

**TAB**

**D**

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Coordination Page

General Counsel

Daniel J. Dell'Orto

March 12, 2004

March 11, 2004

TO: David Chu  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Active Duty for Reserve

I was told by the personal security officer that he can only stay on active duty a maximum of two and a half years as a member of the Army Reserve.

Do you know anything about a rule like that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031104-4

.....  
Please respond by

3/26/04  
3/19

OSD 04151-04

11-L-0559/OSD/40757



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

INFO MEMO

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, USD(P&R)

*David S. C. Chu 19 Mar 04*

SUBJECT: SNOWFLAKE - Active Duty for Reserve

- You asked if I know about a rule that would limit Army Reserve personnel serving as personal security officers to a maximum of two and a half years on active duty. There is no such rule.
- For the GWOT, Department policy states that involuntary active duty service is limited to 24 cumulative months, generally in a TDY status with per diem. Active duty beyond that shall be in a voluntary status. I have not approved a department-wide policy that would limit such voluntary duty.
- Army policy (attached) states soldiers may volunteer to serve beyond 24 months in a TDY status for up to six months, with per diem. If the mission is to continue beyond six months, soldiers may be placed on extended active duty for up to three years. Such duty will involve a permanent change of station, and per diem stops.
- The Army is trying to inform all commands of this policy. As far as the Personal Security Detail is concerned, Army has communicated directly with CID. Security personnel know the policy, but are not happy with the loss of per diem.
- CID is trying to make the Personal Security Detail an Active duty mission and eliminate the need for Reserve support.

Attachment:  
As stated

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: Mr. Rich Krimmer, OASD(RA) (b)(6)





# NOBLE EAGLE / ENDURING FREEDOM

Army Operations Center (AOC) - Crisis Action Team (CAT)



Originator:

DA  
WASHINGTON  
DC/DAMO-  
AOC//

DTG: 271302Z JAN 04

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Recipients List

**UNCLASSIFIED**

## VOLUNTARY EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY (EAD) ISO CONTINGENCY

SUBJECT>SUBJECT:VOLUNTARY EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY (EAD) ISO CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

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1. (U) REFERENCES:

1.A. ~~(FOUO)~~ ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS), MEMORANDUM, DECEMBER 2, 2003. SUBJECT: VOLUNTEER DUTY BEYOND 24 MONTHS FOR STABILIZATION OF INDIVIDUAL RESERVE COMPONENT SOLDIERS.

1.B. ~~(FOUO)~~ HQDA MESSAGE 171635Z SEP 02, SUBJECT: CONSOLIDATED PPG FOR OPERATIONS NOBLE EAGLE AND ENDURING FREEDOM.

1.C. ~~(FOUO)~~ AR 135-210, ORDER TO ACTIVE DUTY AS INDIVIDUALS FOR OTHER

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THAN A PRESIDENTIAL SELECTED RESERVE CALL-UP, PARTIAL OR FULL MOBILIZATION.

1.D. ~~(FOUO)~~ AR 600-8-101, PERSONNEL PROCESSING (IN- AND OUT- AND MOBILIZATION PROCESSING).

1.E. ~~(FOUO)~~ AR 600-8-105, MILITARY ORDERS.

1.F. ~~(FOUO)~~ AR 635-5, SEPARATION DOCUMENTS.

1.G. ~~(FOUO)~~ UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND READINESS), MEMORANDUM, JULY 3, 2003 SUBJECT MOBILIZATION OF RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD BEYOND 24 MONTHS - TASK FORCE RESULTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND GUIDANCE.

1.H. ~~(FOUO)~~ UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND READINESS), MEMORANDUM, JULY 19, 2002, SUBJECT: ADDENDUM TO MOBILIZATION/DEMOBILIZATION PERSONNEL AND PAY POLICY FOR RESERVE COMPONENT MEMBERS ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY IN RESPONSE TO THE WORLD TRADE CENTER AND PENTAGON ATTACKS.

1.I. ~~(FOUO)~~ UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND READINESS), MEMORANDUM, SEPTEMBER 20, 2001, SUBJECT: MOBILIZATION/DEMOBILIZATION PERSONNEL AND PAY POLICY FOR RESERVE COMPONENT MEMBERS ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY IN RESPONSE TO THE WORLD TRADE CENTER AND PENTAGON ATTACKS.

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2. (U) BACKGROUND.

2.A. ~~(FOUO)~~ MANY RESERVE COMPONENT (RC) SOLDIERS HAVE COMPLETED OR ARE NEARING TWO YEARS OF MOBILIZATION UNDER THE EXISTING PARTIAL MOBILIZATION AUTHORITY (10 USC 12302), FOLLOWED BY A CONTINGENCY TEMPORARY TOUR OF ACTIVE DUTY (COTTAD) OF 179 OR 270 DAYS AT THE END

11-L-0559/OSD/40759

OF THEIR TWO-YEAR MOBILIZATION.

2. ~~(FOUO)~~ THE COMMANDS TO WHICH THESE SOLDIERS ARE ASSIGNED, AS WELL AS MANY OF THE SOLDIERS THEMSELVES, DESIRE TO CONTINUE OR RESUME THEIR ACTIVE DUTY SERVICE. ONE OPTION IS FOR ELIGIBLE SOLDIERS TO SERVE IN A VOLUNTARY EAD STATUS UNDER PROVISIONS (UP) REF. 1A, FOR A MINIMUM OF TWO YEARS WITH AN ARMY-INITIATED OPTION FOR A THIRD YEAR. SOLDIERS APPROVED FOR EAD UNDER THIS POLICY, WILL RECEIVE ACTIVE DUTY PAY AND BENEFITS.

2C. ~~(FOUO)~~ UP REF. 1A, THE ASA (M&RA), HAS GRANTED AUTHORITY TO THE DCS, G-3, TO APPROVE UP TO 2,500 RC SOLDIERS TO SERVE IN AN EAD STATUS IN SUPPORT OF CURRENT CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS. EAD UNDER THIS POLICY IS IN ADDITION TO, BUT DISTINCT FROM, OTHER EAD PROGRAMS CONDUCTED IAW AR 135-210; ACCORDINGLY, SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THIS EAD POLICY MAY NOT NECESSARILY APPLY TO OTHER EAD PROGRAMS.

2.D. (FOUO) ONLY RC SOLDIERS CURRENTLY SERVING ON ACTIVE DUTY ISO THE

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GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM (GWOT) UP 10 USC 12302 (PARTIAL MOBILIZATION); OR SOLDIERS WHO HAVE BEEN REFRAID FROM SUCH CALL TO ACTIVE DUTY ARE ELIGIBLE FOR CONTINGENCY EAD UP THIS POLICY.

2E. ~~(FOUO)~~ RC OFFICERS WHO ARE ORDERED TO EAD UP OF THIS POLICY SHALL REMAIN ON THE RESERVE ACTIVE STATUS LIST (RASL) AND HAVE THEIR ORDERS STATE THE OFFICER SHALL BE RETAINED ON THE (RASL).

3. ~~(FOUO)~~ 1,000 OF THE 2,500 EAD AUTHORIZATIONS WILL BE USED FOR FILLING VALIDATED INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTATION (IA) REQUIREMENTS CONTROLLED BY THE WORLDWIDE INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTATION SYSTEM (WIAS). THE INTENT IS TO USE THESE AUTHORIZATIONS TO REPLACE (BUY OUT) EXISTING IA REQUIREMENTS CURRENTLY MANNED BY ACTIVE COMPONENT SOLDIERS AND TO MINIMIZE GROWTH BY PROVIDING CONTINUITY AND DEDICATED SUPPORT TO THE RESPECTIVE HEADQUARTERS. HQDA, DCS, G-3, DAMO-ODO, WILL CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS, ICW THE ARMY FORCE PROVIDERS, TO FIND UNIT SOURCING SOLUTIONS TO MEET FUTURE IA REQUIREMENTS.

3A. ~~(FOUO)~~ HQDA, DCS, G-3, DAMO-ODO, WILL COORDINATE DIRECTLY WITH THE RESPECTIVE IA ACCOUNT HOLDER TO SUPPORT THE DISTRIBUTION OF THESE AUTHORIZATIONS AND THE COVERSION OF BILLETS TO EAD SOURCING.

3B. ~~(FOUO)~~ HQDA, DCS, G-3, DAMO-ODO, WILL CODE EACH WIAS BILLET FILLED BY A QUALIFIED EAD RC SOLDIER BASED ON THE COORDINATION

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CONDUCTED IAW PARAGRAPH 3A. OF THIS MESSAGE AS EAD.

4. ~~(FOUO)~~ SOLDIERS WILL ONLY BE ASSIGNED TO VALID RC BILLETS ON AUTHORIZED TDAIMOB TDA. HQDA WILL NOT SUPPORT REQUESTS BASED ON EMERGING REQUIREMENTS.

5. ~~(FOUO)~~ SUBMITTING REQUESTS FOR EAD.

5.A. ~~(FOUO)~~ THE ARMY COMPONENT COMMANDER OF THE SUPPORTED COMBATANT COMMANDER, SUPPORTED MACOM/FIELD COMMAND, OR DEFENSE AGENCY WILL FORWARD A REQUEST FOR VOLUNTARY EAD UNDER THIS POLICY THROUGH THE SUPPORTING COMMAND/MACOM TO HQDA, DCS, G-3, DAMO-ODM. NLT 120 DAYS PRIOR TO THE REQUESTED START DATE. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION MUST BE PROVIDED FOR EACH REQUEST:

5.B.1. ~~(FOUO)~~ TDA/MOBTDA DOC NO.

