

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Roles and Missions

Let's think through who we want to be at a meeting with Brownlee, Schoomaker, Myers, Pace, and maybe Jim Haynes to talk about roles and missions and the fact that it ought to go up from McKiernan through the Army chain.

We ought to figure out who is supposed to do what, and whether or not we need some clarification in administrative orders or the law.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
060904-15



Please respond by 6/18/04

OSD 15960-04

4 Jun 04

June 9, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Thoughts for the Remarks on Abuse Issue

383.6

The first thing that has to be said is that we know there is still more information to come. investigations are underway, and new information will develop as the investigations are completed. That having been said, there are some things that can be asserted now:

1. At least thus far, we have not seen anything that suggests that a senior official of the US Government, military or civilian, authorized or encouraged guidance or authorization to those managing custody of detainees that permitted them to use torture or to treat any detainee in anything other than a humane manner as directed by the President.
2. Further, thus far, we are not aware of any detainee who was, despite the President's instructions, tortured or treated in an inhumane manner for the purpose of interrogation.
3. The photos from Abu Ghraib depict mistreatment of detainees, but thus far our information shows that any such mistreatment would be contrary to the guidance, instructions, procedures and techniques that have been in place at various times since September 11, 2001.

DHR:dh  
060904-B

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

970004

OSD 15967-04

June 9, 2004

TO: Paul Butler  
Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meet w/Gingrich

Let's get Newt Gingrich in for lunch, so I can talk to him about his discussion on the size of the Army. Maybe have Pete Schoomaker there.

Thanks.

Attach.  
6/4/04 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh  
060904-6

.....  
Please respond by 6/18/04

000.715D

9 Jun 04

OSD 15969-04

cc: Craddock  
Butler

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

**From:** Thirdwave2@aol.com  
**Sent:** Friday, June 04, 2004 8:27 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;  
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6) jack.patterson@osd.mil  
**Cc:** peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; stephen.cambone@OSD.mil; paula.thornhill@js.pentagon.mil  
**Subject:** the army is too small-newt

for secdef, depsecdef  
from newt 6/04/04

it is untenable to argue the Army is the right size

it is a direct contradiction of the Secretary's warning at West Point that we are in the early stages of a long war

it is impossible for average Americans to believe that the Army is the right size but we have to rely on reservists and guardsmen on a continuing basis and we now have to extend service involuntarily

I do not care what the studies and higher ups are telling you as an Army brat who went through the Eisenhower reductions in forces in the late 1950s as a child this combination of events is going to weaken the Army

finally, it is impossible to explain to the American people why the Army is the right size when their neighbors are called up and service is involuntarily extended

I cannot defend the current size and when asked I am going to say the Army should be larger

Kerry will win this debate

this is a repetition of the 1960 Nixon mistake of defending America's strength against Kennedy's charge of a missile gap—the country decided Kennedy was right even though he was wrong

for the first time in decades Republicans are now on the weakness side of a defense issue and giving the Democrats an easy way to be on the pro-defense side of more strength.

You should call for a significant increase in Army end strength and a significant increase in the Army budget to cover that cost without eating into the rest of the Army's program

11-L-0559/OSD/44634

6/7/2004

if this is a long war then let's start acting like its a real war and budget accordingly

to repeat: I personally cannot defend the smaller Army position and I would support a substantial increase in both Army strength and the Army budget

this is both a national security and a political issue and the adminstration is wrong on both

June 9, 2004

TO: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Airline Tickets

*U.S.H.C.*

Please have somebody look into the facts behind this article.

Thanks.

Attach.

Margasak, Larry. "Pentagon Wasted Millions on Airline Tickets, GAO Says." *Washington Post*, June 9, 2004, p. 8.

DHR:dh  
060904-3

.....  
Please respond by 6/25/04

*hounfb*

OSD 15972-04

Washington Post  
June 9, 2004  
Pg. 8

## **Pentagon Wasted Millions On Airline Tickets, GAO Says**

By Larry Margasak, Associated Press

The Defense Department spent an estimated \$100 million for airline tickets that were not used over six years and failed to seek refunds even though the tickets were reimbursable, congressional investigators say.

The department compounded the problem by reimbursing employee claims for tickets the Pentagon bought, the investigators said.

To demonstrate how easy it was to have the Pentagon pay for airline travel, the investigators posed as defense employees, had the department generate a ticket and showed up at the ticket counter to pick up a boarding pass.

The General Accounting Office of Congress issued the findings in two reports on the Pentagon's lack of control over airline travel, copies of which the Associated Press obtained yesterday. A prior report, issued last November, found that the Pentagon bought 68,000 first-class or business-class airline seats for employees who should have flown coach.

"At a time when our soldiers are patrolling the streets of Iraq in unarmored Humvees, and when the Bush administration is asking for record defense spending, Secretary [Donald H.] Rumsfeld is letting hundreds of millions of dollars that could be used to protect our troops and our country go to waste," said Rep. Janice D. Schakowsky (D-Ill.), one of three lawmakers -- along with Republican Sens. Charles E. Grassley (Iowa) and Susan Collins (Maine) -- who ordered the studies.

The GAO estimated that between 1997 and 2003, the Defense Department bought at least \$100 million in tickets that were not used or used only partially by a passenger who did not complete all legs of a flight. The waste went undetected because the department relied on individuals to report the unused tickets. They did not.

The Pentagon said in a written statement that it is working to ensure it receives credit in the future for each unused ticket.

"We take this deficiency in our procedures very seriously and are moving swiftly to establish proper management controls. The long-term answer will be the automated Defense Travel System [DTS] that controls the travel order and payment process from beginning to end," the statement said. "DOD is researching the data presented in the GAO report and will continue to pursue the amounts we determine are recoupable."

The reimbursable tickets had no advanced purchase requirements, minimum or maximum stays or penalties for changes or cancellations under department agreements with the airlines.

While one GAO report focused on the unused tickets, the second investigation found potential fraud. It said the department paid travelers for tickets the department bought and reimbursed employees for tickets that had not been authorized.

11-L-0559/OSD/44637

- A limited review of records for 2001 and 2002 identified 27,000 transactions totaling more than \$8 million in reimbursements to employees for tickets bought by the government. These figures represent only a small portion of the potential fraud, the GAO said.

It is a crime for a government employee knowingly to request reimbursement for goods and services he or she did not buy.



TAB A

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SEP 21 2004

234 OCT 13 PM 3:1

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Manning of **Standing** Joint ~~Task~~ Forces

We **simply** have **to address** the problem of not having Standing Joint Task Forces capable of fighting wars. Please come back to me with a proposal.

Those timelines showing how undermanned headquarters are, long past after the **wars are** over. That is **not** acceptable in this day and age. Please come back with a **first** cut at a **proposal** soon – no later than Oct. 1. **This** is something we have been wrestling with in the **building** for 3 and a half years. We have to adapt to the imperatives of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Attach.  
CJTF-7 Manning Timeline

DHR:ss  
091304-17

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_


*DR*  
9/24/04

OSD 15980-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/44639


# CJTF-7 Manning Timeline



- activated
  - J1 receives Phase IV JMD from CJTF-7
  - Instruction published
  - CENTCOM forwards multiple JMD changes to JFCOM
  - J1 informs CENTCOM that the JMD is frozen for P&SR
- 6 23 Jan 04: JFCOM, JS J1 P&SR: Services agree to source 598 of 640 (93%) IAs in CJTF-7 Phase IV IA requirements
  - 7 11 Feb 04: JFCOM releases message tasking Services to fill CJTF-7 IA requirements.
  - 8 15 Apr 04: P&SR for MNF-I/MNC-I. End of CJTF-7 JMD
  - 9 15 May 04: MNF-I/MNC-I stand-up. CJTF-7 stands down
  - 10 15 Jun 04: MNF-I/MNC-I FOC



## CJTF-7 Manning Timeline





CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-8999

11-0559-05  
CM-2119-04  
13 October 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RFM 10/10*

SUBJECT: Manning of Standing Joint Task Forces

- **Issue.** "We simply have to address the problem of not having Standing Joint Task Forces capable of fighting wars. Please come back to me with a proposal. Those timelines showing how undermanned headquarters are, long past after the wars are over. ...Please come back with a first cut at a proposal soon--no later than Oct. 1. ...." (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** USJFCOM is developing a concept on forming, training and sustaining Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters (HQ). To address immediate manning concerns, a short-term solution will be provided to you by the end of October.
- **Discussion**
  - Regional combatant commands are on track establishing Standing Joint Force Headquarters in fiscal year 2005, as directed by the 2003 Defense Planning Guidance.
  - USJFCOM is developing a process for forming and sustaining future JTF HQs. It is taking a comprehensive approach, in collaboration with the Services, combatant commands and other agencies, which includes organizing, equipping and training future JTF HQs.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: RADM Donna L. Crisp, USN; Director, J-1 (b)(6)

OSD 15980-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44642

TAB A

SEP 21 2004 2:11 PM '04

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Manning of Standing Joint Task Forces

We simply have to address *the problem* of not having Standing Joint Task Forces capable of ~~fighting wars~~. Please come back to me with a proposal.

Those timelines showing how undermanned headquarters are, long past after the wars are over. That is not acceptable in this day and age. Please come back with a first cut at a proposal soon – no later than Oct. 1. This is something we have been wrestling with in the building for 3 and a half years. We have to adapt to the imperatives of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Attach.  
CJTF-7 Manning Timeline

DHR:s  
091304-17

.....  
Please respond by ~~9/29/04~~

OSD 15980-04

TAB A

11-L-0559/OSD/44643

FOUO

October 13, 2004

TO: Mira Ricardel

CC: Larry Di Rita  
 Doug Feith  
 VADM Jim Stavridis  
 Paul Butler  
*AMB J.D. COACH*

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Romania

I should not have gone to see the base in Romania. It leaves the impression that I might select it, and, if I don't, it turns out to be a negative for our friends in Romania.

Let's avoid this in the future.

Thanks.

DHR:as  
 101304-1

.....  
 Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

ROMANIA

OSD 16018-04

FOUO

13 OCT 04

11-L-0559/OSD/44644



TO: Larry Di Rita  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: June 6, 2004  
 SUBJECT: **William Mayer Article**

006

Let's make sure we get that William Mayer "D-Day" article out to as many people as you possibly can, as fast as you can. Send it out internally, and let's get it into the *Early Bird*.

Get a copy sent to Andy Card as well.

Possibly you might want to get it to the press people on the traveling team back at the Pentagon.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
 060604F.06ts

*Attach: If D-Day Had Been Reported*

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

6 Jun 04

OSD 16112-04

Date: 6/4/2004 10:25:13 AM Eastern Daylight Time  
From: "Schmautz, Kurt" <(b)(6)>  
To: "Dayton, Soren" <(b)(6)>, "Latimer, Matt" <(b)(6)>  
Sent from the Internet (Details)

## **If D-Day Had Been Reported On Today**

by William A. Mayer

Tragic French Offensive Stalled on Beaches (Normandy, France - June 6, 1944) - Pandemonium, shock and sheer terror predominate today's events in Europe.

In an as yet unfolding apparent fiasco, Supreme Allied Commander, Gen. Dwight David Eisenhower's troops got a rude awakening this morning at Omaha Beach here in Normandy.

Due to insufficient planning and lack of a workable entrance strategy, soldiers of the 1st and 29th Infantry as well as Army Rangers are now bogged down and sustaining heavy casualties inflicted on them by dug-in insurgent positions located 170 feet above them on cliffs overlooking the beaches which now resemble blood soaked killing fields at the time of this mid-morning filing.

Bodies, parts of bodies, and blood are the order of the day here, the screams of the dying and the stillness of the dead mingle in testament to this terrible event.

Morale can only be described as extremely poor--in some companies all the officers have been either killed or incapacitated, leaving only poorly trained privates to fend for themselves.

Things appear to be going so poorly that Lt. General Omar Bradley has been rumored to be considering breaking off the attack entirely. As we go to press embattled U.S. president Franklin Delano Roosevelt's spokesman has not made himself available for comment at all, fueling fires that something has gone disastrously awry.

The government at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue is in a distinct lock-down mode and the Vice President's location is presently and officially undisclosed.

Whether the second in command should have gone into hiding during such a crisis will have to be answered at some future time, but many agree it does not send a good signal.

Miles behind the beaches and adding to the chaos, U.S. Naval gunships have inflicted many friendly fire casualties, as huge high explosive projectiles rain death and destruction on unsuspecting Allied positions.

The lack of training of Naval gunners has been called into question numerous times before and today's demonstration seems to underlie those concerns.

At Utah Beach the situation is also grim, elements of the 82nd and 101st Airborne seemed to be in disarray as they missed their primary drop zones behind the area believed to comprise the militant's front lines. Errant paratroopers have been hung up in trees, breaking arms and legs, rendering themselves easy targets for those defending this territory.

On the beach front itself the landing area was missed, catapulting U.S. forces nearly 2,000 yards South of the intended coordinates, thus placing them that much farther away from the German insurgents and unable to direct covering fire or materially add to the operation.

11-L-0559/OSD/44646



were wounded in the haphazardly coordinated attack, which seems to have no unifying purpose or intent. Of this number at least 3,000 have been estimated as having been killed, making June 6th by far, the worst single day of the war which has dragged on now--with no exit strategy in sight--as the American economy still struggles to recover from Herbert Hoover's depression and its 25% unemployment.

Military spending has skyrocketed the national debt into uncharted regions, lending another cause for concern. When and if the current hostilities finally end it may take generations for the huge debt to be repaid.

On the planning end of things, experts wonder privately if enough troops were committed to the initial offensive and whether at least another 100,000 troops should have been added to the force structure before such an audacious undertaking. Communication problems also have made their presence felt making that an area for further investigation by the appropriate governmental committees.

On the home front, questions and concern have been voiced. A telephone poll has shown dwindling support for the wheel-chair bound Commander In Chief, which might indicate a further erosion of support for his now three year-old global war.

Of course, the President's precarious health has always been a question. He has just recently recovered from pneumonia and speculation persists whether or not he has sufficient stamina to properly sustain the war effort. This remains a topic of furious discussion among those questioning his competency.

Today's costly and chaotic landing compounds the President's already large credibility problem. More darkly, this phase of the war, commencing less than six months before the next general election, gives some the impression that Roosevelt may be using this offensive simply as a means to secure re-election in the fall.

Underlining the less than effective Allied attack, German casualties--most of them innocent and hapless conscripts--seem not to be as severe as would be imagined. A German minister who requested anonymity stated categorically that "the aggressors were being driven back into the sea amidst heavy casualties, the German people seek no wider war."

"The news couldn't be better," Adolph Hitler said when he was first informed of the D-Day assault earlier this afternoon.

"As long as they were in Britain we couldn't get at them. Now we have them where we can destroy them."

German minister Goebbels had been told of the Allied airborne landings at 0400 hours.

"Thank God, at last," he said. "This is the final round."

June 8, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: News Coverage

006

Duncan Hunter says his staff is doing a summary. They found out that the *Washington Post* did something like 50 or 60 articles on D-day and the Normandy invasion, and they did something like 107 on Abu Ghraib already.

You might want to talk to his staff about it. That is kind of an interesting fact. Don't use the numbers, because they are still working them up.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
060804-9

.....  
Please respond by 6/18/04

OSD 16113-04

8 Jun 04

12

EF-9825  
04/007758  
C 6/9

June 8, 2004

W  
W  
W

TO: Doug Feith  
cc: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Trip to Taiwan

DR

I don't think it is a good idea for Brigadier General Allen to go to Taiwan right now. What do you think?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
060804-14

.....  
Please respond by 6/11/04

WJF 6/9

NOTE FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy DTF 6/4/04

Per today's roundtable, BG Allen will not go.

8 Jun 04

OSD 16114-04

TO: Jim Haynes  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: June 6, 2004  
SUBJECT: Witness

✓ ✓

IRAQ

I notice that people are talking about me being a witness in Saddam Hussein's trial and also at an Abu Gahrib soldier's trial.

Do you know anything about it?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060604.07ts

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

6/5

*JA 7/8*  
*C 7/6*

Sir,  
Response attached.

*v/cdr Nosenz*  
*7/6*

6 JUN 04

OSD 15116-04



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

7/8

INFO MEMO

June 29, 2004, 6:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel 

SUBJECT: Potential Testimony at Trial of Saddam Hussein or Courts-Martial of Soldiers Accused of Abuses at Abu Ghraib Prison

- You asked about the potential of being called as a witness at either the trial of Saddam Hussein or at the courts-martial of soldiers charged with offenses at the Abu Ghraib Prison.

Saddam's Trial

- The Iraqis intend to try Saddam before the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) for crimes against humanity and other crimes against the Iraqi people. The IST is not yet up and running – its procedures, including those related to witness requests, have yet to be promulgated.
- Media reporting suggests that Saddam's defense counsel may request you as a witness, citing your service as President Reagan's Special Middle East Envoy in the 1980s.
- The defense team could try to call high-profile witnesses as in the Milosevic case before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Milosevic has listed President Clinton, Secretary Albright, Secretary Christopher, and General Clark as witnesses he would like to call. Due to delays in the case, including the replacement of the senior judge due to serious illness, this list has not yet been litigated.
- Such requests for senior U.S. officials or former officials, if approved by the court, present issues for the USG since the purpose would be to provide testimony about governmental rather than private actions. Testimony related to one's actions in a diplomatic capacity, such as your service as Special Middle East Envoy, present a significant additional factor that the USG would need to consider before deciding whether or not to provide the testimony.



11-L-0559/OSD/44651

- Since the IST process has not yet taken shape, it is too early to make an accurate assessment. My preliminary view, however, is that it is unlikely that the IST would order your testimony based on either your current or previous capacity. //

#### Court-Martial Cases

- Civilian defense attorneys for soldiers charged in Abu Ghraib cases have stated that they intend to call you and other senior civilian and military officials as defense witnesses.
- At recent pretrial hearings for two soldiers, however, counsel sought testimony from other senior officials but did not seek to compel your testimony. The military judge ordered that defense counsel be given the opportunity to interview GEN Abizaid, LTG Sanchez, and their subordinates. These interviews could lead to requests for certain senior officials to appear as witnesses at trial.
- Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the defense counsel must demonstrate the relevance and materiality of expected testimony; this requirement helps guard against frivolous requests for senior officials as witnesses.
- Even if defense counsel can meet the threshold of relevance and materiality, the trial counsel (prosecutor) could first seek other means to obtain the evidence deemed relevant. Normally, the trial judge would work with the attorneys to obtain the evidence deemed relevant by means other than the witness's attendance in court. The parties could agree to stipulate to facts or to the statement that the witness would be expected to offer were he or she to appear in court.
- My assessment is that it is unlikely in these cases that a court-martial would require your testimony. //

10:10 AM

TO: Ron Sega

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 1, 2004

SUBJECT:

Attached is a letter from a friend from college who is talking about a composite that has been developed. Are you aware of it?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060104.04

Attach: Ltr from Mac Williams to SD

Please respond by: 6/10

451

OSD 16117-04

1 JUN 04

May 19, 2004

(D)

Mr. Donald Rumsfeld

Dear Don,

Time will be precious at our 50" so I wanted to write some thoughts to share with you.

You know how I value our friendship. From the mats and Cap & Gown to Pensacola, to the nasty phone calls as you checked out in a new aircraft, to your meeting with Grant and the thoughts that we have shared by mail, you know how I feel about you and the jobs you have done.

Enough of that- Several questions- Why are we court marshaling a young (misguided) soldier so quickly yet- Saddam is no where near a trial which should result in his death? (D)

Some people have really let you down in Iraq. My friend Alex said we aren't getting the information that we should. There is a fine line as to what can be done to help catch the other bad guys but I know that somehow you will squeeze out the information that you need to save other servicemen.

One thing for the future- A Princetonian from Houston has developed a composite material with which he can make a vehicle that will stop an RPG and/or a 50 caliber bullet!! It would weigh 20% of the armored Humvee and provide the needed protection for the occupants. When you get back to D.C. would you please advise me to whom we might speak to explore a demonstration of the material? I have seen the material and it is truly amazing, 1/5 the weight of steel yet stronger!!

Dick Respass got a physics degree from Princeton, is an E.R.M.D. and has developed several cars in the past for auto racing. I recruited him years ago (as a single wing center) and have stayed in touch with him over the years. He is Class of '70 and a real character. We would love to talk to the proper procurement people, as the material could be a real breakthrough for your vehicles. Is Roy Du Boise still working for you? (D)

If you have time to talk with my Granddaughter it will be great. She would be a great catch for Princeton!! My best always to you and Joyce.


Best Regards, *always*

*Jim*  
Jim MacWilliam

11-L-0559/OSD/44654



11:01 AM

TO: Les Brownlee  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
DATE: June 1, 2004  
SUBJECT: **Media**

Would you please give me a one-pager on that point you made about WWII and D-Day, and how the press would be carrying it if they had 24/7 news back then.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060104.12

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

6/7

006

15 Jun 04

**OSD 16119-04**

11-L-0559/OSD/44655



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON  
INFO MEMO

June 7, 2004, 2:00 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Media, D-Day, and 24/7 news coverage

*Brownlee -  
Mr. Secretary -  
Shogren's is  
what you had in  
mind. Jea*

- Secretary of Defense's note of June 1, 2004, 11:01 A.M., requested a one-page response on World War II and D-Day, and how the press would be carrying it if they had 24/7 news back then.
- One-page information paper attached. Conclusion is that media technology and practices developed over the past sixty years might have proven disastrous at Normandy - and perhaps are dysfunctional now.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared by: LTC John Shaw (b)(6)

## Information Paper: Thoughts on D-Day and Current Media Practices

1. Current media practices might have led to some of the headlines below and put the campaign at risk in several ways: shaking the confidence of the American public and the troops, inviting premature Congressional or Administration involvement, and compromising the operational plan itself or the deception plan upon which operational success depended.
2. **TOP SECRET OVERLORD PLAN CALLS FOR MASSIVE AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE ASSAULTS IN NORMANDY!!** With today's 24/7 news cycle it might be impossible to keep news of such a massive operation a closely guarded secret. The tendency of news "leaks" and news organizations putting the public's "right to know" above all other considerations would likely lead to premature compromise.
3. **GERMANS DUPED; NORMANDY THE MAIN ATTACK!!!** Allied deception plans depended upon Germans believing the main attack would be the Pas de Calais, even after landings at Normandy had already occurred. A complex charade portrayed an entire dummy army commanded by Patton scattered across the southeastern English countryside. Given the intrusiveness of international reporting today and the rapidity of media distribution, could this secret have been kept? Would the media have revealed what they could find of the war plan, perhaps indirectly by the virtue of retired senior officers who know our organizational habits so well they can inevitably connect the dots while on international broadcasts?
4. **LANDINGS BOTCHED; HUNDREDS DEAD ON THE BEACHES!!!** War is usually untidy. A lot can look wrong even when things are going well overall. A media tendency to focus negatively on the sensational or tragic distorts the overall picture. While D-Day was a striking success, with the bulk of nine divisions ashore on the first day and casualties far more modest than anticipated by operational planners, nevertheless a lot went wrong. The 116<sup>th</sup> regiment in the very first wave took extremely heavy casualties before making their way onto shore, amphibious tanks sank in rough seas, Rangers attacked positions already emptied of their guns at Pont du Hoc, paratroopers were widely scattered, some landing craft hit the wrong beaches, the Air Corps missed key designated targets, and French civilians were killed in preparatory bombardments. The larger success of getting tens of thousands ashore with thousands of tons of equipment in the face of stiff opposition might be lost in media reports that focused on these negative events. How would the public and the troops have reacted to a real time fixation on those things that went wrong?
5. **EISENHOWER MAY BE CALLED BACK FOR HEARINGS; MANY CALL FOR MARSHALL AND STINSON TO RESIGN; FDR REELECTION IN DOUBT!** Congress and the Administration understandably want to contribute to mission success. Alarming news or apparent controversy can trigger their intervention – often unnecessarily or prematurely. Eisenhower launched in uncertain weather, significant tensions lurked beneath the apparent amity of the uniformed allies, and much went wrong on the first day. Allied military leaders worked through all of this successfully. How dysfunctional would the distraction have been if they had had to respond in real time to their political leadership to every rumor or whiff of controversy?
6. Tensions among operational security, the delegation of command authority and the freedom of the press present an enormous challenge to the conduct of modern warfare. Media technology and practices developed over the past sixty years might have proven disastrous at Normandy – and perhaps are dysfunctional now.

72

File

11:35 AM

793

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 1, 2004

SUBJECT: **Round Table**

IRAQ

Do you have any thoughts on this paper from Steve Cambone? Do you think it is OBE or is there something we ought to be doing. Let's talk at Round Table.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060104.15

*Attach: Thoughts on Next Steps in Iraq 5/28/04 - Cambone*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ 6/8

OSD 16121-04

1 Jun 04

28 May 2004, 10:10

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: STEVE CAMBONE *SC*

SUBJECT: THOUGHTS ON NEXT STEPS IN IRAQ

The handover of sovereignty is a ready-made opportunity to reset DOD relationships with State and CIA to ensure closer cooperation and greater effectiveness in the pursuit of U.S. objectives in Iraq.

