


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Over 260,000 tons of munitions have been destroyed. Approximately 145,000 tons remain to be destroyed. Destruction is taking place at a rate of about 600 tons per day. We expect to complete destruction or transfer to Iraq security forces all munitions at two of the six depots in January 2005.

As of September 2003, there were over 6,000 Soldiers dedicated to securing, transporting, guarding and destroying captured enemy munitions. In September 2003, this mission transitioned to US contractors. The three contractors employ approximately 2,000 workers, of which 600 are US workers and 1,400 local nationals. Approximately \$460 million out of approximately \$580 million budgeted has been spent on ammunition destruction efforts.

On behalf of our men and women in uniform, thank you for your continued concern and support.

Sincerely,



RICHARD B. MYERS
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



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Discover the Truth at: <http://www.theblackvault.com>



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

1 December 2004

The Honorable Jon S. Corzine
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Senator Corzine,

The Secretary of Defense asked that I respond to your letter regarding missing explosives in Al Qa Qaa, Iraq.

Coalition efforts to secure, destroy or demilitarize the enormous quantity of captured enemy ammunition have been very successful. Coalition forces discovered over 10,000 weapons cache sites in Iraq. All known weapons caches have been consolidated into six guarded depots. Over 400,000 tons of munitions have been discovered in Iraq. While we regard any missing explosive material as a serious matter, the alleged missing explosives from Al Qa Qaa comprises less than .1 percent of the total munitions found to date.

The Al Qa Qaa facility was one of dozens of ammunition storage points the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) encountered during the rapid advance toward Baghdad. When US forces arrived, the facility gates were found open. Fedayeen Saddam, Special Republican Guard and other Iraqi military units were firing from inside, defending the facility. US forces engaged them, eliminated the resistance and set up a defensive position in the facility in order to secure the adjacent bridge. The only checks made for munitions at that time were those necessary to establish the defensive position. The next day, the division continued the advance to Baghdad.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) tagged and inventoried 201 tons of munitions inside bunkers at Al Qa Qaa on 14 January 2003. The agency acknowledged that it could not account for 32 tons of high melting-point explosive (HMX) and accepted Saddam's claims that the missing explosives were used for industrial purposes.

Prior to combat operations, the Iraqi Ministry of Science and Technology alleged, in April 2003, that 340 tons of high explosives were stored at Al Qa Qaa. US forces discovered and removed over 400 tons of munitions and explosives between April and June 2003. Units involved in the removal of the material found indications of looting and stated that none of the bunkers were under IAEA or UN seals. The facility currently has no munitions.

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/47867

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On behalf of our men and women in uniform, thank you for your continued concern and support.

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Chairman

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1 December 2004

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United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20515

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Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/47869


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CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

1 December 2004

The Honorable Frank R. Lautenberg
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Senator Lautenberg,

The Secretary of Defense asked that I respond to your letter regarding missing explosives in Al Qa Qaa, Iraq.

Coalition efforts to secure, destroy or demilitarize the enormous quantity of captured enemy ammunition have been very successful. Coalition forces discovered over 10,000 weapons cache sites in Iraq. All known weapons caches have been consolidated into *six* guarded depots. Over 400,000 tons of munitions have been discovered in Iraq. While we regard any missing explosive material as a serious matter, the alleged missing explosives from Al Qa Qaa comprises less than .1 percent of the total munitions found to date.

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Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/47871


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Sincerely,



RICHARD B. MYERS

Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~FOUO~~

SEARCHED
SERIALIZED
INDEXED
2005 JAN 11 PM 2:42

JAN 31 2005

I-05/001495
ES-218A

TO: Ryan Henry
CC: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Leads

310.1

Let's get those leads picked - **FAST**. And don't forget, I do want a professional editor to go over that - even though it is a classified document. I think it is important that we do that.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
012805-20

.....
Please respond by 2/3/05

31 JAN 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 04960-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47873

~~FOUO~~

February 15, 2005

I-05/002323
ES-2328

TO: Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Helicopters

The MOD of Poland told me that Petraeus and someone else are telling the Iraqi MOD that they don't need 20 Polish helicopters and it is bothering the Polish MOD.

DHR ss
021405-61

.....
Please respond by 3/10/05

Poland

15 Feb 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 05004-05

15-02-05 13:47 13

11-L-0559/OSD/47874

24

TAB A
~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECURITY COORDINATOR

JAN 31 2005 14:53 2:23

TO: Gen Dick Myers
CC: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Options to Shorten Education during Stress Period

Let's come up with some options as to how we might shorten professional military education, or abbreviate it, during this stress period.

Thanks.

DMR:sk
012805-18

.....
Please respond by

3/10/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 05019-05
Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/47875



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CM-2375-05 2005 MAR 14 13 2:23
14 March 2005

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS ^{F&A} *ve R. Myers 13 Mar 05*

SUBJECT: Options to Shorten Education During Stress Period (SF 947)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB A), the Services are reducing class size and continuing the discretionary practice of releasing students early from joint professional military education and professional military education (JPME/PME) to meet operational needs.
- **Analysis.** I brought together the Services and National Defense University to vet the issue. The current practice of releasing students from schooling while giving them constructive credit for course completion and adjusting class size is serving us well. For example, due to operational needs, this year's US Army Command & General Staff College class started approximately 17 percent smaller than the previous year; they will graduate a yet smaller number due to operationally justified early releases. The US Army War College's experience is similar: approximately 5 percent smaller this year from last and have accommodated operationally justified early releases. Additionally, next year's National War College class will be 5 percent smaller and the length of JPME II at the Joint Forces Staff College has been shortened.
- Any blanket shortening or reducing access to education is not a good option. The WWII example of closing the Army War College in hindsight produced short-term relief at the long-term cost of creating a group of Field Grade and General Officers who were not sufficiently well prepared for the operational and strategic responsibilities of that conflict.
- The United States is involved in a protracted fight where the battle of ideas is central to victory. Resident education of sufficient duration to allow officers to study and reflect is essential to producing the critical thinking skills, the requisite cultural understanding and strategic communications competencies needed to win the battle of ideas.
- Transformation also requires advanced critical thinking skills; our educational institutions are where the seeds of cultural change are planted. Successful organizations are learning organizations, and resident education is essential to inculcating these attributes within the Department of Defense.

OSD 05019-05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47876

- The manpower needs of the current stress period fall differently on the Services; no one-size-fits-all solution is practical. The individual Services are in the best position to balance their varying mission and manpower needs and are actively doing so by selectively releasing officers early from PME/JPME or adjusting class sizes as required by operational demands.
- An overall shortening of education delivery or reduced student loads suggests that these actions free officers for the War on Terrorism. Absent from this discussion is the recognition that the PME/JPME venues offer places to go (as students and faculty) after service in operational or other high personnel tempo units. Further, the operational experiences of these officers serve to catalyze curricula, ensuring cutting edge relevancy with the desired effect on their fellow students' education and joint acculturation.
- The task assigned to the Department of Defense from Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act 2005 to produce a "Strategic Plan for Joint Officer Development" (suspense January 2006) is an opportunity to recraft joint officer development in transformational ways. Aside from Joint Officer Management issues, the Joint Staff is also parsing what learning approaches are required to produce the leaders of the Joint Operations Concepts-envisioned force of 2015, to include both new content and delivery approaches.
- Congressional concern -- specifically that of Representative Skelton -- regarding any truncating of PME has been expressed both in the press and in the Congressional Record. Relatedly, MG Robert Scales' (USA, Retired), who is coordinating a Congressional PME Roundtable for Reps Skelton and Israel, recent editorial "Too Busy to Learn" (TAB B) provides insight into these concerns.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:

As stated

Reference:

- 1 Kreiberg & Henry: "History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army 1775-1945," Center for Military History Publication 104-10, 2d ed, 1989, pp 613-614.

Prepared By: Major General Jack Catton, USAF; DJ-7; (b)(6)

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

JAN 31 2005 14 01 23

TO: Gen Dick Myers
CC: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
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Thanks.

DHR:m
012805-18

.....
Please respond by 3/10/05

~~FOUO~~

SECRET

OSD 05019-05

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/47878

Washington Times
February 17, 2005
Pg. 19

Studying The Art Of War

Soldiers need time to learn about combat

By Robert H. Scales

From the Congress of Vienna in 1815 to the German invasion of France in 1914, the British Army maintained order from Egypt to Hong Kong with an Army that never exceeded 300,000. A "thin red line" of British infantry fought a succession of small wars against mostly tribal enemies, winning virtually all of them quickly. The Achilles' heel of the Victorian military system was intellectual rather than physical. The demands of defending the empire created an army too busy to learn. For an institution obsessed with active service, time away from campaigning was time wasted. Staff college attendance was considered bad form. Writing about one's profession gave evidence of a mind unengaged in the necessary business of fighting real wars against real enemies. In the officers' mess, polite conversation was spent on equine sport rather than the art of war.

The parallels between the British Army then and ours today are striking and disturbing. The American military has become so stretched that it has little time to devote to any activity other than repetitive deployments to Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. The strains of overcommitment are evident, most disturbingly in the military's crumbling academic infrastructure. The Department of Defense is seeking ways to cut drastically the time soldiers spend in school. In World War II, 31 of the Army's 35 corps commanders taught at service schools. Today, the Army's staff college is so short of instructors that it has been forced to hire civilian contractors to do the bulk of the teaching.

After Vietnam, the Army sent 7,400 officers to fully funded graduate education. Today that figure is 396, half of whom are studying to join the weapons-buying community. The military school system remains an anachronism of 19th-century pedagogy that fails to make best use of the dimly limited time available to soldiers for learning. Many young officers have voted with their fingers. The most popular learning platforms among lieutenants and captains are self-generated Web sites such as companycommand.com rather than established institutions.

While the press of operations lessens opportunities to learn, experience in Iraq reinforces the belief that the need to learn has never been greater. Soldiers today can no longer just practice the science of killing in order to win. They must understand and be sensitive to alien cultures. They must be skilled in the art of peacekeeping and stability operations. They must be able to operate with coalition partners and work with governmental and non governmental institutions such as the Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders. Today in Iraq and Afghanistan, junior officers and sergeants make critical life-and-death decisions that were the purview of colonels and generals in previous wars. Thus, in this

new and unfamiliar era of conflict, the military must prepare soldiers to think critically and analytically much earlier in their careers.

Who is to blame for allowing the learning deficit within the military to grow so wide? The list of the guilty is long. Congress shares much of the blame. In the past it has had a "show me the money" attitude toward funding military education that required an immediate and demonstrable payback for any fully funded learning program. This policy tended to overstate the need for scientific degrees and minimize opportunities for officers to study culture and the art of war.

This administration is to blame for slighting professional education in an effort to free up the (too small) pool of available soldiers and Marines for deployment into combat. The services are to blame for failing to build progressive learning institutions and to recognize those who demonstrate exceptional intellectual ability. Before Vietnam, some of our best universities, such as Duke, Yale and Princeton, had vibrant defense-studies programs that gave future combat leaders the opportunity to learn from many great teachers of the art of war. For the most part those programs and teachers are gone, victims of an academic culture that somehow believes that ignoring the study of war will make wars go away.

While the British Army obsessed on fighting distant small wars, the Germans, under Helmuth von Moltke, developed a system of disciplined learning that rewarded brilliance and creative thought. During the opening battles of World War I, the Germans taught the British a lesson in blood: In war the intellectually gifted will win over well-practiced dullards every time. Just as the British failed to understand how to transition from small- to large-scale combat, perhaps we are facing a similar intellectual challenge transitioning from large to small wars.

One fact is clear, however. War is a thinking man's game and only those who take the time to study war are likely to fight it competently. Soldiers and Marines need time for reflection, time to learn, teach, research and write. In this new age of warfare we must do more to prepare soldiers to think as well as act.

Retired Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales is the former commander of the Army War College.

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

| | | |
|----------------|---|------------------|
| Lt Gen Dunn | President, NDU | 1 March 2005 |
| Lt Gen Regni | President, Air University | 1 March 2005 |
| MG Huntoon | Commandant, USAWC | 1 March 2005 |
| RADM Shuford | President, NWC | 1 March 2005 |
| Dr. Ferguson | VP of Academic Affairs, Marine Corps University | 1 March 2005 |
| COL Chappell | USA | 24 February 2005 |
| CAPT Goldacker | USN | 24 February 2005 |
| Col Van Dyke | USMC | 26 February 2005 |
| Col Ball | USAF | 24 February 2005 |

~~FOUO~~

MAR 15 2005

TO: Tim Corcoran
CC: COL Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Investment in Russia

Russia

I would like the CIA to give me some better detail on foreign investment in the Russian private sector than is on the attached graph. I would like to see it by quarter, going back to when Yeltsin came in, and then let's track it into 2005.

Thanks.

Attach.
"Foreign Investment Into Russian Private Sector"

DHR:dh
031405-31

.....
Please respond by 3/31/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 05068-05

IS/Min/DC

11-L-0559/OSD/47882

7

Figure 1: Foreign Investment Into Russian Private Sector (U)

Billion \$US

100

80

60

40

20

0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Trend line
1999-2003

Source: The Central Bank of Russia

UNCLASSIFIED

~~FOUO~~

MAR 1 0 2005

I-05/003492
ES-2589

TO: Doug Feith
CC: COL Steve Bucci
FROM: ..
SUBJECT: Phone Call to Bulgarian MoD

I should call the Bulgarian MoD and talk about the person who was killed.

Thanks.

DHR dh
030905-19

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 05075-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47884

030905-19

2705 Y1P 15-01 10 10

Policy Executive Secretariat Note

MAR 14 2005

I-05/003492/ES-2589

Reference: 030905-19. "Phone Call to Bulgarian MoD"

Captain Marriott,

SecDef spoke with Bulgarian Minister of Defense Szinarov regarding the person who was killed on Thursday, March 10, at 2:15 p.m.

VA

June Bartlett
Deputy Director
Policy Executive Secretariat

OSD 05075-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47885

~~FOUO~~

MAR 10 2005

I-05/003492
ES-2589

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CC: COL Steve Bucci
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Thanks.

DHR dh
030905-19

Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47886

~~FOUO~~

MAR 15 2005 -

TO: Ambassador Zal Khalilzad
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: International Commission on Missing Persons

095

Attached is some material on the International Commission on Missing Persons. I would like to talk to you about it at your convenience when you're in town.

Thanks,

Attach.
3/14/05 Kimsey memo to SD with attachment: ICMP Proposal for Iraq

DHR:dh
031405-46

15Mar05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 05089-05

15Mar05

icmp International Commission on Missing Persons

Alipašina 45a, 71000 Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina
Tel: +387 33 21 8660 Fax: +387 33 20 3297
Email: icmp@ic-mp.org
Web: www.ic-mp.org

To: Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
From: James V. Kimsey, Chairman, ICMP
Regarding: Kimsey/Rumsfeld Meeting
Date: March 14, 2005

Why it's important to support the work of the ICMP

1. The issue of persons missing from armed conflicts, abuses of human rights and other crimes against humanity is a global concern.
 - The Former Yugoslavia: Over 40,000 persons missing by the end of the conflicts in the 1990's.
 - Iraq: Over 400,000 persons missing during the regime of Saddam Hussein, some estimates as high as 1M.
 - The South Caucasus: Over 8,000 missing persons from the Georgian-Abkhaz, Georgian- South Ossetian and Ngomo Karabakh wars in the 1990's.
 - East Timor: estimated 3000
 - Algeria: upwards of 5000
 - Central Africa: estimated 500,000
 - Sudan: Over 1,731 to date
 - Nepal: estimated 2000
 - Chile: 840 outstanding cases according to the UN
 - Argentina: upwards of 11,000
 - Rwanda: over 100,000 cases still unresolved
2. ICMP is the only organization in the world that specifically addresses the complexities of this problem on a political, **human** rights and technical level. The work of ICMP made it possible to locate, identify and commemorate thousands of victims of the Yugoslav wars, thereby opening the path to eventual closure and reconciliation for those war-torn societies.
3. In two years **ICMP** will successfully complete its operational efforts in the former Yugoslavia and, with the support of the United States, has already begun assisting *Iraq*.
4. The participation of the United States in the work of ICMP has been a prominent expression of the US governments' commitment to the development of democracy, justice and good government around the world.

The Issue of Missing Persons is also Relevant to Terrorist Attacks and Natural Disasters. What can ICMP do to Help in these Cases?

1. The core mandate of ICMP is to assist governments with the problem of persons missing from armed conflict, abuses of human rights and other crimes against humanity. However, ICMP's cutting edge DNA technology can also be **used** to help identify missing persons from terrorist attacks and natural disasters.

2. Following the World Trade Center attack on September 11, 2001, the New York Medical Examiner asked for ICMP's help. ICMP immediately responded by giving New York the DNA database, which was used to help identify victims.
3. Countries affected by the Tsunami have requested ICMP's help and ICMP is in the process of trying to address their needs.

How Can the Pentagon Support ICMP?

1. The Pentagon can help ICMP by providing financial and political support to ICMP efforts worldwide.
2. The ICMP has submitted four proposals to the Iraqi government.

The proposals include:

- o assistance in the excavation and identification of mortal remains of missing persons
- o assistance specifically at sites that will be excavated by the Regime Crimes Liaison Office (RCLO)
- o training for technical specialists, family associations and government officials
- o institution building

ICMP Proposal

For a Short-term Project in Iraq to Assist in the Excavation and Identification of Missing Persons

Distribution:
Restricted

Sarajevo, 25 January 2005

Contents

- I. Introduction
- II. Background
- III. Operational Requirements
- IV. Outcomes
- V. Core Team

Annex

- ICMP Fact Sheet

I. Introduction

1. This proposal builds upon previous ICMP proposals to assist the Iraqi government in addressing the issue of missing and disappeared persons,¹ as well as conversations with the Iraqi Minister for Human Rights, the US Department of State and the Regime Crimes Liaison Office (RCLO).
2. The objective of this proposal is to outline a short-term project to assist the Iraqi Ministry for Human Rights² in its effort to address the needs of the families of the missing and the larger Iraqi society in achieving a sense of closure regarding the fate of missing persons in Iraq. Given that this project proposal specifically concerns the humanitarian excavation and identification of mortal remains of sites of interest to the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) and the RCLO, it is foreseen that ICMP operational activities would be conducted in conjunction with the IST and the RCLO.
3. At present little, if any, information is known to have been put forward to the families of the missing or the Ministry for Human Rights regarding exhumations conducted by the RCLO. For this reason it is imperative that direct liaison be established between the Ministry, ICMP and the RCLO teams involved in any future activities related to the opening and removal of mortal remains from mass grave sites in Iraq is established. Otherwise the humanitarian and human rights needs of Iraqi society for collective and individual closure and access to legal rights will not be satisfactorily met.
4. ICMP has a well established history of conducting operations in conjunction with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), as well as in coordination with the courts in the regions of the former Yugoslavia. In the case of ICTY, its excavations were limited to the needs of the prosecution and identifications were only conducted on a small percentage of cases for the same purpose. ICMP's efforts were often conducted in parallel with ICTY; however, ICMP's objectives concerned assistance to the governments affected by the conflicts to meet the individual needs of families and the larger needs of society for truth and justice. Thus, ICMP broadened the scope of excavations and identifications to include a population based process.
5. The proposal outlines a forty-four day mission in Iraq, which would include 30 days at a site to be specified by the Minister for Human Rights and the RCLO and would be conducted during the period of late January to early March in Iraq. The proposal also outlines a budget that would include four ICMP staff members, including three forensic specialists and one government relations monitor, costs for insurance, accommodation, as well as security and transportation.

¹ Proposal for Iraq, June 2004; Proposal for Iraq: Revised Version 01, August 2004; White Paper on Strategic Options to Address the Missing Persons Issue in Iraq, (Co-authored with PHR, et al) November 2004; Missing Persons in Iraq: Interim Strategy and Program Proposal, December 2004.

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7. In order to facilitate the operations of the IST, the RCLO was formed and arrived in Iraq in March 2003. Amongst its many duties are the excavations of approximately 20 of the assessed sites within the various governorates of Iraq, using the previously accumulated data. The sites would be partially exhumed (“strategic and limited recovery only”) by a team of archaeologists and anthropologists employed by the United States Corps of Engineers. The first site to be exhumed was located at Al-Hatra in the northwestern sector of Iraq. A second site is known to be located within the southern deserts, and it is expected that this site will be exhumed in early 2005 using the approach of strategic and limited collection of mortal remains and forensic evidence.

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8. To successfully assist the Iraqi government and the families of the missing, ICMP will seek the cooperation of the RCLO in particular with respect to information sharing and on-site coordination.
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11. ICMP expects to achieve the following:

- To inform and support the government process of drafting legislation to address various aspects of the missing persons issue, e.g., protection of gravesites, the process of excavation and identification and the implementation of the National Center for Missing and Disappeared Persons;
- To record information relevant to the excavation, exhumation, storage and identification of mortal remains and to ensure that such information is made available to the Minister for Human Rights, as well as to the families of the missing;
- To ensure that recorded information is included in a secure, centralized database, such as the ICMP Forensic Database Management System, which ICMP stands ready to donate to the government;
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12. ICMP's core team for this project in Iraq would include three members of the original CPA OHRTJ forensic team who were in Iraq for eight months working on this issue and who have considerable experience working with the ICTY in the Balkans. The fourth member of the team would come from ICMP's Government Relations Department. The technical team would include the following individuals:

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Annex - ICMP Fact Sheet

Overview

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The existence of large numbers of missing persons often poses a significant impediment to post-conflict institution building, peace initiatives and reconciliation. Resolving the fate of the missing is also a crucial political concern between the former warring parties.

High-level attention from the international community can effectively support post-conflict societies in engaging in peace building and reconciliation. Such support is provided by ICMP.

Background

- ICMP is an international organization that was created in 1996, following the G-7 Summit, in Lyon, France, to address the issue of persons missing as a result of the different conflicts relevant to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the Republic of Croatia (RoC) and Serbia and Montenegro during the time period 1991-1995.
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- ICMP has recently responded to a request for assistance from the authorities in Iraq and maintains contacts with other countries that have large numbers of missing persons.

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ICMP endeavors to secure the co-operation of Governments and other authorities in locating and identifying persons missing as a result of armed conflicts, other hostilities or violations of human rights and to assist them in doing so.

ICMP also supports the work of other organizations in their efforts, encourages public involvement in its activities and contributes to the development of appropriate expressions of commemoration and tribute to the missing.

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ICMP's Forensic Science Department (FSD) has the primary responsibility within ICMP for developing, implementing and managing the technical process of assisting governments in exhumations, examinations and identifications of persons missing as a result of violent conflicts. In the region of the former Yugoslavia, the FSD incorporates the use of a population-based, DNA-led system of identifications, which requires the collection and profiling of blood samples from family members with missing relatives and bone samples from exhumed mortal remains. The ICMP identification process is subject to quality assurance and quality control mechanisms and to external review. The FSD is organized into three divisions:

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The E&E Program is predominantly involved in the detection of sites, the recovery and anthropological examination of mortal remains and in the use of scientific methods to compare ante mortem and postmortem records for forensic identification.

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The ICD is responsible for the collection of blood samples from families with missing relatives, the preparation of bone samples for DNA extraction, administration of the DNA matching software, the production and archiving of DNA reports and the archiving of biological samples.

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In addition to the impediments to post-conflict institution building, peace initiatives and reconciliation that unresolved missing persons issues create, victims groups, particularly associations of families of missing persons, are poorly informed about existing and possible mechanisms to seek the truth about the fate of their missing loved ones. Linkages between victims groups and other NGOs and decision makers are often insufficient, thus creating a weak and uncoordinated voice of civil society on the topic of pursuing truth, justice, and reconciliation.

ICMP believes that family members of the missing and the family associations that they have formed can play a critical role in addressing the missing persons issue through advocacy, education, data collection, and raising public awareness. Therefore, the objectives of the Civil Society Initiatives Department are to encourage effective engagement of family members and other members of civil society, in the representation of their interests and in advocacy activities geared towards achieving more effective resolution of the missing persons' issue, through:

- **Empowerment:** To ensure that associations of families of missing persons are strong, independent and fully engaged in clarifying the fate of their missing relatives; implemented through project grants to family associations and training and technical assistance.
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The fDMS is an electronic database of ICMP Forensic Science activities that tracks the process of exhumations and identifications from reconnaissance and exhumation to identification, notification and burial. ICMP has provided user access of this database to governments in the former Yugoslavia and in Iraq.
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The eminence of ICMP's Commissioners highlights the significance that the international community attaches to the issue of the missing.

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ICMP is headquartered in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alipašina 45a, 71000

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Web: www.ic-mp.org

MAR 15 2005

TO: GEN George Casey

c c : Gen Dick Myers
 GEN John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: International Commission on Missing Persons

OSD

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Thanks.

Attach.
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 Please respond by _____

OSD 05089-05

15 MAR 05

To: Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
From: James V. Kimsey, Chairman, ICMP
Regarding: Kimsey/Rumsfeld Meeting
Date: March 14, 2005

Why it's important to support the work of the ICMP

1. The issue of persons missing from armed conflicts, abuses of human rights and other crimes against humanity is a global concern.
 - The Former Yugoslavia: Over 40,000 persons missing by the end of the conflicts in the 1990's.
 - **Iraq:** Over 400,000 persons missing during the regime of Saddam Hussein, some estimates **as high as 1M**.
 - The South Caucasus: Over 8,000 missing persons from the Georgian-Abkhaz, Georgian- South Ossetian and Ngorno Karabakh wars in the 1990's.
 - East Timor: estimated 3000
 - Algeria: upwards of **5000**
 - Central Africa: estimated 500,000
 - Sudan: Over 1,731 to date
 - Nepal: estimated 2000
 - Chile: **840** outstanding cases according to the UN
 - Argentina: upwards of 11,000
 - Rwanda: over 100,000 cases still unresolved
2. ICMP is **the only** organization in the world that specifically addresses the complexities of this problem on a political, human rights and technical level. The work of ICMP made it possible to locate, identify and commemorate thousands of victims of the Yugoslav wars, thereby opening the path to eventual closure and reconciliation for those war-torn societies.
3. In two years ICMP will successfully complete its operational efforts in the former Yugoslavia and, with the support of the United States, has already begun assisting Iraq.
4. The participation of the United States in the work of ICMP has been **a prominent** expression of the US governments' commitment to the development of democracy, justice and good government around the world.

The Issue of Missing Persons is also Relevant to Terrorist Attacks and Natural Disasters. What can ICMP do to Help in these Cases?

1. The core mandate of ICMP is to assist governments with the problem of persons missing from armed conflict, abuses of human rights and other crimes against **humanity**. However, ICMP's cutting edge DNA technology can also be **used** to help identify missing persons from terrorist attacks and natural disasters.

2. Following the World Trade Center attack on September 11, 2001, the New York Medical Examiner asked for ICMP's help. ICMP immediately responded by giving New York the DNA database, which was used to help identify victims.
3. Countries affected by the Tsunami have requested ICMP's help and ICMP is in the process of trying to address their needs.

How Can the Pentagon Support ICMP?

1. The Pentagon can help ICMP by providing financial and political support to ICMP efforts worldwide.
2. The ICMP has submitted four proposals to the Iraqi government.

The proposals include:

- o assistance in the excavation and identification of mortal remains of missing persons
- o assistance specifically at sites that will be excavated by the Regime Crimes Liaison Office (RCLO)
- o training for technical specialists, family associations and government officials
- o institution building

ICMP Proposal

For a Short-term Project in Iraq to Assist in the Excavation and Identification of Missing Persons

Distribution:
Restricted

Sarajevo, 25 January 2005

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- II. Background**
- III. Operational Requirements**
- IV. Outcomes**
- V. Core Team**

Annex

- **ICMP Fact Sheet**

I. Introduction

1. This proposal builds upon previous ICMP proposals to assist the Iraqi government in addressing the issue of missing and disappeared persons,¹ as well as conversations with the Iraqi Minister for Human Rights, the US Department of State and the Regime Crimes Liaison Office (RCLO).
2. The objective of this proposal is to outline a short-term project to assist the Iraqi Ministry for Human Rights² in its effort to address the needs of the families of the missing and the larger Iraqi society in achieving a sense of closure regarding the fate of missing persons in Iraq. Given that this project proposal specifically concerns the humanitarian excavation and identification of mortal remains of sites of interest to the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) and the RCLO, it is foreseen that ICMP operational activities would be conducted in conjunction with the IST and the RCLO.
3. At present little, if any, information is known to have been put forward to the families of the missing or the Ministry for Human Rights regarding exhumations conducted by the RCLO. For this reason it is imperative that direct liaison be established between the Ministry, ICMP and the RCLO teams involved in any future activities related to the opening and removal of mortal remains from mass grave sites in Iraq is established. Otherwise the humanitarian and human rights needs of Iraqi society for collective and individual closure and access to legal rights will not be satisfactorily met.
4. ICMP has a well established history of conducting operations in conjunction with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), as well as in coordination with the courts in the regions of the former Yugoslavia. In the case of ICTY, its excavations were limited to the needs of the prosecution and identifications were only conducted on a small percentage of cases for the same purpose. ICMP's efforts were often conducted in parallel with ICTY; however, ICMP's objectives concerned assistance to the governments affected by the conflicts to meet the individual needs of families and the larger needs of society for truth and justice. Thus, ICMP broadened the scope of excavations and identifications to include a population based process.
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icmp International Commission on Missing Persons

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From: James V. Kimsey, Chairman, ICMP
Regarding: Kimsey/Rumsfeld Meeting
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 - The **Former** Yugoslavia: Over **40,000 persons** missing by **the** end of the conflicts in **the 1990's**.
 - Iraq: Over 400,000 **persons** missing during the regime of **Saddam** Hussein, some estimates **as high as 1M**.
 - The South Caucasus: Over 8,000 **missing persons** from the Georgian-Abkhaz, Georgian- **South** Ossetian and Ngorno Karabakh **wars** in **the 1990's**.
 - East Timor: estimated 3000
 - Algeria: **upwards** of 5000
 - **Central Africa**: estimated **500,000**
 - Sudan: **Over 1,731** to date
 - Nepal: estimated 2000
 - Chile: **840 outstanding cases** according to the UN
 - **Argentina**: upwards of **11,000**
 - **Rwanda**: over **100,000** cases still **unresolved**
2. ICMP is the **only** organization in the world that specifically addresses the **complexities** of **this** problem on a political, human **rights** and technical level. The work of ICMP made it possible to locate, identify and **commemorate thousands** of victims of **the** Yugoslav wars, thereby opening the path to eventual closure **and** reconciliation for **those** war-torn societies.
3. **In two years ICMP** will successfully complete its operational efforts in **the former Yugoslav** **and**, with the support of the United States, **has already** begun assisting **Iraq**.
4. The participation of the United States in the work of ICMP **has been** a prominent expression of the US governments' commitment to the development of democracy, **justice and good** government **around the** world.

The Issue of Missing Persons is also Relevant to Terrorist Attacks and Natural Disasters. ▽ can ICMP do to Help in these Cases?

1. **The core mandate** of ICMP is to assist governments with the problem of **persons** missing in **armed** conflict, abuses of human **rights** and other crimes **against** humanity. However, **the** cutting edge DNA technology **can** also be used to help identify **missing persons** **from** **terrorist** attacks **and natural** disasters.

2. Following the World Trade Center attack on September 11, 2001, the New York Medical Examiner **asked** for ICMP's help. ICMP immediately responded by **giving** New York the DNA database, which was **used** to help identify victims,
3. Countries affected by the Tsunami **have** requested ICMP's help and ICMP is in the process of **trying** to address their **needs**.

How Can the Pentagon Support ICMP?

1. The Pentagon **can** help ICMP by providing financial and political support to ICMP **efforts** worldwide.
2. The ICMP has **ICMP has** submitted **four** proposals to the Iraqi government.

The proposals include:

- o assistance in the excavation **and** identification of **mortal remains of missing persons**
- o assistance specifically at sites **that** will be excavated by the **Regime Crimes Liaison Office (RCLO)**
- o **training** for technical specialists, **family** associations **and** government officials
- o institution building

ICMP Proposal

For a Short-term Project in Iraq to Assist in the Excavation and Identification of Missing Persons

Distribution:
Restricted

Sarajevo, 25 January 2005

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- III. Operational Requirements
- IV. Outcomes
- V. Core Team

Annex

- ICMP Fact Sheet

I. Introduction

1. This proposal builds upon previous **ICMP** proposals to assist the Iraqi government in addressing the issue of missing and disappeared persons,¹ as well as conversations with the Iraqi Minister for Human Rights, the US Department of State and the Regime Crimes Liaison Office (RCLO).
2. The objective of this proposal is to outline a short-term project to assist the Iraqi Ministry for Human Rights² in its effort to address the needs of the families of the missing and the larger Iraqi society in achieving a sense of closure regarding the fate of missing persons in Iraq. Given that this project proposal specifically concerns the humanitarian excavation and identification of mortal remains of sites of interest to the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) and the RCLO, it is foreseen that **ICMP** operational activities would be conducted **in conjunction with the** IST and the RCLO.
3. At present little, if any, information is known to have been put forward to the families of the missing or the Ministry for Human Rights regarding exhumations conducted by the RCLO. For this reason it is imperative that direct liaison be established between the Ministry, ICMP and the RCLO teams involved in any future activities related to the opening and removal of mortal remains from mass grave sites in Iraq is established. Otherwise the humanitarian and human rights needs of Iraqi society for collective and individual closure and access to legal rights will not be satisfactorily met.
4. ICMP has a well established history of conducting operations in conjunction with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), as well as in coordination with the courts in the regions of the former Yugoslavia. In the case of ICTY, its excavations were limited to the needs of the prosecution and identifications were only conducted on a small percentage of cases for the same purpose. ICMP's efforts were often conducted in parallel with ICTY; however, ICMP's objectives concerned assistance to the governments affected by the conflicts to meet the individual needs of families and the larger needs of society for truth and justice. Thus, ICMP broadened the scope of excavations and identifications to include a population based process.
5. The proposal outlines a forty-four day mission in Iraq, which would include 30 days at a site to be specified by the Minister for Human Rights and the RCLO and would be conducted during the period of late January to early March in Iraq. The proposal also outlines a budget that would include four ICMP staff members, including three forensic specialists and one government relations monitor, costs for insurance, accommodation, as well as security and transportation.

¹ Proposal for Iraq, June 2004; Proposal for Iraq: Revised Version 01, August 2004; White Paper on Strategic Options to Address the Missing Persons Issue in Iraq, (Co-authored with PHR, et al) November 2004; Missing Persons in Iraq: Interim Strategy and Program Proposal, December 2004.

² The Ministry for Human Rights is charged with addressing the humanitarian and human rights aspects of the missing persons issue in Iraq. As such the Ministry is in the process of establishing a National Centre for Missing and Disappeared Persons in Iraq.

II. Background

6. Following the end of active combat to Iraq in May 2003 large numbers of reported mass graves were discovered and actively exhumed by relatives of those **known** to have gone missing or disappeared during the regime of Saddam Hussein. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) included an Office of Human Rights and Transitional Justice (OHRTJ), which in turn included a four member forensic team whose task it was to put together **known** information from a variety of sources **into** a comprehensive database. The database was used **as** a means to assess the reported 274 sites which were thought to contain victims **from** several major periods of atrocities? Due to continuing military action and security concerns, a comprehensive assessment was ruled out. However, a limited assessment of **55** of these sites was undertaken by a combination of teams from the United Kingdom, Denmark and Finland. Twenty-two of these sites were found to contain the mortal remains of victims **from** a wide spectrum of the population.
7. In order to facilitate the operations of the IST, the RCLO was formed and arrived in Iraq in March-2003. Amongst its many duties are the excavations of approximately **20** of the assessed sites within the various governorates of Iraq, using the previously accumulated **data**. The sites would be partially exhumed ("strategic and limited recovery only") by a team of archaeologists and anthropologists employed by the United States Corps of Engineers. The **first** site to be exhumed was located at Al-Hatra in the northwestern sector of **Iraq**. A second site is **known** to be located within the southern deserts, and it is expected that this site will be exhumed in early **2005** using the approach of strategic and limited collection of mortal remains and forensic evidence.

III. Operational Requirements

8. To successfully assist the Iraqi government and the families of the missing, ICMP will seek the cooperation of the RCLO in particular with respect to information sharing and on-site coordination.
9. ICMP would require a letter of invitation from the Iraqi Government to provide assistance in accordance with ICMP's mandate and the needs specified in this proposal. If the Iraqi Government would like ICMP to conduct DNA identification testing, arrangements with courts, prosecutors and other authorities would need to be put in place.⁴
10. ICMP requirements include the provision of security by Iraqi and coalition forces subject to detailed agreement ICMP would seek with the relevant authorities.

³ See "Mass Grave Action Plan." Hodgkinson, 2003.

⁴ ICMP does not to release any genetic **data** without the written consent of the donor. In an effort to protect the missing person and the relatives of the missing, ICMP codes genetic information that is released to relevant technical experts in areas where ICMP provides assistance, while still permitting these experts to delineate a family relationship in an effort to formally close a case. Such coding of genetic information by ICMP prevents any possibility of these experts using this information for purposes other **than** ascertaining the identity of the **missing**.

IV. Objectives

11. ICMP expects to achieve the following:

- To inform and support the government process of drafting legislation to address various aspects of the missing persons issue, e.g., protection of gravesites, the process of excavation and identification and the implementation of the National Center for Missing and Disappeared Persons;
- To record information relevant to the excavation, exhumation, storage and identification of mortal remains and to ensure that such information is made available to the Minister for Human Rights, as well as to the families of the missing;
- To ensure that recorded information is included in a secure, centralized database, such as the ICMP Forensic Database Management System, which ICMP stands ready to donate to the government;
- To assist the government in its objective to meet the humanitarian and human rights needs of Iraqi society for collective and individual closure.

V. Core Team

12. ICMP's core team for this project in Iraq would include three members of the original CPA OHRTJ forensic team who were in Iraq for eight months working on this issue and who have considerable experience working with the **ICTY** in the Balkans. The fourth member of the team would come from ICMP's Government Relations Department. The technical team would include the following individuals:
13. Jon Sterenberg, Forensic Archeologist. Jon received a Master of Science degree in Forensic Archaeology at Bournemouth University (UK). Jon has worked in the field of forensic archaeology since early 1997 both within the United Kingdom and abroad. He has worked in the Balkans with ICTY (1997-2001), Sierra Leone with the United Nations and in Iraq (2003-2004) with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) forensic team under the Director of Human Rights and Transitional Justice (OHRTJ). Jon is currently Head of Excavation and Examination division within the ICMP's Forensic Sciences Department.
14. Irene O'Sullivan, Forensic Archeologist. Irene received a Master of Science in Forensic Archaeology at Bournemouth University. She worked for ICTY in the Balkans and in Iraq where she worked within the CPAs forensic team as an advisor to the Director of Human Rights and Transitional Justice and acted as a liaison with universities and institutions within Iraq and abroad. One of her specific tasks included national and international training issues and fundraising for training. She is currently working for Kenyon International in Thailand aiding in the identification of Tsunami victims.
15. Barrie Simpson, Forensic Archeologist. Barrie worked with the CPA forensic team, as the international team liaison and as advisor to the Director of Human Rights and Transitional Justice. He also worked in the Balkans for ICTY. He is currently undertaking a degree in Forensic Archaeology at Bournemouth University. Currently he is working for Kenyon International in Thailand.

Annex - ICMP Fact Sheet

Overview

As a political transition unfolds after a period of armed conflict, violence or repression, a society is confronted with a difficult legacy of human rights abuses that **often** include large numbers of disappearances of persons never to be heard from again. Resolving their fate is important.

The existence of large numbers of missing persons often poses a significant impediment to post-conflict institution building, peace initiatives and reconciliation. Resolving the fate of the **missing** is also a crucial political concern between the former warring parties.

High-level attention **from** the international community can effectively support post-conflict societies in engaging in peace building and reconciliation. Such support is provided by ICMP.

Background

- ICMP is an international organization that was created in 1996, following the **G-7** Summit, in Lyon, France, to address the issue of persons missing **as** a result of the different conflicts relevant to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the Republic of Croatia (RoC) and Serbia and Montenegro during the time period 1991-1995.
- Following the conflict in Kosovo in 1999 and the crisis in the **Former** Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in 2001, ICMP expanded its operations to address missing persons' cases from these areas. ICMP is headquartered in Sarajevo, BiH, but also has offices in the Republic of Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, the UN administered Kosovo and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
- ICMP has recently responded to a request for assistance **from** the authorities in Iraq and maintains contacts with other countries that have large numbers of missing persons.

Mandate

ICMP endeavors to secure the co-operation of Governments and other authorities in locating and identifying persons missing **as** a result of armed conflicts, other hostilities or violations of human **rights** and to assist them in doing so.

ICMP also supports the work of other organizations in their efforts, encourages public involvement in its activities and contributes to the development of appropriate expressions of commemoration and tribute to the missing.

ICMP Areas of Work

Science in Service of Truth and Justice: Forensic Sciences

ICMP's Forensic Science Department (**FSD**) has the primary responsibility within ICMP for developing, implementing and managing the technical process of **assisting** governments in exhumations, examinations and identifications of persons missing **as** a result of violent conflicts. In the region of the former Yugoslavia, the FSD incorporates the use of a population-based, DNA-led system of identifications, which requires the collection and profiling of blood samples from family members with missing relatives and bone samples **from** exhumed mortal remains. The ICMP identification process is subject **to** quality assurance and quality control mechanisms and to external review. The FSD is organized into three divisions:

- **Telling the Story of a Mass Grave: Exhumations and Examination Program (E&E):**

The E&E Program is predominantly involved in the detection of sites, the recovery **and** anthropological examination of mortal remains and in the use of scientific methods to compare ante mortem and postmortem records for forensic identification.

- **A Profile of the Missing: The Identification Coordination Division (ICD):**

The ICD is responsible for the collection of blood samples from families with missing relatives, the preparation of bone samples for DNA extraction, administration of the DNA matching software, the production and archiving of DNA reports and the archiving of biological samples.

- **Irrefutable Evidence of Identity: DNA Laboratories:**

The DNA Labs program is responsible for extracting DNA from biological samples, for profiling (obtaining the unique code from) DNA and for generating and reviewing DNA reports in an effort to identify mortal remains. In addition DNA scientists are involved in R&D activities to reduce costs and to improve the identifications process.

Public Involvement: Civil Society Initiatives

In addition to the impediments to post-conflict institution building, peace initiatives and reconciliation that unresolved missing persons issues create, victims groups, particularly associations of families of missing persons, are poorly informed about existing and possible mechanisms to seek the truth about the fate of their missing loved ones. Linkages between victims groups and other NGOs and decision makers are often insufficient, thus creating a weak and uncoordinated voice of civil society on the topic of pursuing truth, justice, and reconciliation.

ICMP believes that family members of the missing and the family associations that they have formed can play a critical role in addressing the missing persons issue through advocacy, education, data collection, and raising public awareness. Therefore, the objectives of the Civil Society Initiatives Department are to encourage effective engagement of family members and other members of civil society, in the representation of their interests and in advocacy activities geared towards achieving more effective resolution of the missing persons' issue, through:

- **Empowerment:** To ensure that associations of families of missing persons are strong, independent and fully engaged in clarifying the fate of their missing relatives; implemented through project grants to family associations and training and technical assistance.
- **Networking:** To engage family associations in effective regional networks that address the specific rights and needs of family members with missing relatives; implemented through conferences, meetings, and publications.
- **Awareness:** To work towards improved understanding of the missing persons issue and the situation of surviving family members; implemented through activities addressing the legal, social, and economic rights of family members of the missing, and raising public awareness about the missing persons issue as a human rights issue.

Special Projects

- **Mapping Crimes against Humanity: The Forensic Database Management System (fDMS)**
The fDMS is an electronic database of ICMP Forensic Science activities that tracks the process of exhumations and identifications from reconnaissance and exhumation to identification, notification and burial. ICMP has provided user access of this database to governments in the former Yugoslavia and in Iraq.
- **Paths to Reconciliation:** A project designed for the regions of the former Yugoslavia to explore various pillars of transitional and restorative justice by opening a space for informed dialogue between victims groups and encouraging exchange of experience on a regional and international level on truth seeking, trust building, documentation, justice, and compensation mechanisms.
- **European Union Campaign to collect blood samples from family members with relatives missing from the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia who are now living in EU countries.** The project will last through 2004 and will also include an information campaign in the countries of the former Yugoslavia.

Finding Long-term Solutions: Institution Building

The Missing Persons Institute (MPI) for Bosnia and Herzegovina: Former ICMP Chairman Bob Dole inaugurated the MPI in BiH in August 2000. The objective of the MPI is to provide BiH with a mechanism over the longer term to address the issue of persons missing as a result of the conflicts in BiH, regardless of their ethnic, religious or national origin. ICMP has engaged in other institution building initiatives in the regions of the former Yugoslavia.

ICMP Commissioners

The eminence of ICMP's Commissioners highlights the significance that the international community attaches to the issue of the missing.

James V. Kimsey (Chairperson)

Willem Kok

Her Majesty Queen Noor

Michael Portillo

Previous chairs included

Bob Dole (Chairperson 1997 - 2001)

Cyrus Vance († Chairperson 1996 - 1997)

Funding

ICMP is funded through voluntary grants, donations and contributions by participating Governments, including Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union. The C.S. Mott Foundation provides funding to ICMP for a special project.

ICMP is headquartered in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alipašina 45a, 71000

Tel: +387 (0) 33 21 86 60 Fax: +387 (0) 33 203 297

Email: icmp@ic-mp.org

Web: www.ic-mp.org

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECURITY ASSISTANT
27 FEB 2005 15:21:45

February 25, 2005

I-05/002082

ES-2456

TO: Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: ~~Confidential~~
CANADIAN MISSILE DEFENSE DECISION

Please have someone talk to me about this Canadian decision not to join Missile Defense. It is fine with me, and I think we ought to think of how we ought to handle it, and let them out.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/24/05 New York Times article

DHR:ss
022505-6

.....
Please respond by 3/17/05

Canada

25 Feb 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 05096-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47920

28-02-05 11:19:10

~~FOUO~~

DEFENSE SECRETARIAT
FEB 18 2005

FEB 18 2005

TO: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Senator Mikulski's Quote

Please give me a copy of Senator Mikulski's quote of yesterday where she claims I said something to the effect of "The war won't cost anything." I have never said that. Let's see what we can find.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
021705-15

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 05109-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47921

~~FOUO~~

14 000
1 1 2005
15 24

March 1, 2005

TO: ~~Dan Stanley~~
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Answer to Senator Mikulski about Costs

Please get me a very good answer to Senator Mikulski's final question about me supposedly saying it wasn't going to cost anything.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022805-39

.....
Please respond by 3/10/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 05110-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47922

3/14
1600



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

11775
2005 MAR 14 15:00

March 14, 2005, 3:00 p.m.

Paul Bremer
3/13
ms

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Acting Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake on Answer to Senator Mikulski
about Costs

- Sen. Mikulski's exact words from the February 16, 2005 Senate Appropriations Committee Supplemental hearing are highlighted at **Tab A**. She asserts that the Secretary stated the war was not going to cost anything. We have been unable to find any quote or reference from the Secretary stating that the war was not going to cost us anything. In fact, we have attached at **Tab B** several quotes from the Secretary including one where he said the cost of the war was "not knowable."
- Sen. Mikulski could have been referring to a quote on the cost of reconstruction. We also searched along these lines and came up with a quote from the Secretary when he appeared before the Senate Appropriations Committee on March 27, 2003. **Tab C** includes the Secretary's words where he implies that reconstruction funds could come from a variety of sources including frozen assets, oil revenues and the Oil for Food program. Other comments by administration officials are located at **Tab D**.

Attachments:
Snowflake #022805-39
Tabs A-D

~~FOUO~~

SECRET
MARCH 1 2005 5:24

March 1, 2005

TO: ~~Dan Stanley~~
FROM: DonaldRumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT Answer to Senator Mikulski about Costs

Please get me a very good answer to Senator Mikulski's final question about me supposedly saying it wasn't going to cost anything.

Thanks.

DRR:dh
022805-39

.....
Please respond by 3/10/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 05110-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47924

~~FOUO~~

RECEIVED
FEB 18 2005
12 5 24

FEB 18 2005

TO: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Senator Mikulski's Quote

Please give me a copy of Senator Mikulski's quote of yesterday where she claims I said something to the effect of "The war won't cost anything." I have never said that. Let's see what we can find.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
021705-15


.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 05109-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47925

To: Dan Stanley

From: Rebecca Schmidt 

Re: Sen. Mikulski Snowflakes

Sen. Mikulski's exact words from the February 16, 2005 Senate Appropriations Committee Supplemental hearing **are** highlighted at Tab A. She asserts that the Secretary stated **the** war was not going to cost anything. We have been unable to find any quote or reference from the Secretary stating that the war was not going to cost **us** anything. In fact, we have attached at Tab B several quotes from the Secretary including one where he said the cost of **the war** was "not knowable."

Sen. Mikulski could have been referring to **a** quote on the cost of reconstruction. We also searched along these lines and came up with a quote from the Secretary when he appeared before the Senate Appropriations Committee on March 27, 2003. Tab C includes **the** Secretary's words where he implies that reconstruction funds could come from a variety of sources including frozen assets, oil revenues and **the** Oil for Food program. Other comments by administration officials are located at Tab D.

SAC hearing
Feb 16, 2005

MIKULSKI:

I didn't dismiss it.

RUMSFELD:

And when I have a general counsel of the department, when we're constantly -- we've got so many lawsuits in that department, we've got so many nonintuitive things that people can do, and we have to go to lawyers, and we have to ask them those questions, and they have to comment to **us**, and **we** have to make judgments based on the best information available. It may not be appealing.

MIKULSKI:

Are these the same lawyers that said the Geneva Convention was quaint?

RUMSFELD:

They were not Defense Department lawyers who said that, obviously they're not.

MIKULSKI:

My time is up. But I think really -- you know, I remember when this war began.

~~First~~ of all, I find this hearing to be really sad -- one, that we have to have a supplemental at all. I remember your testimony that said this war isn't going to cost us anything.

11- L-0559/OSD/47927

RUMSFELD:

I never said anything like that ...

MIKULSKI:

It's going to be paid for by frozen assets ...

RUMSFELD:

...ever.

MIKULSKI:

... or by Iraqi oil money. Well, I haven't seen a frozen asset. I haven't even seen an ice cube asset.

Then, I don't know where this Iraqi oil is coming from. When we debated it last time, Senator Dorgan at least wanted to make it a loan. Well, we didn't go there. So that's that.

Then we looked at this body armor thing, and then saw that it didn't -- we didn't start using up-armor, as we called it, until well into the war.

Now we're talking about death benefits.

And I just find this, that we had to push to get a death benefit raised from \$12,000 to \$100,000.

So can you see what we think about this?

RUMSFELD:

11-L-0559/OSD/47928

Senator, the Defense Department takes wonderful care of the men and women who are wounded while they're in the military. You're involved with the Veterans Administration. I'm not.

MIKULSKI:

Well, maybe you ought to.

RUMSFELD:

Well, just a minute now. Give me just a moment.

I think your saying that I said that this war's not going to cost anything is just flat wrong. I never said that. And you **must** know that.

And to lay that **out**...

(CROSSTALK)

MIKULSKI:

Didn't you say that a good part of the war was going to be paid for by frozen assets?

RUMSFELD:

Well, I'll go back and find my quote and you can go back and find my quote, but it certainly wasn't what you said.

MIKULSKI:

Well, we're back in the "you said/we said," but I think I know what you said, because I

11-L-0559/OSD/47929

remember what we said when we had to vote on this.

My time's up.

COCHRAN:

Senator Dorgan?

DORGAN:

Mr. Chairman, first of **all**, thank you for your patience, Mr. Chairman. It's been a long hearing.

And, Mr. Secretary and General Myers, thank you for being here and thanks for spending the time with us.

You can see there's a great **deal** of passion about a range of these issues. And I want to make just a couple of quick comments.

First, I think all of us on this committee **are** going to support all the funds that **are** needed to support the troops. Are troops are fighting. And this committee -- I don't think any member of this committee is ever going to short the funds that you request **as** necessary to support those troops.

Second, as I said a year ago, **Mr.** Secretary -- you've heard me say it -- it is a budget game, regrettably, to be asking for emergency supplemental money and then have zero in the regular budget.

The Congress passed a piece of legislation that asked you to put in the budget your best guess of what the costs would be for

11-L-0559/OSD/47930



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March 11, 2005 4:04pm ET

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What's A War Cost These Days?


NEW YORK, Feb. 28, 2003

FREE VIDEO
Post-Saddam Plans



(Photo: AP)

QUOTE
"There is unquestionably a responsibility on the Executive Branch to provide to the Legislative Branch an estimate about what the war would cost..."
While House spokesman An Fleischer



Wolfowitz says the cost of fighting a war must be compared to the cost of allowing Saddam to stay in power. (Photo: AP)

(CBS) The Bush administration is refusing to produce any estimate of the possible cost of war and rebuilding in Iraq, which a series of outside studies have placed at anywhere from \$50 billion to more than a trillion dollars.

The White House maintains that any estimate now would be no more than a guess, since the timing and length of war, and the duration and nature of post-war peacekeeping and reconstruction, are unknown.

But some in Congress contend that they must be given some idea what the war will require.

"The bottom line is we need a better and fuller understanding of the financial commitments we are undertaking, and how much of these costs our allies are willing to bear," Rep. Chris Shays, a Connecticut Republican who chairs the House Budget Committee, told a hearing Thursday on the administration's defense budget — which requests no funding for the war or its aftermath.

Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz countered that, "Such estimates are so dependent on future, unpredictable circumstances as to be of little value."

Wolfowitz's refusal to talk dollars and cents infuriated some Democrats, like Virginia's James Moran, who according to the New York Times said the deputy

- World
War On Terror

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Video
Wyan Andrews reports on post-Saddam plans that call for a full military occupation of Iraq until the country becomes a democracy.

MULTIMEDIA
Video
In the first of a series of speeches to come, President

11-L-0559/OSD/47931



Read:

- **Text** of Mr. Bush's War
 - **Text** of Mr. Ultimatum
 - **Bush**
 - **Transcript** Rather/Saddam
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 - **French-German-Russian UN. Memorandum Text**
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secretary was 'deliberately keeping us in the dark.'

In the absence of an official White House estimate, members of Congress must choose from a wide range of outside studies and media reports.

Budget director Mitch Daniels guessed \$50 to \$60 billion in a newspaper interview this fall. Former White House economic adviser Larry Lindsey put the price tag between \$100 billion and \$200 billion. The Washington Post reported Wednesday that defense officials were preparing an estimate of \$60 billion to \$95 billion.

The Congressional Budget Office said in September that a month-long conflict might run \$22 billion to \$29 billion, but Democrats on the House Budget Committee put it somewhat higher, at \$30.6 billion to \$48.3 billion.

The reason for the range is the vast number of variables to be considered. Much depends on how long the war would take, which requires guessing how easy it will be for the U.S. to defeat Iraq.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld Thursday described the possible war's cost as "not knowable."

"We have no idea how long the war will last. We don't know to what extent there may or may not be weapons of mass destruction used," he said. "We don't have any idea whether or not there would be ethnic strife. We don't know exactly how long it would take to find weapons of mass destruction and destroy them — those sites."

It's also unclear how long the U.S. will maintain a presence in post-war Iraq, and how many troops will have to be there. This week, Army chief of staff Gen. Eric Shinseki guessed "several hundred thousand" soldiers could be needed, but Rumsfeld predicts far fewer will be required.

Reflecting on those varied possibilities, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said Wednesday that the cost will "depend on a number of factors, many of them up to Saddam Hussein and to Saddam Hussein's henchmen."

"If (the henchmen) don't follow their orders from Saddam Hussein, that can lead to one scenario," he said. "And so it is too soon to say with precision how much this war will cost."

Bush prepared the nation and world for the necessity of war with Iraq, laying out the threat posed by Saddam, Bill Plante reports.

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- Gathering Steam
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Message Board:
 • Should the U.S. go to war with Iraq now?

After the war, how much will the U.S. spend not just to protect Iraq, but to rebuild it? Will Iraq's oil reserves help cover this cost? That depends on how much of the oil survives the war intact, and on the vagaries of the oil market.

The variation also reflects different ideas of what the war's cost encompasses. Some studies guess only at what the actual deployment will cost the government, while others try to

gauge how a potentially long war and a possible oil price spike might affect the overall economy.

For example, at the high end of estimates is a report by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, which sees a short war going for \$99 billion and a long one costing as much as \$1.9 trillion, when all the effects of war trickle out over a decade.

But as Wolfowitz reminded Congress, there may be a price tag associated with avoiding conflict.

"The possible cost of war in Iraq should be considered in the context of America's other international undertakings of recent years. We must remember that there is a cost of containment in both dollars as well as risk to our national security," Wolfowitz argued.

He added that the value of defeating Saddam has to be weighed in any discussion of war's cost.

At least to date in its public statements, the White House is not precluding that a cost estimate will emerge at some point.

"There is unquestionably a responsibility on the Executive Branch to provide to the Legislative Branch an estimate about what the war would cost, what the humanitarian operation would cost. And that is a responsibility the administration takes seriously," Fleischer told reporters.

"Because we take it seriously, I'm not in a position to speculate what the number may be," he said.

By Jarrett Murphy
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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld**Sunday, January 19, 2003**

Secretary Rumsfeld Media Stakeout

(Media stakeout at **Fox News**)

Rumsfeld I'm smiling at the crowd.

Q: Right. Let me ask you a few questions first about North Korea.

Rumsfeld Uh huh.

Q: Did the administration seriously think last month that they might attack North Korea, and was it a suggestion that they leave South Korea?

Rumsfeld Well, I read a comment by a South Korean -- I think it was the president elect where he indicated that he thought that there had been some high-level discussion -- I've not -- about invading North Korea. I've not seen anything like that, or heard of anything like that. So, I really can't imagine what he might have been referring to.

Q: Mr. Secretary, on Iraq, how much money do you think the Department of Defense would need to pay for a war with Iraq?

Rumsfeld: Well, the Office of Management and Budget, has come up come up with a number that's something under \$50 billion for the cost. How much of that would be the U.S. burden, and how much would be other countries, is an open question. I think the way to put it into perspective is that the estimates as to what September 11th cost the United States of America ranges high up into the hundreds of billions of dollars. Now, another event in the United States that was like September 11th, and which cost thousands of lives, but one that involved a -- for example, a biological weapon, would be -- have a cost in human life, as well as in billions, hundreds of billions of dollars, that would be vastly greater.

Q: Do you consider the recent discovery of warheads to be a material breach of the U.N. resolution?

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http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/t01212003_t019sdstakeoutfox.html

3/11/2005

Rumsfeld I don't know. I think that, really, the only way inspectors can find anything is if the Iraqi government cooperates and shows them to them, and people are looking at those warheads now. I think it's probably early to make a judgment about them, but I think what really is being tested is not whether something can be found, because inspectors can't find things; they can only inspect what they've been shown. And the real test that's taking place is the issue as to whether or not the Iraqi regime is going to be cooperative with the United Nations. And thus far, they've filed a false declaration of what they have. They have refused to provide the lists of scientists that they **are** required to provide, so that the scientists can be taken out of the country, and talked to in safety with their families, and won't be killed by Saddam Hussein, as he did kill his sons-in-law after they came back from the country. So, the real decision -- well, the process that's going on right now is not testing whether something can be found; it's testing the degree of cooperation that the Iraqi regime is going to show to the United Nations.

Q: (Inaudible).

Rumsfeld Oh, we'll be able to manage what we're doing in a way that supports the diplomacy, which is what we're doing now, and anything else the President may decide.

Q: (Inaudible).