5.B.2. ~~(FOUO)~~ TDA/MOBTDA CCNUM.

5.B.3. ~~(FOUO)~~ TDA/MOBTDA EDATE.

5.B.4. ~~(FOUO)~~ TDAIMOB TDA BILLET PARA/LIN #.

5.B.5. ~~(FOUO)~~ DETAILED JUSTIFICATION EXPLAINING THE REASON FOR THE

11-L-0559/OSD/40760

REQUEST.

5.C. (FOUO) FOR RC SOLDIERS CURRENTLY SERVING ON ACTIVE DUTY, REQUEST PACKETS MUST INCLUDE A TAG/GOVERNOR RELEASE FOR ARMY NATIONAL GUARD SOLDIERS, A USAR COMMAND RELEASE FOR ARMY RESERVE (TPU) SOLDIERS, A

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COMPLETED DA FORM 160R (APPLICATION FOR ACTIVE DUTY), COPIES OF ALL PREVIOUS MOBILIZATION/TTAD/EAD ORDERS, AND ALL ASSOCIATED TEMPORARY CHANGE OF STATION (TCS) ORDERS. THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT TO SUBMIT VERIFICATION OF HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCYVIRUS (HIV) TEST, DA FORM 7349 (INITIAL MEDICAL REVIEW ANNUAL MEDICAL CERTIFICATE), OR MEDICAL EXAMINATION BECAUSE THE SOLDIER IS ALREADY ON ACTIVE DUTY AND THESE REQUIREMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN COMPLETED AND VERIFIED DURING THE INITIAL READINESS AND DEPLOYMENT PROCESSING.

5.D. (FOUO) FOR SOLDIERS NOT CURRENTLY SERVING ON ACTIVE DUTY, REQUEST PACKETS MUST INCLUDE A TAG/GOVERNOR RELEASE FOR ARMY NATIONAL GUARD SOLDIERS, A USAR COMMAND RELEASE FOR ARMY RESERVE (TPU) SOLDIERS, A COMPLETED DA FORM 160R (APPLICATION FOR ACTIVE DUTY), DA FORM 2A/2-1 OR ORB/ERB, VERIFICATION OF HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCYVIRUS (HIV) TEST, DA FORM 7349 (INITIAL MEDICAL REVIEW ANNUAL MEDICAL CERTIFICATE), CURRENT PHYSICAL, NGB 23 OR ARPC 249, AND COPIES OF ALL DD 214. COMMANDERS WILL ENSURE ALL ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS OUTLINED IN AR 135-210 ARE MET.

UNCLAS ALARACT 010/2004 FOUO FINAL SECTION OF 2

6. (FOUO) HQDA, DCS, G-3, DAMO-ODO, WILL DETERMINE WHETHER TO VALIDATE THE NEED TO CONTINUE TO FILL POSITIONS UNDER THIS POLICY BASED ON THE NEEDS OF THE ARMY, AND WHETHER TO APPROVE THE RC SOLDIERS REQUEST FOR EAD UP THIS POLICY. VALIDATED REQUIREMENTS AND APPROVED REQUESTS WILL BE FORWARDED TO U.S. ARMY HUMAN RESOURCES COMMAND (HRC) FOR EAD PROCESSING. HRC WILL PUBLISH AN EAD ORDER, AFTER VERIFYING THE SOLDIER MEETS ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS. HRC WILL ENSURE APPROPRIATE DISTRIBUTION OF THE EAD ORDER.

7. (FOUO) FOR SOLDIERS APPROVED FOR EAD UNDER THIS POLICY RESULTING IN PERIODS OF CONSECUTIVE ACTIVE DUTY:

7.A. (FOUO) THE ORDER WILL INDICATE, YOU HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY IN SUPPORT OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY DECLARED UNDER PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION 7463, DATED SEPTEMBER 14, 2001. UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF

PAGE 02 RUEWDAU5184 UNCLAS

TITLE 38, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 4312 (C)(4)(B), THIS PERIOD OF ACTIVE DUTY IS EXEMPT FROM THE FIVE-YEAR CUMULATIVE SERVICE LIMIT ON REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS UNDER TITLE 38, UNITED STATES CODE, CHAPTER 43. THE START DATE OF THE EAD WILL BE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE END DATE OF THE PREVIOUS MOBILIZATION OR COTTAD ORDER FOR THOSE CURRENTLY ON ACTIVE DUTY TO ENSURE THERE IS NO BREAK IN SERVICE.

7.B. (FOUO) CURRENT PERSONNEL POLICY AND PROCEDURES WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT DURING THE VOLUNTARY EAD.

7.C. (FOUO) PREPARATION OF DD FORM 214 (CERTIFICATE OF RELEASE OR DISCHARGE FROM ACTIVE DUTY). TO ENSURE IDENTIFICATION OF QUALIFICATION FOR VETERANS AND OTHER BENEFITS, A DD FORM 214 WILL BE ISSUED UP AR 635-5 TO ARNGUS AND USAR SOLDIERS ON ACTIVE DUTY UNDER 10 USC SECTIONS 12302 AND/OR 12301(D) WHEN THEY ARE REFRAD. ALL PERIODS OF ACTIVE DUTY WILL BE ENTERED ON THE DD 214. ITEM 26 (SEPARATION CODE) FOR RC SOLDIERS SEPARATING FOR COMPLETION OF

11-L-0559/OSD/40761



REQUIRED ACTIVE SERVICE, INCLUDE: ~~LBK~~. THE DD 214 WILL BE PUBLISHED UPON FINAL RELEASE FROM ACTIVE DUTY.

7. D. ~~(FOUO)~~ LEAVE. SOLDIERS WITH ACCRUED LEAVE SHALL BE TREATED IAW 37 USC 501. COMMANDERS SHOULD ALLOW SOLDIERS THE OPPORTUNITY TO USE ACCRUED LEAVE WITHIN THE CURRENT OR NEW ACTIVE DUTY PERIOD. BECAUSE

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THERE ~~IS~~ NO BREAK IN SERVICE, SOLDIERS CAN CARRY OVER LEAVE WITH NO PENALTY SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS IN 10 USC 701; HOWEVER, A STATEMENT OF ACCRUED LEAVE WILL NEED TO BE PROVIDED TO HRC BEFORE IT CAN BE ENTERED INTO THE PAY SYSTEM.

8. (U) SANCTUARY/18-YEAR LOCK-IN.

8. A. ~~(FOUO)~~ UP 10 USC SECTION 12686(A), RC SOLDIERS WHO, ON THE DATE WHICH THEY WOULD OTHERWISE BE RELEASED FROM ACTIVE DUTY (OTHER THAN FOR TRAINING), ARE WITHIN TWO YEARS OF BECOMING ELIGIBLE FOR RETIRED OR RETAINER PAY UNDER A PURELY MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM, MAY NOT BE INVOLUNTARILY REFRAD BEFORE BECOMING ELIGIBLE FOR THAT PAY UNLESS SUCH RELEASE IS APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (THIS AUTHORITY IS DELEGATED TO THE ASA (M&RA)).

8. B. ~~(FOUO)~~ INDIVIDUALS WHO FALL IN THIS CATEGORY SHOULD IMMEDIATELY CONTACT HRC, AHRC-PDZ-RC, DSN 221-5067, FOR A DETERMINATION OF APPROPRIATE ACTIONS AND VERIFICATION OF ACTIVE FEDERAL SERVICE. CONTACT SHOULD BE MADE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE AND, IF POSSIBLE, AT LEAST 90 DAYS PRIOR TO THE END OF THE ACTIVE DUTY PERIOD TO ENSURE THE SOLDIER HAS FOLLOW-ON ASSIGNMENT INSTRUCTIONS. SOLDIERS RETAINED ON ACTIVE DUTY UP THIS EAD POLICY AND SUBJECT TO SANCTUARY WILL BE REASSIGNED BASED ON NEEDS OF THE SERVICE UPON COMPLETION OF

PAGE 04 RUEWDAU5184 UNCLAS

THEIR EAD, IF REQUIRED.

8. C. ~~(FOUO)~~ HQDA, DCS, G-3, DAMO-ODO, WILL EXERCISE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO SELECT OTHER QUALIFIED RC SOLDIERS FOR EAD UNDER THIS POLICY BASED ON THE NEEDS OF THE ~~ARMY~~ BEFORE APPROVING RC SOLDIERS WITHIN THIS CATEGORY.

8. D. ~~(FOUO)~~ UP 10 USC 12737, RC SOLDIERS MAY NOT BE ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF QUALIFYING FOR RETIREMENT.

9. ~~(FOUO)~~ THIS POLICY DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE USE ~~OF~~ COTTAD IN SUPPORT OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDER WHEN MISSION REQUIREMENTS DO NOT EXCEED 270 DAYS. HOWEVER, CONSECUTIVE PERIODS ~~OF~~ ACTIVE DUTY PERFORMED UNDER 12301(D) (WHICH INCLUDES ADSW, TTAD, AND EAD) MAY NOT EXCEED A THREE-YEAR PERIOD. AN RC SOLDIER WHO WILL OTHERWISE FALL WITHIN THE SANCTUARY PROVISIONS OF 10 USC 12686 MAY NOT BE ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY FOR A PERIOD OF LESS THAN 180 DAYS UNLESS SUCH SOLDIER AFFIRMATIVELY WAIVES IN WRITING THE SANCTUARY PROVISIONS OF 10 USC 12686 FOR THAT PERIOD OF ACTIVE DUTY.