Following are thoughts on steps you might consider taking to reset those relationships:

- Host a meeting with the Secretary of State, the DCI, Ambassador Negroponte, and General George Casey.
  - Agenda:
    - Settling the question of, "Who's in charge?"
    - Establishing a communications plan so that each of you is kept informed of the activities of the other and coordination is done expeditiously on important issues;
    - Clarification on "lanes in the road in Iraq."
    - Creation of a State-DOD-CIA support group in Washington, D.C., to back-stop Baghdad. It could be State-chaired and held accountable for resolving issues or, if they cannot resolve them quickly, for referring them to you, the Secretary of State, and the DCI.
- DOD team. This could be an opportunity to put a new face on DOD's lead for Iraqi affairs. It would have the advantage of freeing the OSD Policy shop from detailed day-to-day support while, at the same time, allowing for the creation of a more operationally and technically oriented mission support staff.

*SC*

11-L-0559/OSD/44659

- It should be dedicated to the “back-office work” that would be needed to support Negroponte and Casey.
- This mission support staff should be a combined staff drawn from across OSD, the services, and the Joint Staff.
- It could be led by a senior DOD career civilian (e.g., Pete Verga, Lisa Bronson, etc.).
- It should have a military deputy drawn from either the services or the Joint Staff.
- It might occupy the spaces to be vacated by the CPA.
- Extending your influence over the DOD portion of the mission in Iraq. I have spoken with General Casey about the organization of his headquarters. I urged him to create a “strategy cell” whose sole purpose would be to give strategic direction to the military campaign in Iraq. The essence of that direction would be to craft military operations explicitly and specifically to support the broader political objectives we are pursuing and to identify those political, economic, reconstruction, and communications, etc., tasks to be directed by the U.S. Mission or the Iraqi government in support of military operations.
  - This might very well be the conduit through which you, the CJCS, General Abizaid, and General Casey might communicate and plan. As such, it would also serve as your channel for communication through Casey to Negroponte.

Whether you would embrace any or all of the above is, in my view, less important than your consideration of how we might make use of the transition of sovereignty to make a “new start” in our approach to affairs in Iraq. I believe that this can and should be done without any suggestion of dissatisfaction with the current arrangement. Instead, it should be presented as the recognition of the fact that circumstances on the ground are changing and that we are adjusting, in an appropriate manner, how we are going to deal with those circumstances.

11:39 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 1, 2004

SUBJECT: **Time Line**

This Time Line is getting better. Let's bring it up to date to June 1<sup>st</sup>, let's add the Abu Ghraib photos, and I think maybe the suspension of the tanker is a pretty big thing, and maybe a few points where we show what percentage of our 48 Presidential Appointees are filled, and update this on a quarterly basis. I think that is important to show. Then ask some other people what else might be added.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060104.16

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*6/10*

*383.6*

*17 Jun 04*

**OSD 16122-04**

11-L-0559/OSD/44661






Draft

Timeline



2001




Draft

Timeline




2002




Draft

Timeline





2004



11:56 AM

TO: Gen. Pete Schoomaker

cc: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 1, 2004

SUBJECT: **Working Draft 2/9/04 – A Campaign Quality Army with a Joint And Expeditionary Mindset**

0005

This working draft Army White Paper of an Army at War is excellent! I saw the February 9<sup>th</sup> draft. I assume you have a later one. When you get it finished, I would like a copy to send over to the President.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060104.19

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

**OSD 16125-04**

13004

*Serving a Nation at War*

*A Campaign Quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset*

*(Draft Army White Paper)*



### Strategic Context

Our Army is serving a Nation at war. To win this war the Nation must meld all elements of our national power in a broad, unyielding, and relentless campaign to defeat those who challenge our very way of life. This is not a 'contingency,' nor is it a 'crisis.' It is a new reality that Soldiers understand all too well: since 9/11, more than a battalion's worth killed in action, more than a brigade's worth severely wounded. Their sacrifice has liberated more than 46 million souls from oppression. As these words are written, the Army is undertaking the largest rotation of forces in its history, and 9 of its 10 active divisions—all but the 2 ID already committed to Korea—will have seen action in Afghanistan or Iraq. More than 128,000 reservists have been activated in the last 2 years, and more than 300,000 Soldiers are forward deployed. We are an Army at War.

For any war, as Clausewitz pointed out, it is essential to understand "the kind of war on which (we) are embarking." Although the fundamental nature of war is constant, its methods and techniques change, chameleon-like, to match the strategic context and operational capabilities at hand. The United States is driving a rapid evolution in the methods and techniques of war. Our

"The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish ... the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that it is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive."

Clausewitz, *On War*

A cursory examination of the ideas in competition may forecast the depth and duration of this conflict. The United States, its economy dependent on overseas resources and trade, has launched a wave of globalization in both markets and ideas. Regions and countries prepared to participate in this phenomenon have benefited. For others, it has precipitated failure, resentment, and rejection. Especially in the Muslim world, while some have embraced modernity, others remain content with the traditional patterns of Islam, and a few are irreconcilably opposed to the modernizing influences of the West. Committed to preserving the secular authority of religion, and intolerant of any faith other than Islam, their ideas directly conflict with western ideas of religious freedom and secular pluralism. Even reduced to a one or two percentage of the Islamic world, this pool of irreconcilables poses a threat of several *million* potential combatants.

And this is but one of the challenges we currently face. In the Far East, North Korea's threatened nuclearization risks intensifying more than 50 years of unremitting hostility, and North Korea is not the only potential enemy actively seeking weapons of mass destruction. Today, moreover, we confront a growing risk that such weapons will find their way into the hands of non-state groups or individuals anxious to apply them to our homeland, and with no homelands of their own to protect. Meanwhile, the technologies — particularly information technologies — that underwrite our current conventional military advantages are highly fungible, and it is not unrealistic to foresee a time when regional competitors may achieve parity or perhaps even superiority in “niche” military technologies tailored to their political ambitions. Concurrently, we see emerging operational concepts and capabilities that will enable us to pursue ways of war that are increasingly rapid, simultaneous, and non-contiguous. These future operational requirements loom even as we must pursue our current conflict.

Some might equate our current challenge to the Cold War but there are critical distinctions :

- Our non-state adversaries are not satisfied with a “cold” standoff, but instead seek at every turn to make it “hot.”
- Our own forces can't focus solely on future overseas contingencies, but also must defend bases and facilities both at home and abroad today.
- Because some of our adversaries are not easily deterred, our national strategy is not “defensive” but “preventive.”
- Above all, because at least some current adversaries consider “peaceful coexistence” with the United States unacceptable, we must either alter the convictions prompting their hostility or destroy them outright by war.

That is neither the context nor the strategy for which we designed today's United States Army. Therefore the Army must meet the supreme test of all armies: *to rapidly adapt to circumstances which it could not foresee*. Fundamental to that adaptation will be our rapid evolution to *a campaign quality Army with a joint and expeditionary mindset*.

### **Expeditionary**

The Army is no stranger to expeditionary operations. WWI saw deployment of the American Expeditionary Forces, WWII the Allied Expeditionary Force, and since WWII the Army has executed a wide array of operations involving the temporary deployment of ground forces to distant places. But by some today, the United States Army is no longer perceived to be “expeditionary.” That perception is largely an artifact of the prolonged forward stationing of Army forces during the Cold War, when the Army focused on known rather than hypothetical threats, on developed rather than austere theaters, and on rapid reinforcement rather than contingency deployment. Historically, such conditions have been the exception rather than the rule, and so they are today.

Some might argue that the primary distinction of an expeditionary operation is its short duration. Neither history nor strategic guidance – which calls for expeditionary forces capable of sustained operations – confirm such a definition. Others view expeditionary



as speed of responsiveness, but this perception, too, is not complete. In the Cold War the United States was prepared to reinforce Europe with 10 divisions within 10 days, but this responsiveness was not perceived as "expeditionary." The reason for this is significant: in the Cold War we knew exactly where we would fight and we met this requirement through prepositioning of units or unit sets in a very developed theater. The uncertainty as to where we must deploy, the probability of a very austere operational environment, and the requirement to fight on arrival throughout the battlespace, pose an entirely different challenge – and the fundamental distinction of expeditionary operations.

This challenge is above all one of mindset, because American soldiers are predisposed with good reason to seek certainty, planning, preparation and synchronization in the application of force. We have engaged repeatedly in conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity, to be sure, but always viewing such operations as the exception rather than the rule. That must no longer be the case. In this globalized world, our enemies shift resources and activities to those areas least accessible to us. As an elusive and asymmetric enemy seeks refuge in the far corners of the earth, the "norm" will be short notice operations, extremely austere theaters of operation, incomplete information – indeed, the requirement to fight *for* information, rather than fight *with* information. This is the essence of the expeditionary mindset we seek.

## **Joint**

The touchstone of our style of warfare is combinations, a style in which no nation on earth can match us. Each of our armed services excels in combining a wide array of technologies and tools in each dimension—land, air, sea and space—to generate a synergy that overwhelms our opponents. Today, that same emphasis on combinations extends beyond single service to joint operations. No longer satisfied merely to deconflict the activities of the several services, we now seek joint *interdependence*.

Interdependence is more than just interoperability, the assurance that service capabilities can work together smoothly. It is even more than integration to improve their collective efficiency and tempo. Instead, joint interdependence combines service capabilities to maximize their complementary rather than merely reinforcing effects, concurrently using each to offset the vulnerabilities of the others. There are several compelling reasons for doing so:

- First, modern technology has extended the reach of weapons far beyond their "dimensions of origin." For example, land-based cruise missiles threaten ships at sea, and land-based air defenses pose challenges to air, sea and even space-based capabilities. Defeating the mirror-image threat within a service's primary dimension of interest will no longer suffice.

- Second, in addition to achieving daunting supremacy within the air, maritime, and space dimensions, our sister services are developing increasingly powerful capabilities that can influence land combat directly.

- Third, the very nature of expeditionary operations argues for leveraging every potential tool of speed, operational reach, and precision, the very strengths offered by our sister services.

The central prerequisites of a commitment to interdependence are broad understanding of the differing strengths and limitations of each service's capabilities, clear agreement about how those capabilities will be committed in any given operational setting, and absolute mutual trust that, once committed, they will be employed as agreed.

At the strategic level, interdependence has pervaded the Army's thinking for over a century. Bereft of organic strategic lift, we can neither deploy nor sustain ourselves without the support of the other services. But our commitment to interdependence has not always extended to the tactical level. Constrained by the tyranny of terrain, ground forces operate in an environment in which movement and observation are restricted, command and control are fragile, and the risk of surprise is omnipresent. That inherent friction encourages a preference for organizational autonomy and redundancy, and tends to prejudice soldiers against relying on others for essential ingredients of tactical survival and success. In the past, moreover, that prejudice too often has both prompted and been reinforced by inter-service rivalries reflecting concerns far removed from the practical imperatives of the battlefield.

An Army at War can't afford that indulgence. War has a bad habit of exposing theories built upon prejudice rather than proof, and Iraq and Afghanistan have been no different. The "air or sea or land" power debates are over. Our collective future is irrefutably joint. To meet the challenges of expeditionary operations, the Army can and must embrace the capabilities of its sister services right down to the tactical level. In turn, that will require us to develop operational concepts and capabilities that are joint from the outset, not merely as an alterthought.

### **Campaign Quality**

While our two magnificently successful campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq provide a tantalizing glimpse of the nascent power of jointness and of the unarguable need for expeditionary capabilities,

"... even within Iraq itself, there are different challenges based on where you are. MG Dave Petraeus (101st Division in Mosul, northern Iraq) is doing a great job in the north, with the demographics he has up there. But that differs from what MG Ray Odierno (4th Infantry Division, Tikrit area) is doing. MG Chuck Swannack (82nd Airborne) has a different challenge in the west. And BG Marty Dempsey in the 1st Armor Division has Baghdad and he deals with entirely different conditions. And we are working with Coalition Forces, the British in particular, and with the Poles I think we are learning a lot, but at the same time we are learning that we can't forget there are other challenges out there that the Army has to be prepared to face. So right up front I will tell you that we are very mindful that you can't apply all of the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan to the responsibilities that the Army has to defend the nation and be part of the joint team."

GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff

those same experiences also demonstrate that neither the duration nor the character of even the most brilliantly conducted campaign is readily predictable. Especially in wars intended to liberate rather than subjugate, decisive victory implies winning a competition of ideas, and thereby fundamentally changing the conditions that prompted the conflict. Long after the defeat of Taliban and Iraqi military forces, we continue to wage just such campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. The campaigning qualities of an Army thus entail not only its ability to conduct sustained combat operations throughout a battlespace of shifting scope, but also its ability to adapt its operations to unpredictable but often profound changes in the context and character of the conflict. The Army's preeminent challenge, then, within the joint framework, is to reconcile the agility and responsiveness to conduct rapid expeditionary deployments with the power, durability and adaptability to carry a conflict to a victorious conclusion no matter what form it eventually takes.

***"Are You Wearing Your Dogtags?"***

"Are you wearing your dogtags?" Does the question surprise you? It might if you view peace as the norm, and war the exception. But our new reality is simple:

- a conflict of irreconcilable ideas
- a desperate pool of potential combatants numbering in the millions
- adaptive adversaries seeking our destruction by any means possible
- an evolving asymmetric threat that will relentlessly seek shelter in those environments and methods for which we are least prepared.
- a foreseeable future of extended conflict in which we can expect to fight every day, and in which real peace will be the anomaly.

This new reality drives the transformation underway in the United States Army. Be it "mindset," "culture," or "attitude," it is the lens that shapes our perception and interpretation of the future, and governs our responses to its challenges. It is the logic for a campaign quality Army with a joint and expeditionary mindset. Are you wearing your dog tags?

**"On September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, terrorists left their mark of murder on my country ... With the passing of months and years, it is the natural human desire to resume a quiet life and to put that day behind us, as if waking from a dark dream. The hope that danger has passed is comforting, is understanding, and it is false ... These terrorists target the innocent and they kill by the thousands. And they would, if they gain the weapons they seek, kill by the millions and not be finished. ... The evil is in plain sight ... We will face these threats with open eyes, and we will defeat them."**

**President Bush in London, Nov 19, 2003**

## Changing for Conflict

### The Center of Our Formations

In a time of profound change, the United States Army can rely on only one certainty: The American Soldier will remain the center of our formations. In today's conflict, indeed, the Soldier is the weapon of choice. Able to fight even when deprived of nearly every tool but his or her skill, courage, and determination, the Soldier remains the irreplaceable foundation of the dynamic array of combinations that America will generate to defeat our enemies in any expeditionary environment. As the ultimate combination of sensor and shooter, the American Soldier is irrefutable proof that people are more important than hardware and quality more important than quantity.

Making Soldiers more effective and survivable is the first requirement of adaptation to a joint and expeditionary environment. However much the tools of war may improve, only

"Every Soldier is a Soldier first, regardless of whether they're a truck driver or a typist, a maintainer or infantryman. While technology has helped the Army become more lethal and effective, individual Soldiers still do the fighting ... technology has to enhance the human dimension. ... Warfare fundamentally is a human endeavor. It's a test of wills. It's a test of things deep within us."

Army Chief of Staff  
General Peter J. Schoomaker

Soldiers with the capacity to endure the hardships of war can exploit them. Their very identity will evolve as the specialization that contributed so effectively to industrial age warfare gives way to greater flexibility, multifunctionality, and a warrior ethos. That ethos reflects the spirit of the pioneers who built our homeland, of whom it rightly

was said: "*The cowards never came. The brave arrived. The tough remained.*" It is a subtle, aggressive but controlled spirit based on quiet competence. It is recognition that closing with an enemy is not simply a matter of killing, but rather imposing one's will on that enemy to achieve the nation's purpose. It is the ultimate responsibility reserved only for the professional whose responsibility and discipline can moderate war's inevitable brutality.

Just as the Nation's expectations are evolving to reflect the realities of our current conflict, so too will expectations of Soldiers and their families. They will expect field duty before garrison duty. They will expect tactical movements and combat drills before drill and ceremony. They will expect deployment before reassignment. They will expect surprise before certainty. They will measure quality of life in terms of meaningful deployments and service to the Nation.

As brave and tough Americans join the United States Army, our values and training will transform them into warriors of character. Bound to each other by integrity and trust, they will learn that in the United States Army, every Soldier is a leader, responsible for what happens in his or her presence regardless of rank. They will value learning and adaptability at every level, particularly as it contributes to *initiative*: creating situations

for an adversary, rather than reacting to them. They will learn that the Army reflects an ethos of selfless service to the nation—a warrior culture, not a corporate one. And they will learn that it is not important who gets the credit, either within the Army or within the joint community; what’s important is that the Nation is served.

## **Organizing for Conflict**

Confronting an adaptive adversary, no singular solution will succeed, no matter how elegant, synchronized, or advanced. Its very ‘perfection’ will ensure its irrelevance, for an adaptive enemy will relentlessly eliminate the vulnerabilities it seeks to exploit and avoid the conditions necessary for its success. Instead, the touchstones of Army Transformation are diversity and adaptability. The Army must retain a wide range of capabilities while significantly improving their flexibility and versatility. Building an expeditionary Army with campaign qualities will require versatile forces that can mount smaller and shorter duration operations routinely without penalty to the Army’s ability to transition to larger and more prolonged campaigns.

**Modular Units.** A key prerequisite to achieving that capability is developing more modular tactical organizations. The Army’s force design has incorporated tailoring and task organization for decades, but primarily in the context of a large conventional war in which all echelons from platoon to Army Service Component Command were deployed. This presumption of infrequent, large-scale deployment allowed the Army to centralize certain functions at higher echelons of command, and implicitly assumed that deployment would largely be complete before employment began. Moreover, presuming peace to be the default condition, the Army garrisoned the bulk of its tactical units with a view to economic efficiency and management convenience rather than combined arms training and rapid deployment. Above all, the Army designed its capabilities to satisfy every tactical requirement independently, treating sister service capabilities as supplementary.

These presumptions no longer apply. Simultaneous employment and deployment increasingly characterize Army operations, and those operations are increasingly diverse in both purpose and scope. Tailoring and task organizing our current force structure for such operations renders an ad hoc deployed force and a residue of partially dissembled, non-deployed structure. The premium now is on effectiveness at lower levels vice efficiency at macro levels. Peace will be the exception, and both tactical organizations and garrison configurations must be designed for expeditionary deployment, not simply improvise it. Force design must catch up with strategic reality.

Our strategic reality is the need for smaller, more agile units ... and more of them. Increasingly, ownership of capabilities by echelons and even by services matters less than how those capabilities are allocated to missions. If the Army can leverage its sister service’s mobility, speed, and flexibility to meet its mission requirements, all the better. Being expeditionary is far less about deployability than it is about operational and tactical agility, including the ability to reach beyond organic capabilities for the required effects. We must expand our view of Army force design to encompass the entire range of



available joint capabilities. At the end of the day, squads and platoons will continue to win our battles, but no one can reliably predict which squads or platoons will come into contact with the enemy or when. In an expeditionary environment, they must be so well networked with other joint capabilities that whichever are in contact can win.

Nor is such joint interdependence unidirectional. The more modular the Army's capabilities, the better we will be able to support our sister services, whether by the air defense protection of an advanced sea base, compelling an enemy ground force to mass and thereby furnish targets for air attack, or exploiting the transitory effects of precision fires with the more permanent effects of maneuver.

Although divisions have long been the nominal measure of the Army's fighting strength, recent operations increasingly have witnessed deployment and employment of multi-functional brigade combat teams of various types in varying combinations. In the future, by shifting to brigade combat teams as our basic units of maneuver, endowing them routinely with adequate combat, combat support, and sustainment capabilities, and assuring them connectivity to higher and joint assets, we can significantly improve the tailorability and scalability of the Army's contribution to the overall joint fight. At the same time, the inherent robustness and self-sufficiency of brigade combat teams will enhance their ability to deploy rapidly and fight on arrival.

**Modular Headquarters.** The transformation of our headquarters will be even more dramatic than that of our units, for we will sever the routine association between headquarters and the units they control. At division level and higher, headquarters will be stripped of organic subordinate formations, becoming themselves streamlined modular organizations capable of commanding and controlling any combination of capabilities, Army or Joint. For that purpose, the headquarters themselves will be more robust, staffed to minimize the requirement for augmentation from subordinate organizations. They will have separable, deployable command posts for rapid response and entry; home station operations center to minimize forward footprints, and network-enabled organizations, capable of commanding of supporting joint and multinational forces.

Today, because our tactical headquarters elements lack the necessary joint interfaces, we have to improvise these when operations begin. That must change. Every division-level headquarters will need to be capable of managing Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC) operations. Similarly, every corps-level headquarters must be designed from the outset with enough permanent sister service staff positions to permit it to receive and employ a Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) plug, enabling it to serve with equal effectiveness as a Joint Task Force or JFLCC headquarters, command Army tactical units directly, or act as the Army Service Component Command.

**Stabilizing the Force.** Paradoxically, an Army that seeks maximum flexibility through modular units and headquarters must simultaneously maximize unit cohesion where it counts, within our companies, battalions and brigades. Once again, our altered strategic context is the driver. In the past, our approach to unit manning reflected the industrial age in which our forces were developed. People were treated as interchangeable parts, and

their administrative availability was valued more highly than their individual and team proficiency. At the unit level, manning and equipping reflected a 'first-to-last' strategic deployment system. Peace was the paradigm, and late deploying units could be filled out at leisure, typically by individual replacements, during the expected prolonged transition from peace to war.

At a time when continuous conflict has become the default condition, in which major portions of our Army will repeatedly be deployed and employed, such an approach to manning won't work. We must make two significant changes:

- First, we will shift the logic of our force structure from a scenario basis to a rotation basis, for we will need an adequate level of capability not only for employment, but also for training, refitting, and rest. An adequate rotation base is needed to allow units to cycle through these operational phases.
- Second, the tiering of readiness by 'early' and 'late' deployers will disappear – because there will be no 'late deployers', merely 'future deployers' who are at different stages of their rotation cycle.

To satisfy the recurring commitments anticipated in an Army at War, units must sustain a level of readiness that far exceeds the ability of an individual manning system. The effects we seek are broad: continuity in training, stability of leadership, unit cohesion, enhanced unit readiness and combat effectiveness, and greater deployment predictability for Soldiers and their families. To achieve them we will need to undertake the most significant revision in manning policy in our Army's history.

Our first task is to redesign the Army's force structure to support unit rotation. The next is to establish unit manning by synchronizing Soldier's tours with those units' operational cycles. While accidents and casualties will preclude eliminating individual replacement altogether, routine attrition of deployed units must be minimized. Our final task is to establish home basing, stabilizing the assignment of Soldiers and their families at home stations and communities across recurring rotations.

***Why Force Stabilization: An Individual Replacement on the Road to Badghad***

"... I graduated from Ranger School March 14th and reported to Fort Bragg a week later. By April 2nd I was on a plane headed to Kuwait. I figured I'd get to recover and spend time learning my battalion with some time as a staff assistant. My Battalion Commander says I lived every infantry officer's dream because I was given a platoon immediately. My platoon and company were engaged in combat the night I met them. The next morning I led my platoon as the company main effort in a raid across the bridge in the battle of As Sawana. In the morning light I did not recognize my PSG or RTO as I had not seen their faces in light. They looked very different from how I had pictured them in my mind." (United States Military Academy Graduate, Class of 2002)

As any personnel manager would tell you ... "this changes everything." And so it will. Today's individual soldier and leader development programs, for example, were not designed to accommodate force stabilization. They must change. Current command tour policies do not accommodate force stabilization. They must change. There have been many previous attempts to experiment with force stabilization, but those attempts always focused narrowly on only a few portions of the Army and invariably failed as a result. Stabilizing the force can be achieved only through a comprehensive redesign.

### **Adjusting the Total Force Mix**

Changes required in our Reserve Component (RC) organizations will match—indeed, may exceed—those in the Active Component (AC). RC forces will remain a vital part of the Army's deployable combat power, but their allocation among functional requirements must change both to accommodate the demands of an expeditionary environment and in recognition of the RC's expanded role in homeland security. In any case, an industrial age approach to mobilization no longer will suffice. To accommodate the uncertainties of today's conflict environment, RC mobilization must take less time and allow more granular management of individual and unit readiness, mobilization and demobilization, deployment and redeployment, and post-deployment recovery.

The near term requirement is to adjust the AC/RC mix so that AC forces can execute the first 30 days of any deployment without regard for the nature of the commitment, and thus with whatever functional capabilities are required. For that purpose, some high demand, low density capabilities currently found only in the RC must be reincorporated in the active force. At the same time, while RC units will not be expected to deploy in the first 30 days, they will require responsiveness measured in *hours* for security operations within our homeland. That, and the need to build predictability into RC deployments so that RC forces can expect routinely to deploy no more than one year in six, will require increasing the proportion of high demand, low density units in the RC as well.

Finally, the arguments for shifting to rotation-based unit manning rather than individual replacement apply as much to the RC as to the AC. As with the AC, therefore, a way must be found to reconcile unit mobilization, training and deployment with the personnel overhead account (Trainees, Transients, Holders and Students -- TTHS).

### **Training and Education**

To change the mindset of an Army, few tools are as important as its programs of training and education. The United States Army has long set the standard among the services and across the world in its commitment to soldier and leader development. This strong legacy is our fulcrum from which to leverage change. We train for certainty while educating for uncertainty. This conflict poses both.

**Individual Training.** The certainty confronting today's Soldiers is overseas deployment and probable combat. Many will enter combat within weeks or months of their basic and



advanced individual training. Thrust into a conflict in which potential adversaries number in the millions, our soldiers must believe and demonstrate that quality is more important than quantity, people are more important than hardware. On the battlefields we face, there are no front lines and rear areas. The rear is often the front, and there are no "secure" garrisons or convoys. Soldiers are warriors first, specialists only second.