Rumsfeld The president has, of course, already said that the goal is to see that the Iraqi regime is disarmed before they do any greater damage to the world than they've already done, and his first choice is to have it done peacefully. And that is why he went to the United Nations. The hope still remains that they'll cooperate. If they don't cooperate, the hope is that he'll leave the country, that the people of the country will throw him out, and that a conflict and the use of force can be avoided. He -- the President has also said that if all of that fails, that he would be willing to lead a coalition of willing countries, and there are a large number of countries that have already signed up to participate in such a coalition.

Q: **Sir**, a deployment for (inaudible), how concerned would the military be to fight a war with Iraq, if need be by the end of January -- as has been suggested earlier in the week.

Rumsfeld There's no way to know if force will have to be used. There's not been a decision that force would be used, and -- but in the event that that decision's made, the United States will be ready to do whatever the President asks.

Q: (Inaudible) the thousands of protestors, yesterday, and today, does that make a difference in the outcome?

Rumsfeld: Well, you know, this is a wonderful country we have, and it's a free country, and we have a constitution that allows people to express themselves in a variety of ways, and that's fine. And there are people who demonstrate and speak out on all sides of all issues, and I think that's the American way.

Q: (Inaudible).

Rumsfeld The United States always maintains contingency plans for a variety of contingencies around the world, non-combatant evacuation, possible attacks from other countries, these types of things. That's what the Pentagon is there to do, is to plan them, and

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be prepared, and to try to deter and defend. So, I think **you** used the words "attack plans." I think -- we think of what we do as more contingency planning, to be capable of **detering** hostile action against our country, and our friends and allies and our forces, and in the event of hostile action against us, to be able to defend.

Q: Okay. Thank you.



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WAR IN IRAQ

SPECIAL REPORT

Administration fends off demand for war estimates

Monday, March 3, 2003 Posted: 11:47 AM EST (1647 GMT)

WASHINGTON (CNN) - The number of U.S. troops that would be required to administer Iraq after a U.S.-led military campaign is "not knowable" because of the large number of variables in how a conflict might unfold, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said Thursday.


He also said it "makes no sense to try" to come up with cost estimates for a war in Iraq because the variables "create a range that simply isn't useful."

"We have no idea how long the war will last. We don't know to what extent there may or may not be weapons of mass destruction used," Rumsfeld said at a Pentagon news conference. "We don't have any idea whether or not there would be ethnic strife. We don't know exactly how long it would take to find weapons of mass destruction and destroy them."

"Until someone decides that there has to be a conflict and that the conflict's over, you're not going to know the answer," he said, adding that people who tried to estimate the cost of the 1991 Gulf War beforehand "were flat wrong by an enormous amount."

However, Rumsfeld said the post-war troop commitment would be less than the number of troops required to win the war. He also said "the idea that it would take several hundred thousand U.S. forces, I think, is far from the mark."

Rumsfeld's comments came in response to a question about an



Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld says there are too many variables to provide an estimate for the cost of war with Iraq.

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VIDEO

CNN's Kathleen Hays examines what a war with Iraq could likely cost the U.S. in terms of dollars.

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WAR COSTS

White House estimate: \$60 billion - \$95 billion



1991 Gulf War cost: \$60 billion (80 percent paid by other countries)

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estimate of post-war troop strength given in a congressional hearing Tuesday by the Army's chief of staff, Gen. Eric Shineski. Under questioning by lawmakers, Shineski offered the estimate that an occupying force might involve several hundred thousand U.S. troops.

In testimony Thursday before the House Budget Committee, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said Shineski's estimate was "way off the mark," noting that other countries would take part in an occupying force and share the financial burden of helping Iraqis build a new government.

Wolfowitz deflected questions from lawmakers trying to pin down numbers for potential costs of a war and Wolfowitz said, "I think it's very hard to put some ambiguity of exactly where the numbers are."

Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz said, "I think you're deliberately keeping us in the dark. We're finding out more from the newspapers than we are from you."

Sources: White House to ask for up to \$95 billion

White House sources told CNN the White House is relying on an emergency spending bill and may ask Congress for as much as \$95 billion. Pentagon sources put the likely amount at \$60 billion, a figure also cited by some officials at the White House.

The Pentagon portion of the supplemental request would be on the order of \$60 billion and would cover costs through the end of September, the Pentagon sources said.

The sources said the money would cover the costs of the war itself, improvements to Turkish military bases, maintaining troops in the region, as well as providing for postwar security, and locating and destroying weapons of mass destruction.

Administration sources noted that any supplemental request could be higher if the costs for various reconstruction projects in a postwar Iraq - which wouldn't fall under the Pentagon portion - are included.

Wolfowitz said that numbers will be provided at an "appropriate point," but that "we're not in a position to do that right now."

One long-range Tomahawk cruise missile: \$1 million (U.S. may use 700 of them)

Estimates exclude: Humanitarian supplies and aid

Postwar costs for five years: \$25 billion to \$105 billion

War aid to Turkey and Israel: \$10 billion

Source: Center for Strategic Budgetary Assessments

SPECIAL REPORT

WAR IN IRAQ

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COMPARING COSTS

If a war with Iraq costs \$100 billion, it will represent 1 percent of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product.



Comparison to cost of other wars:

World War II: 130 percent of GDP per year

Vietnam: 12 percent of GDP per year

Source: Yale University study

President Bush and other officials have argued that the costs of efforts related to Iraq would be less than the cost of terrorist groups attacking the United States with weapons of mass destruction obtained from Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

Administration sources said two months of war would cost as much as \$40 billion and that a peacekeeping force in Iraq would cost at least \$6 billion a year. The administration is also planning to deliver billions of dollars in aid to Turkey, Jordan, Israel and other countries in the region.

A shorter war would mean less spending, but the costs could be higher if Iraq uses chemical or biological weapons on U.S. troops, or if it sets fire to oil fields as it did in Kuwait in the Gulf War.

Iraq's oil reserves could be used to pay for long-term reconstruction costs, but the White House says oil money would not be used to pay for the war itself.

The administration's \$2.2 trillion budget proposal for the 2004 fiscal year, which projects a record federal deficit of \$304 billion, does not include the cost of a war with Iraq in its \$380 billion Pentagon request.

In September, White House economic adviser Lawrence Lindsey estimated the cost of a war at more than \$100 billion. After Lindsey was asked to resign in December, Mitch Daniels, the director of the Office of Management and Budget, said it was impossible to know how much a war might cost.

The 1991 conflict cost about \$60 billion, but U.S. allies paid more than 80 percent of the cost. Administration officials said they're not expecting that kind of help this time.

A report from the Congressional Budget Office released last fall was far more modest in its estimate of the cost of war with Iraq. That report said it would cost between \$9 billion and \$13 billion to deploy troops to Iraq and that it would take up to another \$9 billion a month to run the war.

CNN Senior White House Correspondent John King and Pentagon Correspondent Barbara Starr contributed to this report.

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
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1 it here, but it is part of the overall campaign, to quickly
2 diminish their capability. We are doing that. Hundreds of
3 them have been engaged. Hundreds of them have been dealt
4 with, and that will continue.

5 Senator Bond: Mr. Secretary, you have talked about phase
6 four, and there is a request of some \$2.4 billion for the new
7 flexible account for humanitarian relief to the people of
8 Afghanistan.

9 In phase four, how long is the Defense Department going
10 to be responsible for that reconstruction humanitarian aid?
11 Is this going to be moved over to another account where we
12 should be funding, either the State Department, USAID, or
13 others?

International Sources of Funds

14 It is a two-part question. The second part is, you have
15 raised in your written statement, the concern that France is
16 threatening to veto the Food for Peace program. How much
17 money do you see as available from international sources to
18 provide the humanitarian relief and reconstruction that we
19 hope and expect for Iraq?

20 Secretary Rumsfeld: These are issues that are currently
21 being discussed, and negotiated, and considered. The sources
22 of funds include the following, at least. One is frozen
23 assets in our country and other countries. A second source
24 is, there is some number that is not quite clear, \$10 billion
25 or \$12 billion in the U.N. Oil for Food accounts, some portion

1 of which is committed to existing contracts, but the contracts
2 were contracts entered into by Saddam Hussein's regime, and
3 one would think that a serious review of those contracts would
4 free up a lot of that money as well.

5 So if it is \$7 billion out of the \$12 billion that are
6 committed to contracts, I would anticipate that a careful
7 scrub of those contracts would mean that there would be less
8 than \$7 billion committed, and, therefore, more available.

9 Third, there are potential oil revenues. It looks at the
10 moment as though the bulk of the Iraqi oil wells are not
11 damaged and are not aflame, which is very fortunate. And, of
12 course, those are revenues that ought to be available for the
13 Iraqi people, and for the people of that country.

14 Third, there are coalition contributions. Already,
15 countries are making contributions in the country. World Food
16 is providing assistance. The UK has a ship, the Sir Galahad,
17 that is off the port south of Iraq, waiting to come in as soon
18 as they are certain that the mines have been cleared.
19 Neighboring countries have offered medical assistance, and a
20 whole host of things.

21 So there undoubtedly will be an international donor's
22 conference to raise money, and there are a variety of places
23 that funds can come for this.

24 Senator Bond: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

25 Chairman Stevens: Senator Hollings.

1 Depending on how the war ends, it could affect how long a
2 stabilization period there would be. So it is entirely
3 possible that -- I do not know in your using the word "war"
4 you meant the entire process, but I assumed you did mean the
5 entire process, and, therefore, I would think there would be
6 costs next year that would relate to Iraq that would run into
7 the next fiscal year.

8 Senator Gregg: I was more focusing on the conflict
9 period versus the reconstruction period, but I appreciate the
10 answer.

11 To what extent will the revenues that might be energized
12 from the oil that is there be used to reimburse the costs of
13 **reconstruction?**

Reconstruction Responsibilities

14 Secretary Rumsfeld: I do not believe that the United
15 States has the responsibility for reconstruction, in a sense.
16 What we have is a responsibility to get that country on a path
17 that it has a representative Government that fulfills the
18 standards that General Myers outlined.

19 We want to participate in reconstruction. Other
20 countries will want to participate in reconstruction, and the
21 funds can come from those various sources I mentioned; frozen
22 assets, oil revenues, and a variety of other things, including
23 the Oil for Food, which has a very substantial number of
24 billions of dollars in it.

Class F. re Initiative

25 Senator Gregg: Do you expect a diplomatic initiative? I

COMMENTARY: HOW MUCH IRAQ WOULD COST

Earlier this year, experts said the war and aftermath in Iraq would cost hundreds of billions of dollars, a fact the White House refused to acknowledge as valid, even going so far as to fire Lawrence Lindsey for his realistic projections. In September, 2003, Paul Wolfowitz even told the Senate "no one said we would know anything other than this would be very bloody, it could be very long and by implication, it could be very expensive." Here's a record of what the administration, in fact, said:

BUDGET DIRECTOR MITCH DANIELS

- On September 15th 2002, White House economic advisor Lawrence Lindsay estimated the high limit on the cost to be 1-2% of GNP, or about **\$100-\$200 billion**. Mitch Daniels, Director of the Office of Management and Budget subsequently discounted this estimate as "**very, very high**" and stated that the costs would be between **\$50-\$60 billion** [Source: WSJ, "Bush Economic Aide Says Cost Of Iraq War May Top \$100 Billion," Davis 09/16/02; NYT, "Estimated Cost of Iraq War Reduced, Bumiller, 12/31/02; Reuters News, "Daniels sees U.S. Iraq war cost below \$200 billion," 09/18/02]
- "When a reporter asked Daniels yesterday whether the administration was preparing to ask other countries to help defray possible Iraq war costs, as the United States did for the 1991 war, the budget director said he **knew of no such plans**. Other countries are having economic downturns of their own, he said." [Source: Pittsburgh-Post Gazette, "Byrd attacks cost of possible Iraq War, McFeatters, 9/25/02]
- "There's just no reason that this can't be **an affordable endeavor**." [Source: Reuters, "U.S. Officials Play Down Iraq Reconstruction Needs," Entous, 4/11/03]
- "The United States is committed to helping Iraq recover from the conflict, but **Iraq will not require sustained aid**." [Source: Washington Post, 4/21/03]

DEFENSE SECRETARY DONALD RUMSFELD

- "Well, the Office of Management and Budget, has come up with a number that's something **under \$50 billion** for the cost. How much of that would be the U.S. burden, and how much would be other countries, is an open question." [Source: Media Stakeout, 1/19/03]
- "**I don't know that there is much reconstruction to do**." [source: Reuters, "U.S. Officials Play Down Iraq Reconstruction Needs," Entous, 4/11/03]

DEPUTY DEFENSE SECRETARY PAUL WOLFOWITZ

- "I think it's necessary to preserve some **ambiguity** of exactly where the numbers are." [Source: House Budget Committee, 2/27/03]

TOP ECONOMIST ADVISER GLEN HUBBARD

- "Costs of any such intervention would be **very small**." [Source: CNBC, 10/4/02]

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BUDGET DIRECTOR JOSH BOLTEN

- “We **don’t** anticipate requesting anything additional for the balance of this year.” [Source: Congressional Testimony, 7/29/03]

A COMMENT ABOUT HOW MUCH IRAQ WOULD COST

The Bush administration promised reconstruction of Iraq could be financed through oil revenue, which they said would provide tens of billions of dollars. However, according to the New York Times, -devastated and decrepit production systems leave the country “unable to make any significant contribution.”

Press Secretary Ari Fleischer: “Well, the reconstruction costs remain a very -- an issue for the future. And Iraq, unlike Afghanistan, is a rather wealthy country. Iraq has tremendous resources that belong to the Iraqi people. And so there are a variety of means that Iraq has to be able to *shoulder much of the burden for their own reconstruction.*” [Source: White House Press Briefing, 2/18/03]

Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage: “This is not Afghanistan... When we approach the question of Iraq, we realize here is a country which has a resource. And it’s obvious, it’s oil. And it can bring in and does bring in a certain amount of revenue each year. *..\$10, \$15, even \$18 billion.* ..this is not a broke country.” [Source: House Committee on Appropriations Hearing on a Supplemental War Regulation, 3/27/03]

Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz: “There’s a lot of money to pay for this that doesn’t have to be U.S. taxpayer money, and it starts with the assets of the Iraqi people., . and on a rough recollection, *the oil revenues of that country could bring between \$50 and \$100 billion over the course of the next two or three years.*... We’re dealing with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon.” [Source: House Committee on Appropriations Hearing on a Supplemental War Regulation, 3/27/03]

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld: “If you [Source: worry about just] the cost, the money, Iraq is a very different situation from Afghanistan ..Iraq has oil. *They have financial resources.*” [Source: Fortune Magazine, Fall 2002]

State Department Official Alan Larson: “On the resource side, Iraq itself will rightly *shoulder much of the responsibilities.* Among the sources of revenue available are \$1.7 billion in invested Iraqi assets, the found assets in Iraq.. and unallocated oil-for-food money that will be deposited in the development fund.” [Source: Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on Iraq Stabilization, 06/04/03]

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld: “I don’t believe that the United States has the

responsibility for reconstruction, in a sense...[Reconstruction] funds can come from those various sources I mentioned: frozen assets, *oilrevenues* and a variety of other things, including the Oil for Food, which has a very substantial number of billions of dollars in it. [Source: Senate Appropriations Hearing, 3/27/03]

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Flawed Assumptions: Bush Administration Expectations for Post-War Iraq

Author:

Council for a Livable World
September 29, 2003

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The Bush Administration persuaded Congress and the American people to support war against Iraq with a series of misleading statements, distortions and overly-optimistic assumptions about the threat from Saddam Hussein and how well the reconstruction effort would go. The following focuses on high Administration officials' "rosy scenario" assumptions on how the post-war situation, assumptions that are now turning into a quagmire. A separate analysis of their distortions of intelligence can be found at: <http://www.clw.org/16distortions.html>

U.S. troops will be welcomed in Iraq as liberators.

What they said:

On March 16, 2003, Vice President Dick Cheney stated in an interview on NBC's Meet the Press "Now, I think things have gotten **so** bad inside Iraq, from the standpoint of the Iraqi people, we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators."

The reality:

Very few Iraqi citizens greeted Americans as liberators. In fact, many *see* the U.S. as an occupier. There has been widespread rioting, looting and demonstrations against the U.S. A strong guerilla movement has continued to cause many casualties among American troops.

The war in Iraq will not be very expensive.

What they said:

In response to a estimate by White House economic advisor Lawrence Lindsay that the Iraq conflict would cost between \$100 billion and \$200 billion dollars, Mitch Daniels, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, discounted this estimate, on September 18, 2002 by saying it was "very likely, very high." On December 31, 2002, the New York Times reported: "The administration's top budget official estimated today that the cost of a war with Iraq could be in the range of \$50 billion to \$60 billion."

The reality:

It is now clear that the prediction of \$50-\$60 billion was extremely low. Last year Congress appropriated about \$70 billion for the war; the latest request is for an additional \$87 billion. It is almost anyone's guess how much the U.S. will ultimately spend.

A large number of U.S. troops will not be needed in Iraq after the war.

What they said:

After Army Chief of Staff Shinseki suggested that hundreds of thousands of troops would be needed for occupying Iraq, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld said on February 28, 2003: "My personal view is that it [several hundred thousand troops] will prove to be high." Vice President Dick Cheney said on March 16, 2003 Meet the Press: "But to suggest that we need several hundred thousand troops there after military operations cease, after the conflict ends, I don't think is accurate. I think that's an overstatement."

The reality:

U.S. and allied troops still number 130,000 in Iraq alone and about 200,000 in and around Iraq at the end of August — and 90% were Americans. A number of Members of Congress are calling for additional American divisions to be deployed to Iraq. The

Administration is seeking troops of other nations.

Iraq will be able to shoulder much of the reconstruction costs.

What they said:

Deputy Defense secretary Paul Wolfowitz told a House defense subcommittee in March 27, 2003 that "**We** are dealing with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon." In a Senate Appropriations Hearing on March 27, 2003, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said, "I don't believe that the United States has the responsibility for reconstruction, in a sense... funds can come from those various sources I mentioned-- frozen assets, oil revenues and a variety of other things, including the Oil for Food, which has a very substantial number of billions of dollars in it."

The reality:

The Administration's claim was an obvious misjudgment. The Iraqi economy is presently in shambles, exacerbated by widespread looting and destruction carried out after the war that the **U.S.** was unable to prevent. It will cost billions of dollars from the United States or other countries to rebuild Iraq's infrastructure. Congress has already appropriated \$2.5 billion for reconstruction in Iraq, and the administration recently requested an additional \$20 billion for next year.

Iraq is a country with abundant natural resources.

What they said:

In March 2003, Paul Wolfowitz claimed to a House defense subcommittee "Iraq could generate \$50 billion to \$100 billion of oil revenue over the next 2-3 years." Reinforcing that notion, Deputy Secretary of State Richard **Armitage** said on March 27, 2003, in a House Committee on Appropriations Hearing, "This is not Afghanistan...When we approach the question of Iraq, we realize here is a country which has a resource. And it's obvious, **it's** oil. And it can bring in and does bring in a certain amount of revenue each year -**\$10**, \$15, even \$18 billion- this is not a broke country." Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was quoted in Fortune Magazine in the fall of 2002 as saying, "Iraq is a very different situation from Afghanistan...Iraq has oil. They have financial resources."

The reality:

Though it is true that Iraq sits on one of the largest oil reserves in the world, at this point the country needs to import oil because of the decrepit state of its oil production facilities and continuing sabotage.

Removal of Saddam Hussein may improve relations between Israel and Palestine

What they said:

Deputy Defense secretary Paul **D.** Wolfowitz told the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 10, 2003: "The other comment I would make is, I am -- what's the right word -- I guess cautiously optimistic that the removal of Saddam Hussein as a major disturber of the peace and as a man who financed terrorism and rewarded suicide bombers will improve the atmosphere for negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians."

The reality:

There has been no significant change in the **Israeli/Palestinian** conflict **as** a result of Hussein's removal from power. In fact, if anything, the situation there has only deteriorated. Suicide bombings and other acts of violence are still ever-present in the region and the most recent peace plan is in shambles.

Post-war Iraq will be like post-war France

What they said:

Wolfowitz, in a November 17, 2002 interview with the Philadelphia Inquirer, suggested: "If you're looking for a historical analogy, it's probably closer to post-liberation France [after World War II]."

The reality:

There is absolutely no similarity.

Saddam Hussein's possession of weapons of mass destruction poses an imminent

threat to the United States.

What they said:

Vice President Dick Cheney told NBC's meet the Press on March 16, 2003: "And we believe he [Saddam Hussein] has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons." In a March 17, 2003, address to the nation, President Bush argued: "Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to **possess** and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised."

The reality:

No weapons of mass destruction have been found.

Once the war was over, other countries opposed to the war will want to contribute to Iraq's reconstruction.

What they said:

Vice President Cheney said on March 16, 2003, Face the Nation that once Hussein was ousted, "a good part of the world, especially our allies, will come around to our way of thinking." Wolfowitz suggested in his February 28, 2003 testimony to the House Budget Committee "I would expect that even countries like France will have a strong interest in assisting Iraq in reconstruction."

The reality:

Most countries, including France, have been reluctant to send troops or help pay for reconstruction. Great Britain reduced its initial contribution of 45,000 troops to about 11,000. There is one Polish-led division of about 9,000 troops composed of forces from more than 20 countries. In most of the world, the **U.S.** intervention remains very unpopular with the public and the leaders.

Iraqi troops will help keep the peace

What they said:

The Pentagon hoped to maintain security in Iraq by redeploying elements of Iraq's 400,000 troops. Gen. Peter Pace, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a April 8, 2003 interview "The security nationwide in Iraq will be a combination of coalition forces and the new Iraqi government's re-established police forces and armed forces."

The reality:

Only a tiny fraction of Iraq's military surrendered to **U.S.** forces; the majority melted away. The remaining Iraqi army was simply disbanded, with some of those soldiers undoubtedly joining the guerillas opposing **U.S.** occupation.

The **US** is not interested in occupying Iraq

What they said:

In a speech to the Iraqi-community on February 23, 2003, Wolfowitz stated, "First and this is really the overarching principle-the United States seeks to liberate Iraq, not occupy Iraq. If the President should decide to **use** force, let me assure you again that the United States would be committed to liberating the people of Iraq, not becoming an occupation force."

The reality:

Neither the Iraqi people and other nations around the world are sure about present **U.S.** intentions; many Iraqis see the **U.S.** as occupiers.

Iraqis will govern themselves in a matter of weeks or months.

What they said:

Rumsfeld said on April 13, 2003 Meet the Press: "The task is to create an environment that is sufficiently permissive that the Iraqi people can fashion a new government. And what they will do is come together in one way or another and select an interim authority of some kind. Then that group will propose a constitution and a more permanent authority of some kind. And over some period of months, the Iraqis will have their government selected by Iraqi people." On the same program, Ahmed Chalabi, the Pentagon's favored exile, stated: "After (Gen. Jay Garner) finishes his job of restoring basic services, the interim Iraqi authority will be established. And that interim authority

will be an authority of Iraqis, chosen by Iraqis. And it will be able to function as an authority in the country immediately after Gen. Garner's job is finished, which should be only a few weeks."

The reality:

Iraqis will not govern the country any time soon. The U.S. is unwilling to establish a timetable for the **handover** of authority. Paul Bremer is leading the Coalition Provisional Authority that appointed an Iraqi Governing Council, a body that is unelected and has little power.

Resistance will fade quickly; hostility will be short-lived.

What they said:

Wolfowitz said on February 19, 2003: "We're seeing today how much the people of Poland and Central and Eastern Europe appreciate what the United States did to help liberate them from the tyranny of the Soviet Union. I think you're going to see even more of that sentiment in Iraq. There's not going to be the hostility that you described Saturday. There simply won't be."

The reality:

Hostility is strong, and growing. During a July 16 interview on "Good Morning America," the head of U.S. Central Command, Gen. John P. Abizaid, described the situation in Iraq as "a classical guerrilla-type campaign [being waged] against us. It's low-intensity conflict in our doctrinal terms, but it's war however you describe it."

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POLITICS

Senators grill Wolfowitz on Iraq request

By **LAWRENCE M. O'ROURKE**
McClatchy Newspapers
September 09, 2003

WASHINGTON - Democratic and Republican senators Tuesday sharply questioned a main architect of the Iraq war, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, about President Bush's emergency request for \$87 billion for Iraq and Afghanistan.

The senators said that Wolfowitz and other top administration officials have misled Congress about the cost of restoring stability and security in Iraq and rebuilding the war-damaged nation.

Declaring that Congress should not give the president a blank check to finance postwar activities, senators reminded Wolfowitz that Congress handed the administration \$80 billion just five months ago.

Wolfowitz declined to say how much additional money would be needed beyond the new \$87 billion. He echoed the assertion by Bush on Sunday night that the United States must spend whatever it takes to achieve security in Iraq and Afghanistan because they are the frontlines of the war on terrorism.

The \$87 billion is a "bitter pill for the American people to swallow," especially since some of the money will be taken from health care, education and other domestic services, Sen. Carl Levin, of Michigan, ranking Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee told Wolfowitz.

"You told the Congress in March that, quote, 'We are dealing with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon,' close quote. Talk about rosy scenarios," Levin said.

In a television interview, Sen. Chuck Hagel, R-Neb., said that the Bush administration had done "a miserable job of planning" for Iraq after Saddam Hussein's ouster, and "miscalculated" the cost of the war.

Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn., said the president's \$87 request faces a challenge in the Senate, but would be approved because members do not want to shortchange the war on terrorism.

Wolfowitz told the committee that terrorists would be the winners if Congress rejects the Bush's request.

Quoting a CIA assessment, Wolfowitz said that despite the recent success of terrorist groups in killing U.S. soldiers in Iraq, the core of the al Qaeda network is "breaking apart."

The worldwide terrorist network is experiencing a "level of disarray and confusion," Wolfowitz

said, as the administration pressed its claim that U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the rebuilding of those nations, would prevent domestic terrorist attacks.

"If killing Americans leads to defeat and the restoration of the old regime or any kind of new tyranny, they would score an enormous strategic victory for terrorism and for the forces of repression and intolerance, rage and despair, hatred and revenge," Wolfowitz told the Senate Armed Service Committee.

Approval of the \$87 billion request would send a "powerful signal ... to terrorists and their allies that defeat in Iraq will be theirs," Wolfowitz declared.

Victory over terrorists, he said, "will take more than killing and capturing terrorists and dismantling terrorist networks, as important as that is. It also requires winning on what could be called the second front of the war on terror, what the president called building a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror, particularly in the Muslim world."

The president's request, announced Sunday night in an address to the nation, got a skeptical reception from most Democratic senators, as well as several Republicans.

Sen. Dianne Feinstein of California and seven other Democrats introduced a resolution that would require the White House to submit a detailed report to Congress on the situation in Iraq within 60 days.

"After months of dodging questions, giving half-answers and ignoring congressional requests, the time has come for this administration to level with the Congress and the American people about Iraq," Feinstein said.

While Republicans predicted that the president's \$87 billion request would be approved within a few weeks, several agreed with Democrats that the White House must do a better job of stating its case for the money.

Hagel said on the CBS "Early Show" that prior to the war, the Bush administration "treated many in the Congress, most in the Congress, like a nuisance."

Sen. Pat Roberts, R-Kan., the Intelligence Committee chairman, called for a review of the administration's prewar predictions of how much the conflict would cost and how long U.S. troops would be forced to remain in Iraq.

In support of the president, Sen. John Warner, R-Va., the Armed Services Committee chairman, urged senators to provide the money now and leave the analysis of what went wrong until later.

As Wolfowitz went to Capitol Hill, the Pentagon announced that it would extend the tours of 20,000 military reservists and National Guard in Iraq by six months. Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., said the extended deployments show that the U.S. military is stretched thin around the world.

As the administration pressured Congress to approve the extra spending on Iraq and Afghanistan in the next few weeks, White House National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice acknowledged that "setbacks are inevitable" as the United States tries to establish security and

democracy in Iraq.

"But the cost of failure in the global war on terrorism is simply too high," Rice told reporters.

Before spending any more on Iraq, said Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, D-Mass., "we should have a very clear, meaningful policy by this administration. We don't have it now. We should not give them a blank check for this request." Kennedy also called on the administration to get additional troops from Muslim nations to help offset the burden on American troops."

Rice said that **\$66** billion of the requested money would go to military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and other efforts to combat terrorists.

She said the remaining \$21 billion would go to health, water and electricity needs inside Iraq. Beyond that, the rebuilding of Iraq will rely on Iraqi oil revenues and aid from other nations, she said.

(Distributed by Scripps Howard News Service.)

December 14, 2005

Draft

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen Pete Pace
Gordon England
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: ~~Precepts~~ for Flag Boards

I have had a chance to **see** some of the precepts issued by the Service Secretaries. They strike me as varying considerably in their emphasis on several important themes -- **jointness**, innovation, combat experience, diversity and the like.

At present, these precepts are issued under the signature of the individual **Service** Secretaries. It might make sense for these vitally important documents to be reviewed by Gordon and me before they are issued. I cannot think of a more important process for the Department ~~over~~ the long term.

Also, what is the current policy **on** identifying race and gender to the selection boards? Is providing that information proscribed? **Are** the Services following a common process, **or** is that individually decided by each Service? Are photographs of the officers **used** in the same way? It is unclear from reading the precepts. We would benefit from a single approach, and we should all agree **on** what it should be.

Please get back to me **so** we can act before another Flag or General Officer board is conducted.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121405-19

.....
Please Respond By Janua

Have Gordon + David Chu edit before I decide

OSD 05128-06



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

~~SECRET~~
INFO MEMO
~~SECRET~~

March 24, 2006, 10:39 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

David S. C. Chu 29 March 2006

(Signature and Date)

SUBJECT SecDef Promotion Board Guidance

- This package provides draft Secretary of Defense guidance to the Secretaries of the Military Departments for use in their instructions (precepts) to promotion boards convened in accordance with title 10, United States Code.
- You indicated that the experience our officers are receiving in Iraq and Afghanistan is vital to our efforts and should be advanced accordingly (Tab B).
- We have included guidance to that effect, but also included language concerning language and cultural awareness, innovation and critical thinking, and equal opportunity.
- Additionally, Deputy Secretary of Defense recommended we include guidance to highlight executive management skills in promotion board precepts.
- Concurrent with your review, we are forwarding the draft guidance to the Secretaries of the Military Departments for comment.

RECOMMENDATION None.

COORDINATION: Tab C.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Dale Bourque, (b)(6)



OSD 05128-06

11-L-0559/OSD/47956

TAB A



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL
AND READINESS

SUBJECT: Promotion Board Guidance

This memorandum provides overarching promotion board guidance for the Secretaries of the Military Departments *to* use in instructions (precepts) provided to promotion boards convened under their authority in accordance with title **10**, United States Code.

This guidance highlights five key areas warranting emphasis in promotion board precepts: service in combat, language and cultural awareness, innovation and critical thinking, executive management **skills**, and diversity in the broadest **sense**. Department personnel performing duty in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other areas of the world are developing combat and nation-building skills that must be retained well **into** the future if we are to continue to defend our nation. Of comparable importance are the experiences and education contributing to a broader cultural awareness and an ability to communicate in a global operating environment. We must cultivate these skills in our forces as they are crucial to supporting strategic national interests. In addition, we must establish a culture that encourages and rewards creativity, innovation, intelligent risk-taking, and critical thinking throughout the Department. In light of the foregoing, it is imperative that the Department recognize the value of having personnel with diverse cultures and backgrounds. To remain competitive, the Department must have members from the entire spectrum of qualified talent available in the United States. **They** will bring a broad mix of innovative approaches to the nation's most complex and demanding problems. We must make **every** effort to encourage service by individuals from all backgrounds by providing for the equal treatment and equitable consideration of all personnel considered **for** promotion.

Some of the existing promotion board precepts already deal with these areas. I would encourage your review of the guidance provided to future promotion boards to ensure these specific areas are appropriately communicated *to* promotion board members. With your assistance, we can ensure we continue *to* be the world's pre-eminent military power and continue to develop an adaptive and flexible force able to respond to our nation's most vital interests when called upon by our Commander in Chief.



11-L-0559/OSD/47958

TAB B

December 14, 2005

Draft

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen Pete Pace
Gordon England
Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Precepts for Flag Boards

I have had a chance to **see** some of the precepts issued by the Service Secretaries. They strike me as varying considerably in their emphasis on several **important** themes -- jointness, innovation, combat experience, diversity and the like.

At present, these precepts are issued under the signature of the individual Service Secretaries. It might make sense for these vitally important documents to be reviewed by Gordon and me before they are issued. I cannot think of a more important process for the Department over the long **term**.

Also, what is the current policy on identifying race and gender to the selection boards? Is providing that **information** proscribed? Are the Services following a common **process**, or is that individually decided by each Service? Are photographs of the officers **used** in the same way? It is unclear from reading the precepts. We would benefit from a single approach, and we should all agree on what it should be.

Please get back to me so we can act before another Flag or General Officer board is conducted.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121405-19

Please Respond By Janua

*Have
Gordon + Chu
edit before I
decide*

TAB C

SUBJECT: SecDef Promotion Board Guidance

COORDINATION:

| <u>Office</u> | <u>Signature & Date</u> |
|-------------------|----------------------------------|
| GC | <u>W. H. [Signature] 1/12/06</u> |
| Acting PDUSD(MPP) | <u>[Signature] 1-19-06</u> |
| Acting DUSD(MPP) | |
| Mrs. McGinn | <u>Gail McGinn 1/23/06</u> |



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

13-04-2006 P01:29 0:13

INFO MEMO

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Promotion Board Guidance

- This responds to Deputy Secretary of Defense's Memo dated April 5, 2006, subject as above (Tab A).
- The Army concurs with the draft memorandum as written.
- In September 2005, I directed that all board guidance (both active and reserve component) be modified and they now include all of the attributes covered in your draft memorandum, to include operational experience, cultural awareness, critical thinking, and effective management. Equal opportunity verbiage has been included in our board guidance since the mid-90s. All reserve and active component board instructions include this language (Tab B).

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: LTC Christine M. Richardson,

(b)(6)

OSD 05128-06

11-L-0559/OSD/47963

Tab A

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Military Assistant

6 April 2006 - 1725 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

SUBJECT: Promotion Board Guidance


Sir:

The Deputy Secretary requests your review and comment on the attached memo by Wednesday, 12 April 2006.

Individual replies are desired from each Service Secretary.

Please attach a copy of this tasker with your reply. Thank you

Very respectfully,



Stuart B. Munsch
Captain, U.S. Navy
Military Assistant to
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachment:
as slated

Suspense: Wednesday, 12 April 2006

OSD 05128-06

11-L-0559/OSD/47965

April 5, 2006

To: Service Secretaries

Fr: Gordon England

Subj: Promotion Board Guidance

Attached is a draft memo regarding service precepts. Kindly provide me your comments. Thanks.



Gordon

Eric.

OSD 05128-06

11-L-0559/OSD/47966

DRAFT

April 5, 2006

**MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL
AND READINESS**

SUBJECT: Promotion Board Guidance

This memorandum provides overarching promotion board guidance for the Secretaries of the Military Departments' use in **instructions** (precepts) provided to promotion boards convened under **your** authority in accordance with title 10, United States **code**.

This guidance highlights five key **areas** warranting increased emphasis in promotion board precepts: service in combat, language and cultural awareness, innovation and critical thinking, executive management skills, and diversity in the broadest sense.

1. Department personnel performing duty in **Iraq**, Afghanistan, and other areas of the world are developing combat and nation-building skills that need to be retained and utilized for future application.
2. Experiences and education that contribute to broader cultural awareness and enable better communication in a global operating environment are crucial **underpinnings** to **support** strategic national interests.
3. DoD needs to establish a culture that encourages and rewards creativity, **innovation**, intelligent risk-taking, and critical thinking throughout the Department.
4. The effectiveness and **efficiency** of the DoD enterprise will continue to demand excellent executive management skills. It is therefore essential that service leadership be well grounded in business practices.
5. It is **imperative** that the Department recognize the value of having personnel with diverse cultures and backgrounds. To remain competitive, the Department must have members from the entire spectrum of **qualified** talent available in the United States. Diverse members will bring a **broad** mix of innovative approaches to the nation's most complex and demanding problems. Accordingly, DoD needs to make **every effort** to encourage service by individuals from all backgrounds and **by** providing for the equal treatment and equitable consideration of all personnel considered for promotion.

DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/47967

DRAFT

By this memo, you are requested to review and revise promotion board precepts to ensure that the above factors are receiving the right degree of emphasis. After your completion and modification of your precepts, kindly provide a copy to me for my review with SECDEF. Thanks for your attention to this matter.

DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/47968

Tab B

x

11-L-0559/OSD/47969

BOARD LANGUAGE PERTAINING TO LEADERSHIP **ATTRIBUTES** AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY

4. Guidance. There are many qualities that I seek in all of our leaders. Because it is difficult to predict the exact combination of challenges our forces and leaders will be called upon to defeat, we must field versatile land forces capable of dominance across the spectrum of conflict and select adaptive leaders capable of joint force employment under a wide range of conditions and with an understanding that military participation will be required beyond the conclusion of major combat operations. In fulfilling this important task, you should use the following points of reference and general guidance as your baseline:

a. Our operational tempo is high and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Sustained operations and deployments will be the norm for our officers - not the exception. Recent experience in the Global War on Terrorism has shown the need for leaders who set the standard for integrity and character and are confident and competent decision-makers in uncertain situations; prudent risk takers; innovative; adaptive; empathetic and positive; professionally educated; dedicated to life-long learning; and effective communicators. Multi-skilled leaders must be:

- (1) Strategic and creative thinkers;
- (2) Builders of leaders and teams;
- (3) Competent full spectrum war fighters or accomplished professionals who support the Soldier and the war fighting effort;
- (4) Effective in managing, leading, and changing organizations;
- (5) Skilled in governance, statesmanship, and diplomacy; and
- (6) Knowledgeable in cultural context with the ability to work across it.

b. Our mission is to defend the Nation, and fundamental to that is fighting and winning on the battlefield. The Warrior Ethos is the foundation for our total commitment to victory in peace and war. While always exemplifying Army Values, leaders who live the Warrior Ethos put the mission first and refuse to accept defeat. The Warrior Ethos is the conviction that military service is much more than just another job. It defines who officers are and what officers do. It is linked to our long-standing Army Values and a determination to do what is right and to do it with pride. Because we are at war and will be for the foreseeable future, we must select officers who have the Warrior Ethos ingrained in their character and who have demonstrated it in their service to the Nation, who seek

to serve our Nation, and who will have the endurance and commitment to stay the course of the conflict.

c. Leaders must possess military bearing, be physically fit, and have sound health, strength, and endurance which support emotional health and conceptual abilities under prolonged stress. They must project confidence by believing and trusting in themselves. A leader must believe in the unit's ability to succeed in every mission. Confident leaders maintain outward composure based on calm and steady control over their emotions, especially in times of stress. Leaders must be resilient and able to recover quickly from shock, setbacks, and adversity while maintaining a mission and organizational focus.

d. Leaders must have the conceptual ability to conduct simultaneous, distributed, and continuous operations. They must be agile in order to adapt to changing situations. They must be able to break out of mental "sets" or habitual thought patterns and improvise when faced with conceptual impasses. Leaders must be critical thinkers and must have sound judgment. They must also be able to assess situations or circumstances shrewdly, make reliable estimates, draw sound conclusions, form sound opinions, and make sensible decisions. Leaders must be innovative and demonstrate creativity in generating ideas and objectives that are original, worthwhile, and appropriate. They must be tactful and sawy. Army leaders must not only be able to lead Soldiers but also to influence other people. They must be able to work with members of other Services and governmental agencies and win the willing cooperation of multinational partners, both military and civilian. Leaders must possess relevant technical, tactical, joint, cultural, and geo-political knowledge. Technical knowledge consists of the specialized information associated with a particular function or system. Tactical knowledge is an understanding of military tactics. Joint knowledge is an understanding of joint organizations, their procedures, and their roles in national defense. Cultural and geo-political knowledge is awareness of cultural, geographic and political differences, and sensitivities.

e. With our forces supporting multiple and simultaneous operations around the globe, experience gained through deployments and in other challenging assignments and duties prepares our officers to lead and train Soldiers. Regardless of an officer's area of specialty, deployments and other challenging assignments provide officers the opportunity to use, hone, and build on what they learn through the formal education process. Experience counts.

f. Previously accepted rules and conventions regarding personnel management timelines may no longer apply. The current operational environment has extended the time in leadership positions for some officers, while reducing the time in leadership positions for others. Operational factors affect the assignments all officers receive – the constraints of time, Army requirements, positions available, and unit readiness. View an officer's experience not in terms of one key assignment, but as a combination of many

assignments and deployments over time. In addition, while not all officers will get the opportunity to deploy, all officers must possess the Warrior Ethos. We are warriors first, specialists second. This guidance is applicable to positions at battalion and garrison level as well. Operational factors may affect the length of time an officer serves in these key positions. Therefore, board members should not penalize officers who may not serve for **24** months.

5. Equal Opportunity.

a. The success of today's Army comes from total commitment to the ideals of freedom, fairness, and human dignity upon which our country was founded. People remain the cornerstone of readiness. To this end, equal opportunity for all Soldiers is the only acceptable standard for our Army. This principle applies to every aspect of career development and utilization in our Army, but is especially important to demonstrate in the selection process. To the extent that each board demonstrates that race, ethnic background, and gender are not impediments to selection for school, command, and promotion, our Soldiers will have a clear perception of equal opportunity in the selection process. The diverse backgrounds, ideas, and insights offered by Soldiers and citizens of all races and of both sexes are a great source of strength for our Nation and our Army. We can best ensure that this source of strength endures by your strict avoidance of the consideration of any factors other than merit and ability as specified elsewhere in this memorandum of instruction in the selection of Soldiers for promotion and other favorable personnel actions.

b. You must be alert to the possibility of past personal or institutional discrimination - whether intentional or inadvertent - in the assignment patterns, evaluations, or professional development of all officers. Such discrimination may be unintentional, not motivated by malice, bigotry, or prejudice, and may have been the result of past service utilization practices. Indicators of discrimination may include disproportionately lower evaluation reports; assignments of lesser importance or responsibility; lack of opportunity to attend career-building military schools; gratuitous mention of race, ethnicity, or gender; or mention of an officer's organizational or institutional affiliations unrelated to duty performance and potential. Take these factors into consideration in assessing the degree to which an officer's record, as a whole, is an accurate reflection, free of bias, of that officer's performance and potential. The foregoing guidance shall not be interpreted as requiring or authorizing you to extend any preference of any sort to any officer or group of officers on the basis of race, ethnicity, or gender.



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

WASHINGTON

INFO MEMO

5 22

13 APR 2006

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael W. Wynne, Secretary of the Air Force

SUBJECT: DoD Draft Memorandum on Promotion Board Guidance

- I appreciate the opportunity to review the draft memorandum and look forward to submitting the Air Force's newly revised promotion board precepts, which were finalized in March 2006.
- While the draft memorandum overall will be salutary, my General Counsel advises that the diversity language in paragraph five is legally problematic (Tab A).

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:

As stated

11-L-0559/OSD/47973

Prepared by: Dan Fogarty, AF/A1PPP, (b)(6)

OSD 05128-06



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20330-1000

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL

APR 12 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

FROM: SAF/GC

SUBJECT: DOD Draft Memorandum on Promotion Board Guidance

I have reviewed the DOD draft Memorandum on Promotion Board Guidance and generally find it acceptable from a legal perspective. However, paragraph five is problematic and I recommend that the Air Force non-concur in the language as currently written. As you know, promotion boards are selection events. As such, the strict scrutiny standards of *Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña* apply. The current language implies that a benefit or a burden can be placed upon individuals based upon their gender, race, or ethnicity. This can only be done if DOD has first established a compelling governmental interest, and the means of achieving the action is narrowly tailored. I am not aware of any such predicate in this case, particularly since it is in the promotion context. Far more benign language in an Air Force precept has cost the Air Force in excess of \$83 million in settlement costs for contravention of this constitutional standard (e.g., in the *Berkley* case) and I would expect the proposed language of paragraph five to be no less problematic.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Mary Walker".

MARY L. WALKER
General Counsel

11-L-0559/OSD/47974

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Military Assistant

0 April 2006 - 1725 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

SUBJECT: Promotion Board Guidance


Sir:

The Deputy Secretary requests your review and comment on the attached memo by Wednesday, 12 April 2006.

Individual replies are desired from each Service Secretary

Please attach a copy of this tasker with your reply. Thank you

Very respectfully,



Stuart B. Munsch
Captain, U.S. Navy
Military Assistant to
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachment:
as stated

Suspense: Wednesday, 12 April 2006

OSD 05128-06

11-L-0559/OSD/47975

DRAFT

April 5, 2006

**MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL
AND READINESS**

SUBJECT Promotion Board Guidance

This memorandum provides overarching promotion board guidance for the Secretaries of the Military Departments' use in instructions (precepts) provided to promotion boards convened under your authority in accordance with title 10, United States Code.

This guidance highlights five key areas warranting increased emphasis in promotion board precepts: service in combat, language and cultural awareness, innovation and critical thinking, executive management skills; and diversity in the broadest sense.

1. Department personnel performing duty in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other areas of the world are developing combat and nation-building skills that need to be retained and utilized for future application.
2. Experiences and education that contribute to broader cultural awareness and enable better communication in a global operating environment are crucial underpinnings to support strategic national interests.
3. DoD needs to establish a culture that encourages and rewards creativity, innovation, intelligent risk-taking, and critical thinking throughout the Department.
4. The effectiveness and efficiency of the DoD enterprise will continue to demand excellent executive management skills. It is therefore essential that service leadership be well grounded in business practices.
5. It is imperative that the Department recognize the value of having personnel with diverse cultures and backgrounds. To remain competitive, the Department must have members from the entire spectrum of qualified talent available in the United States. Diverse members will bring a broad mix of innovative approaches to the nation's most complex and demanding problems. Accordingly, DoD needs to make every effort to encourage service by individuals from all backgrounds and by providing for the equal treatment and equitable consideration of all personnel considered for promotion.

DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/47976

DRAFT

By this memo, you are requested to review and revise promotion board precepts to ensure that the above factors are receiving the right degree of emphasis. After your completion and modification of your precepts, kindly provide a copy to me for my review with SECDEF. Thanks for your attention to this matter.

DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/47977



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

4/12
0910


APR 12 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

210

Subj: PROMOTION BOARD GUIDANCE

You asked **that** I provide comments on your draft memo regarding precepts. I have no objection to the proposed memo. I have already begun the process of reviewing both Navy and Marine Corps precepts and I look forward to incorporating your guidance into that review.


Donald C. Winter

copy to:
CNO
CMC
JAG

12 Apr 06

24 Mar 06

OSD 05128-06

11-L-0559/OSD/47978

April 5, 2006

216

To: Service Secretaries

Fr: Gordon England

Subj: Promotion Board Guidance

Attached is a draft memo regarding service precepts. Kindly provide me your comments. Thanks.



Gordon

Enc.

5 Apr 06

24 Mar 06

OSD 05128-06

11-L-0559/OSD/47979

DRAFT

April 5,2006

**MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL
AND READINESS**

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DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/47980

DRAFT

By this memo, you are requested to review and revise promotion board precepts to ensure that the above factors are receiving the right degree of emphasis. After your completion and modification of your precepts, kindly provide a copy to me for my review with SECDEF. Thanks for your attention to this matter.

DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/47981

April 5, 2006

To: David Chu
Fr: Gordon England
Subj: Promotion Board Guidance

Attached is a redraft of the draft ~~memo~~ you provided me today. Kindly review and comment.

Thanks!

Gordon
G.

Eric.

210

5 Apr 06

24 Mar 06

OSD 05128-06

DRAFT

April 5, 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL
AND READINESS

SUBJECT: Promotion Board Guidance

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This guidance highlights five key areas warranting increased emphasis in promotion board precepts: service in combat, language and cultural awareness, innovation and critical thinking, executive management skills, and diversity in the broadest sense.

1. Department personnel performing duty in **Iraq**, Afghanistan, and other areas of the world are developing combat and nation-building skills that need to be retained and utilized for future application.
2. Experiences and education that **contribute to** broader cultural awareness and enable better communication in a global operating environment are crucial underpinnings to support strategic national interests.
3. DoD needs to establish a culture that encourages and rewards creativity, innovation, intelligent risk-taking, and critical thinking throughout the Department.
4. The effectiveness and efficiency of the DoD enterprise will continue to demand excellent executive management skills. It is therefore essential that service leadership be well grounded in business practices.
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DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/47983

DRAFT

By **this** memo, you are requested to review and revise promotion board precepts to ensure that the above factors are receiving the right degree of emphasis. **After your** completion **and** modification of your precepts, kindly provide a copy to me for my review with **SECDEF** .*Thanks* for your attention to **this** matter.

DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/47984

Sherrod, Jimmy, CIV, WHS/ESD

from: Boykin, Jason CIV WHS/ESD
Sent: Monday, August 07, 2006 3:26 PM
To: Sherrod, Jimmy, CIV, WHS/ESD

210

Jimmy,

I think Bob Dannemiller needs some help getting some of these ancient taskings closed out. Any suggestions?

| | | | | |
|--------|-----|---------------------|-----------|-----|
| 1. ADN | UPR | <u>OSD 05128-06</u> | 12-Apr-06 | 117 |
| 2. ADN | UPR | OSD 05500-06 | 13-Apr-06 | 116 |
| 3. ADN | UPR | OSD 03776-06 | 23-Jun-06 | 45 |
| 4. ADN | UPR | OSD 07106-06 | 7-Jul-06 | 31 |
| 5. C&R | UPR | <u>OSD 77545-05</u> | 28-Sep-05 | 313 |
| 6. C&R | UPR | OSD 20165-05 | 19-Oct-05 | 292 |
| 7. C&R | UPR | OSD 23911-05 | 22-Dec-05 | 228 |
| 8. C&R | UPR | OSD 07441-06 | 15-May-06 | 84 |

close it
close it.
ck w/ Ed Burtol

v/r,
Jason

Jason O. Boykin - Executive Services Directorate
(703) 693-7965

1. Promotion board guidance issued by DSD on 8/3/06 see 11632-06
2. UPR sent an INFO memo to SD discussing Thruway costs see 07117-06
3. It's a directive - check w/ Burtol on status!
4. There's an approved (actually disapproved) action memo scanned in under a "Front Office doc." Looks like a dead issue to me. Check w/ Lt Col Bill Korman. I think it's closed
5. Old most likely outdated + OBE
6. OBE. Never acted on - regardless data is out dated.
7. Old would close as OBE. If its important it will resurface
8. See 10448-06. I think we could use it to say 07441-06 is closed. UPR is writing the voting issue. The SN memo 07441-06 talks about what the Navy plans to do.

(5 Apr 06)
24 Mar 06

8/8/2006

11-L-0559/OSD/47985

JR
05128-06

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

March 10, 2005

2005 MAR 16 AM 9:34

TO: Tina Jonas
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Linkage Between Offices

What is the linkage between the Assistant Secretaries for Financial Management and the Comptroller's Office?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
031005-10

■■■■■C.....

Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 05129-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47986



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

305 APR 16 AM 9:34

INFO MEMO

COMPTROLLER

March 15, 2005 6:00 PM

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas 

SUBJECT: Linkage Between Offices

- You asked me: "What is the linkage between the Assistant Secretaries for Financial Management and the Comptroller's Office?" (TAB A).
- Each of the Military Departments has an Assistant Secretary for Financial Management and Comptroller who is responsible for directing and managing financial activities and operations and performing comptroller functions.
- The three Assistant Secretaries for Financial Management and Comptroller provide similar functions for their Service Secretary as I do for you. They do not work for me, however I provide them guidance and oversight from ~~the~~ OSD level.
- My staff and I work with the Assistant Secretaries, their military budget officers, and their staffs on a regular basis to resolve budget and accounting issues. Our relationships are quite good.

COORDINATION None.

DSD 05129-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47987

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

2005 MAR 16 11 08 24

March 10, 2005

TO: Tina Jonas
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Linkage Between Offices

What is the linkage between the Assistant Secretaries for Financial Management and the Comptroller's Office?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
031005-10

.....
Please respond by _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

OSD 05129-05


11-L-0559/OSD/47988

~~FOUO~~

March 16, 2005

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: China and Latin America

China

Mr. President—

Attached is a brief summary from a private company about China's strategic objectives in Latin America. It struck me that this is a subject that might usefully be discussed at some point.

Respectfully,

c c :

Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice
Honorable Porter Goss
Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Stephen J. Hadley

Attach.

Undated Booz Allen Hamilton *Summary*

DHR:dh
031605-11

~~FOUO~~

OSD 05148-05

16 Mar 05

11-L-0559/OSD/47989

SUMMARY

In this monograph, the author argues that China's pursuit of long-term strategic objectives is leading the country to increase its presence in Latin America, with serious national security implications for the United States. Sustained Chinese economic growth requires ever greater quantities of basic commodities such as petroleum products, coal, iron and steel, and strategic minerals. As the new generation of Chinese leadership under Hu Jintao has moved away from the more cautious approach of its predecessor Jiang Zemin, it has begun to aggressively court Latin America as its principal source of supply outside Asia. Figures from the Chinese National Statistics Office show that, for example, 49% of all Chinese foreign investment in 2004 went to Latin America—almost double the amount directed to its own region.

The pattern of Chinese investment in countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Chile suggests that the Asian giant is seeking to assure access to critical commodities by constructing vertically integrated supply networks over which it has leverage. China is purchasing interest in key Latin American suppliers such as the Canadian minerals firm Noranda, or the Argentine oil subsidiary PlusPetrol Norte. It is also building cooperative relationships with supplier governments, such as the joint oil exploration and refinery construction deals signed with Venezuela and Brazil in 2004. Where necessary, China is also investing in the infrastructure of Latin American countries to help them more effectively bring their products to market.

In addition to documenting China's aggressive new posture in specific Latin American countries, this paper argues that the expanded Chinese trade and investment presence in the region will ultimately give China a stake in the politics of the region, and may tempt it to become involved in the region's security affairs. Expanded Chinese trade and investment in Latin America will, for example, greatly expand the community of Chinese nationals in the region. The broadened community of Chinese nationals multiplies opportunities for incidents involving those nationals, while also expanding the community in China with an interest in the region. At the same time, significant Chinese investments in Latin American extractive industries and increasing dependence on its production will cause the Chinese government to seek to deflect political movements in Latin American countries that could expropriate these investments or disrupt these resource flows.

Ultimately, this paper argues that Chinese engagement with Latin America will make the nation both a powerful competitor and a potential partner for the United States in the region. On one hand China with major investments in Latin America and dependence on its material flows is likely to be a nation interested in reducing political instability, armed groups, and criminal activity in the region, rather than fueling radical populism and insurgency. On the other hand, the United States needs to consider to what degree it is willing to accept a China that has increasing leverage in Latin America through its investment and trade presence—and a growing interest in the political course of the region. Now, rather than later is the time for the United States to begin seriously considering how to most constructively engage the Chinese in Western Hemisphere.

March 23, 2005

TO: COL Steve Bucci

CC: Cathy Mainardi

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Mike Montelongo

Please schedule a time for Mike Montelongo to come in for a photo, and so *that* I can *thank* him.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/16/05 ASD Montelongo letter to SecDef

DHR:ss
032305-11S

.....
Please respond by _____

020 AF

23 Mar-05

16 Mar 05

059 05/6/05

3/18
1800



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 MAR 16 PM 4: 34

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

MAR 16 2005

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
The Department of Defense
Washington, DC 20330

Paul Butler
3/18

Dear Mr. Secretary,

As you know, my last day in office is March 28, 2005 when I will step down as the 18th Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial Management and Comptroller to return to private life. Before leaving, however, I want to express my deep gratitude for this extraordinary opportunity you and the President have given me these last several years.

It has been a distinct privilege and honor to serve on your team working for the American people alongside my talented and dedicated colleagues here at the Air Force and Department of Defense. In particular, I am proud to have served with Secretary Jim Roche and General John Jumper since the summer of 2001. Thanks to your strong leadership and theirs and the courage and skill of our men and women in uniform and those who support them, we are transforming our military to achieve your vision and we are promoting the cause of freedom around the world.

It has also been my great pleasure and a source of deep pride to be the "chief financial officer" for the world's finest Air Force, especially as we prosecute the Global War on Terrorism. Over the course of the President's first term, we have successfully "financed the fight" ensuring the warfighter has the resources necessary to accomplish the mission. Just as importantly, we have aggressively pursued business and financial management reform to achieve the goals you set out very early in your tenure. Today, our financial managers are delivering services that are every bit as sophisticated as the warfighting concepts and systems we support and I am optimistic about our prospects to do more.

As the Air Force's senior Hispanic official and inspired by your commitment to diversity, I am also pleased we were able to expand access to opportunities for everyone and implement programs to prepare our workforce for those opportunities. Thanks to your leadership, we are closer to having a more representative cadre of qualified senior leaders that reflects the society it serves.

Finally, Mr. Secretary, I am eternally grateful for the extraordinary opportunities you have permitted me to assume these last four years. They have been experiences of a lifetime. That is why this action is a very difficult decision, but it is one I feel is best for my family and our future. I am humbled by the dedication and selflessness of the Air Force Family and their commitment to the future of this nation. I wish each of them the very best. With your continued support, I am confident in their ability to carry out what we have begun.

Thank you again, Mr. Secretary. I wish you God's gracious blessings as you lead this great organization.

| | | | |
|----------|---------|------|------|
| MA SD | SMA DSD | SPR | 3/18 |
| TSA SD | SA DSD | 3/18 | |
| EXEC SEC | 11/3/16 | | |
| ESR MA | | | |

Financing the Fight
11-L-0559/OSD/47992

OSD 05161-05



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 MAR 16 PM 4:34

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
The Department of Defense
Washington, DC 20330

MAR 16 2005

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March 16, 2005

TO: GEN John Abizaid
 CC: Gen Dick Myers
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Memo on *AP* Story re: Syria and Iraq

SYRIA

Please take a look at the attached unclassified memo on Syria and Iraq and let me know if you have any knowledge of it.

Thanks.

Attach.
 3/15/05 Memo Re: *AP* Story

DHR:ss
 031605-23

.....
 Please respond by 3/24/05

16MAY05

DOCUMENT-ID: OW46763375
 DOCST: ACTIVE
 LANGUAGE: ENGLISH
 VENDOR: ASSOCIATED PRESS
 PUBNAME: ASSOCIATED PRESS
 ORIGDATE: 200503151549
 PUBLISHR: ASSOCIATED PRESS
 PUENO: a0670
 AUTHOR: BARRY SCHWEID
 DOR: 20050315
 TOR: 155227
 CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
 TITLE: Syrian ambassador says Iraq may be spiraling toward civil war, asks U.S. to help seal border

TOPLINES:

WASHINGTON (AP) _ Syria's U.S. ambassador said Tuesday that Iraq may be spiraling toward a civil war "that will have a domino effect on the whole region," and he urged the Bush administration

TEXT:

"BC-US-Syria, 2nd Ld-Writethru, 780<
 "Syrian ambassador says Iraq may be spiraling toward civil war, asks U.S. to help seal border<

^Eds: AMs. SUBS 2 grafs for 2nd pvs with further quote, ambassador saying Syria not permitting infiltration; ADDS 1 graf at end with Bush on Hezbollah<

^AP Photos WX111-113<

"By BARRY SCHWEID=

"AP Diplomatic Writer=

WASHINGTON (AP) _ Syria's U.S. ambassador said Tuesday that Iraq may be spiraling toward a civil war "that will have a domino effect on the whole region," and he urged the Bush administration to stop accusing his country of harboring infiltrators.