10. ~~(FOUO)~~ SOLDIERS VOLUNTEERING FOR EAD UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THIS MESSAGE SHOULD NOT BE DISADVANTAGED IN CAREER PROGRESSION. THE COMMANDER AND THE ARMY HUMAN RESOURCES COMMAND MUST APPROVE ATTENDANCE AT CAREER DEVELOPMENT COURSES. THERE ~~IS~~ NO GUARANTEE A

PAGE 05 RUEWDAU5184 UNCLAS

SOLDIER WILL BE ABLE TO ATTEND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION/TRAINING WHILE PERFORMING EAD; THEREFORE, SOLDIERS WHO

11-L-0559/OSD/40762

REQUIRE COMPLETION OF PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION/TRAINING TO BE ELIGIBLE FOR PROMOTION CONSIDERATION DURING THE PERIOD OF ACTIVE DUTY SHOULD NOT PERFORM EAD.

11. ~~(FOUO)~~ REQUESTS FOR EXCEPTION TO POLICY FOR EARLIER REFRAID OF EAD WILL BE ADDRESSED TO HRC, AHRC-PDZ-RC, DSN 221-5067.

BT

\*DEDICATED TO \* \$\$\$"EXCELLENCE IN \* \$\$\$"COMMUNICATIONS" \$\$\$  
ARMY SECTIONAL MSG \$\$\$

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01 DA WASH DC 5

ACTION SAMR(\*) DAAR/CHIEF OF RESERVES(\*) SAFM(\*) (U,A,6)  
DACH(\*) DAEN-ZC(\*) RETURN TO MRO(\*) SAPA-PLAN(\*)  
DAJA(\*) DAMH(\*) DAMO(2) DAPE-MSO(\*) DASG(\*) SASA(\*)  
AAOC(\*) DAMO-AAOC(\*) MARV(\*) JDNI-PT(\*) CMSDA(\*)  
CMSDA-C(\*) CMSDA-B(\*) SAAG(\*) SAIS(\*) DAIM(\*)  
SAIE(\*) SACW(\*) SARD(\*) AOC-AHS(1) SAGC(\*)  
DACS CABLES(\*) DALO(\*) DCSOPS SAT TERMINAL(1)  
DAMI-ZA(\*)  
INFO SAIG-ZA(\*) JDNI-PT-ANR(\*) DAMO-FDW(1) DALO-ZXA(\*)  
DAMI-FL(\*)

03 COE 0

ACTION (A)  
INFO CEHECIM/COE(\*)

04 DLA FT BLVR 0

ACTION (A)  
INFO DLATCC(\*)

05 HONDURAS 0

ACTION (A)  
INFO JTFBTCC/HONDURAS(\*)  
TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 5

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Received from AUTODIN 2714202 JAN 04  
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Close Window

**TAB**

**B**

March 11, 2004

TO: David Chu  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Active Duty for Reserve

I was told by the personal security officer that he can only stay on active duty a maximum of two and a half years as a member of the Army Reserve.

Do you know anything about a rule like that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031104-4

.....  
Please respond by

3/26/04  
3/19

11-L-0559/OSD/40765



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 MAR 22 PM 1:02  
CH-1634-04  
22 March 2004

ACTION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 3/20*

SUBJECT: Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL)

- Question. "I have been waiting a long time to get the joint assignment list straightened out. I am unhappy that they still have not been properly fixed, where the ones who don't deserve joint credit are taken off the list and the ones who do are put on it. What do we have to do to get it done?"
- Answer. Dr. Chu's office and my staff are sponsoring a RAND Corporation Study regarding the joint duty assignment list. RAND is conducting a billet-by-billet review of all 9000 joint billets and will submit a long-range "get well" plan in October 2004 that will recommend which positions deserve joint credit and which should be removed. Many of the changes require legislation, and I believe the best way to get this passed is to back up the proposal with the RAND Study.
- Analysis. In addition to the study, our staffs have taken several actions to address joint duty credit:
  - Developed seven FY 05 legislative proposals allowing you to award joint credit to more joint task force (JTF) and Service component positions (TABs B and C).
  - In October 2003, Mr. Abell, Principal Deputy USD(P&R) OSD approved 343 new USCENTCOM JTF positions for joint credit.
  - USJFCOM has developed a test program to exchange officers among its Service components, allowing the Department of Defense to give joint credit to an additional 28 officers.
  - USCENTCOM and the Joint Staff identified 61 additional Service component positions manned by officers who work in the JTFs who deserve joint credit. Request your approval to give these positions joint credit (TABD).

RECOMMENDATION. Approve 61 additional Service component positions for joint duty credit.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

COORDINATION: TAB E

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Brig Gen Maria C. Owens, USAF; Director, J-1; (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT TO RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI NOSENKO	3/23
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	3/22

SECRET

211

22 MAR 04

621

December 9, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Joint Assignment List

J-1

I have been waiting a long time to get the joint assignment list straightened out. I am unhappy that they still have not been properly fixed, where the ones who don't deserve joint credit are taken off the list and the ones who do are put on it.

What do we have to do to get it done?

Thanks.

Not sure SecDef  
can approve this given  
current table 10.  
Pls get a GC chop

DHR:dh  
120603-12 (is computer)

.....

Please respond by 12/19


3/23

Sir.  
Response attached.  
vr / CDR Nosenzo  
3/23

TAB B

<b>Joint Officer Management/ Joint Professional Military Education Legislative Proposals</b>		
OMNIBUS 252/MPP 50 §662/10 USC	Changes to Promotion Objectives for Joint Officers	Makes permanent the joint promotion policy objective for the “other joint” category, which includes JSOs, to greater than or equal to Service board average.
OMNIBUS 253/MPP 51 §668/10 USC	Modifications to Definition of Qualifying Joint Service to Improve Management of Officers in Joint Activities	Modifies definition of “tour of duty” Multiple consecutive joint tours to count as one continuous tour.
OMNIBUS 250/MPP 52 §619/10 USC	Modifications to Waivers and Exceptions to the Requirement for a Joint Duty Assignment before Promotion to General or Flag Grade to Reduce Waivers	Eliminates 180-day serving in waiver by removing 180-day requirement for “serving in waivers” for selection to G/FO. Officer must complete full tour of duty in the joint assignment.
OMNIBUS 249/MPP 53 §667/10 USC	Modifications to the <b>Annual Report</b> to Congress to Highlight Key Indicators of Compliance	Modifies the <b>Annual Report</b> by adding more meaningful metrics for measuring joint compliance. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Number of JSO by Service/Grade</li> <li>- Analysis of Service assignment to <b>JDA</b></li> <li>- GOS Waivers by Service</li> <li>- Percent of officers departed before full credit</li> <li>- NDU fill rate by course</li> <li>- JTF – Joint Duty</li> </ul>
OMNIBUS 265/MPP 54 §661/10 USC	Changes to the Joint Specialty Officer Program to Improve Utility, and Streamline Management	Eliminates fill rate requirements and mandatory number of designated critical billets. Deletes 50% fill-rate requirement; and deletes 800 critical billets.  Allow CJCS accredited Senior Service Colleges to teach and award JPME 11 credit
OMNIBUS 264/MPP 55 §663/10 USC	Modifications to the Length of Joint Forces Staff College and allow CJCS authority to accredit Senior Service Colleges’ JPME 11 programs.	Repeal the requirement that Phase II JPME may not be less than 3 months and allow CJCS accredited Senior Service Colleges teach and award JPME 11 credit.
OMNIBUS 262/MPP 60 §664/10 USC	Modification to the Length of Joint Duty Assignments to Restore Equity and Reduce Waivers	Modifies general rules for length of joint duty assignment and award of full joint duty credit. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Mirror DOD tour lengths for full credit</li> <li>- 1 year JTF duty for full credit</li> </ul>
§663/10 USC Late Add  Transformation Initiative	Waiver of Military Education Eligibility and Post-Education Placement	Eliminates post-education placement requirements. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sci/Tech renamed “career field specialty”</li> <li>- Removes JSO outplacement requirements</li> <li>- Removes 50%+1 outplacement requirement</li> </ul>

TAB C



***Joint Officer Management (JOM) and  
Joint Professional Military Education  
(JPME): Legislative Proposals***

**30 December 2003**

3/12/2004

Tab C

1

11-L-0559/OSD/40769



## *Purpose*

- **Provide information on Department's JOM/JPME legislative proposals**
- **Provide strategic approach development progress**
- **What we can change now?**

# *Changing Environment*

## What has changed since Goldwater-Nichols?

1986

- Single threat focus
- Large force structure
- Service centric warfighting
- Resistance to jointness
- Joint operations problematic



Today

- War on Terror
- 30 percent smaller force
- Joint Warfighting
  - Interdependent
  - Capabilities-based
  - Interagency/Multinational operations
- Joint Task Forces
- Joint Experience is the norm, earlier and more often
- Synergy in joint operations



Tab C  
3



## **17 Years of Experience With GNA Shows:**

- **JOM/JPME need to evolve to current realities**
- **Combatant commands, Joint Staff set requirements for Joint Staff Specialty Officers (JSOs)**
  - ➔ **Produce more JSOs, matched to requirements**
  - ➔ **JPME occur earlier and more frequently**
  - ➔ **Better recognition of joint credit**
  - ➔ **Improve utilization**
  - ➔ **Establish metrics that measure Services' compliance with GNA**