"We don't have the luxury of time right now. We graduate soldiers, and a short time later they are deploying ... When soldiers arrive in Baghdad and get off the planes and into Humvees, they are immediately thrust into combat operations. ... They have to go in with a mind-set that they will engage and kill the enemy on their first day in country."

SFC Gallagher, IET Trainer

The warrior experience will be tough; Soldier training must be stressful, beyond the comfort zone. We must move beyond the 72-hour field

conflict of daunting ambiguity and complexity, Soldiers will need a fundamental attitude of *multifunctionality* rather than *specialization*, *curiosity* rather than *complacency*, and *initiative* rather than *compliance*.

**Collective Training.** Our Combat Training Centers (CTCs) drive the tactical culture of the Army. They are the linchpin of our extraordinary battlefield success over the past several

"Dispersed fighting, whether the dispersal is caused by the terrain, the lack of supplies, or by the weapons of the enemy, will have two major requirements - skilled and determined junior leaders and self-reliant, physically hard, well-disciplined troops. Success in future land operations will depend on the immediate availability of such leaders and soldiers, ready to operate in small, independent formations."

Field Marshal William Slim, WW II

That reluctance, however, violated the "task-condition-standard" requirements of Army training doctrine, since a joint context has become an inevitable condition of every Army employment. Recognizing that, we have begun introducing joint, interagency, and multinational components into our key training experiences at both the "dirt" CTCs and our Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) for division and corps headquarters. We also are proactively supporting establishment of the Joint National Training Center (JNTC) and routinely introducing consideration of joint effects in our home station

training. All these efforts will make Soldiers expert in the application of joint capabilities at every organizational level.

Additional change is underway at the CTCs. In very short order, the threat environment has been transformed to reflect the complexity and ambiguity experienced by our deployed forces, not only at the Joint Readiness Training Center, but also at the National Training Center. Transforming the training mindset will not be as easy, for we must shake a legacy of planning-centric rather than execution-centric collective training. We need battle drills rather than rock drills, and units conditioned to fight for information, not wait passively to *receive* it. Integrated with force stabilization cycles, CTCs will be the capstone experience for forces preparing to rotate to their deployment phase.

**Education.** Just as training must reflect the hard certainties of the conflict before us, individual Soldier and leader education must address the uncertainties of those we may confront in the future. George C. Marshall once said that an Army at peace must go to school. Our challenge is to go to school while at war. The need to teach Soldiers and leaders *how to think* rather than *what to think* has never been more clear. To defeat adaptive enemies, we must out-think them as well as out-fight them.

Adaptive leaders must instinctively eschew mirror-imaging, for an asymmetric enemy will relentlessly seek areas of vulnerability and surprise. We also must exploit our own asymmetric advantages, particularly information, but be cautious in relying on them. We can have perfect knowledge without understanding. Appreciation of context transforms knowledge to understanding, and only education can make that context accessible to us. Technology can enhance human capabilities, but at the end of the day, war remains more art than science, and its successful prosecution will require battle command more than battle management. Only education informed by experience will encourage soldiers and leaders to meet the irreducible uncertainties of war with confidence, and to act decisively even when events fail to conform to planning assumptions and expectations.

Greater emphasis on adaptive execution will require us to rethink a military decision-making process (MDMP) that hasn't changed in its essentials for nearly half a century, and that was devised originally to assure systematic planning of set-piece operations by relatively inexperienced and untrained leaders. As we improve leaders' skill and knowledge, that rote style of decision-making can be replaced with a more artful application of leader knowledge and intuition that encourages greater adaptation and initiative within the commander's intent. Planning will become iterative rather than linear, more a framework for learning and adjusting than a rigid template for action. Adjusting the MDMP thus will allow us to capitalize on the American soldier's inherent versatility, our growing ability to acquire and process information, and the increased rapidity with which planning adjustments can be disseminated, coordinated, and transformed into effective action.

To that end, the Army already has begun to refocus institutional learning, shifting Center for Army Lessons Learned collection assets from the CTCs to forward employed units. Similarly, recognizing that a learning-driven organization has no room for a culture of

information ownership, we are working to streamline the flow of combat information to assure broader and faster dissemination of actionable intelligence. At the individual level, finally, there is no substitute for experiential learning. Some of the best lessons learned are associated with honest, even tragic mistakes. We can not allow a zero defects mentality to write off such learners too early, and we should review our leader evaluation systems to ensure they are leader development tools and not mere management sorting tools.

The Army **has** always prized leader development, and in an era dominated by peace would take risk to facilitate it. An emphasis on career-broadening experiences, however, makes less sense in an environment where most commanders will employ their units in combat. The Army does not exist to broaden careers, and units are not training aides for a commander. Effective collective training requires the participation of the entire team. Especially in an environment requiring more multi-functional junior leaders, we must avoid too rapid a turnover of those leaders in the name of career development.

The problem is somewhat less acute for middle- and senior-grade officers, among whom some degree of specialization is unavoidable. Even in their case, however, the increasing complexity, uncertainty, and political sensitivity associated with joint and expeditionary operations urges some measure of stabilization in assignments that inherently involve interpreting complex requirements and implementing sophisticated solutions. This completes a trend already begun in recent changes to officer management.

At the individual level, Army leader development will be subordinate to mission requirements; so too at the institutional level it will be subordinate to joint requirements. If we are to create a culture that

"I'd just like to tell you right up front and declare I am a joint officer, who happens to be in the Army, who happens to be the Chief of Staff of the Army right now."

**Army Chief of Staff  
General Peter J. Schoomaker**

empowers our leaders to think beyond their own service for creative solutions to tactical and operational problems, Army leader development must be fully joint, incorporating joint education and experience. We must build a bench of leaders able think creatively at all levels of war, leaders able to operate comfortably in joint, inter-agency, and multi-national environments. And if achieving that requires submitting our internal educational institutions to joint oversight, we should not shrink from it.

## **Doctrine and Materiel**

**Doctrine.** The Army rightfully views itself as "doctrine-based." In the 1970s and 1980s, doctrine was the engine that transformed the post-Vietnam Army into the victor of our post-Cold War engagements. That doctrine, however, reflected the strategic environment of its time, particularly a singular, mirror-image adversary. Although the challenges of

developing doctrine for an expeditionary Army with a joint mindset and campaign qualities are very different, they are no less essential.

In any era, doctrine links theory, history, experimentation, and practice. It encapsulates a much larger body of knowledge and experience, providing an authoritative statement about how military forces do business and a common lexicon with which to describe it. As it has evolved since the end of Cold War, Army doctrine portrays military operations as a seamless and dynamic combination of offense, defense, stability and support. Our challenge now is to extend it to address asymmetric opponents.

To deal with such opponents, doctrine must reflect an operational philosophy that takes the uncertainties associated with asymmetry fully into account. Uncertainty is in some measure inseparable from the nature of warfare. Asymmetry merely increases it. Doctrine can't predict the precise nature and form of asymmetric engagements, but it can forecast the kinds of knowledge and organizational qualities necessary to cope with an asymmetric operational environment.

#### **Asymmetry and Adaptation**

##### **Strategic:**

"This is a game of wits and will. You've got to be learning and adapting constantly to survive."

Army Chief of Staff  
General Peter J. Schoomaker

##### **Operational:**

"The enemy is evolving. He's getting a bit more lethal, a little more complex ..."

Joint Task Force 7, Iraq  
LTG Ricardo Sanchez

##### **Tactical:**

"This is the way you take down Samarra - at night. You can either lockstep and not change with the enemy, or you can evolve to keep him off balance."

Commander, 5-20 In, after night raid  
LTC Karl Reed

A doctrine geared to uncertainty cannot prescribe solutions. Instead, it must furnish the intellectual tools with which to diagnose unexpected requirements, and a menu of practical options founded in experience from which leaders can create their own solutions quickly and effectively. Its underlying philosophy must be initiative and creative thinking. Such a doctrine is more playbook than textbook, and like any playbook, it is merely a gateway to decision, not a roadmap. The U.S. military has an immense array of capabilities that are worthless unless both their prerequisites and limitations are understood. Doctrine can help frame those prerequisites and limitations in context. It cannot prescribe how they should be accommodated in any given case. Instead, the purpose of doctrine in a contest with asymmetry is to underwrite flexible thought and action and thereby assure the most creative exploitation of our own asymmetric advantages.

Most important in today's environment, doctrine must acknowledge the adaptive nature of a thinking, willful opponent and avoid both prediction and prescription. It isn't the part of doctrine to predict how an adversary will behave. Rather, its function is to enable us recognize that behavior, understand its vulnerabilities and our own, and suggest ways of exploiting the former and diminishing the latter. It will be useful only to the extent that experience confirms it, and its continuous review and amendment therefore is essential.

Such review would be necessary in any case to assure Army doctrine remains consistent with and imbedded in joint doctrine and that our operations thus remain coherently joint.

**Materiel.** Materiel development is a special challenge for an Army at War, because we must not only meet pressing current needs, but also anticipate and address future ones. Both share one common first priority: Equipping the individual Soldier. Since war began, the Army has shifted more than a billion dollars to improved body armor, up-armed vehicles, and other essential equipment for the Soldiers who are kicking down doors every day. In the past, the best individual equipment was reserved for units most likely to engage first. In an expeditionary environment, it is impossible to forecast which those will be. Every deployed Soldier needs the best individual equipment available.

“Every soldier in theater will have it (Interceptor Body Armor). That wasn’t the requirement when we went there. It was intended only for the front-line soldiers that we thought would be in the closest contact with the enemy. But with attacks rampant on convoys and checkpoints, the decision was made to equip all soldiers.”  
Acting Secretary of the Army Les Brownlee

In an expeditionary environment, we can no longer continue to treat equipment as permanently owned by the units to which it is assigned. In a rotation-based force, equipment ownership will be the exception. We will increasingly divorce Soldiers from their carriers and equipment, tailoring the materiel mix for the mission at hand. We currently are reorganizing Army Prepositioned Stocks to reflect an Army Regional Flotilla concept that will expedite our ability to deploy and fight on arrival. As brigade combat teams modernize and transform, they will take advantage of their position in the unit rotation cycle to re-equip through unit set fielding.

With respect to weapon systems, the challenge of reconciling current with future needs is tougher. An Army at War exhausts its current set of equipment ever faster, while future development needs are unabated. Many systems are promising -- we have barely tapped the potential of UAVs. Aviation systems will need particular attention if they are to remain a key tool of maneuver, with better C2 connectivity, extended operational reach, and all-weather capability. Being most amenable to adaptability, speed, and flexibility, aviation assets will be key to an expeditionary force.

Still more vital is the continued development of more rapidly deployable fighting platforms. The Future Combat System remains the material centerpiece of the Army’s commitment to become more expeditionary, and it is well on its way to addressing the challenge of reconciling deployability with sustainable combat power. But even if FCS meets all expectations, we will remain a hybrid force for the foreseeable future, and we must seek ways to improve the deployability of the platforms we already own.

Moreover, although we are confident of the general direction of the FCS program, we are not as confident of its priorities. Originally conceived as an 18+1 “system of systems” (18 systems plus the connecting network), we increasingly appreciate that it is actually



“1+18”, for if the network fails, FCS will not reach its potential. Limitations in communications bandwidth at corps level and below, particularly in an expeditionary environment, remain our single most serious deficiency. To repair it, the Army together with the Joint community must relentlessly address the architectures, protocols, and systems of a redundant, non-terrestrial network capable of providing the focused bandwidth necessary to support mobile Battle Command and joint Blue Force tracking.

Until now, the Army has pursued a dual approach to networking, one business-oriented (Army Knowledge Management) and the other operational (LandWarNet). We now need to bring these approaches together, because for an Army at War, still more a rotational Army, units in the field are inseparable from the installations that train, mobilize, deploy and support them.

Installations are part of the sustaining base once units deploy – power projection platforms from which they mobilize, deploy, fight and sustain. Routine use as reach-back platforms will profoundly alter the way we manage installations, and unit rotation and home basing will change them even more. In an expeditionary environment the metrics for effective installation will increasingly be measured in access to the internet as much as access to railheads, airheads and seaports. Their potential to facilitate habitual joint training will be another important criterion. Facilities will be increasingly modular and reconfigurable to accommodate the one certainty of future installation requirements: change.

## **Constant Conflict—Constant Change**

The Army always has changed and always will. But as the default condition shifts from peace to conflict, we must change the way we change.

**Current and Future.** In peacetime, armies tend to change deliberately and gradually -- and for good reason. Land warfare is immensely complex. The vast array of capabilities, skills, techniques and organizations on which it depends is a recipe for chaos without careful analysis to assure interoperability, synchronization, and synergy. The second and third order effects of a change in any part of this mechanism are difficult to forecast, and the consequences of misjudgment can be immense.

Peacetime also tends to sacrifice effectiveness to economy and interdependence to the inevitable institutional competition for budgets and programs. Institutional energies tend to focus on preserving force structure and budget "programs of record." Resource risk is allocated evenly across all budget years and all programs -- including forces in the field.

But we are an Army at War. Our current force is totally engaged, and in a way not perfectly forecast. Our near term demands are urgent, and the need to accelerate capabilities that can feasibly be made available in the near term necessarily outweighs protection of the "program of record." Resource risk must be redirected to where it will do the least damage to our fighting soldiers.


To be sure, this urgency does not excuse us from the obligation to prepare for the future, for the continuation of this conflict as well as others we can only hypothesize. But it does significantly blur the usual dichotomy between the current and future force. We must be willing to risk the integrity of a future force program if necessary to ensure we win the fight today. And we must assure the lessons learned from today's fight are applied to future force programs, even if that means altering their direction and timing. The integrating mechanism of the simultaneous consideration of the current and the future must pervade our change processes.

It must also pervade our institution. Change will not be restricted to our operating forces. The institutional Army confronts equally dramatic change in organizations and processes. The same soldiers and leaders who adapt, learn, and innovate on our battlefields also serve in our institutional Army. Success on the battlefield must be matched by successful change in our internal institutions. Such change already is apparent in the expansion and retailoring of our combat training centers, establishment of the Future Center in Training and Doctrine Command, reformulation of the Army Campaign Plan, and a wide range of consolidation and reorganization initiatives in Army Materiel Command.

**Interdependencies.** Earlier we noted that our future is irrevocably joint. Interdependence is central to both the expeditionary mindset and campaign quality we seek. Achieving it is first a *conceptual* challenge, for all capabilities -- not only in materiel but also doctrine, organization, and so on -- spring from operational concepts. Joint operational concepts are emerging, and the Army has participated actively with its

sister services in their creation, articulation, wargaming, and experimentation. The collaborative development of joint concepts allows Army concept development to be nested in a coherently joint context. That context embodies five key joint and expeditionary interdependencies:

- **Joint Battle Command.** The flexible supported-to-supporting relationships first attempted in Operation Iraqi Freedom will demand interdependent command and control driven by top-down, comprehensive architectures and redundant, interoperable networks. Joint protocols and standards will enable effective joint fires, blue force tracking, and logistic support for effective anticipation and reaction in an expeditionary context. Army contributions to Joint Forces Command's Joint Battle Management Command and Control (JBMC2) Transformation Roadmap will be essential to integrate the Army's LandWarNet, the Air Force's C2 Constellation, and the Navy's ForceNet.



- **Joint Fires.** Interdependence of joint fires will be vital to mitigating risk and reducing reliance on organic fires in a joint expeditionary environment. Linked through an effective joint command and control system, the American Soldier has the entire target acquisition and engagement resources of the theater at his fingertips. All of our modular solutions depend on enabling even our smallest combat formations to leverage joint fires through mechanisms such as "universal observers" or "joint effects control teams." To facilitate more effective employment of close air support in a non-contiguous battlespace, we need universal standards for observation, designation and target acquisition. The Air Force has demonstrated increasing flexibility in recent operations and has committed to a general officer-led Joint Force Air Component Command element at every Army corps exercise. Both the Army and the Air Force still have concerns, the Army for responsiveness and reliability, the Air Force for control and training demands. Their resolution will require cooperative adjustments by both services.

Air Force Sorties Redirected After Launch
Operation Desert Storm : 20%
Operation Enduring Freedom: 43%
Operation Iraqi Freedom: 80%

- **Joint Lift.** The Army's dependence on its sister services is nowhere more obvious than in the area of mobility, both strategic and operational. We cannot wish away the laws of physics, but neither must we surrender to them. The solution of the Army's mobility challenges will require action by both the Army and its partners. For its part, the Army must continue to improve its inherent deployability. This remains the focus of major development programs such as Stryker, the Future Combat System, and numerous



complementary systems, all of which are being designed to satisfy the space and weight limitations of the C-130. It also is a major objective of our tactical unit redesign. For their part, our sister services must recognize strategic and operational lift as critical service competencies. Intra-theater lift will be especially crucial in a future conflict in which enemies may be able to obstruct or deny altogether the use of fixed entry points such as airfields and seaports. To overcome that challenge, we will need the ability through vertical envelopment to bypass those defended areas with forces of operational significance, forces with the mobility, lethality, and survivability to maneuver to and defeat these integrated point defenses. Current intra-theater lift assets have neither the range nor the payload to support that. Future lift assets will require both. We also share the Marine Corps' interest in the feasibility of deploying from a Sea Base. The Army supports the Sea Base Joint Requirements Office and looks forward to a cooperative effort to address the intra-theater lift challenge.

- **Joint Air and Missile Defense.** The increasing range and speed of air and missile threats, and their potential ability to deliver weapons of mass destruction, place a high premium on the interdependence of service air and missile defenses, regardless of their domain of origin. This interdependence has driven considerable integration of programs and requirements, most recently the merger of Army and Marine Corps programs to defend against cruise missiles. All services need to pursue complementary air defense kill mechanisms able to defeat mixed threats of varying complexity through the right amount and combination of effects at the right time and place. Collaboration already underway addresses key issues: Joint Airspace Control Procedures, Joint Identification Procedures, Joint Engagement Authority Procedures, resolving voice and data communication issues, incorporating into school and unit training a common grid reference system, improving situational awareness for all participants, and emission deconfliction / control. All services also are collaborating on a Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Course, to be conducted for the first time at Ft Bliss in June, 2004.

- **Joint Logistics.** All the services have key interdependencies in the logistics arena and will experience even more in an expeditionary environment. There is a pressing demand for a joint end-to-end logistics structure that permits reliable sustainment of distributed operations in which deployment, employment, and sustainment are simultaneous. At the national level, the Army is prepared to make resources available to a global logistics command. At the theater level, where the Army is the predominant service component, we are willing to redirect the resources of our current Theater Support Commands to regional joint logistics commands under the supervision of the regional combatant commander. If another service is the predominant component, that service's logistics organization similarly could be used as the basis for a *regional joint* support command, with the Army contributing in its normal Title X/WEAR (Wartime Executive Agency Requirement) role. At the tactical level, to bridge the gap from theater or regional support commands to brigade combat teams, we already plan to convert current COSCOMs and DISCOMs into joint-capable Army Expeditionary Support Commands that are more rapidly deployable, employable, modular and sustainable.

## Moving Out

The changes ahead are significant. But they are neither reckless nor revolutionary. On the contrary, they reflect years of Army study, experimentation, and experience. We have delayed this transformation repeatedly, believing that we could not afford such change in a time of turbulence and reduced resources. Now we realize that what we cannot afford is further delay. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division is reorganizing today to a prototype redesign that converts its combat structure from 3 brigades to 4 brigade combat teams. Other divisions will follow.

Throughout, Soldiers will remain the centerpiece of our formations. The effects of changes in organizations, material, doctrine and facilities are additive. Those of training are multiplicative. Those of leadership are exponential. Simultaneous consideration of current and future requirements will be the integrating mechanism in all our change processes. And all will be viewed through the lens of a joint and expeditionary mindset.

The best way to anticipate the future is to create it. The Army is moving out, and this is merely the beginning. As drastic as some may consider these changes, the incentive for pursuing them is not radicalism. The incentive is effectiveness, and if additional change becomes necessary to defeat our adaptive adversaries, those described here will be only a down payment on what follows.

"We're going to have to [change] some of the things that made us the best Army in the world. Our values are sacrosanct ... everything else is on the table."

Army Chief of Staff  
General Peter J. Schoomaker


The Army has never failed the nation. It has just prevailed in two successive campaigns, and has earned the nation's respect and gratitude for its resolute determination to stabilize Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite the dangers confronting us, most of our citizens can continue to pursue their lives in relative peace and safety – a significant measure of our success.

But our challenge is to measure ourselves not against others, but against our own potential. It is not enough that we are changing. The real question is, are we changing enough? Our brave Soldiers and adaptive leaders constitute the best Army in the world, but we can be far better. It is inside of us and it is what the nation expects. The future of the world as we know it – our lives, the lives of our families, this country, everything we love and cherish – all depend on our success in meeting this challenge. *Are you wearing your dog tags?*

060104.24

12

12:11 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
DATE: June 1, 2004  
SUBJECT: Q&A

Somewhere in the press briefing you might want to begin doing the Q&A.

Here's the question that has been raised, here's the answers.

It's been \_\_\_\_ weeks since the Taguba report was made public.

We've completed \_\_\_\_ number of investigations, we have \_\_\_\_ number still underway, and there will be more initiated.

There have been a great many charges leveled during this period, and a great many of conclusions jumped to.

What I can say at this point, and it may be subject to amplification, elaboration, or even correction later as more information is known.

- Knowing we do not yet have the full information, several things seem to be coming clear.
- We have learned a great deal, but there is more we need to learn. That means that very likely there will be new revelations.
- At least thusfar it appears that the services have been open and forthcoming and moving with dispatch as problems have been discovered.
- While certainly regrettable, the abuses do not appear at least thusfar to be widespread.

OSD 16129-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44689

383.6

1 JUN 04

12:12 PM

- The suggestion that the abuses were the result of a senior official's encouraging such actions as part of a softening up process for interrogation have not been demonstrated thus far.

Then use the Q&A approach.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060104.24

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

11-L-0559/OSD/44690

3:56 PM

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Da*

DATE: June 1, 2004

SUBJECT:

I want to send Joe Castle, Dick Stevens, Somers Steelman, James MacWilliam at Princeton, the unclassified version of the Iraq weekly summary with a bump slip from me.