In an Associated Press interview, Ambassador Imad Moustapha said "we are really not allowing people to infiltrate" into Iraq. He invited the United States to help secure the border.

The Syrian diplomat said his government had taken unprecedented steps to seal its border with Iraq, and that even the United States had problems guarding its border with Mexico.

Moustapha said his government "has been very sure to not allow anyone to act from inside Syria to create any violence in Iraq." He said he knew that if Syria helped insurgents, "we will be put in direct confrontation with the United States, which I don't believe any country wants to be."

Outsiders are responsible for about 5 percent of the anti-U.S. attacks in Iraq, he said. "But there are politicians in the United States who find it politically useful to say the balance is in the hands of outsiders, and that Syria and Iran are allowing them to do this job."

"If you believe you can help us improve security on our borders, we are willing to enhance the quality of cooperation," he said. "But it takes two to tango, and we cannot do this by ourselves while you continue to bash Syria through the media."

On another touchy front, the Syrian diplomat said the 10,000 Syrian troops still in Lebanon would be withdrawn across the border once Lebanon's military and security leaders were ready to replace them.

UNCLASSIFIED

"It will be as soon as possible, but not to create chaos," Moustapha said at Syria's embassy in Washington. "This is the only consideration."

Syria has pulled out about 4,000 of the 14,000 troops who were in Lebanon a month ago when former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated in Beirut. This accelerated U.S., French and U.N. demands for a complete and immediate withdrawal of the troops initially sent to Lebanon 29 years ago to help end a civil war.

Clearly sensitive to the rising demands, Moustapha said, "We realize that our presence there has become controversial." He said his government wants to see Hariri's assassination solved.

The ambassador did not respond directly, however, when asked if all Syrian troops would be gone before Lebanon holds elections in May. "The second phase has not been agreed upon as yet," he said.

But, the Syrian diplomat continued, "That doesn't mean it will take a long time to agree on what we are trying to do," he said.

"Whenever Lebanese security and military leaders tell us they can put their troops in their place, we are withdrawing."

And once the troops leave, Moustapha said, they will not re-enter Lebanon.

"We went there because we believed the Christian community was threatened and people were killing each other because of their religious and sectarian background," he said.

"But if our troops withdraw from Lebanon and civil war erupts, that means our whole enterprise was a failure, a fiasco for us. We do not believe this will happen," the ambassador said.

At the same time, he defended the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah as a grass-roots political movement and invited the Bush administration to help it evolve into a "purely political movement."

"This is a historical opportunity for the United States to stop repeating Israeli propaganda about Hezbollah and try to understand it is a national liberation movement that fought the Israeli occupation."

At the behest of the United Nations, Israel in 2000 ended 18 years of maintaining a military foothold in southern Lebanon, with the help of pro-Israel militia.

"Hezbollah has never, ever sent a suicide bomber to go and kill any civilians in Israel," Moustapha said. "They are not a terrorist organization."

With U.S. help, he said, Hezbollah's armed wing could be integrated into the Lebanese army "and the whole issue will be resolved constructively, for the benefit of Lebanon and the long-term strategic interests of the United States," he said.

The State Department for years has branded Hezbollah a terror group. But President Bush said Tuesday, after a White House meeting with King Abdullah II of Jordan, "I would hope that Hezbollah would prove that they are not by laying down arms and not threatening peace."

On the Net:

State Department: <http://www.state.gov>

Syria: <http://www.syria-net.com>

APTV 03-15-05 1549EST<



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MAR 16 2005

000.7

Mr. Bruce Beattie
Daytona Beach News-Journal
901 6th Street
Daytona Beach, Florida 32114

Dear Mr. Beattie,

I enjoyed your cartoon "*Intelligence Czar Negroponte
Ponders War on Two Fronts.*" It is imaginative work. Thank
you for sending the original.

Sincerely,

You have quite a talent!

16MAR05

16MAR05



OSD 05168-05

March 1, 2005

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Cartoon in *Washington Times*

000.7

In the last Sunday's *Washington Times*, page B5, there is a cartoon of Negroponte that I would like to get. It has my name in the upper right corner.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022805-84

.....
Please respond by 3/24/05

3/15

- ① Attached
- ② The cartoonist asked for a letter from you/ a draft is attached.

Di Rita

1 MAR 05


ing at the candles in Giessen, Germany, on the night marking the US bombing of the city in 1944; the monuments to Americans and British in Prague for liberating their country from the Nazis and the Soviets; the love of Americans all over Luxembourg, where the people's suffering in war was so graphic; the quaint grouped graves of Jews who made up the better parts of some German towns;

hostility in Paris and Berlin. What you aren't seeing is that all around them, in Denmark, Hungary and elsewhere, the movie is to support the U.S. and prevent Paris and Berlin from ever dominating again. In the last months, the European Union has moved to create 13 small military units. Some argue this is to counter the US military. This really is all too small and disorganized to lead


European leaders who dominate the news to see that beyond them are many supporters and admirers of America, even in the case of the Iraq mission. For example, conservative Christian Democratic Union leader Angela Merkel, raised in communist East Germany, is leads Germany's most prominent opposition party. She illustrates the disparity in pro- and anti-American sentiments in

ern saints. I know, though, that it is really about the legacy of great Americans there in the two world wars, and their sacrifices they made for freedom against tyrants terrorizing Europe and then against the Soviet threat for 45 years after. One thing to realize about is that we sometimes provoke some of the anti-American sentiments too. We laugh when this is joked

being worthy can. We should American legacy by ignorant and ignorant of tory and place in the world. JOE ROCHE U.S. Army Spec. Joe Roche's observations about his experiences in Iraq have been quoted by President Bush and by the Smithsonian Institution, among other distinctions.



INTELLIGENCE CZAR NEGROPONTE PONDERES WAR ON TWO FRONTS



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~~FOUO~~

TAB A

FEB 17 2005

967

TO: Gen Pete Pace
CC: ~~Gen Dick Myers~~
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Pop Up Armies

You ought to get your head into this question of pop up armies and whether or not there are 15,000 of them. They don't call them militias, but there is an article in the paper today and you ought to check with Abizaid and see how we should answer that.

Thanks.

Dick
011605-08

.....
Please respond by _____

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

OSD 05190-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48000



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-2378-05

17 March 2005

SECRET
2005 MAR 17 PM 1:39

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, ^{For} CJCS *16 Mar 05*

SUBJECT: Pop Up Armies (SF 967)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB A), the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, on its own initiative, has recruited approximately 5,600 soldiers and formed them into units. Though not part of the original force generation plan, they have proven useful in combat against the insurgency.
- **Analysis.** Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq monitors these unplanned units, providing some equipment and aligns them with US forces for employment. The Ministry of Defense will integrate the units into the Iraqi Army structure and will work with Multi-national Forces-Iraq to train and partner them with Coalition forces. Additional analysis is provided at TAB B.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Walter Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

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11-L-0559/OSD/48001

OSD 05190-05

~~FOUO~~
TAB A

FEB 17 2005

967

TO: Gen Pete Pace
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Pop Up Armies

You ought to get your head into this question of pop up armies and whether or not there are 15,000 of them. They don't call them militias, but there is an article in the paper today and you ought to check with Abizaid and see how we should answer that.

Thanks.

DHR:sw
021605-10

.....
Please respond by _____

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48002

28 February 2005

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Unplanned Iraqi Units

1. Purpose. To provide an update on unplanned Iraqi units.

2. Key Points

- The Iraqi Ministry of Defense, on its own initiative, has recruited approximately 5,600 soldiers and formed them into units. Though not part of the original formal force generation plan, these units have been useful, trained hard and proven themselves in combat against the insurgents.
- Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq monitors these units, providing some equipment and aligns them with US forces for employment.
- The Ministry will integrate these units into the Iraqi Army structure and will work with Multi-national Forces-Iraq to train and partner them with Coalition forces. As needed, they will receive formal training with Coalition force units or at Iraqi Army training facilities before employment. Such training will assist them in becoming integrated into the Iraqi Army.
- Unplanned Unit Details:
 - Muthana Brigade. Originally known as the Presidential Brigade, it was formed to provide security for the Ministry and the Prime Minister. This brigade is now made up of three 500- to 600-member battalions.
 - 1st Battalion (512 members) is under the tactical control of the US 1st Cavalry Division and is conducting security operations in North Babil, South of Baghdad, where it has done well.
 - 2d Battalion (563 members) is under the tactical control of the US 1st Marine Division and is conducting operations in Fallujah; this battalion has received high praise for its performance from the Marines.
 - Two companies of the 3d Battalion are located at Mahmudiya (south of Baghdad), also under the tactical control of 1st Cavalry,

Tab B

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and its other company is providing security at the Ministry of Defense in Baghdad.

- The Muthana Brigade *also* has a military police battalion including one all-female company, which also assists with security around the Ministry. The commander is Brigadier General Aziz, a very capable and impressive officer.
- 1st Brigade, "Defenders of Baghdad." This brigade has three battalions, two located in Eastern Baghdad near Sadr City and the third training at Muthana Airfield, Baghdad. Total manning is about 1,800, all from the Baghdad area. These three battalions are under the tactical control of the US 1st Cavalry Division, which used them effectively to provide polling station security on election day. This brigade will likely be transferred to Ramadi, where it will be under the tactical control of the 2d Marine Division, in early March. 2d Marine will provide intensive training and employ the brigade in the Ramadi and Fallujah areas. Security Transition Command and 1st Cavalry fully equipped the brigade with weapons, uniforms and ammunition, but its life support is being provided by the Ministry of Defense. Brigadier General Khalid, a quite capable and competent officer, commands the brigade.
- Amarah Brigade. This brigade deployed to Baghdad from Amarah at the Ministry's direction on 1 January 2005. It was formed by its commander, Brigadier General Faisal (a relative of the Minister of Defense), from tribes in the Amarah region. Its manning is approximately 800 men. The brigade is under the tactical control of US 1st Cavalry Division and has been employed in the vicinity of Haifa Street in Baghdad and for election day security. It will be employed to provide security in the Khatimiya section of Baghdad during the Shi'a holiday week of Ashura. The Security Transition Command and 1st Cavalry have provided weapons, uniforms and ammunition to the Amarah Brigade.
- 2d Brigade, "Defenders of Baghdad." This brigade was recruited in the Hillah and Diwanayah region, south of Baghdad, and is composed almost entirely of experienced former Iraqi Army soldiers. Major General Foad Faris, a Sandhurst graduate, commands the unit of approximately 1,400, split between two battalions. It is currently located at Muthana Airfield and is recruiting a third battalion. This unit has not yet received any weapons or equipment from the Security Transition Command but has received some uniforms and a limited number of weapons from the Ministry. The

brigade is currently receiving limited training from officers and noncommissioned officers of the Muthana brigade, and will likely remain in the Baghdad area to be integrated into the overall security plan for the city.

- Khatimiya Brigade. The Ministry of Defense plans to form a brigade to be used to provide security in the Khatimiya district of Baghdad, where one of the most revered Shi'a shrines is located. Security Transition Command has discouraged the formation of this unit and has provided no support to this initiative, as this task would be more appropriate for police.

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

USCENTCOM

COL Kanewske

9 March 2005

MNSTC-I

COL Laufenburg

9 March 2005

Tab C

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48006

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 11 22 17 PM 3:02

November 22, 2004

I-04/015791

ES-1478

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Larry Di Rita
Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Paper

Attached is a paper that was prepared at my request. It resulted from a dinner I had with the three authors, Joe Duffey, Ed Feulner and Lew Manilow. Please read it and let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach
11/2/04 Private Report to the Secretary of Defense

DHR:ss
112204-5

.....
Please respond by 12/10/04

11-11-04 11:13 AM

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48007

0 SD 05203 -05

*Private Report to the
Secretary of Defense*

Submitted Respectfully by:
Joseph Duffey
Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.
Lewis Manilow

November 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/48008

Executive Summary

To win the War on Terror, the United States must capture, kill, or deter more terrorists than our extremist allies can win over to their side. Moreover, it is crucial that we convince a significant number of people to be actively on our side. As such, the challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and central component of the War on Terror. Dozens of studies offering prescriptions for the deficiencies in America's foreign communication effort have already been produced. This paper does not seek to add to this cacophony of voices. Rather, we present two substantial and vital recommendations, which will allow America to bring to bear the full force of the greatest communications society in the history of the world to the challenge of shaping hearts and minds and changing viewpoints in the War on Terror.

It is important to note from the start, however, that any attempt at changing the attitudes and behaviors of foreign publics towards the United States is futile unless it enjoys the full support of the President. Just as the President serves as commander-in-chief of the United States military, he must similarly view himself as the lead spokesman for the United States to the citizens of foreign nations beyond foreign government leaders. This role must be a priority commitment that is followed through on a day-to-day basis and is an integral component of each of the President's decisions.

In order to communicate with foreign publics in a manner that changes attitudes and behavior towards America, the United States government should:

1) Establish a Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis

OBJECTIVE: Listen, ask questions, and analyze foreign public opinion as well as test the effectiveness of various USG messages.

It is startling how little the U.S. government (USG) currently engages in public opinion polling and how irrelevant much of the research it does do is. An effective public diplomacy effort must monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and then inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. By listening to the opinions of various groups and tailoring our message and - to an

appropriate degree - our policies to the information they are giving us, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world.

Winning the War on ~~Terrorism~~ will require unprecedented use of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and communications resources. To this end, the Administration should establish a private sector institution similar to RAND charged with gathering the information required by the USG to advance America's position in the communications aspect of the War on Terror.

The mission of this "Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis" (CFOA) will be to use the resources and capabilities of the United States of America to fully engage in a long-term market research effort aimed at better understanding foreign public opinion. It will be tasked with contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, ask questions, and analyze foreign public opinion in a manner that is not being done today, as well as test the effectiveness of various USG messages. Crucially, CFOA would only provide the research product - coordination of message and broad strategic decisions must be made through the National Security Council, the Departments of State and Defense, and relevant agencies.

2) Prepare the Government Bureaucracy to Apply Information

OBJECTIVE: Provide senior policy makers with immediate input so they are aware of the effect an impending policy action or statement will have on foreign public opinion.

Because the USG has so many official messengers, the need to have all of them singing off the same sheet is especially important. CFO.4 will provide the data that allows America to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly reevaluate and refine the U.S. government's message into the future. The USG must create a mechanism by which it can utilize this information effectively.

As such, a new staff position on the National Security Council should be created and charged with coordinating the U.S. government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with providing senior policy makers with immediate input based on CFOA data so that they are aware of the effect an impending policy action

11-L-0559/OSD/48010

or statement will have on foreign **public** opinion. Further, a senior interagency group should be created that brings the NSC staff member charged with the **U.S. government's** foreign public opinion **programs together** with the Under **Secretary** of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, **representatives of USAID**, all other relevant members of the Executive Branch, and other participants on an **ad hoc** basis.

A dialogue between America and the **rest** of the world must be seen as a long-term commitment central to **America's** vital national interest. **The** creation of a private institution, *performing* government contract work, charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of **America's** message, **and** the **impact of** **American** policy on foreign public **opinion** would *give* the USG the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the **rest** of the world. Further, **bringing** public **diplomacy** to the highest level of **NSC** deliberation will ensure that we communicate *our* message more **effectively** in **the** future.

Introduction

Shortly after the American Revolution, John Adams was asked who supported it and who didn't. He said about a third of the population had supported it; about a third had opposed it; and about a third was waiting to see who won. In many ways, this is the situation America is faced with today in the court of world opinion – and of particular importance in the Arab and Muslim World. The scorecard in the War on Terror, however, is not simply one of battles or casualties. The simple (in theory) challenge of the War on Terror is to capture, kill, or deter more terrorists than our extremist adversaries can win over to their side. As such, the communications challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and central component of the war.

As the 9/11 commission bluntly stated, "The small percentage of Muslims who are fully committed to Usama Bin Ladin's version of Islam are impervious to persuasion."¹ To win the War on Terror, America needs a strong policy aimed at increasing the ranks of our supporters, decreasing the small percentage of Muslims who are "impervious to persuasion," and impacting those who, while not actively supportive of extremists, have sat on the sidelines due to resentment of America. Put bluntly, America needs to embark on a long-term project to improve her standing in the public opinion of individuals in other nations around the world.

There have been a number of recent studies looking at the problem of public diplomacy. All have acknowledged a problem exists and there is significant agreement that there must be reform of the U.S. government's public diplomacy infrastructure.² Yet just as the War on Terror has required a rethinking of many aspects of American foreign policy, it similarly justifies a strategic reevaluation of our public diplomacy efforts. Changing foreign public opinion is not simply a matter of allocating more resources or reshuffling bureaucratic boxes. Rather, the U.S. government needs to consider all available tools of public diplomacy – old and new – and how they can be properly targeted at various audiences in order to reach them effectively.

¹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, "The 9/11 Commission Report," pg. 375.

² Studies by The Heritage Foundation (including Heritage Backgrounder 1645 as well as a section in the 2005 *Mandate for Leadership*), The Brookings Institution, The American Enterprise Institute, The Council on Foreign Relations, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency, along with the U.S. Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World have all come to the same conclusion that there is a need to improve Islamic world perceptions of the United States and that there is inadequate structure to the U.S. public diplomacy effort.

This project must be whole-heartedly embarked upon by the Administration not because it will play well in the American media or because of a philosophical commitment to Wilsonian multilateralism. Rather, it is a challenge that lies at the very core of America's own vital national interest.

I. How America Is Viewed Abroad

America's standing in the rest of the world has taken a beating in recent years. In the Republic of Korea, for example, 50% of respondents to a poll taken by the Pew Research Center in May 2003 have a negative view of the United States. This negative view of the U.S., however, is sharply divided based on the respondent's age: only 30% of respondents over 50 had a negative view of the U.S. while 71% of respondents between the ages of 18 and 29 view America unfavorably.⁵ This stark contrast suggests that older Koreans are perhaps more cognizant of the North Korean threat – and, therefore, look more favorably on the security provided by the United States – than the younger generation, and that older Koreans remember the shared sacrifices of the United States and South Korea in the 1950s.

America's standing is also highly negative in the Arab and Muslim World. A Zogby International Poll taken in March 2003 finds only 14% of Egyptians, 11% of Jordanians, 9% of Moroccans, 3% of Saudis, and 11% of citizens of the United Arab Emirates hold a favorable view of the United States.

These numbers are particularly shocking in light of the fact that in that same month Zogby found strong similarities between the citizens of the Arab World and Americans. Arabs, for example, list "Quality of Work," "Family," and "Religion" as the three most important concerns of their personal life; Americans list "Family," "Quality of Work," and "Friends" as their three most important values. "Foreign policy," seen by many as an important cause of the strained view many Arabs hold of the United States, is only the eighth most important concern for Arabs.

In addition to sharing values on a personal level, Americans and Arabs share core political values. 92% of respondents in Turkey, 92% in Lebanon, 53% in Jordan, and 79% in Uzbekistan and Pakistan feel it is important to be able to criticize their

⁵ "International Public Concern About North Korea," *The Pew Research Center*, August 22, 2003.

government. There is also strong support among **Arabs** for honest elections, a fair judicial system, and freedom of the **press**.⁴ The question these statistics beg is: "Why, given the amount we have in common, is the United States seen in such a negative light in the rest of the world?" While each of us could come **up with** a number of answers to this question – some of which might even prove accurate – the best way to reverse this troubling trend of anti-Americanism **is** to comprehensively study the question and formulate policy based on accurate, scientific data. Collecting these data **is** a crucial first step towards engaging the rest of the world in a public diplomacy dialogue.

II. If It Isn't Measured, It Won't Be Improved

It is startling how little the U.S. government currently does by way of public opinion polling. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. government only spends **\$5** million annually on this type of analysis? Further, much of the research the U.S. government does **fails** to address important **questions**. For example, *The Washington Post* has reported on a **draft** report prepared by the State Department's inspector general on the effectiveness of **Radio Sawa**, a key organ of the United States government's Middle East public diplomacy effort:

The **draft** report said that while Radio Sawa **has** been **promoted** as a "heavily researched broadcasting network," the research concentrated primarily on gaining audience share, not on measuring whether Radio Sawa was influencing its audience. **Despite** the larger audiences, "it is difficult to ascertain Radio Sawa's impact in countering anti-American views and the biased state-run media of the Arab world," the draft report said.⁵

Comprehensive research into how foreign audiences feel **about** America, specific American policies, **and** how the United States can best change **attitudes** and behavior needs to be conducted.⁶ Doing so would require a significant **increase** to the miniscule

⁴ Hady Amr, "The Need to Communicate: How To Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World," *The Brookings Institution*, January 2004.

⁵ 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. 6.

⁶ Glenn Kessler, "The Role of Radio Sawa in Mideast Questioned," *The Washington Post*, October 13, 2004, page A12. The draft report was leaked to the *Post* "by a source who said he feared that the inspector general's office was buckling under pressure and would water down the conclusions"

⁷ U.S. foreign opinion polling and analysis is fragmented and poorly focused. Senior State Department managers moved USIA's Office of Research and Media Reaction out of the public diplomacy hierarchy when the agency was folded into the Department in 1999. Today, it sits in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) where it contributes more to all-source intelligence reports than to strategic communication efforts. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has contracts with Intermedia, a private firm, which conducts surveys of audience share. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) collects and assesses print.

budget public diplomacy research currently receives. **This** investment is essential to building an effective program.

An effective public diplomacy effort would monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and would inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. Public diplomacy experts have long sought to have public diplomacy present at the "takeoff" as well as the "crash landing" of American policy. Rather, public diplomacy should be seen as a crucial component of the aircraft itself.

At its best, information gathered by public diplomacy researchers would be passed along to policymakers in relevant agencies. As a result, policymakers would be aware of the implications of policy decisions and statements on foreign public opinion and public diplomacy officers would be able to honestly inform foreign publics that their opinions were considered - if not always agreed with - in the formation of American policy.

Clearly, American officials should be making public policy decisions based on America's vital national interest; they should, however, recognize that it is conceivable the benefits of a policy might in fact be outweighed by the negative impact that policy has on foreign public opinion. Informing policymakers of how an issue will "play" in foreign public opinion can help them determine whether a seemingly beneficial policy will unintentionally create more terrorists than it deters, captures, or kills.

Up-to-date information on foreign publics is not only important for policy makers, but also for public diplomacy officers. With a wide variety of tools at their disposal - from visas to speeches, advertisements to interviews, and so forth - information about the people with whom they are communicating can only help public diplomacy officers in applying the correct tools to the correct audience at the right time and in the right proportion. In this way, public diplomacy research allow for a dialogue between America and the rest of the world by seeking feedback from foreign audience. Public diplomacy is not just about getting our message out, but also listening to the sentiments

radio, TV, and Internet-based publications. Some U.S. Embassies, individual military commands, and the CIA also engage in limited opinion and media research. None of these products are combined and analyzed in ways for policymakers to use. Many are available to restricted user sets. Collection takes precedence over analysis and "issue of the day" palling often trumps media content and trend assessments. See the "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Washington, DC, September 2004, p. 26-27.

of foreigners. By incorporating a serious research component into the overall public diplomacy effort of the U.S. government, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world. It **is** a dialogue **that has been** ignored for *too long*.

III. A Serious Reevaluation of Public Diplomacy in the War on Terror

The U.S. government might be well-advised to remember the words of MIT professor Norbert Wiener, who said "I never know what I say until I hear the response." This **is certainly** not the **case** for the U.S. government, which consistently fails to attempt to research the reasons for anti-Americanism abroad or to use research in formulating a **clear** communication strategy that engages foreign audiences in a dialogue. **As** the General Accounting Office found in its 2002 analysis of the State Department's public diplomacy efforts, "State Lacks a Strategy for Public Diplomacy Programs." America **is the best in the world at market research** – it is a crucial **part** of domestic politics – but **we** are notably uninformed about audiences abroad. Changing this situation must be an immediate priority of the **U.S.** government.

In trying to improve America's standing in the eyes of the rest of the world American public diplomacy officers need to understand that public opinion cannot be changed **either** solely on the basis of reason **nor** solely on the basis of emotion. Rather, it requires the foundation of reason to persuade people and the associated emotional relevance *to* motivate their decision-making and behavior. Further, the *bottom* line of public diplomacy ought to be changing **the** attitudes and behavior of foreign publics. If the end product of a particular program is only a change in mental state, it is not effective public diplomacy.

Underlying this change in behaviors **is** an exchange process **between** the **U.S.** (including the **U.S.** government **as** well as the private sector) and foreign audiences. To be successful, foreign audiences must believe that the ideas advocated by the United States are better than any reasonable alternative – including world views promoted by their governments, other segments of the population they are exposed to, and extremists who can often be quite persuasive. This relationship between the United States and foreign audiences can only be cultivated if the United States pursues a broad strategy that

⁶ U.S. General Accounting Office, "U.S. Public Diplomacy," September 2003, pg. 13

identifies what audiences we are **trying** to persuade and **what** tools we have **at** our disposal to attempt to influence these audiences **as well as** how **and** when these **tools** should be utilized.

In order to convince foreign audiences to support America's vision of freedom and prosperity under the rule of law for, at the **very least**, oppose **extremist** visions of death and destruction), we must begin by identifying the different segments that exist around the world **that we** are trying to persuade. That **is**, a one-size-fits-all public diplomacy effort **is** less **likely** to be successful than one that recognizes **that** the arguments that **are** successful in the Muslim world might **be different** from the persuasive arguments **we** should highlight in Asia. Further, **we** might package our message differently to one religious or ethnic group within a country **than** we would another group. The same could be true for different age groups - older Koreans who remember the Korean War, for example, will be persuaded by a different message **than** their younger countrymen who only know of the war from distorted history books accounts.

Crucially, this does not mean America should **be** delivering contradictory messages to different groups. Not only does delivering false messages or propaganda go against many of the basic principles our country stands for, but **also** it would be unwise from a practical standpoint, as audiences worldwide would quickly catch on to any contradictions. Rather, America **should** simply recognize that our **message** should be delivered **differently to** different groups.

To spread our message, the **U.S.** government should employ all available tools of public diplomacy. **This** would include utilizing the President, the Secretary of State, and other Cabinet officers and senior government officials as well as **Americans** in the **private** sector, including teachers, students, journalists, **business** people, and so forth. These "public diplomacy ambassadors" can speak to foreign audiences using a variety of promotional tools such as advertisements, speeches, interviews, lectures, and educational exchanges. The key is for the U.S. government to invest in the research necessary to effectively pair a message with a messenger and a medium.

The **U.S.** government should also not be hesitant to use the private sector in doing research into foreign audiences **and** their reactions to the United States. **As** an Independent Taskforce sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations noted in 2003:

The "U.S. private sector leads the world in most of the key strategic areas required for effective public diplomacy: technology, film and broadcast, marketing research, and communications."⁹ Ultimately, effective communication with the rest of the world will require not only the tools of traditional government-run public diplomacy (though these tools will remain vital), but also the resources and expertise of the American private sector.

IV. Incorporating Research Into the US Government Bureaucracy

A vital part of this new framework for engaging the public opinion aspect of the War on Terror is making sure that American policy makers and advocates have the most accurate and up-to-date information about foreign audiences available to them at all times. Doing so requires two important actions from the Administration that will allow the U.S. government to bring the best work of the American public and private sectors to bear in the fight to shape the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics.

The U.S. Government should create an independent foreign public opinion institution

At the conclusion of World War II, the Commanding General of the Army Air Force, Hap Arnold, wrote to Secretary of War Henry Stimson:

"During this war the Army, Army Air Forces, and the Navy have made unprecedented use of scientific and industrial resources. The conclusion is inescapable that we have not yet established the balance necessary to insure the continuance of teamwork among the military, other government agencies, industry, and the universities. Scientific planning must be years in advance of the actual research and development work."¹⁰

Out of this understanding of the importance of technology research and development for success on the battlefield, representatives of the War Department, the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and private industry established Project RAND, the precursor of today's RAND Corporation. The Articles of Incorporation bluntly set forth RAND's purpose: "To further and promote scientific, educational, and charitable purposes, all for the public welfare and security of the United States of America."

⁹ Peter G. Peterson, et al., "Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy Toward the Middle East", *The Council on Foreign Relations*, 2003, pg. 6.

¹⁰ The Rand Corporation, "History and Mission" (<http://www.rand.org/about/history/>)

Similarly, winning the **War on Terrorism** will require **unprecedented use** of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and communications resources. In order to best utilize those resources it is vital to insure the **teamwork** of the State Department, Defense Department, other government agencies, universities, and the private sector. **To** this end, the Administration should push for the creation of a private sector institution **similar** to RAND charged with gathering the information required by the **U.S. government** to advance America's position in the ideological aspect of the War on Terror.

The mission of this "Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis" (CFOA) would be to **use** the resources and capabilities of the United States of America to **fully** engage in a long-term market **research effort** aimed at **better** understanding foreign public opinion. It would be tasked **with** contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, ask question, and analyze foreign public opinion in a manner **that** is **simply** not done today. There are knowledge gaps with regard to **issues** of anti-American sentiment **and** this institution would be **tasked** with reviewing all existing data plus contracting for any original research **needed** to fill remaining knowledge gaps."

There are a number of significant advantages to creating this **corporation**. First, the corporation's **independence** avoids creating bureaucratic fights **over** what budget the money for foreign public opinion research comes from, who controls **the focus** of the research, and so forth. Second, CFOA would provide a useful product for consumption across **many areas** of government - from the Broadcasting **Board** of Governors to the National **Security Advisor** - **and** keeping it **independent** would **allow** its resources to be used by a wide-array of interests. Finally, it would provide a method for coordinating different aspects of government engagement with **the rest** of the world while **still** maintaining crucial separation between various entities. **That is**, given how vital it is that public diplomacy be differentiated from public affairs, public relations, information warfare, and **psyops**, **creating** an independent corporation would **allow** each to continue to work completely **in** its own sphere while **still** having access to research when **necessary**.

¹¹ See the testimony of Keith Reinhard, President of Business for Diplomatic Action, Inc., before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations (August 23, 2004) for an excellent analysis of how America's communications expertise can be applied to the communication aspect of the War on Terror.

Create a mechanism for using CFOA

Because the U.S. government has so many official messengers, the need to have all of them singing off the same sheet is especially important. Yet, over recent years, public diplomacy coordination has deteriorated.¹² CFO. 4 will provide the data that allows America to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly reevaluate and revise that strategy into the future. The U.S. government must create a mechanism by which it can utilize this information effectively.

A vital first step is to make sure that someone is empowered with coordinating all activities, behaviors, and messages so that they are aligned with the U.S. government's overall communication strategy. The current Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy position is clearly not this empowered individual as he or she lacks authority over both budgets and personnel assignments. It is also vital that this individual have the ability to easily get information to the highest levels of government.

As such, a new staff position on the National Security Council should be created and charged with coordinating the U.S. government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with receiving information from CIOA and disseminating it to policy makers so that they are aware of the effect a policy action will have on foreign public opinion. This coordination does not currently exist. As the 2004 report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy states, "Along with the White House and the Department of State, nearly all government agencies engage in

¹² The former U.S. Information Agency had a Director and senior staff that coordinated with other government agencies, and a budget to accomplish its mission, even though it declined toward the end of the Cold War. Moreover, a public diplomacy coordinator position was staffed in the National Security Council during the Reagan Administration. Since President Clinton issued PDD 68 (Presidential Decision Directive on International Public Information) April 30, 1999, there has been no Presidential directive on public diplomacy. The NSC terminated it in 2001 pending a review of U.S. public diplomacy policy. Since then, the Department of Defense created and abolished the Office of Strategic Influence. The State Department has had two Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy with large gaps in service. In June 2002, the White House created the Office of Global Communications which keeps U.S. officials "on message," but does not direct, coordinate, or evaluate public diplomacy activities. And in September 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice established the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee to coordinate inter-agency activities. It reportedly met twice and has had little impact. A small inter-agency working group was created within the State Department Under Secretariat for Public Diplomacy, but lacks a budget, contracting authority, sufficient communications support, and attention from State and other Cabinet agency leaders. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," p. 25, 26.

some public diplomacy efforts. **While** a few structures link federal officials, coordination often **does** not extend to embassy practitioners.¹³

In order to keep all pans of the government bureaucracy moving towards the **same** goal, a senior interagency **group** (SIG) should be created that brings the **NSC** staff member charged with the **U.S.** government's foreign public opinion programs together with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, **all** other relevant members of the Executive Branch, and other participants on an ad hoc basis. This formal consulting mechanism would encourage closer cooperation **among** the various parties involved. **Acting** on the information provided by CFOA, this SIG would allow the relevant Under Secretaries to implement the government's long-term communications strategy.

The NSC staff member **would also** be responsible for ensuring that **all** U.S. government messengers are given the information required to effectively communicate with their audiences. Something similar to the daily "Talking Points from the Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs" or "The Global Messenger" produced by the White House Office of Global Communications should be disseminated to all U.S. government messengers as well as information that is specific to particular audiences.¹⁴ Thus, a U.S. government public diplomacy officer in the Republic of Korea should be given instructions as to what information the U.S. government communication strategy calls for him or her to communicate to young Koreans, old Koreans, businessman, opinion makers, and so forth. Once **again**, it is **vital** that each of these segments only be given accurate information from the U.S. government, but the **style** and tone of America's message must be fine-tuned for various foreign audience segments. Importantly, this fine-tuning **must** be based on continuous research.

A Serious Commitment From the President

Regardless of how well-structured the **U.S.** public diplomacy apparatus is, **however**, it will only be effective if changing foreign public opinion is signaled as a

¹³ 20M Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. E.

¹⁴ The effectiveness of these talking points would be drastically improved by comprehensive audience research allowing them to explain not only what America wants to say, but how it should be said as well as what questions audience segments around the world are looking for America to answer. Further, it is striking that the State Department does not appear to produce any daily talking points.

national security priority by the President. Just **as** the President serves as commander-in-chief of the United **States military**, he must similarly view himself **as** the lead spokesman for the United States to foreign nationals beyond foreign **governmental** leaders. This **commitment** must be made not only through public statements and private **consultation** and analysis **within** the White House, but also in the President's continuing contacts with **Department** of State officials, including diplomatic Chiefs of Mission. It must be **a** **priority commitment** that is followed through on **a** day-to-day **basis** and in each of the President's decisions. Foreign public opinion **is** no less important to American national security than American public opinion **is** to an election.

Conclusion

While one might be understandably skeptical of **a** proposal for "further study" of a problem, in the case of altering foreign beliefs **and** behavior **a** short pause to **hammer** out a comprehensive **strategy is called** for. The temptation of **many** in Washington - including **many** who have written reports on how to revitalize public diplomacy - **is** to try **and** rekindle the glory years of the United States Information Agency (USIA) during the Cold War. While USIA-type programs are important - and should be seen **as** vital components of the **War on Terrorism** - **it is far more** important **for** the **U.S. government** to fully understand and conceptualize a long-term communications program with the rest of the world. America needs to do more than broadcast our message to foreign audiences; we need to listen to their complaints and respond to them appropriately.

The framework laid out in **this** paper does just that. It **starts** with an intense stage of information gathering where **American government officials** - with the help of the private-sector - evaluate **all** of the information currently available **and** **procures** whatever other information is needed to accurately and fully **understand** foreign public opinion **at a** specific point in time. This baseline is then **given** to policy makers, so prior policy can be reevaluated and future policy evaluated in light of the benefits America **gains** and the cost **is** may or may not have on foreign public opinion. Further, this information is **given** to **American** public diplomacy and public affairs officials - under the guidance of **a** newly created NSC staff **member** chairing a SIG - who use this information to craft an effective, informed, **and** flexible communications effort for America.

Finally, **this** dialogue between America and the **rest** of the world - and the responsive framework established that incorporates government and the private sector - is seen **as** a long-term commitment. The creation of a private institution charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of **America's** message, and the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion would **give** the **U.S. government** the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the **rest of** the world.

As John Adams famously observed, "**The** Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people." For a **small, extremist segment of** the world *population values like* freedom **and** prosperity **are** meaningless. Yet **the** vast majority of people around **the** globe **is** more interested in security for themselves and their families than **war** and destruction. America **has** a peaceful message and **strives** to be a force for freedom and prosperity around **the world**. **Yet we** are doing incredible harm to ourselves by **not** advocating for ourselves effectively. **As** the 9/11 commission stated "If the United States does not act aggressively to **define** itself in the Islamic world, the extremists will **gladly** do the job for us."¹⁵ Richard Holbrooke put it best, "**How** can a *man in a cave* out communicate the world's leading communications society?"¹⁶

American national security **requires** that **we** harness the wealth of **resources we** have available to **communicate with** the rest of the **world**. We must speak and listen to the **rest** of the world clearly, accurately, and effectively. If we do **so**, **we** will prevail.

¹⁵ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States. "The 9/11 Commission Report," pg. 377.

¹⁶ Richard Holbrooke, "Get the Message Out," *Washington Post*, Oct. 28, 2001, p. B7

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INFO MEMO

MAR 17 PM 3:24

MAR 16 2005
POUSDP
I-04/015791-ES
ES-1478

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6))

PRM 02 MAR 2005

SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Paper (SD Snowflake)

- You asked for Policy's thoughts on the Strategic Communications Paper submitted by Joe Duffey, Ed Feulner, and Lew Manilow.
- The general premise is that the more we know our audience, the more effective we will be in communicating with it.
- The paper recommends increasing funds for foreign opinion research and polling, and establishing a government-funded private sector institution to conduct this research.
- The paper points out that no one in the USG is "empowered with coordinating all activities, behaviors, and messages so that they are aligned with the U.S. government's overall communication strategy."
 - The paper recommends a new staff position on the National Security Council to do this.
- The paper points to real problems. But this cannot be solved until we have answered the larger question of how to conduct public diplomacy. Until that larger question is resolved
 - It is not clear that we need a new government-funded corporation to do an increased amount of foreign opinion research.
 - It might be just as effective to increase the funding (currently around \$6 million) of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
 - The paper's emphasis seems to be on reacting, not on setting the agenda.
 - It is not clear that the new NSC position would have the executive authority to do the job.

Bottom Line: The findings and recommendations of this paper are very similar to the Defense Science Board's recommendations on strategic communications.

OSD 05203-05

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11- L-0559/OSD/48024

02-03-05 PCT:SS IF

~~FOUO~~

Attachments: As stated

Peter Flory (PDASD/ISA)_____

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48025

~~FOUO~~

RECEIVED

2005 MAR 17 PM 3:10

November 22, 2004

I-04/015791

ES-1478

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Larry Di Rita
Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Paper

Attached is a paper that was prepared at my request. It resulted from a dinner I had with the three authors, Joe Duffey, Ed Feulner and Lew Manilow. Please read it and let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/2/04 Private Report to the Secretary of Defense

DHR:js
112204-5

.....
Please respond by 12/10/04

20-11-02 1:33 PM

~~FOUO~~

05D 05203 -05

11-L-0559/OSD/48027

*Private Report to the
Secretary of Defense*

Submitted Respectfully by:
Joseph Duffey
Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.
Lewis Manilow

November 2004

Executive Summary

To win the War on Terror, the United States **must** capture, **kill**, or deter more terrorists than our **extremist allies** can win over to their side. Moreover, it is crucial that **we** convince a significant number of people to be actively on our side. **As** such, the challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and central **component** of the **War** on Terror. Dozens of studies offering prescriptions for the deficiencies in America's foreign communication effort have already been produced. This paper does **not** seek to add to this cacophony of voices. **Rather**, we **present** two substantial **and** vital recommendations, which will allow America to bring to bear the full **Force of the greatest** communications **society** in the history of the world to the challenge of shaping **hearts** and minds and changing **viewpoints** in the **War** on Terror.

It is important to note from the start, however, **that any** attempt at changing the attitudes and behaviors of foreign publics **towards the** United States is futile unless it enjoys the full support of the President. Just **as** the President serves as commander-in-chief of the United States military, he must **similarly view** himself as the lead spokesman for the United States **to the** citizens of foreign nations beyond foreign government leaders. **This** role must be a priority commitment that is followed through on a day-to-day basis and is **an** integral component of each of the President's decisions.

In order to communicate with foreign publics in a manner that changes attitudes and behavior towards America, the **United** States government should

1) Establish a Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis

OBJECTIVE: Listen, **ask** questions, and **analyze** foreign public opinion as well as test the effectiveness of various **USG** messages.

It is startling how little the U.S. government (**USG**) currently engages in public opinion polling and how irrelevant much of the research it does do is. An effective public diplomacy effort must monitor **how** the opinions of **various** demographic groups are changing over time and then inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. By listening to the opinions of various groups **and** tailoring our message **and** to an

appropriate 'degree - our policies to the information they are giving us, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world.

Winning the ~~War~~ on ~~Terrorism~~ will require unprecedented **use** of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and communications **resources**. To **this** end, the Administration should establish a private sector institution similar to **RAND** charged with **gathering** the information required by the **USG** to advance America's position in the communications **aspect** of the **War on Terror**.

The **mission** of this "Corporation for **Foreign Opinion Analysis**" (**CFOA**) will be to use the **resources** and capabilities of the United States of America to fully engage in a **long-term** market research **effort** aimed **at** better understanding foreign public opinion. It **will** be **tasked with** contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, **ask** questions, **and** analyze foreign public opinion in a manner that **is** not being done **today**, as **well as** test the effectiveness of various **USG messages**. **Crucially**, **CFOA would** only **provide** the research product - **coordination of message** and broad strategic decisions must be made through the National Security **Council**, the **Departments** of **State** and **Defense**, and relevant agencies.

2) Prepare the Government Bureaucracy to Apply Information

OBJECTIVE: **Provide senior policy makers with immediate input so they are aware of the effect an impending policy action or statement will have on foreign public opinion.**

Because the **USG** has so many official messengers, the need to have **all** of them singing off the **same** sheet is especially important. **CFO. 4** will provide the **data that** allows **America** to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and **constantly** reevaluate and refine the **U.S. government's** message into the future. The **USG** must create a mechanism by which it **can utilize this** information effectively.

As such, a **new** staff position on the National Security Council should be created and charged with coordinating the **U.S. government's overall** communications strategy. **This** staff member would be charged with providing senior policy **makers with** immediate input based on **CFOA data** **so** that they are aware of the effect an impending policy **action**

or statement will have on foreign public opinion. Further, a senior interagency group should be created that brings the NSC staff member charged with the U.S. government's foreign public opinion programs together with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, all other relevant members of the Executive branch, and other participants on an ad hoc basis.

A dialogue between America and the rest of the world must be seen as a long-term commitment central to America's vital national interest. The creation of a private institution, performing government contract work, charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of America's message, and the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion would give the USG the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the rest of the world. Further, bringing public diplomacy to the highest level of NSC & liberation will ensure that we communicate our message more effectively in the future.

Introduction

Shortly after the **American** Revolution, John Adams was asked who supported it and who didn't. He said about a third of the population had supported it: about a third had **opposed it**; and about a third was waiting to **see who won**. In many ways, this **is the situation America is** faced with today in the court of world opinion - and of particular importance in the Arab and Muslim World. The scorecard in the **War** on Terror, however, is not simply one of battles or casualties. The simple (in theory) challenge of the **War** on Terror is to capture, kill, or deter more terrorists **than** our extremist adversaries can **win over** to their side. As such, the communications challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a viral and central component of the **war**.

As the 9/11 commission bluntly stated, "The **small** percentage of Muslims who are fully committed to Usama Bin Ladin's version of **Islam** are **impervious to persuasion**."¹ To win the **War** on Terror, America needs a strong policy aimed at increasing the **ranks** of our supporters, decreasing the **small** percentage of Muslims who are "impervious to persuasion," and impacting those who, **while** not actively **supportive of** extremists, have sat on the sidelines **due to resentment of** America. Put bluntly, **America needs** to embark on a long-term project to improve her standing in the public opinion of individuals in other nations **around the world**.

There have been a number of recent studies looking at the **problem** of public diplomacy. All have acknowledged a **problem exists** and there is significant agreement that there must be reform of the U.S. government's public diplomacy infrastructure.² Yet just as the **War** on Terror has required a rethinking of many aspects of American foreign policy, it similarly justifies a **strategic** reevaluation of our public diplomacy efforts. Changing foreign public opinion is not simply a matter of allocating more resources or reshuffling bureaucratic boxes. Rather, the U.S. government needs to consider all available tools of public diplomacy - old and **new** - and how they can be properly **targeted** at various audiences in order to reach them effectively.

¹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, "The 9/11 Commission Report," pg. 375.

² Studies by The Heritage Foundation (including Heritage Backgrounder 1645 as well as a section in the 2005 *Mandate for Leadership*), The Brookings Institution, The American Enterprise Institute, The Council on Foreign Relations, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency along with the U.S. Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World have all come to the same conclusion that there is a need to improve Islamic world perceptions of the United States and that there is inadequate structure to the U.S. public diplomacy effort.

This project must be whole-heartedly embarked upon by the Administration not because it will play well in the **American** media or **because** of a philosophical commitment to Wilsonian multilateralism. Rather, it is a challenge that lies **at the very** core of **America's own vital national interest.**

I. How America Is Viewed Abroad

America's standing in the rest of the world has taken a beating in recent years. In the Republic of Korea, for example, 50% of respondents to a poll taken by the Pew Research Center in May 2003 have a negative view of the United States. This negative view of the U.S., however, is sharply divided based on the respondent's age: only 30% of respondents over 50 had a negative view of the U.S. while 71% of respondents between the ages of 18 and 29 view America unfavorably.³ This stark contrast suggests that older Koreans are perhaps more cognizant of the North Korean threat – and, therefore, look more favorably on the security provided by the United States – than the younger generation, and that older Koreans remember the shared sacrifices of the United States and South Korea in the 1950s.

America's standing is also highly negative in the Arab and Muslim World. A Zogby International Poll taken in March 2003 finds only 14% of Egyptians, 11% of Jordanians, 9% of Moroccans, 3% of Saudis, and 11% of citizens of the United Arab Emirates hold a favorable view of the United States.

These numbers are particularly shocking in light of the fact that in that same month Zogby found strong similarities between the citizens of the Arab World and Americans. Arabs, for example, list "Quality of Work," "Family?" and "Religion" as the three most important concerns of their personal life; Americans list "Family," "Quality of Work," and "Friends" as their three most important values. "Foreign policy," seen by many as an important cause of the strained view many Arabs hold of the United States, is only the eighth most important concern for Arabs.

In addition to sharing values on a personal level, Americans and Arabs share core political values. 92% of respondents in Turkey, 92% in Lebanon, 53% in Jordan, and 79% in Uzbekistan and Pakistan feel it is important to be able to criticize their

³ "International Public Concern About North Korea," *The Pew Research Center*, August 22, 2003.

government. There is also strong support among Arabs for honest elections, a fair judicial system, and freedom of the press.⁴ The question these statistics beg is: "Why, given the amount we have in common, is the United States seen in such a negative light in the rest of the world?" While each of us could come up with a number of answers to this question — some of which might even prove accurate — the best way to reverse this troubling trend of anti-Americanism is to comprehensively study the question and formulate policy based on accurate, scientific data. Collecting these data is a crucial first step towards engaging the rest of the world in a public diplomacy dialogue.

II. If It Isn't Measured, It Won't Be Improved

It is startling how little the U.S. government currently does by way of public opinion polling. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. government only spends \$5 million annually on this type of analysis.⁵ Further, much of the research the U.S. government does fails to address important questions. For example, The Washington Post has reported on a draft report prepared by the State Department's inspector general on the effectiveness of Radio Sawa, a key organ of the United States government's Middle East public diplomacy effort:

The draft report said that while Radio Sawa has been promoted as a "heavily researched broadcasting network," the research concentrated primarily on gaining audience share, not on measuring whether Radio Sawa was influencing its audience. Despite the larger audiences, "it is difficult to ascertain Radio Sawa's impact in countering anti-American views and the biased state-run media of the Arab world," the draft report said."

Comprehensive research into how foreign audiences feel about America, specific American policies, and how the United States can best change attitudes and behavior needs to be conducted.⁷ Doing so would require a significant increase to the miniscule

⁴ Hady Amr, "The Need to Communicate: How to Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World," *The Brookings Institution*, January 2004.

⁵ 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. 6.

⁶ Glenn Kessler, "The Role of Radio Sawa in Mideast Questioned," *The Washington Post*, October 13, 2004, page A12. The draft report was leaked to the *Post* "by a source who said he feared that the inspector general's office was buckling under pressure and would water down the conclusions."

⁷ U.S. foreign opinion polling and analysis is fragmented and poorly focused. Senior State Department managers moved USIA's Office of Research and Media Reaction out of the public diplomacy hierarchy when the agency was folded into the Department in 1999. Today, it sits in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) where it contributes more to all-source intelligence reports than to strategic communication efforts. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has contracts with Intermedia, a private firm, which conducts surveys of audience share. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) collect and assesses print,

budget public diplomacy research currently receives. This investment is essential to building an effective program.

An effective public diplomacy effort would monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and would inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. Public diplomacy experts have long sought to have public diplomacy present at the "takeoff" as well as the "crash landing" of American policy. Rather, public diplomacy should be seen as a crucial component of the aircraft itself.

At its best, information gathered by public diplomacy researchers would be passed along to policymakers in relevant agencies. As a result, policymakers would be aware of the implications of policy decisions and statements on foreign public opinion and public diplomacy officers would be able to honestly inform foreign publics that their opinions were considered – if not always agreed with – in the formation of American policy.

Clearly, American officials should be making public policy decisions based on America's vital national interest; they should, however, recognize that it is conceivable the benefits of a policy might in fact be outweighed by the negative impact that policy has on foreign public opinion. Informing policymakers of how an issue will "play" in foreign public opinion can help them determine whether a seemingly beneficial policy will unintentionally create more terrorists than it deters, captures, or kills.

Up-to-date information on foreign publics is not only important for policy makers, but also for public diplomacy officers. With a wide variety of tools at their disposal – from visas to speeches, advertisements to interviews, and so forth – information about the people with whom they are communicating can only help public diplomacy officers in applying the correct tools to the correct audience at the right time and in the right proportion. In this way, public diplomacy research allows for a dialogue between America and the rest of the world by seeking feedback from foreign audience. Public diplomacy is not just about getting our message out, but also listening to the sentiments

radio, TV, and Internet-based publications. Some U.S. Embassies, individual military commands, and the CIA also engage in limited opinion and media research. None of these products are combined and analyzed in ways for policymakers to use. Many are available to restricted user nets. Collection takes precedence over analysis and "issue of the Jay" polling often trumps media content and trend assessments. See the "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Washington, DC, September 2004, p. 26-27.

of foreigners. By incorporating a serious research component into the overall public diplomacy effort of the U.S. government, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world. It is a dialogue that has been ignored for too long.

III. A Serious Reevaluation of Public Diplomacy in the War on Terror

The U.S. government might be well-advised to remember the words of MIT professor Norbert Wiener, who said "I never know what I say until I hear the response." This is certainly not the case for the U.S. government, which consistently fails to attempt to research the reasons for anti-Americanism abroad or to use research in formulating a clear communication strategy that engages foreign audiences in a dialogue. As the General Accounting Office found in its 2002 analysis of the State Department's public diplomacy efforts, "State Lacks a Strategy for Public Diplomacy Programs." America is the best in the world at market research - it is a crucial part of domestic politics - but we are notably uninformed about audiences abroad. Changing this situation must be an immediate priority of the U.S. government.

In trying to improve America's standing in the eyes of the rest of the world, American public diplomacy officers need to understand that public opinion cannot be changed either solely on the basis of reason nor solely on the basis of emotion. Rather, it requires the foundation of reason to persuade people and the associated emotional relevance to motivate their decision-making and behavior. Further, the bottom line of public diplomacy ought to be changing the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics. If the end product of a particular program is only a change in mental state, it is not effective public diplomacy.

Underlying this change in behaviors is an exchange process between the U.S. (including the U.S. government as well as the private sector) and foreign audiences. To be successful, foreign audiences must believe that the ideas advocated by the United States are better than any reasonable alternative - including world views promoted by their governments, other segments of the population they are exposed to, and extremists who can often be quite persuasive. This relationship between the United States and foreign audiences can only be cultivated if the United States pursues a broad strategy that

* U.S. General Accounting Office, "U.S. public Diplomacy," September 2003, pg. 13

identifies what audiences we are **trying** to persuade and **what** tools we **have** at **our** disposal to attempt to influence these audiences **as well as** how and **when these** tools should be utilized.

In order to convince foreign audiences to support America's vision of freedom and prosperity under the rule of **law** (or, at the very least, oppose extremist visions of death and destruction), **we** must begin by **identifying** the different segments that **exist** around the world that **we** are trying to persuade. That is, **a one-size-fits-all public** diplomacy effort **is** less likely to be successful than one **that recognizes that the** arguments that are successful in the Muslim world might be different from the persuasive arguments **we** should highlight in Asia. Further, we might package our message differently to one religious or ethnic group within a country than we **would** another group. The same could be true for different age groups - older **Koreans** who remember the Korean War, for example, will be persuaded by a different message than their younger countrymen who only know of the war from distorted history **books** accounts.

Crucially, **this** does not mean America **should** be delivering **contradictory** messages to **different groups**. Not only does delivering false messages or **propaganda** go against many of the basic principles our country stands for, but **also** it would be unwise from a practical standpoint, **as** audiences worldwide would quickly catch on to any contradictions. Rather, America should simply recognize that our message should be delivered differently to different **groups**.

To spread our message, the U.S. government should employ **all available** tools of public diplomacy. This would include utilizing the President, the Secretary of State, and other Cabinet officers and senior government officials **as well as** Americans in the private sector, including teachers, students, journalists, **business** people, and so forth. **These** "public diplomacy ambassadors" can speak to foreign audiences using a variety of promotional tools such as advertisements, speeches, **interviews**, lectures, and educational exchanges. The key is for the U.S. government to invest in the **research** necessary to effectively pair a message with a messenger and a medium.

The **U.S.** government should **also** not be hesitant to use the private sector in doing research into foreign audiences and their reactions to the United States; **As an** Independent Taskforce sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations noted in 2003:

The "U.S. private sector leads the world in most of the key strategic areas required for effective public **diplomacy**: technology, film and broadcast, marketing research, and communications." Ultimately, effective communication with the rest of the world will require not only the tools of traditional government-run public diplomacy (though these tools **will** remain vital), but also the resources and expertise of the American **private** sector

IV. *Incorporating Research Into the US Government Bureaucracy*

A vital part of this new framework for engaging the public opinion aspect of the War on **Terror** is making sure that American policy makers and *advocates* have the most accurate and up-to-date information about foreign audiences available to them **at all** times. Doing so requires two important actions from the Administration **that will allow** the U.S. government to bring the best **work** of the American public and private sectors to bear in the right to **shape** the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics.

The U.S. Government should create an independent foreign public opinion institution

At the conclusion of World War II, the Commanding General of the Army Air Force, **Hap Arnold**, wrote to Secretary of War Henry Stimson:

"During this war the Army, Army Air Forces, and the Navy have made unprecedented use of scientific and industrial resources. The conclusion is inescapable that we have, not yet established the balance necessary to insure the continuance of teamwork among the military, other government agencies, industry, and the universities. Scientific planning must be years in advance of the actual research and development work."⁹

Out of this understanding of the importance of technology research and development for success on the battlefield, representatives of the War Department, the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and private industry established Project RAND, the precursor of today's RAND Corporation. The Articles of Incorporation bluntly set forth RAND's purpose: "To further and promote scientific, educational, and charitable purposes, all for the public welfare and security of the *United States of America*."

⁹ Peter G. Peterson, et al., "Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy Toward the Middle East", The Council on Foreign Relations, 2003, pg. 6.

¹⁰ The Rand Corporation, "History and Mission" (<http://www.rand.org/about/history/>)

Similarly, winning the War on Terrorism will require unprecedented use of America's **technology**, broadcast, market research, and **communications** resources. In order to best utilize those resources **it is** vital to insure the teamwork of the State Department, Defense Department, other **government** agencies, universities, and the private sector. To this end, the Administration should **push** for the creation of a private sector institution **similar** to RAND charged with gathering the information required by the **U.S. government** to advance America's position in the ideological aspect of the War on Terror.

The **mission** of this "Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis" (CFOA) would be to **use** the resources and capabilities of the United States of America to **fully engage** in a long-term market research effort aimed at **better** understanding foreign **public** opinion. It would be **tasked** with contracting with specialist firms around the world to **listen**, ask question, and analyze foreign public opinion in a **manner** that **is simply** not done **Today**. There are knowledge gaps with regard to issues of anti-American sentiment **and this** institution would be tasked with **reviewing** all existing data **plus** contracting for any original research needed to fill remaining knowledge gaps."

There are a number of significant advantages to creating this corporation. First, the corporation's **independence** avoids creating bureaucratic **fight** over what budget the money for foreign **public** opinion research comes from, who controls the **focus** of the research, and so forth. Second, CFOA would provide a useful product for consumption **across many** areas of government - from the Broadcasting Board of Governors to the National Security Advisor - and keeping it independent would allow **its resources** to be used by a **wide array** of interests. Finally, it would **provide** a method for coordinating different aspects of government engagement **with** the rest of the world while still maintaining crucial separation between various entities. That is, given how vital it is that public diplomacy **be** differentiated from public affairs, public relations, information warfare, and psyops, creating an independent corporation would allow each to continue to work completely in its own sphere while still having access to research **when** necessary.

¹¹ See the testimony of Keith Reinhard, President of Business for Diplomatic Action, Inc., before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations (August 23, 2004) for an excellent analysis of how America's communications expertise can be applied to the communication aspect of the War on Terror.

Create a mechanism for using CFOA

Because the U.S. government has so many official messengers, the need to have all of them singing off the same sheet is especially important. Yet, over recent years, public diplomacy coordination has deteriorated.¹² CFOA will provide the data that allows America to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly reevaluate and revise that strategy into the future. The U.S. government must create a mechanism by which it can utilize this information effectively.

A vital first step is to make sure that someone is empowered with coordinating all activities, behaviors, and messages so that they are aligned with the U.S. government's overall communication strategy. The current Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy position is clearly not this empowered individual as he or she lacks authority over both budgets and personnel assignments. It is also vital that this individual have the ability to easily get information to the highest levels of government.

As such, a new staff position on the National Security Council should be created and charged with coordinating the U.S. government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with receiving information from CFOA and disseminating it to policy makers so that they are aware of the effect a policy action will have on foreign public opinion. This coordination does not currently exist. As the 2004 report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy states, "Along with the White House and the Department of State, nearly all government agencies engage in

¹² The former U.S. Information Agency had a Director and senior staff that coordinated with other government agencies, and a budget to accomplish its mission, even though it declined toward the end of the Cold War. Moreover, a public diplomacy coordinator position was staffed in the National Security Council during the Reagan Administration. Since President Clinton issued PDD 68 (Presidential Decision Directive on International Public Information) April 30, 1999, there has been no Presidential directive on public diplomacy. The NSC terminated it in 2001 pending a review of U.S. public diplomacy policy. Since then, the Department of Defense created and abolished the Office of Strategic Influence. The State Department has had two Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy with large gaps in service. In June 2002, the White House created the Office of Global Communications which keeps U.S. officials "on message," but does not direct, coordinate, or evaluate public diplomacy activities. And in September 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice established the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee to coordinate inter-agency activities. It reportedly met twice and has had little impact. A small inter-agency working group was created within the State Department Under Secretariat for Public Diplomacy, but lacks a budget, coordinating authority, sufficient communications support, and attention from State and other Cabinet agency leaders. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," p. 25, 26.

some public diplomacy efforts. **While a few structures link** federal officials, coordination **often** does not extend to embassy practitioners.¹³

In order to keep **all parts** of the government bureaucracy **moving towards** the same goal, **a senior** interagency group (SIG) should be created that brings the NSC staff member charged with the U.S. government's foreign public opinion programs together **with** the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, all other relevant members of the Executive Branch, and other participants on **an ad hoc basis**. This **formal** consulting mechanism would **encourage** closer cooperation **among** the various parties involved. Acting on the information provided by CIOA, this SIG would **allow** the relevant **Union Secretaries** to implement the government's long-term communications strategy.