# Proposed Legislation

<b><u>180 Day Serving in Waiver: (Section 619)</u></b>
Remove requirement that officer must be in joint assignment 180 days before 0-7 promotion board to qualify for "Serving in Waiver"
<b><u>Joint Specialty Officer: (Section 661)</u></b>
Remove sequence requirement for education & experience
Automatic designation of JSO status after meeting qualifications
Eliminate 50 percent rule
Eliminate Critical Billets
Allow CJCS accredited Senior Service Colleges to teach and award JPME II credit
<b><u>Promotions: (Section 662)</u></b>
Reduce the number of promotion objectives
<b><u>Education: (Section 663)</u></b>
Eliminate requirement for all JSOs and 50 percent+1 of other NDU grads to go to JDA upon graduation
Allow CJCS to determine appropriate length of the principal course taught at JFSC
Allow CJCS authority to accredit Senior Service Colleges' JPME II programs.
<b><u>Tour Lengths &amp; Joint Credit: (Section 664)</u></b>
Full Credit for DOD tour length and full credit for 12 months cumulative time on JTF HQ
Allow some in-Service billets to be on Joint Duty Assignment List
Eliminate 36-month tour length average and establish 2-year minimum for standard joint assignments
<b><u>Report to Congress: (Sec 667)</u></b>
New measures of merit

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## *Modification to O-7*

### **GNA 86**

- **Officers must serve 180 days in a JDA prior to O-7 board convening to be eligible for Serving in Waiver for O-7 promotion**

### **Proposed**

- **Officers eligible for Serving in Waiver as soon as assigned to JDA - but must serve a minimum of 6 months**

- **Protects officers from board schedule changes**
- **Reduces need for GOS waivers**

3/12/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/40774

## *Joint Promotion Objectives*

### **GNA '86**

- **Promotion targets**

**Current: 3 tiers**

- JSO to Svc HQ for life
- Joint Staff to Svc HQ,  
Serving In & Have Served
- All others to Svc Avg,  
Serving In & Have Served

### **Modified Proposal**

- **2 tiers**

- Joint Staff to Svc HQ, Serving In &  
Have Served
- All other officers in joint to Svc  
Avg, Serving In & Have Served

**Provides a more accurate assessment of the quality of officers the  
Services assign to joint duty assignments**

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**GNA '86**

**Proposal**

- Credit tied to serving 36 or 24 months
  - Services required to maintain 36 month avg for JDAs
  - "Tour of Duty" definition
  - In-Service positions prohibited from JDAL
  - Improves recognition of legitimately earned credit
  - Gives joint greater flexibility in use of officers
- USNORTHCOM ↔ NORAD, USEUCOM ↔ SHAP

3/17/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/40776

## *Maximizing Pool of JSOs*

### **GNA '86**

- **JSO sequence requirement**
  - **JPME I + II + Joint Assignment + SECDEF designation**

### **Proposal**

- **Designate all qualified officers automatically after successfully completing all JSO requirements**
  - **JPME I + II + Joint Assignment = JSO**

- **Most timely path to meeting combatant command requirements**
- **Increases JSO pool without diluting qualifications**




# Requirements for JSOs

## GNA '86

- 37.5 percent of all JDAL billets must be filled by JSO or JPME II grad
  - Services determine how to fulfill requirements
- Critical Billets - must be filled by JSO or obtain waiver

## Proposal

- JSO and JPME II requirements established by combatant commands & Joint Staff



**Joint requirements drive JSO production & assignments**

# *Tour Lengths and Joint*

## **GNA '86**

- **Critical Occupational Specialty exempt from some rules & officers on 2d joint tour have special rules**
- **Many waivers to allow accommodation of Service needs**
  - **Perception of unequal treatment**
- **Cumulative and Constructive credit**

## **Proposal**

- **One set of simple, fair rules for all officers serving in the community**
  - **All CONUS officers serve at least 24 months**
- **Joint commander and Service agree to departures before 24 months**
- **Credit: full or none**
  - **Eliminates confusion and excessive administrative burden**

**Provides effective management of joint officers and gives joint commander more voice in assigned officers departures**

3/12/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/40779

## *Tour Lengths and Joint Credit (Continued)*

### **GNA '96 Amendment**

- Allows officers to receive full credit if they accumulate **36 months** of duty in JTF HQs approved by SecDef for joint credit
  - To date **no** officer has earned full credit under this criteria

### **Proposal**

- Allows officers to receive full credit if they accumulate **12 months** of duty in JTF HQs involved in combat or combat related operations
  - Recognizes joint competencies the officer obtains in a high intensity environment

**Provides recognition for some officers in high demand, low density specialties**

## *Joint Education*

### **GNA '86**

- JSOs at National War College (NWC) & Industrial College of armed Forces (ICAF) must go to JDA at graduation
- 50 percent+1 of all non-JSO grads at NWC & ICAF must go to JDA
- Principal course at JFSC must **be at least 3 months long**
- JPME taught only at National Defense University schools

### **Proposal**

- No restrictions on placement of NWC or ICAF grads
  - Improves utilization by increasing flexibility
  - Allows better use of ICAF for acquisition officers
- Allow CJCS to determine appropriate length of the principal course taught at the JFSC
- Allow certified Senior Service Colleges to teach and award JPME II credit

**Educate and train the right person for the right task at the right time**

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# *Proposed Metrics: Annual Report*


## Current Report to Congress

- Promotions to 0-7
- JSOs designated by Service
- List of COS specialties
- COS officers as JSOs & JSO noms
- Where officers were assigned after being designated JSO
- Average tour length
- Tour length exclusions
- JDA distribution by Service
- Critical position summary
- Waiver usage by Service
- JPME II grads by Service
- JTF HQs credit awarded
- Promotion comparisons

## Proposed Report to Congress

- JSO Inventory by Service, Grade & Specialty
- Analysis of how well Services fill JDAs
- GOS Waivers by Service
- Percent of Officers departing JDAs early
- Percent of NDU class seats filled by course
- JTF HQs approved for JDA credit
- Simplified promotion comparisons
- JTF HQs credit awarded

## *Legislative Summary*

- 
- **Consistent with vision of GNA**
  - **Requirements driven**
  - **Expands number and improve the quality of JSOs**
  - **Increase and expand Joint Education opportunities**
  - **More officers receive joint credit**
  - **Combatant commands, Joint Staff have more control over officers assigned**
  - **Improves utilization of all officers serving JDAs**
  - **Gives Congress better measure of merit in annual report**

# *Joint Officer Management (JOM)*

## *Approach*

- **USD(P&R) and Joint Staff working with RAND to develop strategic approach to shape JOM to meet future joint requirements**
- **The strategic approach will:**
  - **Establish clear goals for officer development in joint matters**
  - **Determine what current and future joint missions will look like**
  - **Identify type and quantity of officers needed to perform joint missions**
  - **Identify joint organizations' requirements**
  - **Identify education, training, and experience joint officers need**
- **Following the RAND study, the Department of Defense will determine strategic vision for JOM**
  - **Strategic vision will:**
    - **Provide impetus for policy/legislative change**
    - **Base JOM system on joint requirements versus requirements of individual services**
    - **Provide mechanism to meet joint organization personnel requirements**
    - **Outline actions to prepare future senior Joint and Service Chiefs**

3/12/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/40784

# *Joint Duty Assignment List Review*

## *Strategic Approach Phase II*



- After completing the strategic approach, RAND will conduct a Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) review
  - Review each position currently providing joint credit
  - Ensure positions on the JDAL provide officers with significant joint experience/competencies
- Strategic approach will provide the foundation for establishing the criteria to define joint duty assignment positions
  - Create objective factors to validate JDAL positions and use these factors to recommend removal of marginally joint positions
  - Criteria will also validate adding positions to JDAL



## *Near-Term Actions*

- Identify in-Service billets for joint credit
  - Service component headquarters
    - Dual hat and cross department
    - Positions placed outside officers own department
- Assess joint duty credit for Coalition Provisional Authority(CPA)
- Increase ongoing JTF positions providing joint duty credit
- Make joint duty credit recommendations to SecDef Feb 04
- Categorize JDAL to ensure right billets award joint credit
  - Critical: Occupant holds fulltime staff or command responsibility==critically related to joint matters
  - Required: Occupant participates directly in joint matters
  - Associated: Occupant participates indirectly or supports joint matters
- Revise Officer Professional Military Education Policy to reflect CJCS Education vision