DHR/azn  
060104.37

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

**OSD 15130-04**

11-L-0559/OSD/44691

01 0500 EDT May 04

# ***WORKING PAPERS***

# ***Iraq Status***

This briefing is classified  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

Derived from: Multiple Sources



## Highlights

### CPA Priorities:

- Governance
- Essential Services
- Economy
- Security
- Strategic Communications

### CPA Intermediate Objectives:

- Support transition to sovereignty
- Develop framework and capacity for elections
- Build Financial Market Structure
- Reconstitute Oil Infrastructure

### Weekly Highlights:

- Mr. Iyad Allawi nominated unanimously by the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) for prime minister of the Interim Iraqi Government
- UN panel interviewed candidates for key Independent Election Commission (IEC) positions
- Iraq's annualized inflation rate for Apr 04 was 19.6%, down from a peak of 47.7% in Oct 03
- Estimated crude oil export revenue is over \$6.2 billion for 2004 to date





## Governance

- **Former exile Mr. Iyad Alawi's nomination for prime minister of the Interim Iraqi Government unanimously endorsed by Iraqi Governing Council (IGC)**
  - UN Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi "respects" the decision and will work with Alawi to pick remainder of government
- **Brahimi continues consultations with a broad spectrum of Iraqi people and their leadership**
- **UN completed processing the 1,878 nominations for the Independent Election Commission (IEC) positions**
  - UN panel interviewing 25 short-listed candidates
  - 18 nominations will then be submitted to IGC for review
- **Iraqi Property Claims Commission (IPCC) Offices accepted 2,582 claims as of 21 May, providing Iraqis a means to resolve property ownership disputes**
- **Ministries of Transportation and Environment transitioned to full Iraqi control last week (15 Ministries have transitioned to date)**

### CPA Objective: Governance

Support Transition to Sovereignty; Develop Civic Participation in Governance; Develop Framework and Capacity for Elections; Promote Respect for Human Rights; Promote Durable Solutions for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)





# Governance (Cont) – National Transition

2004

08 Mar

Transitional Administrative Law signed

End-May

Establishment of Election Commission (approximate date)

End-May

Selection of Interim Government (approximate date)

30 Jun

Iraqi Interim Government takes power

Phase I  
(Interim Government)

July/Aug

National Conference selects Consultative Council

2005

31 Jan

Elections for the National Assembly complete: NLT 31 Jan 05  
(31 Dec 04 if possible)

Early '05

Iraqi Transitional Government takes power

Phase II  
(Elected Government)

15 Aug

National Assembly completes draft of permanent constitution

15 Oct

Referendum for permanent constitution

15 Dec

Elections for government completed

31 Dec

Elected government assumes office

N/P

UNCLASSIFIED



## Strategic Communication

- **USAID's Democracy Development Activities (DDA) program organized over 9,000 sessions in Iraq, with 280,000 participants**
  - **Stimulated civic participation and increased Iraqis' understanding of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) and basic democratic principles**
- **Other activities continue in support of political transition and the TAL including:**
  - **Distribution of booklets and leaflets on the TAL**
  - **Numerous focus groups, seminars, public forums, and town hall meetings across Iraq**
- **CPA and USAID continue to undertake extensive activities providing assistance to Iraqi women, including:**
  - **Establishment of women's centers**
  - **Vocational training and education programs**
  - **Civic education and participation**

DRAFT WORKING PAPERS

01 0500 EDT May 04

## **Municipal Services - Water and Sanitation**

Continuing on the expansion of Shark Dijlah water treatment plant in Baghdad

Investments to the plant will increase potable water flow by 45 percent to the underdeveloped area of east Baghdad

Dijlah is one of two main water treatment plants that serve 4.7 million Baghdad residents

Mechanical and electrical work is more than 50 percent complete at Adhnan wastewater treatment plant

Plant will benefit more than 80,000 when completed in Aug 04

Repairing damaged water and sewage stations and networks in Fallujah to meet urgent needs after the recent conflicts

Work completed by end of Jun and benefit more than 200,000

### **Water Objective: Provide Water Supply, Sewerage & Municipal Services; Improve Water Resource Management**


Strengthen the organization to deliver water/sewerage/municipal services (WSMS); Develop WSMS to meet national needs; Develop full range of municipal services & delivery mechanism; Infrastructure improvements to water resource management; Municipalities improvements & capacity building within Ministry



## Essential Services – Telecommunications and Postal

- Total number of telephone subscribers in Iraq is now over 1,192,000 (inc. 415,000 cell phone subscribers) – over 43 % above pre-war levels

- Chart shows trend in number of telephone subscribers



- Completed the Baghdad Digital Network, which provides emergency communications capability for police, fire and emergency medical technicians
- Iraq Post's International Service Center opened at Baghdad International Airport and introduction of Iraq's new Postal Code system announced

### CPA Objectives: Reconstruct Communications & Postal Systems

Build Iraq's first responder network • Establish independent regulatory agency • Upgrade Iraqi Telephone and Postal Company (ITPC) network • Build transmission component data network for Iraq, including international gateways • Restructure ITPC and its business operations • Upgrade and modernize postal systems • Upgrade ITPC outside plant for increased subscriber capacity and use



## Essential Services – Transportation

- **Reconstruction of Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) and other activities continue in preparation for commercial operations and increased traffic**
  - More than 30 cargo handlers unload up to 45 tons of cargo each day
  - BIAP transition timeline due to commence on 01 Jun with Iraqi Air Traffic Control (ATC) taking over the civilian side of airport operations
  - Work is expected to be complete by Aug 04
- **Port Umm Qasr received 50 ships in Apr and over 40 in May, dredging of the port continues**
- **Work initiated on a \$7M project for salvage and dredging at the port of Khor Az Zubayr to enable oil tankers to use dock facilities**
  - Contract awarded to an Iraqi company based in Baghdad

### CPA Objectives: Restore Economically Strategic Transportation Infrastructure


Enable Iraqi civil aviation to prepare for international commercial aviation and cargo service • Enable Iraqi Port Authority to administer a port of call with intermodal capabilities and inland container distribution • Enable Iraqi Republic Railways to provide domestic and international passenger and freight capabilities • Reform civil service at Ministry of Transportation





# Essential Services - Food Security

- Chart below shows % of estimated requirements for Public Distribution System (PDS) goods from Apr - 01 Jul
- Requirement includes stocks sufficient for the period and a three month buffer by 01 Jul
- While substantial additional shipments of most goods have been procured, they are not shown as these shipments will arrive after 01 Jul



## CPA Food Security Objective: Provide Food Security for all Iraqis

Enhance capacity of Ministry of Agriculture • Assure supply of inputs • Strengthen research system • Ensure adequate stocks for Public Distribution System (PDS) • Monitor food security • Hand over administration of system in the North • Initiate reform of rations basket • Environmental Initiatives



## Essential Services – Food Security (cont)

- **Buffer stock build-up is slower than anticipated, due to delays in finalizing the first round of Ministry of Trade (MoT) contracts**
- **Transporting commodities from Um Qasr to warehouses and silos has been affected by truck drivers concerned about hijackings and robberies**
- **Concerns over wheat requirements for June addressed by additional procurement by CPA / MoT of 100,000 metric tons of flour and scheduled arrivals of wheat supplied by World Food Program**
- **A schedule for the second phase of MoT commodity procurements was due to be finalized by 30 May**

## **Health Services - Health Care**

and that 85% of children have now been immunized and rates will continue to rise with ongoing programs

There are 12 hospitals and over 1,200 preventive health clinics are

operating. However, medical supply shortages continue to be reported, especially for antibiotics, however:

One shipment of Ministry of Health (MoH) emergency drug purchase was received and two more shipments were due to arrive last week

and emergency drug purchase was finalized last week

Four MoH employees attended a World Bank sponsored training session in Amman covering the establishment of National Health

to help the MoH make cost-based decisions as they establish a sustainable National Health Care finance system

and the distribution of over 30,000 medical books and reference materials to 46 medical hospitals, clinics and universities throughout

**Health Objective: Improve Quality and Access to Health Care**  
strengthen health care organizations, management, & infrastructure; Train health professionals; Pharmaceuticals logistic support; Public health





## Essential Services - Education


- Nearly 2,500 schools have been rehabilitated
- Primary, intermediate, and secondary students have been completing their final examinations for the school year
  - Ministry of Education reports that the examination process has been uneventful
  - Apart from a few schools in Najaf and Karbala, all schools have been open for exams including Fallujah
- To date, over 32,000 secondary school teachers and 3,000 supervisors have been trained as part of effort to upgrade the quality of education
  - Includes modern teaching methods, curriculum development, and promoting change in teaching philosophies
- Six Iraqi high school students attended the second United World Youth Council at Radley College in Oxford, England

### CPA Education Objective: Improve Quality and Access to Education

- Reorganize and staff the Ministry of Education
- Rehabilitate school buildings and build new schools
- Advance national dialog on curriculum reform
- Continue and expand teacher training



# Program Management Office (PMO)




PMO Web-site Portal:  
[www.rebuilding-iraq.net](http://www.rebuilding-iraq.net)

UNCLASSIFIED

Data as of 27 May

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

# ram Management Office (PMO) (cont)







## Economy (cont)

- **Micro-credit loans now total almost \$5M, with 2,500 clients**
  - Provide credit to financially viable micro and small businesses
  - First loan in Fallujah as micro-lending presence is established in Al Anbar Province
- **As of 20 May, the balance in the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) was \$10.2B (\$3.1B is already committed, and \$7.1B is slated for projected 04 budget items)**
- **Recent economic sector surveys were completed by the Iraqi Central Statistics Organization (CSO)**
  - Will assist in economic and planning and in meeting data requirements for an IMF stabilization program
  - CPA and USAID providing technical support and training to build CSO's capacity to use modern statistical data and forecasting techniques
- **A Ministry of Trade delegation attended the World Trade Organization (WTO) General Council meeting in Geneva, Switzerland**
  - This was the first formal participation in the WTO by Iraq



## Accelerated Iraqi Reconstruction Program (AIRP)

- **New Accelerated Iraq Reconstruction Program (AIRP) announced to meet urgent local needs in eighteen Iraqi cities**
- **Projects and requirements were developed as a joint effort between CPA, PMO, various US and Iraqi agencies, and local community leadership**
- **Projects cover: water and sanitation, health, education, building, roads, power, and telecommunications**
- **Benefits of the AIRP:**
  - **Will employ thousand of Iraqis in high unemployment areas**
  - **Jump starts community essential services construction**
  - **100% contract awards by 15 Jun**
  - **Rapid execution and impact**
  - **Over 160 urgent, high profile projects**
  - **Stimulates local economy**
  - **Provides opportunities for local businesses**
  - **Improves Iraqi's quality of life**





# Iraqi Budgeted Spending for 2004

- The following chart shows Iraqi budgeted spending for 2004, from all revenue sources:


Ministry funding in millions of US\$	Revised Iraqi Budget, March 2004					New OFF Deposits		Budgeted Total
	Salaries (inc. FPS)	Other Operating Expenses	Capital Projects	Other	Total	Total		
Finance (with selected major payments)*	17	12,938	184	814	13,953	1,580	15,533	
<i>Public Distribution System</i>		2,400			2,400	200	2,600	
<i>Fuel Imports</i>		2,100			2,100	0	2,100	
<i>Transfer Payments</i>		1,671			1,671	0	1,671	
<i>Foreign Obligations (e.g., reparations)</i>		1,432			1,432	0	1,432	
<i>Local/Regional Grants</i>		831			831	0	831	
<i>Salaries and Retirement Awards</i>		797			797	0	797	
<i>SOE Restructuring and Salary Support</i>		761			761	50	811	
<i>Regional Development</i>		600			600	277	877	
<i>Nation Building projects</i>		571			571	0	571	
<i>Additional Security Projects</i>		500			500	500	1,000	
<i>Rapid Regional Response Program</i>		225			225	0	225	
<i>CERP</i>		70			70	123	193	
<i>All other</i>		981			981	430	1,411	
Electricity	8	210	900	-	1,118	315	1,433	
Health	230	750	50	-	1,030	0	1,030	
Education	682	103	170	-	955	0	955	
Transport	7	82	212	-	301	0	301	
Housing	37	17	233	-	287	0	287	
Oil	5	56	200	-	261	460	721	
Public Works	15	21	166	-	202	0	202	
Water Resources	19	7	128	-	155	0	155	
Interior	367	108	10	-	485	0	485	
Justice	42	67	42	-	151	0	151	
Defense	77	24	0	-	101	0	101	
Other Agencies	265	425	237	-	927	130	1,057	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,773</b>	<b>14,809</b>	<b>2,532</b>	<b>914</b>	<b>19,926</b>	<b>2,485</b>	<b>22,411</b>	

N/P



# Electricity Overview

Goal 01 June 04: 6,000 MW Peak Deliverable Generation Capacity





- Ambassador Bremer approved an increase plan in Jan to reach 6,000 MW of peak deliverable capacity and 120,000 MWH of daily production by 01 Jun. Due to unforeseen problems, these goals will slip until 30 Jun
- CPA spring maintenance program continues resulting in about 1,323 MW of generation capacity currently offline for scheduled and 529 MW for unscheduled maintenance





# Power Production


## Mega Watt Hour Production



N/P Data as of 27 May



# Hours of Power – Week of 20 May



**Average Hours of Electricity Available to Governorate Per Day Over a 7 Day Period**


- ≤ 8 Hrs = Red ●
- 9 to 15 Hrs = Amber ○
- ≥ 16 Hrs = Green ●

**Percent Change (7 Day)**

Baghdad	2.7%
Duhok	0.0%
Naynawa	12.4%
Tamim	10.2%
Salah Ad Din	6.7%
Anbar	8.0%
Dyala	24.8%
Babil	7.3%
Karbala	8.2%
Najaf	10.9%
Qadisiyah	7.9%
Wasit	9.4%
Muthanna	13.3%
Dhi Qar	-1.4%
Misan	7.9%
Basrah	-0.2%



# Crude Oil Production




**Weekly Average of 2.236 MBPD Is Below Target of 2.5 MBPD**

- Long Term Target (Dec 04): 2.8 - 3.0 MBPD (Pre-War Capacity)
- Pre-War Peak: 2.5 MBPD in Mar 03
- Post-war Peak: 2.595 MBPD on 16 Apr 04



# Crude Oil Exports

Monthly Average of Crude Oil Exports




• **Current Monthly Average: 1.198 MBPD**

N/P



# Diesel Supply




• This week's average production and imports are 85% of goal

DRAFT WORKING PAPERS

01 0500 EDT May 04

# ene Supply


Current Goal: 4.5 M Liters



k's average production and imports are 97% of goal



# Gasoline / Benzene Supply




• This week's average production and imports are 83% of goal





# Liquefied Petroleum Gas Supply



• This week's average production and imports are 51% of goal





# Iraqi Security Forces Personnel & Training Summary

	Required	Of Total			Total of 2014	Total of 2015	Total of 2016	Total of 2017
		Untrained	Trained	Available				
Iraqi Police Service (IPS) 1	89,369	65,084	21,018	4,701	90,803	1,174	250	92,227
Dept of Border Enforcement (DBE) 2	20,420	0	0	0	17,472	101	0	17,573

	Required	Of Duty		Total of 2014	Total of 2015
		Available	Unavailable		
Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) 3	35,000	3,939	2,763	6,702	
Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) 4	40,556	24,874	100	24,974	

REF ID: A66700

VP



## Iraqi Security Forces Personnel & Training Summary (cont)

	Required			
Facilities Protection Service (Ministries & MSCs) (FPS) <sup>5</sup>	73,992	73,992	156	74,148
	<b>Total Required: 259,337</b>			<b>Total on Duty and in Training: 215,624</b>

- 1 New requirement from MNF-I 22 Apr based on better census data. IPS implementing new reporting procedures
- 2 OSC SITREP 29 Apr. DBE includes Border Police, Customs, Immigration, Nationality. There is no TIP training for DBE but Border Police received basic sentry training
- 3 MNF-I C3 Effects NISF Roll-up
- 4 OSC SITREP 29 Apr. ICDC includes the 36<sup>th</sup> ICDC BN
- 5 FPS requirements changed by Ministries. Numbers are estimated. Source OSC SITREP

Number required and total on duty reflects best available data in the wake of recent combat operations.  
Re-assessments and updates are continuing



## Security - Build Justice

- **Ambassador Bremer announced the creation of the Special Task Force on Compensation for Victims of the Former Regime**
  - Initial endowment of \$25 million from the Development Fund for Iraq
- **President Bush announced that Abu Ghraib prison will be demolished, as a symbol of Iraq's new beginning**
- **The fourth of six judicial training courses has been completed, each course trains approximately 30 judges**
  - Covers due process, rule of law, human rights, judicial independence, ethics, developments in international law, and CPA Orders
- **Weekly programs to train about 600 court-appointed defense counselors for indigent defendants began last week**
- **Iraqi Corrections Service has improved the prisoner transport system, which has reduced disruptions to scheduled court appearances**

### CPA Objective: Build Justice

**Establish Independent Judiciary; Reform Judicial System; Improve the Penal System; Establish Commission on Public Integrity; Solidify Real Property Rights**



## Security - Developments

- **The Coalition military headquarters, Combined Joint Task Force - 7 stood down and transitioned into the Multi-National Force – Iraq**
- **Fallujah has remained relatively quiet since the creation of the Fallujah Brigade and there have been no violations of the cease-fire since 03 May**
- **All militias have now agreed to a transition and reintegration plan**
  - **Almost 90 percent of the roughly 100,000 militia members will have passed into new occupations prior to the elections**
- **The Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Personnel Redirection program continues to make progress with the hiring of 25 high-level former weapons scientists and engineers**
  - **Will work as scientific and technical consultants with Iraqi Ministries and the private sector in support of reconstruction efforts**

### CPA Objectives: Security

**Achieve a Secure and Stable Environment; Develop Institutions that are Effective in Protecting Society and Constitutional Order; Develop Iraqi Defense Capabilities and Oversight Mechanism**



## Security – Developments (Cont)



- **Key leadership of the Ministry of Defense has been appointed, including the Inspector General and all five Directors General**
- **Status of the Iraqi Army:**
  - **Three battalions conducting operations with Coalition forces**
  - **Three new battalions are training new recruits and leadership staff**
  - **One battalion is learning techniques for military operations in urban terrain through a “train-the-trainer” program**
- **19 Iraqi helicopter pilots graduated from flight training conducted at the Royal Jordanian Air Force in Jordan**
  - **All 19 airman were pilots under the former regime**
- **Thirty police managers are enrolled in the first Mid-Level Management course for the Iraqi Police Service (IPS)**
- **More than 21,000 police of the former regime are on duty after completing Training and Integration of Police program**





# Security – Developments (Cont)

- Chart shows significant insurgent activities in Iraq, includes attacks using:
  - Improvised explosive devices (IED), vehicle-borne IEDs, mortars, rocket propelled grenades (RPG), and improvised rockets
- Chart opposite shows murders reported to the Baghdad Police Department since May 03





# Stability Contributors – OIF

## Countries with forces in Iraq

34

- Albania
- Australia
- Azerbaijan
- Bulgaria
- Czech Rep
- Denmark
- Dom Rep
- El Salvador
- Estonia
- Georgia
- Honduras
- Hungary
- Italy
- Japan
- Kazakhstan
- Korea
- Latvia

TOTAL ~24K

- Lithuania
- Macedonia
- Moldova
- Mongolia
- Netherlands
- New Zealand
- Norway
- Philippines
- Poland
- Portugal
- Romania
- Singapore
- Slovakia
- Spain
- Thailand
- Ukraine
- UK

## Countries considering decision to provide forces for Iraq

5

TOTAL TBD

**39 Countries**  
 Potentially Supporting  
 Iraqi Stability and  
 Humanitarian Relief

Data as of 28 May

# IRAQ Governance - Transition

fact sheet



2004

08 Mar

Transitional Administrative Law signed

End - May

Establishment of Election Commission (approximate date)

End - May

Selection of Interim Government (approximate date)

30 Jun

Iraqi Interim Government takes power

Phase I  
(Interim Government)

July / Aug

National Conference selects Consultative Council

2005

31 Jan

Elections for the National Assembly complete: NLT 31 Jan 05  
(31 Dec if possible)

Early '05

Iraqi Transitional Government takes power

Phase II  
(Elected Government)

15 Aug

National Assembly completes draft of permanent constitution

15 Oct

Referendum for permanent constitution

15 Dec

Elections for government completed

31 Dec

Elected government assumes office





# IRAQ

fact sheet

## Economics

- On May 21, estimated crude oil export revenue was over \$6.2 billion for 2004
- In Jan, the Iraq Ministry of Planning reported a national unemployment rate of 28 percent and underemployment rate of 21.6 percent
- The Consumer Price Index (CPI) for Iraq, compiled by the Ministry of Planning, increased by 27.9 percent over the year to Feb 04
  - Over past six months the CPI has risen by 3.5 %, or 7.0 % at an annual rate
- To date, more than 2,500 loans totaling \$5 million have been disbursed to micro and small enterprises throughout Iraq
- The New Iraq Dinar (NID) has been relatively stable for the past three months at around 1,425 - 1,460 NID to the US Dollar
- The Trade Bank of Iraq has issued 200 letters of credit, totaling \$767.5 million, covering imports from 32 countries



## ***Water and Sanitation***

**g water and sanitation projects across Iraq that will benefit  
n people**

**40 percent of the marshlands deliberately drained by  
ave been reflooded since liberation**

**I program in 2003 that cleared over 17,000 kilometers of  
erways to improve water flow and irrigation**

**am in 2004 will clear 20,000 kilometers of Iraq's waterways  
y around 100,000 Iraqis**

**Objective: Provide Water Supply, Sewerage & Municipal  
nprove Water Resource Management Create viable organization  
ater / sewerage / municipal services (WSMS); Expand WSMS to  
ial needs; Develop full range of municipal services & inclusive  
chanism; Infrastructure improvements to water resource system;  
mprovements & capacity building within Ministry**

That 85% of children have now been immunized and rates  
are rising with ongoing programs

Million children (6 - 12 years) have been immunized for  
Measles, Mumps, and Rubella

Million children under 5 years have been vaccinated since

hospitals and over 1,200 preventive health clinics are

52 primary healthcare clinics and re-equipping 600 more to  
provide essential primary healthcare services


Initiates primary health care training of trainers program  
to reach 2,500 primary health care providers throughout Iraq  
has helped 700 doctors to provide better primary and  
preventive care, especially for women and children

**Objective: Improve Quality and Access to Health Care**  
**Health care organizations, management, and infrastructure;**  
**Health care professionals; Pharmaceuticals logistic support;**  
**Public health**



ed nearly 2,500 schools across Iraq  
aw schools required and 11,939 schools need repairs  
plemental funds will rehabilitate at least 1,047 schools  
bank may commit to rehabilitate another 1,000 schools  
,000 secondary school teachers and administrative staff  
d distributed over 8.7 million textbooks throughout Iraq  
l large numbers of school equipment including student  
cher desks, chairs, cabinets, chalkboards, and teachers kits  
g an accelerated learning program for 600 students to  
them into the school system  
i will be expanded to 50,000 in 2004

**Education Objective: Improve Quality and Access to Education,  
e and staff the Ministry of Education; Rehabilitate school  
ind build new schools; Advance national dialog on  
reform; Continue and expand teacher training**



**Generation**

- 4,400 Megawatts (MW) Peak Capacity
- 4,417 MW (Met initial goal of 4,400 MW)
- 6,000 MW Peak Generation Capacity
- 20,000 MWH Production

Bremer approved an increase plan in Jan 04 for 10 MW of peak deliverable capacity and 100,000 MWh of daily production by 01 Jun. Due to problems, these goals will slip until 30 Jun. A maintenance program continues resulting in 100 MW of generation capacity currently reduced and 529 MW for unscheduled



# **RAQ** fact sheet

**Oil**

## Production

**Peak:** 2.595M BPD (16 Apr)  
**Range:** 2.236M BPD  
1.038M BPD  
**Target (Dec):** 2.8 - 3.0M BPD




- **2003 Revenue:** \$5,076.6M
  - **2004 Revenue:**
    - **Cash Received:** \$3,966.0M
    - **Receivable:** \$1,979.3M
- \$5,945.3M**

**ite which includes unspecified re-injection rates, smuggling, and storage**



**Monthly Average of Crude Oil Exports**



**Current Monthly Export: 1.198 MBPD**

<u>Security Forces</u>	<u>Operating</u>	<u>Required</u>
ce	92.2K	89.4K
of Border Enforcement	17.6K	20.4K
i Armed Forces	6.7K	35.0K
I Defense Corps	25.0K	40.5K
ilities Protection Service	74.1K	74.0K
al	*215.6K	259.3K

quired and total on duty reflects best available data in the  
cent combat operations. Re-assessment and updates are

4.5K in training





June 16, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone  
cc: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Intel Bill

350.09

I am told Porter Goss has an intel bill that he has going through, and he got Duke Cunningham to sign **up** for it. Duke said, "I wonder if Rumsfeld is going to be mad at me for this."

You have not briefed me at all on any of the legislation coming through. I need to know what is going on. Please let me know, so we can get Cunningham off of it if we should be off of it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
061604-10

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

16 JUN 04

OSD 16133-04

June 16, 2004

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Support from the Hill

032

You heard me talk to Duncan Hunter about the items we are worried about.

I also saw Congressman Lewis and talked to him about the \$500 million for train and equip. He said he would work on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
061604-11

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 16134-04

16 Jun 04

June 21, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Air Defense

384

Let's talk about how we could stop another airplane from hitting an important target in the US. Either we can or we cannot, or it is somewhere in the middle.

I think it is important that the President know which it is, and that we let the Congress and the world know in some way, so expectations are not unrealistic.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
062104-13

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

215004

OSD 16136-04



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June 21, 2004

TO: Powell Moore  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Funding Strategy

110.01

We have to make a major effort using the Chiefs and everyone else to get the train and equip money and the CERP money.

Please give me a battle plan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
062104-5

.....  
Please respond by 7/9/04

hounch

OSD 16138-04

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11-L-0559/OSD/44738

JUN 21 2004

0005

TO: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Document Production

George Tenet and I agreed that we would each **try** to pull together data on the reams of material that we have been required to send to different organizations – the House, the Senate Committees, individual Congressman and Senators, the 9/11 Commission, subpoenas on other things, etc. and the man-years of work that it is taking.

The purpose would be to show that what is happening has gone past the point of “oversight.” A question is: How can we manage this, and is it possible to conduct a war given the accelerating kinds of demands.

I cannot remember to what extent I started getting this project organized in the Department. I think I asked Feith to pull it together. Please look into it. The key people would be Doug Feith, Jim Haynes, Steve Cambone, Paul Wolfowitz and Powell Moore. You could check with others.

Please see me to discuss.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
061904-4

.....  
Please respond by 7/16/04

214904

OSD 16140-04

720  
June 16, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Including Coalition

IRAQ

You should figure out a way we can include the coalition in all the fast-moving decisions that are taking place with respect to security issues in Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
061604-20

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 16142-04

16 JUN 04

11-L-0559/OSD/44740

June 23, 2004

210

TO: David Chu

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Waivers

I notice I am signing more and more waivers – for adverse information, for the number of years so they can retire in a higher rank, for joint service, etc.

It strikes me that it is not a good procedure to keep signing waivers. If the rules are wrong, we should change the rules. If the rules are right, we ought to adhere to them and not sign so many waivers. I am not a purist, but the volume seems to be too high.

Please check, and come back to me with a recommendation.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
062304-7

.....  
Please respond by 7/23/04

23 Jun 04

OSD 16143-04

June 23, 2004

TO: David Chu  
Ray DuBois

cc: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Naval Nuclear Propulsion Director

Attached is some material on the Director of Naval Nuclear propulsion. My instinct is that eight years is too long. I would like to get it changed so it is four years with the possibility of adding one, two, three or four years.

Please come back to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

Attach.  
6/14/04 GC memo to SecDef re: Position of Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

DHR:dh  
062304-13

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

O20 Navy

**OSD 16144-04**

23 June 04





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June 30, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: POTUS Outreach to Veterans' Groups

*ebe*

When we met with John McCain, one of the things he recommended is for the President to meet with heads of the veterans' organizations and figure out ways we can work with them, so we stay in good touch with them.

Please come up with a proposal, and tell me how you are going to propose it to the White House.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
063004-6

.....  
Please respond by 7/19/04

*30 Jun 04*

**OSD 16146-04**

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11-L-0559/OSD/44743

~~FOUO~~

JUN 23 2004

I-04/008326

EF-9225

JUN 21 2004

J 6/29

IRAQ

TO: Peter Rodman

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *J*

SUBJECT: Edits to "Thoughts on Iraq" Paper

Electrons can be sent if needed.