The NSC staff member would **also be** responsible for ensuring **that all U.S. government messengers are given** the information required to effectively communicate **with their audiences**. Something similar to the **daily** "Talking Points **from** the Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs" or "The Global Messenger" produced by the White House Office of Global Communications **should be disseminated** to all U.S. government messengers **as well as** information that is specific to particular audiences.¹⁴ **Thus, a U.S. government** public diplomacy officer in the Republic of **Korea should be given** instructions **as to what** information the U.S. government communication strategy **calls for** him or her to communicate to young **Koreans**, old **Korea**, businessman, opinion makers, **and so forth**. **Once again, it is vital** that each of these segments only be **given** accurate information **from** the U.S. government, **but the style and tone** of America's message **must be** fine-tuned for various **foreign** audience segments. **Importantly, this fine-tuning must be based** on continuous research.

A Serious Commitment From the President

Regardless of how well-structured **the** U.S. public diplomacy apparatus is, **however**, it will only be effective if changing foreign public opinion is signaled as a

¹³ 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. E.

¹⁴ The effectiveness of these talking points would be drastically improved by comprehensive audience research allowing them to explain not only what America wants to say, but how it should be said as well as what questions audience segments around the world are looking for America to answer. Further, it is striking that the State Department does not appear to produce any daily talking points.

Finally, **this** dialogue between America and the rest of the **world** – and the **responsive framework** established that incorporates government **and the private sector** – is seen **as a** long-term commitment. The creation **of a private** institution charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of **America's** message, **and** the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion **would** give the **U.S.** government **the real-time information necessary** for effective communication with **the** rest of the world.

As John **Adams** famously observed, "**The** Revolution was in the **minds and hearts** of **the** people." **For a** small, extremist segment of the world population values like **freedom** and prosperity are meaningless. Yet **the vast** majority of people around the **globe** is more interested in **security** for themselves and their families than **war** and **destruction**. **America** has a peaceful message and strives to **be a** force for **freedom** and **prosperity** around **the** world. **Yet we are** doing incredible harm to **ourselves** by not advocating for ourselves effectively. **As the 9/11 commission stated:** "If **the United States** does not act aggressively to **define** itself in the Islamic world, the **extremists** will gladly do the job for us."¹⁵ Richard **Holbrooke** put it best, "How can a **man** in a cave out communicate the world's leading communications society?"¹⁶

American national security requires **that** we harness **the** wealth of resources **we** have available to **communicate with** the rest of the world. We must speak and listen to **the rest of** the world clearly, accurately, and effectively. If **we** do so, **we** will prevail.

¹⁵ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States. "The 9/11 Commission Report," pg. 377.

¹⁶ Richard Holbrooke, "Get the Message Out." *Washington Post*, Oct. 28, 2001, p. B7

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

MAR 16 2005

POUSDP

2005 MAR 17 PM 3: 241-04/015791-ES
ES-1478

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6))

WWR

02 MAR 2005

090

SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Paper (SD Snowflake)

- You asked for Policy's thoughts on the Strategic Communications Paper submitted by Joe Duffey, Ed Feulner, and Lew Manilow.
- The general premise is that the more we know our audience, the more effective we will be in communicating with it.
- The paper recommends increasing funds for foreign opinion research and polling, and establishing a government-funded private sector institution to conduct this research.
- The paper points out that no one in the USG is "empowered with coordinating all activities, behaviors, and messages so that they are aligned with the U.S. government's overall communication strategy."
 - The paper recommends a new staff position on the National Security Council to do this.
- The paper points to real problems. But this cannot be solved until we have answered the larger question of how to conduct public diplomacy. Until that larger question is resolved:
 - It is not clear that we need a new government-funded corporation to do an increased amount of foreign opinion research.
 - It might be just as effective to increase the funding (currently around \$6 million) of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
 - The paper's emphasis seems to be on reacting, not on setting the agenda.
 - It is not clear that the new NSC position would have the executive authority to do the job.

Bottom Line: The findings and recommendations of this paper are very similar to the Defense Science Board's recommendations on strategic communications.

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| MA SD | SMA DSD | | |
| TSA SD | SA DSD | 3/18 | |
| EXEC SEC | M3/18 | 070 | |

~~FOUO~~

Attachments: As stated

Peter Flory (PDASD/ISA)_____

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48044

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

205 MAR 17 PM 3:09

November 22, 2004

I-04/015791

ES-1478

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Larry Di Rita
Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Paper

Attached is a paper that ~~was~~ prepared at my request. It resulted from a dinner I had with the three authors, Joe Duffey, Ed Feulner and Lew Manilow. Please read it and let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.

11/2/04 Private Report to the Secretary of Defense

DHR:as
112204-5



Please respond by 12/10/04

23-11-04 10:33 OUT

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48045

DSD 05203-05

*Private Report to the
Secretary of Defense*

Submitted Respectfully by:
Joseph Duffey
Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.
Lewis Manilow.

November 2004

Executive Summary

To win the War on Terror, the United States must capture, kill, or deter more terrorists than our extremist allies can win over to their side. Moreover, it is crucial that we convince a significant number of people to be actively on our side. As such, the challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and central component of the War on Terror. Dozens of studies offering prescriptions for the deficiencies in America's foreign communication effort have already been produced. This paper does not seek to add to this cacophony of voices. Rather, we present two substantial and vital recommendations, which will allow America to bring to bear the full force of the greatest communications society in the history of the world to the challenge of shaping hearts and minds and changing viewpoints in the War on Terror.

It is important to note from the start, however, that any attempt at changing the attitudes and behaviors of foreign publics towards the United States is futile unless it enjoys the full support of the President. Just as the President serves as commander-in-chief of the United States military, he must similarly view himself as the lead spokesman for the United States to the citizens of foreign nations beyond foreign government leaders. This role must be a priority commitment that is followed through on a day-to-day basis and is an integral component of each of the President's decisions.

In order to communicate with foreign publics in a manner that changes attitudes and behavior towards America, the United States government should:

1) Establish a Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis

OBJECTIVE: Listen, ask questions, and analyze foreign public opinion as well as test the effectiveness of various USG messages.

It is startling how little the U.S. government (USG) currently engages in public opinion polling and how irrelevant much of the research it does do is. An effective public diplomacy effort must monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and then inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. By listening to the opinions of various groups and tailoring our message and -- to an

appropriate degree - our policies to the information they are giving us, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world.

Winning the War on **Terrorism** will require unprecedented use of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and **communications resources**. To this end, the **Administration** should establish a private sector institution similar to RAND charged with gathering the information required by the **USG** to advance **America's** position in the communications aspect of the War on Terror.

The mission of this "Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis" (**CFOA**) will be to use the resources and capabilities of the United States of **America** to fully engage in a long-term market research effort aimed at better understanding foreign public opinion. It will be tasked with contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, ask questions, and analyze foreign public opinion in a manner that is not being done today, as well as test the effectiveness of various **USG** messages. Crucially, **CFOA** would only provide the research product - coordination of message and broad strategic decisions must be made through the **National Security Council**, the Departments of State and Defense, and relevant agencies.

2) Prepare the Government Bureaucracy to Apply Information

OBJECTIVE: Provide senior policy makers with immediate input so they are aware of the effect an impending policy action or statement will have on foreign public opinion.

Because the **USG** has so many official messengers, the need to have all of them singing off the same sheet is especially important. **CFOA** will provide the data that allows **America** to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly reevaluate and refine the **U.S.** government's message into the future. The **USG** must create a mechanism by which it can utilize this information effectively.

As such, a new staff position on the **National Security Council** should be created and charged with coordinating the **U.S.** government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with providing senior policy makers with immediate input based on **CFOA** data so that they are aware of the effect an impending policy action

or statement will have on foreign public opinion. Further, a senior interagency group should be created that brings the NSC staff member charged with the U.S. government's foreign public opinion programs together with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, all other relevant members of the Executive branch, and other participants on an ad hoc basis.

A dialogue between America and the rest of the world must be seen as a long-term commitment central to America's vital national interest. The creation of a private institution, performing government contract work, charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of America's message, and the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion would give the USG the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the rest of the world. Further, bringing public diplomacy to the highest level of NSC deliberation will ensure that we communicate our message more effectively in the future.

Introduction

Shortly after the American Revolution, John Adams was asked who supported it and who didn't. He said about a third of the population had supported it; about a third had opposed it; and about a third was waiting to see who won. In many ways, this is the situation America is faced with today in the court of world opinion - and of particular importance in the Arab and Muslim World. The scorecard in the War on Terror, however, is not simply one of battles or casualties. The simple (in theory) challenge of the War on Terror is to capture, kill, or deter more terrorists than our extremist adversaries can win over to their side. As such, the communications challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and central component of the war.

As the 9/11 commission bluntly stated, "The small percentage of Muslims who are fully committed to Usama Bin Ladin's version of Islam are impervious to persuasion." To win the War on Terror, America needs a strong policy aimed at increasing the ranks of our supporters, decreasing the small percentage of Muslims who are "impervious to persuasion," and impacting those who, while not actively supportive of extremists, have sat on the sidelines due to resentment of America. Put bluntly, America needs to embark on a long-term project to improve her standing in the public opinion of individuals in other nations around the world.

There have been a number of recent studies looking at the problem of public diplomacy. All have acknowledged a problem exists and there is significant agreement that there must be reform of the U.S. government's public diplomacy infrastructure.² Yet just as the War on Terror has required a rethinking of many aspects of American foreign policy, it similarly justifies a strategic reevaluation of our public diplomacy efforts. Changing foreign public opinion is not simply a matter of allocating more resources or reshuffling bureaucratic boxes. Rather, the U.S. government needs to consider all available tools of public diplomacy - old and new - and how they can be properly targeted at various audiences in order to reach them effectively.

¹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States. "The 9/11 Commission Report," pg. 375.

² Studies by The Heritage Foundation (including Heritage Backgrounder 1645 as well as a section in the 2005 *Mandate for Leadership*), The Brookings Institution, The American Enterprise Institute, The Council on Foreign Relations, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency, along with the U.S. Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World have all come to the same conclusion that there is a need to improve Islamic world perceptions of the United States and that there is inadequate structure to the U.S. public diplomacy effort.

- This project must be whole-heartedly embarked upon by the Administration not because it will play well in *the American media* or because of a philosophical commitment to Wilsonian multilateralism. Rather, it is a challenge that lies at the very core of America's own vital national interest.

I. How America Is Viewed Abroad

America's standing in the rest of the world has taken a beating in recent years. In the Republic of Korea, for example, 50% of respondents to a poll taken by the Pew Research Center in May 2003 have a negative view of the United States. This negative view of the U.S., however, is sharply divided based on the respondent's age: only 30% of respondents over 50 had a negative view of the U.S. while 71% of respondents between the ages of 18 and 29 view *America* unfavorably.³ This stark contrast suggests that older Koreans are perhaps more cognizant of the North Korean threat - and, therefore, look more favorably on the security provided by the United States - than the younger generation, and that older Koreans remember the shared sacrifices of the United States and South Korea in the 1950s.

America's standing is also highly negative in the Arab and Muslim World. A Zogby International Poll taken in March 2003 finds only 14% of Egyptians, 11% of Jordanians, 9% of Moroccans, 3% of Saudis, and 11% of citizens of the United Arab Emirates hold a favorable view of the United States.

These numbers are particularly shocking in light of the fact that in that same month Zogby found strong similarities between the citizens of the Arab World and Americans. Arabs, for example, list "Quality of Work," "Family," and "Religion" as the three most important concerns of their personal life; Americans list "Family," "Quality of Work," and "Friends" as their three most important values. "Foreign policy," seen by many as an important cause of the strained view many Arabs hold of the United States, is only the eighth most important concern for Arabs.

In addition to sharing values on a personal level, Americans and Arabs share core political values. 92% of respondents in Turkey, 92% in Lebanon, 53% in Jordan, and 79% in Uzbekistan and Pakistan feel it is important to be able to criticize their

³ "International Public Concern About North Korea," *The Pew Research Center*, August 22, 2003.

government. There is also strong support among Arabs for honest elections, a fair judicial system, and freedom of the press.' The question these statistics beg is: "Why, given the amount we have in common, is the United States seen in such a negative light in the rest of the world?" While each of us could come up with a number of answers to this question - some of which might even prove accurate - the best way to reverse this troubling trend of anti-Americanism is to comprehensively study the question and formulate policy based on accurate, scientific data. Collecting these data is a crucial first step towards engaging the rest of the world in a public diplomacy dialogue.

II. If It Isn't Measured, It Won't Be Improved

It is startling how little the U.S. government currently does by way of public opinion polling. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. government only spends \$5 million annually on this type of analysis.⁴ Further, much of the research the U.S. government does fails to address important questions. For example, *The Washington Post* has reported on a draft report prepared by the State Department's inspector general on the effectiveness of Radio Sawa, a key organ of the United States government's Middle East public diplomacy effort:

The draft report said that while Radio Sawa has been promoted as a "heavily researched broadcasting network," the research concentrated primarily on gaining audience share, not on measuring whether Radio Sawa was influencing its audience. Despite the larger audiences, "it is difficult to ascertain Radio Sawa's impact in countering anti-American views and the biased state-run media of the Arab world," the draft report said.⁵

Comprehensive research into how foreign audiences feel about America, specific American policies, and how the United States can best change attitudes and behavior needs to be conducted.⁷ Doing so would require a significant increase to the miniscule

⁴ Hady Amr, "The Need to Communicate: How To Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World," *The Brookings Institution*, January 2004.

⁵ 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. 6.

⁶ Glenn Kessler, "The Role of Radio Sawa in Mideast Questioned," *The Washington Post*, October 13, 2004, page A12. The draft report was leaked to the *Post* "by a source who said he feared that the inspector general's office was hunkling under pressure and would water down the conclusions."

U.S. foreign opinion polling and analysis is fragmented and poorly focused. Senior State Department managers moved USIA's Office of Research and Media Reaction out of the public diplomacy hierarchy when the agency was folded into the Department in 1999. Today, it sits in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) where it contributes more to all-source intelligence reports than to strategic communication efforts. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has contracts with Intermedia, a private firm, which conducts surveys of audience share. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) collects and assesses print,

budget public diplomacy research currently receives. This investment is essential to building an effective program.

An effective public diplomacy effort would monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and would inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. Public diplomacy experts have long sought to have public diplomacy present at the 'takeoff' as well as the "crash landing" of American policy. Rather, public diplomacy should be seen as a crucial component of the aircraft itself.

At its best, information gathered by public diplomacy researchers would be passed along to policymakers in relevant agencies. As a result, policymakers would be aware of the implications of policy decisions and statements on foreign public opinion and public diplomacy officers would be able to honestly inform foreign publics that their opinions were considered - if not always agreed with - in the formation of American policy.

Clearly, American officials should be making public policy decisions based on America's vital national interest; they should, however, recognize that it is conceivable the benefits of a policy might in fact be outweighed by the negative impact that policy has on foreign public opinion. Informing policymakers of how an issue will "play" in foreign public opinion can help them determine whether a seemingly beneficial policy will unintentionally create more terrorists than it deters, captures, or kills.

Up-to-date information on foreign publics is not only important for policy makers, but also for public diplomacy officers. With a wide variety of tools at their disposal - from visas to speeches, advertisements to interviews, and so forth - information about the people with whom they are communicating can only help public diplomacy officers in applying the correct tools to the correct audience at the right time and in the right proportion. In this way, public diplomacy research allows for a dialogue between America and the rest of the world by seeking feedback from foreign audience. Public diplomacy is not just about getting our message out, but also listening to the sentiments

radio, TV, and Internet-based publications. Some U.S. Embassies, individual military commands, and the CIA also engage in limited opinion and media research. None of these products are combined and analyzed in ways for policymakers to use. Many are available to restricted user sets. Collection takes precedence over analysis and "issue of the day" polling often trumps media content and trend assessments. See the "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Washington, DC, September 2004, p. 26-27.

of foreigners. By incorporating a serious research component into the overall public diplomacy effort of the U.S. government, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world. It is a dialogue that has been ignored for too long.

III. A Serious Reevaluation of Public Diplomacy in the War on Terror

The U.S. government might be well-advised to remember the words of MIT professor Norbert Wiener, who said "I never know what I say until I hear the response." This is certainly not the case for the U.S. government, which consistently fails to attempt to research the reasons for anti-Americanism abroad or to use research in formulating a clear communication strategy that engages foreign audiences in a dialogue. As the General Accounting Office found in its 2002 analysis of the State Department's public diplomacy efforts, "State Lacks a Strategy for Public Diplomacy Programs."⁸ America is the best in the world at market research - it is a crucial part of domestic politics - but we are notably uninformed about audiences abroad. Changing this situation **must** be an immediate priority of the U.S. government.

In trying to improve America's standing in the eyes of the rest of the world American public diplomacy officers need to understand that public opinion cannot be changed either solely on the basis of reason nor solely on the basis of emotion. Rather, it requires the foundation of reason to persuade people and associated emotional relevance to motivate their decision-making and behavior. Further, the bottom line of public diplomacy ought to be changing the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics. If the end product of a particular program is only a change in mental state, it is not effective public diplomacy.

Underlying this change in behaviors is an exchange process between the U.S. (including the U.S. government as well as the private sector) and foreign audiences. To be successful, foreign audiences **must** believe that the ideas advocated by the United States are better than any reasonable alternative - including world views promoted by their governments, other segments of the population they are exposed to, and extremists who can often be quite persuasive. This relationship between the United States and foreign audiences can only be cultivated if the United States pursues a broad strategy that

⁸ U.S. General Accounting Office, "U.S. Public Diplomacy," September 2003, pg. 13

identifies what audiences **we are trying to persuade** and **what tools we have at our disposal to attempt to influence these audiences as well as how and when these tools should be utilized.**

In order to convince foreign audiences to support **America's** vision of **freedom** and prosperity under **the rule of law** (or, at the very least, oppose extremist visions of death and destruction), we must **begin by identifying the different segments that exist around the world that we are trying to persuade.** That is, **a one-size-fits-all public diplomacy effort is less likely to be successful than one that recognizes that the arguments that are successful in the Muslim world might be different from the persuasive arguments we should highlight in Asia.** Further, we might package our message differently to one religious or ethnic group **within a country than we would another group.** The **same** could be true for different **age groups - older Koreans who remember the Korean War, for example, will be persuaded by a different message than their younger countrymen who only know of the war from distorted history books accounts.**

Crucially, this **does not mean America should be delivering contradictory messages to different groups.** Not only **does** delivering false messages or propaganda go against many of the **basic principles our country stands for, but also it would be unwise** from a practical standpoint, **as audiences worldwide would quickly catch on to any contradictions.** Rather, **America should simply recognize that our message should be delivered differently to different groups.**

To spread our message, the U.S. government should employ all available tools of public diplomacy. This would include utilizing **the President, the Secretary of State, and other Cabinet officers and senior government officials as well as Americans in the private sector, including teachers, students, journalists, business people, and so forth.** These "public diplomacy **ambassadors**" can speak to foreign audiences **using a variety of promotional tools such as advertisements, speeches, interviews, lectures, and educational exchanges.** The **key is for the U.S. government to invest in the research necessary to effectively pair a message with a messenger and a medium.**

The **U.S. government should also not be hesitant to use the private sector in doing research into foreign audiences and their reactions to the United States.** As an **Independent Taskforce** sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations noted in 2003:

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The "U.S. private sector leads the world in most of the key strategic areas required for effective public diplomacy: technology, film and broadcast, marketing research, and communications."⁹ Ultimately, effective communication with the rest of the world will require not only the tools of traditional government-run public diplomacy (though these tools will remain vital), but also the resources and expertise of the American private sector

IV. Incorporating Research Into the US Government Bureaucracy

A vital part of this new framework for engaging the public opinion aspect of the War on Terror is making sure that American policy makers and advocates have the most accurate and up-to-date information about foreign audiences available to them at all times. Doing so requires two important actions from the Administration that will allow the U.S. government to bring the best work of the American public and private sectors to bear in the fight to shape the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics.

The U.S. Government should create an independent foreign public opinion institution

At the conclusion of World War II, the Commanding General of the Army Air Force, Hap Arnold, wrote to Secretary of War Henry Stimson:

"During this war the Army, Army Air Forces, and the Navy have made unprecedented use of scientific and industrial resources. The conclusion is inescapable that we have not yet established the balance necessary to insure the continuance of teamwork among the military, other government agencies, industry, and the universities. Scientific planning must be years in advance of the actual research and development work."¹⁰

Out of this understanding of the importance of technology research and development for success on the battlefield, representatives of the War Department, the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and private industry established Project RAND, the precursor of today's RAND Corporation. The Articles of Incorporation bluntly set forth RAND's purpose: "To further and promote scientific, educational, and charitable purposes- all for the public welfare and security of the United States of America."

⁹ Peter G. Peterson, et al., "Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy Toward the Middle East", The Council on Foreign Relations, 2003, pg. 6.

¹⁰ The Rand Corporation, "History and Mission" (<http://www.rand.org/about/history/>)

Similarly, winning the War on Terrorism will require unprecedented use of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and communications resources. In order to best utilize those resources it is vital to insure the teamwork of the State Department, Defense Department, other government agencies, universities, and the private sector. To this end, the Administration should push for the creation of a private sector institution similar to RAND charged with gathering the information required by the U.S. government to advance America's position in the ideological aspect of the War on Terror.

The mission of this "Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis" (CFOA) would be to use the resources and capabilities of the United States of America to fully engage in a long-term market research effort aimed at better understanding foreign public opinion. It would be tasked with contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, ask question, and analyze foreign public opinion in a manner that is simply not done Today. There are knowledge gaps with regard to issues of anti-American sentiment and this institution would be tasked with reviewing all existing data plus contracting for any original research needed to fill remaining knowledge gaps."

There are a number of significant advantages to creating this corporation. First, the corporation's independence avoids creating bureaucratic fights over what budget the money for foreign public opinion research comes from, who controls the focus of the research, and so forth. Second, CFOA would provide a useful product for consumption across many areas of government - from the Broadcasting Board of Governors to the National Security Advisor - and keeping it independent would allow its resources to be used by a wide-array of interests. Finally, it would provide a method for coordinating different aspects of government engagement with the rest of the world while still maintaining crucial separation between various entities. That is, given how vital it is that public diplomacy be differentiated from public affairs, public relations, information warfare, and psyops, creating an independent corporation would allow each to continue to work completely in its own sphere while still having access to research when necessary.

¹¹ See the testimony of Keith Reinhard, President of Business for Diplomatic Action, Inc., before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations (August 23, 2004) for an excellent analysis of how America's communications expertise can be applied to the communication aspect of the War on Terror.

Create a mechanism for using CFOA

Because the U.S. government has so many official messengers, the need to have all of them singing off the same sheet is especially important. Yet, over recent years; public diplomacy coordination has deteriorated.¹² CFOA will provide the data that allows America to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly reevaluate and revise that strategy into the future. The U.S. government **must** create a mechanism by which it can utilize this information effectively.

A vital first step is to make sure that someone is empowered with coordinating all activities, behaviors, and messages so that they are aligned with the U.S. government's overall communication strategy. The current Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy position is clearly not this empowered individual as he or she lacks authority over both budgets and personnel assignments. It is also vital that this individual have the ability to easily get information to the highest levels of government.

As such, a new staff position on the National Security Council should be created and charged with coordinating the U.S. government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with receiving information from CFOA and disseminating it to policy makers so that they are aware of the effect a policy action will have on foreign public opinion. This coordination does not currently exist. As the 2004 report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy states, "Along with the White House and the Department of State, nearly all government agencies engage in

¹² The former U.S. Information Agency had a Director and senior staff that coordinated with other government agencies, and a budget to accomplish its mission, even though it declined toward the end of the Cold War. Moreover, a public diplomacy coordinator position was staffed in the National Security Council during the Reagan Administration. Since President Clinton issued PDD 68 (Presidential Decision Directive on International Public Information) April 30, 1999, there has been no Presidential directive on public diplomacy. The NSC terminated it in 2001 pending a review of U.S. public diplomacy policy. Since then, the Department of Defense created and abolished the Office of Strategic Influence. The State Department has had two Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy with large gaps in service. In June 2002, the White House created the Office of Global Communications which keeps U.S. officials "on message," but does not direct, coordinate, or evaluate public diplomacy activities. And in September 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice established the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee to coordinate inter-agency activities. It reportedly met twice and has had little impact. A small inter-agency working group was created within the State Department Under Secretariat for Public Diplomacy, but lacks a budget, contracting authority, sufficient communications support, and attention from State and other Cabinet agency leaders. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," p. 25, 26.

some public diplomacy efforts. While a few structures link federal officials, coordination often does not extend to embassy practitioners.”¹³

In order to keep all parts of the government bureaucracy moving towards the same goal, a senior interagency group (SIG) should be created that brings the NSC staff member charged with the U.S. government's foreign public opinion programs together with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, all other relevant members of the Executive Branch, and other participants on an ad hoc basis. This formal consulting mechanism would encourage closer cooperation among the various parties involved. Acting on the information provided by CFOA, this SIG would allow the relevant Under Secretaries to implement the government's long-term communications strategy.

The NSC staff member would also be responsible for ensuring that all U.S. government messengers are given the information required to effectively communicate with their audiences. Something similar to the daily “Talking Points from the Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs” or “The Global Messenger” produced by the White House Office of Global Communications should be disseminated to all U.S. government messengers as well as information that is specific to particular audiences.¹⁴ Thus, a U.S. government public diplomacy officer in the Republic of Korea should be given instructions as to what information the U.S. government communication strategy calls for him or her to communicate to young Koreans, old Koreans, businessman, opinion makers, and so forth. Once again, it is vital that each of these segments only be given accurate information from the U.S. government, but the style and tone of America's message must be fine-tuned for various foreign audience segments. Importantly, this fine-tuning must be based on continuous research.

A Serious Commitment From the President

Regardless of how well-structured the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus is, however, it will only be effective if changing foreign public opinion is signaled as

¹³ 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. E.

¹⁴ The effectiveness of these talking points would be drastically improved by comprehensive audience research allowing them to explain not only what America wants to say, but how it should be said as well as what questions audience segments around the world are looking for America to answer. Further, it is striking that the State Department does not appear to produce any daily talking points.

national security priority by the President. Just as the President serves as commander-in-chief of the United States military, he must similarly view himself as the lead spokesman for the United States to foreign nationals beyond foreign governmental leaders. This commitment must be made not only through public statements and private consultation and analysis within the White House, but also in the President's continuing contacts with Department of State officials, including diplomatic Chiefs of Mission. It must be a priority commitment that is followed through on a day-to-day basis and in each of the President's decisions. Foreign public opinion is no less important to American national security than American public opinion is to an election.

Conclusion

While one might be understandably skeptical of a proposal for "further study" of a problem, in the case of altering foreign beliefs and behavior a short pause to hammer out a comprehensive strategy is called for. The temptation of many in Washington - including many who have written reports on how to revitalize public diplomacy - is to try and rekindle the glory years of the United States Information Agency (USIA) during the Cold War. While USIA-type programs are important - and should be seen as vital components of the War on Terrorism - it is far more important for the U.S. government to fully understand and conceptualize a long-term communications program with the rest of the world. America needs to do more than broadcast our message to foreign audiences; we need to listen to their complaints and respond to them appropriately.

The framework laid out in this paper does just that. It starts with an intense stage of information gathering where American government officials - with the help of the private-sector - evaluate all of the information currently available and procures whatever other information is needed to accurately and fully understand foreign public opinion at a specific point in time. This baseline is then given to policy makers, so prior policy can be reevaluated and future policy evaluated in light of the benefits America gains and the cost it may or may not have on foreign public opinion. Further, this information is given to American public diplomacy and public affairs officials - under the guidance of a newly created NSC staff member chairing a SIG - who use this information to craft an effective, informed, and flexible communication effort for America.

Finally, this dialogue between America and the rest of the world – and the responsive framework established that incorporates government and the private sector – is seen as a long-term commitment. The creation of a private institution charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of America's message, and the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion would give the U.S. government the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the rest of the world.


As John Adams famously observed, "The Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people." For a small, extremist segment of the world population values like freedom and prosperity are meaningless. Yet the vast majority of people around the globe is more interested in security for themselves and their families than war and destruction. America has a peaceful message and strives to be a force for freedom and prosperity around the world. Yet we are doing incredible harm to ourselves by not advocating for ourselves effectively. As the 9/11 commission stated: "If the United States does not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic world, the extremists will gladly do the job for us."¹⁵ Richard Holbrooke put it best, "How can a man in a cave out communicate the world's leading communications society?"¹⁶

American national security requires that we harness the wealth of resources we have available to communicate with the rest of the world. We must speak and listen to the rest of the world clearly, accurately, and effectively. If we do so, we will prevail.

¹⁵ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States. "The 9/11 Commission Report," pg. 377.

¹⁶ Richard Holbrooke, "Get the Message Out," *Washington Post*, Oct. 28, 2001, p. B7

~~FOUO~~
March 17, 2005

TO: Ambassador Zal Khalilzad
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Washington *Times* Article

Please take a look at this article, "Privatizing Afghanistan", and let me know what you think about it.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/17/05 *Washington Times* article: Privatizing Afghanistan

DHR:ss
031705-9

Afghanistan

IN MAROS

~~FOUO~~

OSD 05206-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48062

Washington Times
March 17, 2005
Pg. 23

Privatizing Afghanistan

Bolster free-market possibilities

By Saad Mohseni and Don Ritter

Afghanistan's rapid transformation from a political and economic basket case into a viable democratic state has been nothing short of miraculous.

The international community, led by the United States, has contributed to the reconstruction of a beleaguered nation to the extent that there now are a democratically elected president, free media, progressive businesses, investment and civil laws plus a viable banking industry, all of which in turn have assisted in the development of a thriving private sector.

Both the government and donor nations pronounce their dedication to building a market economy. Afghanistan has emerged from an emergency situation to be confronted with a new phenomenon: Aid organizations have tapped into the financial lifeblood of private enterprise development and the government itself is competing with the private sector.

Here are five reasons why this contingent of nongovernmental organizations and government-engaged businesses have alarming long-term implications: First, the United Nations and other international organizations generally do not outsource functions critical to improving the private sector. International agencies and the United Nations (and its divisions) favor sister entities or the NGO community, or they set up parallel structures to the private sector.

Take the recent UNESCO educational TV pilot project. Rather than contracting with existing TV stations for delivery of services, they have opted to purchase all the equipment and set up duplicate structures.

Second, NGOs compete directly with the private sector. Lack of market competition, access to public funding and the ability to operate tax-free all mean that NGOs can offer products and services at highly subsidized rates, creating an anti-competitive environment for businesses that vie for the same markets.

This is rife in the media sector. The donor-nation mantra is "support free media," but rather than run their programs in existing and available free and independent media, they choose to create new subsidized media organizations, competing in a tight market. In Kabul, we have the BBC, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Kilid (NGO), VOA, AINA/Women's Radio (NGO) and others that compete directly with the commercial ARMAN FM.

Third, NGOs and International agencies absorb Afghanistan's best employees. With a ready source of funding and no need for return on equity or having to deal with other free-market exigencies, they have attracted, with large salaries, Afghanistan's best and brightest workers. The resulting drain on human resources away from the private sector and into the vast nonprofit economy has severely limited the private sector's ability to build human-resource capacity.

11-L-0559/OSD/48063

Fourth, international contract and grant mechanisms tend to favor NGOs. Today's NGOs — organizations funded by the international community — can undercut any business entity in Afghanistan and secure lucrative contracts that private businesses depend on. NGOs can disregard factors relating to life-and-death business issues like supply, demand and profit margins. They also have the benefit of starting with a fully geared-up infrastructure, also funded through donors, while many firms in similar areas must start from scratch.

Fifth, some government departments compete with the private sector, creating huge conflicts of interest. The role of government, as elaborated in Afghanistan's National Development Framework, is to regulate rather than compete. However, in some cases, entrepreneurial government bureaucrats develop capacity and do work that clearly competes with the private sector, in direct conflict with the government's market-economy objectives.

A few examples of such government-owned or -controlled entities include: (1) The Afghan Chambers of Commerce and Industry, which is the voice of government in business, not a voice for the private sector; (2) Afghan Film, which virtually controls matters pertaining to film and cinema; (3) Ariana Airlines: a government-run airline; (4) Afghan Tel, which, controlled by the government, also has a stake in Afghan Wireless, while other telecom entries are funded entirely by the private sector.

A four-point private-sector "affirmative action" plan is needed before public enterprise overwhelms the private, and should include: (1) favorable treatment vis-a-vis the subsidized NGOs in bidding for contracts; (2) significant outsourcing by nonprofits to local businesses; (3) more local-level salary structures for NGOs; (4) a means of limiting government involvement in business; and (5) direct flow of donor funds to the private sector, bypassing government.

Such proactive steps are absolutely necessary to overcome the powerful momentum that is pushing the Afghan economy in a non-market direction. And while a market economy is enshrined in the country's constitution and policies, it will take more than words for the private sector to be able to provide for the needs of the Afghan people.

Saad Mohseni is a director of Moby Capital Partners, a media entity in Afghanistan that includes ARMAN FM and Tolo TV. Former Rep. Don Ritter is an investor in Afghanistan and a senior adviser to an Afghan business community effort to promote investment and market-based economic policies.

11- L-0559/OSD/48064

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

SECRET

2005 MAR 10 AM 9:20 March 3, 2005

383.6

TO: Gen Pete Pace

CC: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: GITMO Question

Please **get back** to me **as to why we** are building a peimanent facility at ~~GI~~.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
030305-7

.....

Please respond by 3/10/05

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

3 MAR 05

OSD 05230-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48065

~~FOUO~~

March 24, 2005 **FILE COPY**

TO: Gen Dick Myers
CC Gen Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Answer to my GTMO Question

I asked you to get back to me as to why we are building a permanent facility in GTMO. The response I received seemed to be more like a list of talking points, rather than a clear answer.

I am interested in why we are building a permanent facility in GTMO.

Thanks.

see highlighted portion

Attach.
3/3/05 SecDef Memo to VCJCS re: GTMO Question
3/17/05 CJCS Memo to SecDef re: GTMO Question

DIRM
032303-108

.....
Please respond by 4/5/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48066

0505230-05

*3/23/05
Dr. Myers*

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310-0000

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 MAR 18 AM 9:28

CM-2381-05

17 March 2005

INFO MEMO

Paul Butler
3/18
Rub

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS ^{For} *vs. R. Pace 17 Mar 05*

SUBJECT: GTMO Question (SF 976)

- **Answer.** In response to your question (TAB A), we are building facilities at GTMO to reduce the military personnel requirements for guard and security forces and to address humanitarian and operational concerns identified by our allies and the International Committee of the Red Cross.
- **Analysis.** Analysis provided in the attached 5x8 (TAB B).

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Vice Admiral R. E. Willard, USN; Director, J-8; (b)(6)

| | | | |
|----------|---------|--------------|--|
| MA SD | SMA DSD | | |
| TSA SD | SA DSD | 3/17 | |
| EXEC SEC | | 3/19 1230 | |
| ESR MA | | 24/3/19 1155 | |

OSD 05230-05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

TAB A
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 MAR 18 AM 9: 28

March 3, 2005

TO Gen Pete Pace
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: GITMO Question

Please get back to me as to why we are building a permanent facility at GITMO.

Thanks.

DHRas
05230-7

Please respond by 3/10/05

*Sir,
Response attached.
In
LH/L lagel*

MAR 18 2005

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 05230-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48068

Date: 7 Mar 05

Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) Detention Facilities

Purpose. To provide talking points as to "why we are building a permanent base" at GTMO.

Issue. SecDef requested talking points on the proposed MILCON program at GTMO.

Bottom Line

- The FY 05 Supplemental request includes two GTMO MILCON projects. They are construction of a new maximum security prison (Camp 6) and a perimeter Security Fence. These 2 projects will reduce military personnel requirements by nearly 320.
- Construction of the Camp 6 prison is based on US prison standards that will address the humanitarian and operational concerns identified by our War on Terrorism allies and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Background

- Naval Base GTMO hosts Joint Task Force-GTMO as a tenant command of ~2,000 military and contractor personnel. Naval Base GTMO also provides logistic support in the event of a Caribbean mass migration.
- First Operation ENDURING FREEDOM detainees were transferred to GTMO in Jan 02.
- 5 Camps were designed to hold 1107 detainees.
 - Camps 1,2 and 3 were constructed as temporary, high security detention facilities in Apr-Oct 02 to hold up to 807 detainees.
 - Camp 4, a medium security facility, was constructed in Apr 03 to house 200 additional detainees.
 - FY 03 Supplemental provided funding for Camp 5 (an interrogation and holding facility for 100 additional high-threat, high-intelligence-value detainees), additional Troop

Support Facilities and the Joint Task Force Military Commission Complex.

- SecDef utilized EEE authority in Dec 04 to construct psychiatric ward addition to the hospital to meet international care standards.
- Camp 6 will be a maximum-security facility designed to hold high-threat, high-intelligence-value detainees. Once completed, Camps 1-3 will be phased out reducing detainee capacity to 520.

FY 05 Supplemental Request

- 2 Projects requested in FY 05 Supplemental.
- Camp 6 Detention Facility (\$37M) provides:
 - A 176-cell, long-term detention facility built to US Bureau of Prisons standards, including 8 single handicap cells.
 - More open living conditions consistent with the Geneva Conventions.
 - Conditions to allow detainees more independence to move between cells, showers and day room.
 - Technology improvements to enable more efficient guard operations (124 fewer personnel).
- Radio Range Perimeter Security Fence (\$5M).
 - "Smart" security fence with high-tech sensors and auto-pan infrared cameras.
 - Ability to detect, deter and assess potential intrusions.
 - Reduction of personnel requirement for security force and perimeter force protection (196 fewer personnel).

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Tab B



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

SECRET

CM-2381-05 2005 MAR 16 11 02 a
17 March 2005

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *for the Sec Def*

SUBJECT: GTMO Question (SF 976)

- **Answer.** In response to your question (TAB A), we are building facilities at GTMO to reduce the military personnel requirements for guard and security forces and to address humanitarian and operational concerns identified by our allies and the International Committee of the Red Cross.
- **Analysis.** Analysis provided in the attached 5x8 (TAB B).

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Vice Admiral R. F. Willard, USN; Director, J-8; (b)(6)

383.6

19 Mar 05

383.6

OSD 05230-05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

CLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

2005 MAR 10 11:02 AM March 3, 2005

TO: Gen Pete Pace

CC: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: GITMO Question

Please get back to me as to why we are building a peimanent facility at GITMO.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
030305-7

.....
Please respond by 3/10/05

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 05230-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48071

Date: 7 Mar 05

Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) Detention Facilities

Purpose. To provide talking points as to “why we are building a permanent base” at GTMO.

Issue. SecDef requested talking points on the proposed MILCON program at GTMO.

security prison (Camp 6) and a perimeter Security Fence. These 2 projects will reduce military personnel requirements by nearly 320.

- Construction of the Camp 6 prison is based on US prison standards that will address the humanitarian and operational concerns identified by our War on Terrorism allies and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Background

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 - More open living conditions consistent with the Geneva Conventions.
 - Conditions to allow detainees more independence to move between cells, showers and day room.
 - Technology improvements to enable more efficient guard operations (124 fewer personnel).
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 - “Smart” security fence with high-tech sensors and auto-pan infrared cameras.
 - Ability to detect, deter and assess potential intrusions.
 - Reduction of personnel requirement for security force and perimeter force protection (196 fewer personnel).

TAB C

COORDINATION

| Unit | Name | Date |
|---------------|--------------|---------------|
| CDRUSSOUTHCOM | GEN Craddock | 14 March 2005 |

March 18, 2005

TO: GEN John Abizaid
 GEN George Casey
 LTG Dave Barno

cc: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Training and Equipping Security Forces

Afghanistan

We need to be training trainers in Afghanistan and Iraq, so that an institutional capability is developed in both countries to sustain the training efforts that have been initiated.

I would like a report as to where we stand on both countries.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
031705-17

.....

Please respond by 4/7/05

OSD 05276-05

18Mar05

~~FOUO~~



December 12, 2005

TO: Eric Edelman
CC: Steve Bucci
Cathy Mainardi
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Update on Panama

D.R.

Panama

Please give me an update as to where we stand with Panama. I am concerned about the intelligence progress.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121205-11

.....
Please Respond By 01/04/06

Sir,
Response attached.
Vn,
LTG/leag/es
20 Dec 05

12/29

12 Dec 05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48075

~~FOUO~~

FILE COPY

December 23, 2005

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Release of ~~Unclassified~~ "Iraqi Perspectives Project"

Please take a look at this note from Newt Gingrich on this project you're working on and tell me what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/26/05 Gingrich e-mails to SD re: Iraqi Perspectives Project

DHR:db
122805-02 (TS).doc

.....
Please respond by January 12, 2006

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48076

B-19-2

T D A N

28 Dec 05

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

12/28

From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Sent: Tuesday, December 27, 2005 1:20 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Subject: FW: declassifying saddam files-newt

Newt's response to ADM G's email...

Original Message

From: Thirdwave2 [mailto:thirdwave2@speakinginrich.com]
Sent: Monday, December 26, 2005 7:28 PM
To: Giambastiani, EP, ADM, VCJCS; (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Cc: Stavridis, James, VADM, OSD; Pace, Peter, Gen, JCS, CJCS; England, Gordon, CIV, OSD
Subject: RE: declassifying saddam files-newt

NEW

Declassifying the Iraqi Perspectives Project ought to include a significant news effort, it is a real achievement
It could be the prelude to the declassification and publishing on the internet of all the files now stored in Kuwait
newt

From: Giambastiani, EP, ADM, VCJCS [mailto:edmund.giambastiani@js.pentagon.mil]
Sent: Monday, December 26, 2005 2:45 PM
To: Thirdwave2; (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Cc: Stavridis, James G @osd.mil [Stavridis, James, VADM, OSD]; Pace, Peter, Gen, JCS, CJCS; England, Gordon @osd.mil [England, Gordon, CIV, OSD]
Subject: RE: declassifying saddam files-newt

ADM G

Newt--for info, we're on the verge of releasing the unclassified version of the "Iraqi Perspectives Project". We've worked through all the clearance issues and are now working out final details. Approximately 1000 pieces of info from the data base you've mentioned were used supplement interviews with Iraqis etc. The project report should be out in sometime in January. Ed

Original Message

From: Thirdwave2 [mailto:thirdwave2@speakinginrich.com]
Sent: Monday, December 26, 2005 10:44 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Cc: Stavridis, James G @osd.mil [Stavridis, James, VADM, OSD]; Pace, Peter, Gen, JCS, CJCS; England, Gordon @osd.mil [England, Gordon, CIV, OSD]; Giambastiani, EP, ADM, VCJCS
Subject: declassifying saddam files-newt

NEW

The following email relates to a topic where we have been consistently wrong. We captured millions of documents from the Saddam dictatorship.

We still have not been able to process them because they are so massive.

Every effort to make them public so people could review them and translate them have been blocked either by DIA or someone

This is an example of classification being counterproductive.

If we simply photocopied the documents onto the web and created an open source game of translation and analysis we would be amazed how many people would participate.

This is worth forcing on the system to be more open
Newt

Here are a couple of articles that you may find interesting.

The first is Steve Hayes' piece from the Standard in which he describes the brick wall that he has run up against in his efforts to FOIA the *unclassified* documents captured from the Saddam regime. Among these is this interesting title:

Title: *Chemical, Biological Agent Destruction*
Short Description: *See Document for Remarks.*
Agency: *DIA*
Document Date: *Feb-03*
Document #: *BIAP-2003-004427*

The second article is an AP piece from the Washington Post entitled "Bill Would Shield DIA from FOIA."

I wonder if the two are related? Part of the intel community's regime change plan

~~FOUO~~

March 23, 2005

To: David Chu

a

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Your Memo on Improving Death and Dismemberment Benefits

Attached is your memo on improving death and dismemberment benefits. I cannot tell whether you are proposing that I do anything to try to fix it.

What, if anything, do you propose?

Thanks.

Attach.

3/18/05 USD (P&R) Memo to Sec Def (OSD 05292-05)

DHR:ms
032305-48

Please respond by _____

019
23 Mar 05

18 Mar 05

02005292-05

~~FOUO~~

321
1330



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
205 APR 19 PM 5:22

INFO MEMO

March 18, 2005, 9:00 AM

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

David S. C. Chu 18 Mar 05
(Signature and date)

SUBJECT: Improving Death and Dismemberment Benefits

Paul Butler
3/22

- The forthcoming Supplemental will expand death benefits, and the President may soon propose new benefits for dismemberment.

Death...

- The President proposed a hike in the "death gratuity," for those you designate, from \$12,400 to \$100,000, while increasing Servicemen's Group Life Insurance from \$250,000 to \$400,000 (total \$500,000).
- Most likely outcome for the Supplemental will be to remove your discretion and entitle all to \$100,000; with SGLI hiked to \$400,000.
 - o Retroactivity would be similar to the Administration's proposal, i.e., limited to OIF/OEF deaths.

Dismemberment...

- White House staff is developing a dismemberment insurance that would pay a lump sum of \$25,000 to \$50,000 for nine conditions ranging from loss of vision or hearing, to loss of limbs.

The interest comes personally from Messrs. Card and Bolton, concerned with family expenses during the period of hospitalization and recuperation.

- o Proposal blurs the line between DoD and VA responsibilities---worse, by asking the Service member to pay the cost (\$1.00 per month premium).
- o The DoD would pay the premium during periods of operational deployment. Using FY04 as a baseline, the cost to the DoD would be \$28 million.
- o We believe we should focus on post-hospitalization income adequacy (i.e., after discharge from the military), and with Veterans Affairs have designed a solution. Existing programs deal reasonably with the hospitalization period.

| | | |
|----------|------|------|
| MA BD | 5/20 | 5/22 |
| ITSA BD | 5/20 | 5/22 |
| EXEC REC | 5/20 | 5/22 |
| BSR MA | 5/20 | 5/22 |

Prepared by: Bill Carr, Acting DUSD (Military Personnel Policy), (b)(6)

A-762

OSD 05292-05



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 MAR 13 PM 5:22


INFO MEMO

March 18, 2005, 9:00 AM

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)


(Signature and date)

SUBJECT: Improving Death and Dismemberment Benefits

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Prepared by: Bill Carr, Acting DUSD (Military Personnel Policy) (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/48081

USD 05292-05

~~FOUO~~

MAR 15 2005

ES-2656
05/003724

TO: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Risk Assessment

I looked over your roll-out briefing. I notice you didn't mention the Chairman's Risk Assessment. I thought that was nested in there as part of the cluster.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031405-36

.....
Please respond by 3/17/05

OSD 05297-05

~~FOUO~~

15-03-05 09:33 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/48082 15-03-05 14:32 IN

March 18, 2005

TO: ADM Fox Fallon
cc: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: USNS MERCY Mission

PACOM

I see the MERCY is on her way home, wrapping up a superb operation by PACOM in Tsunami relief.

Please pass along a well done to the crew of MERCY – they did fine work out there.

DHR:ss
031805-13

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 05300-05

18MAR05

March 3, 2005

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Federal Advisory Committee Act

I think we ought to work with Newt Gingrich on this Federal Advisory Committee Act ideas. Please be the contact point.

Thanks.

Attach
3/3/05 Email from Newt Gingrich

DHR:ss
030305-11

.....
Please respond by 3/24/05




GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 MAR 21 AM 10:12

INFO MEMO

March 18, 2005 600 p.m.

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: **William** J. Haynes II 
SUBJECT: Federal Advisory Committee Act

- You asked me to be the point of contact in responding to a suggestion by former Speaker Gingrich that a DoD working group prepare **an** informal memorandum explaining the flaws of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) **and** how FACA could be improved.
- I have contacted Speaker Gingrich, who **has** forwarded some **relevant** material to me.
- My office will work with Ray Dubois, under whose auspices DoD Advisory Committees are managed.

cc: Ray Dubois




11-L-0559/OSD/48085

OSD 05326-05

~~FOUO~~

March 3, 2005

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Federal Advisory Committee Act

I *think* we ought to work with Newt Gingrich on this Federal Advisory Committee Act ideas. Please be the contact point.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/3/05 Email from Newt Gingrich

DHR:ss
030305-11

.....
Please respond by 3/24/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48086

(b)(6)

CIV. OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Thursday, March 03, 2005 1:31 PM
To: (b)(6)@OSD.Mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil; (b)(6)
jack.patterson@osd.mil; jarnes.stavridis@osd.mil
Cc: peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; Doman.McArthur@osd.mil; paula.thornhill@js.pentagon.mil;
hlSanders@aei.org
Subject: federal advisory committee act

I talked with chairman tom Davis of the government operations committee about rethinking the federal advisory committee act

in its current form it is cumbersome and inhibits government from getting sound advice in a timely way

he is very interested and is prepared to assign staff and recruit some members to dig into this

do you have some people you could ask to prepare an informal memo about how the federal advisory committee act could be improved and what is wrong about the current time consuming cumbersome system

I want to maintain transparency and accountability but add speed and flexibility

if you look at ups and fedex you have some idea of how I think entrepreneurial public management will work (I am having a paper sent to you on this topic)

if you look at the openness of the Thomas system for Congress and the potential for immediate worldwide access you can imagine how we could have a very quick but still transparent and accountable system of seeking advice

I think this is a topic worth assigning some people to think through the possibility of a better faster system
newt

3/3/2005

11-L-0559/OSD/48087

Mr. Abell's copy

2/28/05

~~FOUO~~
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
205 MAR 21 AM 10:17

February 25, 2005

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Answer to VA Budget Question ~~from~~ Sen. Murray

I need an answer to the question Senator Murray asked about the Veterans Administration budget. I'd like to have the answer in a week.

Thanks.

DHR:sa
022505-10

.....
Please respond by 3/7/05

SASC

Glaring omission from Supplemental

Continued Emotional Care after they leave

others stated it would be in the VA budget.

OSD 05328-05

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/48088 pg 27-28-29-30 32

~~FOUO~~

MAR 24 2005

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: The Memo on VA Budget Question from Senator Murray

I just read your memo. I don't understand it. Please rewrite it and send it back.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/25/05 SecDef Memo to USD (P&R)
3/18/05 USD (P&R) Memo to SecDef

DHR:am
032305-38

.....

Please respond by _____

040VA

21 MAR 05

05 4605

050 05328-05

~~FOUO~~

2/28/05

Mr. Abell's copy

~~FOUO~~
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 MAR 21 AM 10:17

February 25, 2005

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Runsfeld
SUBJECT: Answer to VA Budget Question from Sen. Murry

I need an answer to the question Senator Murry asked about the Veterans Administration budget. I'd like to have the answer in a week.

Thanks.

OSD
02350-10

.....
Please respond by 3/7/05

5/10
Response Attached
V/R/COCD
3/22

SASC Glaring omission from Supplemental

Continued Emotional Care after they leave

others stated it would be in the VA budget.

~~FOUO~~

OSD 05320-05

79-2

1927-28-29-30 72

3/22
3/21



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 MAR 01 AM 10:44

INFO MEMO

March 18, 2005 - 2:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, USD (PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

was
Paid Budget
3/22

SUBJECT: Answer to VA Budget Question from Sen. Murray
SNOWFLAKE (Tab A)

- You told Senator Murray that the Department of Defense works with the Veterans Administration and that we just opened the Military Severely Injured Joint Support Operations Center, which provides 24/7 family support which also augments the military services' efforts. (Your exchange with Senator Murray is at Tab B.)
- The amount in the FY 2005 supplemental to support both severely injured members and their families as well as the active and reserve Service members and their families deployed in support of OIF and OEF is \$92 million.
 - o Severely injured support activity - \$13 M
 - o Non-medical counseling to help families adjust - \$30M
 - o Child care support for respite and deployment - \$40M
 - o Reduction of personal telecommunications to call home - \$9M
- Both the HAC-D and the SAC-D have asked about the FY 2005 supplemental funds. Comptroller has advised that the above funding breakout was already released to the HAC-D.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

Attachments: As stated

PREPARED BY: Dori Hays, ODUSD(MC&FP),

(b)(6)

| | | | |
|----------|---------|------|---------|
| MA SD | SHR DSD | JFB | 3/22 |
| (SA SD) | SA DSD | 3/22 | |
| EXEC SEC | M322 | 1700 | 3/22/05 |
| ESR MA | 7/1/01 | 1515 | |



OSD 05328-05

A-79-3

FOCH TRANSCRIPTS
Congressional Hearings
Feb. 14, 2005.

Senate Appropriations Committee Holds Hearing on FY2005 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations

UNIT OF ORIGIN

COCHRAN:

Thank you for clarifying the record.
Senator Murray?

MURRAY:

Well, Mr. Secretary, thank you so much for being here today.

First, I do want to applaud you for including an increase in military death benefit and the service members group life insurance program. Many of us have encouraged the administration to increase those programs.

MURRAY:

My home state of Washington has lost nearly 100 soldiers since the war began. And I really agree that it is an emergency situation for those families, and they paid the ultimate price for our country and it's the right thing to do. So I appreciate that.

I'm also pleased to see that additional funding has been added for equipment, including the armored security vehicles. Those can really help our soldiers complete their mission more safely and successfully.

And my state has thousands of soldiers on the ground in Iraq and in Afghanistan, and I just know their families are really going to appreciate that so that they know their loved ones are protected. So I thank you for that.

As you can imagine, I do share some of the concerns of my colleagues, but rather than take my time to rehash why some of these items have not been included in the president's budget, but rather came through as a supplemental, I want to focus my time on one glaring omission that I do see from this supplemental request.

Mr. Secretary, just a few weeks ago we listened to President Bush outline his priorities for the nation during his State of the Union address. And he told us that that document

reflected his priorities and he said, and I quote, his "budget substantially reduces or eliminates more than 150 government programs that are not getting results or duplicate current efforts or do not fulfill essentially priorities."

Now, just last week, as a member of the budget committee, I listened to the OMB director repeat that message about these so-called nonessential priorities.

But the president's essential priorities had the same glaring omission. According to the president's letter to Congress, this request, this supplemental request, reflects urgent and essential requirements.

The president said that the majority of his emergency request and I quote, "will ensure that our troops continue to get what they need to protect themselves and complete their mission." He said, and I agree with him, "that we have to move quickly so that our troops and diplomats have the tools they need to succeed."

That is why I'm very troubled by this request. There is no mention in here of our responsibility to pay for the continued emotional and physical costs of war. It's as if once these brave men and women leave the service, they're no longer considered an essential priority for the administration.

Mr. Secretary, my father was a World War II veteran. He came home disabled.

During the Vietnam War, I interned in a Seattle V.A. hospital and I know firsthand the scars and the wounds that our veterans carry.

MURRAY:

And as I look at this request, I see money for everything from reorganization to training to armor to bullets, but I do not see one dollar -- not one dime -- to take care of our troops and ensure that they have the tools they need to succeed when they become veterans.

This administration decided to fund this war and all of its implications through supplemental requests, yet this request in front of us does not provide even one dollar for a very important cost of war, and that is the care of our heroes when they return home.

Mr. Secretary, can you share with this committee why, when we are creating more veterans who need health care, who are coming home with tremendous costs that we have a responsibility to pay for, that they are not considered part of the cost of war?

RUMSPFELD:

It'll have to supply for the record details of all the pieces that those funds are.

MURRAY: *

For veterans' services?

RUMSPFELD:

Well, of course, the veterans budget is in the veterans budget. I'm here testifying on the Defense Department...

MURRAY:

Well, we're looking at a supplemental request to take care of the cost of war. Would you not agree with me that taking care of our veterans when they return home is not a cost of war?

RUMSFELD:
Absolutely.

MURRAY:
But we do not see one dime in this budget -- in this supplemental cost of war emergency funding, we do not see one dime for veterans.

RUMSFELD:
Could I take a minute and try to respond?
I'm here testifying on the Department of Defense portion of the supplemental, not the entire supplemental. I don't know -- I'm sure you're correct, but I just don't happen to know how much is in the Veterans Administration. I know the Veterans Administration budget is about \$30 billion.

MURRAY:
Well...

RUMSFELD:
I think that's right.

MURRAY:
Well, Mr. Secretary, let me just share with you...

RUMSFELD:
Could I just finish, please?
And I'm told that mental health is in the regular budget.
And I want to add that the Department of Defense works with the Veterans Administration, and we just opened the Military Severely Injured Joint Support Operations Center, which provides 24/7 family support. It augments the military services' efforts.

RUMSFELD:
We have a totally different family support effort, which is called Military One Source, which is available 24 hours a day.
You're absolutely right. When a person is injured, he gets wonderful care, medical care, while they're on active duty. And at some moment they transfer over and they leave the base and the support group that fits around their unit, and they're home, and they're still severely wounded. And they still get excellent medical care, but they need a variety of other things.
And we have -- and maybe General Myers wants to respond -- but we have put a great deal of time and effort in it because we agree with you, it's terribly important.

MURRAY:
And it is part of costs of the war, I think you would agree?

R

MURRAY:

The cost of caring for our veterans is a cost of the war.

The supplemental that is in front of us is to cover the costs of war, and I will tell you there's not one dime in it.

Now, I have to tell you, I'm a member of the Veterans' Committee. The V.A. secretary was in front of us yesterday. I asked him these questions. He couldn't provide me with an answer.

When I asked you, you tell me you're secretary of defense, you can't answer me. Well, I want to know who I'm supposed to ask.

We do not have the services available to take care of our soldiers once they come home and come out of service and become veterans.

In Washington state, we have 3,000 soldiers who are going to be coming home in a couple of weeks - the Guard and Reserve folks - who are going to go into the veterans services.

I met with all of our service personnel and with the veterans services. They know that they do not have the services to take care of this.

They told me that 20 percent of these soldiers, at least, will need help for post-dramatic stress syndrome, and we have lines today. We do not have the services for these folks.

So, Mr. Chairman, I just have to say, if this is a cost of war, then we should have money in the supplemental, in the emergency supplemental, to take care of these veterans.

And I am deeply disappointed by this request that it does not take care of those soldiers when they return home.

MURRAY:

I think all of us agree that they are a part of the cost of war, and we have a responsibility to make sure they get cared for.

But we also have to recognize that it is part of our recruitment and retention, and if we are not taking care of these veterans when they return home, it is going to be very hard in the future to take care of them.

So, Mr. Secretary, I will let you respond but, Mr. Chairman, I want you to know that I will be offering an amendment on this supplemental when it comes before this committee for \$2 billion to care for our veterans, because I do believe it's a cost of war. I do believe it's a responsibility of the United States Senate and Congress, and I think we have an obligation to those who serve us to make sure we're there for them.

RUMSFELD:

We will get you a written response. I am just passed a note saying that a severely wounded operation center is in the supplemental.

MURRAY:

How many soldiers does that cover?

RUMSFELD:

It covers severely wounded...

MURRAY:

Do you have a number for me on how many...

MYERS:

It's unlimited. It's anybody who wants to avail themselves of the service. It's set up for the severely wounded, but it can handle any number.

MURRAY:

Well, in the president's budget request on veterans, we'll be cutting more than 3,000 people out of the V.A. system who we're covering health care at a time when we have thousands of veterans who are coming home.

I don't have time this morning to outline for this committee the inadequacies it has, but I will tell any of you to go home next week and visit your veterans' facilities, talk to the service people who are responsible for reintegration for your Guard and Reserve and veterans who are coming home, and you will know as I do that we have an emergency in front of us in not being there to take care of these soldiers. It is a crisis.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

COCHRAN:

Senator Domenici?