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TAB D

ENTCOM	CFACC	AIRSPACE PLANNER	04	TS	013M3	AF	CAOC	DEPLOYABLE TO MB/COB/LB/SB/BB. PROVIDES AUGMENTATION SUPPORT FOR AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL OPERATIONS/CHIEF AIRFIELD OPERATIONS/LIAISON FUNCTIONS AT CONTROL REPORTING CENTERS, HOST NATION/ALLIED AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTERS, EMBASSIES & HEADQUARTERS STAFF ELEMENTS.
ENTCOM	CFACC	ALCT DEP CHIEF	04	TS	012A3C	AF	CAOC	Responsible to the CFACC for the execution of the daily Air Tasking Order, exercising Command and Control of Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. The COD also coordinates continuously with Special Operations and Army aviation and ground forces.
ENTCOM	CFACC	TANKER OPERATIONS	04	TS	011T3Y	AF	CAOC	Responsible to the CFACC for the execution of the daily Air Tasking Order, exercising Command and Control of Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. The COD also coordinates continuously with Special Operations and Army aviation and ground forces.
ENTCOM	CFACC	OPERATIONS DUTY OFFICER (DDO)	04	TS	013B3D	AF	CAOC	Responsible to the CFACC for the execution of the daily Air Tasking Order, exercising Command and Control of Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. The COD also coordinates continuously with Special Operations and Army aviation and ground forces.
ENTCOM	CFACC	OPERATIONS DUTY OFFICER (DDO)	05	TS	013838	AF	CAOC	Responsible to the CFACC for the execution of the daily Air Tasking Order, exercising Command and Control of Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. The COD also coordinates continuously with Special Operations and Army aviation and ground forces.
ENTCOM	CFACC	BATTLECAB FIGHTER DUTY OFFICER	04	TS	011F3F	AF	CAOC	Responsible to the CFACC for the execution of the daily Air Tasking Order, exercising Command and Control of Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. The COD also coordinates continuously with Special Operations and Army aviation and ground forces.
ENTCOM	CFACC	DEPUTY CHIEF, COMBAT OPS	05	TS	011F3Y	AF	CAOC	Responsible to the CFACC for the execution of the daily Air Tasking Order, exercising Command and Control of Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. The COD also coordinates continuously with Special Operations and Army aviation and ground forces.
ENTCOM	CFACC	RC-135 LNO	04	TS	011R3G	AF	CAOC	Responsible to the CFACC for the execution of the daily Air Tasking Order, exercising Command and Control of Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. The COD also coordinates continuously with Special Operations and Army aviation and ground forces.
ENTCOM	CFACC	SENIOR OFFENSIVE DUTY OFFICER	04	TS	011F3H	AF	CAOC	Responsible to the CFACC for the execution of the daily Air Tasking Order, exercising Command and Control of Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. The COD also coordinates continuously with Special Operations and Army aviation and ground forces.
ENTCOM	CFACC	U-2 LNO	04	TS	011R3J	AF	CAOC	Responsible to the CFACC for the execution of the daily Air Tasking Order, exercising Command and Control of Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. The COD also coordinates continuously with Special Operations and Army aviation and ground forces.
ENTCOM	CFACC	ATO PRODUCTION CHIEF	04	TS	012G3	AF	CAOC	Oversees strat guidance/apportionment/targeting, and MAAP develop. Develops ATO directing joint and coalition air assets. Develops contingency plans to support the full spectrum of combat operations.
ENTCOM	CFACC	BOMBER PLANNER	04	TS	W011B3Y	AF	CAOC	Oversees strat guidance/apportionment/targeting, and MAAP develop. Develops ATO directing joint and coalition air assets. Develops contingency plans to support the full spectrum of combat operations.
ENTCOM	CFACC	CHIEF MAAP CELL	04	TS	W011F3Y	AF	CAOC	Oversees strat guidance/apportionment/targeting, and MAAP develop. Develops ATO directing joint and coalition air assets. Develops contingency plans to support the full spectrum of combat operations.
EMCOM	CFACC	DEPUTY CHIEF MAAP CELL	04	TS	012B3Y	AF	CAOC	Oversees strat guidance/apportionment/targeting, and MAAP develop. Develops ATO directing joint and coalition air assets. Develops contingency plans to support the full spectrum of combat operations.
ENTCOM	CFACC	DEPUTY CHIEF, COMBAT PLANS	04	TS	R011F3Y	AF	CAOC	Oversees strat guidance/apportionment/targeting, and MAAP develop. Develops ATO directing joint and coalition air assets. Develops contingency plans to support the full spectrum of combat operations.
ENTCOM	CFACC	FIGHTER PLANNER (MAAP)	04	TS	011F3Y	AF	CAOC	Oversees strat guidance/apportionment/targeting, and MAAP develop. Develops ATO directing joint and coalition air assets. Develops contingency plans to support the full spectrum of combat operations.
ENTCOM	CFACC	KVCAS OEF	04	TS	011F3Y	AF	CAOC	Oversees strat guidance/apportionment/targeting, and MAAP develop. Develops ATO directing joint and coalition air assets. Develops contingency plans to support the full spectrum of combat operations.
ENTCOM	CFACC	SPINS OFFICER	04	TS	011F3Y	AF	CAM	Oversees strat guidance/apportionment/targeting, and MAAP develop. Develops ATO directing joint and coalition air assets. Develops contingency plans to support the full spectrum of combat operations.
ENTCOM	CFACC	ACF/CHIEF	04	TS	014N3	AF	CAOC	The Chief of the ACF team is responsible for coordinating with CPD and COD for planning and executing airborne ISR operations, and providing combat ISR support to air and space planning, execution, and campaign and threat assessment activities.
ENTCOM	CFACC	CHIEF, COLLECTIONS	04	TS	014N3	AF	CAOC	Chief of ISR Management Team is responsible for the collaborative effort of collection managers reconnaissance and surveillance planners, platform sensor liaisons, and PED assets to ensure ISR operations are synchronized with joint operations.
ENTCOM	CFACC	SIDO	04	TS	014N3	AF	CAM	The SIDO is the senior intelligence officer in the COD. The SIDO organizes and directs the operations of the ISR personnel assigned to the COD, and reports to the COD. The SIDO is responsible for monitoring and dynamically adjusting ISR collections plans, monitoring current day's ATO target and supporting roles, monitoring or reporting on situational awareness and threat information.



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CENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-HOA ACCE	Operations Planner	05	<del>SECRET</del>	012G4	AF	ACCE	Operations Planner. Provides expertise to CJTF-HOA Joint Planning Team to synchronize joint air operations into CJTF-HOA CONOPS, OPORDs and Fragos. Ensures joint/combine air planning is appropriately integrated into all CJTF-HOA operations. Coordinates with Joint Search and Rescue Center on providing joint air support for personnel rescue. Reviews and comments on all CJTF-HOA CONOPS, OPORDs and Fragos to ensure joint air interoperability. Provides command and control expertise for joint air intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations ISO CJTF-HOA collection requirements. Provides training and education to CJTF-HOA staff on the planning, executing, and assessing joint air operations to provide a common understanding and facilitate combined/joint operations.
CENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-HOA ACCE	Operations Planner	04	<del>SECRET</del>	011S3V	AF	ACCE	Plans, executes and monitors the employment of USAF/USN/USMC aircraft in support of CJTF-HOA air requirements. Provides command and control for airlift and DV travel support for CG CJTF-HOA, in a multinational/joint environment. Coordinates taskings, diplomatic clearances, and support requirements for all USN, USMC, and USAF air assets operating ISO CJTF-HOA. Coordinates with USAF/USN/USMC aircrews, their respective TACON and OPCON authorities, CJTF-HOA staff, MARCENT-DJ and US diplomatic representatives to ensure CJTF-HOA air missions are successful.
CENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-HOA ACCE	Director of Operations	04	<del>SECRET</del>	012A3Y	AF	ACCE	Plans, executes and monitors the employment of USAF/USN/USMC aircraft in support of CJTF-HOA air requirements. Provides command and control for airlift and DV travel support for CG CJTF-HOA, in a multinational/joint environment. Coordinates tasking, diplomatic clearances, and support requirements for all USN, USMC and USAF air assets operating ISO CJTF-HOA. Coordinates with USAF/USN/USMC aircrews, their respective TACON and OPCON authorities, CJTF-HOA staff, MARCENT-DJ and US diplomatic representatives to ensure HO air missions are successful. Provides information to ACCE.
CENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-180 ACCE	Deputy Director	06	<del>SECRET</del>	011F4Y	AF	ACCE	Vice Chairman of the Air Tasking Order (ATO) and Deputy Director in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Represents the number two Airman in the JTF-180. Acts as advisor in air concerns where joint forces must interact and rely upon. Represents Wing Commander at regularly scheduled meetings, VTC's, and INTEL briefs involving Army, Marines and Coalition forces located at Bagram Air Base. Participates in joint meetings of Army, Marines, and Navy forces to properly employ Air resources in support of ground campaigns. Acts as Air expert when investigating mishaps, whether Helos, ground transport, or other fixed wing aircraft. Advises CG of JTF-180 of concerns raised by CFACC or CACC.
CENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-180 ACCE E	Executive Officer	04	<del>SECRET</del>	097E0	AF	ACCE	The Executive Officer for the 455th AEW and Air Component Coordination Element D. Provides support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Provides guidance concerning Wing Commanders policies and Air Force (AF) guidance to Army, Marine, and Navy counterparts, especially the 1st element. Meets regularly with CJ1 to de-conflict obstacles with fulfilling Joint Manning Document billets; coordinates actions for Awards process which involves the conferring of Army awards to Air personnel and vice versa; represents AF senior leader in personnel issues involving cross-functional duties of certain Air assets.
CENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-180 ACCE	Strike Operations Officer	05	<del>SECRET</del>	011F4Y	AF	ACCE	Strike Operations Officer for the CJTF-180 ACCE in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan. Coordinates the execution of Air Tasking Orders for combined joint operations, as well as associated taskings supporting tanker operations and Intel, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance missions. Represents strategic CJTF/Air position at meetings with Embassies, Coalition Force and Joint Force meetings. Coordinates escort missions for ground forces or other air forces. Coordinates Air Support plans.
CENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-180 ACCE	Mobility Operations Officer	05	<del>SECRET</del>	011A4Y	AF	ACCE	Mobility Operations Officer in the Air Component Coordination Element of the CJTF 180 in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Coordinates Air Tasking Orders for combined joint airlift and combat sorties, interacting with CENTAF's Director of Mobility Forces to ensure CJTF-180 requirements are met for its ground and air forces. Directly responsible for synchronization of air movement of senior Army, Marine, and other leaders in the AOR. Provides guidance to CJTF-180 senior staff on diplomatic Country Clearance for its ground and air forces. Directly responsible for synchronization of air movement of senior Army, Marine, and other leaders in the AOR. Provides guidance to CJTF-180 senior staff on diplomatic.
CENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-180 ACCE	Mobility Operations Officer	05	<del>SECRET</del>	011A4Y	AF	ACCE	(see above Position description LNR 005 & 006)
CENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-180 ACCE	Strike Operations Officer	05	<del>SECRET</del>	011A4K	AF	ACCE	(see above description for LNR 004)
CENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-7 ACCE	CCE Director	06	<del>SECRET</del>	011G4	AF	ACCE	The IRAQ ACCE Director is the CFA senior air component coordination officer at CJTF-7 HQ. He represents the CFACC and coordinates COM CJTF-7 interests with the CFACC. The IRAQ ACCE Director's responsibilities include the following: Ensure CJTF-7 operations are planned with consideration of CFACC capabilities and constraints; Effectively introduce CFACC staffs to their CJTF-7 counterparts; Advise both COM CJTF-7 and CFACC regarding coordination activities; Monitor IRAQ ACCE participation in the appointment processes. The Director supervises a team of up to 6 action officers (O-3 through O-5) and 2 NCOs. The ACCE participates as the CFACC's primary liaison element to CJTF-7 and Civil authorities in Iraq. Long range and crisis action planning are coordinated as required with CFACC and CJTF-7 staff sections.