(b)(6)

672-7051

Thanks for the edits on the GWOT paper. I am currently incorporating them.

Please also edit the "Thoughts on Iraq" paper, along the lines of the memo you sent on June 10. I have attached another copy of the paper.

Thanks.

Attach.

6/10/04 ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef re: Thoughts on Iraq  
6/7/04 "Thoughts on Iraq"

This is quite good. Works either as a speech or a longish OPED. *J*

DHR:dt  
061804-3

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

SIR,  
Response attached.

21JUN04

OSD 16147-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/44744

~~FOUO~~

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS



I-04/007908

USDP \_\_\_\_\_

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs 10 JUN 2004  
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6) *JMA*)

SUBJECT: Your Memo "Some Thoughts on Iraq..."

Your memo on Iraq (I have the 7 June draft) could be the basis of an important speech. However, it would have to be recrafted with care. Seeming to "blame the media" is an explosive matter, and you would need to prepare the ground well, with a bill of particulars and appropriately humble admissions of USG fallibility. E.g.,:

- There are many examples in history of governments deluding themselves and misjudging reality. But there are also precedents – I would cite Tet '68 – where the USG was correct and the media got it wrong.
- A bill of particulars could start with the contrast between coverage in April and in May. In April we faced two real challenges (Fallujah; Sadr), which led to screaming headlines about a national uprising. By May these challenges were overcome but the headlines never caught up.
- In addition, there is the host of cheap-shot negative articles interviewing grumbling Iraqis. This is too easy and just tendentious.
- I would give credit to leading Democrats – Senators Kerry, Biden, Lieberman; Sandy Berger – who have made good statements that we have to win this. But they too probably feel the heat from the media reporting. The trick is to find a way to bring this strong consensus of our political class forward, so that it and not the negativism dominates the national discourse.
- We need to admit fallibility. The superficial media notwithstanding, there are also serious – and friendly – voices like Eliot Cohen who see a deteriorating security situation (measured by the ability to move around easily and safely). This could be the context for your discussion of what the right metrics are.



11-L-0559/OSD/44745

**FOUO**

The reason this is worth a speech is that your central point – that we can't be defeated unless we defeat ourselves – really needs to be said.

I would be glad to try my hand at it. I have two Congressional appearances next week that I have to write statements for, but I will do my best to do it if you would like.

Prepared by: Peter W. Rodman, ASD/ISA (b)(6)

**FOUO**

11-L-0559/OSD/44746

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INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400



I-04/008677

USDP \_\_\_\_\_

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs *JWR* 28 JUN 2004  
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6))

SUBJECT: Your Memo "Some Thoughts on Iraq..."

I have redrafted your memo of June 7 (Tab D) on "some thoughts on Iraq and how to think about it," as you requested. My redraft is at Tab A. I have cast it as a speech.

However, criticizing the media can be a kamikaze exercise, as DepSec has discovered. Therefore, whether to deliver such a speech at all is a separate question. You may wish to consult with other Principals.

What I have tried to do is "embed" this criticism deeper in a discussion of your broader points, e.g., what are the right metrics, what are the lessons of history, etc. It might work.

Attachments

TAB A: Redraft

TAB C: My memo of June 10

TAB D: Your memo of June 7

Prepared by: ASD/ISA Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6)

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11-L-0559/OSD/44747

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SUBJECT: Some Thoughts on Iraq and How to Think about It

A central question that I wrestle with everyday is: How do we assess properly what is going on in Iraq? What is the right measure of success? Or of failure?

The fact is, there are contradictory trends. There is the daily turbulence that makes the news – the bombings, the casualties. The extremists are showing themselves somewhat more capable of organizing their attacks, and it is clear that the job of suppressing them will not be easy.

At the same time, our soldiers see a different ground-truth: of schools and hospitals and institutions of local government being rebuilt; of brave Iraqis coming forward to defend their future against the extremist minority trying to hijack it. And we see the extraordinary political progress that the June 28 turnover of sovereignty represents.

Which is the right perspective?

All of us should approach this question with some humility. There is ample historical precedent for governments misjudging reality very badly and the critics being

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11-L-0559/OSD/44748

right. However, there is also historical precedent – I think of Tet 1968 – when the government was correct in its analysis of the strategic outcome and the media got it wrong. (I refer you to Peter Braestrup's classic study, **Big Story**, of how the media covered Tet 1968.)

*This is a superb example of a fine book.*

Our soldiers, as I said, see a certain reality on the ground, face-to-face. These dedicated men and women – all volunteers – know that the overwhelming majority of the Iraqi people not only welcome their liberation from Saddam Hussein but continue to yearn for a decent, democratic future. Opinion polls show this too. Of course, Iraqis wanted to see the occupation over, so would you and I. But our soldiers see every day how hard the Iraqi people are striving to rebuild their lives, and that they reject what the extremists stand for.

Our armed forces also know that conflicts have always been difficult, that people get killed or wounded. They know that the purpose of terrorism is to terrorize, to frighten and to alter behavior – and it sometimes works. There have always been those who, when terrorized, change course and seek to appease the terrorists. It has been so throughout history. So, those brave Americans on the front lines of this struggle see it for what it is, and their expectations tend to be realistic. Their perspectives are rooted in an understanding of history and their own personal experiences.

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In 1946, there were some who complained that we had "botched" the occupation of Germany, that it was a hopeless mess, that we didn't know what we were doing, that the Europeans didn't love us as liberators any more, and so on. We have a file of such reports back in the Pentagon. Maybe that's how it looked in 1946. But they lacked the perspective we have now.

The process of building new institutions to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of a totalitarian regime is a complicated one. It takes time. Even today in the former Soviet bloc, where the transition was peaceful, we see the dislocations that come from building different kinds of institutions to replace the flawed institutions of the past. It takes time.

So, when we look at Iraq today, what do we compare it to? What standards and expectations do we apply?

Some among us seem to measure Iraq's many difficulties and challenges not against history or realistic expectations but against a false standard of perfection, that of countries that enjoy relative tranquility, of countries that have succeeded in their struggles for freedom.

Events in Iraq are not tranquil, and in many cases are ugly. The media are doing their job when they report that. But, without perspective being brought to bear, our publics risk falling prey to despair – to the conclusion that all is lost, that the terrorists are

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3

11-L-0559/OSD/44750



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sure to win, and that what is being done is hopelessly flawed, or misguided, or even malevolent.

**That is wrong – totally wrong, very dangerously wrong.**

History tells us that the path to freedom has always been arduous, dangerous, and sometimes marked by ugliness. Democracy in Iraq is being fought tooth-and-nail by extremists who fear its success because of what it will mean for the entire Middle East. So, to measure its condition by the standard of countries that have already achieved their freedom misses the point.

The Iraqi people are on a tough road, a road filled with lethal dangers. But, as tough as it is, it is the right road. It is a road that has been successfully, if perilously, traveled by a number of countries over the decades. So, despite obstacles and opposition, it can be done. It has been done. Our own republic went through tough periods – surviving rebellions, riots, and civil war – but we made it. We succeeded because the American people were steadfast and courageous and did not listen to counsels of despair. As Thomas Jefferson said of the path to democracy: “One ought not expect to be transported on a featherbed.”

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4

11-L-0559/OSD/44751

Many contended that Japan, Germany and Italy could not successfully advance from fascism to democracy. But, although it was not easy, they made it. In each case, it was hard. It took time. But they succeeded, to the benefit of the civilized world.

What is taking place in Iraq is hard, to be sure. It is far from perfect and certainly not predictable. It should not be expected to be perfect or predictable. But is it failing? No. Is there a good chance it will succeed? You bet. **One thing is certain: US and Coalition forces cannot be defeated on the battlefield in Iraq. Coalition nations will suffer casualties, as they are, but they cannot be defeated. The only way this noble cause can be lost is if people become falsely persuaded that the struggle cannot be won or that winning it is not worth the cost.**

Thus, the question of how to measure success or failure – of what perspective or standard or expectation to apply – is not simply an analytical challenge to us in the Department of Defense. It should be a core question in our national debate.

I am convinced there is a solid bipartisan consensus in both houses of Congress, and among most leaders of both parties, that we must succeed in Iraq. The cause could not be more just; the enemy could not be more vicious or more hostile to our most basic values; the strategic stakes in a vital region of the world could not be higher.

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Senator Kerry, to his credit, has strongly affirmed this. So have other key Democratic leaders such as [President Clinton], Senator Biden, Senator Lieberman, Congressmen Skelton and Lantos, [William Cohen], Sandy Berger, and many others.

The task we all face is: How do we bring **this** national consensus and national steadfastness to the fore in our national discussion? How do we get **this** story to be front and center? The American people deserve this, so that the daily events in Iraq can be better seen in their context -- so that the progress being made will be properly perceived, so that the courage that our men and women are showing on the ground in Iraq will be reinforced by a confident and determined nation back home.

The Iraqi people need to hear this message, as well: They, who are truly on the front line -- and who are bravely taking on more and more of the security responsibility -- need reassurance that the Coalition will back them and help them. This is our national commitment, and they need to know we will fulfill it.

And the enemy needs to hear that message too. We are in a test of wills with a fierce enemy. The enemy has many faces -- die-hard remnants of the old totalitarian regime, or fanatical Islamists -- but we have seen that it is the face of evil. Much more is at stake than the future of Iraq. In that test of wills with the forces of evil, the forces of freedom must prevail. ~~Does anyone disagree with that?~~

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6

11-L-0559/OSD/44753

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It is instructive to ask: What might be the alternatives to the course we are on for the 25 million recently liberated Iraqis, for that troubled region, and for the United States? Those who reject this enterprise, or who oppose doing what it takes to win, can be asked: What is your proposal? Some say: Leave. What if the Coalition were to leave? The possibilities are not attractive. They include:

- a failed state, anarchy, with terrorists taking over and creating a safe haven to attack other moderate friends in the Middle East, or in Europe, or to attack this country;
- a civil war and ethnic cleansing, filling up still more of Saddam's mass grave sites;
- falling under the sway of a neighboring country and radical clerics, spreading a virulent Islamist ideology;
- a split-up of Iraq into several parts; or
- a new Saddam Hussein taking control and reimposing a brutal dictatorship.

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11-L-0559/OSD/44754

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Which of those options would anyone argue would be better than the goal of Iraq as a single country, at peace with its neighbors, not trafficking with terrorists, and respectful of women and all ethnic, religious and minority groups with its borders?

We are on the right course. The difficulties we face are understandable, given the history of countries that have navigated through these difficult seas. There is no better alternative for the Iraqi people, for the region, for the United States or for the world.

**I repeat: There is no way this struggle can be lost on the ground in Iraq. It can only be lost if people come to the conclusion that it cannot be done. There is no reason for such a conclusion, since our strategy in Iraq – the empowerment of moderate Iraqis to take charge of their own future – is on track.**

But, for us and the Iraqis to prevail, we in this country will need to conduct our political debate this year in a manner that does justice to the huge stakes involved. The imperative to win in Iraq should not be a partisan issue; the Administration will not treat it as one. Nor is this a debate about media coverage; the media should report the truth as they see it. But our country's leaders, as they discuss Iraq, owe the American people perspective, and balance, and a clear affirmation of what is at stake and of why we must be united in the will to win.

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8

11-L-0559/OSD/44755

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I trust the American people. They usually get it right. Their common sense, and courage, and patriotism, will prevail. Caving in to terrorist blackmail is the worst possible course – and the most dangerous. That is not in the cards. This is the United States of America.

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9

11-L-0559/OSD/44756

~~FOUO~~

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS



I-04/007908

USDP \_\_\_\_\_

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs 10 JUN 2004  
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6) *JMA*)

SUBJECT: Your Memo "Some Thoughts on Iraq..."

Your memo on Iraq (I have the 7 June draft) could be the basis of an important speech. However, it would have to be recrafted with care. Seeming to "blame the media" is an explosive matter, and you would need to prepare the ground well, with a bill of particulars and appropriately humble admissions of USG fallibility. E.g.:

- There are many examples in history of governments deluding themselves and misjudging reality. But there are also precedents – I would cite Tet '68 – where the USG was correct and the media got it wrong.
- A bill of particulars could start with the contrast between coverage in April and in May. In April we faced two real challenges (Fallujah; Sadr), which led to screaming headlines about a national uprising. By May these challenges were overcome but the headlines never caught up.
- In addition, there is the host of cheap-shot negative articles interviewing grumbling Iraqis. This is too easy and just tendentious.
- I would give credit to leading Democrats – Senators Kerry, Biden, Lieberman; Sandy Berger – who have made good statements that we have to win this. But they too probably feel the heat from the media reporting. The trick is to find a way to bring this strong consensus of our political class forward, so that **it** and not the negativism dominates the national discourse.
- We need to admit fallibility. The superficial media notwithstanding, there are also serious – and friendly – voices like Eliot Cohen who see a deteriorating security situation (measured by the ability to move around easily and safely). This could be the context for your discussion of what the right metrics are.

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/44757

**FOUO**

The reason this is worth a speech is that your central point – that we can't be defeated unless we defeat ourselves – really needs to be said.

I would be glad to try my hand at it. I have two Congressional appearances next week that I have to write statements for, but I will do my best to do it if you would like.

Prepared by: Peter W. Rodman, ASD/ISA (b)(6)

**FOUO**

11-L-0559/OSD/44758



~~FOUO~~

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS



I-04/007908

USDP \_\_\_\_\_

INFO MEMO

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- In addition, there is the host of cheap-shot negative articles interviewing grumbling Iraqis. This is too easy and just tendentious.
- I would give credit to leading Democrats – Senators Kerry, Biden, Lieberman; Sandy Berger – who have made good statements that we have to win this. But they too probably feel the heat from the media reporting. The trick is to find a way to bring this strong consensus of our political class forward, so that it and not the negativism dominates the national discourse.
- We need to admit fallibility. The superficial media notwithstanding, there are also serious – and friendly – voices like Eliot Cohen who see a deteriorating security situation (measured by the ability to move around easily and safely). This could be the context for your discussion of what the right metrics are.



11-L-0559/OSD/44759

~~FOUO~~

The reason this is worth a speech is that your central point – that we can't be defeated unless we defeat ourselves – really needs to be said.

I would be glad to try my hand at it. I have two Congressional appearances next week that I have to write statements for, but I will do my best to do it if you would like.

Prepared by: Peter W. Rodman, ASD/ISA (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/44760

June 7, 2004

SUBJECT: Some thoughts on Iraq and how to think about it

Military commanders and other visitors to Iraq have confidence and conviction about the progress being made and what they see as the solid prospects for success. But, television and press reports in the United States and in much of the world generally focus on the problems and the difficulties, creating pessimism and even despair. And it is the media that is shaping public opinion here and across the globe.

It is fair to ask: Which of the two widely differing perspectives is correct, or more correct, and, therefore, which view ought to be shaping U.S. policy and world thinking on this important matter?

One reason for the disparity in perspectives may be the standard that one measures progress against. The dedicated volunteer soldiers engaged in the struggle against extremists are on the front lines. They see first-hand the extremists trying to hijack a religion from the majority of moderate Muslims. They see the terrorist insurgency that the Iraqi people face. They see, first-hand, ground truth. Further, they seem to understand that war has never been tidy, orderly or predictable.

Our troops recognize that conflicts have always been difficult, that people get killed and wounded. They see the Iraqis who courageously step forward and become targets of assassins. They know that the purpose of terrorism is to terrorize, to frighten and to alter behavior – and it works. There have always been those who, when terrorized, change course and seek to appease the terrorists. It has been so throughout history. So, those brave souls on the front line of this

11-L-0559/OSD/44761

struggle see the conflict for what it is, and their expectations tend to be realistic. Their perspectives are rooted in an understanding of history and their own personal experiences.

Conversely, those removed from the battle, who receive their information from the media, tend to see it differently. Their perspectives are shaped by those who seem to compare the many difficulties and challenges, not against history or personal experience, but against a false standard of countries that have already succeeded in their struggles for freedom, countries that today enjoy relative tranquility. The media report events in Iraq that are not tranquil and, in many cases, are ugly. So, our publics risk falling prey to the argument that all is lost, that the terrorists are sure to win, and that what is being done is imperfect, or wrong, or misguided, or even malevolent.

The more correct perspective, I believe, is to look to history, to consider the struggles that have taken place over the decades and the experiences of countries that have made that difficult and dangerous journey from dictatorship to civil societies. Only by considering history can one fully appreciate that the path to freedom has always been difficult, dangerous, and marked by ugliness. So, to measure the Coalition's progress against countries that have successfully achieved their freedom misses the point.

What is taking place in Iraq is not unusual. The Iraqi people are on a tough road, a road filled with lethal dangers. But, as tough as it is, it is the right road. It is a road that has been successfully, if perilously, traveled by a number of countries over the decades. So, despite understandable concerns, it can be done. It has been done. Our own country went through tough periods, surviving demonstrations, riots, battles, deaths – but we made it. We succeeded because the American people were steadfast and courageous and did not listen to counsels of despair.

Many contended that Japan, Germany and Italy could not successfully move from fascism to civil societies. But, although it was not easy, they made it. In each case, it was hard. It took time. But they succeeded, to the benefit of the civilized world.

For a people to achieve great things requires that they be purposeful and steadfast. They must have a concentration span of something greater than a 30-second sound bite. They need to appreciate why Thomas Jefferson said of the path to democracy, "One ought not to expect to be transported on a featherbed."

What is taking place in Iraq is hard, to be sure. It is far from perfect and certainly not predictable. But it should not be expected to be perfect or predictable. But is it failing? No. Is there a good chance it will succeed? You bet. One thing is certain. U.S. and Coalition forces cannot be defeated on the battlefield in Iraq. Coalition nations will suffer casualties, as they are, but they cannot be defeated. The only way this noble cause can be lost is if people become falsely persuaded that the struggle cannot be won or that winning it is not worth the cost.

Those who seek the truth should challenge any who would measure progress in Iraq against unrealistic expectations. Ask: When in history it has ever been easy or predictable? When has a country gone from a repressive dictatorship to a peaceful, stable, constitutional, civil society without difficulties or loss of life – "on a featherbed"? Why should Iraq be measured against an unrealistic standard?

What is taking place is tough. It is uncertain. It is dangerous. It is ugly. It is requiring the sacrifice of fine young men and women – each a volunteer – and may God bless them all. But the very least they deserve is a totally honest assessment by their countrymen of what it is they are doing. The least they deserve is an accurate, truthful recognition of the progress that has been and is being achieved in Iraq, as well as in Afghanistan – the hospitals built, the clinics

opened, the schools staffed and provided new textbooks and the economic progress. And the least the Iraqi people deserve is an appreciation of the courage they have demonstrated – by their security forces and by the hundreds of Iraqis who have stepped up to become governors, city council members and police chiefs, at risk to their lives.

The test of wills we face – and it is a test of wills, let there be no doubt – calls for balance and historical perspective. The American people deserve that. They deserve it from the media that benefits from the constitutional protections, and, with those protections, has a responsibility to be fair, honest, and accountable.

The Iraqi people want their freedom, their security and the opportunities that will flow from them. More than 80 percent of the Iraqi people say they want Iraq to be whole. They are opposed to a breakup of the country. We know, despite terrorist attacks, assassinations, and disruptions to services, and despite the fact that terrorists and extremists kill innocent Iraqi citizens by the dozens each week – and have killed some 400 Iraqi security forces – that 70 percent of Iraqis say that getting rid of Saddam Hussein was worth the hardships they face today. Over 90 percent of Iraqi Kurds and 80 percent of Shia agree. Even among the minority Arab Sunnis, many of whom governed the country under Saddam Hussein, the figure is only slightly below 50 percent. So the Iraqi people understand that their lives are better today, despite the drumbeat to the contrary.

It is instructive to ask: What might be the alternatives to the course we are on for the 25 million recently liberated Iraqis, for that troubled region, and for the United States? What alternatives do those who criticize and contend that all that is lost suggest? Some say leave. What if the coalition were to leave? The possibilities are not attractive. They include:

- A failed state, anarchy, with terrorists taking over and creating a safe haven to attack the United States and other civil societies.

- A civil war and ethnic cleansing, filling up still more of Saddam's mass grave sites.
- Takeover by a neighboring country and radical clerics.
- A split up of Iraq into several parts, or
- A new Saddam Hussein could take control and re-impose a vicious dictatorship.

Which of those options would any argue would be better than the goal of Iraq as a single country, at peace with its neighbors, not trafficking with terrorists and respectful of women and all ethnic, religious and minority groups within their borders?

We are on the right course. The difficulties we face are understandable, given the history of countries that have navigated through these difficult seas. There is no better alternative for the Iraqi people, for the region, for the United States or for the world.

I repeat: there is no way this struggle can be lost on the ground in Iraq. It can only be lost if people come to the conclusion that it cannot be done. This struggle is being waged during an era of 24-hour news, seven days a week – for the first time in history. And it is being waged during a Presidential election year, when there seems to be a suspension of civil discourse. So, we are in for a rough period of months. But, when we are successful, it will be a fresh 21<sup>st</sup> century demonstration of the good center of gravity of the American people, and their common sense ability to separate fact from fiction and perseverance from paralysis.

DHR:dh  
Current MFRs/Thoughts on Iraq

June 18, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Intel Reform

W5009

Please give me a copy of Bill Schneider's dissent on the Scowcroft Commission. Isn't that something we could be using?

It seems to me we need to mount a major campaign on this intel reform. The 9/11 Commission is going to recommend it. Goss is now recommending it. Scowcroft recommended it.

We need to hit it head on. No one is doing it intellectually. Why don't we get a team of folks together and get after it? It is a bad thing for the country.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
061804-4

.....  
Please respond by 7/16/04

JUN 19 2004 *attached*

OSD 16148-04

18JUN04



## ADDITIONAL VIEWS

William Schneider, Jr.

While I share the views and recommendations of the Commission concerning the challenges and opportunities facing the Intelligence Community (IC) and our current and planned capabilities, I disagree with its recommendations concerning the reorganization of the IC (**Task 4, Organizing for Success**). If the Commission's reorganization recommendations were implemented, I believe that the ability of the IC to respond to the President's aspirations to transform the nation's national security posture could be sharply diminished.

### *The need to transform the IC to meet 21<sup>st</sup> century international security requirements*

The international security environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century no longer permits the United States to predict the nature of threats posed to its interests. As a result, the **US military** posture cannot be optimized against well-understood threats, as was the case during the Cold **War**. For this reason (among others), public policy aims to transform US military capabilities to those that **are** far more agile, flexible, and adaptable than the legacy force structure of the Cold **War**. To meet this requirement, intelligence must not simply be "good" or "better"; it must be exquisite. In the words chosen by the Commission to characterize the requirement, "US intelligence will not meet the demands of the future if **our** intelligence agencies continue with business as usual."

To permit the **US** national defense posture to adapt to new threats, the IC will need to provide deep insights into the nature of **US** adversaries, their capabilities, vulnerabilities, resources, infrastructure, personnel, and most closely held secrets. At the highest level of national policy, the transformation of the IC is needed to strengthen the hand of American diplomacy, and permit the national leadership to anticipate and act before future threats **pose** overwhelming problems for **US** security.

It is the tactical or operational requirements of the armed forces that pose the most compelling challenge for the transformation of the intelligence community. The impact of the **military** applications of information technology and the intelligence that supports that capability will be fundamental; Twenty-first century **warfare** requires **US** military forces to conduct operations within the decision cycle of its adversaries if it is to prevail in future conflict. Intelligence information to support military operations will need to be collected from multiple sources, processed and fused into **an** actionable form, and delivered to military users in a timely manner. **This** processed intelligence information **will** often need to be transmitted directly to the seeker in a weapon system to permit **US** forces to bring a fleeting target under attack in a matter of seconds, not minutes or hours or days as is now the case. Moreover, extraordinary precision in the location of targets will be required **as** well to permit discriminate targeting, and a reduction in the risk of unintended casualties from friendly fire and collateral damage to non-combatants. These demanding intelligence requirements for 21<sup>st</sup> century warfare are affirmed in the Joint Chiefs of Staff document, Joint Vision 2020.

**Role of shared DCI-DoD responsibility for the management of IC**

The responsibility for the management of IC is shared between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense. This unique managerial arrangement reflects the special circumstances surrounding the uses of intelligence information within the government. The DoD is both the collector and user of an overwhelming fraction of intelligence information – more than three fourths of all intelligence collected by the US government. Moreover, the DoD's need for timeliness and precision are unique and on a scale without parallel within the US government.

Notable IC difficulties during the 1990s in predicting crucial international developments have had powerful implications for US security. These difficulties included a failure to predict developments such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in India, Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Pakistan. This failure to predict these developments remind us that the IC must jointly serve both DoD and non-DoD interests as well.

The need to jointly serve the "national" or "strategic" intelligence requirements of the US government with the demanding "tactical" or "operational" DoD applications for the conduct of military operations establishes a need for shared management of the IC. The Department of Defense cannot transform its military capabilities to meet 21<sup>st</sup> century requirements without access to intelligence that meets its needs for timeliness and precision. Its interaction with elements of the IC most directly associated with producing such intelligence is intimate and routine, and led by personnel directly managed by the Secretary of Defense, but with shared responsibility for tasking and resource allocation with the DCI. This "creative tension" between intelligence collectors and users is a constructive managerial model for which there is strong empirical support.<sup>1</sup>

The new administration has undertaken constructive measures that have mitigated some of the most damaging failures of the Secretary of Defense and the DCI to coordinate. The failure of the Secretary of Defense and the DCI to meet regularly during the late 1990s when some of the most egregious and damaging lapses in coordination took place has been replaced since January 2001 by frequent meetings between the Secretary of Defense and the DCI. The exigencies imposed by wartime intelligence demands have further strengthened this collaborative relationship.