DOMENICI:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Murray, first of all, might I say to you, with reference to this concern, I think we all share it.

DOMENICI:

But I think there is a difference between being a veteran that is injured or mentally ill or neither post-traumatic, and a member of the military that's still in the military that needs hospitalization and care and the like.

MURRAY:

Well, I would just say to you, with all due respect, if we don't care for those soldiers when they come home, recruitment...

DOMENICI:

Well, I'm agreeing with you.

MURRAY:

And it is a part of the cost of the war to take care of these soldiers when they return.

DOMENICI:

Senator, I wasn't arguing with you. I just said there is a difference between the cost of taking care of a military person who is injured and taking care of a veteran who is injured, because it was in war.

We still have to cover it. It is just two different items.
And perhaps in this budget.

MURRAY:

But there is no money there to do it. This is the supplemental.

DOMENICI:

I understand. I hope we get the information. I'm not arguing. I just hope we get it. I thank you very much for asking the question.

MYERS:

Senator Domenici, can I chime in for just a second?

DOMENICI:

Yes.

MYERS:

I wanted to address this earlier.

Senator Murray, you probably know that the services have -- this doesn't directly address your issue, your issue is more with the V.A. piece of it. And my understanding is that the V.A. has set up centers to address the stress and post-traumatic stress syndrome of returning warriors and our heroes.

So I'm told they have set up centers. But I don't.

MURRAY:

There's a plan. There's not the personnel.

MYERS:

Well, like I said, the V.A. is going to have to work that. And we'll help them.

The other thing I would say though is that all of the services have reacted very proactively to deal with those folks that are returning from the battlefield much different than we have, I think, in previous conflicts.

And I think that's a really good sign. We have learned from our past experiences.

So in terms of those that are returning, we work that very, very hard in the services.

DOMENICI:

Mr. Secretary, first excuse my voice. I have a cold. I hope it goes away before I go back to New Mexico, to that beautiful country that you share sometimes.

I would like very much to, in the few minutes that I have, focus in on what I think is currently the most important thing for us to try to understand and for you to tell us about, and that has to do with the training of Iraqis.

COORDINATION

PDUSD(P&R)

Charles S. Abell

C. Abell S. A. of

A-79-10



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 MAR 21 AM 10:44

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

March 18, 2005 - 2:00 PM

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, USD (PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

David S. C. Chu 18 March 05
SUBJECT: Answer to VA Budget Question from Sen. Murray—
SNOWFLAKE (Tab A)

- You told Senator Murray that the Department of Defense works with the Veterans Administration and that we just opened the Military Severely Injured Joint Support Operations Center, which provides 24/7 family support which also augments the military services' efforts. (Your exchange with Senator Murray is at Tab B.)
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RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

Attachments: As stated

PREPARED BY: Dori Hays, ODUSD(MC&FP), (b)(6)



OSD 05328-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48099

2/28/05

Mr. Abell's copy

~~FOUO~~
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 MAR 21 AM 10:17

February 25, 2005

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Answer to VA Budget Question from Sen. Murray

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Administration budget I'd like to have the ~~answer~~ in a week.

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DHR:is
022505-10

.....
Please respond by 3/7/05

SASC

Glaring omission from Supplemental

Continued Emotional Care after they leave

others stated it would be in the VA budget.

OSD 05328-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48101 pg 27-28-29-30 52

Senate Appropriations Committee Holds Hearing on FY2005 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations

LIST OF SPEAKERS

COCHRAN:

Thank you for clarifying the **record**.
Senator **Murray**?

MURRAY:

Well, Mr. **Secretary**, thank you so much for **being** here today.

First, I do want to applaud you for including an increase to **military** death benefit and the service members group life insurance program. Many of us have encouraged the **administration** to increase **those** programs.

MURRAY:

My home state of Washington has lost nearly 100 soldiers since the **war** began. And I **really agree** that it is an emergency situation for those families, and they paid the **ultimate price** for **our country** and it's the right thing to do. **So** I appreciate that.

I'm **also pleased** to **see** that additional funding has **been** added for equipment, including the armored **security** vehicles. **Those** can really help our soldiers complete **their** mission more safely **and** successfully.

And my state has thousands of soldiers **on** the ground in Iraq and in **Afghanistan**, and I just **know their** families **are** really going to appreciate that **so** that they **know** their loved ones are protected. **So** I thank you for that.

As you can imagine, I do share **some** of the concerns of my **colleagues**, but **rather than** take my time to **rehash** why some of these items have not been included in the president's budget, but rather **came through as a** supplemental, I want to focus my **time** on one glaring omission that I do **see** from **this** supplemental request.

Mr. Secretary, just **a few weeks ago we** listened to President Bush outline his priorities for the nation during his State of the Union address. And he told us that **that** document

reflected **his** priorities and he said, and I quote, **his** "budget substantially **reduces** or eliminates more than 150 government programs **that** are not getting results or duplicate current efforts or do not fulfill essentially priorities."

Now, just last week, **as** a member of the budget committee, I listened to the OMB director repeat that mantra about these so-called nonessential priorities.

But the president's essential priorities had the same glaring omission. According to the president's letter to Congress, **this** request, **this** supplemental request, reflects urgent and essential requirements.

The president said that the majority of **this** emergency request and I quote, "will ensure that **our troops** continue to get what they need to protect themselves and complete their mission." He said, and I agree with him, "**that** we have to move quickly **so** that our troops and diplomats have the tools **they** need to succeed."

That is why I'm very troubled by **this** request. There is no mention in here of our responsibility to pay for the continued emotional and physical costs of war. It's **as** if **once** these brave men and women leave the service, **they're** no longer considered an essential priority for the administration.

Mr. Secretary, my father was a World War II veteran. He came home disabled.

During the Vietnam War, I interned in a Seattle V.A. hospital and I know firsthand the **scars** and the wounds that our veterans carry.

MURRAY :

And **as** I look at **this** request, I see money for everything from reorganization to training to mortar bullets, but I do not see one dollar -- not one dime -- to take care of **our** troops and ensure that they have the tools they need to **succeed** when they become veterans.

This administration decided to fund **this** war and all of its implications **through** supplemental requests, yet **this** request in front of **us** does not provide even one dollar for a **very** important cost of war, and that is the care of our heroes when they **return** home.

Mr. Secretary, can you share with **this** committee why, when we **are** creating **more** veterans **who** need health care, who **are** coming home with tremendous costs that we have a responsibility to pay for, that they are not considered part of the cost of war?

RUMSFELD:

I'll have to supply for the **record details** of all the places that those funds are.

MURRAY: †

For veterans' services?

RUMSFELD.

Well, of course, the veterans budget is in the veterans budgets. I'm here testifying on the Defense Department...

MURRAY:

Well, we're looking at a supplemental request to take care of the cost of war. Would you not agree with me that taking care of our veterans when they return home is not a cost of war?

RUMSFELD:

Absolutely.

MURRAY

But we do not **see** one **dime** in **this** budget -- in this supplemental cost of war emergency funding, we do not **see** one dime for veterans.

RUMSFELD:

Could I take a minute and **try** to respond?

I'm here testifying **on** the Department of Defense portion of the supplemental, not the entire supplemental. I don't know -- **I'm** **sure** you're correct, but I just don't happen to know how **much** is in the Veterans Administration. I know the Veterans Administration budget is about \$30 billion.

MURRAY

Well...

RUMSFELD:

I think that's right.

MURRAY:

Well, Mr. Secretary, let me just share with you...

RUMSFELD:

Could I just finish, please?

And **in** told that **mental** health is in the regular budget.

And I want to add that the Department of Defense works with the Veterans **Administration**, and we just opened the Military Severely Injured Joint Support **Operations** Center, which provides 24/7 family support. It augments the military services' efforts.

RUMSFELD:

We have a totally different family support effort, which is called Military One Source, which is available 24 hours a day.

You're **absolutely** right. When a person is injured, he gets wonderful care, **medical** care, while they're **on** active duty. And at **some** moment they **transfer** over and they leave the base and the support group that fits around their unit, and they're home, and they're still severely wounded. And they **still** get excellent medical care, but they need a variety of other **things**.

And we have -- and maybe General Myers wants to respond -- but we have put a **great deal** of time and effort in it because we agree with you, it's **tembly** important.

MURRAY

And it is part of **costs** of the war, **I think you** would agree?

RUMSFELD:

Absolutely.

MURRAY

The cost of caring for our veterans is a cost of the war.

The supplemental that is in front of us is to cover the costs of war, and I will tell you there's not one dime in it.

Now, I have to tell you, I'm a member of the Veterans' Committee. The V.A. secretary was in front of us yesterday. I asked him these questions. He couldn't provide me with an answer.

When I asked you, you tell me you're secretary of defense, you can't answer me. Well, I want to know who I'm supposed to ask.

We do not have the services available to take care of our soldiers once they come home and come out of service and become veterans.

In Washington state, we have 3,000 soldiers who are going to be coming home in a couple of weeks -- the Guard and Reserve folks -- who are going to go into the veterans services.

I met with all of our service personnel and with the veterans services. They know that they do not have the services to take care of this.

They told me that 20 percent of these soldiers, at least, will need help for post-dramatic stress syndrome, and we have lines today. We do not have the services for these folks.

So, Mr. Chairman, I just have to say, if this is a cost of war, then we should have money in the supplemental, in the emergency supplemental, to take care of these veterans.

And I am deeply disappointed by this request that it does not take care of those soldiers when they return home.

MURRAY

I think all of us agree that they are a part of the cost of war, and we have a responsibility to make sure they get cared for.

But we also have to recognize that it is part of our recruitment and retention, and if we are not taking care of these veterans when they return home, it is going to be very hard in the future to take care of them.

So, Mr. Secretary, I will let you respond but, Mr. Chairman, I want you to know that I will be offering an amendment on this supplemental when it comes before this committee for \$2 billion to care for our veterans, because I do believe it's a cost of war. I do believe it's a responsibility of the United States Senate and Congress, and I think we have an obligation to those who serve us to make sure we're there for them.

RUMSFELD:

We will get you a written response. I am just passed a note saying that a severely wounded operation center is in the supplemental.

MURRAY:

How many soldiers does that cover?

RUMSFELD:

It covers severely wounded...

MURRAY:

Do you have a number for me *on* how many...

MYERS:

It's unlimited. It's anybody who wants to avail themselves of the service. It's set up for the severely wounded, but it can handle any number.

MURRAY:

Well, in the president's budget request on veterans, we'll be cutting more than 3,000 people out of the **V.A.** system who we're covering health care at a time when we have thousands of veterans who are coming home.

I don't have ~~time~~ *this* morning to outline for **this** committee the inadequacies it has, but I will tell any of you to go home next week and visit your veterans' facilities, talk to the service people who **are** responsible for reintegration for your **Guard** and Reserve and veterans who **are** coming home, and you will **know as I do** that we have an emergency in front of us in not being there to **take care** of these soldiers. **It is a crisis.**

Thank you, **Mr.** Chairman.

COCHRAN:

Senator Domenici?

DOMENICI:

Thank you very much, **Mr.** Chairman,

Senator Murray, **first** of all, **might** I say to you, with reference to **this** concern, **I think** we all share it.

DOMENICI:

But I think **then** is a difference **between** being a veteran that is injured or mentally ill or neither post-traumatic, and a member of the military that's still in the military that needs hospitalization and care and the like.

MURRAY *

Well, I would just say to you, with all due respect, if we don't care for these soldiers when they come home, recruitment...

DOMENICI

Well, **in** agreeing with you.

MURRAY:

And it is a **part** of the cost of the war to take care of these soldiers when they **return**.

DOMENICI

Senator, I wasn't arguing with you. I just said there is a difference between the cost of taking care of a military person who is injured and taking care of a veteran who is injured. because it was in war.

We **still** have to cover it. It is just two different items.
And perhaps in **this** budget ...

MURRAY:

But there is no money there to do it. This is the supplemental.

DOMENICI:

I understand. I hope we get the information. I'm not arguing. I just hope we get it.
I thank you very much for asking the question.

MYERS:

Senator Domenici, can I chime in for just a second?

DOMENICI:

Yes.

MYERS:

I wanted to address **this** earlier.

Senator Murray, **you** probably know that the services have - **this** doesn't directly address your issue, your issue is more with the V.A. piece of it. **And** my understanding is that the **V.A.** has set up centers to address the **stress** and post-traumatic **stress** syndrome of returning **warriors** and our heroes.

So I'm told they have set up centers. But I don't..

MURRAY

There's a plan. There's not the personnel.

MYERS :

Well, like I said, the **V.A.** is going to have to work that. And we'll help them.

The other thing I would say though is that all of the services have reacted very proactively to deal with those folks that **are** returning from the battlefield much different than we have, I think, in previous conflicts.

And I think that's a really good sign. We have learned from our past experiences.

So in terms of those that **are** returning, we work that very, very hard in the services.

DOMENICI:

Mr. Secretary, first excuse my voice. I have a cold. I hope it **goes** away before I go back to New **Mexico**, to that beautiful country that you share sometimes.

I would like very much to, in the few minutes that I have, focus in on what I **think** is currently the most **important** thing for us to **try** to understand and for you to tell us about, **and that** has to do with the **training** of Iraqis.

COORDINATION

PDUSD(P&R)

Charles S. Abell

C. Abell 3-17-05

~~FOUO~~

ES-2680
05/003808
March 16, 2005

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Tin Cup

Please come up with an idea on who could do the "tin cup" for Afghanistan - or maybe do both Afghanistan and Iraq.

My guess is it could be added to somebody's job. It would be an interesting thing to do.

Thanks.

DHRdh
031605-14

.....
Please respond by 3/31/05

AF/US/WH/ST/5743

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48110

OSD 05333-05

16 Dec 05

~~FOUO~~

ES-2680

05/003808

March 16, 2005



2005 MAR 22 10:18 AM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Tin Cup

Please come up with an idea on who could do the "tin cup" for Afghanistan – or maybe do both Afghanistan and Iraq.

My guess is it could be added to somebody's job. It would be an interesting thing to do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031605-14

.....
Please respond by 3/31/05

3/20/05

→SD

Peter Rodman and I have a "tin cup" strategy that we'd like to brief to you

We've developed it with DSD and the Joint Staff.

You suggested that Reuben Jeffrey might be good for the job. I raised this with JD Crouch on Friday, March 18.

I'm awaiting word back from JD.

~~FOUO~~

OSD 05333-05

13-03-05 13:15

Doug Feith

11-L-0559/OSD/48111

AP 2/14/05 5:00 PM

16 MAR 05

16 MAR 05

~~FOUO~~

March 1, 2005

TO: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Healthcare Questions

On Congressman Sabo, I would like to see what answer we are going to give him on health insurance - the same thing on the question on healthcare from Vislocky

I had never heard of that issue

Thanks

DHR Jh
022805-97

.....
Please respond by 3/17/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 05409-05



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 MAR 22 AM 7:54

March 21, 2005, 1:00 p.m.

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Acting Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

for David V. Brown

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake#022805-97

- You requested to see the response to Reps. Martin Sabo (D-MN) and Peter Visclosky's (D-IN) question from the FY06 Budget Hearing before the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee on February 17, which concerned contractor health care benefits. The proposed response is attached at Tab 3.

Attachments:

1. Snowflake#022805-97 dated 3/1/05
2. Hearing transcript excerpts from Reps. Sabo and Visclosky.
3. Proposed response.

Prepared by: Rebecca Schmidt, OUSD(C), (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/48113

OSD 05409-05

~~FOUO~~

March 1, 2001

TO: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Healthcare Questions

On Congressman Sabo, I **would like** to see what answer we **are** going **to give** him on health insurance – the same thing on the question on healthcare **from Vislocky**

I had never heard of **that** issue.

Thanks,

DHR:dh
022805-97

.....
Please respond by 3/17/05

~~FOUO~~

1518 | it is just incredible how well armed that country was at this
1515 | point.

1520 | Mr. SABO. Sort of amazing with the centralized type of
1521 | control they had that they allowed that type of--number of
1522 | weapons to be widely dispersed and, I suppose, not under the
1523 | best of control even under the old administration.

1524 | General MYERS. True.

1525 | Mr. SABO. Let me ask a different question, different
1526 | subject, one of those provisions we put in the last defense
1521 | appropriation bill that I and the others think is important,
1528 | and that is how we treat people who either work for us or do
1529 | contract work for us.

1530 | It was a provision that says that when you are bidding
1531 | between current employees and contractors for a contract out,
1532 | or whatever we call it these days, then the bidding process,
1533 | an advantage in bidding process--the contractor cannot gain
1534 | an advantage in the bidding process by eliminating health
1535 | benefits and offering inferior health insurance plans or
1536 | requiring contract employees to pay a higher percentage for
1537 | their health insurance than Federal employees.

1538 | I simply wanted to make sure that contracting out is
1539 | simply not an excuse to provide health benefits that are
1540 | poorer than normally what Federal employees get. We keep
1541 | hearing that the Defense Department isn't being very diligent
1542 | in implementing the law that was passed by Congress, and is

154 | trying to get their way around it.

154 | Secretary RUMSFELD. I just don't know. We would have to
154 | get back to you in writing on that. I am sorry.

154 | [The information follows:]

154 | ***** COMMITTEE INSERT *****

154f Mr. SABO. I would like that.

1545 You know, my observation is, often the reason for
155C contracting out appears, on one end of the pay scale, to pay
1551 more than what government can pay, and at the other end of
1552 the pay scale it is an attempt to contract out, so we don't
1553 have to pay basic benefits like health insurance to people.
1554 I think that is simply wrong.

1555 Secretary RUMSFELD. Uh-huh. I will get back to you with
1556 something in writing. Thank you.

1557 Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Bonilla.

1558 Mr. BONILLA. Thank you, Chairman.

1559 Secretary, General, Ms. Jonas, thank you for being here.

1560 **And** I don't have any questions. I just want to tell you how
1561 proud we are of the job you are all doing. And you know what
1562 comes with the job: all the Monday morning quarterbacks and
1563 the critics and the TV talk show hosts that want to make a
1564 name for themselves and be the topic of cocktail
1565 conversation. *And* God bless you all for working through
1566 that, seeing through all of that, and facing it head on.

1567 I will have, as we go through the procees on
1568 appropriations, the same concerns that my colleagues,
1569 Granger, Cunningham and, I believe, Mr. Young have as well
1570 about the **F-22** and the **C-130** and some other issues that are
1571 of great interest to us.

1572 But no need to dwell on that, because I think my

1825 mechanism until they could create the governing council. And
1826 then the interim government--the U.N. then created the
1827 interim government, and then sovereignty was passed to that
1828 second entity, and at that point it was an Iraqi face.

1829 Mr. WICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1830 Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Visclosky.

1831 Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1832 Mr. Secretary, you had mentioned those 80-somethousand
1833 congressional inquiries, and I just kind of did the math.
1834 That comes out to about a \$5,200,000 expenditure by the
1835 Department of Defense for every congressional inquiry, so I
1836 think we have an oversight responsibility, and I wouldn't
1837 apologize for those.

1838 Secretary RUMSFELD. I am not asking for an apology.

1839 Mr. VISCLOSKY. Good, I am happy you are not.

1840 The second thing, to follow up on Mr. Sabo's questioning
1841 on the line of health insurance, a number of members,
1842 including Mr. Sabo, Mr. Dicks, Mr. Skelton, transmitted a
1843 letter to you on February 7th of this year relative to that
1844 issue, relative to a law that was signed by the President on
1845 August 5th of last year.

1846 The letter on February 7th was sent in response to a
1847 November 12th letter by Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
1848 Philip Grone that said that the provision should be repealed
1849 or grandfathered so as not to affect in-progress public

185C private competitions 3 months after the law had been signed.

1851 So there is some concern, given the fact that an under
1852 secretary, 3 months after a law had been signed, is worried
1853 about the impact of ongoing competition. But I guess you
1854 will get back to us.

1855 Secretary **RUMSFELD**. I will. Unless Dr. Chu, who is
1856 here, has knowledge of this.

1857 He does not, either. Sorry. We will get back in
1858 writing.

1859 [The information follows:]

1860 ***** COMMITTEE INSERT *****

1. What is the impact of the Health Insurance provisions?

- DoD is implementing the law (no work has been moved to the private sector since the provision was enacted), but it is difficult to manage since private sector health care must be compared to government health care. This will likely skew competition in favor of in-house performance since private sector contractors must also pay Service Contract Act wages which also have a fringe benefit factor that includes health care. The provision eliminates any incentive for private-sector offers to identify cost-effective health insurance, including health savings accounts or medical savings accounts, since it is based solely on cost. This provision also has a disproportionate impact on small business, which may not be competitive if their evaluated costs for health care are adjusted simply to match the cost of government health plans.

*[NOTE: The DoD Competitive Sourcing Official, Mr. Philip Grone, provided a letter to OMB in November stating our concerns with these provisions. Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) objected to the Department's position in a February 7, 2005, letter to SecDef (signed by 22 congressional members). SecDef has responded to the members that the Acting USD(AT&L) **will** respond. His response is expected to be signed by March 10th]*

~~FOUO~~

TAB

February 17, 2005

966

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Patraeus

Please find out what Patraeus is telling people. In the hearing yesterday, they quoted him as saying we don't have enough troops.

Thanks

DER:sk
021708-9

.....
Please respond by 2/24/05

~~FOUO~~

Tab

OSD 05423-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48121



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

SECRETARY

INFO MEMO

CM-2389-05
21 March 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

*For
VR
Petraeus 18 Mar 05*

SUBJECT: Petraeus (SF 966)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB), Congresswoman Sanchez misquoted LTG Petraeus.
- **Analysis.** During the House Armed Services Committee testimony on 16 February, Representative Loretta Sanchez quoted LTG Petraeus as saying that in his opinion there were insufficient forces in Iraq. I discussed this issue with GEN Casey and I am confident that Congresswoman Sanchez misquoted LTG Petraeus. LTG Petraeus' position on the number of forces required in Iraq has been and remains consistent with GEN Casey's views.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ OSD 05423-05

11- L-0559/OSD/48122

~~TOP SECRET~~

TAB

February 17, 2005

966

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Patraeus

Please find out what Patraeus is telling people. In the hearing yesterday, they quoted him as saying we don't have enough troops.

Thanks

DER:ms
021705-9

.....
Please respond by 2/24/05

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tab

11- L-0559/OSD/48123

~~TOP SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2005 MAR 02 AM 11:01

March 4, 2005

I-05/003238
ES-2540

China

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Andy Marshall
FROM: ~
SUBJECT: Note from Newt

Here's an interesting note from Newt. Why don't you take a look at it, and tell me if you think it is worth looking at.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/2/05 E-mail from Newt Gingrich re: China's Oil Diplomacy in Latin America

DHR:ss
030405-7

.....
Please respond by 3/31/05

4mar05

OSD 05468-05

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Wednesday, March 02, 2005 4:09 PM
To: kry565@charter.net; WSanders@aei.org
CC: revans@mckennalong.com; vhaley@aei.org; cdemuth@aei.org; ed.feulner@heritage.org; jr@hoover.stanford.edu
Subject: Fwd: China's Oil Diplomacy in Latin America

this question of Chinese energy needs and Indian energy needs is going to be of increasing importance at a very practical level and I do not think we are shaping a strategy that takes it into account

this will have huge effect on our relative leverage and european relative leverage as the Chinese and Indians create entirely new networks of commercial alliance

I do not know if anyone is systematically tracking all the deals the Chinese and Indians are making around the world

this would be a useful report on a quarterly basis
newt

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From: Terry Balderson [tbalders@tampabay.rr.com]
Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2005 7:41 PM
To: undisclosed-recipients
Subject: China's Oil Diplomacy in Latin America

China's Oil Diplomacy in Latin America

By JUAN FORERO The New York Times 1 March 2005

via truthout



European Pressphoto Agency

President Hugo Chávez, left, with Wu Bangguo, leader of China's Parliament, in Beijing in December. Accords were signed to develop oil fields and build a boiler-fuel plant, and analysts expect further cooperation.

BOGOTA, Colombia, Feb. 28 - Latin America is becoming a rich destination for China in its global quest for energy, with the Chinese quickly signing accords with Venezuela, investing in largely untapped markets like Peru and exploring possibilities in Bolivia and Colombia.

China's sights are focused mostly on Venezuela, which ships more than 60 percent of its crude oil to the United States. With the largest oil reserves outside the Middle East, and a president who says that his country needs to diversify its energy business beyond the United States, Venezuela has emerged as an obvious contender for Beijing's attention.

The Venezuelan leader, Hugo Chavez, accompanied by a delegation of 125 officials and businessmen, and Vice President Zeng Qinghong of China signed 19 cooperation agreements in Caracas late in January. They included long-range plans for Chinese stakes in oil and gas fields, most of them now considered marginal but which could become valuable with big investments.

Mr. Chávez has been engaged in a war of words with the Bush administration since the White House gave tacit support to a 2002 coup that briefly ousted him. Still, Venezuela is a major source for American oil companies, one of four main providers of imported crude oil to the United States, inexorably linking the two countries' interests.

Analysts and Venezuelan government officials say those ties will not be severed, as Venezuela is a relatively short tanker trip from the United States and Venezuelan refineries have been adapted to process the nation's heavy, tar-like crude oil.

"The United States should not be concerned," Rafael Ramirez, Venezuela's energy minister, said in an interview, "because this expansion in no way means that we will be withdrawing from the North American market for political reasons."

In recent months, though, China's voracious economy has brought it to Venezuela, and much of South America, in search of

11-L-0559/OSD/48126

3/1/2005

fuel.

"The Chinese are entering without political expectations or demands," said Roger Tissot, an analyst who evaluates political and economic risks in leading oil-producing countries for the PFC Energy Group in Washington. "They just say, 'I'm coming here to invest,' and they can invest billions of dollars. And obviously, as a country with billions to invest, they are taken very seriously."

China's entry is worrisome to some American energy officials, especially because the United States is becoming more dependent on foreign oil at a time when foreign reserves remain tight. It was the limited supplies that pushed a barrel of oil to \$55 in October, driving up retail prices and hurting economies. On Monday, crude oil for April delivery settled at \$51.75 in New York, up 26 cents.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, headed by Richard G. Lugar, Republican of Indiana, recently asked the Government Accountability Office to examine contingency plans should Venezuelan oil stop flowing. Chinese interest in Venezuela, a senior committee aide said, underlines Washington's lack of attention toward Latin America.

"For years and years, the hemisphere has been a low priority for the U.S., and the Chinese are taking advantage of it," the aide said, speaking on condition of anonymity. "They're taking advantage of the fact that we don't care as much as we should about Latin America."

To be sure, China, the world's second-largest consumer of oil, has emerged as a leading competitor to the United States in its search for oil, gas and minerals throughout the world - notably Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa.

China has accounted for 40 percent of global growth in oil demand in the last four years, according to the Energy Department, and its consumption in 20 years is projected to rise to 12.8 million barrels a day from 5.56 million barrels now. Most of that oil will need to be imported. The United States now uses 20.4 million barrels a day, nearly 12 million of it imported.

Aggressively seeking out potential deals, China tries to out-muscle the big international oil companies, always beholden to shareholders. Chinese companies, which have substantial government help, can dispense government aid to secure deals, take advantage of lower costs in China and draw on hefty credit lines from the government and Chinese financial institutions.

"These companies tend to make uneconomic bids, use Chinese state bilateral loans and financing, and spend wildly," Frank A. Verrastro, director and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, told the Senate Energy Committee early in February. "Chinese investors pursue market and strategic objectives, rather than commercial ones."

China already operates two oil fields in Venezuela. Under accords signed in Beijing in December and Caracas in January, it would develop 15 declining oil fields in Zumanó in eastern Venezuela, buy 120,000 barrels of fuel oil a month and build a plant in Venezuela to produce boiler fuel used in Chinese power plants.

Energy analysts say these deals, though mostly marginal, show that China is willing to wade in slowly, with larger ambitions in mind.

"These are steps you have to take to have a longer-term relationship," said Larry J. Goldstein, president of the Petroleum Industry Research Foundation in New York. "We don't know enough about whether they will lead to larger projects, but my sense is that they will."

Under the agreements, Venezuela has invited China to participate in much larger projects, like exploring for oil in the Orinoco belt, which has one of the world's great deposits of crude oil, and searching for natural gas offshore through ambitious projects intended to make Venezuela a world competitor in gas.

Analysts note that part of China's effort is to learn about Venezuelan technology, particularly the workings of its heavy-oil refineries. Much of the oil that will be exploited in the future will be tarlike, requiring an intricate and expensive refining process. In return, China is offering the Venezuelans a \$700 million line of credit to build housing, aid that helps Mr. Chavez in his goal of lifting his compatriots out of poverty. The recent trip also yielded plans to invest in telecommunications and farming.

"It's a country that permits you to get more out of agreements than just energy accords," Bernardo Alvarez, Venezuela's ambassador to the United States, said of China.

Venezuela, with a view to exports to China, says it is exploring plans to rebuild a Panamanian pipeline to pump crude oil to the Pacific, where it would be loaded onto supertankers that are too big to use the Panama Canal.

Another proposal, with neighboring Colombia, would lead to the construction of a pipeline across Colombia to carry Venezuelan hydrocarbons, which would then be shipped to Asia from Colombia's Pacific ports.

Mr. Chavez has promoted these plans in three visits to China. In the most recent, in December, he unveiled a statue of Simon Bolivar in Beijing. Trade between the two countries could rise to \$3 billion this year from \$1.2 billion, Mr. Chavez said, celebrating their links as a way for Venezuela to break free of dependence on the American market.

"We have been producing and exporting oil for more than 100 years," Mr. Chavez told Chinese businessmen in December. "But these have been 100 years of domination by the United States. Now we are free, and place this oil at the disposal of the great Chinese fatherland."

China, though, is not just interested in Venezuela. Much of Latin America has become crucial to China's need for raw materials and markets, with trade at \$32.85 billion in the first 10 months of 2004, about 50 percent more than in 2003. Mining, analysts say, is among China's priorities, whether it is oil in Venezuela, tin in Chile or gas in Bolivia.

Chinese involvement in Latin America is "growing by leaps and bounds," said Eduardo Gamarra, director of the Latin America and Caribbean Center at Florida International University, adding, "It's driven by the need for privileged access to raw material and privileged access to hydrocarbons."

In Brazil, the state-owned Petrobras and China National Offshore Oil have been studying the viability of joint operations in refining, pipelines and exploration in their two countries and in other parts of the world. This comes after a \$1 billion Brazilian agreement with another Chinese company, Sinopec, to build a gas pipeline that will cross Brazil.

In Bolivia, Shengli International Petroleum Development has opened an office in the gas-rich eastern region and announced plans to invest up to \$1.5 billion, though it is awaiting a new hydrocarbons law being drafted before committing itself to deals.

In Ecuador, China National Petroleum and Sinopec have been looking at oil blocks that the government is trying to develop.

In Peru, the Chinese vice president signed a memorandum of understanding in January that could lead to more exploration deals. Currently, a subsidiary of China National Petroleum produces oil.

The Colombian state oil company has been discussing exploration and production with the Chinese. Part of the lure is in new, more beneficial terms for oil companies and an improving security situation.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

SECRET

2005 MAR 22 09 14 16
 18 MAR 2005

004
 3/29



ADMINISTRATION AND
 MANAGEMENT

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

Paul Butler
 3/25

Ray DuBois 3/18/05

SUBJECT: Boards, Commissions, Etc.

- In the attached snowflake, you noted that you were not impressed with the results of our initial reduction effort and asked if we should get some outsiders to augment our own internal efforts.
- The initial effort evaluated all 60 DoD Federal Advisory boards, task forces, and commissions (Tab A). However, the results were minimal because it focused primarily on quick successes. While I believe that other opportunities for reduction exist, affirmative action will require a more detailed analysis of all relevant factors and a careful calibration of the political sensitivities associated with their consolidation or elimination. In this regard, I believe that an independent outside review would be a credible source for obtaining a comprehensive and objective evaluation of the remaining boards and commission as a means of further reducing these numbers.
- For each existing advisory committee, we will:
 - Review its purpose, membership, and activities;
 - Examine budgetary expenditures over the past 5 years in dollars/man-years;
 - Assess "value added" provided;
 - Determine if "independent advice and recommendations" are being provided to the Department or if the committee is an extension of the DoD sponsor's staff;
 - Recommend retention, elimination, consolidation, or transfer to a different Federal Agency.
 - Ensure recommendations for elimination consider whether the mission has been accomplished, become obsolete, or has been assumed by another entity.

- My intention is to have an outside source under agreement within 30 days and authorize 120 days to complete the independent review.

RECOMMENDATION: With your concurrence, I will initiate the review.

Approved [Signature] Disapproved _____ Other _____

MAR 29 2005

Attachments: As stated

Excellant

Prepared by: Frank Wilson, (b)(6)

OSD 05478-05

AM 03412-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48129

| | | |
|----------|----------|------|
| INMA DU | INMA DSD | 3/25 |
| TSA SD | SA DSD | 3/15 |
| EXEC SEC | 3/23 | 0815 |
| GER MA | | |

18 APR 05

23 FEB



REGISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

ACTION MEMO

June 25, 2004 5:30PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef Action _____

FROM: Raymond F. DUBels, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Elimination of Unnecessary Committees, Boards, and Commissions

Ray DUBels
6/25/04

- This responds to the attached snowflake in which you requested that I review the DOD Advisory Boards and advise you as to which could be discontinued. The results of this review are as follows.
- Five Statutory Committees are either inactive, have lapsed charters, or have met less than once a year during the period FY99-FY03; i.e., Defense Environmental Task Force II, DoD-Government-Industry Advisory Committee on the Operation and Modernization of the National Defense Stockpile, Semiconductor Technology Council, Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee, and Uniform Formulary Beneficiary Advisory Panel. I believe that these have served their purpose and could be terminated.
- The President's Information Technology Advisory Committee, a Presidential Advisory Committee, has not met since FY00 and could also be eliminated.
- Four Statutory Committees could be combined into two. The Missouri River-North Dakota Task Force and the Missouri River-South Dakota Task Force could be merged into a single Missouri River Task Force. The DoD Domestic Advisory Panel on Early Intervention and Education for Infants, Toddlers, and pre-School Children and Children with Disabilities and the Overseas Dependent Schools National Advisory Panel on the Education of Dependents with Disabilities could be merged into a single Disabilities Advisory Body.
- The Board of Advisors, Marine Corp University, a Statutory Committee, and two Discretionary Committees, the Air University Board of Visitors and the Board of Advisors to the President, Naval War College, perform similar functions, are service centric, and are not optimally structured to foster jointness in military thinking. These could be combined into a single Board of Visitors for Professional Military Education. This new Board, with multi-service representatives, would emphasize jointness at the respective institutions.



- Similarly, the three Service Academy Boards (United States Air Force Academy Board of Visitors, the United States Military Academy Board of Visitors, and the United States Naval Academy Board of Visitors) could be combined into a single Board of Visitors for Military Academies, which would be constituted to foster a stronger joint focus.
- If effected, these actions would reduce the number of DoD Advisory Boards from 60 to 48, resulting in a 19% reduction.
- The committees and a brief description of each are listed at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION: If you concur, I will work with the General Counsel, Service Secretaries, and OSD Principal Staff Officials to take the actions necessary to achieve the recommended eliminations and consolidations.

Approved _____ Disapproved _____ Other _____

COORDINATION None

Attachments: As stated

Prepared By: Paul Granahan, (b)(6)

1. Statutory committees that are inactive or have served their purpose.

- **Defense Environmental Test Force II:** Studies and provides an annual report to Congress on the findings and recommendations concerning environmental restoration at military installations closed or realigned. (One meeting FY99-03)
 - **DoD-Government-Industry Advisory Committee on the Operation and Modernization of the National Defense Stockpile:** Established pursuant to Section 10(a) of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98b-1(a)), and Section 3305 of Public Law 102-484, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, advises the Secretary of Defense concerning significant issues relating to the operations of the National Defense Stockpile (NDS) and recommends ways to effect a modernization of the NDS consistent with NDS material requirements and sound business management practices description. (No meetings FY99-03)
 - **Semiconductor Technology Council:** Advises the Secretary of Defense on appropriate technology goals and appropriate level of effort for the research and development activities of Sematech; to link assessment by the semiconductor industry of future market and national security needs to opportunities for technology development through cooperative public and private investment; and, to seek ways to respond to the technology challenges for semiconductors by fostering precompetitive cooperation among industry, the Federal Government, and institutions of higher education. (No meetings FY99-03)
 - **Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee:** Advises the Secretary of Defense concerning the legal and policy considerations implemented by: a) the application of pattern queries/data correlation technology to counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence missions, and b) other DoD activities related to the war on terrorism. (Committee's work is complete)
 - **Uniform Formulary Beneficiary Advisory Panel:** Reviews and comments on the development of the uniform formulary by the DoD Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee. (No meetings since FY00)
- 2. Committees that have not met since FY00.**
- **President's Information Technology Advisory Committee:** Provides the National Science and Technology Council, through the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, with advice and information on high-performance computing and communications, information technology, and the Next Generation Internet.

3. Committees that are duplicative and could be merged.

- Merge into a single Missouri River Task Force.
- Missouri River - North Dakota Task Force: Advise the Secretary of the Army on a plan and projects to reduce siltation of the Missouri River in the State of North Dakota and to meet the objectives of the Pick-Sloan program in accordance with the Missouri River Protection and Improvement Act of 2000.
- Missouri River - South Dakota Task Force: Advise the Secretary of the Army on a plan and projects to reduce siltation of the Missouri River in the State of South Dakota and to meet the objectives of the Pick-Sloan program in accordance with the Missouri River Protection and Improvement Act of 2000.

• Merge into a single Disability Advisory Body.

- DoD Domestic Advisory Panel on Early Intervention and Education for Infants, Toddlers, and pre-School Children and Children with Disabilities: Advise the Director, Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) and Director, Domestic Dependence Elementary and Secondary Schools (DDDESS) unmet needs within the DDDESS for the education of children with disabilities, comment publicly on any proposed DDDESS rules or standards regarding the education of children with disabilities; and advise DDDESS in matters that have been identified as areas of concern by the Director, DoDEA and Director, DDDESS.
- Overseas Dependent Schools National Advisory Panel on the Education of Dependents with Disabilities: Advise the Director, DoD Dependent Schools (DoDDS), of unmet needs within the system for the education of children with disabilities; comment publicly on any ODS of Dependent Schools (ODS) rules or standards regarding the education of children with disabilities; and advise ODS in matters that have been identified as areas of concern by the Director, DoDDS.

4. Boards that perform similar functions for Service Schools and could be consolidated under a new charter to emphasize jobtasks in Professional Military Education.

- Air University Board of Visitors: Advise the Air University in sustaining effective programs pertaining to the educational, doctrinal, and research policies and activities of the Air University, and advise the Secretary of the Air Force, through the Commander, AFU.

- **Board of Advisors to the President, Naval War College:** Advises and assists the President, Naval War College in educational and support areas. Reports or opinions, suggestions and recommendations of the Board will be made to the President, Naval War College. The President, Naval War College shall advise the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations of opinions and recommendations made by the members of the Board which should receive consideration by a higher authority.
- **Board of Advisors, Marine Corp University:** Reviews develops, and provides recommendations on all aspects of the academic and administrative policies of the University; examines all aspects of the University's Professional Military Education operations; and provides such oversight and advice as is necessary to facilitate high educational standards and cost effective operations.

5. Boards that perform similar functions for the Military Academies and could be consolidated under a new charter to emphasize Johnson's Military Education.

- **United States Air Force Academy Board of Visitors:** Inquires into the morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Academy which the Board decides to consider.
- **United States Military Academy Board of Visitors:** Inquires into the morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Academy that the Board decides to consider.
- **United States Naval Academy Board of Visitors:** Inquires into the state of morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Naval Academy that the Board decides to consider and, within 60 days of its annual meeting, submits its findings and recommendation to the President of the United States.

May 25, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Advisory Boards

Please take a look at some of these advisory boards and let me know if there are any you think we could usefully discontinue.

Thanks.

Attach. *4/29/04 DuBois ^{INFO} ~~message~~ re DOD Advisory Boards*
~~5/14/04 ASD(IST) memo to Sec Def OSD 76611-04~~

DEB:ab
 052504-20

.....
 Please respond by 6/25/04

Information Paper on DoD Advisory Boards

- The Department currently utilizes 60 advisory boards, 34 of which were established at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense. Twenty-five were created in statute by the legislative branch, and one was established by Executive Order. A listing of these boards and their missions is at Tab 1. This listing is also found at the DoD Federal Advisory Committees website: <http://faca.dia.mil> under the Advisory Committees tab.
- DoD advisory boards which have private citizens as members are subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. I. This statute not only recognizes the merits of seeking advice and assistance from experts outside the government, but it allows the executive branch to receive advice that is relevant, objective, and open to the public.
- Department advisory boards can be established on a long-term basis to address continuing issues, or they can be established on a short-term basis to address a specific issue. Long-term boards can be established for two-year periods and can be renewed for additional two-year periods thereafter.
- Under the law, advisory board meetings must be announced in advance and must be open to the public. All or part of an advisory board meeting may be closed, however, based on one or more of the provisions of the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(e).
 - As an example, advisory board meetings may be closed to the public when the board will discuss classified information.
- The law also requires advisory boards to keep and make available to the public minutes of open and closed meetings, including an accurate description of and the resolution of each matter discussed by the board.
- Department advisory boards are independent entities. While they report their findings to the Department leadership, their recommendations are not subject to direction and control by the Department.
- It has been the Department of Defense's policy for the past 15 years to appoint all private sector board members as Consultants, also known as Special Government Employees. After agreeing to serve, potential members are vetted through the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (White House Liaison) and various Principal Staff Assistants who utilize the board

and/or receive their advice. Nominees are also required to fill out financial disclosure reports if the board they serve on makes recommendations that could affect the expenditure of government funds in the future. Board members may accept travel and per diem, but are rarely compensated directly for their work.

- The General Counsel of the Department of Defense notifies advisory committee members by letter to contact the Standards of Conduct Office (SOCO) for advice concerning ethics issues relating to their appointment. SOCO assures that the members' confidential financial disclosure reports are completed before their first meeting. Committee members also complete a Foreign Activities Questionnaire and execute a disqualification from participation in any particular matters involving financial interests listed on the confidential financial disclosure report. SOCO attorneys provide an ethics briefing to the Committee members. A guide for current committee members is distributed at a committee meeting and can be found at http://www.defenseink.mil/dodoc/defense_ethics under "ethics resource library" and under "DoD guidance."
- Advice provided to the Department has been critical to current transformation efforts, keeping the Department informed on cutting edge issues from the latest best business practices to state-of-the-art science and technology developments. This advice cannot be drawn exclusively from internal government sources. We simply do not have the expertise or those with professional networks with access to the kind of information needed. This advice often has a direct impact on future military operations and the welfare of the war fighter.
- If the Department were to use survey instruments and contractual arrangements to gather the advice provided by advisory boards, the costs would be significantly higher. Most support provided to these committees is done by federal employees who manage these committees as a collateral duty to their principal duties.

~~FOUO~~

February 23, 2005

al

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Boards, Commissions, Etc.

I hope you have moved ahead on this eliminating unnecessary boards and commissions matter.

My impression is that a 12% reduction from 60 to 53 is not impressive. Should we get some outsiders to take a look at it?

Thanks.

Attach:
7/1/04 SecDef memo to Ray DuBois
1/3/05 DuBois memo to SecDef

DHR:as
022205-21

.....
Please respond by 3/10/05

*Sir, ^{DR} 3/29
Response attached.
✓/R
Lt Col Lenzel*

MAR 25 2005

~~FOUO~~

February 23, 2005

334

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Boards, Commissions, Etc.

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7/1/04 SecDef memo to Ray DuBois
1/3/05 DuBois memo to SecDef

DHR:sa
022205-21

.....
Please respond by 3/10/05

23 FEB 05

OSD 05478-05

March 1, 2005

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen **Dick** Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Recruitment and Retention Memo & Tables

When I go over this recruiting and retention paper I must say, I cannot follow it. Why don't we try to rewrite it so that it is clear, as to whether something is good or bad, up or down, favorable or unfavorable.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/24/05 USD (P&R) Memo to SecDef

DIR:ss
030105-15

.....
Please respond by 3/24/05



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D C 20301-4000

2005 MAR 22 11:45 AM

INFO MEMO

March 18, 2005, 11:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, USD (P&R)

David S. C. Chu 18 March 2005
Signature and Date

Subject: Recruiting and Retention Update — Through February 2005—
SNOWFLAKE (Tab A)

Tab B provides a revised format for recruiting and retention results, per your request. **Green** means at desired level, **yellow** and **red** mean outside of established boundaries, with the difference a matter of degree. The colors are meant to draw attention, not to evaluate the result. Principal points are:

- **Active Recruiting.** Army recruiting fell short in February and is down by 1,747 accessions year-to-date. All other components met or exceeded accession goals. Army is confident it will make its full-year goal, as are the other Services.
- **Active Retention.** Army retention is weaker than we would like to see, but may be influenced by troops timing their re-enlistment decisions to receive bonuses tax-free in theater.
- **Reserve Recruiting.** The Army National Guard and the Army Reserve remain at risk of missing their 2005 recruiting objectives. They are aggressively using enlistment incentives and increasing their recruiting force (plus 1,400 to 4,100 in the Army National Guard; plus 734 to 1,774 in the Army Reserve).
- **Reserve Attrition.** We expect attrition to remain within acceptable limits. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve are aggressively using reenlistment bonuses to assist retention efforts.

Attachments:

Tabular Summaries — Recruiting and Retention

Prepared by: MAJ Harvey Johnson OUSD(P&R)/MPP (b)(6)



OSD 05481-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48141

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~~FOUO~~

March 1, 2005

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Recruitment and Retention Memo & Tables

When I go over this recruiting and retention paper I must say, I cannot follow it. Why don't we try to rewrite it so that it is clear, as to whether something is good or bad, up or down, favorable or unfavorable.

Thanks.

Attach
2124105 USD (P&R) Memo to SecDef

DHK ss
030105-15

.....
Please respond by 3/24/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48143



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D C 20301-4000

DA
3/1

INFO MEMO

February 24, 2005 - 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: DR. DAVID S. CHU, USD (P&R)
SUBJECT: Recruiting/Retention through January (and early bulletin on February)

And

David S. Chu 24 Feb 05

- Active recruiting and retention remain largely on track.
- Both Army and Marines report a challenging recruiting environment, and early Army recruiting results for February look weak.
- The Army and Marine *Corps* are both deploying additional recruiters, the **Army** increased its advertising, and it is using existing bonus authority more vigorously. You and the President assist us when you celebrate the value of military service.
- Active Army early career retention is also a bit weak, but senior retention has exceeded goal. Month-to-month figures may be affected by re-enlistment timing (re-enlistments in the Central Command area of operations makes bonuses tax-free).
- Army Reserve and Army Guard recruiting are starting to improve, thanks to additional bonus authority we sought and received from Congress last year, and the deployment of additional recruiters. But both components are about 20 percent below goal year to date. Strength is sustained by good retention. Internal polling suggests future pressure on retention, and we will be seeking additional retention incentives in this year's legislative package, while using vigorously the new authority we secured last year.
- Tables attached

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock, (b)(6)

| | | | |
|----------|---------|--------|--|
| MA SD | SMA DSD | 2/28 | |
| TSA SD | SA DSD | 2/28 | |
| EXEC SEC | | 1/2/25 | |
| ESR MA | | 1/2/25 | |



OSD 03783-05

Active Duty Enlisted Recruiting Through 31 Jan 08

| | Quantity | | | Quality* | | Outlook | |
|------------------|---------------|---------------|-------------|---------------------------------------|--|------------------------------------|--|
| | Accessions | Goal | % of Goal | % High School Diploma Graduate (HSDG) | % Scoring at / above 50th Percentile on Armed Forces Qualification (Cat I-III) | % of Next 12-Months Mission in DEP | Relative to Desired Begin-Year DEP Level |
| Army | 22,306 | 22,135 | 101% | 91% | 76% | 18% | Below |
| Navy ** | 10,708 | 10,762 | 100% | 97% | 71% | 69% | Above |
| Marine Corps *** | 10,228 | 10,038 | 102% | 98% | 69% | 57% | Above |
| Air Force | 4,553 | 4,553 | 100% | 99% | 82% | 23% | Below |
| Total | 47,793 | 47,488 | 101% | 96% | 73% | NA | NA |

*Quality Goal: 90% High School Diploma Grad, 60% top-half aptitude (I-III)

** Within Navy's desired range

*** Marine Corps did not miss its January accession goal or 1k YTD goal for new contracts. The February 3, 2005 article in the New York Times was triggered by a shortfall of 84 in January new contracts. Marine Corps recruiting is challenged, and signs that FY05 through is more difficult than FY04 include a lower DEP level and a larger number of critical MOSs showing less than 85% fill in accessions. While it will not be easy, we predict successful achievement of the FY05 Marine Corps active duty enlisted accession mission.

DEP = Delayed Entry Program, individuals currently under contract to join the military at a date up to one-year in advance. Each Service sets its own objective for begin-year DEP, based upon differences in recruiting strategy and DEP management procedures. Navy and Marine Corps desired levels are higher than Army and Air Force objectives.

HSDG performance for the Army omik up to 4,000 participants in the GED+ pilot program.

POC: Major **Angela Giddings**, OUSD(P&R)/MPP, 697-9272

Active Duty Enlisted Retention Through 31 Jan 08

| Service Retention Categories | Reenlisted (through Jan 08) | 2 QTR FY05 Goals | Performance | FY05 Goals |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------|-------------|------------|
| Army* | | | | |
| - Initial | 9,376 | 10,380 | 90.3% | 26,935 |
| - Mid Career | 8,338 | 8,909 | 93.6% | 23,773 |
| - Career | 5,892 | 5,042 | 116.9% | 13,454 |
| Navy*** | | | | |
| - Zone A | 58.4% | 53% | Exceeded | 53% |
| - Zone B | 69.1% | 69% | Met | 69% |
| - Zone C | 85.7% | 85% | Exceeded | 85% |
| Air Force | | | | |
| - 1st Term | 51% | 55% | Short | 55% |
| - 2nd Term | 49% | 75% | Short | 75% |
| - Career | 95% | 95% | Met | 95% |
| Marine Corps** | | | | |
| - 1st term | 4,633 | 2,855 | Exceeded | 5,710 |
| - Subsequent | 2,558 | 2,502 | Exceeded | 5,003 |

*Army, historically begins the fiscal year slow and finishes strong.

** Marine Corps does not provide quarterly goals. Goal is based on an OSD prorated projection using FY05 goals.

*** Navy decreased their FY05 goals for zones A & B consistent with efforts to downsize the force.

MAJ Harvey Johnson OUSD(P&R)/MPP (b)(6)

**Reserve Component Enlisted Recruiting
As of 31 January 2005**

| Reserve Enlisted Recruiting, FY05 Through January | Goal | Accessions | % of Goal |
|---|--------|------------|-----------|
| Army National Guard | 16,835 | 12,821 | 76% |
| * Army Reserve | 7,034 | 5,537 | 79% |
| Naval Reserve | 3,085 | 2,577 | 84% |
| Marine Corps Reserve | 2,835 | 2,862 | 101% |
| Air National Guard | 3,395 | 2,537 | 75% |
| Air Force Reserve | 2,968 | 2,803 | 94% |

*Preliminary - HRC Alexandria portion of the NPS performance is estimated

**Reserve Component Enlisted Attrition
As of December 31, 2004**

| Selected Reserve Enlisted Attrition Rate (in percent) | FY 2005 Target (Ceiling) | 2000 YTD (Dec) | FY 2003 YTD (Dec) | FY 2004 YTD (Dec) |
|---|--------------------------|----------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Army National Guard | 19.5 | 5.4 | 4.9 | 5.3 |
| Army Reserve | 28.6 | 6.5 | 4.8 | 5.4 |
| Naval Reserve * | 36.0 | 3.9 | 6.0 | 7.8 |
| Marine Corps Reserve | 30.0 | 7.1 | 6.5 | 4.6 |
| Air National Guard | 12.0 | 3.0 | 3.6 | 2.5 |
| Air Force Reserve | 18.0 | 5.7 | 3.6 | 3.5 |
| DOD | | 5.3 | 4.8 | 5.0 |

* Naval Reserve attrition is elevated probably as a result of their on-going drawdown in strength.

B

FY 2005 Active Duty Enlisted Recruiting Through February

| Active Duty Enlisted Recruiting (Preliminary Through February) | Quantity | | | Quality | | | |
|--|------------|--------|--|--|--|-----|---|
| | Accessions | Goal | % of Goal | % High School Diploma Graduate (HSDG); DoD Benchmark = 90% | % Scoring at/ above 50th Percentile on Armed Forces Qualification (Cat I- IIIA); DoD Benchmark = 60% | | |
| Army | 27,438 | 29,185 | 94% Y | 91% | G | 75% | G |
| Navy | 12,769 | 12,809 | 100% G | 96% | G | 71% | G |
| Marine Corps | 11,984 | 11,771 | 102% G | 98% | G | 69% | G |
| Air Force | 5,636 | 5,626 | 100% G | 99% | G | 82% | G |
| Total | 57,918 | 59,391 | 98% N/A | 95% | N/A | 73% | N/A |

FY 2005 Active Duty Enlisted Retention Through February

| Active Duty Enlisted Retention (Preliminary Through February) | Reenlisted Thru Feb 05 | Mission | Performance of Mission | FY05 Goals |
|---|------------------------|---------|---|------------|
| - Initial | 11,165 | 12,094 | 92.3% R | 26,935 |
| - Mid Career | 9,991 | 10,378 | 96.3% Y | 23,773 |
| - Career | 7,189 | 5,874 | 122.2% G | 13,454 |
| - Initial | 59% | 53% | Exceeded G | 53% |
| - Mid Career | 69% | 69% | Met mission G | 69% |
| - Career | 85% | 85% | Met mission G | 85% |
| - Initial | 55% | 55% | Met Mission G | 55% |
| - Mid Career | 59% | 75% | Short R | 75% |
| - Career | 94% | 95% | Short Y | 95% |
| Marine Corps | | | | |
| - Initial | 4,953 | 2,972 | Exceeded G | 5,944 |
| - Career | 3,072 | 2,540 | Exceeded G | 5,079 |

Active Components

| Reserve Component Enlisted Recruiting Through February | Accessions | Goal | % of Goal | % High School Diploma Graduate (HSDG); DoD Benchmark = 90% | | % Scoring at / above 50th Percentile on Armed Forces Qualification (Cat I-III A); DoD Benchmark = 60% | | |
|--|------------|--------|-----------|--|-----|---|-----|-----|
| | | | | | | | | |
| Army National Guard | 22,368 | 16,645 | 74% | R | 84% | R | 54% | R |
| Army Reserve | 8,838 | 7,261 | 82% | R | 92% | R | 72% | R |
| Navy Reserve | 3,754 | 3,316 | 88% | R | 91% | G | 71% | G |
| Marine Corps Reserve | 3,342 | 3,160 | 95% | G | 96% | G | 75% | G |
| Air National Guard | 4,207 | 3,230 | 77% | R | unk | R | unk | R |
| Air Force Reserve | 3,062 | 3,547 | 116% | G | 93% | G | 73% | G |
| Total | 45,571 | 37,159 | 82% | NIA | 91% | N/A | 69% | NIA |

FY 2005 Reserve Component Enlisted Attrition Through February

| Selected Reserve Enlisted Attrition Rate (in percent) | FY 2005 Target (Ceiling) | 2000 YTD (Feb) | FY 2004 YTD (Feb) | FY 2005 YTD (Feb) |
|---|--------------------------|----------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Army National Guard | 19.5 | 6.9 | 6.4 | 1.2 |
| Army Reserve | 28.6 | 9.0 | 6.4 | 7.3 |
| Naval Reserve | 36.0 | 10.4 | 9.9 | 10.6 |
| Marine Corps Reserve | 30.0 | 9.7 | 9.3 | 6.5 |
| Air National Guard | 12.0 | 4.4 | 4.6 | 3.5 |
| Air Force Reserve | 18.0 | 6.9 | 4.5 | 4.1 |
| DOD | | 7.5 | 6.5 | 6.8 |

Reserve Components

~~FOUO~~

JAN 31 2005
I-05/001460
ES-2188

320.2 Strategic

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM:
SUBJECT: Global Posture Issue

I really do ~~think~~ we have got to get finished with this Global Posture issue. All the open issues need to be brought to me in an orderly way so we can make the decisions and get on with life.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
012805-9

.....
Please respond by 2/3/05

31Jan05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48150

OSD 05497-05

31-01-05 19:12 18

~~FOUO~~

March 1, 2005

I-05/003019
ES-2487

3/13/05

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Dan Stanley
FROM: .
SUBJECT: Weldon and Missile Defense

Please get the transcript of the hearing where Curt Weldon said there is something waiting for you on your desk to do on missile defense in terms of biological sites.

I have no idea what he is talking about. Please find out and tell me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022805-49

.....
Please respond by 3/10/05

1 MAR 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 05498-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48151

~~FOUO~~

March 22, 2005

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Tony Principi

3233

Attached is a note I received from Senator Warner about Tony Principi. I fully agree that at the right moment, a recess appointment may be necessary. With Warner's support, it should be doable.

Attach.
3/21/05 Chmn Warner note to SecDef

DHR:ss
032205-55

~~FOUO~~

22MAR05

OSD 032205-55

March 21, 2005

1:30pm

Mr. Secretary —

RE: Senator Warner

Chairman Warner just called and asked me to pass on to you three messages:

1. He wanted to thank you for the pictures you sent, It confirmed what he has always known - that you have a sense of humor!
2. He watched you on *Meet the Press* and thought your performance was superb. He was especially pleased that you brought up the 4th ID and that if they had been able to come through Turkey, the insurgency would be less today. He said he has publicly made that point many times also.
3. He is very disappointed about the hold on the nomination of Tony Principi to be the BRAC chairman. The Senator has urged the President (via the Vice President) to use a recess appointment to put Secretary Principi in as BRAC Chairman. Senator Warner asked if you could please use your great influence to push for this solution as well.

V/R,

(b)(6)

A32-3

129
1293



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

SECRET
11 FEB 2005 11:23 AM

ACTION MEMO

2005 FEB 23 PM 12:12

I-05/001772-SP&1
ES-2273
DepSecDef _____

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mira R. Ricardel, ASD/ISP (Acting)

MAR 15

USD(P) copy received

SUBJECT: Update on the Status of the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) Study

Paul Butler
3/25

- Per your request, an update on the RNEP study:

Funding

- In response to your memo to Secretary Abraham (Tab A), the Department of Energy (DOE) budgeted \$4 M in FY '06 and \$16 M in FY '07 to complete a scaled-back study by April 2007.
- DOE plans to examine the feasibility of adapting the B83 warhead carried by the B-2 bomber to be an earth-penetrator.
- To save money and time, DOE no longer plans to study the feasibility of adapting the B61 warhead carried by B-2 and B-52 bombers for this role, which they say is less-promising.
- DoD's budget includes \$4.5 M in FY '06 and \$3.5 M in FY '07 for the study.

Chairman Hobson

- Chairman Hobson gave a speech to the Arms Control Association critical of the RNEP study and other Administration nuclear weapons efforts in which he repeated his criticism of the study stating:

"Neither the Department of Defense nor the Department of Energy has ever articulated to me a specific military requirement for a nuclear earth penetrator.. I even spent an entire day at Offutt Air Force Base getting briefed by STRATCOM, but I was never told of any specific military mission requiring the nuclear bunker buster."