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ENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-7ACCE	ACCE Deputy Director	04	AF	01204	AF	ACCE	The IRAQ ACCE Deputy Director performs duties as assigned by the IRAQ ACCE Director. Some of the duties of the IRAQ ACCE Deputy Director include the following: Supervise the IRAQ ACCE in the absence of the Director, Primary duty will be to manage the Plans, Operations & Intelligence (POI) section of the IRAQ ACCE. Ensure unity of effort amongst the staff; Ensure POI operations are synchronized. ACCE team responsibilities include: Ensure CJTF-7 operations are planned with consideration of CFACC capabilities and constraints; Effectively introduce CFACC staffs to their CJTF-7 counterparts; Advise both COMCJTF-7 and CFACC regarding coordination activities; Monitor IRAQ ACCE participation in the apportionment processes. The ACCE participates as the CFACC's primary liaison element to CJTF-7 and Civil authorities in Iraq. Long range and crisis action planning are coordinated as required with CFACC and CJTF-7 staff sections.
ENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-7ACCE	Air Ops Specialist - Mobility	04	AF	011A3Y	AF	ACCE	The IRAQ ACCE Air Operations Specialist - Mobility is the ACCE team's primary mobility/airlift subject matter expert. Responsibilities include monitoring CJTF-7 airlift requirements and acting as a liaison between CJTF-7 and CFACC mobility agencies. ACCE team responsibilities include: Ensure CJTF-7 operations are planned with consideration of CFACC capabilities and constraints; Effectively introduce CFACC staffs to their CJTF-7 counterparts; Advise both COMCJTF-7 and CFACC regarding coordination activities; Monitor IRAQ ACCE participation in the apportionment processes. The ACCE participates as the CFACC's primary liaison element to CJTF-7 and Civil authorities in Iraq. Long range and crisis action planning are coordinated as required with CFACC and CJTF-7 staff sections.
ENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-7ACCE	Air Ops Specialist - ISR	04	AF	011G3	AF	ACCE	The IRAQ ACCE Air Operations Specialist - ISR is the ACCE team's primary ISR operations subject matter expert. Responsibilities include monitoring CJTF-7 use of ISR platforms and acting as a liaison between CJTF-7 and CFACC ISR & operations agencies. ACCE team responsibilities include: Ensure CJTF-7 operations are planned with consideration of CFACC capabilities and constraints; Effectively introduce CFACC staffs to their CJTF-7 counterparts; Advise both COMCJTF-7 and CFACC regarding coordination activities; Monitor IRAQ ACCE participation in the apportionment processes. The ACCE participates as the CFACC's primary liaison element to CJTF-7 and Civil authorities in Iraq. Long range and crisis action planning are coordinated as required with CFACC and CJTF-7 staff sections.
ENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-7ACCE	Air Ops Specialist - Airspace	04	AF	012B4Y	AF	ACCE	The IRAQ ACCE Air Operations Specialist - Airspace is the ACCE team's primary airspace subject matter expert. Responsibilities include monitoring CJTF-7 use of airspace and acting as a liaison between CJTF-7 and CFACC airspace agencies. ACCE team responsibilities include: Ensure CJTF-7 operations are planned with consideration of CFACC capabilities and constraints; Effectively introduce CFACC staffs to their CJTF-7 counterparts; Advise both COMCJTF-7 and CFACC regarding coordination activities; Monitor IRAQ ACCE participation in the apportionment processes. The ACCE participates as the CFACC's primary liaison element to CJTF-7 and Civil authorities in Iraq. Long range and crisis action planning are coordinated as required with CFACC and CJTF-7 staff sections.
ENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-7 ACCE	Air Ops Specialist - Kinetic	05	AF	011F3Y	AF	ACCE	The IRAQ ACCE Air Operations Specialist - Kinetic is the ACCE team's primary kinetic operations subject matter expert. Responsibilities include monitoring CJTF-7 kinetic requirements and operations; and acting as a liaison between CJTF-7 and CFACC combat operations sections. ACCE team responsibilities include: Ensure CJTF-7 operations are planned with consideration of CFACC capabilities and constraints; Effectively introduce CFACC staffs to their CJTF-7 counterparts; Advise both COMCJTF-7 and CFACC regarding coordination activities; Monitor IRAQ ACCE participation in the apportionment processes. The ACCE participates as the CFACC's primary liaison element to CJTF-7 and Civil authorities in Iraq. Long range and crisis action planning are coordinated as required with CFACC and CJTF-7 staff sections.
ENTCOM	CFACC	CJTF-7 ACCE	Intal Specialist	04	AF	014N3	AF	ACCE	The IRAQ ACCE Intelligence Specialist is the ACCE team's primary intelligence expert. Responsibilities include monitoring CJTF-7 ISR requirements and acting as a liaison between CJTF-7 and CFACC ISR agencies. ACCE team responsibilities include: Ensure CJTF-7 operations are planned with consideration of CFACC capabilities and constraints; Effectively introduce CFACC staffs to their CJTF-7 counterparts; Advise both COMCJTF-7 and CFACC regarding coordination activities; Monitor IRAQ ACCE participation in the apportionment processes. The ACCE participates as the CFACC's primary liaison element to CJTF-7 and Civil authorities in Iraq. Long range and crisis action planning are coordinated as required with CFACC and

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CENTCOM	CFACC		INFORMATION MANAGEMENT OFFICER	05		3384	AF	CAOCC	The IMO is the chief for all information management in the CAOCC/AFFOR. They serve as the focal point for CFACC information management issues with other functional component commander staffs, works closely with higher HQ IMOs, to include CENTCOM, to ensure all required reports are up-channeled consistent with the CFACC battle rhythm, coordinates with the Joint Information Management Board as well as publishing the CFACC Information Management Plan. The IMO is intimately aware of the CFACC's information manager requirements and possesses the authority to coordinate actions and processes to satisfy essential information needs. The IMO also works closely with command and admin staffs and command and control elements (command posts) of all subordinate units in order to define reporting requirements for Situation Reports (SITREP) and Operational Reporting (OPREPS). also conducts oversight of messaging services for the CAOCC/AFFOR Staff to include Defense Messaging System (DMS).
CENTCOM	NAVCENT	N3	CFLCC LNO OIF 0401020	04-5		1000	Navy	NAVY	LNO for CFLCC in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Provides operational advice and coordination between CFLCC and CFMCC. Assists with planning, development, analysis, and integration of all joint, interagency and multinational operations and plans at the theater-strategic level, operational level to focus CFMCC assets for essential maritime and naval tasks in permissive and non-permissive areas. Advises CFMCC and the CFLCC on planning efforts and coordination regarding CENTCOM, Theater Service Components, and subordinate commands. Responsible for coordinating and developing combined, joint and inter-agency plans and orders. Coordination to include coalition and joint military, and other units, agencies, and organizations as mission requires.
CENTCOM	NAVCENT	N3	CFLCC LNO OIF 0401026	04-5		1060	Navy	NAVY	LNO for CFLCC in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Provides operational advice and coordination between CFLCC and CFMCC. Assists with planning, development, analysis, and integration of all joint, interagency and multinational operations and plans at the theater-strategic level, operational level to focus CFMCC assets for essential maritime and naval tasks in permissive and non-permissive areas. Advises CFMCC and the CFLCC on planning efforts and coordination regarding CENTCOM, Theater Service Components, and subordinate commands. Responsible for coordinating and developing combined, joint and inter-agency plans and orders. Coordination to include coalition and joint military, and other units, agencies, and organizations as mission requires.
CENTCOM	NAVCENT	N1	AUGMENTATION MANAGER JFMCC-353	05-6		1200	Navy	NAVY	Freedom. Provides coordination and advice between CENTCOM, CFMCC, CFACC, CFLCC, and theater JTF's for joint manning requirements and personnel fill issues. Assists with planning, development, analysis, and integration of all joint, interagency and multinational manning requirements for joint operations and plans at the theater-strategic level. Provides expert advice on Naval personnel occupational and skill specialties to assist with assignment of joint positions for maximum effectiveness. Provides liaison between Navy Service Headquarters (OPNAV) and CENTCOM translating requirements and personnel concerns. Advises CFMCC and CENTCOM planning and execution efforts and coordination regarding CENTCOM, Theater Service Components, and subordinate commands manning issues. Responsible for coordinating and developing combined, joint and inter-agency plans and orders. Coordination to include coalition and joint military, and other units, agencies, and organizations as mission requires.
CENTCOM	NAVCENT	N1	CONTINGENCY MANNING ASSISTANT OIF 0401-022			1000	Navy	NAVY	Management of individual Augmentees for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Provides coordination and advice between CENTCOM, CFMCC, CFACC, CFLCC, and theater JTF's for joint manning requirements and personnel fill issues. Assists with planning, development, analysis, and integration of all joint, interagency and multinational manning requirements for joint operations and plans at the theater-strategic level. Provides expert advice on Naval personnel occupational and skill specialties to assist with assignment of joint positions for maximum effectiveness. Provides liaison between Navy Service Headquarters (OPNAV) and CENTCOM translating requirements and personnel concerns. Advises CFMCC and CENTCOM planning and execution efforts and coordination regarding CENTCOM, Theater Service Components, and subordinate commands manning issues. Responsible for coordinating and developing combined, joint and inter-agency plans and orders. Coordination to include coalition and joint military, and other units, agencies, and organizations as mission requires.
CENTCOM	NAVCENT	N5	F2C2 COORDINATOR JFMCC-013	05	TS	1110	Navy	NA W	Friendly Forces Coalition Center Coordinator in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Provides liaison between CFMCC, Coalition Naval Forces and CENTCOM. Assists with planning, development, analysis, and integration of all joint, interagency and multinational operations and plans at the theater-strategic level, operational level to focus CFMCC and Coalition assets for essential maritime and naval tasks in permissive and non-permissive areas. Advises CFMCC and Coalition Naval Forces on planning efforts and coordination regarding CENTCOM, Theater Service Components, and subordinate commands. Responsible for coordinating and developing combined, joint and inter-agency plans and orders. Coordination to include coalition and joint military, and other units, agencies, and organizations as mission requires.