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<sup>1</sup> The tri-cornered relationship between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the NRO for the management of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) has been affirmed in the report of a recent statutory body, The National Commission for the Review of the National Reconnaissance Office. See *The Report of National Commission for the Review of the National Reconnaissance Office*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, November 2000), p 44. In the report, the Commissioners unanimously concluded that "the tri-cornered arrangement among the Secretary of Defense, the DCI, and NRO Director has at times provided great strength to the NRO because it has allowed the NRO Director to draw on the resources and benefit from the advocacy of two major forces in the Intelligence Community and the DoD."

*Limitations of the Commission's reorganization recommendations*

The Commission has recommended that the authority to manage and appoint the leadership of the major DoD agencies in the IC (the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency and other special programs) be shifted from the Secretary of Defense to the DCI.

Doing so would, in my view, perpetuate the IC's institutional weaknesses that have adversely affected its post-Cold War performance. Further, the proposed reorganization is likely to produce a result that is orthogonal to the modernization aspirations the Commission.<sup>2</sup>

1. The Commission's recommendation to centralize management of the IC agencies under the DCI would perpetuate the obsolete organizing principle of the IC around the means by which intelligence is collected rather than ends served by national intelligence? It is the flawed underlying organizational concept of the IC that focuses on collection disciplines that produces the performance problems for the IC from the perspective of the user of intelligence - not whether the DCI or the Secretary of Defense leads the collection management function. Moreover, centralizing the management of these important intelligence collection disciplines will greatly increase the "distance" of these organizations from the user. Such an outcome is precisely opposite to the underlying need for the modernization of the intelligence function. The example of the manner in which the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is employed in support of US military operations in Afghanistan offers an informative example of the constructive interplay between users and producers of intelligence. In this case, intelligence collectors operating under the control of users collaboratively participate in meeting the needs of users. This model is more appropriate to the support of 21<sup>st</sup> century military operations than the supplier-user model that would be created if the major defense-related intelligence organizations are subordinate to the DCI.
2. The intense needs of the DoD to improve the timeliness and precision of intelligence information make the responsiveness of the IC crucial. By moving away from the constructive tension of shared responsibility for the IC between collector and user as the Commission proposes, the responsiveness of the IC to the warfighter is at risk. In practice, diminished responsiveness by the IC is likely to produce undesirable bureaucratic pathologies. It is likely that the DoD will be forced to create parallel capabilities to those controlled by the DCI within elements of the DoD that are not included in the National Foreign Intelligence Program to assure responsiveness to the immediate tactical requirements of the armed forces.

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<sup>2</sup> The Commission seeks to create national intelligence that reflects "seamless integration across intelligence disciplines, operational agility, and analytic prowess that are necessary to support the President and the NSC in the 21<sup>st</sup> century."

<sup>3</sup> The Secretary of Defense has directed that the Defense Science Board establish a Task Force to study the concept of managing foreign intelligence by focusing on ends vice means to study the organizational and operational implications of such an organizing principle.

3. Institutionalizing the existing informal DoD-DCI collection management function (called the Collection Management Center in the report) would burden the IC by adding yet another coordinating bureaucracy to the excessively baroque existing structures with little value-added to the user of intelligence. The Commission's view of the coordination difficulties between the DoD and the DCI were influenced by an exceptional period in the late 1990s when the Secretary of Defense and the DCI never met. This practice has been reversed by the new administration. Similarly on a smaller scale, the informal coordination process between the Secretary of Defense, the DCI, and the Director of the NRO has been successfully maintained for nearly 40 years (apart from exceptional 1997-2001 period) when the DoD function was delegated to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. In this respect, it would be constructive for the DCI to participate more directly in the intelligence dimension of the Defense Planning Guidance process to better assess the intelligence implications of DoD modernization initiatives.
4. Appropriating funding to the DCI rather than to the Secretary of Defense jeopardizes the ability of the government to maintain the secrecy of patterns of resource allocation within the IC. Moreover, such a change does not address the most important problem - the allocation of resources within the IC to adjust to changes in priorities. The IC budget is assembled two years in advance of execution. The fast-breaking international security environment will not permit the IC to be effective unless its resources can be reallocated in a timely manner to respond to contingencies that could not have been anticipated when the budget was created. The DCI's authority should be strengthened by the repeal of the 1997 statutory provision in the Intelligence Authorization Act. The statutory provision prevents the DCI from reallocating funding within the IC without the agreement "of the Secretary or the head of the department which contains the affected element or elements." The provisions of the 1997 legislation were insufficiently mitigated in Section 105 of the FY 2001 Intelligence Authorization Act.

*Draft 02*

*31 December 2001*

October 15, 2004

TO: The Right Honourable Geoffrey Hoon  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Update on Iraqi Security Force Training

IRAQ

1. Here is the latest information on our training program for Iraqi forces. I'll continue to send these along every couple of weeks, and would ask you to pass them along to the Prime Minister.
2. Our discussions in Romania were pleasant and productive as always - I look forward to our next meeting.

Attach.  
10/13/04 Iraqi Security Forces Update

DHR:ss  
101504-8

15 OCT 04

OSD 16101-04

15 OCT 04

~~For Official Use Only~~

# *Iraqi Security Forces Update Executive Summary*

*13 October 2004*

# Grand Total all Iraqi Security Forces

~~For Official Use Only~~

• <u>Ministry of Interior Forces</u>	<u>Trained &amp; Equipped*</u>
– Police	
– Civil Intervention	
– Emergency Response	
– Border Enforcement	
– Highway Patrol	
– Dignitary Protection	
	<b>57,726</b>
• <u>Ministry of Defense Forces</u>	<u>Trained &amp; Equipped</u>
– Army	
– National Guard	
– Intervention Force	
– Special Operations	
– Air Force	
– Coastal Defense Force	
	<hr/>
	<b>48,540</b>
	<hr/>
	<b>106,266</b>

\*Note: 74,000 Facilities Protection Service forces are not included


Data as of: 13 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/44773



# Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces

~~For Official Use Only~~



Note: Does not include 74,000 in Facilities Protection Service

Data as of: 13 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/44774



## Ministry of Interior Forces-Projection

~~For Official Use Only~~




Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, Equipped) Policing Units on hand over time

Security Force Element	Current Targeted End State	11 OCT 04	1 NOVO4	1 FEB 05	1 MAY 05	1 AUG 05	1 JAN 06
Regular Iraqi Police *	135,000				47%	58%	68%
Dept of Border Enforcement **	32,000	44%	45%	50%	60%	66%	84%
Emergency Response Unit	270		55%	70%	100%	100%	100%
Special Police Regiments ***	1,200			50%	100%	100%	100%
Public Order Battalions ***	3,600			67%	100%	100%	100%
Bur. of Dignitary Protection ****	500		90%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Iraqi Highway Patrol	1,500			47%	58%	71%	92%

### Notes

- \* Police figures reflect trained and equipped individuals, not units
- \*\* Border Police considered trained based on training by coalition forces; capabilities are uneven
- \*\*\* Special Police Regiments and Public Order Battalions equipment schedules still TBD; training of initial 3 Public Order Battalions will commence this week.
- \*\*\*\* Bureau of Dignitary Protection personnel have completed initial training and began specialized training on 2 October.

### Legend

-  70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
-  40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
-  39% OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Data as of: 13 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/44775

# Ministry of Defense Forces-Projection

~~For Official Use Only~~




Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, and Equipped) Units on hand over time\*

Security Force Element	End state	11 OCT 04	1 NOVO4	1 FEB 05	1 MAY 05	1 AUG 05	1 JAN 06
Iraqi Regular Army	27,000 soldiers		44%	81%	93%	100%	100%
Iraqi Intervention Force	6,584 soldiers		67%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Iraqi National Guard	61,904 soldiers		57%	74%	91%	100%	100%
Commando Battalion	1,516 soldiers	58%	58%	67%	76%	85%	100%
Iraqi Counter Terrorism Force	451 soldiers			40%	58%	76%	100%

\*Based on achievement of Limited Operational Capability

Data as of: 13 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/44776

Legend	
	70-100% OF REQUIREMENT
	40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
	39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

# MNF-I and Iraqi Security Forces

~~For Official Use Only~~

MNF-I = 32 Countries					
Albania	73	El Salvador	380	Korea	2,837
Australia	148	Estonia	48	Latvia	133
<b>Armenia</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>Georgia</b>	<b>162</b>	Lithuania	88
Azerbaijan	150	Hungary	282	Macedonia	31
Bulgaria	449	Italy	3,088	Moldova	11
Czech Rep.	92	Japan	800	Mongolia	132
Denmark	535	Kazakhstan	30	Netherlands	1,470
				<b>Thailand</b>	<b>0</b>
				<b>Total</b>	<b>155,402</b>

Iraqi Forces On Hand- 167,757	
Police Service	85,532
Civil Interv. Force	1,336
Emer. Response Unit	107
Dept. of Border Enf.	16,233
Bureau of Dignitary Protection.	446
Highway Patrol	927
<b>Army</b>	<b>11,776</b>
<b>National Guard</b>	<b>43,062</b>
<b>Intervention Force</b>	<b>7,033</b>
<b>Special Ops Force</b>	<b>690</b>
<b>Air Force</b>	<b>206</b>
<b>Coastal Defense Force</b>	<b>409</b>



Iraqi Forces On Hand  MNF-I

Trained/In-Training Iraqi Forces Total- 127,621	
Police Service	47,109
Civil Interv. Force	1,336
Emer. Response Unit	107
Dept. of Border Enf.	14,858
Bureau of Dignitary Protection.	446
Highway Patrol	589
<b>Army</b>	<b>11,776</b>
<b>National Guard</b>	<b>43,062</b>
<b>Intervention Force</b>	<b>7,033</b>
<b>Special Ops Force</b>	<b>690</b>
<b>Air Force</b>	<b>206</b>
<b>Coastal Defense Force</b>	<b>409</b>



Trained Iraqi Forces  MNF-I

## Notes

- Georgia expected to increase forces from 162 to 300 and add a 500 man battalion for UN Security
- Armenia & Thailand pending deployment of their forces

## Other Forces

Facilities Protection Service  
73,992

NATO Training Team = 15

Data as of: 13 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/44777

## *NATO Training in Iraq*

~~For Official Use Only~~

- North Atlantic Council decision, 8 October includes:
  - Approval of concept of operations for NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I).
  - Dual-hatting the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq Commander
  - Help in establishing an Iraqi Training, Doctrine, and Education Center.
  - Help in establishing an Iraqi Training Command.
  - Focusing on training, equipping, and technical assistance.
  - Adding value to training and equipping efforts already underway in Iraq.
  - Providing out-of-country training.
- NATO Military Authorities will now develop the Operations Plan within the next four weeks and submit it to the NAC for approval.

~~For Official Use Only~~

# *Back Up*

Data as of: 13 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/44779

# Iraqi Security Forces MoI Update

~~For Official Use Only~~

COMPONENT	AUTHORIZED	ON DUTY	TRAINED & EQUIPPED	TRAINED & EQUIPPED ON 31 JAN '05	100% TRAINED & EQUIPPED
POLICE	135,000	84,950	42,302	52,800	JUL '06
CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE	4,920	1,336 (In Training)	0	1,800	JUL '05
EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT	270	107	76	188	MAY '05
BORDER ENFORCEMENT	32,000	15,688	14,313	15,900	MAR '06
HIGHWAY PATROL	1,500	927	589	750	SEP '05
DIGNITARY PROTECTION	500	446	446	500	DEC '04
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>174,190</b>	<b>103,454</b>	<b>57,726</b>	<b>71,938</b>	<b>OCT '06</b>

Data as of: 13 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/44780

# *Iraqi Security Forces MoD Update*

~~For Official Use Only~~

COMPONENT	AUTHORIZED	LIMITED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY <sup>(1)</sup>	FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY <sup>(2)</sup>	31 JAN '05 L/F CAPABILITY	100% FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
ARMY	27,000	4,507	0	0 121,831	JUL '05
NATIONAL GUARD	61,904	41,097	0	46,000 10	SEP '05
INTERVENTION FORCE	6,584	1,743	0	732 / 5,852	MAY '05
SPECIAL OPS	1,967	617	0	725 / 0	SEP '05
AIR FORCE	502	167	0	TBD BASED ON AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT	TBDBASEDON AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT
COASTAL DEFENSE	582	409	0	TBD BASED ON PATROL BOAT PROCUREMENT	TBDBASEDON PATROL BOAT PROCUREMENT
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>98,539</b>	<b>48,540</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>47,457 127,683</b>	<b>MAR '06</b>

(1) Limited Operational Capability = unit is conducting combat operations, but continues to receive advanced unit training and may still require some equipment

(2) Full Operational Capability = unit is fully manned, trained, and equipped and is capable of conducting independent operations

Data as of: 13 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/44781

# Iraqi Security Forces Training

~~For Official Use Only~~

COMPONENT	TRAINING	NUMBER IN TRAINING
Iraqi Police Service	3 Week TIP Training 8 Week Academy Specialized Training	4,888
Civil Intervention Force	6 Week Specialized Training	1,336
Emergency Response Unit	8 Week Specialized Training	31
Dept of Border Enforcement	4 Week Academy Specialized Training	545
Highway Patrol	3 Week TIP Training 8 Week Academy Training	0
Bureau of Dignitary Protection	3 Week Initial Training 2-3 Week Advanced Training Mentoring by US Special Forces	138
Iraq Regular Army	Cadre: 4 Weeks Basic Training: 4 Weeks Collective Training: 4 Weeks	7,269
Iraqi National Guard	Basic Training: 3 Weeks Collective Training: 4 Weeks	1,965
Iraqi Intervention Force	Cadre: 4 Weeks Basic/Collective Training: 8 Weeks Urban Operations Training: 6 Weeks	5,290
Iraqi Special Ops Force - Counter Terrorist	Field Training Provided by US Special Forces (Small Unit tactics Ranger type training) 12 Week course on Close Quarter Combat	72
Air Force	Varies by specialty: 1-6 months	39
Coastal Defense Force	Basic Training: 8 Weeks followed by specialized Training at Umm Qasr (In Progress)	0
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>21,573</b>

Data as of: 13 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/44782



# Iraqi Security Forces Missions

~~For Official Use Only~~

Unit	Mission
Police	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide law enforcement, public safety and internal security</li> </ul>
Civil Intervention Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide a national level, high end, rapid response police capability to counter large scale disobedience and insurgents.</li> </ul>
Emergency Response Unit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide a special operations police capability in support of the Iraqi Police Service.</li> </ul>
Department of Border Enforcement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Protect the integrity of Iraq's border and monitor and control the movement of persons and goods</li> </ul>
Highway Patrol	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide law enforcement, public safety, and internal security, and convoy security along Iraq's Highways.</li> </ul>
Bureau of Dignitary Protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide close protection, convoy security, and fixed-site security for Iraqi key political leaders.</li> </ul>
Regular Army	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Defend Iraq against external threats.</li> <li>• When directed, assist the Ministry of Interior in providing defense against internal threats to national security.</li> </ul>
National Guard	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct stability operations to support the achievement of internal security, including (as required) support to Ministry of Interior elements.</li> <li>• Conduct Constabulary duties in support of internal security</li> </ul>
Intervention Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct operations in order to defeat anti-Iraqi forces in Iraq, with primary focus on urban areas</li> <li>• Assist in the restoration of a secure and stable environment in which the Iraqi Police Services and Iraqi National Guard can maintain law and order</li> </ul>
Commando Battalion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support for Iraqi Counter Terrorist Force. Similar in organization, training, and mission to US Army Ranger Battalion</li> </ul>
Counter-Terrorist Task Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Direct action counter-terrorism similar in organization, mission, and training to US Special Operations Forces with counter-terrorist function</li> </ul>
Air Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide aerial reconnaissance, and rotary and fixed wing transport for Iraqi Security Forces and authorities</li> </ul>
Coastal Defense Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct security operations on the Iraqi coastline and over territorial waters, including gas and oil platforms out to 12 nautical miles</li> <li>• In conjunction with DBE, conduct police operations on the Iraqi coastline and out to 12 nautical miles to counter piracy, smuggling and other unlawful activities</li> </ul>

Data as of: 13 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/44783

# *Significant Events Since Last Report*

~~For Official Use Only~~

## Manning:

- **9,065** available and qualified Army recruits ready for movement to initial training.
- **1<sup>st</sup>** Iraqi Transportation Battalion started its first driver class.
- Two additional Special Police Commando Battalions recruited.

## Training:

- **1,500** Public Order Battalion recruits began initial training at Numaniyah Training Area
- **804** Iraqi Police students graduated from Police Basic Course at the Baghdad Academy.
- **545** DBE students started courses in Border Policing, Immigration, and Civil Customs at Jordan Academy

## Equipping:

- Issued **16,000** weapons, **64** vehicles, and over **2.6** million rounds of ammunition to Ministry of Interior forces
- Issued **1,958** radios and **4,560** kevlar helmets to Iraqi National Guard.

## Building:

- Approximately \$1B of construction ongoing; 75% of construction of Iraqi military bases complete.
- Awarded **16** Department of Border Enforcement border fort construction contracts.
- Began construction of **8** Iraqi Police Stations in Baghdad.

## *Significant Events Since Last Report*

~~For Official Use Only~~

### Mentor/Employ:

- 5<sup>th</sup> Battalion, 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade conducted cordon and search operations with 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division in Baghdad; assisted with the recovery of a large weapons and ammunition cache.
- 41 of 45 Iraqi National Guard battalions continue effective operations throughout Iraq.

~~FOUO~~

October 15, 2004

IRAQ

TO: President George W. Bush  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Secretary Colin Powell  
Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Update of Iraqi Security Force Training

Mr. President,

1. Here is the latest update concerning the training efforts in Iraq. We remain on track. I had a chance to visit with various elements of the Iraqi Security Forces in the Kirkuk region earlier this week, and they appear determined and confident.
2. As always, I'll ensure a copy of this is forwarded to Tony Blair via his Minister of Defense.

Attach.  
10/13/04 Iraqi Security Forces Update

DHR:ss  
101504-7

1505704

~~FOUO~~

OSD 16181-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44786



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

OCT 15 2004

293

Mr. Walter E. Massey  
Morehouse College  
830 Westview Drive, S.W.  
Atlanta, GA 30314-3773

Dear Walter,

Thank you so much for your recent letter. It was good hearing from you.

I do also appreciate the information about John Hopps. I am sorry to hear he passed away. It's clear that the Department of Defense lost a dedicated member of its community.

Send my best wishes to (b)(6) We hope to see you soon.

Sincerely,

15 OCT 04

19 SEP 04

OSD 16194-04

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Carrie Sue,

Please draft a letter for  
SD to Mr. Massey for review.

Thanks,  
WHE

Note (F41)  
The Department gave  
him an award in May 2004  
(the award was a distinguished  
public service award). - I  
believe in honor of his retirement.

Mr. Walter E. Massey  
Morehouse College  
830 Westview Drive, S.W.  
Atlanta, GA 30314-3773

0200PRE


Dear Walter,

Thank you so much for your recent letter. It was good hearing from you.

I do also appreciate the information about John Hopps. I am sorry to hear he passed away. It's clear that the Department of Defense lost a dedicated member of its community.

Send my best wishes to (b)(6) We hope to see you soon.

Sincerely,

 Prepare for  
Sec Def signature  
PPH/BUBER  
10/12

24SEP04


19SEP04

9/24  
1700

~~FOUO~~

September 24, 2004

TO: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Information on John Hopps



Please see if you can figure out who John Hopps is that is mentioned in Walter Massey's letter.

I'd like to answer Walter's letter - he is a good friend.

Thanks.

ATTACHED

Attach.  
9/19/04 Note from Walter Massey

DI IR:ss  
092404-5

.....  
Please respond by 9/28/04

293

24 Sep 04

19 Sep 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 16100-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44790





*Ref*

WALTER E. MASSEY

(b)(6)

9/11/04

293

Dear Dan,

The Department of Defense lost a Very Valuable member when

→ John Wayne passed a few months ago. John was my College roommate at Morehouse, and one of my closest friends (and a fellow physicist.)

John and I talked about his going to D.O.D.. At first he really did not want to, having just retired from Morehouse. However, after 9/11 he felt he had to do what was necessary to serve his Country. Today he reminded me of his decision.

19 SEP 04

He really loved working at D.O.D and felt he was making important contributions.

OSD 16101-04

I know you are overwhelmed,  
but I thought that might be  
of interest to you.

(b)(6)  
sends regards to  
you and Jayce, and says  
to tell Jayce she still  
uses (quite often) the great  
dictionary Jayce gave her in  
Chicago.

Hang in there!

Walter



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

WAB 9/28

To SecDef  
From Paul Butler Paul Butler  
9/27

Subject: Walter Massey Letter on John Hopps.

Attached is a bio on Dr. John Hopps  
who worked for Mike Wynne in AT&L.  
● He passed away <sup>in</sup> ~~over~~ the late spring.  
Please let me know if you would like us  
to do an initial draft reply to Mr. Massey

Yes

**DR. JOHN H. HOPPS, JR.**

**Deputy Director, Defense Research & Engineering  
and**

**Deputy Under Secretary of Defense  
(Laboratories and Basic Sciences)**

(b)(6)

Phone: (b)(6)

Fax: (b)(6)

Email: [john.hopps@osd.mil](mailto:john.hopps@osd.mil)



Dr. John H. Hopps, Jr. serves in dual capacities within the Office of Defense Research and Engineering. He serves as Principal Deputy to the Honorable Ronald M. Sega, Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E). Dr. Hopps also serves as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Laboratories and Basic Sciences (LABS). In this capacity he has responsibility for the oversight of the Defense Laboratories, for the improvement of the Defense Laboratory science and engineering workforce, and for DDR&E university-based basic research, instrumentation, graduate fellowship and education programs in the science and engineering disciplines. He has additional responsibility for international programs of technical cooperation between the U.S. and its allies.

Dr. Hopps comes to the Department of Defense from Northwestern University where he served as Institute Professor in the Materials Research Center. His activities included an initiative for the integration of materials science into the undergraduate liberal arts curriculum. His research interests involved the application of bio-inspired perspectives in the study of strategies for self-healing in non-biological materials.

Prior to returning to scientific activities at Northwestern, Dr. Hopps served as Provost and Senior Vice President for Academic Affairs, and as Professor of Physics, at Morehouse College from 1995-1999. He was responsible for all matters related to the academic program, student affairs, information technology and resources, institutional research, and athletics. Significant accomplishments included establishing the Andrew Young Center for International Affairs and the International Power Institute, and establishing interdisciplinary programs in neuroscience and telecommunications, all within the framework of a 4-year liberal arts institutional structure.

Prior to joining Morehouse, he served as Director of the Division of Materials Research at the National Science Foundation (1991-1995). Dr. Hopps' tenure at NSF was through an IPA arrangement with the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory. At Draper, Dr. Hopps was a Principal Member of the Technical Staff and served as Chief of Photonics Technology. His responsibilities included overseeing research and development activities, as well as fabrication and test facilities in the areas of high performance fiber optic components, integrated optic components, laser devices, semiconductor photonic devices, photonics fabrication automation and packaging, and optical signal processing. He also had direct technical and management responsibility for the Laser Development and Test Facility. Dr. Hopps supervised the research of graduate students in the areas of quantum optics and in the microscopic theory of high-frequency dynamical behavior of complex semiconductor laser structures.

Also, during his tenure at Draper, which began in 1977, he served as Manager of Energy Program Development, Manager of Fault-Tolerant Systems Research, and as Education Director. From 1977 to 1991 he was concurrently a Research Affiliate in the Departments of Nuclear and/or Electrical Engineering at MIT. His primary research areas were the non-equilibrium statistical mechanics of dense fluids and their study via light and neutron scattering; and plasma kinetic theory and neutron transport theory, and their application to the control of fusion, fission and hybrid reactors. He supervised dissertations in the area of reactor control using fault-tolerant systems concepts and strategies, and in the application of real-time stochastic decision models to nuclear plant operational safety.

Dr. Hopps is a member of Phi Beta Kappa, Sigma Xi, Beta Kappa Chi, and Golden Key Honor Societies. He has been a member, and in some cases held national office, in several scientific organizations including, American Association of the Advancement of Science, American Chemical Society, American Physical Society, American Nuclear Society and the Material Research Society. He has served on task forces and evaluation teams for government agencies, educational institutions and foundations, as well as public service organizations. Board appointments have included the National Research Council's National Materials Advisory and Space Studies Boards; U.S. Department of Energy National Reliable Energy Laboratory, National Advisory Board; the Negro Educational Review Editorial Board; and the Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU) Board of Directors.