- But, during his visit to STRATCOM on 22 March 2004, Admiral Ellis spoke to him about the importance of the RNEP study. And, in 2003, ASD J.D. Crouch met with Hobson and urged him to support the study, as have DOE officials.

| | | | | |
|--------|----------|---------|---------|------|
| | MA SD | SMA DSD | PO | 3/28 |
| (b)(6) | TSA SD | SA DSD | 1/28 | |
| | EXEC SEC | 3/24 | 12/0 | |
| | ESR MA | 1/5 | 3/24/03 | |

Prepared by: John Rood, OSD/Policy,
7 February 2005

OSD 05566-05

A-471, 61

15 Mar 05

(3)

11-L-0559/OSD/48154

- Last fall, you sent a letter (Tab B) with Secretary Abraham to the Congressional leadership expressing support for RNEP and other nuclear initiatives.
- Mr. Hobson told Linton Brooks, Administrator of DOE's weapons programs, that he spoke to you about RNEP and you did not feel strongly about it.
- A few weeks ago, Brooks met with Hobson again to inform him about NNSA's budget submission for FY 06. Brooks reported that Hobson stated, "To this day, no one from DoD had ever spoken with him on this subject [RNEP]."
- Two weeks ago, DASD John Rood met with Hobson's staff on this issue.
 - John explained that DoD validated military requirements (Tab C) for the defeat of hard and deeply buried targets, including some facilities for which there are no existing strike options (nuclear or non-nuclear) capable of destroying them.
 - Hobson's staff expressed concerns that pursuing RNEP sent the wrong signal to the world.
 - John explained that an important part of deterring rogue leaders like North Korea's Kim Chong-il was not allowing them to think they could take sanctuary in hardened facilities that are beyond the reach of existing weapons.
 - It was not clear whether Hobson's staff was open to persuasion on this and other related issues.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- In order to prevent the Department's position on this issue from being mischaracterized, I recommend that you sign the attached letter (Tab D) to Mr. Hobson. *General Cartwright reviewed and supports it.*
- Recently, Gen Myers testified before the House Armed Services Committee that both he and Gen Cartwright support the RNEP study. They may want to send similar letters as Hobson continues to represent that the uniformed military does not support the study.


COORDINATION: See Tab E

Attachments:

- A. Ltr to Sec Energy (U)
- B. Ltr to Hill Leaders (U)
- C. JROC Validation (S/NF)
- D. Proposed Ltr to Hobson (U)
- E. Coordination (U)

11-L-0559/OSD/48155

*Mr. Secretary,
The letter to Hobson uses the word "requirements" because the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) validated a Capstone Requirements Document for the defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets (Tab C). (4)
- Mira*




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Federal News Service

February 16, 2005 Wednesday

DEPARTMENT DEFENSE BRIEFING

28455 words

HEARING OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: FISCAL YEAR 2006 NATIONAL DEFENSE-AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST

CHAIR BY: REPRESENTATIVE DUNCAN HUNTER (R-CA)

WITNESSES: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD RUMSFELD; GENERAL RICHARD MYERS, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

LOCATION: 2118 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

REP. HUNTER: The committee will come to order. With the arrival of the president's budget request last week, and the supplemental appropriations request on Monday, Washington has officially launched the annual budget ritual. This year's cycle brings with it a number of important policy and budgetary decisions that will receive considerable debate and attention over the coming few months.

However, it's critical that the coming budget battles, while important, don't overshadow the most compelling policy questions facing our nation. Namely, we are a nation at war in a complex and rapidly changing security environment.

The daily headlines out of Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran or North Korea should be a constant reminder of this fact. At the same time, our armed forces are experiencing the most severe challenges and demands that have been placed on them in decades. This critical instrument of American national security policy is undergoing sweeping and fundamental change while simultaneously carrying most of the free world's burden in the global war on terrorism. We should recognize these circumstances as necessary and in keeping with our nation's interests. However, we must also recognize that these circumstances place policy choices before us of extraordinary importance that will shape the future security of our nation, the long-term effectiveness of our military, and the welfare of our men and women in uniform. And in this regard I'm concerned that as a nation we are gradually shifting focus away from these national security challenges to other pressing concerns

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intelligence says that there are 40,000 hard-core fighters and more than 200,000 part-time fighters. That's the only number that I have in front of me. Do you agree or disagree with his assessment?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Who is that?

REP. SKELTON: His name is General Mohammed Abdullah Shalani (ph).

SEC. RUMSFELD: Oh, I've seen that. I've got two in front of me that are different, one from CIA and one from DIA. So if --

REP. SKELTON: Could you share those with us?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Pardon?

REP. SKELTON: Could you share those with us?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I'd be happy to. They're classified.

REP. SKELTON: Well, all right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

GEN. MYERS: But they're considerably different than that number and considerably lower.

REP. HUNTER: I thank the gentleman. And it is the chair's prerogative to give more time to the ranking member, but we are going to adhere to this five-minute rule. I would say to questioners and questionees. So let me go to the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Weldon.

REP. CURT WELDON (R-PA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank each of you for coming in, for your service to the country.

Mr. Secretary, I couldn't be prouder of our troops and the leadership for the job that they've done, and I applaud you for the effort. And General, having visited the region and seen our troops and talked to them, their morale is high. And we're here to support and continue to support the kinds of resources that you need. In this year's Defense authorization markup, we'll give you that support.

I'm not going to talk about Iraq. We have a members' briefing this afternoon where I'll be asking some Iraqi questions. But I do want to bring two specific congressional initiatives to your attention. Mr. Secretary, I'd ask for your support for each of them.

The first is an effort -- and you both mentioned the control of proliferation as a major priority, and I agree with that, especially with weapons of mass destruction coming out of the former Soviet Union. And the first gets at the heart of cooperation with the Russians in two areas. One is to move forward with a new effort in joint missile defense cooperation.

As you know, General Kadish canceled the only cooperative program we had with the Russians, called RAMOS. There is no follow-on program. At his suggestion, last May I took General Olbring (sp) over to Moscow because we were not able to get a proper meeting with General Balievski (ph).

We had that meeting, and the Missile Defense Agency was ready to sign a contract to move forward with missile defense cooperation, both for targeting and for the use of their radars. The policy shop weighed in and wanted to review the team that was being dealt with, and General Balievski (ph) had been then elevated to the chief of the general staff.

Right now, on Doug Feith's desk -- and he's been very cooperative in this effort -- there's an assessment being done of working with a new group that reports directly to Putin on cooperation in both missile defense and in getting access to 39 of the most sensitive biological sites in Russia to do joint research and applications work.

Some of these sites have never been made available to us before. So I would just ask you to get a briefing from Undersecretary Feith. Let him know that as I briefed you and Secretary Wolfowitz a

11-L-0559/OSD/48157

year ago, that this is an effort that we should pursue aggressively, because the end result is to get better access from the Russians on their biological sites, as well as cooperation with them on missile defense.

The group that the Russians have organized is called the International Exchange Group, and they will be coming over here in the next two months. And they report directly to Putin.

The second issue deals with nuclear policy and the posture review. As I've talked to you, Mr. Secretary, repeatedly, members and the public don't fully understand all the time the implications of the use of nuclear weapons in the 21st century. And the best evidence of that lack of understanding was the rejection by the Congress of various aspects of your request last year, specifically for the (ARNEP?).

I can tell you, having met a delegation in North Korea one month ago with three of my Democrat colleagues from this committee and two Republicans on this committee, the North Koreans were very intrigued by the notion that we were looking to pursue a deep-earth penetrator to get at their underground complexes.

We told them it lost by one vote. And I would suggest to you, Mr. Secretary, that we ought to pursue the creation that we recommended last year of a nuclear posture commission -- it's now a non-profit organization -- that could provide consultation to the Congress and to the American people about the role of nuclear weapons as a part of our nuclear posture in the 21st century.

If that commission were, in fact, in place, perhaps you wouldn't have had the kind of actions that led to the defeat of the (ARNEP?) by one vote in the last session of Congress. And so I'd ask you to relook at that whole commission and the current activities of the Nuclear Strategy Forum, which is being co-chaired by Johnny Foster and Keith Payne (sp).

These tools are designed to help you in your effort at dealing with the use of nuclear weapons in the 21st century and the understanding of them by the Congress and by the people, and in the area of proliferation, to help you get at the sources of those weapons-of-mass-destruction technology that largely lie in the former Soviet states.

So I would just make those two comments. I do have a more detailed question about the posture review. And with the chairman's indulgence, I will add that into the record and ask you to respond to the actual specifics of the question in more detail.

Thank you.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Congressman, I'd be happy to get the briefing you suggested. As you know, we have about \$450 million in the budget for cooperative threat reduction and we spent up to \$25 million to \$30 million for RAMOS in 2004. And we have gone back in the budget for the robust nuclear earth penetrator study.

And if you think about it, the new technology enables anyone in the world to buy dual-use technology and dig underground, in rock, twice the height of a basketball net and the full length of a basketball court every day in rock. And it's available to anybody. And countries all across the globe are putting things underground, and we have no capability, conventional or nuclear, to deal with the issue of deep penetrator.

REP. HUNTER: I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ortiz.

REP. SOLOMON ORTIZ (D-TX): Mr. Secretary, Mr. Chairman, welcome to our committee today. I was looking at the chart that you have there: neutralize the insurgency; ensure legitimate elections, and so on down the line. To do that, how long will it take us to get there?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, I'd be happy to start, and maybe General Myers wants to comment. There's never been a war that was predictable as to length, casualty or cost in the history of mankind. Anyone who attempts to do it is, within a relatively short order, proven to be not quite as wise as they thought they were.

And so how long will it take? The goal is to have the Iraqis have the security capability to manage

11-L-0559/OSD/48158

Weldon.

mirrors the bill of Senator Sessions over in the Senate. And I, too, think that the difference in geography here does matter, that when you're under fire and you're in a combat zone, that that should have some special consideration. I wouldn't ask you to comment on that, and I'd be just pleased to work -- our bill, I think, has some 70 sponsors or thereabout, cosponsors that'll be pleased to work with you through this process.

General Myers, the dependence of our nation on our space assets is, I think, underestimated and also underappreciated. Could you please describe just briefly in an unclassified manner how we are to protect and defend those critical assets from some emerging threats?

GEN. MYERS: Well, when you talk about space systems and defense, you've got to think about three segments: the ground segment, how you protect that security of the ground segment; the uplinks; and then, of course, the on-orbit segment. And one of the first things you have to do is to know when you're under attack. And it's been one of those issues with space systems, that it's sometimes very hard to determine if, in fact, you're under attack. I think it was a Hughes satellite back in the '90s that went down. It had a lot of the pagers on it in this country and around the world. And it wasn't known for quite some time after analysis what actually happened. And that's what we face today.

And so, as we put new systems up, every new system that we develop is built with the idea in mind, okay, how can we provide warning that we're actually under attack? That's the, obviously, the first thing you have to think about. And so, we're doing that. But space systems by virtue of where they are and the ambiguity sometimes in malfunctions, whether it's a weather-related phenomenon or actually somebody bringing it under attack, has to be designed into the whole system. Ground -- the ground segment's a little bit easier in that we can provide the same kind of physical security that we provide to other fixed locations. And, of course, the up -- up and down-links are a challenge because they are susceptible to jamming.

I would say another important piece of that, so we understand it well, is that -- the intelligence, to know what threats are out there to our systems, has to be well developed. When I was commander of U.S. Space Command, that was one of the areas that I thought should be enhanced, that we needed more intel focus on threats to our space segment. Absolutely.

REP. EVERETT: Well, obviously, General (sic) Loy's doing an outstanding job out there, but are we considering hardening our assets?

GEN. MYERS: Yes, absolutely. And that was what I was alluding to, I think. And I -- we probably can't go much further in this -- but we've got to look -- warning is part of it, hardening is part of it. And for all new space systems, those will all be considered. And as it usually comes down to it, it'll come down to a risk equation. And we'll balance risk versus cost, and then try to determine what it is we specifically want to do to a given system.

REP. EVERETT: And I understand we're using a -- we're looking at using reversible methods in denying adversaries certain ways to get to our assets.

GEN. MYERS: There's all -- there are several concept of operations that can mitigate the impact of having large fixed assets in space and their vulnerability. And I think we probably ought to stop there in this audience.

REP. EVERETT: Let me comment on RNEP just a moment, which is under the jurisdiction of my subcommittee. I'm not all -- I'm not taking a position on outside groups, advising or -- proliferation and those issues.

Mr. Secretary, what I would like to -- to have a clear understanding, because we've passed this in subcommittee, we've passed it in full committee, we have narrowly passed it on the floor, and then we lost it in the appropriation process by the one vote. Could you please tell me directly if there's a military need for this, for robust earth -- nuclear earth penetrator?

SEC. RUMSFELD: That's a -- I guess our time is almost out -- again. It is a question that's difficult to answer, because sometimes they say "military requirement". And that's a formal process. There was no military requirement for military aircraft, for example. There was no military requirement for unmanned aerial vehicles until they came along. And so, what I believe, there is a need for the study -- which is what we're talking about here, and not a weapon. We're talking about taking

11-L-0559/OSD/48159

existing weapons and doing a study to see if they can be reduced in their power, their lethality to a level that's lower than the current weapons are so that they might have the ability to penetrate the earth in a way that could help protect the United States of America. I think that it is clearly in our country's interest to do the study. Has it --

You want to comment on whether there's a, quote, "military requirement" specifically?

GEN. MYERS: You bet. Our combatant commander that is charged by this nation to worry about countering the kind of targets, deeply buried targets certainly thinks there's a need for this study. And General Cartwright has said such. I think that. I think the Joint Chiefs think that. And so, the study is that. It's not a commitment to go forward with a system, it's just to see if it's feasible.

REP. HUNTER: (Gavels.) I'll give you a minute. (Gavels.)

REP. EVERETT: Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HUNTER: Okay. I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Arkansas, Dr. Snyder

REP. VIC SNYDER (D-AR): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentleman and Ms. Jonas, for being here today. We appreciate you. And we want you to succeed in everything that you do.

General Myers, you had mentioned a while ago -- I think it was you that mentioned the matrix room? And I have heard of Matrix the movie; I have never heard of matrix the room. (Light laughter.) And, I'm -- I mean, what is this room, and why -- if there's information in there, why can't that be transferred over here so that we could actually see it and make this matrix room for the day so we could find out how we're doing? Is there -- what is this room? Is it open to the press? Can we take constituents over there? Is it classified? What is the matrix room that I never heard of?

GEN. MYERS: Of lot of that is classified. Some of it is not classified. It's a room where we track our progress against our -- the task that I had, the objectives, and the task that I had on that board. And it's --

REP. SNYDER: Is there any reason that that information couldn't be compiled on a regular basis? I mean, just -- is it on the walls, or something, and transferred over here to the committee that we might -- or, do we need to take weekly or monthly tours over there to the matrix room?

GEN. MYERS: We are just standing it up. I mean, we've got it in operation, and it continues to evolve. We'll have to look at that. I can't answer that right now, sitting in front of you.

REP. SNYDER: But if we want to go --

GEN. MYERS: But I offered -- if anybody wants to come see it, I'll offer you to come see it.

REP. SNYDER: (Inaudible.)

GEN. MYERS: I don't know that you'd find a lot of interest in looking at it weekly. I think that's -- but certainly, the information is important, and that's why we're tracking it.

REP. SNYDER: Secretary Rumsfeld, you mentioned the election as being a wonderful step on the way, and I agree with you. And one of the issues that has -- was discussed prior to the election was, would there be adequate security? And you all beefed up forces, and whatever you did seemed to work well to give a period of calm there that -- for the period of time during elections.

One of the issues that has gone on for some time has been whether there was an adequate level of U.S. forces in Iraq. Would you respond, if you will, to this question?

11-L-0559/OSD/48160

TAB

A



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JAN 10 2005

FOR THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY

SUBJECT: Funding for Nuclear Programs in the FY 2006 Budget

- Our staffs have spoken about funding the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) study to support its completion by April 2007.
- I think we should request funds in FY06 and FY07 to complete the study.
- Securing funds from Congress in FY 2006 demonstrates that both Departments are in clear support.
- You can count on my support for your efforts to revitalize the nuclear weapons infrastructure and to complete the RNEP study.
- Let me know how I can assist you in this regard.

cc: Director, Office of Management and Budget

A-471.96

10 Jan 05

OSD 00718-05



TAB

B

SEP 8 2004


The Honorable Bill **Frist**, MD
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510


• **Dear Majority Leader Frist:**

We are writing to express our concern about several provisions in the FY 05 House Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill and accompanying report and their implications for our Nation's nuclear security. If specific funding levels, detailed in the report, are sustained, they would eliminate or severely restrict key programs and initiatives necessary to support the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile and restore a long-needed responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. Specifically, we oppose the elimination of FY 05 funds for *the Advanced Concepts Initiative, the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator study, and planning for a Modern Pit Facility.* Such actions are contrary to our efforts to transform the U.S. nuclear stockpile to be smaller and more responsive to the threats we may face in the 21st century. They also run counter to the FY 05 Defense Authorization bills passed by both the House and the Senate.

We also oppose reductions in funds for key warhead Life Extension Programs, underground nuclear test readiness, which would preclude achievement of the 18-month readiness posture considered prudent by the Administration, and other support activities essential for the continued safety and reliability of the stockpile. In summary, if the House's actions, cited above, are sustained in this or future years, it would impede our ability to ensure the effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent, especially as existing warheads age well beyond their design service lives. More broadly, it would disrupt critical elements of our strategy to adapt the Nation's nuclear deterrent forces to the defense needs of the 21st century. Finally, it would place at risk the significant reduction in the nuclear stockpile called for by President George W. Bush last May, and it could limit future opportunities for deeper stockpile reductions. We look forward to working with you to address our mutual concerns.

Sincerely,


Spencer Abraham
Secretary of Energy


Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense

SEP 8 2004

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear **Mr. Chairman:**

We are writing to express our concern about **several** provisions in the **FY 05 House** Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill and accompanying **report** and their implications for our Nation's nuclear **security**. If specific funding levels, detailed in the report, are **sustained**, **they would** eliminate or severely restrict key programs and initiatives necessary to support the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile and restore a *long-needed* responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. Specifically, we oppose the elimination of **FY 05 funds** for the Advanced Concepts Initiative, the Robust Nuclear **Earth** Penetrator study, and planning for a Modern Pit Facility. Such actions are contrary to our **efforts** to transform **the U.S.** nuclear stockpile to be **smaller** and more responsive to the threats we may face in the 21st century. **They** also run counter to the **FY 05** Defense Authorization bills passed by **both the House and the Senate**.

We also **oppose** reductions in **funds** for key warhead Life Extension Programs, underground nuclear test readiness, which would preclude **achievement** of the 18-month readiness posture considered prudent by the Administration, and other support activities essential for the continued safety and reliability of the stockpile. In summary, if the **House's** actions, cited above, are **sustained** in this or future years, it would impede our ability to ensure the effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent, especially as existing warheads age well beyond their design service lives. More broadly, it would disrupt critical elements of our **strategy** to adapt the Nation's nuclear **deterrent** forces to the defense **needs** of the 21st century. Finally, it **would** place at **risk** the significant reduction in the nuclear stockpile called for by President George W. **Bush** last May, and it could limit future opportunities for deeper stockpile reductions. We **look** forward to working with you to **address our mutual concerns**.

Sincerely,



Spencer Abraham
Secretary of Energy



Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense

SEP 8 2004

The Honorable C.W. "Bill" Young
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515


Dear Mr. Chairman:

We are writing to express our concern about several provisions in the FY 05 House Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill and accompanying report and their implications for our Nation's nuclear security. If specific funding levels, detailed in the report, are sustained, they would eliminate or severely restrict key programs and initiatives necessary to support the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile and restore a long-needed responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. Specifically, we oppose the elimination of FY 05 funds for the Advanced Concepts Initiative, the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator study, and planning for a Modern Pit Facility. Such actions are contrary to our efforts to transform the U.S. nuclear stockpile to be smaller and more responsive to the threats we may face in the 21st century. They also run counter to the FY 05 Defense Authorization bills passed by both the House and the Senate.

We also oppose reductions in funds for key warhead Life Extension Programs, underground nuclear test readiness, which would preclude achievement of the 18-month readiness posture considered prudent by the Administration, and other support activities essential for the continued safety and reliability of the stockpile. In summary, if the House's actions, cited above, are sustained in this or future years, it would impede our ability to ensure the effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent, especially as existing warheads age well beyond their design service lives. More broadly, it would disrupt critical elements of our strategy to adapt the Nation's nuclear deterrent forces to the defense needs of the 21st century. Finally, it would place at risk the significant reduction in the nuclear stockpile called for by President George W. Bush last May, and it could limit future opportunities for deeper stockpile reductions. We look forward to working with you to address our mutual concerns.

Sincerely,


Spencer Abraham
Secretary of Energy


Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense

SEP 8 2004

The Honorable J. **Dennis** Hastert
Speaker of the **U.S.** House of Representatives
Washington, **D.C.** 20515


Dear **Mr.** Speaker:

We **are** writing to express **our** concern about several provisions in the **FY 05** House Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill **and** accompanying report and their **implications for our Nation's nuclear security**. If **specific funding levels, detailed in the report, are sustained, they** would eliminate or severely restrict key programs **and** initiatives necessary to support **the Nation's** nuclear weapons stockpile and restore a long-needed responsive nuclear **weapons** infrastructure. Specifically, **we** oppose **the elimination of FY 05 funds for the** Advanced Concepts Initiative, the Robust Nuclear **Earth** Penetrator study, and planning for a Modern Pit Facility. Such actions are contrary to **our** efforts to transform **the U.S.** nuclear stockpile to **be** smaller and more responsive to the threats **we** may face in the **21st century**. They also run counter to **the FY 05** Defense Authorization bills passed by both the House and **the** Senate.

We also oppose reductions in funds for key warhead Life Extension **Programs,** underground nuclear test readiness, which would preclude achievement of the **18-month** readiness posture considered prudent by the Administration, and other support activities essential for the continued safety and reliability **of the** stockpile. In **summary,** if **the** House's actions, cited above, are sustained **in this** or future years, it would impede **our** ability to **ensure** the **effectiveness** of our nuclear deterrent, especially **as existing** warheads age well beyond their design **service** lives. More broadly, it would disrupt critical elements of **our** strategy to adapt the Nation's nuclear deterrent **forces to the defense needs of the 21st century**. Finally, it would place at risk the significant reduction in the nuclear stockpile called for by President George **W. Bush** last May, and it could limit future opportunities for deeper stockpile reductions. We look forward to working with you to address **our** mutual concerns.

Sincerely,


Spencer Abraham
Secretary of Energy


Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense

TAB

C


~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

This Page is Unclassified

Last Updated: 1 Dec 00

**HARD AND DEEPLY BURIED
TARGET (HDBT) DEFEAT
CAPSTONE REQUIREMENTS
DOCUMENT (CRD) (U)**

Submitted by:



CHARLES R. HOLLAND
General, U.S. Air Force
Commander in Chief
U.S. Special Operations Command



RICHARD W. MIES
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander in Chief
U.S. Strategic Command

~~CLASSIFIED BY: Multiple Sources Reason: 1.5 (a), (e), or (g)
DECLASSIFY ON: X1, X3~~

OPR: USSTRATCOM/J54, USSOCOM/SCOP

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

This Page is Unclassified

11-L-0559/OSD/48169

Last Updated: 1 Dec 01

1. (U) Definition. A Capstone Requirements Document (CRD), as defined in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01A, "acts as a bridge between the mission need statement (MNS) and program operational requirements documents (ORDs) .., (and) identifies the overarching system requirements for a broad mission need."

2. (U) Background. In his memorandum, (JROCM 115-99, 18 Oct 99), the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) requested that the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) co-lead a Senior Warfighter Forum (SWARF) to develop a Capstone Requirements Document (CRD) for the defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets (HDBT). This document satisfies that request. The JROC reviewed and approved the HDBTD CRD and validated the Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) (JROCM 009-01, 12 Jan 01).

3. (U) Purpose. Requirements for HDBT defeat systems must reflect the needs of the Joint Force Commander (JFC). HDBTs may house strategic assets such as leadership, major command and control functions, and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Existing systems cannot adequately address a small, but critical, portion of the postulated threat during the period from 2002 to 2010. This document identifies the overarching requirements for a Family of Systems (FoS) that can defeat enemy HDBTs, to include critical strategic facilities. This CRD is intended to guide the Services in the development of ORDs for future HDBT defeat systems, to facilitate the incorporation of HDBT defeat-specific requirements into existing systems and architectures, and to promote the development of interoperable systems. It will also provide a vehicle for the JROC to maintain oversight of HDBT defeat acquisition programs.

4. (U) Applicability. The requirements identified in this CRD apply to any Service, acquisition authority, or program executive office involved in identifying and further articulating HDBT defeat requirements in ORDs. This CRD is specifically applicable to those systems whose primary mission is HDBT defeat. It must be considered when developing requirements for all other systems whose primary mission has a potential role in HDBT defeat. The JROC will use this CRD as a checklist to ensure that requirements contained herein are addressed by the Services.

TAB

D



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

The Honorable David Hobson
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Hobson:

As a follow up from our recent meeting, I would like to reiterate my support for completion of the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) study. Recent Defense Department studies documented the worldwide proliferation of hard and deeply buried facilities in a number of potentially hostile states. The RNEP study is intended to examine the feasibility and desirability of adapting an existing nuclear warhead to defeat such facilities.

We have validated military requirements for a range of capabilities to defeat hard and deeply buried targets. There are some facilities for which existing strike options (nuclear or non-nuclear) are inadequate for this purpose.

The RNEP study is important to evaluate concepts to fill a validated military mission. Furthermore, such a weapon would have the benefit of improving our ability to deter the leaders of rogue states. In order for deterrence to operate effectively, such leaders should not be able to count on taking sanctuary in hardened facilities beyond the reach of existing weapons.

It is also important that any Secretary of Defense be able to pursue studies that will assist in making informed decisions.

Sincerely,

CC: The Honorable Jerry Lewis
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations



11-L-0559/OSD/48172

TAB

E

Coordination
on
Request for Current Status of RNEP Study
7 February 2005

ASD/ Legislative Affairs

Dan Stanley



W/edote

April 11, 2005

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: RNEP Study

You were there at the meeting with Hobson. Please read this material from Mira, and see if the letter conforms to the way we left it. I don't think it does.

Please check it with Dale, ~~or~~ whoever you have to, and then let's get the letter revised and send it along.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/15/05 Ricardel memo to SD [OSD05566-05]

DHR:dh
041105-24 (ts laptop)

.....
Please respond by 4/21/05

A-471.61

11 APR 05

15 MAY 05

~~FOUO~~
TAB A
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 FEB 23 PM 4:40

February 15, 2005

Poland

TO: Gen Pete Pace
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Poles' Training Request

The Minister of Defense of Poland wants someone to talk to Petraeus about Poles doing some training in their area in August.

DHR:as
021403-63

.....
Please respond by

3/10/05

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

15 Feb 05

OSD 05612-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48176

~~FOUO~~

TAB

March 11, 2005

785

TO: Dan Stanley
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: SVTC with Congressional Members

We need to think through this idea of having GEN Petraeus participate in a SVTC with the Congressional Members. We need to develop a policy and work it through with the leadership.

Thanks.

DHR:sm
031105-15

.....
Please respond by 3/24/05

~~FOUO~~

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/48177

OSD 05717-05

032

11 MAR 05



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC 20318-9999

SECRET

CM-2403-05 2005 MAR 25 AM 8:53
24 March 2005

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

ASAM 3/24

SUBJECT: SVTC with Congressional Members (SF 985)

- Answer. In response to your issue (TAB), we should avoid having the Chief of **Security** Transition-Iraq, LTG David Petraeus, USA, participate in a SVTC **with** congressional members.
- Analysis. **As** a matter of policy, congressional witness requirements concerning Iraq should be satisfied by appropriate staffs in the Pentagon or by the US Central Command CONUS Headquarters. Allowing SVTCs with specific theater commanders has the potential to **bypass** the chain-of-command in the **exchange of information**. We should continue the practice of making commanders available to Congress when they are present in the National Capital Region.

COORDINATION: NONE

cc: ASD/LA

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: Colonel Michael Barron, USA; OCJCS Legislative Assistant;

(b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48178

OSD 05717-05

~~TOP SECRET~~
TAB

March 11, 2005

985

TO: Dan Stanley
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 21

SUBJECT: SVTC with Congressional Members

We need to think through this idea of having GEN Petraeus participate in a SVTC with the Congressional Members. We need to develop a policy and work it through with the leadership.

Thanks.

DHR:m
031105-15

.....
Please respond by 3/24/05

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tab

OSD 05717-05

~~FOUO~~

APR 12 2005

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice
Honorable Margaret Spellings

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Handwritten signature]*

SUBJECT: Language Initiative

Attached is a memo I received from Doug Feith after I asked him about the idea of having a three-Department effort on foreign language. Why don't you read this, and then let's each assign someone to work on how we want to proceed going forward.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/23/05USD(P) memo to SecDef

DHR:ah
041105-22 (ts Laptop)

091.4

12 Apr 05

~~FOUO~~

2

15 Feb 05

OSD 05719-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48180

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
00A
4/11

2005 MAR 25 AM 9:15

INFO MEMO

②

DepSecDef _____

I-05/002328
ES-2332

Paul Butler
3/28
PUB

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

231 MAR 25
MAR 23 2005

SUBJECT: Secretary Rice's Language Initiative

- You asked us to look into Secretary Rice's idea for a joint DoD-State-Department of Education language education program (snowflake attached).
- Our initial take is that Secretary Rice is interested in an effort tantamount to the National Defense Education Act, only with more focus on War on Terror-related languages versus Russian.
- Her proposal has merit.
- Currently, each of the three ^{USG} departments has language education responsibilities and assets with differing degrees of capability.
 - DoD's program (Defense Language Institute, or DLI) is the largest and accepts other agencies' students with reimbursement; the curriculum emphasizes grammar because 70% of students are crypto-analysts.
 - o DLI does the most foreign language education R&D, technology support, and curricula development, but has no authority or funding to share results with other agencies.
 - State's program (Foreign Service Institute, or FSI) offers instruction in a larger number of languages and emphasizes speaking; 30% of the students are from DoD, mostly attaché and security assistance officers.
 - Education's program is oriented toward curricula support of public schools; it does not include an educational facility. They do provide grants to 14 educational institutions to promote the teaching of foreign languages.

| | | | |
|----------|--------|---------|------|
| MA SD | SMR/SD | 5/27 | 5/24 |
| TSA SD | SA DSD | 3/28 | |
| EXEC SEC | 3/28 | 4/21 | |
| ESR MA | 151 | 3/25/03 | 1/03 |

OSD 05719-05
3

- This could be an opportunity to apply a Goldwater-Nichols approach to interagency cooperation.
 - We could explore creating a “center of excellence,” or a national-level agency, to help coordinate foreign language education among the three departments.
 - The Regional Centers could serve as good venues for interagency language and regional education.
 - National-level attention could energize foreign language education beginning at the kindergarten level.
- We recommend expanding Secretary Rice’s concept to include the difficult languages of national security relevance, e.g., Modern Standard Arabic and multiple dialects, Farsi, Dari, Pashto, Urdu, Tagalog, Indonesian, Chinese and Korean.
- We recommend universal testing to identify individual aptitude for learning languages. Those with high aptitude should receive **priority** training.
- National intelligence requirements also should be factored into any national-level language education program. Thus, we should consider involving the intelligence community in this effort.
- We are coordinating with David Chu on a proposed approach to the initiative and will report to you **after** further discussions with Secretary Rice’s staff.

COORDINATION:
ASD (ISA)
DUSD (P&R)

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Susanne Stetzer and Dan Devlin, ISA (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

APR 12 2005

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice
Honorable ~~Margaret~~ Spellings

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Language Initiative

Attached is a memo I received from Doug Feith after I asked him about the idea of having a three-Department effort on foreign language. Why don't you read this, and then let's each assign someone to work on how we want to proceed going forward.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/23/05USD(P) memo to SecDef

DHR:ah
041105-22 (is Laptop)

~~FOUO~~

2

11-L-0559/OSD/48183

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 MAR 25 AM 9:15

DepSecDef _____

1-051002328

ES-2332

INFO MEMO

②

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Paul Butler
3/25
PUB

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Handwritten signature and stamp: MAR 23 2005

SUBJECT Secretary Rice's Language Initiative

- o You asked us to look into Secretary Rice's idea for a joint DoD-State-Department of Education language education program (snowflake attached).
- o Our initial take is that Secretary Rice is interested in an effort tantamount to the National Defense Education Act, only with more focus on War on Terror-related languages versus Russian.
- o Her proposal has merit.
- o Currently, each of the three ^{DSB} departments has language education responsibilities and assets with differing degrees of capability.
 - DoD's program (Defense Language Institute, or DLI) is the largest and accepts other agencies' students with reimbursement; the curriculum emphasizes grammar because 70% of students are crypto-analysts.
 - o DLI does the most foreign language education R&D, technology support, and cumcula development, but has no authority or funding to share results with other agencies.
 - State's program (Foreign Service Institute, or FSI) offers instruction in a larger number of languages and emphasizes speaking; 30% of the students are from DoD, mostly attaché and security assistance officers.
 - Education's program is oriented toward cumcula support of public schools; it does not include an educational facility. They do provide grants to 14 educational institutions to promote the teaching of foreign languages.

| | | | |
|----------|--------|---------|------|
| MA SD | SM/ASD | SP3 | 3/20 |
| TSA SD | SA DSD | 3/29 | |
| EXEC SEC | 3/25 | 4/21 | |
| ESR MA | 151 | 3/25/03 | 1/03 |

OSD 05719-05

3

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 - We could explore creating a "center of excellence," or a national-level agency, to help coordinate foreign language education among the three departments.
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- We are coordinating with David Chu on a proposed approach to the initiative and will report to you after further discussions with Secretary Rice's staff.

COORDINATION:

ASD (ISA)
DUSD (P&R)

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Susanne Stetzer and Dan Devlin, ISA, (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

205 MAR 25 AM 9:10
February 15, 2005

I-05/002328
ES-2332

TO: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Condi's **Idea** for a Language Program

Condi **wants to do an** education program relating to languages with State, Defense and the **Department** of Education.

DHR ss
021405-57

.....
Please respond by 3/17/05

0914

15 Feb 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 05719-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48186

13-02-05 17:47:00

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2005 MAR 25 11 9: 15

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef _____

I-05/002328
ES-2332

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Handwritten signature
23 MAR 05
MAR 23 2005

SUBJECT: Secretary Rice's Language Initiative

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- Her proposal has merit.
- Currently, each of the three ^{US6} departments has language education responsibilities and assets with differing degrees of capability.
 - DoD's program (Defense Language Institute, or DLI) is the largest and accepts other agencies' students with reimbursement; the curriculum emphasizes grammar because 70% of students are crypto-analysts.
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0914

23 MAR 05

15 FEB 05

OSD 05719-05

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 - The Regional Centers could serve as good venues for interagency language and regional education.
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- o National intelligence requirements also should be factored into any national-level language education program. Thus, we should consider involving the intelligence community in this effort.
- o We are coordinating with David Chu on a proposed approach to the initiative and will report to you after further discussions with Secretary Rice’s staff.

COORDINATION:

ASD (ISA)
DUSD (P&R)

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Susanne Stetzer and Dan Devlin, ISA

(b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

MAR 10 2005

984

Afghanistan

TO: Gen Pete Pace
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Afghan and Iraqi Security Forces Updates

I want to add some pages in the Afghan and Iraqi Security Forces Updates that give greater clarity as to the number of people that are police, the number that are mobile, the number that are mechanized, and so forth.

Senator Levin continues to claim our presentations are misleading -- which, of course, is inaccurate. They ask how many we have trained, we tell them and then they say it is misleading. There ought to be a way to add some more information.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
030905-21

.....
Please respond by 3/17/05

10MAR05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 05725-05

~~FOUO~~

March 21, 2005

TO: Tina Jonas
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Tracking Monthly Costs

Do you have some way of tracking monthly costs, so I can see if there is some sort of an anomaly?

Thanks.

DHR:as
032105-BS

.....
Please respond by _____

*Monthly Costs
of War OIF/OEF*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 05733-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48190



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

INFO MEMO

2005 MAR 25 11:01 AM

COMPTROLLER

March 24, 2005, 5:00 PM


FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *TWJ*

SUBJECT: Tracking Monthly Costs


- You asked if we had “some way of tracking monthly costs, so that I can see if there is some **sort of an anomaly?**”
- The following chart provides a monthly track of obligations for OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) during FY 2005. The average cost for OIF is about \$5.2 billion for FY 2005. (For FY 2004, total monthly obligations averaged about \$4.3 billion.)
 - Obligations in October (\$7.9 billion) were higher due to the annual obligation for the logistical support contract and increased costs associated with troop rotations.
 - Obligations in **January** (\$6.1 billion) were higher because of the deployment of 16,000 additional troops for the Iraqi elections.

FY 2005 OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM OBLIGATIONS
(Dollars in Billions)



o The following chart provides a monthly track of obligations for OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) during FY 2005. The average cost for OEF is about \$0.8 billion for FY 2005. (For FY 2004, total monthly obligations also averaged \$0.8 billion.)

- The December obligations (\$0.9 billion) were higher because of the increased costs associated with the beginning of troop rotations.
- The January obligations (\$1.0 billion) were higher primarily due to increased operating tempo and further troop rotations (total troops surged to almost 18,800).



- We recently advised the Services that we intend to conduct the annual midyear review in May. We will use the OIF and OEF obligation data, along with other information, to assess our financial position and cash flow requirements.
- o If required, we will submit a prior approval reprogramming action to the Congress to realign resources to finance the "must fund" requirements and other high priorities.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared By: Roberto Rodriguez, (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

March 21, 2005

TO: Tina Jonas
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Tracking Monthly Costs

Do you have some way of tracking monthly costs, so I can see if there is some sort of an anomaly?

Thanks.

DHR:as
032105-8S

.....
Please respond by _____

*Monthly Costs
of War OIF/OEF*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48193

January 4, 2005

933

TO: Gen Pete Pace

CC: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.A. [Signature]*

SUBJECT: Views from Generals

I know John Abizaid and George Casey periodically hold Commanders' Conferences. If you agree it would be worthwhile, please **ask** them to discuss the below-listed questions with their generals and senior colonels and provide some feedback to us. I don't need **to** know names, but it would be helpful for me to have a sense of what the commanders at various levels **think** on these **issues**. Please include minority opinions and their reasoning.

For example, I would be interested in knowing whether or not they believe the US **and** the coalition:

1. Are doing about the **right** things overall, and with about the right number of troops in their respective areas of operation (*specify their AORs*).
2. Need more troops and, if so, where and for what purposes,
3. Would be better off with fewer US troops (*where*) and doing less of **what** types of activities.
4. Would be better off with the same (larger or smaller) number of troops, but refocusing coalition efforts to put *X % (i.e., 10%? 50? 90%?)* of our forces on the tasks of organizing, training, equipping, and mentoring Iraqi Security forces.
5. Should cut back dramatically on US-only patrols and focus most of their efforts on joint patrols and/or mentoring **Iraqi** Security forces.
6. Put more coalition forces Iraq's borders (*with Syria? Iran? and/or on Baghdad? Mosul? other?*), but remain available to conduct raids throughout the country as required.
7. Should establish a larger presence in the relatively secure North and South, and less coalition presence in the Sunni Triangle
8. Other.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010405-3

.....
 Please respond by 2/3/05

OSD 05755-05

Iraq

4 Jan 05



OFFICE OF THE VICE CHAIRMAN
of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff

6 JAN 05

MEMO TO: GEN ABIZAID
GEN CASEY

JOHN AND GEORGE,

REQUEST YOU TAKE SECDEF'S
SNOWFLAKE FOR ACTION.

PLEASE PROVIDE RESPONSE(S) TO
ME.

THANKS!

VR/
J. St

DAVE

Please check status of their response.

VR/
J. St 2/25

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

DJS

OCT 18 2004

882

TO: Gen Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Options

Qatar

I believe you are going to get back to me with options on Qatar headquarters.

Thanks.

DHR:sa
101504-20

.....
Please respond by 11/1/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 05782-05

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/48196

18 Oct 04

March 25, 2005

TO: GEN John Abizaid

c c : Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Recommendations on Iraq and Afghanistan

Open

As we discussed on the phone, please make sure the recommendations you come in with on Afghanistan include options, rather than a single point recommendation.

And also make sure it includes logistics.

By the same token, we are going to have to look at logistics as we look at force levels in Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
032505-19

.....

Please respond by 4/7/05

25 MAR 05

OSD 05810-05

March 14, 2005

TO: Tina Jonas
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meeting Financial Standards

Is it true that 6 of 63 departments in the Defense Department can meet the proper financial standards?

Please give me a report on what the **status** is by external measurements, and then give me a program as to how we are going to get on track in the next two years. I **am** sure Dov, Larry and you have been working on **this** for four years, so we ought to have a schedule and a program.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031405-7

.....
Please respond by 4/7/05

100.

14 Mar 05

25 Mar 05

OSD 05811-05

~~FOUO~~

March 29, 2005

11-L-0559/OSD/48199

TO: Tina Jonas

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Ken Krieg

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meeting Financial Standards

Thank you for sending along our status.

What I would like to see is your plan to get us on track. I would like it to have measurable goals and specific dates by which you will move us along to success in two years.

Thanks.

Attach.
 3/14/05 SecDef Memo to USD (COMPT)
 3/25/05 USD (COMPT) Memo to SecDef

DHR:ss
 32805-23

.....
 Please respond by 4/7/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48199

OSD 05811-05



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100



INFO MEMO 255 MAR 25 PM 5:24

March 25, 2005, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *TWJ*

SUBJECT: Financial Statements

- You asked: "Is it true that 6 of 63 departments in the Defense Department can meet proper financial standards?" You also asked for a report on our financial status -- by external measurements (TAB A).
- The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) judge our overall financial condition based upon our ability to achieve an unqualified or "clean" opinion.
- Our financial status is measured by OMB as part of the President's Management Agenda. We are "red" due to our inability to obtain a clean opinion. We are "yellow" on progress. GAO cites the inability of DoD to obtain a clean opinion in its "High Risk" series -- a list of the government's key challenges (TAB B).
- DoD's consolidated financial statements include 59 entities. Six of those entities (representing 16% of our assets and 49% of our liabilities) have received a clean opinion for 2004. One additional entity received an opinion that noted one minor exception preventing a clean opinion. In 2001, only three entities received a clean opinion (TAB C).
- To achieve a clean opinion, 11 material weaknesses must be eliminated. This will require: (1) hundreds of business process improvements and (2) successful deployment of new information technology (IT) systems across DoD.

100.5

25 MAR 05



OSD 05811-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48200

- Process improvements have yielded results (e.g., elimination of two material weaknesses). Progress on IT systems has lagged. This is largely due to the complexity of the task and the program management structure. We are addressing these issues and will forward our plan to you shortly. TAB D is a list of financial management accomplishments.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Terri McKay, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/48201

March 14, 2005

TO: Tina Jonas
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meeting Financial Standards

Is it true that 6 of 63 departments in the Defense Department can meet the proper financial standards?

Please **give** me a report on what the **status** is **by** external measurements, and then give me a program **as** to how we are going to get on track in the next two years. I **am** sure Dov, Larry **and** you have been working **on** this for four years, so we ought to have a schedule and a program.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031405-7

.....
Please respond by 4/7/05

OSD 05811-05

Executive Branch Management Scorecard

Current Status as of December 31, 2004

Progress in Implementing the President's
Management Agenda

| | Current Status as of December 31, 2004 | | | | | Progress in Implementing the President's Management Agenda | | | | |
|-------------|--|----------------------|----------------|-------|-----------------------|--|----------------------|----------------|-------|--------------------------|
| | Human Capital | Competitive Sourcing | Financial Perf | E-Gov | Budget/Pe Integration | Human Capital | Competitive Sourcing | Financial Perf | E-Gov | Budget/Perf. Integration |
| AGRICULTURE | ○ | ○ | ● | ○ | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| COMMERCE | ●↑ | ○ | ●↑ | ○ | ○ | ● | ○ | ● | ● | ● |
| DEFENSE | ○ | ○↓ | ● | ● | ○ | ● | ○ | ○ | ● | ● |
| EDUCATION | ○ | ○ | ● | ○ | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ● |
| ENERGY | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| EPA | ○ | ○ | ● | ● | ○ | ● | ○ | ● | ● | ● |
| HHS | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ● |
| DHS | ○ | ○ | ● | ● | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ● |
| HUD | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ● | ● |
| INTERIOR | ○ | ○ | ● | ○ | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| JUSTICE | ○ | ○ | ● | ○ | ○ | ● | ● | ○ | ● | ● |
| LABOR | ● | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| STATE | ● | ○ | ●↑ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| DOT | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| TREASURY | ○ | ●↑ | ● | ● | ○ | ● | ○ | ○ | ● | ● |
| VA | ○ | ● | ● | ○↓ | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ● |
| AID | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ● | ○ | ● | ● | ● |
| CORPS | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ● |
| GSA | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ● |
| NASA | ● | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| NSF | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| OMB | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| OPM | ● | ● | ●↓ | ○ | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ● |
| SBA | ○ | ○ | ● | ○↓ | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| SMITHSONIAN | ● | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| SSA | ● | ○ | ● | ●↑ | ○ | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ |

↑ ↓ Arrows indicate change in status since evaluation on September 30, 2004



For additional information about this high risk area, contact Gregory D. Kutz at (202) 512-9095 or kutzg@gao.gov.

Why Area Is High Risk

Taken together, DOD's financial management deficiencies represent **the single largest obstacle to achieving an unqualified opinion on the U.S. government's consolidated financial statements**. DOD continues to face financial management problems that are pervasive, complex, long-standing, and deeply rooted in virtually all its business operations. DOD's financial management deficiencies adversely affect the department's ability to control costs, ensure basic accountability, anticipate future costs and claims on the budget, measure performance, maintain funds control, prevent fraud, and address pressing management issues. GAO first designated this area as high risk in 1996; it remains so today.

What Remains to Be Done

GAO has made numerous recommendations intended to improve DOD's financial management. Essential elements of DOD's financial management reform include (1) sustained leadership and resource control, (2) clear lines of responsibility and accountability, (3) plans and related results-oriented performance measures, and (4) appropriate individual and organizational incentives and consequences. However, successful, lasting reform in this area will only be possible if implemented as part of a comprehensive, integrated approach to transforming all of DOD's business operations.

HIGH-RISK SERIES

Department of Defense Financial Management

What GAO Found

DOD's senior civilian and military leaders, committed to reforming the department's financial management operations, have taken positive steps to begin this effort. However, to date, tangible evidence of improvement has been seen in a few specific areas, such as internal controls related to DOD's purchase card program. While DOD has established a goal of obtaining a clean opinion on its financial statements by 2007, it lacks a clear and realistic plan to make that goal a reality. DOD's continuing, substantial financial management weaknesses adversely affect its ability to produce auditable financial information as well as provide accurate and timely information for management and the Congress to use in making informed decisions.

Examples of the Impact of Financial Management Problems at DOD

| Business area affected | Problem Identified and its Impact |
|------------------------|--|
| Military pay | Ninety-four percent of mobilized Army National Guard and Reserve soldiers GAO investigated during recent audits had pay problems. These problems distracted soldiers from their missions, imposed financial hardships on their families, and had a negative impact on retention. |
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| Property | DOD purchased new JSLIST chem-bio suits for \$200 apiece while they were selling on the Internet for \$3. In addition, thousands of defective suits that DOD declared as excess were improperly issued to local law enforcement agencies, which are likely to be the first responders in a terrorist attack. |
| Contract payments | Some DOD contractors have abused the federal tax system, including potential criminal activity, with little or no consequence. As of September 2003, DOD had collected only \$687,000 of unpaid federal taxes through a mandated levy program. GAO estimated that at least \$100 million could be collected annually by effectively implementing the levy on DOD contract payments. |
| Automated systems | DOD invested \$179 million on two failed automated system efforts that were intended to resolve its long-standing disbursement problems. |

Source: GAO.

DOD is still in the very early stages of a departmentwide reform that will take years to accomplish. DOD has not yet established a framework to integrate improvement efforts in this area with related broad-based DOD initiatives, such as human capital reform. Overhauling the financial management and related business operations of one of the largest and most complex organizations in the world represents a daunting challenge. Such an overhaul of DOD's financial management operations goes far beyond financial accounting to the very fiber of the department's wide-ranging business operations and its management culture. As discussed previously, GAO now considers DOD's current management approach to transforming its entire business operations as a separate overarching high-risk area.

Department of Defense Audit Status

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| Organization | Assets (% of DoD) | Liabilities (% of DoD) |
|--|----------------------|---------------------------|
| Services | | |
| Air Force | 22.2% | 1.4% |
| Army | 21.8% | 3.8% |
| Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund | 3.2% | 29.5% |
| Military Retirement Trust Fund | 15.6% | 49.0% |
| Navy | 26.6% | 1.7% |
| Army Corps of Engineers | 3.0% | 0.2% |
| Total Services (12 Financial Statements) | 92.3% | 85.6% |
| Major Defense Agencies | | |
| Defense Contract Audit Agency | < 0.1% | < 0.1% |
| Defense Commissary Agency | 0.2% | < 0.1% |
| Defense Finance & Accounting Service | 0.1% | < 0.1% |
| Defense Logistics Agency | 1.6% | < 0.1% |
| Defense Threat Reduction Agency | 0.2% | < 0.1% |
| Missile Defense Agency | 0.3% | < 0.1% |
| Other Defense Agencies | 0.3% | < 0.1% |
| Total Major Defense Agencies (15 Financial Stmtms) | 2.7% | 0.4% |
| Other Defense Organizations | | |
| Defense Acquisition University | < 0.1% | < 0.1% |
| Defense Health Program | 0.4% | 13.6% |
| Joint Chiefs of Staff | < 0.1% | < 0.1% |
| Office of Inspector General | < 0.1% | < 0.1% |
| United States Special Operations Command | 1.6% | < 0.1% |
| Washington Headquarter Service | < 0.1% | < 0.1% |
| Other Defense Organizations | 3.0% | < 0.1% |
| Total Other Defense Organizations (32 Financial Stmtms) | 5.0% | 14.0% |
| DoD Total | \$ 1,208,486 | \$ 1,710,114 |

| | |
|--|--------------------------|
| | Unqualified Opinion |
| | Qualified Opinion |
| | No Opinion or Disclaimer |

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Corrected Deficiencies and Improved Timeliness. We have made progress in improving the accuracy and timeliness of accounting data. For example, the Department:

- Received an unqualified audit opinion on 6 entities in 2004, an increase of 3 entities since 2001.
- Reduced accounting adjustments from \$2.3 trillion in 1999 to \$369 billion in 2004 – a major step in complying with financial audit standards.
- Implemented systems controls to prevent payments from cancelled appropriations. Corrected \$615 million in associated improper payments since 2001.
- Reduced errors in recording payments from \$11.5 billion in 2001 to \$3.2 billion in 2004.
- Accelerated financial statements and produced reports 21 days after the close of each quarter and in 45 days at the end of each fiscal year. In 2001, we only produced financial statements at the end of the fiscal year which took 5 months to complete.

| Key Measures | FY 1999 | FY 2001 | FY 2004 | Improvement (2001-2004) |
|--|---------|----------|---------|----------------------------|
| Entities Achieving Unqualified Opinion | | 3 | 6 | 3 additional |
| Unsupported Accounting Entries | \$2.3 T | \$700 B | \$369 B | 84% since 1999 |
| Improper Charges to Cancelled Appropriations | | \$615 M | \$0 | 100% |
| Errors in Recording Payments | | \$11.5B | \$3.2B | 72% |
| Timeliness of Annual Financial Statements | | 150 days | 45 days | 70% |

Increased Efficiency and Productivity. We improved our efficiency and productivity in our business operations. For example, the Department:

- Reduced staff at the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) by 18 percent from 2001 to 2004. During this same time period, DFAS increased its financial transactions by 14 percent and maintained high customer satisfaction ratings.
- Saved \$18.4 million since 2001 by reducing interest penalty late payments to vendors. This savings was realized during a period when total payments increased by \$100 billion due to the war.
- Implemented electronic commerce processes in our vendor payment operations, and reduced personnel strength by 20 percent (596 people). During the same period, the number of invoices paid increased from 11 million in 2001 to 12.6 million in 2004.
- Reduced our travel and purchase card delinquencies between 2001 and 2004 – Individual Travel Card – down 54 percent; Organization Travel Card – down 76 percent; and Purchase Card – down 67 percent. This enabled increased refunds from the bank and put us in a better negotiating position for future contract negotiations.

| Key Measures | FY 2001 | FY 2004 | Improvement (2001-2004) |
|---|----------------|----------------|--------------------------------|
| Interest Penalties per Million Dollars of Commercial Payments | \$343 per M | \$138 per M | 60% |
| Number of Invoices Paid Electronically | 11 million | 12.6 million | 15% |
| Purchase Card Delinquency Rate | 3.0% | 1.0% | 67% |
| Travel Card Delinquency Rate | | | |
| Individual Accounts | 9.4% | 4.3% | 54% |
| Central Accounts | 4.2% | 1.0% | 76% |
| Reduce DFAS Staffing | 17,783 | 14,611 | 18% |

Enhanced Financial Management Workforce. We are improving the knowledge, skills and abilities of the financial community workforce.

- In the Department, 83 percent of accountants, auditors, and financial managers have college degrees.
- All of my accounting staff hold college degrees with 65 percent holding masters.
- Sixty-five percent of my accounting staff hold a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) license, up from 35 percent in 2001.

Modernized Defense Financial Systems. We currently operate approximately 4,100 systems that lack interoperability and adequate internal controls, do not provide adequate management information, and are costly to maintain. Our efforts to modernize our financial systems have yielded the following:

- Our business includes over 90 core end-to-end processes which are subject to over 25,000 rules and regulations to control investments. We have mapped these into an architecture that allows us to simplify and integrate our business operations. This is called the Business Enterprise Architecture.
- We developed the Standard Financial Information Structure (SFIS) to link all business systems and allow accurate data exchange. SFIS will replace hundreds of incompatible data reporting structures. Implementation of SFIS will correct several financial management weaknesses and allow the Department to track the billions of dollars spent annually.
- We are controlling business systems spending through Investment Review Boards. This will ensure that the Department does not waste money on systems that do not comply with the Business Enterprise Architecture. By the end of this year, we will complete a review of 78 percent of the funding programmed for system modernization.



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100
INFO MEMO



2005 APR -7 PM 5:


April 7, 2005 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Meeting Financial Standards

- You asked to see our plan for getting the Department on track to meet external financial standards. (TAB A) Our current plan is scheduled to deliver unqualified ("clean") audit opinions for 66% of DoD assets and 53% of DoD liabilities by 2007 as depicted below. Today, we have clean opinions on 16% of assets and 49% of liabilities.



- In addition to the focus areas above, we are aggressively working to resolve key issues related to inventory (18% of assets) and military health care benefits (42% of liabilities). (TAB B) However, we cannot resolve these issues by 2007 due to the high number of procedures, systems, and internal controls that must be corrected across the entire Department.

- New business systems are essential to our success. Systems will allow us to both achieve and sustain unqualified opinions. The Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP) has established priorities for these systems, and is driving implementation. An interim systems transition plan was delivered by BMMP last week. A final plan will be delivered in September '05.
- BMMP program management was recently moved to AT&L to ensure disciplined acquisition oversight over these critical systems initiatives. We are updating our plan for audit to incorporate BMMP systems milestones.
- A more detailed presentation is attached for your review (TAB C). I will reserve time on your calendar to discuss this with you at the earliest opportunity.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared by: T.Modly, DUSD (FM) (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/48210

~~FOUO~~

March 29, 2005

OSD 05811-7 000 01 02

TO: Tina Jonas
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Ken Krieg
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meeting Financial Standards

Thank you for sending along our status.

What I would like to see is your plan to get us on track. I would like it to have measurable goals and specific dates by which you will move us along to success in two years.

Thanks.

Attach.

3/14/05 SecDef Memo to USD (COMPT)
3/25/05 USD (COMPT) Memo to SecDef

DHR:ss
032805-23

.....
Please respond by 4/7/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48211

OSD 05811-05

March 14, 2005

TO: Tina Jonas
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meeting Financial Standards

Is it true that 6 of 63 departments in the Defense Department can meet the proper financial standards?