TAB D

CENTCOM	NAVCENT/NS	F2C2 DIRECTOR JFMCC-016	O6	1110	Navy	NAVY	<p>Friendly Forces Coalition Center Director in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Provides liaison between CFMCC, Coalition Naval Forces and CENTCOM. Assists with planning, coordination and execution of all interagency and multinational operations and plans at the strategic level to CFMCC and other essential areas. Advises CFMCC and Coalition Naval Forces on planning tasks in permissive and non-permissive areas. Advises CENTCOM, Component, and other commands. Provides for coordination and inter-agency plans and coordination to include coalition and joint military, and other agencies and organizations as required.</p>
CENTCOM	NAVCENT/NS	F2C2 COORDINATOR OIF 0401-024	O5	1050			<p>Provides coordination and liaison between CFMCC, Coalition Naval Forces and CENTCOM. Assists with analysis, coordination and multinational operations and plans at the strategic level to focus on essential maritime and naval assets. Advises CFMCC and Coalition Naval Forces on planning tasks in permissive and non-permissive areas. Provides coordination and inter-agency plans and coordination to include coalition and joint military, and other agencies and organizations as required.</p>

TAB E  
COORDINATION

USCENTCOM	Colonel Levan	27 February 2004
USJFCOM	BG Warner	17 February 2004
USD(P&R)	Ms. Earle	<b>5 March 2004</b>





DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600

APR 2 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL CRADDOCK

SUBJECT: Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL)

This responds to your recent question concerning the Secretary's authority to approve the Chairman's recommendation (last sub-bullet in the 3<sup>rd</sup> bullet of the attached Action Memo) to approve 61 additional positions to receive joint credit (Tab D). While that sub-bullet is not clearly worded, it appears that the Chairman is recommending that the Secretary preapprove positions for award of joint duty credit.

Under 10 U.S.C. § 664(i), temporary assignments to the headquarters staff of a United States joint task force (JTF) may qualify for award of joint duty credit if officers serving in those positions meet certain requirements. Section 664(i) envisions the award of credit to individual officers upon recommendation of the Chairman and after the Secretary determines that the officer has served in a qualifying JTF, that the service of that officer is equivalent to that which would be gained by the officer in a joint duty assignment, and that the following requirements are satisfied:

- 1.) For award of full joint tour credit, the officer has served two years or three years, as appropriate;
- 2.) For the officer to receive cumulative joint tour credit, the officer must have served at least 90 consecutive days in the qualifying temporary JTF assignment;
- 3.) The service must be performed in support of a mission that is directed by the President or that is assigned by the President to United States forces in the JTF involved;
- 4.) The JTF must be constituted or designated by the Secretary or by the commander of a combatant command or of another force; and
- 5.) The JTF must conduct combat or combat-related operations in a unified action under joint or multinational command and control (or other requirements not pertinent here).

The Department has implemented section 664(i) in DoD Instruction 1300.20. As a measure of expedience, Appendix 13 of the DoDI sets out procedures to gain the preapproval of JTF positions that satisfy the requirements set out above, except for 1 and 2. After completing a temporary assignment to a tour of duty in a preapproved assignment that satisfies the time period stipulated in 1 or 2, above, an officer receives an appropriate joint credit award.

11-L-0559/OSD/40794



TAB

4:05 AM

707

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 24, 2004

SUBJECT: Protective Forces

When the U.N. asks us to provide protection for them but not U.S. forces, we ought to use that as a lever to get other countries to send in troops since is obviously a choice assignment. Either we could get Morocco or India to do it rather than just moving current coalition people over to do it.

UN

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
0202404.13ts

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

24 Feb 04

04 FEB 25 PM 4:12

OSD 041 61 -04

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/40795



November 8, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: HAG Program

NOV 10 2004  
11 08 05

Please take a look at this HAG Program and tell me what you think of it -- if we ought to be doing anything with it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Paper on High Accuracy Guidance Program

DHR:ss  
110804-8

OSD 04210-05

373.24

.....  
Please respond by 11/26/04

- Met with The proponents
- Missile Defense Agency is interested; issue is legal/contractual.
- Inventor wants an agreement to be paid for "value" after testing - raising the <sup>possibility</sup> prospect of a different assessment by the government and law suits by the inventor.
- MDA wants to use a legal vehicle by which they "buy" the intellectual property in advance. Inventor has no residual value.
- I'd leave this to the missile defense agency to solve.

S. Myers

04/11/8

## High Accuracy Guidance (HAG)

- HAG is a homing guidance and missile command generator whose proponents claim can achieve a small miss distance in homing missile engagements, especially against highly maneuvering endoatmospheric targets.
- HAG technology is proprietary and has been offered for sale to the Government as a sealed "black box" by HAG Technologies.
- In simulations of U.S. missile engagements conducted by DoD, academia, and industry from 1994 to 2000, HAG sometimes outperformed classical homing guidance algorithms but was not evaluated against modern algorithms.
- HAG's inventor is no longer available, complicating the understanding of its underlying principles. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has suggested that HAG Technologies give DoD access to HAG source code in order to ascertain the true nature and potential of HAG algorithms.
- Radiance Technologies has proposed that MDA fund an ongoing program sponsored by HAG Technologies to reverse engineer HAG. The proposed program would assess HAG performance in simulation testing, rewrite HAG computer code in maintainable format, and determine its weaponization potential.
- MDA has an open Broad Agency Announcement for technologies such as HAG, MDA suggested to the HAG owners to submit a proposal to allow an in-depth evaluation.



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY  
7100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-7100

DT

00 8 2004

The Honorable Jon Kyl  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510-0304


Dear Senator Kyl:

In my response to your letter of June 24, 2004, I promised to provide an assessment of the High Accuracy Guidance (HAG) algorithms for defense against high speed maneuvering reentry vehicles, as it may be applied within the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).

We formed a team of missile guidance experts and they have concluded that given extremely good seeker measurements, HAG generally outperforms classical homing guidance techniques against some classes of targets. Without access to the HAG some code, the true nature and potential of the HAG algorithms cannot be ascertained. With access to the code we could avoid the current "black box" approach and allow a more thorough comparison to similar modern guidance, estimation and control techniques against threatening targets.

Since the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has an open Broad Agency Announcement (BAA, Solicitation Number HQ0006-04-MDA-BAA) for technologies such as HAG, I suggest the HAG owners consider some of the questions raised by our assessment team, which we will forward to them directly, and then submit a proposal to us through this BAA. Again, thank you for your support of Ballistic Missile Defense and the technologies that will keep us outpacing the threat.

Sincerely,

  
HENRY A. OBERING III  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Director



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
 MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY  
 7100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-7100

*①*  
*Power 1111 J 10*  
*4/14*

INFO MEMO

March 24, 2005

*37*  
*24*

FOR: UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE)  
 FROM: Lieutenant General Henry A. Obering III, Director, Missile Defense Agency  
 SUBJECT: High Accuracy Guidance Algorithm Status

- The High Accuracy Guidance (HAG) is a homing guidance and missile command algorithm currently under evaluation by the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command and the Missile Defense Agency.
- Proponents claim it can improve the hit accuracy of an interceptor against a missile, especially against highly maneuvering targets within the atmosphere.
- The HAG intellectual property is believed to be owned by a U.S. citizen living in Israel. Space and Missile Defense Center has been negotiating with the owner's representative since January 2005 to evaluate the algorithm and examine the source code.
- The evaluation is to be conducted over the next year in a Patriot missile simulation environment. During the evaluation period, the owner will retain all intellectual property rights. The government will assume no obligations and will make no commitments regarding the purchase of the HAG intellectual property.
- Upon completion of the evaluation, the government will determine whether inclusion of the algorithm improves the performance of the Patriot missile.
- If the results show reason for continued government interest, then SMDC will recommend options to acquire the defense rights to the HAG intellectual property.
- The government and the owner's representative are expected to complete contract negotiations by July 2005 and the test evaluation period is from September 2005 through May 2006.