**Education:**

Ph.D., Physics, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA (1971)  
M.S., Chemistry, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA (1961)  
B.S., Math and Chemistry, Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA (1958)  
Certificate, Institute for Educational Management, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA

**Other Honors and Awards:**

Ford Foundation Early Admissions Scholar, Morehouse College  
Jessie Smith Noyes Foundation Fellow, Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
Sanders Associates Corporate Doctoral Fellow, Brandeis University  
U.S. Presidential Citation for "Outstanding Accomplishments in the Technology Reinvestment Project"  
Morehouse College Presidential Citation, awarded by Morehouse College Board of Trustees



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

ACTION MEMO

2004 OCT 19 10:00 AM  
October 19, 2004 - 10:00 AM

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

DepSecDef \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: Selective Service Registration Options--SNOWFLAKE

- This responds to your question (Tab A) about reducing or eliminating draft registration requirements. National investments in the present Selective Service System (SSS) generally, and draft registration specifically, are of increasingly questionable value.
- The SSS today registers men aged 18-25 (citizens and resident aliens) (90% compliance). One who fails to register is disqualified for certain Federal employment or education programs, and in most states would be ineligible for a driver's license.
- The SSS has about 200 full-time employees, including 16 military officers. Its annual budget is roughly \$26 million. The registrant database is used by DoD to identify recruitment leads, but is not essential. We can and do purchase excellent and well targeted "lead lists" from the private sector.
- Although we must confer with the Director of Selective Service, it presently appears we could pursue the following changes, with little or no risk to national security:
  1. Administration take action to reduce registration and downsize SSS.
  2. Administration propose repeal of the Military Selective Service Act, eliminating the SSS. This could be done directly or as follow-on to "1" above.
- Once you have indicated the course of action you prefer, I would be glad to organize the necessary consultative process.

RECOMMENDATION: Select #1 \_\_\_\_\_ Select #2 \_\_\_\_\_

COORDINATION: General Counsel (Tab B) + JCS (TAB B)

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Bill Carr (b)(6)

TSA SD	
SRMA SD	
MA SD	
EXEC SEC	M 10/20

571-0114

LARRY D. FINE  
10/29

OSD 16220-04

327

19 OCT 04

15 OCT 04

**TAB**

**A**

11-L-0559/OSD/44798



11/5/04

November 5, 2004

TO: David Chu  
cc: Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace  
Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Selective Service for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

Please take a good look at what they are doing with Selective Service, including general registration, maintenance of specific skill lists, and anything else they are doing. As we move forward, we may want to significantly change the approach.

Please show me some options, including ending it entirely.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
101904-19

.....  
Please respond by 12/5/04

**TAB**

**B**



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

October 14, 2004, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

DepSecDef \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: Selective Service Registration Options

- o This responds to your question (Tab A) about reducing or eliminating draft registration requirements. National investments in the present Selective Service System (SSS) generally, and draft registration specifically, are of increasingly questionable value.
- o After 30 years of success with the All Volunteer Force, and with the Cold War behind us, we find mandatory draft registration increasingly questionable. Today's weapon systems and tactics do not lend themselves to a rapid infusion of draftees.
- The SSS today registers men aged 18-25 (90% compliance). One who fails to register is disqualified for certain Federal employment or education programs, and in most states would be ineligible for a driver's license.
- The SSS has about 200 full-time employees, including 16 military officers. Its annual budget is roughly \$26 million. The registrant database is used by DoD to identify recruitment leads, but is not essential. We can and do purchase excellent and well targeted "lead lists" from the private sector.
- Although I must confer with General Meyers, it presently appears we could pursue the following changes, with little or no risk to national security:
  1. Administration take action to <sup>REMOVE</sup> ~~terminate~~ registration and downsize SSS. ✓
  2. Administration propose <sup>REPEAL</sup> ~~repeat~~ the anachronistic Military Selective Service Act, and do away with the SSS. This could be done directly or as follow-on to "1" above. ✓

COORDINATION: General Counsel: \_\_\_\_\_

*PDGC*  
*10/18/04*

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Bill Carr (b)(6)



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999


CM-2179-04

12 November 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
PERSONNEL AND READINESS

Subject: Selective Service System (SSS) Registration Options

1. I have reviewed the SSS options outlined in your recent note.<sup>1</sup> Recommend that we pursue Option 1: "Administration take action to reduce registration and downsize SSS."
2. The SSS database provides the Nation a valuable strategic manpower pool that should be retained. However, it is essential to transform the agency into a more modern, agile and efficient operation. Accordingly, the administration should pursue the following initiatives.
  - a. Retain the legislation supporting the SSS as a response to a national security crisis or emergency.
  - b. Realign the organization and infrastructure to a bare-bones operation and change the scope of the mission to a more limited, quick-response capability for the Nation.
  - c. Mandate that SSS's leadership exploit modern information technology applications, lessening the **staff** and administrative burdens to further reduce unnecessary costs.

  
RICHARD B. MYERS  
Chairman  
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Reference:

- 1 USD(P&R) Note, 29 October 2004

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/44802

~~FOUO~~

OCT 08 2004

339

TO: David Chu  
 Jim Haynes

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
 Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Selective Service Registration Options

Please get back to me with options for reducing or eliminating the requirements associated with Selective Service registration.

You mentioned that current requirements cost the taxpayers a considerable amount of money. We should look at whether it is worth it. We should take a thorough look – rapidly – and decide what to propose.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
100704-13

.....  
Please respond by 10/15/04

800204

1500704

OSD 16220-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/44803




GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

327

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel 

SUBJECT: Options Regarding Selective Service

- You asked Dr. Chu and me to provide you with options for reducing or eliminating the requirements associated with Selective Service registration.
- The Selective Service System is a separate agency in the Executive Branch. It is not part of DoD.
- I have asked a member of my staff to work with Dr. Chu's staff in preparing a reply to you. I will coordinate on Dr. Chu's reply, and ensure it incorporates my advice.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared by: Jim Schwenk/DoD OGC (b)(6)  


cc: USD(P&R)

15 Oct 04



OCT 15 2604

TO: Gen Leon LaPorte  
ADM Tom Fargo  
Gen Dick Myers  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Kissenger Memo

Attached is a dated memo by Henry Kissenger on China that is of interest.

Thanks.

**Attach.**  
7/30/03 Memo by Dr. Henry Kissinger re: Chinese Views on Korea

DHR:ss  
101404-23

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

China

15 OCT 04

OSD 16230-04

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

DATE: July 30, 2003

SUBJECT: Chinese Views on Korea

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Overall, my impression is that the implications of North Korea's current policies are so grave for Beijing, and pose such high risks of international complications that impact directly on fundamental Chinese security interests, that there are divided counsels in the PRC government over the best approach. At the same time, top leaders clearly recognize that if China is perceived as disengaged, or unwilling to press resolutely for a **non-nuclear** Korean peninsula, it will compromise its ability to sustain Japanese restraint on acquiring nuclear weapons. For that reason, China is more resolute than South Korea in its determination to reverse North Korea's nuclear program, even at severe cost to its relations with North Korea, or to the survivability of the regime there.

However, for China it is vitally important, in part because of its internal divided counsels, that regime-threatening actions not be taken except after every alternative possibility of resolving the matter through dialogue and negotiations has been exhausted. This underlines the need for a patient but resolute tightening of the screws on North Korea, rather than premature resort to a regime-threatening approach that will maximize Beijing's internal difficulties and increase the risks that China will seek more starkly to differentiate its approach from that of the United States.

October 18, 2004

TO: Gen Leon LaPorte  
ADM Tom Fargo  
Gen Dick Myers  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Kissinger Memo

Attached is a dated memo by Henry Kissinger on China that is of interest.

Attach.  
7/3/03 Memo by Dr. Henry Kissinger re: Chinese Views on Korea

DHR:ss  
101404-23

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger  
DATE: July 30, 2003  
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**Washington Headquarters Services  
Executive Services & Communications Directorate**

1155 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1155

Phone: (b)(6) -- Fax: (b)(6)

FROM : TO: Commander, UNC/CFC/USFK (GEN LaPorte)

Subject: Kissinger Memo Organization: Office of the Secretary of Defense

Phone: DSN (b)(6)

Pages (Including Cover): 4 Date: 10/18/2004 Fax: (b)(6)

Urgent     For Review     Please Comment     Please Reply     Information

Comments: Item of interest from SECDEF

October 18, 2004

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Gen Dick Myers  
Doug Feith

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October 18, 2004

TO: Ambassador Zal Khalilzad  
LTG David Barno  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Conversation with Norway's MOD

Kristin Devold, the Norwegian MOD, is going to be coming to Afghanistan.

We suggested she see both of you. Possibly see a U.S. PRT -- maybe Kandahar, Gardez or Jalalabad. We also suggested she might think about seeing Wardock or the Minister of Finance.

She is a very bright, capable person and it would be a help if she had a good trip.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
101504-12

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

18 Oct 04

October 15, 2004

TO: Ambassador Zal Khalilzad  
LTG David Barno

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101504-12

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DHR:ss  
101504-12

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

720

HOLD



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SENSITIVE

2004 OCT 14 10 55

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

ACTION MEMO

October 14, 2004 - 11:00 AM  
DepSecDef Action

210 (344)

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (P&R)  
*David S. C. Chu 18 Oct 04*  
SUBJECT: Female General and Flag Officers — SNOWFLAKE

- You asked two questions regarding female general and flag officers (Tab A).
  - Have we ever had a four-star woman? **Answer:** No
  - Are there any four-star candidate females in any of the Services right now? **Answer:** We currently have no three-star female officers. The Services do intend to nominate several three-star slates this year. The Service game plan meetings with you later this month should provide a clear assessment of the potential of each of these two-stars.
- Among recently retired female three-stars, perhaps the strongest possibility is LTG Kenne, who could be a candidate for Air Force Materiel Command at a future date (bio at Tab B).
- Reflecting the period when they entered military service, all one and two-star women officers chose careers in "support" specialties. This will make it difficult to compete successfully as combatant commander candidates, and likewise for chief of service. But some may be strong candidates for the four-star training commands in the Air Force and the Army, the acquisition commands, and possibly for vice chief of a military service.

14 Oct 04

**RECOMMENDATION:** That you discuss with the Service Secretaries and Chiefs how they are developing women with operational backgrounds for the next cohort of junior flag officers.

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock, (b)(6)

**SECDEF DECISION:**  
APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
OTHER: \_\_\_\_\_

20 Oct 04



OSD 16310-04

October 7, 2004

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Four-Star Question

DA

10/7/04  
10/7/04

210(344)

Have **we ever had** a four-star woman? **And** are there any four-star candidate **females** in **any** of the services right **now**?

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
100704-14

10/8

.....

10 OCT 04



# BIOGRAPHY

## UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

### LIEUTENANT GENERAL LESLIE F. KENNE

**Retired Sep. 1, 2003.**

Lt. Gen. Leslie F. Kenne is Deputy Chief of Staff for Warfighting Integration, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. She is responsible to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff for forming and executing policy and strategy to integrate command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to enable more effective employment of air and space power in support of national objectives. General Kenne also provides guidance and direction to four field operating agencies: the Air Force Command and Control & Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center; the Air Force Communications Agency; the Air Force Frequency Management Agency; and the Air Force Agency for Modeling and Simulation.



General Kenne entered the Air Force in 1971 as a distinguished graduate of Auburn University's ROTC program. She has served as a flight line maintenance officer in operations, and attended the U.S. Air Force Test Pilot School in 1974. After school, she served as a test and evaluation project manager, and in test and evaluation supervisory positions.

General Kenne has served in two other Pentagon staff positions, first as a division chief, and during a second tour, as a deputy director in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition. She has directed three major programs-- the Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared System for Night, the F-16 and the Joint Strike Fighter. She also has served as Vice Commander of Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, and the Sacramento Air Logistics Center, McClellan Air Force Base, Calif. Prior to assuming her current position, General Kenne commanded the Electronic Systems Center, Hanscom Air Force Base, Mass.

#### EDUCATION

1970 Bachelor's degree in aerospace engineering, Auburn University, Auburn, Ala.  
 1975 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.  
 1979 Master's degree in procurement management, Webster College, St. Louis, Mo.  
 1981 Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.  
 1986 National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.  
 1988 Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir, Va.  
 1993 Advanced Management Program, Whittemore School of Business and Economics, University of New Hampshire

11-L-0559/OSD/44820

1995 National and International Security Management: Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

#### **ASSIGNMENTS**

1. April 1971 - December 1971, space systems analyst, Headquarters Foreign Technology Division, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
2. December 1971 - April 1972, student, aircraft maintenance officer course, Chanute Air Force Base, Ill.
3. April 1972 - June 1973, flight line maintenance officer, 347th Tactical Fighter Wing, Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho
4. June 1973 - June 1974, maintenance supervisor, 474th Organizational Maintenance Squadron, Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand
5. July 1974 - October 1975, student, flight test engineering course, U.S. Air Force Test Pilot School, Edwards Air Force Base, Calif.
6. October 1975 - June 1978, project manager for air combat measuring instrumentation, later, Deputy Test Director, Range Measurement System Joint Testing, Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.
7. June 1978 - August 1981, program manager for Secretary of Defense Office-directed joint tests, Air Force Test and Evaluation Center, Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M.
8. August 1981 - January 1982, student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.
9. January 1982 - June 1985, Chief, Airborne Systems Test Branch, later, Chief, Electronics Systems Test Division, 3246th Test Wing, Eglin Air Force Base, Fla.
10. June 1985 - June 1986, student, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
11. June 1986 - April 1988, Director of Operations and Support, Airborne Warning and Control Systems Program Office, later, Program Manager, Joint Tactical Information Distribution System Class II, Headquarters Electronic Systems Division, Hanscom Air Force Base, Mass.
12. April 1988 - September 1988, student, Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir, Va.
13. December 1988 - August 1990, Chief, Special Projects Division, Directorate of Special Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
14. August 1990 - July 1992, Director, LANTIRN Systems Program Office, Aeronautical Systems Division, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
15. July 1992 - October 1993, Deputy Director, Fighters, Command and Control and Weapons Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
16. October 1993 - September 1994, Director, F-16 System Program Office, Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
17. September 1994 - July 1995, Vice Commander, Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
18. July 1995 - September 1996, Vice Commander, Sacramento Air Logistics Center, McClellan Air Force Base, Calif.
19. September 1996 - July 1997, Deputy Director, Joint Strike Fighter Program, Arlington, Va.
20. August 1997 - June 1999, Director, Joint Strike Fighter Program, Arlington, Va.
21. June 1999 - April 2002, Commander, Electronic Systems Center, Hanscom Air Force Base, Mass.
22. May 2002 - August 2003, Deputy Chief of Staff for Warfighting Integration, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

#### **MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS**

Defense Distinguished Service Medal  
Air Force Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster  
Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster  
Bronze Star Medal  
Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters  
Joint Service Commendation Medal  
Air Force Commendation Medal

#### **PROFESSIONAL CERTIFICATIONS**

Level III Program Management  
Level III Test and Evaluation

11-L-0559/OSD/44821

**EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION**

Second Lieutenant Apr 1, 1971  
First Lieutenant Apr 1, 1973  
Captain Apr 1, 1975  
Major Oct 24, 1980  
Lieutenant Colonel Mar 1, 1985  
Colonel Oct 1, 1989  
Brigadier General Oct 1, 1994  
Major General Mar 20, 1998  
Lieutenant General Jul 1, 1999

(Current as of July 2002)

11-L-0559/OSD/44822



October 18, 2004

TO: Ambassador Zal Khalilzad  
LTG David Barno  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Conversation with Norway's MOD

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DHR:ss  
101504-12

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

*Norway*

*18 OCT 04*

OSD 16364-04

10/18/2004 4:26:39 PM

**OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
CABLES DIVISION**

**FAX TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET**

**To:** Ambassador Khalilzad

**Subject:** Conversation with Norway's MOD

**Facsimile #:** (b)(6)

**From:** Secretary Rumsfeld

**Office/Desk:** OSD Cables Division

**Number of Pages Incl. Cover:** 2

**Telephone:** Comm: (b)(6)  
DSN: (b)(6)

**Facsimile:** (b)(6)

**Remarks:**

COMPLETED



**Steinfadt, Kyle D, Capt, OSD**

---

**From:** McInturff, Sandra L [(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, October 19, 2004 5:44 AM  
**To:** 'Steinfadt, Kyle D, Capt, OSD'  
**Subject:** RE: Memo for Khalizad from SecDef Rumsfeld

I got it. I will take a copy to General Barno's people.  
Sandy McInturff

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Steinfadt, Kyle D, Capt, OSD [mailto:Kyle.Steinfadt@osd.mil]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, October 19, 2004 2:09 PM  
**To:** [(b)(6)]  
**Subject:** Memo for Khalizad from SecDef Rumsfeld

Please receipt email for the attached 2-pg doc.

Thank You,  
Capt Steinfadt <<Khalizad.snowflake.19Oct04.pdf>>

10/18/2004 4:28:24 PM

**OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
CABLES DIVISION**

**FAX TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET**

COMPLETED

**To:** LTG Barno

**Subject:** Conversation with Norway's MOD

**Facsimile #:** (b)(6)

**From:** Secretary Rumsfeld

**Office/Desk:** OSD Cables Division

**Number of Pages Incl. Cover:** 2

**Telephone:** Comm: (b)(6)  
DSN: (b)(6)

**Facsimile:** (b)(6)

**Remarks:**

SECRET CABLES DISTRIBUTION					
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/	/	/	/	/	/
NAME	CD	DD	CD	CD	CD

**RSS - SecDef CablesESO**

---

**From:** System Administrator [(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, October 19, 2004 3:28 AM  
**To:** CablesESO@osd.smil.mil  
**Subject:** Delivered: RE:



RE:

<<RE: >> Your message

To: 'CFC-EMB-ADMIN-NCO'  
Subject: RE:  
Sent: Tue, 19 Oct 2004 07:30:26 -0000

was delivered to the following recipient(s):

CFC-EMB-ADMIN-NCO on Tue, 19 Oct 2004 07:28:03 -0000

**RSS - SecDef CablesESO**

---

**From:** CFC-EMB-ADMIN-NCO (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, October 19, 2004 4:35 AM  
**To:** 'RSS - SecDef CablesESO'  
**Subject:** RE:

Got it sir. Thanks

**MICHAEL K. ANDERSON**  
**SFC, USA**  
**Embassy Liaison NCO**  
**DSN:** (b)(6)



-----Original Message-----

**From:** RSS - SecDef CablesESO [mailto:(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, October 19, 2004 12:00 PM  
**To:** 'CFC-EMB-ADMIN-NCO'  
**Subject:** RE:

**~~Classification: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~**

I see all CAPS in the address, that was not told to me....

Please confirm receipt of 2-pg doc from SecDef to GEN Barno.

Thank You,  
Capt Steinfadt  
SecDef ESO

-----Original Message-----

**From:** CFC-EMB-ADMIN-NCO [mailto:(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, October 19, 2004 3:25 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:**

Test.

**MICHAEL K. ANDERSON**  
**SFC, USA**  
**Embassy Liaison NCO**

August 25, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Over Classification

Please look into this article on over classification.

I have always felt that there has been a "better safe than sorry" approach. Everyone tends to classify things that didn't need to be classified, and there is really no process for reviewing it in a timely fashion and declassifying it.

Maybe we ought to put together a team inside the Department to see if we can avoid having excessive classification. Let's get some folks to look at how we might do a better job on that—possibly a training program.

Thanks very much.

Attach.  
Waterman, Shaun. "Overclassification Overdone?" *Washington Times*, August 25, 2004, p. 6.

DNR:dk  
082504-12 (to computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 9/20/04

OSD 16378-04

Members of the commission have said that the recommendations for overhaul of Congressional intelligence oversight, which the panel described as "dysfunctional," were among the panel's most important - and would be among the most difficult for Congress to endorse. The commission called for Congress to consider creation of a single joint committee on intelligence or, alternatively, for a single committee in each house of Congress that would have the power to appropriate budget money.

Either proposal would almost certainly face strong opposition from lawmakers on the many Congressional committees that now review intelligence affairs and would have to cede power under a new oversight structure.

The membership of the working group includes Mr. Roberts, as well as Senators John W. Warner of Virginia, the Republican chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Carl Levin of Michigan, the committee's ranking Democrat. Senators Warner and Levin have already expressed wariness about any change that might strip the Defense Department - and the Armed Services Committee as well - of control over intelligence matters related to the military.

Among the other members of the working group are the two Senate authors of the legislation that created the Sept. 11 commission: John McCain, Republican of Arizona, and Joseph I. Lieberman, Democrat of Connecticut.

"Ensuring that the Senate is as effective as possible when dealing with the threat of terrorism is a principal concern," Mr. Frist said, "and I welcome the working group's recommendations."

Washington Times  
August 25, 2004  
Pg. 6

## Overclassification Overdone?

*Pentagon testifies it errs 'on the side of caution'*

By Shaun Waterman, United Press International

The official in charge of information security at the Pentagon told lawmakers yesterday that at least half of the information the U.S. government classifies every year should not be kept secret.

"How about if I say 50-50?" Carol Haave told the House Government Reform national security, emerging threats and international relations subcommittee, when asked to quantify the problem of overclassification.

Ms. Haave, the deputy undersecretary of defense for counterintelligence and security, said classification generally was not done maliciously, but because "people have a tendency to err on the side of caution."

The hearing was one in an unprecedented summer-recess series held to consider the recommendations of the September 11 commission, which found "current security requirements nurture overclassification" and create a barrier to the information-sharing needed to fight terrorism.

[http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20040825aaindex\\_concat.html](http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20040825aaindex_concat.html)

8/25/2004



Rep. Christopher Shays, Connecticut Republican, the panel's chairman, called the system for safeguarding the nation's secrets "incomprehensibly complex" and "so bloated it often does not distinguish between the critically important and the comically irrelevant."

Mr. Shays said there was broad agreement that many of the 14 million pieces of information the government classified last year did not need to be secret, but that estimates varied wildly on how bad the problem is.

"Some estimate 10 percent of current secrets should never have been classified. Others put the extent of overclassification as high as 90 percent," he said.

The administration's secrecy watchdog, Bill Leonard, head of the Information Security Oversight Office, told legislators that too much information is being classified in violation of President Bush's executive order governing secrecy.

That order, introduced in March, says information can lawfully be classified only if its "unauthorized disclosure ... reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security ...."

The problem, said Bill Crowell, a former deputy director of the National Security Agency who has served on a number of commissions inquiring into classification and secrecy, is that the system dated from the Cold War.

"The current system assumes that it is possible to determine in advance who needs to know particular information, and that the risks associated with disclosure are greater than the potential benefits of wider information-sharing," he said.

As a result, there are significant incentives to protect information, but none to share it.

---

Christian Science Monitor  
August 25, 2004

## Debate Reignites Over US Aid To Indonesia

*A court ruling earlier this month exonerated four officials charged in the 1999 massacre in East Timor.*

By Eric Umwacht, Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

JAKARTA, INDONESIA - Two competing perspectives have long dominated Washington when it comes to military aid for Indonesia. On one side there are those in Congress who call the country's military brutal abusers of human rights. They want US aid to remain suspended until Indonesia's military is reformed.

On the other side is the Pentagon and some White House officials who say the US, once Indonesia's largest source of military aid, should resume funding because of the country's importance to the war on terrorism.

[http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20040825sa/index\\_concat.html](http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20040825sa/index_concat.html)

8/25/2004



INTELLIGENCE

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000  
INFO MEMO

2004 OCT 12 11:20

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

OCT 12 2004

SUBJECT: SecDef Snowflake Regarding Overclassification

- Your snowflake of 25 August 2004 (attached) expressed concern about over classification within the Department. This is predominately a training issue. People overclassify because they are in a hurry or cautious, the classification guidance is unclear or the derivative source was over classified.
- We have recently established the DoD Security Directors Group comprised of senior security officials from the Military Departments, Joint Staff, Combatant Commands and Defense Agencies that is meeting quarterly to oversee implementation of security policies to include this one. Recommend this be "the team" you suggest establishing in your comments to help reduce excessive classification.
- Regarding your comment about review of documents, there are systematic and mandatory declassification review processes as well as reviews done in response to Freedom of Information requests. For example, USD(P) is conducting a declassification review of prewar Iraq policy material. Also, there is a package on its way to you designating USD(I) as the final declassification arbiter for GTMO related issues.
- Attached are some actions underway to help remedy the situation, but the key is command emphasis on security as part of the operational mission, training and oversight. These actions and venues provide the opportunity and ability to strengthen the DoD information security program and reduce over classification.

Attachment:

List of additional actions

COORDINATION:

DA&M: Concur

GC: Concur

Prepared by: C. Bromwell, OUSD(I) (b)(6)

OSD 16378-04



11-L-0559/OSD/44832

### Revised Guidance

- As required by the SecDef All Hands message (attached), we are issuing a memorandum to all DoD agencies to rejustify their list of original classification authorities to ensure only those positions requiring this authority have it.
- In a revision to DoD 5200.1-R, "Information Security Program," we will be proposing that derivative classification authorities be identified on classified documents. This will reinforce accountability of decisions.
- We are coordinating recommended changes to detainee guidance with a number of DoD agencies and once agreed, we will provide them to the Commanding General, Joint Task Force (JTF) Guantanamo (GTMO) for updating his security classification guide.
- You will be receiving, if you haven't already, a memo for your signature designating me as the declassification authority for collateral classified information related to JTF GTMO detainee issues.

### Training Initiatives

- The Defense Security Service Academy is updating and reinforcing the training requirements that will be articulated in a memorandum from me to all DoD Components. We are also investigating novel ways to disseminate the information across the Department such as websites, and assist visits. We are also sending a survey to deploying commands to determine security training needs.
- The Director, Pentagon Force Protection Agency conducts a security awareness week in the Pentagon every year, and one of my staff will be participating in October to emphasize your message.
- We continue efforts to enhance the training and professionalization of security managers.
- Considering assigning DSS representatives to Combatant Commanders to educate and answer security-related questions.