Please give me a report on what the **status** is by external measurements, and then give me a program as to how we are going to get on track in the next two years. I am sure **Dov**, Larry and you have been working on **this** for four years, so we ought to have a schedule and a program.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031405-7

.....
Please respond by 4/7/05

3/28

DR 3/28

SIR _____

This is status,
but not a plan
to get better.
Draft snowflake
attached *v/r*

Response needed
4/10
800 B
7/2

OSD 05811-05



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100



INFO MEMO 25 PM 5:24

March 25, 2005, 5:00 PM

Paul Butler
3/28
Prots
FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *TWJ*

SUBJECT: Financial Statements

- You asked: "Is it true that 6 of 63 departments in the Defense Department can meet proper financial standards?" You also asked for a report on our financial status -- by external measurements (TAB A).
- The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) judge our overall financial condition based upon our ability to achieve an unqualified or "clean" opinion.
- Our financial status is measured by OMB as part of the President's Management Agenda. We are "red" due to our inability to obtain a clean opinion. We are "yellow" on progress. GAO cites the inability of DoD to obtain a clean opinion in its "High Risk" series -- a list of the government's key challenges (TAB B).
- DoD's consolidated financial statements include 59 entities. Six of those entities (representing 16% of our assets and 49% of our liabilities) have received a clean opinion for 2004. One additional entity received an opinion that noted one minor exception preventing a clean opinion. In 2001, only three entities received a clean opinion (TAB C).
- To achieve a clean opinion, 11 material weaknesses must be eliminated. This will require: (1) hundreds of business process improvements and (2) successful deployment of new information technology (IT) systems across DoD.

| | | | |
|----------|---------|------|------|
| MA SD | SMA BSD | 5/3 | 3/28 |
| TSA SD | SA DSD | 2/28 | |
| EXEC SEC | M | 3/28 | |
| ESR MA | BH | 3/29 | 0335 |



OSD 05811-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48213

- Process improvements have yielded results (e.g., elimination of two material weaknesses). Progress on IT systems has lagged. This is largely due to the complexity of the task and the program management structure. We are addressing these issues and will forward our plan to you shortly. TAB D is a list of financial management accomplishments.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Terri McKay, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/48214

Executive Branch Management Scorecard

Current Status as of December 31, 2004

Progress in Implementing the President's
Management Agenda

| | Current Status as of December 31, 2004 | | | | | Progress in Implementing the President's Management Agenda | | | | |
|-------------|--|----------------------|-----------------|-------|------------------------|--|----------------------|----------------|-------|--------------------------|
| | Human Capital | Competitive Sourcing | Financial Perf. | E-Gov | Budget/Perf Integrator | Human Capital | Competitive Sourcing | Financial Perf | E-Gov | Budget/Perf. Integration |
| AGRICULTURE | ○ | ○ | ● | ○ | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
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| DEFENSE | ○ | ○↓ | ● | ● | ○ | ● | ○ | ○ | ● | ● |
| EDUCATION | ○ | ○ | ● | ○ | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ● |
| ENERGY | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| EPA | ○ | ○ | ● | ● | ○ | ● | ○ | ● | ● | ● |
| HHS | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ● |
| DHS | ○↑ | ○ | ● | ● | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ● |
| HUD | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ● | ● |
| INTERIOR | ○ | ○ | ● | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| JUSTICE | ○ | ○ | ● | ○ | ○ | ● | ● | ○ | ● | ● |
| LABOR | ● | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| STATE | ● | ○↑ | ●↑ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| DOT | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
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| VA | ○ | ● | ● | ●↓ | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ● |
| AID | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ● | ○ | ● | ● | ● |
| CORPS | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ● |
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What Remains to Be Done

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HIGH-RISK SERIES

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Department of Defense Audit Status

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| Organization | Assets (% of DoD) | Liabilities (% of DoD) |
|--|----------------------|---------------------------|
| Services | | |
| Air Force | 22.2% | 1.4% |
| Army | 21.8% | 3.8% |
| Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund | 3.2% | 29.5% |
| Military Retirement Trust Fund | 15.6% | 49.0% |
| Navy | 26.6% | 1.7% |
| Army Corps of Engineers | 3.0% | 0.2% |
| Total Services (12 Financial Statements) | 92.3% | 85.6% |
| Major Defense Agencies | | |
| Defense Contract Audit Agency | < 0.1% | < 0.1% |
| Defense Commissary Agency | 0.2% | < 0.1% |
| Defense Finance & Accounting Service | 0.1% | < 0.1% |
| Defense Logistics Agency | 1.6% | < 0.1% |
| Defense Threat Reduction Agency | 0.2% | < 0.1% |
| Missile Defense Agency | 0.3% | < 0.1% |
| Other Defense Agencies | 0.3% | < 0.1% |
| Total Major Defense Agencies (15 Financial Stmt) | 2.7% | 0.4% |
| Other Defense Organizations | | |
| Defense Acquisition University | < 0.1% | < 0.1% |
| Defense Health Program | 0.4% | 13.6% |
| Joint Chiefs of Staff | < 0.1% | < 0.1% |
| Office of Inspector General | < 0.1% | < 0.1% |
| United States Special Operations Command | 1.6% | < 0.1% |
| Washington Headquarter Service | < 0.1% | < 0.1% |
| Other Defense Organizations | 3.0% | < 0.1% |
| Total Other Defense Organizations (32 Financial Stmt) | 5.0% | 14.0% |
| DoD Total | \$ 1,208,486 | \$ 1,710,114 |

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FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Corrected Deficiencies and Improved Timeliness. We have made progress in improving the accuracy and timeliness of accounting data. For example, the Department:

- Received an unqualified audit opinion on 6 entities in 2004, an increase of 3 entities since 2001.
- Reduced accounting adjustments from \$2.3 trillion in 1999 to \$369 billion in 2004 – a major step in complying with financial audit standards.
- Implemented systems controls to prevent payments from cancelled appropriations. Corrected \$615 million in associated improper payments since 2001.
- Reduced errors in recording payments from \$11.5 billion in 2001 to \$3.2 billion in 2004.
- Accelerated financial statements and produced reports 21 days after the close of each quarter and in 45 days at the end of each fiscal year. In 2001, we only produced financial statements at the end of the fiscal year which took 5 months to complete.

| Key Measures | FY 1999 | FY 2001 | FY 2004 | Improvement (2001-2004) |
|--|---------|----------|----------------|----------------------------|
| Entities Achieving Unqualified Opinion | | 3 | 6 | 3 additional |
| Unsupported Accounting Entries | \$2.3 T | \$700 B | \$369 B | 84% since 1999 |
| Improper Charges to Cancelled Appropriations | | \$615 M | \$0 | 100% |
| Errors in Recording Payments | | \$11.5B | \$3.2B | 72% |
| Timeliness of Annual Financial Statements | | 150 days | 45 days | 70% |

Increased Efficiency and Productivity. We improved our efficiency and productivity in our business operations. For example, the Department:

- Reduced staff at the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) by 18 percent from 2001 to 2004. During this same time period, DFAS increased its financial transactions by 14 percent and maintained high customer satisfaction ratings.
- Saved \$18.4 million since 2001 by reducing interest penalty late payments to vendors. This savings was realized during a period when total payments increased by \$100 billion due to the war.
- Implemented electronic commerce processes in our vendor payment operations, and reduced personnel strength by 20 percent (596 people). During the same period, the number of invoices paid increased from 11 million in 2001 to 12.6 million in 2004.
- Reduced our travel and purchase card delinquencies between 2001 and 2004 – Individual Travel Card – down 54 percent; Organization Travel Card – down 76 percent; and Purchase Card – down 67 percent. This enabled increased refunds from the bank and put us in a better negotiating position for future contract negotiations.

| Key Measures | FY 2001 | FY 2004 | Improvement (2001-2004) |
|---|-------------|--------------|-------------------------|
| Interest Penalties per Million Dollars of Commercial Payments | \$343 per M | \$138 per M | 60% |
| Number of Invoices Paid Electronically | 11 million | 12.6 million | 15% |
| Purchase Card Delinquency Rate | 3.0% | 1.0% | 67% |
| Travel Card Delinquency Rate | | | |
| Individual Accounts | 9.4% | 4.3% | 54% |
| Central Accounts | 4.2% | 1.0% | 76% |
| Reduce DFAS Staffing | 17,783 | 14,611 | 18% |

Enhanced Financial Management Workforce. We are improving the knowledge, skills and abilities of the financial community workforce.

- In the Department, 83 percent of accountants, auditors, and financial managers have college degrees.
- All of my accounting staff hold college degrees with 65 percent holding masters.
- Sixty-five percent of my accounting staff hold a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) license, up from 35 percent in 2001.

Modernized Defense Financial Systems. We currently operate approximately 4,100 systems that lack interoperability and adequate internal controls, do not provide adequate management information, and are costly to maintain. Our efforts to modernize our financial systems have yielded the following:


- Our business includes over 90 core end-to-end processes which are subject to over 25,000 rules and regulations to control investments. We have mapped these into an architecture that allows us to simplify and integrate our business operations. This is called the Business Enterprise Architecture.
- We developed the Standard Financial Information Structure (SFIS) to link all business systems and allow accurate data exchange. SFIS will replace hundreds of incompatible data reporting structures. Implementation of SFIS will correct several financial management weaknesses and allow the Department to track the billions of dollars spent annually.
- We are controlling business systems spending through Investment Review Boards. This will ensure that the Department does not waste money on systems that do not comply with the Business Enterprise Architecture. By the end of this year, we will complete a review of 78 percent of the funding programmed for system modernization.

TAB B

DoD Audit Challenge Examples


Asset Challenge: Inventory

- Inventory and operating materials and supplies are \$213 billion (18% of DoD assets)
- Millions of different types of inventory items must be valued according to accounting rules. For example, the Defense Logistics Agency has 5.2 million different types of items with varying quantities for each type that must be accounted for. By comparison, Wal-Mart has approximately 11,000 inventory items and Home Depot has approximately 40,000-50,000. Each company has only one system to report inventory.
- Currently, 60 DoD systems report inventory
- 11 can comply with accounting rules
- 49 must be transitioned, revised, or migrated



Liability Challenge: Health Care.

- Health care liability is approximately \$670 billion (42% of DoD liabilities)
- DoD has 896 Military Medical Treatment Facilities and medical records for approximately 8.7 million people. By comparison, Kaiser Permanente, the largest HMO, operates 30 medical centers and 431 medical offices.
- Currently, health care coding is not accurately performed by DoD healthcare professionals.
- Consistent, accurate coding is the basis for allocating cost and funding, and it is needed for a clean opinion.



Financial Audit Update

Briefing to the Secretary of Defense

April 2005

11-L-0559/OSD/48222

Objectives

- Provide Update on DoD Financial Audit
 - Current Audit Picture
 - Current Plan
 - Audit Challenges
 - Role of Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP)

Current Audit Picture

(Reporting Entity View)

52 Reporting Entities


| | % DoD Assets | % DoD Liabilities |
|--------------|--------------|-------------------|
| Army | 27% | 2% |
| Navy | 22% | 1% |
| Air Force | 22% | 4% |
| Others | 10% | 15% |
| TOTAL | 81% | 22% |

1 Reporting Entity

| | % DoD Assets | % DoD Liabilities |
|---|--------------|-------------------|
| Medicare-Eligible Retiree Healthcare Fund | 3% | 29% |

6 Reporting Entities


| | % DoD Assets | % DoD Liabilities |
|--------------------------------|--------------|-------------------|
| Military Retirement Trust Fund | 16% | 49% |
| Others | <1% | <1% |
| TOTAL | 16% | 49% |



Current Audit Picture


(Balance Sheet View)

Assets (\$1.2 trillion)



Military Retirement Trust Fund
Defense Contract Audit Agency
Defense Commissary Agency
Defense Finance and Accounting Service
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Office of the Inspector General

Liabilities (\$1.7 trillion)



Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund

Military Retirement Trust Fund


Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund

The Current Plan

- Original plan to achieve an unqualified opinion for the Department by 2007 was too expensive (>\$1 billion), and not sustainable.
- Current plan will result in substantial progress by 2007 without “heroic” measures and expense required by date-driven approach.


| | <u>Approach</u> | <u>Cost Drivers</u> | <u>Improvement to Business Operations</u> | <u>Sustainable Clean Opinion in 2007?</u> |
|---------------|--|--|---|---|
| Original Plan | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Date-driven •Broad scope (all DoD) •Independent of new systems timelines | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Manual work •Accelerated •One-time | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Minimal, at a high cost | NO |
| Current Plan | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Line item-driven •Focused on most significant balance sheet categories •Integrated with new systems timelines | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Business process improvements •New systems implementations | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Sustained •Auditability will be a by-product of improved business ops | YES, for focus areas |

The Current Plan: Two-Year View




The Current Plan: 2008-2010*

(*Dependent on Resolution of Healthcare and Inventory Categories)



Plan Milestones



Role of Business Management Modernization Program

- The Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP) is delivering business capabilities that improve warfighter through new business systems and standards.
- The BMMP has delivered critical audit capabilities that have been in 2001:
 - Standard financial structure (SFIS)—a common financial
 - Standard DoD general ledger—a common financial ledger
 - Interim Systems Transition Plan— a detailed roadmap for of legacy financial systems (delivered in March '05)

| | FY05 | FY06 | FY07 |
|------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------|
| BMMP Milestones* | SFIS initial elements ▽ | Final Systems Transition Plan ▽ | DDRS FOC ▽ |
| | | DDMRS IOC ▽ | CAMS FOC ▽ |
| | | | DCAS FOC ▽ |


*Interim Transition Plan: Sample set of some the most critical systems deliverables with respect to enhanced audit capabilities. Final plan due September '05.

IOC: Initial Operating Capability FOC: Final Operating Capability

11-L-0559/OSD/48230

BMMP and the Audit


- BMMP's priorities are focused on enabling enhanced business operations that will also drive down the "Cost of Audit" by facilitating clean, traceable transaction-level financial information.



Summary

- Although we will not have a clean opinion for the entire Department by 2007, we have a plan to make further audit progress in the next two years.
- Our plan focuses on achieving “clean” opinions for balance sheet line items that represent our largest asset and liability categories.
- We are integrating our plan with new systems implementations schedules as delivered by the BMMP.
- We are determining how we can accelerate progress in two key categories (Health Care and Inventory) to improve our clean opinion projections for 2007 and beyond.

March 29, 2005

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Government Contracting

Attached is a response I received on government contracting. It proposes no action. It seems to me we ought to be doing something.

What do you propose?·

Thanks.

Attach.
3/1/05 SecDef Memo to DSD
3/25/05 USD (COMPT) Memo to SecDef

DHR:ss
032905-5

.....
Please respond by 4/21/05

160

DRUMS

1 memo

March 1, 2005

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Government Contracting

Please come to me with a proposal on what we need **to** do to be more aggressive on accountability with respect to government contracting in DoD, as Senator Dorgan suggested the **other** day.

It seems to me we've done **a great** many things, but you ought **to** inventory what we've done, and then come to me with a proposal of anything else anyone **thinks** **we** can do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022805-93

.....
Please respond by 3/24/05

Sir, *DR 3/29*
Response Attached

V/R, COLB
3/28



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100

2005 MAR 28 AM 8:36



INFO MEMO

March 25, 2005, 5:00 PM

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas

SUBJECT: Government Contracting - SecDef Snowflake

- The Secretary's March 1, 2005 note asked how we could be more aggressive on accountability in DoD contracting. Mike Wynne recently submitted his ideas on how DoD might respond, but I would like to suggest some additional points that should be considered.
- The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) performs about 40,000 audits annually. Over the past three years, contracting officials have used DCAA audits to reduce proposed prices or recover overbilled costs by \$2.3 billion per year.
- In FY 2004, DCAA auditors submitted 55 suspected fraud referrals to the Inspector General and provided direct support for fraud investigations. During FY 2004, 164 investigations were completed in which DoD recovered \$73 million.
- DCAA has audited over \$15 billion of proposed costs on Iraq reconstruction contracts and reduced actual contract billed costs by \$377 million pending review and settlement of disputed contract costs. Major contract cost issues raised by Senator Dorgan were found as part of DCAA's contract oversight.
- In Iraq, DCAA found problems in three areas: (1) delays in establishing fully functioning acquisition processes in-theater; (2) a lack of trained and qualified staff, and (3) delays in resolving contracting problems.
- The Department could introduce process improvements for future contracting in a wartime environment:

| | | | |
|----------|---------|-----|------|
| MA SD | SMA DSD | SD | 3/28 |
| TSA SD | SA DSD | SD | |
| EXEC SEC | M 3/28 | 114 | |
| ESP MA | | | |



OSD 05817-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48235

- Future contingency plans should include an acquisition, contract management and audit component with coordinated deployment schedules and logistical support.
- Develop an integrated cadre of contracting officers and financial managers for on-call deployment. This will require unique position requirements and incentives to attract and retain qualified individuals.
- Establish goals and metrics for battlefield contracting support to track timeliness of all acquisition phases from requirements to contract award and audit.
- We are working with Joint Forces Command on a lessons learned study to develop ways to improve our contracting and financial processes in a wartime environment and will share our findings with you once the study is complete.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: William H. Reed, Director, DCAA, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/48236

~~FOUO~~

1 Mar -16 01
Scanned

March 1, 2005

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Government Contracting

Please come to me with a proposal on what we need to do to be more aggressive on accountability with respect to government contracting in DoD, as Senator Dorgan suggested the other day.

It seems to me we've done a great many things, but you ought to inventory what we've done, and then come to me with a proposal of anything else anyone thinks we can do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022805-93

.....
Please respond by 3/24/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 05817-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48237



COMPTROLLER

UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100



036

INFO MEMO

March 25, 2005, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jones *Tina W. Jones*

SUBJECT: Government Contracting – SecDef Snowflake

- The Secretary's March 1, 2005 note asked how we could be more aggressive on accountability in DoD contracting. Mike Wynne recently submitted his ideas on how DoD might respond, but I would like to suggest some additional points that should be considered.
 - The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) performs about 40,000 audits annually. Over the past three years, contracting officials have used DCAA audits to reduce proposed prices or recover overbilled costs by \$2.3 billion per year.
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 - In Iraq, DCAA found problems in three areas: (1) delays in establishing fully functioning acquisition processes in-theater; (2) a lack of trained and qualified staff, and (3) delays in resolving contracting problems.
- The Department could introduce process improvements for future contracting in a wartime environment:



11-L-0559/OSD/48238

OSD 05817-05

- Future contingency plans should include an acquisition, contract management and audit component with coordinated deployment schedules and logistical support.
- Develop an integrated cadre of contracting officers and financial managers for on-call deployment. This will require unique position requirements and incentives to attract and retain qualified individuals.
- Establish goals and metrics for battlefield contracting support to track timeliness of all acquisition phases from requirements to contract award and audit.
- We are working with Joint Forces Command on a lessons learned study to develop ways to improve our contracting and financial processes in a wartime environment and will share our findings with you once the study is complete.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: William H. Reed, Director, DCAA, (b)(6)

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Senior Military Assistant

02 Mar 05 - 1630

MEMORANDUM FOR: USD(COMPT)
USD(AT&L)

SUBJECT: Government Contracting - SecDef Snowflake

The Deputy reviewed the attached snowflake and asks:

“Please get the exchange that Senator Dorgan had with SecDef. You are scheduled to brief me on your assessment of how we should respond to Senator Dorgan on 9 Mar at 1620.”

Request Comptroller take the lead in a coordinated response

Thank You.

Very respectfully,



Frank G. Helmick

Brigadier General, USA
Senior Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Suspense: 9 ~~Mar~~ 05

Attached: SD Snowflake (Government Contracting)

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

4524

December 19, 2005

TO: Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Use of UAVs

Is it possible for me to get some sort of a report and review as to how we are using UAVs, both tactical and strategic, with respect to the borders in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Thanks.

DRR:dh
12/19/05-20


.....
Please Respond By 01/19/06

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

19 Dec 05

March 18, 2005

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Question about Contracting Rules

Attached is an e-mail I received. You will notice it says there are contracting rules (point #14, which I have marked). Please check into that and see if it is true, and if so, what can be done about it.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/17/05 E-mail to (b)(6)

DHR:ss
031805-6

.....
Please respond by 3/31/05

Joyce Rumsfeld

From: (b)(6)
To: "Rumsfeld, Joyce" (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2005 10:24 AM
Subject: More Lessons Learned from Iraq

Joyce,

From Joan. I hunted around on the Internet a bit, and the story seems to be legitimate.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2005 8:53 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Fwd: FW: More Lessons Learned from Iraq

(b)(6)

I think you might find this interesting reading, and perhaps you will forward it to Don and Joyce. **Thanks.**

Hope all is going well with you.

Joan

From: bill saer [mailto:wsaer@mchsi.com]
Sent: Wednesday, March 16, 2005 7:17 AM
To: Undisclosed-Recipient:;;undisclosed-recipients:
Subject: Fw: More Lessons Learned

Thought you would enjoy reading an **unfiltered report** from a meeting of the Association of the United States Army with the 1st Cav Division Commander as the keynote speaker. Gives a bit of insight to what's happening in Iraq that will make you proud you're an American...take that back, make you understand why you ARE an American.

Went to **an** AUSA dinner last night at the Ft. Hood Officers' Club to hear a speech by MG Pete Chiarelli, CG of the 1st Cav Div. He and most of the Div. have just returned from Iraq. Very informative and, **surprise**, the Mainstream Media (MSM) isn't telling the story. I was not there as a reporter, didn't take notes but I'll make some the **points** I remember that were interesting, suprising or generally **stuff** I had not heard before.

It was not a speech per se. He just walked and talked, showed some slides and answered questions. Very impressive guy.

1. While units of the Cav served **all** over Iraq, he spoke mostly of Baghdad and more specifically **Sadr** City, the big slum on the eastern side of the Tigris River. He pointed out that Baghdad is, in geography, about the size of Austin. Austin has 600,000 to 700,000 people. Baghdad has 6 to 7 million people.

2. The Cav lost **28 main** battle **tanks**. He said one of the big lessons learned is that, contrary to doctrine going in, **M1-A2s** and Bradleys **are** needed, preferred and devastating in urban combat and he is going to make that point to the JCS next week while they are considering downsizing armor.

3. He showed a graph of attacks in Sadr City by month. Last Aug-Sep they were getting up to 160 attacks **per** week. During the last **three** months, the graph had flatlined at below **5** to zero per week.

4. His big point was not that they were "winning battles" to do **this** but that cleaning the place up, electricity, sewage, water were the key factors. He said yes they fought but after they started delivering services that the Iraqis in **Sadr** City had never had, the terrorist recruiting of **15** and 16 year olds came up empty.

5. The electrical "grid" is a bad, deadly joke. Said that **driving** down the street in a Hummv with an antenna would short out a whole block of apt. buildings. People do their own wiring and it was not uncommon for early morning patrols would find one or two people lying dead in the street, having been electrocuted trying to re-wire their own homes.

6. Said that not tending to a dead body in the Muslim culture never happens. On election day, after suicide bombers blew themselves up trying to take out polling places, voters would step up to the body lying there, spit on it, and move up in the line to vote.

7. Pointed out that we all heard from the media about the 100 Iraqis killed **as** they were lined up to enlist in the police and security service. What the media didn't point out was that the next day there 300 lined up in the same place.

8. Said bin Laden and Zarqawi made a HUGE mistake when bin laden went public with naming Zarqawi the "prince" of al Quacda in Iraq. Said that what the Iraqis saw and heard was a Saudi telling a Jordanian that his job was to kill Iraqis. HUGE mistake. It was one of the biggest factors in getting Iraqis who were on the "fence" to jump off on the side of the coalition and the new gov't.

9. Said the MSM was making a big, and wrong, deal out of the religious sects. Said Iraqis **are** incredibly nationalistic. They are Iraqis first and then say they **are** Muslim but the Shi'a - Sunni thing is just not that big a deal to them.

10. After the election the Mayor of **Baghdad** told **him** that the people of the region (Middle East) are joyous and the governments are nervous.

11. Said that he did not lose a single tanker truck carrying oil and gas over the roads of Iraq. Think about that. All the attacks we saw on TV with IEDs hitting trucks but he didn't lose one. Why? Army Aviation. Praised his **air** units and said they made the decision early on that every convoy would have helicopter air cover. Said aviators in that unit were hitting the 1,000 hour mark (sound familiar?). Said a covoy was supposed to head out but stopped at the gates of a compound on the command of an **E6**. He asked the SSG what the hold up was. **E6** said, "Air, **sir**." He wondered what was wrong with the air, not realizing what the **kid** was talking about. Then the **AH-64s** showed up and the **E6** said, "That **air** **sir**." And then moved out.

12. Said one of the biggest problems was money and regs. There was a \$77 million gap between the supplemental budget and what he needed in cash on the ground to get projects started. Said he spent most of his time trying to get money. Said he didn't do much as a "combat commander" because the the war he was fighting was a war at the squad and platoon level. Said that his NCOs were winning the war and it was a sight to behold.

13. Said that of all the money appropriated for Iraq, not a cent was earmarked for agriculture. Said that Iraq could feed itself completely and still have food for export but no one thought about it. Said the Cav started working with Texas A&M on ag projects and had special hybrid seeds sent to them through Jordan. TAM analyzed soil samples and worked out how and what to plant. Said he had **an E7 from** Belton, TX (just down the road from Ft. Hood) who was almost single-handedly rebuilding the **ag** industry in the Baghdad area.

14. Said he could hire hundreds of Iraqis daily for \$7 to \$10 a day to work on sewer, electric, water projects, etc. but that the contracting rules **from** CONUS applied so he had to have \$500,000 insurance policies in place in case the workers got hurt. Not kidding. The CONUS peacetime regs slowed everything down, even if they could eventually get waivers for the regs.

There was more, lots more, but the idea is that you haven't heard any of this from anyone, at least I hadn't and I pay more attention than most.

Great stuff. We should be proud. Said the Cav troops said it was ALL worth it on Jan. 30 when they saw how the Iraqis handled election day. Made them very proud of their service and what they had accomplished.



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600



INFO MEMO

March 28, 2005 2:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

SUBJECT: Insurance in Iraq

- You inquired about a statement attributed to Major General Chiarelli about contracting rules regarding insurance (number 14 on the attached e-mail). I believe that the issue involves insurance required by the Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. 1651 - 1654.
- The Defense Base Act (DBA) requires contractors and subcontractors to provide worker's compensation insurance for employees in the event of injury, death, capture, or detention in connection with the performance of construction projects or defense related services outside the United States. Foreign national employees are covered. However, the Secretary of Labor may waive DBA insurance for foreign nationals if their respective countries have alternative compensation systems. Currently, Iraq has no worker's compensation system.
- The costs to contractors of this insurance and the amounts of deductibles vary from carrier to carrier. However, our clients uniformly have observed a significant increase in the cost of DBA insurance, given the risks associated with the volatile global environment.
- To address the escalating costs of this insurance, the Corps of Engineers has instituted a pilot program, based upon practices of the Agency for International Development and the State Department, under which it intends to conduct a competition among DBA insurance providers and award a single contract to one provider. All contractors performing work in Iraq will be required to obtain their DBA insurance from that provider. Competition should help contain costs and ensure uniformity.
- If Iraq establishes a worker's compensation scheme, we can request the Secretary of Labor to waive DBA insurance for Iraqi nationals working on U.S. Government contracts and subcontracts.



11-L-0559/OSD/48246

OSD 05888-05

March 31, 2005

TO: Fran Harvey
Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT: Your Memo on Army Modularity

I received your memo on the former "modularity." I believe it is an improvement and hope you agree.

The only thing I found that I don't agree with is the number of National Guard Brigade Combat Teams at 34. I don't think we have agreed to that.

Thanks for going back at it.

Attach.

- 3/3/05 SecDef memo to Sec Army & CSA
- 3/29/05 SecArmy & CSA memo to SecDef

DHR:ss
033105-7

.....
Please respond by 4/21/05

05D05956-05

32012
31 Mar 05
3 Mar 05

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
March 2005
2005 MAR 29 P 12:56

TO: Fran Harvey
GEN Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen Dick ~~Myers~~
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Army Modularity

I've looked over the attached paper on **Army** modularity. It still needs work. We have to continue to make sure everyone understands what we're doing with **this** important set of concepts. **This** paper doesn't quite get us there. Please take another turn on it and get back to me.

Also, I'd still like you folks to think about a better name **than** "modularity" or **the** overall concept

Thanks.

Attach.
2/2/05 "The Army Modular Force"

DHR:dh
030205-11

.....
Please respond by 3/31/05

Sir,
Response Attached

VR
100B

129
151K



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3/31

2005-03-29 11:19
2005 MAR 29 PM 12:55

INFO MEMO

Paul Butler
3/30

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army
GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, Army

SUBJECT: Snowflake Response: Army Modularity

- Reference your Snowflake dated March 3, 2005 attached at Tab A.
- At your request, General Schoomaker and I have reviewed the Army Modular Force Point Paper dated February 2, 2005.
- We have addressed the issues that you raised with the original point paper. The revised (and improved) point paper is attached at Tab B.
- We have modified the words we are using to describe this transformational initiative from "Modularity," which refers to the process, to the "Army Modular Forge," which describes the end state.
- The principal reason why we want to use the term "Modular" is because the dictionary defines "modular" as "designed with standardized units or dimensions, as for easy assembly and repair or flexible arrangement and use." In addition, the term preserves the emphasis on the standardization of design, and enjoys broad recognition by OMB and Congress.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments: As stated

Prepared By: LTC Ed Palekas, (b)(6)

| | | | |
|----------|--------------|-------|------|
| MA SD | SMA DSD | SES | 3/30 |
| TSA SD | SA DSD | 3/30 | |
| EXEC SEC | TSS 20050329 | M/S/A | 1/20 |
| ESR MA | | | |

11-L-0559/OSD/48249

O5D 05956-05

The Army Modular Force

Modularity is the Army's major force transformation initiative, which involves the total redesign of the operational Army into a larger, more powerful, flexible and rapidly deployable force.

A Modular Army

- The **Army** Modular Force contains three basic components – centered around the **Soldier**:
 - *Units of Employment* above the brigade-level providing command and control;
 - **Brigade Combat Teams (Units of Action)** providing fighting forces, of which there **are** three types: Heavy, Infantry, and Stryker Brigades.
 - **Support Brigades** providing enhanced capabilities, of which there **are** five types: Maneuver Enhancement; Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition; Aviation; Fires; and Sustainment.
- Each organization will have a common design. For example, a Heavy Brigade Combat Team in the 3rd Infantry Division will be organized exactly the same as a Heavy Brigade Combat Team in the 4th Infantry Division.
- The Army's current plan is to develop 77 Brigade Combat Teams using **this modular concept**:
 - **43** in the Active Component and **34** in the National Guard.
 - A decision will be made whether or not **to** increase the number of **Brigade Combat Teams in the Active Component to 48** in FY 06.
 - **13** Brigade Combat Teams transformed in FY04; 12 more are currently transforming **into** modular formations during FY 05.
- The **mix** of Active and National Guard Brigades can change depending on the outcome of **the** Quadrennial Defense Review.
- Each Brigade Combat Team is a stand-alone, self-sufficient and standardized unit with **between 3500 and 4000** Soldiers.
- The Brigade Combat Teams are organized **the** way that they will fight with embedded, organic Combat Support (Signal, Military Police, Military Intelligence, Chemical) and Combat Service **Support** (Transportation, Ordnance, Quartermaster) functions.
- The Army Modular Force will have a number of key operational advantages:
 - An initial increase in combat power of 30% in the Active Component resulting from a **corresponding** increase in the number of Brigade Combat Teams from **33** to **43**.
 - An organizational framework into which advanced technologies from the Future **Combat System** *can* be incorporated which will result in further increases in combat power.
 - A more predictable deployment cycle with longer dwell times at home station **because** of an increase in the number of units from the current total of **48** to **77** in combination with the **rebalancing** of the Active and Reserve components.
 - An enhancement in the Brigade Combat Team's deployability and operational sustainability during the first **30** days because it is a stand-alone and self-sufficient unit.
- The Army Modular Force provides the Nation with an enhanced strategically responsive capability by which the approaches of assure, dissuade, deter and defeat as outlined in the National Defense **Strategy** *can* be more effectively implemented.

The Army Modular Force

Modularity is the Army's major force transformation initiative, which involves the total **redesign** of the operational Army into a larger, more powerful, flexible and **rapidly** deployable force.

A Modular Army

- The Army will use its congressionally authorized increase in size to transition to the Army Modular Force design.
 - The Army Modular Force contains three basic components:
 - **Units of Employment** above the brigade-level providing command and control;
 - **Brigade Combat Teams (Units of Action)** providing fighting forces. There are three types:
 - o Heavy Brigade organized around armored fighting vehicles
 - o Infantry Brigade organized around the infantry Soldier
 - o Stryker Brigade organized around Stryker fighting vehicles
 - Support **Brigades** providing enhanced capabilities.
 - In keeping with the modularity concept, each organization will have a common design. For example, a Heavy Brigade Combat Team in the 3rd Infantry Division will be organized exactly the same as a Heavy Brigade Combat Team in the 4th Infantry Division. *Not agreed*
 - The Army will develop 77-82 Brigade Combat Teams using this modular concept:
 - 43-48 in the Active Component and 34 in the National Guard
 - 13 Brigade Combat Teams have begun transforming into modular formations.
 - Each Brigade Combat Team has about 3,300 to 3,900 Soldiers. Brigade Combat Teams:
 - Are a standardized tactical force;
 - Require ~~less~~ augmentation upon deployment;
 - Are organized the way they fight and contain embedded enablers such as communications, military police, chemical defense, artillery fires, intelligence, engineer and logistics.
- What can we do?*
- Transition to The Army Modular Force Will: *# of lethality*
- Result in at least a 30% increase in the combat power of the Active force;
 - Reduce stress on the force by increasing the rotational pool of ready units by at least 50%; *what to what*
 - ~~Make~~ deployment cycles more predictable for Soldiers, their families and employers;
 - Reduce the requirement for ~~immediate~~ mobilization of Reserve Component units;
 - Enhance the Active Component's deployment capability and operational sustainability during first 30 days of a contingency; *How*
 - Provide lethal, agile and versatile forces capable of operating interchangeably within the Joint environment.

The Army Modular Force provides the Nation with a strategically responsive capability able to meet the challenges of the 21st Century security environment.

March 3, 2005

TO: Fran Harvey
GEN Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Army Modularity

I've looked over the attached paper on Army modularity. It still needs work. We have to continue to make sure everyone understands what we're doing with this important set of concepts. This paper doesn't quite get us there. Please take another **turn** on it and get back to me.

Also, I'd still like you folks to think about a better name than "modularity" for the overall concept

Thanks.

Attach.
2/2/05 "The Army Modular Force"

DHR:dh
030205-11

.....
Please respond by 3/31/05

The Army Modular Force

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 - Are a standardized tactical force;
 - Require less augmentation upon deployment;
 - Are organized the way they fight and contain embedded enablers such as communications, military police, chemical defense, artillery fires, intelligence, engineer and logistics.

Transition to The Army Modular Force Will:

- Result in at least a **30%** increase in the combat power of the Active force;
- Reduce stress on the force by increasing the rotational pool of ready units by at least **50%**;
- Make deployment cycles more predictable for Soldiers, their families and employers;
- Reduce the requirement for immediate mobilization of Reserve Component units;
- Enhance the Active Component's deployment capability and operational sustainability during first **30 days** of a contingency;
- Provide lethal, agile and versatile forces capable of operating interchangeably within the Joint environment.

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The Army Modular Force

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 - **An** enhancement in the Brigade Combat Team's deployability and operational sustainability during the first 30 days because it is a stand-alone and self-sufficient unit.

- e The Army Modular Force provides the Nation with an enhanced strategically responsive capability by which the approaches of assure, dissuade, deter and defeat as outlined in the National Defense Strategy can be more effectively implemented.



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

2005-03-29 A11:19
11-L-0559/OSD/48255

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army
GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, Army

SUBJECT: Snowflake Response: Army Modularity

- Reference your Snowflake dated March 3, 2005 attached at Tab A.
- At your request, General Schoomaker and I have reviewed the Army Modular Force Point Paper dated February 2, 2005.
- We have addressed the issues that you raised with the original point paper. The revised (and improved) point paper is attached at Tab B.
- We have modified the words we are using to describe this transformational initiative from "Modularity," which refers to the process, to the "Army Modular Force," which describes the end state.
- The principal reason why we want to use the term "Modular" is because the dictionary defines "modular" as "designed with standardized units or dimensions, as for easy assembly and repair or flexible arrangement and use." In addition, the term preserves the emphasis on the standardization of design, and enjoys broad recognition by OMB and Congress.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments: As stated

Prepared By: LTC Ed Palekas, (b)(6)


March 30, 2005

334

TO: Steve Cambone
Lt Gen Mike Hayden
Lt Gen Jim Clapper (Ret)
VADM Jake Jacoby
Mike Dominguez

CC: Gordon England
Fran Harvey
Gen Dick Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Silberman-Robb Report on Intelligence Capabilities Regarding WMD

The Report of the Silberman-Robb Commission is to be released later this week. I have not read it as yet, but I **am** advised that it discusses the work of all of the U.S. Intelligence Agencies and elements within the Department.

I request that each of the responsible authorities for intelligence activities in the Department review the Report with care and undertake a systematic review of their comments and suggestions with respect to your areas of responsibility.

Within **30** days or sooner, I would like a report from each of you as to what you propose by way of reforms to improve the work of your organization or agency in connection with the comments and suggestions made by the Commission.

Please coordinate your responses through Steve Cambone.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
032905-8

.....
Please respond by 5/2/05

504205

~~FOUO~~

March 30, 2005

2005 11 2 - 7 11 3 05

I-05 1008478
ES-2833

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen Dick Myers
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Review of Silberman WMD Commission

You should carefully review the report of the Silbennan WMD Commission. One of the tasks the Commission addressed was the question of whether policymakers pressured intelligence analysts regarding their assessments of Iraq's WMD programs.

As this is a matter that has been of some interest with respect to the DoD policy shop, we will want to understand and assess the Commission's conclusions in this area.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
033005-1

.....
Please respond by 5/2/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48257 OSD 06086-05
05-03-05 9:17:19 AM



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2100



INFO MEMO

2005 APR - 7 09 1-05

DcpSecDef _____

APR - 6 2005

I-05/004461-ES

I-05/004478-ES

ES-2829/ES-2833

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *DJF 4/6/05*

SUBJECT: Comments on WMD Commission Report (U)

- (U) The Report is a hard-hitting critique of the Intelligence Community (IC), especially as to the IC's assessments on Iraqi WMD, which it calls "one of the most public – and most damaging – intelligence failures in recent American history." (3)*
- (U) The Report does not address how policymakers used the intelligence assessments they got from the IC. (8)
- (U) The Report does not directly mention the Policy organization, but several of its conclusions refute allegations that Policy pressured intelligence analysts to change their assessments, or had something to do with disseminating false information from the Iraqi National Congress (INC).
- Here are the key relevant conclusions and commentary:

P d Not P Intelligence Analyst

"Conclusion 26: The Intelligence Community did not make or change any analytic judgments in response to political pressure to reach a particular conclusion, but the pervasive conventional wisdom that Saddam retained WMD affected the analytic process." (188)

- "[T]he paucity of intelligence and poor analytical tradecraft, rather than political pressure, ...produced the inaccurate pre-war intelligence assessments." (51)

* Numbers in parentheses refer to the corresponding page number in the unclassified version of the WMD Commission's Report.



OSD 06086-05

- (U) There were serious shortcomings in the way the assessments were made and communicated to policymakers:
 - (U) The President’s Daily Brief “likely conveyed a greater sense of certainty about analytic judgments than warranted.” (181)
 - (U) Analysts skewed the analytical process by requiring proof Iraq did not have WMD. (168)
 - (U) The IC failed to inform policymakers about the doubtful reliability of key sources (Curveball in particular, on whom the IC placed “near-total reliance” for its judgments on biological weapons). (93, 175)
- “The Commission has found no evidence of ‘politicization’ of the Intelligence Community’s assessments concerning Iraq’s reported WMD programs. No analytical judgments were changed in response to political pressure to reach a particular conclusion. The Commission has investigated this issue closely, querying in detail those analysts involved...” (188)
- “These analysts universally assert that in no instance did political pressure cause them to change any of their analytical judgments. Indeed, these analysts reiterated their strong belief in the validity and soundness of their prewar judgments at the time they were made.” (188)
- “[A]ll of the Iraqi WMD analysts interviewed by the Commission staff stated that they reached their conclusions about Iraq’s pursuit of WMD independently of policymaker pressure, based on the evidence at hand.” (189)
- A former Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research said that “policymakers never once applied any pressure on coming up with the ‘right’ answer on Iraq.” (188)

Policymakers Are Right to Probe and Question Intelligence Analysts

“Demand More From Analysts. We conclude that good-faith efforts by intelligence consumers to understand the bases for analytic judgments, far from constituting politicization, are entirely legitimate. This is the case even if policymakers raise questions because they do not like the conclusions or are seeking evidence to support policy preferences. Those who must use intelligence are entitled to insist that they be fully informed as to both the evidence and the analysis.” (189)

- “We urge that policymakers actively probe and question analysts. ...[S]uch interaction is not ‘politicization.’ Analysts should expect such demanding and aggressive testing without – as a matter of principal and professionalism – allowing it to subvert their judgment.” (27)
- “Nor is pressure to work more quickly than is ideal or normal ‘politicization.’” (189)

INC Sources Had Minimal Impact On Pre-War Assessments

- “CIA’s post-war investigations revealed that INC-related sources had a minimal impact on pre-war assessments.” (108)
- The October 2002 NIE on Iraqi WMD did rely on two INC sources later deemed to be fabricators. But “reporting from these two INC sources had a ‘negligible’ impact on the overall assessments.” (108)
- Reporting from one of the INC sources regarding Iraqi mobile BW facilities did end up in Secretary’s Powell’s UN speech, but this source was “handled by DIA’s Defense HUMINT Service” (108) (i.e., Policy had nothing to do with it).
- “Despite speculation that Curveball was encouraged to lie by the Iraqi National Congress (INC), the CIA’s post-war investigations failed to uncover any evidence that the INC or any other organization was directing Curveball to feed misleading information” to the IC. (108)
- To the contrary, “post-war investigations concluded that Curveball’s reporting was not influenced by, controlled by, or connected to, the INC.” (108)
- The “inability to prevent information known to be unreliable from making its way to policymakers was due to flawed processes at DIA’s Defense HUMINT Service” (109) (i.e., not Policy).

Comment

- This Report, together with the one last July by the SSCI, helps refute the speculations that motivated Senators Levin and Rockefeller to raise questions about Policy’s pre-war work on Iraq.

Prepared by: Michael H. Mobbs, OUSD(P), (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

2005 03 30 10:01 AM

March 30, 2005
I-05 / 004478
ES-2833

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen Dick Myers
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Review of Silberman WMD Commission

You should carefully review the report of the Silberman WMD Commission. One of the tasks the Commission addressed was the question of whether policymakers pressured intelligence analysts regarding their assessments of Iraq's WMD programs.

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Thanks.

DHR:ss
033005-1

.....
Please respond by 5/2/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48261

OSD 06086-05
30-03-05 10:11:02

~~FOUO~~

March 30, 2005

I-05/004461
ES-2829

TO: Steve Cambone
Lt Gen Mike Hayden
Lt **Gen Jim** Clapper (Ret)
VADM Jake Jacoby
Mike Dominguez

CC: Gordon England
Fran Harvey
Gen Dick Myers
Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Silberman-Robb Report on Intelligence Capabilities Regarding WMD

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Within 30 days or sooner, I would like a **report from** each of you as to what you propose by way of reforms to improve **the** work of your organization or agency in connection with the comments and suggestions made by the Commission.

Please coordinate your responses through Steve Cambone.

Thanks .

DHR:ss
032905-8

.....
Please respond by

5/2/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48262

OSD 06086-05

36-05-12 11:00:00

~~FOUO~~

MAR 10 2005
J05/003591
ES-2614

TO: Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Diagram of U.S. Participation in International Missions

Why don't you have someone do a U.S. Participation in International Missions diagram that looks something like the one attached.

Thanks,

Attach.
Romanian Diagram

DHR:ss
030905-26


.....
Please respond by 3/31/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 06110-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48263

ROMANIAN PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL MISSIONS



February 15, 2005

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: UAVs

I don't think we are doing enough on UAVs. Here is another memo on the subject. We have talked about this before. I'm curious to know if you have had a serious look at it.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/7/05 Memo from Acting Sec Air Force to SecDef re: Predator B Update

DHR:ss
021405-44

.....
Please respond by 3/10/05

452 R

Teb A

OSD 06141-05

15 Feb 05

2/8
1600



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 FEB -8 11 10:04

7 February 2005

Handwritten initials

Handwritten squiggle

Paul Bulte MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

*2/8
FNO*

SUBJECT: Predator B Update

I understand the subject of Predator B came up at a Round Table discussion last week. Here's an update for you:

- We are working to finalize the details for the standup of as many as 15 Active/Air National Guard (ANG) Predator A/B Squadrons. We've got 3 Active squadrons now, we've announced 2 ANG locations, we're close to announcing another 4 ANG squadrons and we're progressing on identifying the operating locations of another 6. This gives us significantly enhanced opportunities for more orbits in CENTCOM's Area of Responsibility (AOR) as well as new opportunities for PACOM, SOCOM, NORTHCOM, and SOUTHCOM.
- To make all that happen...we're are in the process of asking General Atomics to produce as many Predator A's and B's and as many ground control stations as they can deliver to the USAF.
- We are also looking at the most rapid way to fully man these squadrons with trained pilots, sensor operators, imagery analysts, and maintenance specialists. We're exploring options with ANG and contractors to identify the trained individuals required for these units in the shortest time to provide enhanced combat capability.
- We will continue to make sure that persistent problems we are seeing in the Predator B (engine failures, landing gear, and sensor issues) are fixed before full rate production, but will tell them to get there as fast as we can.
- We will ask for supplemental money to help with this increase.

Handwritten signature of Peter B. Teets

Peter B. Teets
Acting Secretary of the Air Force

CC: USD(I)
CSAF
VCSAF

| | | | |
|----------|--------------|------------|--|
| MA SD | SMA DSD | | |
| TSA SD | SA DSD | <i>2/8</i> | |
| EXEC SEC | <i>M 2/8</i> | | |
| ESR MA | <i>E 2/8</i> | | |

OSD 02669-05

Tab A'

A-83-2

January 24, 2005

TO: Gen Dick Myers
CC: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Afghanistan

I would like to see a plan for what we expect for Afghanistan over the next 12-18 months.

Thanks

DHR:ss
012405-15

.....
Please respond by 2/17/05

Afghanistan

05 06 18 7 05

24 Jan 05

TAB
~~FOUO~~

JAN 31 2005

948

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Request by DCI Goss

Porter Goss wants to get some clarity as to who is supposed to do what, and when we would check with each other before moving forward on something. I think it is a good idea, let's talk about it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
012805-6

.....
Please respond by 2/10/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 061 92 -05

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/48268

040 CIA

31 Jan 05

April 4, 2005

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card

cc: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Karl Rove
Dina Powell

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Defense Policy Board, Defense Business Board, Defense Science Board, Defense Personnel Commission and other Defense Boards

334

To my knowledge, throughout the history of the Department of Defense, the Department has effectively used boards, such as the current ones listed above.

Further, to my recollection, they have always been non-partisan. They were bi-partisan when I was last here. They were bi-partisan when I arrived this time and we have kept them so.

4 APR 05

I am now in the process of appointing and reappointing some people to these boards. I have talked to the President about it; he agrees they should be bi-partisan. I would appreciate if you would visit with whomever you deem appropriate and explain the importance to the Department of Defense, the Administration, the government, and the country, of keeping these boards bi-partisan.

Thanks so much.

DHR:ss
033105-16

31 mar 05

OSD 06199-05

March 31, 2005

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card

CC: Karl Rove
Dina Powell

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

SUBJECT: Defense Policy Board, Defense Business Board, Defense Science Board, Defense Personnel Commission and other Defense Boards

334

To my knowledge, throughout the history of the Department of Defense, the Department has effectively used boards, such as the current ones listed above.

Further, to my recollection, they have always been non-partisan. They were bi-partisan when I was last here. They were bi-partisan when I arrived this time and we have kept them so.

I am now in the process of appointing and reappointing some people to these boards. I have talked to the President about it; he agrees they should be bi-partisan. I would appreciate if you would visit with whomever you deem appropriate and explain the importance to the Department of Defense, the Administration, the government, and the country, of keeping these boards bi-partisan.

Thanks so much.


DHR:ss
033105-16

31 Mar 05

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CC: Karl Rove
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DHR:ss
033105-16

March 31, 2005

334

TO: Fran Townsend

c c : The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
 Stephen J. Hadley
 Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: My Memo on the Silberman Robb Commission Report

Fran -

Attached is a memo I sent out to the Department regarding the Silberman-Robb Commission Report. I have also attached the DoD public statement we made.

Your contact point here in the Department on this subject is Steve Cambone. He will be working with you to see that we follow the track the President laid out and that you are working on.

Thanks.

Attach
 03/31/05 SecDef Memo re: Silberman-Robb Report on Intelligence Capabilities Regarding WMD
 03/31/05 DoD Press Release

DHR:ss
03/31/05-21

3/14/05

OSD 06242-05

March 30, 2005

TO: Steve Cambone
Lt Gen Mike Hayden
Lt Gen Jim Clapper (Ret)
VADM Jake Jacoby
Mike Dominguez

c c : Gordon England
Fran Harvey
Gen Dick Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Silberman-Robb Report on Intelligence Capabilities Regarding WMD

The Report of the Silberman-Robb Commission is to be released later this week. I have not read it as yet, but I am advised that it discusses the work of all of the U.S. Intelligence Agencies and elements within the Department.

I request that each of the responsible authorities for intelligence activities in the Department review the Report with care and undertake a systematic review of their comments and suggestions with respect to your areas of responsibility.

Within 30 days or sooner, I would like a report from each of you as to what you propose by way of reforms to improve the work of your organization or agency in connection with the comments and suggestions made by the Commission.

Please coordinate your responses through Steve Cambone.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
032905-8

.....
Please respond by

5/2/05



U.S. Department of Defense
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

News Release

On the Web:

<http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?>

<http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2005/nr20050331-2362.html>

Media contact: +1 (703)697-5131

Public contact:

<http://www.dod.mil/fao/comment.html>

or +1 (703)428-0711

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No. 305-05
March 31, 2005

Rumsfeld Statement on Silberman-Robb Commission

We appreciate the work of the Silberman-Robb Commission and thank the distinguished chairmen and members for their contributions to these important subjects. Their report represents a serious commitment of time and effort, and their insights will help the government continue to reform and improve U.S. intelligence capabilities for the 21st century.

I have asked that DoD officials responsible for intelligence activities review the report with care, undertake a systematic review of the commission's recommendations, and make suggestions to me for improvements.

Intelligence will continue to be a critical underpinning for U.S. national security capabilities. As the circumstances in the world continue to evolve, the US intelligence community must have insights into the challenges and continue to strengthen and improve the way intelligence is collected and analyzed.

<http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2005/nr20050331-2362.html>

11-L-0559/OSD/48274


<http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2005/n...> 3/31/2005

~~FOUO~~

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03/31/05 DoD Press Release

DHR:ss
03/31/05-21

~~FOUO~~

OSD 06242-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48275

March 30, 2005

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DHR:ss
032905-8

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Please respond by 5/2/05



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Media contact: +1 (703) 697-5131

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or +1 (b)(6)

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<http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2005/nr20050331-2362.html>

11-L-0559/OSD/48277

March 31, 2005

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c c : The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Stephen J. Hadley
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: My Memo on the Silberman Robb Commission Report

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DHR:ss
03/31/05-21

OSD 06242-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48278

March 30, 2005

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Gen Dick Myers
Doug Feith

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032905-8

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March 31, 2005

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<http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2005/nr20050331-2362.html>

11-L-0559/OSD/48280

~~FOUO~~

March 31, 2005

TO: Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Transmittal Letter

334

Please fax me a copy of that classified transmittal letter from the Silberman
mission that the President said I should read.

Thank you,

DHR:ss
033105-29


~~FOUO~~

OSD 06243-05

31 Mar 05

11-L-0559/OSD/48281

APR 01 2011

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Vacancies in the Federal Government

I really do urge you to appoint a small group of people to do something about fixing the fact that during an entire Administration the Executive Branch of the Federal Government functions with about a 15-25% vacancy rate of Senate-confirmed Presidential appointees (PAS).

The system is broken. Everything takes too long. Enormously important opportunities are missed. It is a frustrating, destructive process.

There isn't any reason why, in the 21st century, this cannot be fixed. I would be happy to help, but it is going to have to come out of your office.

Regards,

DHR:ss
03000-24

230.02

1 APR 05

OSD 06282-05

~~FOUO~~

March 16, 2005

TO: Fran Harvey
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: *New York Daily News* Story

Please let me know about item #44 in today's Early Bird.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/16/05 *New York Daily News* article

DHR:ss
031605-19

.....
Please respond by 3/31/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48283

OSD 06323-05



~~FOUO~~
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

INFO MEMO

2005-04-02 P03:07

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Frands J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Press Article Alleging Abuse by Female Interrogator at Guantanamo (U)

- This responds to the Secretary of Defense's Snowflake, March 16, 2005, Subject: *New York Daily News* Story (Tab A).
- Ms. Jeannette Arocho-Burkart was an Anteon contract employee for projects such as interrogation and report writing training development. She did not instruct students on interrogation techniques at the Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca. She previously worked as a DIA contractor teaching Strategic Debriefing Courses, a joint course designed to educate students on how to elicit information from willing sources.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ We have learned that Anteon terminated Ms. Arocho-Burkart on March 31, 2005 for undeclared reasons. There was no Army influence over Anteon's actions.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ There is no record of Ms. Arocho-Burkart's as a subject of any criminal or administrative investigation pursuant to allegation of detainee abuse.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ There is currently no evidence that Ms. Arocho-Burkart was ever reprimanded, verbally or in writing, for the alleged incident of smearing ink on the detainee, or for any other incident. She has stated to Anteon officials that although she did put red ink on her hand, she never touched the detainee with the ink. She also stated that she was not reprimanded for this incident.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ A review of detainee procedures at Guantanamo and Charleston by Vice Admiral Church in May 2004 did mention a report of an unnamed female interrogator wiping red magic marker dye on a detainee's shirt and telling him it was blood. This report could not be verified by the Church investigation.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ Anteon has stated that they checked with Guantanamo prior to employing her and they were not given any derogatory information.

~~FOUO~~



Printed on Recycled Paper

11-L-0559/OSD/48284

OSD 06323-05

FOUO

SUBJECT: Press Article Alleging Abuse by Female Interrogator at Guantanamo (U)

- ~~(FOUO)~~ Ms. Arocho-Burthart recently sat down with a producer from *60 Minutes* to discuss the transcript of a book by a former Army interpreter, Sergeant Erik Saar, who was at Guantanamo with her. We do not know what she said during the interview; however, we do know that she subsequently relayed to Anteon representatives that she called the events described in the book as inaccurate and "laughable". *60 Minutes* indicated to Army PAO that a story on the incident may run at a date to be determined.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Major Dana Rucinski (b)(6)

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/48285

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

March 16, 2005

TO: Fran Harvey
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: *New York Daily News Story*

Please let me know about item #44 in today's Early Bird.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/16/05 *New York Daily News* article

DHR:ss
031605-19

.....
Please respond by 3/31/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 06323-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48287

New York Daily News
March 16, 2005

Gitmo Taunter Teaches Tactics

By James Gordon Meek, Daily News Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON - **An** ex-Army interrogator punished for sexually humiliating detainees at the Guantanamo prison is now teaching soldiers interrogation techniques, the Daily News has learned.

Former **Staff**Sgt. Jeannette Arocho-Burkart, 37, is **an** instructor at the Army Intelligence School in Fort Huachuca, Ariz., despite being reprimanded in 2003 for her **sexually** taunting tactics that included smearing fake menstrual blood on terror suspects, according to **four** sources who knew her there.

"She did get in trouble," confirmed one former colleague at Gitmo. "Huachuca could probably do better."

The source said that Arocho-Burkart **was a** "competent" interrogator, but "she fudged the line to an uncomfortable level."

"It wasn't torture, but touching the detainee inappropriately to humiliate **him**," the source said.

Besides wearing skimpy clothing to make **Muslim** men uncomfortable during questioning, Arocho-Burkart allegedly smeared red **ink** on a detainee's face, saying it was her menstrual blood - an act that got her punished.

Last week, Vice **Adm.** Albert Church, in a Pentagon report that cited only three cases of "substantiated" abuse at Gitmo, wrote that "two female interrogators ... touched and spoke to detainees in a sexually suggestive manner ...to incur stress based on the detainees' religious beliefs."

"Those reprimands were verbal, strong and immediate, and dealt with the situation," said another source who knew Arocho-Burkart at the prison camp.

Arocho-Burkart, raised in Mount Holly, N.J., **and** Puerto Rico, couldn't be reached for comment.

She left the Army and spent last year **as** a contractor with the Phoenix Consulting Group, where she was handpicked by the Defense Intelligence Agency to teach "strategic debriefing," or eliciting information from willing sources.

Last month, she left the agency and Phoenix. She now teaches an interrogation course at the **Army** school under contract with defense company Anteon Corp., officials said.

Officials at Huachuca and Phoenix's chairman, John Nolan, said they weren't aware until recently that Arocho-Burkart was reprimanded for detainee abuse.

Before she quit the agency job, Arocho-Burkart was quizzed about the allegations and denied them, a military official said.

Officials checked with Guantanamo before hiring Arocho-Burkart, but weren't told of the reprimand.

Had they learned of it, "We wouldn't have hired her," the official said. Nolan added, "We're not interested in [hiring] somebody who colors outside the lines."

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

March 21, 2005

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Investigation of Italian Friendly Fire Incident

I don't know what the situation is, but to the extent the investigation of the Italian friendly fire incident could be completed in three weeks, it would sure be a help.

Our people seem to move at a snail's pace in these investigations and I think it is important to get it done and over with - as long as they can do it properly and in a reasonably short period of time - even though that is not the general pattern.

Thanks.

DHR:as
032105-35

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 06382-05

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/48290

~~SECRET~~ December 1, 2004

205 APR -5 AM 0:55

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Stabilization

Do we need to organize the civilian side of the Department of Defense to include post-war, post-major combat operations stabilization efforts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120104-26

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Agmt 2005 IFR -5 MI 8:52
March 31, 2005, 4:20 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Post-Major **Combat Operations Stabilization** Efforts

- In the attached snowflake you asked if we need to organize the civilian side of the Department to include post-war, post-major combat operations stabilization efforts.
- After many weeks of deliberations in **OSD**, we are coordinating a draft directive to define and assign DoD responsibilities for stability operations. After the Defense Science Board briefed you on its stabilization study last Fall, you asked that a directive be prepared.
- The directive creates a policy framework for stability operations and reconstruction, and catalyzes the Department to develop a range of stability operations capabilities such as language and cultural expertise, planning, intelligence, and training exercises.
- The directive also calls for the production of metrics to determine progress and inform decisions on how resources should be allocated. It also seeks to integrate DoD efforts with the interagency, NGOs and the private sector in the post-major combat period.
- In the directive, the Secretary of the Army is designated as the Executive Agent for Stability Operations and will lead implementation. He and the USD(P) will co-chair an Executive Committee to oversee implementation and develop a Roadmap of necessary actions. The Secretary of the Army will report to you on progress.
- Marty Hoffmann believes that the directive will be only part of the solution to improving DoD and USG performance in stabilization efforts. DoD needs to develop better operational doctrines for stabilization and reconstruction missions. Key issues include: how to engage in economic reconstruction under combat conditions and how to jumpstart bottom-up, citizen driven economic activity.
- With respect to specific organizational arrangements necessary to enable the Department to execute its responsibilities in stabilization, the Stability Operations Executive Committee will work with the stakeholders and develop recommendations for your approval.

COORDINATION: *none*

CC: FEITH, HENRY, O'CONNELL, HARVEY, HOFFMANN

Prepared By: Bob Menig, (b)(6)

OSD 06405-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48292

~~FOUO~~

APR 12 2005

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Richard McCormack *DR*

Attached is a note I received from Richard McCormack that you might want to take a look at.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/11/05 McCormack ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
041105-35 (ts laptop)

123

~~FOUO~~

2

12 Apr 05

OSD 06428-05

AMBASSADOR RICHARD T. McCORMACK

(b)(6)

SECRETARY OF THE
SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT

2005 APR -5 AM 11: 20

2005
4/11

The Hon. Donald Rumsfeld

March 11, 2005


Dear Don;

Next week I am headed off to a trip to India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, but I wanted you to see the attached. Note particularly point number 3 which discusses how vulnerabilities in the British pound forced the collapse of the Anglo/French/Israeli campaign in 1956 to prevent the Egyptian dictator, President Nasser, from siezing the European trade life line to Asia, the Suez Canal.

Unless we deal with our out control current account problem, one of your early successors is likely to find himself in the same position as Anthony Eden.

With appreciation for your public service;

Sincerely,



Richard McCormack

OSD 06428-05

4

11-L-0559/OSD/48294



Center for Strategic & International Studies
Washington, DC

The Hon. Andy Card

March 11, 2005

Dear Andy;

Next week I am **flying** to India, in part to **have** a **long** private meeting with David Mulford, ~~our former~~ colleague from the Treasury Department, who is now Ambassador in Delhi.

I want his read out on the subject of the attached memorandum-He's had the additional advantage of long term subsequent service in the financial industry

You and I discussed this subject long ago when you were in the private sector. Now, the chickens are coming home to roost big time.

As far as I can tell now, we need a credible **medium term** strategy to gradually turn our current account problem around.

If we move too quickly, **we** will trigger a global financial melt down, since growth and employment in countries like Germany and Japan which are already in recession, are linked to large trade surpluses with the United States.

If we fail to implement a credible **medium term** strategy, the dollar accumulations overseas will eventually cause a melt down of our own currency, in addition to all the foreign policy related issues mentioned in the attached memorandum.

When I return from India, I will be in touch again with whatever thoughts emerge from the discussion with David.

Best Wishes;

Richard McCormack

5



Center for Strategic & International Studies
Washington, DC

Memorandum to: Andy Card and Karl Rove

From: Richard McCormack *RCM* March 11, 2005

Re: The Dollar, The Trade Deficit, The 1956 Suez Crisis, and "Wagging the Dog".

Today's lead editorial in *the Washington Post* denounces the President for pressing the Japanese to allow beef that is **considered** safe to eat for the American people, to be offered to Japanese consumers. This follows a very different editorial two weeks ago bemoaning dollar **weakness**.

The Japanese response to the President's appeal? They gently **threatened** to diversify some of their 900 billion dollar reserves into the Euro, and presumably sent a couple of key paid lobbyists to contact the **editorial staff** of the *Washington Post*. (Ask the Director of the FBI about the vast overall problem of unregistered lobbyists for our trading partners in Washington. There is a very large file on this subject at the FBI, which goes back at least to 1992.)