### Oversight

- The DoD Security Directors Group comprised of senior security officials from the Military Departments, Joint Staff, Combatant Commands and defense agencies that is meeting on 5 October and quarterly thereafter to help oversee implementation of revised security policies.
- OUSDI-led coordination of JTF GTMO detainee-related documents.
- Command self-inspections.
- Considering a proposal to DoD Inspector General — make classification a special interest item.
- Information Security Oversight Office oversight visits to DoD Components.

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ZNR UUUUU ZUI RUEKJCS9815 2602142  
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FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
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INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC  
ZEN/PTC OTC SPT

UNCLAS

SUBJ: SUBJ: DOD INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM

ALDODACT 13/04

ADDRESSEES PASS TO ALL SUBORDINATE COMMNADS  
REF: (A) EXECUTIVE ORDER 12958, AS AMENDED, CLASSIFIED NATIONAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION (B) DOD 5200.1-R, INFORMATION SECURITY  
PROGRAM

1. THE PRESIDENT ESTABLISHED A STRONG INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM EXECUTIVE ORDER 12958 (REFERENCE A), IMPLEMENTED WITHIN DEPARTMENT BY REFERENCE (B). ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION (OCA), DESIGNATED PURSUANT TO REFERENCE (A), AND CLASSIFIERS, ARE ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE ACCURACY OF THEIR DECISIONS. OFFICIALS WITH COMMAND SIGNATURE AUTHORITY SHALL ENSURE THAT CLASSIFICATION MARKINGS ARE
2. IT IS IMPORTANT TO STATE THAT CLASSIFIERS SHALL NOT: A) CLASSIFICATION TO CONCEAL VIOLATIONS OF LAW, INEFFICIENCY, ADMINISTRATIVE ERROR; B) CLASSIFY INFORMATION TO EMBARRASSMENT TO A PERSON, ORGANIZATION, OR AGENCY; C) INFORMATION TO PREVENT OR DELAY THE RELEASE OF INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT REQUIRE PROTECTION IN THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL SECURITY. INFORMATION MAY ONLY BE CLASSIFIED IF IT MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT IN REFERENCE (A) AND REITERATED IN REFERENCE (B).
3. THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE (USD(I)) ISSUE MINIMUM TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR OCAS AND CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITIES WITHIN 45 DAYS. USD(I) ALSO SHALL THAT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE IS UPDATED, CORRECTIVE IS TAKEN, AS APPROPRIATE, AT DOD COMPONENTS THAT GENERATE RELATED TO DETAINEES AND PRISONER ABUSE, AND THAT ALL DOD CONDUCT ACTIVE OVERSIGHT OF ALL OCA POSITIONS FOR JUSTIFICATION MAINTAIN THIS
4. ALL CLASSIFIED DRAFTS AND WORKING PAPERS SHALL BE CLEARLY MARKED

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

SECDEF:   /   DEPSEC:   /   EXECSEC:   /    
C&D:   /   CCD:   /   CABLE CH:   /   FILE: XCEB

USDP:   /   DIA:            OTHER: ESR / MILPER / CIVPER /  
USDI:   /   PER SEC:            COMM:            PROTOCOL /

\*\*\* UNCLASSIFIED \*\*\*

SUCH AND CLASSIFICATION MARKINGS APPLIED AS REQUIRED BY REFERENCE  
(B). DRAFTS AND WORKING PAPERS MAY NOT BE USED AS SOURCES FOR  
DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION PURPOSES.

5. ANY QUESTIONS SHOULD BE SENT VIA THE CHAIN OF COMMAND TO ONE OF THE  
MILITARY DEPARTMENTS SENIOR SECURITY OFFICIAL, THE DIRECTOR OF  
MANAGEMENT, JOINT STAFF OR THE DIRECTOR, SECURITY, (ODUSD/CI&S).

PJBD...INFO \*\*\*\*\*  
USRMCLD... INFO \*\*\*\*\*  
JSSC...INFO \*\*\*\*\*  
SHAPE LNO...INFO \*\*\*\*\*  
USSOCOMWO...INFO \*\*\*\*\*

JOINT STAFF V1 3  
ACTION (U,7)  
INFO SJS-C(\*) SJS-C(1) NMCC:CWO(\*) CMAS(\*)  
CMAS(1) JS COMPT(\*) PJBD(\*) JSSC(\*) USSOCOMWO(\*)  
JMUSDC(\*) USTRANSCOMWO(\*) JSAMS(\*) SECDEF-C(1)  
SECDEF-C(\*) JCSOINIPRDA(\*) JCSOINSIPRDA(\*)

SECDEF V2 0  
ACTION SECDEF WASH DC(\*) (U,6,7,8)  
INFO CHAIRS(\*) CHAIRS TESTBED(\*) CHAIRS2(\*) DOTE:OSD(\*)  
DOD:IG(\*) ATSD:IO(\*) NCCS SUPPORT(\*) MDA(\*)  
C3I-DASD-DCIO(\*) USDAT:STS(\*) ASD:PA-SMTP(\*)  
DIR:PAE-RAM(\*) DIR:PAE-SSACP(\*) DIR:PAE-DCL(\*)  
USDCOMP(\*) MILPERDIV(\*) USDP:ESC(\*) ESC-SMTP(\*)  
IG-DCIS KWS(\*) OSDONNIPRDA(\*) OSDONSIPRDA(\*)  
+SAFE

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 3

#9815

NNNN

August 25, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Over Classification

Please look into this article on over classification.

I have always felt that there has been a "better safe than sorry" approach. Everyone tends to classify things that didn't need to be classified, and there is really no process for reviewing it in a timely fashion and declassifying it.

Maybe we ought to put together a team inside the Department to see if we can avoid having excessive classification. Let's get some folks to look at how we might do a better job on that—possibly a training program.

Thanks very much.

Attach.

Waterman, Shaun. "Overclassification Overdone?" *Washington Times*, August 25, 2004, p. 6.

DHR:gs  
NE2504-12 (to computer).doc

.....  
Please respond by

9/20/04

OSD 16378-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44836

Members of the commission have said that the recommendations for an overhaul of Congressional intelligence oversight, which the panel described as "dysfunctional," were among the panel's most important - and would be among the most difficult for Congress to endorse. The commission called for Congress to consider creation of a single joint committee on intelligence or, alternatively, for a single committee in each house of Congress that would have the power to appropriate budget money.

Either proposal would almost certainly face opposition from lawmakers on the many Congressional committees that now review intelligence matters and would have to adapt to a new oversight structure.

The membership of the working group includes Mr. Roberts, as well as Senators John W. Warner of Virginia, the Republican chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Carl Levin of Michigan, the committee's ranking Democrat. Senators Warner and Levin have already expressed wariness about any change that might strip the Defense Department - and the Armed Services Committee, as well - of control over intelligence matters related to the military.

Among the other members of the working group are the two Senate authors of the legislation that created the Sept. 11 commission: John McCain, Republican of Arizona, and Joseph I. Lieberman, Democrat of Connecticut.

"Ensuring that the Senate is as effective as possible when dealing with the threat of terrorism is a principal concern," Mr. Frist said, "and I welcome the working group's recommendations."

Washington Times  
August 25, 2004  
Pg. 6

## Overclassification Overdone?

*Pentagon testifies it errs 'on the side of caution'*

By Shaun Waterman, United Press International

The official in charge of information security at the Pentagon told lawmakers yesterday that at least half of the information the U.S. government classifies every year should not be kept secret.

"How about if I say 50-50?" Carol Haave told the House Government Reform national security, emerging threats and international relations subcommittee, when asked to quantify the problem of overclassification.

Ms. Haave, the deputy undersecretary of defense for counterintelligence and security, said classification generally was not done maliciously, but because "people have a tendency to err on the side of caution."

The hearing was one in an unprecedented summer-recess series held to consider the recommendations of the September 11 commission, which found "current security requirements nurture overclassification" and create a barrier to the information-sharing needed to fight terrorism.

[http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20040825aaindex\\_concat.html](http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20040825aaindex_concat.html)

8/25/2004

Rep. Christopher Shays, Connecticut Republican, L. epanel's chairman, called the system for safeguarding the nation's secrets "incomprehensibly complex" and "so bloated it often does not distinguish between the critically important and the comically irrelevant."

Mr. Shays said there was broad agreement that many of the 14 million pieces of information the government classified last year did not need to be secret, but that estimates varied wildly on how bad the problem is.

"Some estimate 10 percent of current secrets should never have been classified. Others put the extent of overclassification as high as 90 percent," he said.

The administration's secrecy watchdog, Bill Leonard, head of the Information Security Oversight Office, told legislators that too much information is being classified in violation of President Bush's executive order governing secrecy.

That order, introduced in March, says information can lawfully be classified only if its "unauthorized disclosure ... reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security ..."

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"The current system assumes that it is possible to determine in advance who needs to know particular information, and that the risks associated with disclosure are greater than the potential benefits of wider information-sharing," he said.

As a result, there are significant incentives to protect information, but none to share it.

Christian Science Monitor  
August 25, 2004

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*A court ruling earlier this month exonerated four officials charged in the 1999 massacre in East Timor.*

By Eric Unmacht, Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

JAKARTA, INDONESIA - Two competing perspectives have long dominated Washington when it comes to military aid for Indonesia. On one side there are those in Congress who call the country's military brutal abusers of human rights. They want US aid to remain suspended until Indonesia's military is reformed.

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[http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20040825aaindex\\_concat.html](http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20040825aaindex_concat.html)

8/25/2004



TAB  
FOUO

September 22, 2004

869

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: CMCs

Should we try to figure out a way to get better connected to those CINCs I don't deal with regularly?

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092804-13

.....  
Please respond by 10/8/04

322

28Sep04

092804-13

FOUO

TAB

11-L-0559/OSD/44839

OSD 16393-04



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CH-2129-04  
19 October 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMy 10/18*

SUBJECT: CINCs

- **Question.** "Should we try to figure out a way to get better connected to those CINCs I don't deal with regularly?" (TAB)
- **Answer.** Yes, we should strive for enhanced connectivity with combatant commanders with whom we are not engaged on a regular basis.
- **Analysis.** The following procedures provide the necessary links:
  - Encourage all combatant commanders to request an office call with SecDef whenever they visit Washington.
  - Host periodic video-telecommunications or teleconferences with one command at a time.
  - Visit (accompanied by Joyce) one combatant command per month for a day.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

**As** stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/44840

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 16393-04

TAB  
FOUO

September 28, 2004

869

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: CMCs

Should we try to figure out a way to get better connected to those CINC's I don't deal with regularly?

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092804-13

.....  
Please *respond-by* 10/8/04

092804-13

FOUO

Tab

OSD 16393-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44841

October 25, 2004

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Memo on Macro Layout of Languages

I just looked over your October 13 memo on the Macro Layout of Languages. It is extremely disappointing. Please come back to me with a set of proposals as to how we can get some intelligent balance into this.

It's clear things in motion remain in motion, and in the past period since September 11, people are not making the kinds of logical corrections that thoughtful people would make.

Please get back to me promptly with some ideas.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
102504-19

.....  
Please respond by 11/19/04

*091.4*

*25 OCT 04*

*4 OCT 04*

~~FOUO~~

10/4/04

~~FOUO~~

CC - 10/4/04  
WDP

OCT 04 2004

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Macro Layout

Please get back to me with a macro layout on languages in the Department of Defense, including what it was each year beginning in 2000 to the present.

I'm from Missouri on this one.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
100104-11

.....  
Please respond by 10/14/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/44843

OSD 16491-04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

SECRET

2004 DEC -2 PM 2:49

November 29, 2004, 5:00 PM

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)  
*David S. C. Chu & Deputy*

SUBJECT: Memo on Macro Layout of Languages—SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- The current language pool is driven by an outdated manpower “requirements” process.
- We need to establish a number of people to be trained in languages over and above the needs defined in this traditional manner, “capabilities based.” This is one of the objectives of our Language Transformation Roadmap.
- We can begin by:
  - Identifying a goal for the percent of the force that should possess capability in investment languages (regardless of job), and tasking the Defense Language Institute to set up courses to train these service members over and above their existing capacity. I propose setting the goal at **5%** active, 2 1/2% selected reserve (= 70,300 active, 21,522 reserves)
  - Establishing a Joint Service Language Corps that could be used to support all services and operations. We are currently developing the concept for such a Corps.
  - Expediting the full implementation of an **Army** pilot program to recruit Arabic speaking service members, by expanding the languages we target for recruitment and starting similar programs in other services.
  - Providing incentive for service members to maintain their language proficiency with enhanced Foreign Language Proficiency Pay. **An** increase was included in this year’s National Defense Authorization Act.
- Subject to your guidance, I will pursue all of the above options and report back to you on our progress.

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by Mrs. Gail McGinn, DUSD(PLANS), (b)(6)



OSD 16491-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44844

October 25, 2004

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Memo on Macro Layout of Languages

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102504-19

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
I'm from Missouri on this one.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
100104-11

.....  
Please respond by

10/14/04



Sir,  
Response Attached  
V/R  
COLB  
10/20





UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000  
 INFO MEMO



PERSONNEL AND  
 READINESS

October 13, 2004, 3 PM

*Gail Butler*

*Aug 19/20*

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

*David S. C. Chu*  
*19 Oct 04*

SUBJECT: Macro Layout of Languages (Snowflake)

- Active Service members with a minimum of Level 1 reading and listening ability:

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Arabic (Modern Standard)	2,391	1,979	2,586	2,606	2,556
Chinese (Mandarin)	1,168	918	1,455	1,578	1,623
Persian Farsi	657	446	739	802	796
Persian Afghan	5	4	15	13	16
Korean	2,646	2,243	3,199	3,322	3,354

*see expanded charts at rear of packet*

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Arabic (Modern Standard)	418	417	398	376	543
Chinese (Mandarin)	150	205	188	237	189
Persian Farsi	124	95	103	138	166
Persian Afghan	0	0	0	0	18
Korean	264	322	274	253	379

- More dramatic improvement has been hampered by the Services' lengthy processes for developing manpower requirements, which are largely based upon past operational experience instead of being driven by a capabilities-based assessment. We have initiated a pilot program to recruit heritage Arabic speakers into the Individual Ready Reserve with an eye to creating a surge capability for operational units in the future. The Army is having success with this program, which should serve as a model for future efforts.
- We are also addressing systemic language issues to fix the requirements process to allow for "top down" driven changes, a doctrinal change to incorporate foreign language and regional expertise as combat capabilities for planning purposes, and a readiness index to measure our progress. We are currently coordinating a Transformation Roadmap that embodies these changes and the need for greater language proficiency among our language specialists. In accordance with the Strategic Planning Guidance, the Roadmap will be forwarded to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for approval.

Attachment:  
 Data on Service Academies language requirements

Prepared by Mrs. Gail McGinn, DUSD (PLANS), (b)(6)

TSA SD	<i>10/20</i>
SRMA SD	
MA SD	<i>SPD 10/20</i>
EXEC SEC	<i>M 10/20</i>



OSD 16491-04

## SERVICE ACADEMIES

**United States Military Academy** (two semester mandatory requirement) Following are the numbers for cadets in the Classes of 2004-2008 for the seven languages taught at West Point.

Academic Year (AY)	AY 2000 (graduates 2004)	AY 2001 (graduates 2005)	AY 2002 (graduates 2006)	AY 2003 (graduates 2007)	AY 2004 (graduates 2008)
Arabic	91	89	208	209	244
Chinese	84	112	58	55	78
French	130	149	148	178	97
German	263	232	234	265	216
Portuguese	118	100	58	127	178
Russian	70	112	141	56	52
Spanish	374	361	279	366	420

**United States Air Force Academy** (four semester requirement for non-technical majors; two semester requirement for mathematics, space operations, meteorology, and biology; no requirement for engineering majors) Students enrolled in language courses, by year.

Academic Year	Fall 2000	Fall 2001	Fall 2002 (voluntary)	Fall 2003 (mandatory again)	Fall 2004
Arabic	104	111	47	84	135
Chinese	108	105	42	46	75
French	312	253	98	151	164
German	285	226	79	156	197
Japanese	109	130	37	65	97
Russian	171	181	92	112	128
Spanish	465	630	261	286	346

**United States Naval Academy** (four semester requirement for humanities and social science majors; no requirement for engineering, mathematics or science majors) **Number** of midshipmen taking languages by the academic year.

Academic Year	2001 (Spring & Fall)	2002 (Spring & Fall)	2003 (Spring & Fall)	2004 (Spring & Fall)	2005 (Fall)
Arabic					*34
Chinese		*56	103	111	51
French	294	297	325	319	172
German	177	174	207	230	120
Japanese	109	112	92	123	82
Russian	89	97	122	134	64
Spanish	1122	963	951	1078	456

Attachment



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000  
 INFO MEMO



PERSONNEL AND  
 READINESS

October 13, 2004, 3 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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OSD 16491-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44849

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Spanish	465	630	261	286	346

**United States Naval Academy** (four semester requirement for humanities and social science majors; no requirement for engineering, mathematics or science majors) Number of midshipmen taking languages by the academic year.

Academic Year	2001 (Spring & Fall)	2002 (Spring & Fall)	2003 (Spring & Fall)	2004 (Spring & Fall)	2005 (Fall)
Arabic					*34
Chinese		*56	103	111	51
French	294	297	325	319	172
German	177	174	207	230	120
Japanese	109	112	92	123	82
Russian	89	97	122	134	64
Spanish	1122	963	951	1078	456

\*Denotes inception year of program.

Attachment

11-L-0559/OSD/44850

10/4/04

FOUO

CL 10/4/04  
NDP

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

OCT 04 2004

OCT 04 11 06:27

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Macro Layout

Please get back to me with a macro layout on languages in the Department of Defense, including what it was each year beginning in 2000 to the present.

I'm from Missouri on this one.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
100104-11

.....  
Please respond by 10/14/04

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/44851

OSD 16491-04

FOUO

OCT 15 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
VADM Jim Stavridis  
Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Elevating Issues Proposal

*Copy of  
PKC to  
GEN Helmick*

Please take a look at this proposal from Ray Dubois and tell me what you think of it.

~~Have Paul Wolfowitz look at it, and then come back to me with a recommendation.~~

Thanks.

Attach  
5/20/04 Memo to SecDef re: Elevating Issues

DHR:es  
101404-33

.....  
Please respond by 10/18

*SJR*

*→ Larry, Paul, and I think it worth setting up & trying for 6 months.  
→ Will send to Deputy for his cut / recommendation.*

*v/r jr*

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/44852

OSD 16606-04


**A**






# Executive Issues Flow

## Chain of Command Reporting




## Expedited Early-Warning





October 19, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Letter from Governor Ehrlich

Attached is a letter from Governor Bob Ehrlich, and a copy of my response to him.

It is in your hands.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/15/04 Gov Ehrlich Letter to SecDef

DHR:ss  
101904-21

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

3233 Navy

19 OCT 04

15 OCT 04

OSD 16610-04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

The Honorable Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr.  
Governor of Maryland  
State House  
Annapolis, MD 21401

4

Dear Governor,


Thanks so much for your note and your holiday greetings. Mary Beth dropped it off.

I have passed your letter along to Ray DuBois, who is working the BRAC issue for us, and I know he will give it the most careful attention.

I look forward to seeing you the weekend after the election, if you are able to make it.

Warm regards,

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a large loop and a long horizontal stroke.



STATE OF MARYLAND  
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

ROBERT L. EHRLICH, JR.  
GOVERNOR

October 15, 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary  
Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington DC, 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As you know, Maryland is home to nearly 100,000 military personnel and some of the nation's most important military installations. While many of these installations have become an integral part of America's tradition and history, I would like to draw your attention to the Naval Surface Warfare Center at Indian Head, a facility that is vital to the way we conduct warfare.

Recently, the Naval Surface Warfare Center at Indian Head developed, tested, and fielded the thermobaric bomb in 68 days. It was a remarkable success story in our fight against Taliban and al Qaeda holdouts in the mountainous Gardez region of eastern Afghanistan. Although this facility has remained relatively anonymous, its unique combination of energetics capability and problem solving are essential to overcome the asymmetrical tactics of our enemies.

While industry has abandoned the energetics business, it can no longer meet this quick-response requirement. As a result, the Navy consolidated its energetics activities into the Naval Warfare Center at Indian Head, which provides a full life-cycle energetics activity, capable of pursuing science and technology, design, development, in-service engineering, process development, scale-up and limited production. This enormous capability is supported by 800 energetics scientists and technicians and efficiently housed in one facility in Indian Head. In fact, 70% of all U.S. explosives and propellants, including the thermobaric bomb, developed since 1985 originated at Indian Head.

The Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 is designed to save money while injecting efficiencies into the way we station and deploy our forces. In 1995, BRAC analysts focused keenly on energetics and devised multiple scenarios to close Indian Head. It became clear that it was too expensive to close Indian Head then, and it will likely remain too expensive to close today. In the wake of BRAC, however, the Navy took the opportunity to consolidate even more energetics missions at Indian Head. Today, it remains the hub of the Department of Defense (DoD) energetics, it is the only research and development center for underwater weapons, the only facility for high-risk chemicals (including being the sole producer of torpedo fuel), and it is DoD's center of excellence for all aircraft ejection seat propellants and other cartridge actuated and propellant actuated (CAD/PAD) devices.

11-L-0559/OSD/44857

STATE HOUSE, ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND 21401  
(410) 974-3901 1-800-811-8336  
TTY USERS CALL VIA MD RELAY


OSD/6610-04

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
October 15, 2004  
Page 2

Others have followed the Navy to Indian Head, taking advantage of its proximity to the Beltway and the affordable living conditions in Charles County. Today, the Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC), which tests the majority of new command and control systems for service-wide compatibility, has re-located to Indian Head. The Joint Service Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Center (EODTC) provides the capability to locate, gain access to, identify, and neutralize hazards presented by military and improvised surface and underwater conventional and nuclear devices. Today, the EODTC operates a 24-7 command cell linked via satellite to Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) technicians on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan to identify unexploded ordnance, including Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Additionally, the U.S. Marines selected Indian Head to position its Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), enabling a rapid response to Washington, D.C. while maintaining a safe distance in the event of a catastrophic event. As you know, it was the Indian Head-based CBIRF that responded to the Senate Hart Office Building following the post 9-11 anthrax attack.


In addition, the analyses of BRAC 95 repeatedly demonstrate the financial and military **risk** inherent in closing this facility or moving its capability elsewhere. While Indian Head offers a continuum of energetics capability, from development and testing to neutralization and disposal for our military, it is also vital to Maryland. If I may be of any assistance on this or any other matter, please do not hesitate to contact my Deputy Chief of Staff, Mary Beth Carozza at (410) 974-5258 or via email at [mbcarozza@gov.state.md.us](mailto:mbcarozza@gov.state.md.us).

Very truly yours,

  
Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr.  
Governor

cc: The Honorable Aris Melissaratos  
Mary Beth Carozza, Deputy Chief of Staff

11-L-0559/OSD/44858



STATE OF MARYLAND  
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

ROBERT L. EHRLICH, JR.  
GOVERNOR

October 15, 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary  
Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington DC, 20301-1000

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3233 Navy

15 Oct 04

OSD 16610-04

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld


October 15, 2004

Page 2

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Very truly yours,

  
Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr.  
Governor

cc: The Honorable *Aris* Melissaratos  
Mary Beth Carozza, Deputy Chief of Staff

11-L-0559/OSD/44860

Mr. Secretary -



Greetings  
from  
Maryland!

MARY BETH CAROZZA  
Deputy Chief of Staff

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR  
STATE HOUSE  
ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND 21401  
410-974-3901  
410-974-5093 FAX  
1-800-811-8336  
mbcarozza@gov.state.md.us

The Governor  
asked me to say  
"Hello!"

ROBERT L. EHRLICH, JR.  
GOVERNOR

Mary Beth

110122344

11-L-0559/OSD/44861

OSD 167 -04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

OCT 20 2004

Ms. Mary Beth Carozza  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
Office of the Governor  
State House  
Annapolis, MD 21401

Dear Mary Beth,

Thanks so much for your note and the letter from the Governor.

I hope things are going well for you. We miss you here.

Warm regards,


323.3 Navy

20 Oct 04

15 Oct 04

OSD 16601-04





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

OCT 20 2004

The Honorable Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr.  
Governor of Maryland  
State House  
Annapolis, MD 21401

Dear Governor,

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I have passed your letter along to Ray DuBois, who is working the BRAC issue for us, and I know he will give it the most careful attention.

I look forward to seeing you the weekend after the election, if you are able to make it.

Warm regards,

323.3 Navy

20 Oct 04

OSD 16637-04

01/04

October 20, 2004

TO: GEN George Casey

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Peshmerga Possibilities

At the right time, in the right way, why don't you think about the possibility of using Peshmerga military forces for one or more of the following possibilities:

- Protection of a UN presence
- Protection of the NATO Mission for training and equipping
- Protection in the Green Zone
- Protection for election activities in selected parts of the country
- Convoy protection – since they would be moving across the country, rather than permanently located
- Selected site protection
- Protection along the Syrian border and/or the Iranian border

One possibility might be to make them an element of the Iraqi Army or the Iraqi National Guard.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
101904-20

.....  
Please respond by 11/5/04

Iraq

200404

OSD 16612-04

October 20, 2004

TO: GEN George Casey

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen John AbizaidFROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Peshmerga Possibilities

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Thanks.

DHR:ss  
101904-20

.....  
Please respond by 11/5/04

**OSD 16612-04**

11-L-0559/OSD/44865