Of course, the dollar promptly fell on **this** hint by Koizumi, just as it wobbled two weeks before when the **South Koreans** made **similar remarks**, and **two weeks before that** on threatening remarks from China. **Just gentle reminders of our currency's vulnerability** to bring us to heel. A year and a half from now, our trade deficit will have generated another trillion dollars worth of overseas debt, **increasing this vulnerability**.

Three points:

1. The President cannot personally take on **each** of the **micro economic** obstacles to U.S. trade and exports without looking **petty**. Each little obstacle, whether it is health **standards** on beef and apples, the airbus financial subsidies, currency problems with **China**, etc. **is only** a small part of a very large problem. It is **only** when you add up the consequences of all the **micro economic** obstacles to U.S. **competitiveness** and exports that you realize **how titanic and strategic the collective micro economic problem really is and how much it contributes to our overall trade deficit problems**. There is, of course, a macro fiscal and monetary stimulus issue that also plays a role here and that we can not ignore.

2. A hundred little negotiations by STR's overworked and underpowered staff will never solve these problems. Those abroad used to benefiting from the status quo will simply talk the problems to **death**, generate a few more critical editorials in the U.S. media, and

engage in a little symbolism, unless there is a forcing mechanism to compel major change. That is the central lesson we have all learned over a half a century of trade negotiations. Lacking a forcing mechanism, what you will accomplish is minor tinkering with the status quo, a PR event in China where pirated CDs are piled into the streets of some provincial city to be crushed for the benefit of the assembled cameras, a couple of WTO cases that eventually address a tactical problem, etc. If history means anything, all these tactical moves are very unlikely to produce a major impact on our titanic out of control current account deficit. Even Alan Greenspan has learned to his cost that he cannot afford to talk frankly in public about our unsustainable current account problem, lest he trigger another run on the dollar by spooked markets. In the meantime, General Motors, once the most powerful company in the world, and a backbone of our strategic industrial might, sees its bonds being reduced to junk status, a legacy of long term currency fuelled competition from Asia that has crippled GM's ability to compete and still honor pension obligations to its retirees.

3. In 1956, led by Prime Minister Anthony Eden, the Great Powers of Europe, plus Israel, mobilized to prevent the Egyptian dictator, President Nasser, from seizing Europe's critical trade life line to Asia, the Suez Canal. Of course, the powerful armies of Great Britain, France, and Israel cut through the Egyptian resistance like a hot knife through butter.

But the American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, in one of the greatest mistakes of his diplomatic career, persuaded President Eisenhower to force the "Great Powers" of Europe into a humiliating retreat. It was the vulnerability of the British pound which Eisenhower threatened that forced the resignation of Prime Minister Eden, and the collapse of the whole Anglo/French/Israeli enterprise against Nasser. Of course, the Russians promptly moved into the vacuum in Egypt. Never again did the "great powers" of Europe attempt such independent action.

If the United States is to retain its present stabilizing global role, it is essential that we regain control over our own vulnerable currency. (Imagine the dollar crisis that could accompany a Chinese mobilization against Taiwan five or ten years from now, as just one of many possible scenarios.)

In my view, the President should not be engaged in calls to Koizumi on such issues as beef. That's the sort of thing that Chirac in France does. Instead, President Bush should assemble his top economic advisors and instruct them to develop a larger strategy for the United States that addresses our core problem: an out of control current account deficit. This deficit, according to every econometric analysis I have seen, is headed for 10% of our gross domestic product in this decade. It will soon increase the dollar's vulnerability by a trillion dollars per years. (See attached from the Financial Times.)

This is what President Nixon did when confronted with a similar problem in the early 1970s when the Bretton Woods system was falling apart over the same issue: U.S. current account deficits. Secretary of the Treasury John Connally forcefully implemented


President Nixon's eventual solution, over protests ~~from~~ our trading partners, but which held for 40 years.

We ourselves need to take a cold look at reality, and consider how to change policies and the rules of the international trade game to allow us to continue with our critical global responsibilities. We cannot afford to have a dollar crisis constantly hanging over our heads every time we have a trade issue in Asia or security problem. Nobody else is going to do this for us. Some of our trading partners just want the gravy train financed by our current account deficits to keep on rolling for a few more years, and if the U.S. is taken down a peg or two, and becomes weakened strategically because of dollar vulnerabilities, so much the better.

Attachments: ~~Financial~~ Times graph.

8

US Current account balance
% of GDP



Source: Poubiri and Selzer - Stern School of Business 2004

FINANCIAL TIMES WEDNESDAY OCTOBER 13 2004

APR 12 2005

TO: Jim Denny
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: McCormack Memo

123

Please take a look at this memo I received from Dick McCormack and tell me what you think of it.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/11/05 McCormack ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
041105-36 (15 laptop)

12 Apr 05

3

11 Mar 05

OSD 06428-05

AMBASSADOR RICHARD T. McCORMACK

(b)(6)

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 APR -5 AM 11:20

The Hon. Donald Rumsfeld

March 11, 2005


Dear Don;

Next week I am headed off to a trip to India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, but I wanted you to see the attached. Note particularly point number 3 which discusses how vulnerabilities in the British pound forced the collapse of the Anglo/French/Israeli campaign in 1956 to prevent the Egyptian dictator, President Nasser, from siezing the European trade life line to Asia, the Suez Canal.

Unless we deal with our out of control current account problem, one of your early successors is likely to find himself in the same position as Anthony Eden.

With appreciation for your public service;

Sincerely,



Richard McCormack

OSD 06428-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48301



Center for Strategic & International Studies
Washington, DC

The Hon. **Andy Card**

March 11, 2005

Dear Andy;

Next week I **am** flying to India, in part to have a long private meeting with David Mulford, **our** former colleague from the Treasury Department, who is now Ambassador in Delhi.

I want his read out on the subject of the attached memorandum. He's had the additional advantage of long term subsequent service in the financial industry.

You and I discussed this subject long ago when you were in the private sector. Now, the chickens are coming home to roost big time.

As far as I can tell now, we need a credible medium term strategy to gradually turn our current account problem around.

If we move too quickly, we will trigger a global financial melt down, since growth and employment in countries like Germany and Japan which are already in recession, are linked to large trade surpluses with the United States.

If we fail to implement a credible ~~medium~~ term strategy, the dollar accumulations overseas **will** eventually cause a melt down of our own currency, in addition to all the foreign policy related issues mentioned in the attached memorandum.

When I return from India, I will be in touch again with whatever thoughts emerge from the discussion with David.

Best Wishes;

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Rick', is written over the typed name.

Richard McCormack

11-L-0559/OSD/48302



Center for Strategic & International Studies
Washington, DC

Memorandum to: Andy ~~Card~~ and Karl Rove

From: Richard McCormack  March 11, 2005

Re: The Dollar, The Trade Deficit, The 1956 Suez Crisis, and "Wagging the Dog".

Today's lead editorial in the *Washington Post* denounces the President for pressing the Japanese to allow beef that is considered safe to eat for the American people, to be offered to Japanese consumers. This follows a very different editorial two weeks ago bemoaning dollar weakness.

The Japanese response to the President's appeal? They gently threatened to diversify some of their 900 billion dollar reserves into the **Euro**, and presumably sent a couple of key paid lobbyists to contact the editorial staff of the *Washington Post*. (Ask the Director of the FBI about the vast overall problem of unregistered lobbyists for our trading partners in Washington. There is a very large file on this subject at the FBI, which goes back at least to 1992.)

Of course, the dollar promptly fell on this hint by Koizumi, just as it wobbled two weeks before when the South Koreans made similar remarks, and two weeks before that on threatening remarks from China. Just gentle reminders of our currency's vulnerability to bring us to heel. A year and a half from now, our trade deficit will have generated another trillion dollars worth of overseas debt, increasing this vulnerability.

Three points:

1. The President cannot personally take on each of the micro economic obstacles to U.S. trade and exports without looking petty. Each little obstacle, whether it is health standards on beef and apples, the airbus financial subsidies, currency problems with China, etc. is **only** a small part of a very large problem. It is **only** when you add up the consequences of all the micro economic obstacles to U.S. competitiveness and exports that you realize how titanic and strategic the collective micro economic problem really is, and how much it contributes to our overall trade deficit problems. There is, of course, a macro fiscal and monetary stimulus issue that also plays a role here and that we can not ignore.

2. A hundred little negotiations by STR's overworked and underpowered staff will never solve these problems. Those abroad used to benefiting from the status quo will simply **talk** the problems to death, generate a few more critical editorials in the U.S. media, and

engage in a little symbolism, unless there is a forcing mechanism to compel major change. That is the central lesson we have all learned over a half a century of trade negotiations. Lacking a forcing mechanism, what you will accomplish is minor tinkering with the status quo, a PR event in China where pirated CDs are piled into the streets of some provincial city to be crushed for the benefit of the assembled cameras, a couple of WTO cases that eventually address a tactical problem, etc. If history means anything, all these tactical moves are very unlikely to produce a major impact on our titanic out of control current account deficit. Even **Alan Greenspan has learned to his cost** that he cannot afford to talk frankly in public about our unsustainable current account problem, lest he trigger another run on the dollar by spooked markets. In the meantime, General Motors, once the most powerful company in the world, and a backbone of our strategic industrial might, sees its bonds being reduced to junk status, a legacy of long term currency fuelled competition from Asia that has crippled GM's ability to compete and still honor pension obligations to its retirees.

3. In 1956, led by Prime Minister Anthony **Eden, the Great Powers of Europe, plus Israel,** mobilized to prevent the Egyptian dictator, **President Nasser, from** seizing Europe's critical trade life line to Asia, the Suez Canal. Of course, the powerful armies of Great Britain, France, and Israel cut through **the Egyptian resistance** like a hot knife through butter.

But the American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, in one of the greatest mistakes of his diplomatic career, persuaded President Eisenhower to force the "Great Powers" of Europe into a humiliating retreat. It was the vulnerability of the British pound which Eisenhower threatened that forced the resignation of Prime Minister Eden, and the collapse of the whole Anglo/French/Israeli enterprise against Nasser. Of course, the Russians promptly moved into the vacuum in Egypt. Never again did the "great powers" of Europe attempt such independent action.

If the United States is to retain its present stabilizing global role, it is essential that we regain control over our own vulnerable currency. (**Imagine** the dollar crisis that could accompany a Chinese mobilization against Taiwan five or ten years from now, as just one of many possible scenarios.)

In my view, the President should not be engaged in calls to Koizumi on such issues as beef. That's the sort of thing that Chirac in France does. Instead, President Bush should assemble his top economic advisors and instruct them to develop a larger strategy for the United States that addresses our core problem: an out of control current account deficit. This deficit, according to every econometric analysis I have seen, is headed for 10% of our gross domestic product in this decade. It will soon increase the dollar's vulnerability by a trillion dollars per years. (See attached from the Financial Times.)

This is what President Nixon did when confronted with a similar problem in the early 1970s when the Bretton Woods system was falling apart over the same issue: U.S. current account deficits. Secretary of the Treasury John Connally forcefully implemented

President Nixon's eventual solution, over protests from our trading partners, but which held for 40 years.


We ourselves need to take a cold look at reality, and consider how to change policies and the rules of the international trade game to allow us to continue with our critical global responsibilities. We cannot afford to have a dollar crisis constantly hanging over our heads every time we have a trade issue in Asia or security problem. Nobody else is going to do this for us. Some of our trading partners just want the gravy train financed by our current account deficits to keep on rolling for a few more years, and if the U.S. is taken down a peg or two, and becomes weakened strategically because of dollar vulnerabilities, so much the better.

Attachment: ~~Financial~~ Times graph.

5

US Current account balance

% of GDP



Source: Roubini and Setser - Stern School of Business 2004

FINANCIAL TIMES WEDNESDAY OCTOBER 13 2004



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

APR 13 2005

Ambassador Richard T. McCormack

(b)(6)

Dear Dick,

Thanks so much for sending along the paper, I look forward to reading it.

Warm regards,

OSD 06428-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48307

123

13 APR 05

10205

Ambassador Richard T. McCormack

(b)(6)

Dear Dick,

Thanks so much for sending along the paper. I look forward to reading it.

Warm regards,

o/k

7

February 28, 2005

TO: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Our Answer to Senator Harkin

Please get a copy of the letter I answered from Senator Harkin – by Powell Moore – and let me know what we plan to do about it.

Thanks.

DHRss
022505-27

.....
Please respond by 3/3/05



DEFENSE
SUPPORT
OFFICE - IRAQ

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1000

SECRET

2005 APR -5 PM 2: 24

INFO MEMO

APR - 4 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Director, Defense Support Office - Iraq

Subject: Our Answer to Senator Harkin

- You asked (Tab A) about our letter to Senator Harkin, et al (Tab B), concerning the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) audit of the \$8.8 billion provided to Iraqi Ministries, and what we plan to do about it.
- We sent the letter to Senator Harkin (Tab B) on October 18, 2004. The SIGIR released his audit report on January 30, 2005.
- The SIGIR concluded in his report that the "CPA provided less than adequate controls" over the funds. Ambassador Bremer provided a written response strongly disagreeing with the SIGIR's conclusion. The Defense Support Office - Iraq provided an OSD response to support Ambassador Bremer's comments. Both responses were published in the SIGIR report of the audit. (Executive Summary of the Audit at Tab C).
- In our letter to Senator Harkin, we said we would take appropriate actions on the SIGIR's recommendations. The SIGIR did not recommend any specific action. A follow-up letter to Senator Harkin is not necessary.
- However, the SIGIR did recommend and is now conducting a lessons learned study "addressing not only the planning for specific managerial, financial, and contractual controls in future situations of this nature but also the national planning aspects necessary to overall management of these type of endeavors should they occur in the future." We will support the study.

COORDINATION: Dan Stanley, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs

Prepared By: Traci Scott, DSO-Iraq

(b)(6)

OSD 06462-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48310

TAB A

February 28, 2005

TO: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Our Answer to Senator Harkin

Please get a copy of the letter I answered from Senator Harkin – by Powell Moore – and let me know what we plan to do about it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
022505-27

.....
Please respond by 3/3/05





LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

1 9 2007 2004

The Honorable Thomas Harkin
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-1502

Dear Senator Harkin:

Thank you for your continued attention to reconstruction efforts in Iraq. This is in reply to your letter to Secretary Rumsfeld regarding \$8.8 billion from the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) provided to Iraqi ministries through the Iraqi budget process.

The news reports that prompted your letter appear to be based on an ongoing audit by the Coalition Provisional Authority Inspector General (CPA-IG). This audit has not been finalized, pending the collection and assessment of additional information through interviews with Ambassador Bremer and senior CPA officials directly responsible for the decisions about the DFI.

Although it is premature to comment on the uncompleted audit, I am advised that possible misperceptions concerning the nature of the DFI and the funds provided to Iraqi ministries need to be clarified. DFI funds were entirely Iraqi funds, the property of the Iraqi people not U.S. taxpayer funds. The DFI included principally revenues from the sale of Iraqi petroleum and transfers from certain United Nations (UN) escrow accounts. It was established as a means of transparently meeting Iraq's humanitarian, relief and reconstruction needs. The CPA published on its website a regularly updated **DFI** financial statement, and a summary of DFI expenditures by or on behalf of each Iraqi ministry.

In keeping with the UN Security Council Resolution 1483 that states, "the funds in the Development funds for Iraq shall be disbursed at the direction of the Authority (the CPA), in consultation with the Iraqi interim administration...." Ambassador Bremer authorized disbursing funds to the Iraq ministries. Additionally, DFI funds were disbursed to Iraqi ministries in accordance with annual budgets that were also published on the CPA website. Iraqi ministries used DFI funds for purposes that directly benefited the people of Iraq. DFI funds paid the salaries of hundreds of thousands of government employees such as teachers, health workers, administrators and government pensioners; supported the Iraqi defense and police forces that are today taking on more and more of the fight against insurgents; sustained operations of Iraq's public services; and helped repair Iraq's dilapidated infrastructure.

11-L-0559/OSD/48314

As you know Ambassador Bremer as Administrator of the CPA had an obligation to ensure that the administration of Iraq was progressively undertaken by the Iraqi interim government, and to return governing responsibilities and authorities to the people of Iraq as soon as possible. Providing Iraqi funds from the DFI to Iraqi ministries, in accordance with a national budget approved by that administration, was an important part of this process.

The Department of Defense fully supports the important work of the CPA-IG. Please be assured that when the CPA-IG audit is complete, the Department of Defense will take appropriate actions on its recommendations. An identical letter has been sent to Senators Wyden and Dorgan.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Powell A. Moore", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Powell A. Moore
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Legislative Affairs)

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

August 19, 2004

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301


Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

We are writing about recent press reports that indicate \$8.8 billion in Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) money cannot be accounted for. The reports indicate that the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which was in charge of the money throughout the period in question, allocated the money to Iraqi ministries earlier this year, prior to the termination of the CPA. The CPA apparently transferred this staggering sum of money with no written rules or guidelines for ensuring adequate managerial, financial or contractual controls over the funds.

Among the disturbing findings are that the payrolls of the ministries, under CPA control, were reportedly padded with thousands of ghost employees. In one example, the report indicates that the CPA paid for 74,000 guards even though the actual number of guards couldn't be validated. In another example, 8,206 guards were listed on a payroll, but only 603 real individuals could be counted. Such enormous discrepancies raise very serious questions about potential fraud, waste, and abuse.

The reports raise anew very serious questions about the quality of the CPA's oversight and accountability in the reconstruction of Iraq. Iraq is now a sovereign nation, but it is clear that the United States will continue to play a major role in the country's reconstruction. It is therefore imperative that the U.S. government exercise careful control and oversight over expenditures of taxpayer dollars. Continued failures to account for funds, such as the \$8.8 billion of concern here, or Halliburton's repeated failure to fully account for \$4.2 billion for logistical support in Iraq and Kuwait, and the refusal, so far, of the Pentagon to take corrective action are a disservice to the American taxpayer, the Iraqi people and to our men and women in uniform.

We are requesting a full, written account of the \$8.8 billion transferred earlier this year from the CPA to the Iraqi ministries, including the amount each ministry received and the way in which the ministry spent the money, as well as a date certain for when the Pentagon will finally install adequate managerial, financial and contractual controls over taxpayer dollars and DFI expenditures in Iraq. We look forward to hearing from your office in the next two weeks.


Ron Wyden

Sincerely,

Tom Harkin


Byron Dorgan

11-L-0559/OSD/48317

OSD 124-58-014

Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

Report Number 05-004

January 30, 2005

(Project No. D2004-DCPAAC-0007)

Oversight of Funds Provided to Iraqi Ministries through the National Budget Process

Executive Summary

Introduction. This audit report discusses the oversight of Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) funds provided to Interim Iraq Government (IIG) ministries through the national budget process. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was the authority responsible for the temporary governance of Iraq through June 28, 2004. Thereafter, the IIG was the authority responsible for the governance of Iraq. Therefore, this report does not address the CPA management or use of U.S. appropriated funds.

Objective. The original objective of the audit was to determine whether the CPA had implemented adequate procedures for recording, reviewing, and reporting disbursements. During the audit, we limited the scope to review procedures and controls to only DFI funds provided to the interim Iraqi government through the national budget process. Specifically, we determined whether the CPA established and implemented adequate managerial, financial, and contractual controls over DFI disbursements provided to interim Iraqi ministries through the national budget process.

Results. The CPA provided less than adequate controls for approximately \$8.8 billion in DFI funds provided to Iraqi ministries through the national budget process. Specifically, the CPA did not establish or implement sufficient managerial, financial, and contractual controls to ensure DFI funds were used in a transparent manner. Consequently, there was no assurance the funds were used for the purposes mandated by Resolution 1483.

- **Managerial Controls.** The CPA did not implement adequate managerial controls over DFI funds provided to Iraqi ministries through the national budget process. Specifically, authorities and responsibilities over DFI funds were not clearly assigned, and CPA regulations, orders, and memoranda did not contain clear guidance regarding the procedures and controls for disbursing funds for the national budget.
- **Financial Controls.** The CPA did not implement adequate financial controls to ensure DFI funds were properly used. Specifically, the CPA did not exercise adequate responsibility over DFI funds provided to Iraqi ministries through the national budget process. Additionally, although the CPA published approved national budgets and total disbursements to Iraqi ministries on the Internet, it was not transparent what the funds were actually used for. Lastly, the CPA did not maintain adequate documentation to support budget spending plans, budget disbursements, or cash allocations made by coalition forces.
- **Contract Controls.** The CPA did not adequately control DFI contracting actions. Specifically, the CPA contracting office did not review contracting procedures at

the Iraqi ministries. In addition, CPA senior advisors and staffs did not provide oversight of Iraqi ministry procurements or contracting operations and executed contracts through the national budget process that were not in compliance with CPA Memorandum Number 4 guidance.

Conclusion. While acknowledging the extraordinarily challenging threat environment that confronted the CPA throughout its existence and the number of actions taken by CPA to improve the IIG budgeting and financial management, we believe the CPA management of Iraq's national budget process and oversight of Iraqi funds was burdened by severe inefficiencies and poor management. Although we did not include all aspects of the threat environment or all CPA actions to improve the IIG budgeting and financial management in our audit scope and, therefore, cannot verify the validity of statements made. The management comments to this report provide the detailed opinions of the CPA Administrator and the Defense Support Office – Iraq on those issues.

Finally, although formal recommendations were not made in this report, we believe that the results of this audit dictate that lessons learned studies should be performed addressing not only the planning for specific managerial, financial, and contractual controls in future situations of this nature but also the national planning aspects necessary to overall management of these type of endeavors should they occur in the future. We are aware that other organizations have similar concerns. For example, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has initiated lessons learned studies concerning financial and logistics issues. However, we believe that those specific studies need to be brought together so that efforts can be better coordinated and be used to assist in formulating national planning initiatives. As such, rather than recommend others to perform this work, the SIGIR will take on the task of consolidating lessons learned studies that are specific in nature and also continue a broader scope lessons learned initiative previously started by this organization.

Management Comments and Audit Response. The initial comments on a draft of this report were received on July 18, 2004, from the Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office. The Director and the Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Finance/Office of Management and Budget concurred with the report. Subsequently, the Defense Support Office - Iraq disagreed with the report by providing informal comments on July 20, 2004, and revised informal comments on August 12, 2004. The CPA Administrator provided comments on September 8, 2004, and the Director of the Defense Support Office – Iraq provided comments on October 7, 2004. Those comments are included in the Management Comments section of the report.

The CPA Administrator and the Director, Defense Support Office – Iraq disagreed with the audit finding and stated the report did not acknowledge the difficult operational context in which the CPA was operating and did not recognize the actions taken to improve weaknesses in the Iraqi budgeting and financial management. We revised our report to address the comments from the CPA Administrator regarding the situation the CPA found in Iraq when it assumed control. However, their comments did not cause us to change our conclusion that the CPA did not establish or implement sufficient managerial, financial, and contractual controls to ensure DFI funds were used in a transparent manner or that there was no assurance the funds were used for the purposes mandated by Resolution 1483. See the Finding section of the report for a discussion of the management comments and the Management Comments section of the report for the complete text of the comments.

SECRET **March 16, 2005**

2005 100 - 0 01 2: 54

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: OSCE Position

Please get me the details on the OSCE job Mr. Nichols had: what it pays, where it is located, is there a house included, is it an Ambassador, is it Senate confirmed - all of that kind of information.

Thanks.

DHR:dt
031605-2

.....
Please respond by 3/24/05

OSD 06483-05

~~FOUO~~

March 16, 2005

2005 MAR 16 13 25

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: OSCE Position

Please get me the details on the **OSCE** job Mr. Nichols had what it pays, where it is located, is there a house included, is it an Ambassador, is it Senate confirmed - all of that kind of information.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031605-2

.....
Please respond by 3/24/05

→ Linda Rogers,

Please see SD's question and give me direct response. Thanks,

Ray D.
3/17/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 06483-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48321



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFORMATION MEMO

275 157 - 110 9:51
April 4,
March 25, 2005, 10:00 am

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director of Administration and Management

Ray DuBois

SUBJECT: Response to Secretary of Defense "Snowflake" Regarding the Position of Secretary of Defense Representative (SecDefRep) to the Organization of Security and Cooperation, Europe (OSCE)

The following is in response to your questions (Attachment 1) regarding the OSCE Position, previously encumbered by Mr. David R. Nicholas, who died on March 13, 2005.

Question: What does the position pay?

The position is an SES General position. Mr. Nicholas, who was a Noncareer SES member, had a salary of \$140,372 per annum. Pay may be set anywhere between \$107,550 - \$149,200 (SES pay range). Once the Department receives OPM certification of their SES Performance Plan, the maximum will be \$162,100.

Question: Where is the position located?

The duty station is Vienna, Austria

Question: Is there a house included?

Attachment 2 is a list of "perks" that were afforded Mr. Nicholas as the SecDefRep to the Organization of Security and Cooperation, Europe (OSCE). As you will note, a leased apartment through the Vienna Mission was included.

Question: Is it an Ambassador position?

We contacted the Secretary of State White House Liaison Office (Mr. David McMaster) for information regarding this question as we had no evidence of Mr. Nicholas ever receiving an Ambassadorship. According to Mr. McMaster, neither his office nor the Secretary of State Clerk's Office, has any record of Mr. Nicholas ever being credited with the title Ambassador. He indicated that there is only one official U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE, Ambassador Steven Minikes, who was credited with that title and appointment as the U.S. Ambassador to OSCE on November 29, 2001.

Question: Is it a Senate-confirmed position?

No. The position of SecDef Rep to the OSCE is not a Senate-confirmed position. It is a Senior Executive Service General position that was filled via a Noncareer appointment. As a note, Ambassador Minikes holds an OSCE position that requires Presidential nomination with Senate confirmation.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:

As stated


Prepared by: Linda Roper (b)(6)

TAB

A

March 16, 2005

2005 / 03 - 5 11 2: 54

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: OSCE Position

Please get me the details on the OSCE job Mr. Nichols had what it pays, where it is located, is there a house included, is it an Ambassador, is it Senate confirmed - all of that kind of information.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031605-2

.....
Please respond by 3/24/05

OSD 06483-05

March 16, 2005

2005 03 -05 11 2: 51

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: OSCE Position

Please get me the details on the OSCE job Mr. Nichols had: what it pays, where it is located, is there a house included, is it an Ambassador, is it Senate confirmed - all of that kind of information.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031605-2

.....
Please respond by 3/24/05

→ Linda Rogers,

Please see SD's question and give me direct response. Thanks,

Ray D.
3/17/05

TAB

B

Support to Secretary of Defense Representative to the Organization of Security and
Cooperation, Europe (OSCE)

- Leased apartment through Vienna Mission
- Leased vehicle through Vienna Mission
- Provided fund cite (\$140,000) to Mission for above leases plus the associated costs for fuel, insurance, maintenance, license, utilities, and upkeep.
- Provided fund cite for Representational Funds (\$7,500)
- Funded ICASS support which pays for the Mission support such as health support, security, office space, communication, mail service, accounting services and all other support the Mission provided (FY05 estimate \$89,128)
- Provided contracted Administrative and Driver support. (FY05, \$202,639)
- ISP provided annual blanket orders for all travel
- Office phone number is (b)(6)


~~FOUO~~

April 5, 2005

2005 127 - 0 11 48 46

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Remarks by Birgit Smith

Mr. President,

At the Cabinet meeting I mentioned Birgit Smith spoke at the Pentagon today when we unveiled Sergeant Paul Smith's name on the plaque in the Hall of Heroes. Her remarks were moving. It struck me that you would like to see a copy (attached).

I was particularly touched by her comments about the Americans having liberated the German people from tyranny in World War II, and about a generation of American soldiers who have given the Iraqi and Afghan people a path to freedom.

Respectfully,

Attach.

4/5/05 Birgit Smith's Remarks at Medal of Honor Ceremony on April 5

DHR:ss
040505-10

350,001

5 Apr 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 06505-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48329



**Pentagon Ceremony to Add Sgt. First Class Paul Smith,
Medal of Honor Recipient, to the Hall of Heroes
(Remarks by Mrs. Birgit Smith)**

First, I would like to say how proud I am to receive this award in honor of Paul. Paul loved his country, he loved the Army, and he loved his soldiers. He loved being a sapper. He died doing what he loved.

I'm grateful the Army gave Paul the opportunity to fulfill his dream of serving his country. He touched so many lives in so many ways and made a lot of people better soldiers and better people by what they learned from him.

I would like to thank all of the soldiers who influenced Paul as he advanced through his military career. Most described him as tough, fair and always putting the mission and his soldiers first. Paul was proud of all of his troops, particularly those in 2nd Platoon, Bravo Company, 11th Engineer. He was dedicated to duty and unwilling to accept less than the best.

My family and I continue to be overwhelmed by the American people's appreciation of his service, and I'm sure Paul would be proud to know that I have begun the process of becoming an American citizen.

Sixty years ago, American soldiers liberated the German people from tyranny in World War II. Today another generation of American soldiers has given the Iraqis, the Afghani people a birth of freedom. This is an ideal that Paul truly believed in.

I know that Paul is looking down on the ceremony, along with Staff Sergeant Hollingshead and Private First Class Myer and all the other fallen soldiers from Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. May God bless them and their family.

Every soldier has a story. Because of this award, Paul's story of uncommon valor will forever be remembered. As soldiers, I encourage you to tell your stories, because the American people and the world will better understand the sacrifice of Paul and others like him. One soldier's story at a time.

Hoo-ah and God bless you. (Applause.)

APR 06 2005

TO: Members of the Cabinet

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Remarks by Birgit Smith

I mentioned there was a Medal of Honor Ceremony for Sergeant Paul Smith at the White House, and that we had just completed another ceremony at the Pentagon before I came over for the Cabinet meeting.

I also mentioned that the widow of Sergeant Paul Smith, Mrs. Birgit Smith, spoke in the most moving way. For your possible interest, I am enclosing a copy of her remarks.

Attach.

4/5/05 Birgit Smith's Remarks at Medal of Honor Ceremony on April 5

DHR:ss
040505-11

350.061

6 Apr 05

OSD 06562-05



**Pentagon Ceremony to Add Sgt. First Class Paul Smith,
Medal of Honor Recipient, to the Hall of Heroes
(Remarks by Mrs. Birgit Smith)**

First, I would like to say how proud I am to receive this award in honor of Paul. Paul loved his country, he loved the Army, and he loved his soldiers. He loved being a sapper. He died doing what he loved.

I'm grateful the Army gave Paul the opportunity to fulfill his dream of serving his country. He touched **so** many lives in **so** many ways and made a lot of people better soldiers and better people by what they learned from him.

I would like to thank all of the soldiers who influenced Paul as he advanced through his military career. Most described him as tough, fair and always putting the mission and his soldiers first. Paul was proud of all of his troops, particularly those in 2nd Platoon, Bravo Company, 11th Engineer. He was dedicated to duty and unwilling to accept less than the best.

My family and I continue to be overwhelmed by the American people's appreciation of his service, and I'm sure Paul would be proud to know that I have begun the process of becoming an American citizen.

Sixty years ago, American soldiers liberated the German people from tyranny in World War II. Today another generation of American soldiers has given the Iraqis, the Afghani people a birth of freedom. This is an ideal that Paul truly believed in.

I know that Paul **is** looking down on the ceremony, along with Staff Sergeant Hollingshead and Private First Class Myer and all the other fallen soldiers from Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. May God bless them and their family.

Every soldier has a story. Because of this award, Paul's story of uncommon valor will forever be remembered. As soldiers, I encourage you to tell your stories, because the American people and the world will better understand the sacrifice of Paul and others like him. One soldier's story at a time.

Hoo-ah and God bless you. (Applause.)

~~FOUO~~

APR 06 2005

~~TO: Members of the Cabinet~~

TO ~~FROM:~~ → Donald Rumsfeld *D*

SUBJECT: Remarks by Birgit Smith

I mentioned there was a Medal of Honor Ceremony for Sergeant Paul Smith at the White House, and that we had just completed another ceremony at the Pentagon before I came over for the Cabinet meeting.

I also mentioned that the widow of Sergeant Paul Smith, Mrs. Birgit Smith, spoke in the most moving way. For your possible interest, I am enclosing a copy of her remarks.

Attach.
4/5/05 Birgit Smith's Remarks at Medal of Honor Ceremony on April 5

DHR:mf
040505-11

MS
4/8

2005 APR -03 11 42

*Sec. Rumsfeld -
Thanks for sending this
along. I now have a tear
in my eye after reading it.
Sam Bedner
4/7*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 06562-05

~~FOUO~~

December 19, 2005

TO: Dan Stanley
CC: Eric Edelman
ADM Ed Giambastiani
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Nuclear Issue

We need to engage the Speaker and key leaders on the Hill regarding DoE support at the Sandia Lab for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetration test.

Please get with Eric Edelman and Admiral Giambastiani, and map out and execute an engagement plan.

Let me know how you come out.

Thanks,

DHR:ss
121905-02

.....
Please Respond By 01/18/06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48334



4/25/2006 8:54:00 AM



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

April 24, 2006

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Robert Wilkie, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Snowflake Response – Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Congressional
Engagement Plan

- Shortly after you directed the development of the subject plan, the proposed RNEP sled test study to be conducted at Sandia encountered significant resistance on Capitol Hill.
 - DOE Secretary Bodman committed to Rep. Hobson (R-OH), Chairman of the Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee, that he would not allow the penetrator sled test to be conducted at the Sandia National Lab.
 - The FY06 Authorization and Defense Appropriations Acts provided no funding to DOD or DOE for the RNEP study. Both acts shifted the \$4M requested for the sled test from DOE to DOD.
 - The Defense Appropriations language designated this funding for a “conventional penetrator study” to be conducted in FY06; the Defense Authorization language designated the funding for a “penetrator sled test” but did not specify that the sled test be nuclear or conventional.
- Given these developments, the Department moved the sled test study to Holloman AFB. Doing so reduced Congressional resistance to the study while still providing a means to achieve useful results.

Attachments:

SECDEF Snowflake 121905-02, 19 Dec 05
ASD/ISP Action Memo, March 7, 2006

Prepared by: Lt Col Testut, Special Assistant, OASD (LA) (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/48335



4/25/2006 8:54:02 AM

~~FOUO~~

December 19, 2005

TO: Dan Stanley
CC: Eric Edelman
ADM Ed Giambastiani
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Ruinsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Nuclear Issue

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Please get with Eric Edelman and Admiral Giambastiani, and map out and execute an engagement plan.

Let me know how you come out

Thanks

DHR:ss
12 1905-412

.....
*Please Respond **By** 01/18/06*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48336



4/25/2006 8:54:00 AM

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3/16
8:40

ACTION MEMO

DSD
USD 3/16 MAR 07 20

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

RC →

FROM: Peter Flory, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISP) MAR 7

SUBJECT: SecDef Decision on the Penetrator Sled Test Configuration (Formerly the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Study)

- Congress did not provide funds for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) study in FY06, but did shift funds requested for the RNEP study to conduct a penetrator sled test as part of a "conventional penetrator study."
- The briefing at Tab A describes options for this penetrator sled test study.
- The briefing recommends an option (Option A), which would both comply with congressional direction and achieve many of the goals of the RNEP study.

RECOMMENDATION: That you concur with the recommendation made in the briefing (Tab A, last slide) to conduct an RNEP B83 penetrator Mock up + Conventional sled test at Holloman AFB, NM.

COORDINATION: See Tab B

SecDef Decision:

Agree PA Disagree _____ Other _____

Attachments:

- A. RNEP Briefing ~~1-0007~~
- B. Coordination Sheet

Prepared by: Gary Betourne, SP&I, (b)(6)
24 February 2006.

| | | | |
|----------|---------|----------------|--|
| MA SD | 3/15 | SMA DSD | |
| TR A SD | 12/3/15 | SA DSD | |
| EXEC SEC | 14/3/8 | 1230 3/13 3/15 | |
| ESSR MA | 4/3/8 | STF DIR | |

OSD 03703-06



05/005091
ES-2970

APR 12 2005

293

~~FORM~~

TO: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Note to French

Please have someone in Policy draft a note for me to send back in response to the French Defense Minister. *if appropriate.*

Thanks.

Attach.
4/7/05 French MoD ltr to SecDef

DMR:dm
041705-52 (to laptop)

.....
Please respond by 4/15/05

12 APR 05

~~FORM~~
Z

7 APR 05



Embassy of the United States of America
235 Ave. - 7^e Et. S. 07 Defense Attaché Office, Paris
PSC 116, B-210
APO AE 09777

U-0135-05

7 April 2005

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

The French Defense Minister, Madame Michèle Alliot-Marie, has asked me to forward the attached correspondence. The text is translated as follows:

"I was very saddened to learn of the tragic accident that occurred on Wednesday, 6 April, when one of **your** helicopters crashed in the Ghazni Province of Afghanistan, fatally injuring **several** Americans.

I would like to express my sincere condolences on behalf of the entire French Armed Forces. In this painful moment, I share the **distress** of the families concerned, and hope you will extend to them my deepest **sympathy**.

This grievous event, which has struck your **fellow** countrymen, tragically illustrates the heavy toll **our** nations are paying while **fighting** the war against terrorism in Afghanistan in order to construct a future of peace, democracy, and prosperity.

I remain, faithfully,

(signed)

Michèle ALLIOT-MARIE"

Very Respectfully,

RALPH R. STEINKE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Defense and Army Attache

1 Enclosure
as stated

OSD 06683-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48339



MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE

Le Ministre

- 7AVR.05 - 004922

Paris, le

Monsieur le Secrétaire à la défense,

Donald

C'est avec une vive émotion que j'ai appris le dramatique accident survenu mercredi 06 avril, lors du crash d'un de vos hélicoptères dans la province de Ghazni en Afghanistan, causant la mort ou la disparition de nombre des vôtres.

Je tiens à vous faire part de mes plus sincères condoléances ainsi que de celles de l'ensemble des forces armées françaises. En ce moment douloureux, je m'associe à la détresse des familles auxquelles je vous serais reconnaissant de bien vouloir transmettre mes sentiments de profonde sympathie.

Ce deuil, qui frappe vos compatriotes, illustre tragiquement le lourd tribut que nos nations sont amenées à payer pour lutter contre le terrorisme en Afghanistan et construire un avenir de paix, de démocratie et de prospérité.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Secrétaire à la défense, l'expression de ma considération distinguée et *de mon souvenir fidèle et attentif*

Michèle ALLIOT-MARIE

Monsieur Donald Rumsfeld
Secrétaire à la défense des Etats-Unis d'Amérique

U. S. DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE, PARIS

PSC 116, B-210

APO AE 09777

FAX: (b)(6)

TEL:

UNCLASSIFIED
FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL

DATE: 7 Apr 05

PAGES: 3

TO: Office of the SECDEF
ATTN: Ms. Stephanie Sherline


FAX NUMBER:

(b)(6)

TELEPHONE:

Ms. Sherline,

A letter from the Defense Attaché to France is attached. It forwards a letter for the Secretary of Defense from the French Defense Minister. Thanks for your assistance.


Rebecca Bouvier
Admin Assistant

11-L-0559/OSD/48341

U.S. DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE, PARIS

PSC 116, B-210
APO AE 09777

FAX: (b)(6)
TEL: (b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED
FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL

DATE: 7 Apr 05
PAGES: 3

TO: Office of the SECDEF
ATTN: Ms. Stephanie Sherline

FAX NUMBER: (b)(6)
TELEPHONE: (b)(6)

Ms. Sherline,

A letter from the Defense Attaché to France is attached. It forwards a letter for the Secretary of Defense from the French Defense Minister. Thanks for your assistance.



Rebecca Bouvier
Admin Assistant

April 7, 2005

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Julie Nixon Eisenhower

Attached is the note I received from Julie Eisenhower and also a copy of my response to her. I would sure appreciate anything you can do to figure this out for her.

Thanks so much.

Attach.

- 3/17/05 Note to SecDef from Julie N. Eisenhower
- 4/7/05 SecDef Itr to JNE

DHR:dh
040705-20

331.1

7 Apr 05

OSD 06684-05

11/24 :
R + R
3/17/05
Subject: from Julie Nixon Eisenhower

Dear Mr. Secretary,

It was wonderful seeing you and Joyce at Bill Safire's retirement dinner! The Nixon years brought us all together and in that spirit I hope you can help me at a critical moment in a two year effort to get my father's Presidential Library into the NARA federally-run system along with the other 11 modern Presidential libraries. Would you be willing to call Josh Bolten at OMB and urge a "plus-up" of 3 million dollars for the National Archives FY'06 budget? The request was cut last month because of "no new starts".

Here are the key points:

- A carefully constructed bipartisan coalition in Congress led by Congressmen Jerry Lewis and Tom Davis, with strong support from the Bush administration, has provided special appropriations and waived Watergate era laws to permit the return to CA -- under Archives control -- of all the Nixon papers and tapes.
- The Archivist and the Nixon Family will today release letters of agreement on this historic step.
- In February '06 there will be a ceremony in Yorba Linda to which all living Presidents will be invited. At this time, the Nixon Library, worth over \$100 million in private funds raised and invested over the last 31 years, will be made available to the American people.
- It is ESSENTIAL that Archives have staff in place (the 3 million dollar figure) in CA to complete this process. Otherwise it will be delayed yet again and the anti-Nixon crowd will have a Archives embarrassment to pillory once more!

Mr. Secretary, I know you are overburdened, but I call on our long friendship in the hopes that you feel you can help me with my father's legacy.

Please give my warmest regards to Joyce and tell her that the

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

on!

Time marches

With gratitude for all you are doing for our nation,

Sincerely,
Julie Eisenhower



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

APR 7 2005

Mrs. David Eisenhower

(b)(6)

Dear Julie,

I received your letter and, as always, it was good to hear from you. I, too, enjoyed our visit at the Safire retirement event.

I have talked to the Vice President about your note and sent it along to him. It seems to me that he is the right person to address this, since it is clearly a White House matter. As you know, he worked closely with me in your father's Administration.

We'll stay in touch with you.

Best regards,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be a stylized 'D' or 'D' with a horizontal line extending to the right.

OSD 06674-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48345

April 8, 2005

TO: The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: General Kicklighter

I believe you indicated you would visit with General Kicklighter, when you return from Rome, to determine if you want to go forward with the idea of Kicklighter serving as the Iraq transition chairman for both of us.

Iraq

Items for consideration below:

- 1) Prepare an inventory of all the things that need to be worked through prior to the expiration of the UN Security Council Resolution and the new government taking office January 2006.
- 2) Assign people from our shops to work on each of the inventory items, and folks from other departments to the extent it is appropriate.
- 3) The chairman should provide us a timetable for each of the items on the list.

After you have talked to him, please let me know how you would like to proceed.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
040705-50

8 Apr 05

OSD 06725-05

11-L-0559/OSD/48346


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~~FOUO~~

SECRET

March 16, 2005

7035 153 - 1 11 13 04

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Fund Raising

0004

I want to figure out if it is proper to have someone like Lynda Webster, or maybe Dov Zakheim, solicit the members of the Defense Science Board, Defense Policy Board, and Defense Business Board for the Pentagon Memorial.

Thanks.

D1R:dh
03 1605-3

.....
Please respond by 3/24/05

Bill Bennett

~~FOUO~~

OSD 06731-05

16 MAR 05

11-L-0559/OSD/48347



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
 OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
 1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600

OFFICE OF THE
 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 2005 APR -3 PM 6:24

MAR 25 2005

000.4

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Director, Standards of Conduct Office

SUBJECT: Pentagon Memorial Fundraising

- This responds to your request concerning whether DoD may have individuals solicit for the Pentagon Memorial from members of the Defense Science Board, Defense Policy Board, and the Defense Business Board.
- DoD personnel, including the Secretary and special Government employees (SGEs), such as Dr. Zakheim and other members of the advisory boards, may not fundraise or solicit in their official capacity for the Memorial. The Secretary, therefore, may not request DoD personnel, SGEs, or private citizens to fundraise on behalf of the Pentagon Memorial.
- DoD personnel, including the Secretary, in their personal capacity, may solicit donations, except from subordinates (DoD personnel, including SGEs) or DoD prohibited sources (including employees of prohibited sources), and may not use their official title, position, or authority when soliciting. Because of the close nexus between the Pentagon Memorial and the Secretary's office, however, it is unlikely that any requests by the Secretary would be perceived to be personal and unofficial. Accordingly, the Secretary should not solicit in his personal capacity.
- DoD SGEs, in their personal capacity, are subject to the same restrictions, except that the prohibited sources are limited to those whose interests they may substantially affect by their performance of their official duties.
- Non-Government personnel, such as Ms. Lynda Webster (who is assisting the public national fundraising campaign for the Memorial), have no restrictions.
- The Principal Deputy General Counsel concurs in this advice. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call me at (b)(6)

Paul Butler
 Paul Butler
 4/8

25 MAR 05

Prepared by Gail Mason



DSD 06731-05


11-L-0559/OSD/48348

16 MAR 05

April 14, 2005

TO: Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice
Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Ideological Support for Terrorism

Attached is a memo on the subject of ideological support for terrorism that I found interesting.

Attach.

3/24/05 PDUSD(P) memo to SecDef re: DoD Efforts to Counter Ideological Support for Terrorism
[OSD 06742-05]

DHR:dh
041405-21 (ts laptop)

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OSD 06742-05

14 Apr 05

4/11/05
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~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

ES-2791

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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2005 APR -0 11 1:25

I-05/004169-PDUSDP

MAR 24 2005

INFO MEMO

FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: DoD Efforts to Counter Ideological Support for Terrorism

Paul Butler
4/12 PWB

- At last Friday's Town Hall, you were asked what to look for in measuring progress in the GWOT. We have found this question to be particularly difficult to answer in regards to DoD's role in *countering ideological support for terrorism*.
- Interestingly, recent polling data indicate some small but uneven shifts in support for terrorism, attitudes towards the U.S., and optimism about the future in some Muslim countries (although the environment remains largely hostile towards U.S. policy and many publics still view terrorist organizations as legitimate resistance groups).
 - o Following the U.S. military response to the tsunami, Indonesians showed a significant rise in support for the United States, with 55% polling favorably, as compared to 37% in April 2004. (See Tab A)
 - o For the first time ever in a Muslim nation since 9/11, more Indonesians (40%) favor U.S.-led efforts against terrorism than oppose (36%). Also for the first time since 9/11, support for Osama Bin Laden dropped (from 58% to 23%). (Tab B).
 - o A post-election survey of Iraqis reveals that 62% believe their country is heading in the right direction, up from 42% in September 2004. (Tab C)
 - o Media surveys of Palestinians indicate that support for recent suicide bombings has declined from 77% to 29% since August 2004. (Tab D)
 - o Pew Center data from 2002-2004 suggest that Middle Eastern and African Muslims' support for democracy is holding over time. (Tab E)
- Although these data, which are event driven, could indicate slight progress, we are still in the early stages of understanding what factors drive attitudinal

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| ESR MA | KSD | 4/8/05 | 1638 |

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/48350

OSD 06742-05

A-90
A-8

changes in the Muslim world over the long term – and polls are but one imperfect measure of support for terrorism.

- o In the Middle East in particular, polls can be episodic, exaggerated, and do not always have a direct connection to people's behavior.
- Good work is being done in your Department in this area, but we need to develop better capabilities to measure, map, interpret, and respond to attitudinal trends over time.
- Recognizing this need, Policy is working to establish an Office of Defense Support to Public Diplomacy within ISA. This new office will support USG strategic communications, including public diplomacy and public affairs, and will also develop analytical capabilities and innovative metrics.
 - o In addition, as a force protection issue we are developing more refined tools to track and analyze Arab media and Jihadist web site activity.
 - o We also are exploring new ways to measure attitudes through targeted alumni outreach by the five Regional Centers.
- Policy is continuing to improve partnerships with State's public diplomacy office.
 - o The Karen Hughes nomination provides an opportunity to strengthen our efforts with State.
 - o As a first step, we are scheduling a meeting for Doug Feith and Peter Rodman to brief Ms. Hughes on the GWOT strategy. We also will discuss how State and DoD can help build a more comprehensive, USG-wide approach to the ideological aspects of the GWOT.
 - o We are inviting Ms. Hughes to tour DoD's Iraq Assessment and Integration Cell and will provide her with an overview of our strategic communications initiatives.
 - o Policy is also working with State to find ways to enable key countries to create their own anti-terrorism campaigns.
- We will keep you informed of our efforts as they progress.

Attachments: As stated
Coordination: See Tab F

CONFIDENTIAL

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NOUSDP R 7 APR 05 7 2005

2005 APR -05 PM 1:23

I-05/004169-PDUSDP

MAR 24 2005

INFO MEMO

FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: DoD Efforts to Counter Ideological Support for Terrorism

- At last Friday's Town Hall, you were asked what to look for in measuring progress in the GWOT. We have found this question to be particularly difficult to answer in regards to DoD's role in *countering ideological support for terrorism*.
- Interestingly, recent polling data indicate some small but uneven shifts in support for terrorism, attitudes towards the U.S., and optimism about the future in some Muslim countries (although the environment remains largely hostile towards U.S. policy and many publics still view terrorist organizations as legitimate resistance groups).
 - Following the U.S. military response to the tsunami, Indonesians showed a significant rise in support for the United States, with 55% polling favorably, as compared to 37% in April 2004. (See Tab A)
 - For the first time ever in a Muslim nation since 9/11, more Indonesians (40%) favor U.S.-led efforts against terrorism than oppose (36%). Also for the first time since 9/11, support for Osama Bin Laden dropped (from 58% to 23%). (Tab B).
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DSD 06742-05

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- We will keep you informed of our efforts as they progress.

Attachments: As stated

Coordination: See Tab F

TAB

A

March 9, 2005

M-29-05

Indonesian Views of U.S. Improve Sharply Following Tsunami Relief Effort


A January 2005 Office of Research-sponsored survey in Indonesia shows that images of the U.S. as "a nation which helps people" have contributed to a significant shift in the way people view the U.S. and the bilateral relationship. Still, public enthusiasm for cooperation with Washington is recovering more slowly. A bare plurality approve of the way the U.S. is handling the war on terrorism, while close to half support cooperating with Washington in fighting terrorism.*

Relief Effort Marks a Turnaround

A small majority of Indonesians (55%) have an overall favorable opinion of the U.S. Available trend data for urban Indonesia show that this represents a major turnaround from a year ago, when a similar majority expressed an unfavorable view (see Figure 1).¹ This is the best reading since 9/11 (although well below the positive readings of the late 1990s).

Among those who have a favorable view of the U.S., half (47%) say that they feel this way because the U.S. "helps other countries" or has supported Indonesia (this was an open-ended question in which respondents could answer anything they wished). Smaller numbers cite advanced American science and technology (19%) or economic strength and prosperity (14%). Eight percent mention American military strength.

Awareness of American assistance in tsunami relief is widespread. Overall, 90 percent say they have heard or read at least a fair amount about foreign help. Asked to name the two countries which are doing the most in the relief effort, 65 percent name the U.S., twice as many as mention second-place Japan (33%; 22% name Australia; see Appendix, Table 1).



* Findings are from a nationwide face-to-face interview survey conducted December 30, 2004-February 6, 2005 with a representative sample of 2000 adults (ages 17 and over). See "How the Poll Was Taken" for a more detailed discussion of the sample. Prepared by R/AA Robert J. Levy (202-203-7924; levyrj@state.gov).

¹ On this question, there was little difference between the urban public (55% favorable vs. 40% unfavorable) and the rural public (54% vs. 35%).

Perhaps as a reflection of the positive media coverage of American soldiers conducting tsunami relief, a small majority (58% to 35%) also say that they have a favorable view of American people.


Those who have an unfavorable opinion of the U.S. overwhelmingly cite American foreign policy and the perception of the U.S. as an aggressive or interfering power (73%) as the reason for their dislike. ¹ A handful cite the view that the U.S. hates Muslims and Muslim countries (8%) or that Americans are arrogant and brutal (6%). In a separate question,² the public was divided on how the U.S. treats Muslim countries: 37 percent said it was *unfriendly*, 30 percent *friendly* and 27 percent *neutral*. This represents an improvement from July 2002, when 44 percent saw the U.S. as *unfriendly* toward Muslim countries.

As a separate measure of declining antipathy toward the U.S., the public is now evenly divided on the degree to which they find President Bush trustworthy (41% say he is, 40% say he is not). Two years ago, a plurality (49% to 31%) found him untrustworthy. Over the same period, there has been a decline in public views of Usama bin Laden: in the current survey, 32 percent see him as trustworthy, 29 percent untrustworthy. Two years ago, a solid plurality (44% to 23%) were inclined to believe him.³

Boost in Views of Bilateral Relations, Diminishing Reluctance to Work with U.S.

A large majority (84% overall, 86% in the cities) say that the U.S.-Indonesian relationship is in good shape – a record in eight years of polling (see trend in urban areas, Figure 2).

Figure 2. Assessment of U.S.-Indonesian Relations Among Urban Indonesians



While Indonesians have tended to look to Japan and ASEAN, rather than the U.S., as their key partners in the last two years, the U.S. seems to be enjoying a modest rebound


² This question was asked only of Muslims, who make up 90 percent of the total sample.

³ In part, the difference between the figures for Bush and bin Laden in the current survey reflects the wide gap in the number of people who answered "don't know" or "haven't heard enough to say" (20% for Bush, 40% for bin Laden).

on these measures as well. Asked to pick from a list the country which is likely to be their closest economic partner in 5-10 years, the public names the U.S. (16%) in a distant third place, behind Japan (29%), ASEAN (25%) and tied with China (17%). Still, this represents an uptick for the U.S., which registered only 7 percent in a 2003 urban poll (see Figure 3 for urban trend).



The public seems once again willing to entertain the notion of the U.S. as a chief security partner. Again, looking ahead 5-10 years, 34 percent pick the U.S., on a par with ASEAN (30%) after lagging for the last two years. Few see Japan as much of a security partner (Figure 4 shows the trend in urban areas).



By a Small Margin, Public Approves of Anti-Terrorism Cooperation with the U.S.

Three-quarters of the public (76%) see terrorism as a serious threat to Indonesia right now. When asked what terrorist groups they are most concerned about, people tend to mention individuals connected with previous bomb attacks in Indonesia (Dr. Azhari, Amrozi, Imam Samudra and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir) or the Aceh independence movement (GAM). Others mention Al Qaida, Usama bin Laden or Jemaah Islamiyah. Overall, Indonesians give their own government high marks in dealing with terrorism (78% say it is doing at least a fairly good job).

Approval for the U.S. anti-terrorist effort is mixed: 44 percent approve (and 40% disapprove) of the way the U.S. government is fighting terrorism. By a similar margin (46% to 38%), they feel that Indonesia should cooperate with the U.S. in the war on terrorism.

American Culture A Strong Negative

Views of American culture are predominantly negative by a two-to-one margin (61% unfavorable to 31% favorable). Those who dislike American culture cite the role of sex in American society, whether in American lifestyle (43%), in overly revealing fashions (35%) or in pornographic films (18%).

The minority who like American culture tend to cite movies (57%), music and popular singers (24%) or, to a lesser extent, American lifestyle (12%).

Despite public antipathy toward American culture, people are more likely to name the U.S. than any other country as a good political model for their country: in an open-ended question, 26 percent name the U.S., followed by Malaysia (16%), Japan (11%), Singapore (4%) and Brunei (4%). When asked about an economic model, they tend to focus on Japan (26%), followed by the U.S. (16%) and Malaysia (13%).

APPENDIX

| TABLE 1. COUNTRIES SEEN AS HELPING MOST WITH THE RELIEF EFFORT | | | |
|---|-----------------------|------------------------|--------------|
| <i>Which foreign countries or international organizations do you think are doing the most to help with disaster relief in Indonesia? Any other?</i> [Open end; two responses accepted] | | | |
| Country/Organization | First Response | Second Response | Total |
| U.S. | 48% | 17% | 65% |
| Japan | 19 | 14 | 33 |
| Australia | 8 | 14 | 22 |
| U.K. | 2 | 4 | 6 |
| UN | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| Saudi Arabia | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Other Muslim countries | 3 | 5 | 8 |
| Germany | 1 | 1 | 2 |

TAB

B

Terror Free Tomorrow Poll: Major Change of Public Opinion in Muslim World

FROM TERROR FREE TOMORROW: In the first substantial shift of public opinion in the Muslim world since the beginning of the United States' global war on terrorism, more people in the world's largest Muslim country now favor American efforts against terrorism than oppose them.

This is just one of many dramatic findings of a new nationwide poll in Indonesia conducted February 1-6, 2005, and just translated and released.

In a stunning turnaround of public opinion, support for Osama Bin Laden and terrorism in the world's most populous Muslim nation has dropped significantly, while favorable views of the United States have increased. The poll demonstrates that the reason for this positive change is the American response to the tsunami.

Key Findings of the Poll:

- For the first time ever in a major Muslim nation, more people favor US-led efforts to fight terrorism than oppose them (40% to 36%). Importantly, those who oppose US efforts against terrorism have declined by half, from **72%** in 2003 to just 36% today.
- For the first time ever in a Muslim nation since 9/11, support for Osama Bin Laden has dropped significantly (**58%** favorable to just 23%).
- 65% of Indonesians now are more favorable to the United States because of the American response to the tsunami, with the highest percentage among people under 30.
- Indeed, 71% of the people who express confidence in Bin Laden are now more favorable to the United States because of American aid to tsunami victims.

The Terror Free Tomorrow poll was conducted by the leading Indonesian pollster, Lembaga Survei Indonesia, and surveyed 1,200 adults nationwide with a margin of error of ± 2.9 percentage points.

Critical Implications

- The support base that empowers global terrorists has significantly declined in the world's largest Muslim country. This is a major blow to Al Qaeda and other global terrorists.
- U.S. actions can make a significant and immediate difference in eroding the support base for global terrorists.

- The United States must sustain its relief and reconstruction efforts in Indonesia in order to prevent the support base from rebounding.
- The size and strength of the support base can dramatically change in a short period of time. This is a front in the war on terrorism where the United States can continue to achieve additional success.

For the complete report, click [here](#) (Word) or [here](#) (PDF).

For a Power Point presentation of the poll results, click [here](#).

To see a videotape of the public release at The Heritage Foundation, click [here](#) and then click on "View Event." Mr. Ballen's presentation is at the beginning. For the Power Point presentation used at The Heritage Foundation event, click [here](#).

Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion

International Republican Institute
February 27 – March 5, 2005

Methodology in Brief

- Face-to-face interviews were conducted February 27 – March 5, 2005.
- All field work was conducted by an Iraqi polling firm employing more than 200 trained interviewers across the country.
- Interviews occurred in 15 of 18 governorates, excluding Anbar (Ramadi), Ninewah (Mosul) and Dohuk for security reasons.
- A total sample of 1,967 valid interviews were obtained from a total sample of 2,200 rendering a response rate of 89.40 percent.
- The overall margin of error for the survey is +/- 3.0 percent.
- Please contact IRI if more detailed methodological information is required.

Demographics in Brief

- Representative of 15 of Iraq's 18 provinces — percentage of sample ranging from 5.1 percent in Umara to 17.0 percent in Baghdad.
- Urban sample accounts for 66.6 percent of respondents and rural respondents made up the remaining 33.4 percent.
- Male to female ratio of 45.8 percent to 54.2 percent, respectively.
- Ethnic distribution: Arabic (79.1 percent), Kurdish (17.5 percent), Turkman (2.4 percent), Chaldo-Assyrian (0.9 percent), No Answer (0.2 percent).
- Age distribution: 18-24 (20.0 percent), 25-34 (29.6 percent), 35-44 (23.2 percent), 45-54 (14.7 percent), 55 and over (12.4 percent).
- Religious Distribution: Sunni Muslim (25.0 percent), Shia Muslim (46.5 percent), Only Muslim (27.4 percent), Christian and other sects (1.1 percent).

Survey Results

*International Republican Institute
February 27 – March 5, 2005*