*24 MAR 05*

COORDINATION: None

cc: DSD

Prepared by: Keith Englander, MDA/DT, (b)(6)

*8 MAR 05*

11-L-0559/OSD/40799

04210-05



ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

ACTION MEMO

HOLD

March 1, 2005

350.09

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director of Administration and Management

*Ray DuBois*

SUBJECT: May 25, 2004 Memo on Intelligence Oversight

- In your attached Snowflake, you asked about the status of a memo you sent to Steve Cambone in May in which you raised organizational placement and access issues associated with the position of Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO)).
- In his response to you on February 15, 2005, Steve stated: "As part of the effort to review and revise oversight, I am working with DuBois to transfer this activity to OUSD(I)."
- While Steve has shared his views with me, I strongly believe that this concept is ill-advised (1) a conflict of interest would exist, since the OUSD(I) should itself be subject to the Intelligence Oversight function and (2) the dynamic state of National and Defense intelligence argues for a careful approach, for reasons of both substance and perception.
- Taking into consideration concerns regarding the number of officials who report directly to you and the Deputy Secretary, we will examine organizational options, which include: (1) realigning the function under the DA&M or (2) realigning the function under the IG, DoD.

2 MAR 05

COORDINATION: None.

RECOMMENDATION: In coordination with Steve Cambone and Jim Haynes, we will forward a recommendation to you in 30 days or less.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments: As stated

cc:  
USD(I)  
GC, DoD

OSD 04230-05

*Amc 03231-05*

25 MAR 05

Prepared by: Mark A. Munson, Sr., O&MP/ODA&M Staff, (b)(6)

FEB 25 2005

TO: Ray DuBois  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: May 25, 2004 Memo on Intelligence Oversight

~~Here's~~ a memo I sent to Steve Cambone ~~May~~ 25, 2004. He says he is working with you on it. What is the status?

Thanks.

**Attach.**  
5/25/04 SecDef Memo to USD (I) re: Intel Oversight

DHR:aa  
022405-1

.....  
*Please respond by* 3/1/05

OSD 04230-05



May 25, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Intelligence Oversight

Please give me a briefing on this person who is responsible for intelligence oversight and whether we want to reorganize the departments. If this person supposedly is reporting to me, and I don't even know who he is, there is something wrong with the organization chart.

Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
052504-14

.....  
Please respond by 6/4/04

*As part of the effort  
to review & revise oversight,  
I am working w/ DuBois to  
transfer this activity to OUSD.I.*

*8 2/15/05*

OSD 04230-05

11-L-0559/OSD/40802

FEB 25 2005

TO: Ray DuBois  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: May 25, 2004 Memo on Intelligence Oversight

Here's a memo I sent to Steve Cambone *May* 25, 2004. He says he is working with you on it. What is the status?

Thanks.

Attach  
5/25/04 SecDef Memo to USD (I) re: Intel Oversight

DHR:sp  
022405-1

.....

Please respond by 3/1/05

350.09

25 Feb 05

25 May 04

OSD 04230-05

May 25, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Intelligence Oversight

Please give me a briefing on this person who is responsible for intelligence oversight and whether we want to reorganize the departments. If this person supposedly is reporting to me, and I don't even know who he is, there is something wrong with the organization chart.

Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
052504-14

.....  
Please respond by 6/4/04

*As part of the effort  
to review & rewrite oversight,  
I am writing w/ Dubois to  
transfer this activity to OUSD.I.*

*J 2/15/05*

*350.09*

*25 m aug 04*

March 19, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
 CC: Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Non-NATO Ally Status

Pakistan

I just heard that Colin has announced that Pakistan is now a non-NATO ally.

I don't recall knowing about this.

We ought to decide who should have non-NATO ally status, and on what basis we will decide it.

It ought not be like passing out eggs at Easter.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031904-4

19 Mar 04

OSD 04237-04

November 30, 2004

000.4

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Pentagon Memorial Fund

I'm told a fellow named Jack Taylor is the retired chairman of Enterprise Rental Car. He's about 80 years old. He apparently gave about \$80 million to the Naval Aviation Museum Academy Program. I wonder if someone in the private fundraising business ought to include him in their solicitation of the Pentagon Memorial. He sounds like a person who could be helpful.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
113004-28

.....  
Please respond by 12/22/04

30 NOV 04

November 30, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Assessments in Iraq and Afghanistan

IRAQ

I think it is important that we conduct honest assessments by outside reviewers of how we are doing with security force development in Iraq and Afghanistan. I understand we've just completed such an assessment in Afghanistan – good. I'd like to see it as soon as it is ready.

For the assessment in Iraq, I'd like a look at a specific proposal, including details on who you suggest to conduct it, what the time table will be, and the draft charter.

Thanks.


DHR:ss  
113004-27

.....  
Please respond by 1/6/05

30NOV04

November 23, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Larry Di Rita  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy Papers

Attached is a series of interesting papers on public diplomacy, which we might want to think about.

Attach.  
The Ambassadors Review, Spring 2004, Special Section on Public Diplomacy

DHR:ss  
112304-4

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

000.7

03 Nov 04

# **Special Section on Public Diplomacy**



## Public Diplomacy: Reaching Beyond Traditional Audiences

*Margaret D. Tutwiler*

Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs

Chairman Wolf, Congressman Serrano and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. Your interest and commitment to public diplomacy is greatly appreciated, and I look forward to working with this Subcommittee.

In less than two months that I have been serving as the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, I have gained a much better sense and appreciation of what the Under Secretary's office, as well as our three bureaus, the public diplomacy offices of the regional bureaus, and our overseas posts do in the field of public diplomacy.

Over the last two years, much has been written and debated about the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the United States (US) government's public diplomacy activities and programs overseas. Helpful and responsible reports by Ambassador Ed Djerejian's Advisory Group, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Heritage Foundation, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency, have served to help us examine that which our government does well and that which can be improved. Many of their insights and recommendations we can all agree upon.

As we all know, unfortunately our country has a problem in far too many parts of the world today—a problem we have regrettably developed over many years through both Republican and Democratic administrations, and a problem that does not lend itself to a quick fix or a single solution. Just as it has taken us many years to get into this situation, so too will it take many years of hard focused work to get out of it.

We need to continue to focus on those areas of the world where there has been a deterioration of the view of our nation and, at the same time, work equally as hard in those areas where the opinion of the United States has not changed to date.

We need to support those programs and activities that go to the bottom line of halting and reversing this deterioration. We need to constantly ask ourselves, "Is this activity or program still effective in today's world?" If it is, we should keep it. If it is judged to no longer contribute, then we should let it go.

We should listen more, not only to foreign audiences, but to our own personnel overseas. We will shortly be able to communicate and share new ideas amongst ourselves and across all regions through a new interactive Web site.

I believe we basically do a good job of advocating our policies and explaining our actions. Audiences may not agree or like what we say and do, but we are communicating our policies to governments and influential elites, including in the foreign media. Our

11- L-0559/OSD/40810

senior officials, Ambassadors and Embassy staff are out there explaining US policy, goals and initiatives. However, we can all do better.

In addition, we must do a better job of reaching beyond the traditional elites and government officials. Where we have not placed enough effort and focus is with the non-elites who, today much more so than in the past, are a very strong force within their countries. This must be a priority focus now and in the future. We only have to look at the outreach activities of many US corporations overseas to see the value of being present and engaged in neighborhoods that we in government have for too long neglected.

We must continue pursuing new initiatives and improving older ones in the hopes of reaching younger, broader and deeper audiences.

For instance:

- ◆ The Bureau of Public Affairs worked with our Embassy in Jakarta to year's State of the Union Address live, with simultaneous interpretation Indonesian. One national radio station carried the entire broadcast millions in this predominately
- ◆ In China, growing numbers of media outlets, including official are carrying material distributed via the International Chinese-language Web site and Embassy

I believe we can all agree that programs that bring Americans together, whether in person or even in a video or press conference, create greater understanding. Last year, the State Department directly sponsored over 30,000 academic, professional and other exchanges worldwide.

Since 9/11, we have organized over 1,000 digital videoconferences between American officials and experts and foreign audiences. In the past year, we facilitated nearly 500 interviews and press conferences with senior officials from the Department of State for foreign media outlets.

As Under Secretary, I would like to see us expand our exchange programs however we can. Exchange programs constitute the single largest part of the State Department public diplomacy budget, \$316,633,000 in FY 2004, which regrettably is \$28,713,000 less than the President's request including a rescission of \$3,367,000. Within this amount, we must set priorities.

Through our School Internet Connectivity Program, 26,000 high school students from the Middle East, South Asia, South East Europe, Central Asian and the Caucasus currently collaborate in online projects on current affairs, entrepreneurship, health, and civic responsibility with US students.

Expanding the circle of opportunity is the concept behind Partnerships for Learning (P4L), an initiative of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), which seeks to extend our exchange programs to undergraduate college students and also high school students. P4L has initiated our first high school exchange program with the Arab and Muslim world. Today, 170 high school students from predominantly Islamic countries are living with American families and studying at local high schools. Another 450 high school students from the Middle East and South Asia will come here in 2004 for the next academic year. In addition, 70 undergraduate students, men and women, from North Africa and the Middle East will come to the US beginning next month for intensive English language training prior to their enrollment in university degree programs.

These are the kinds of initiatives I believe we should be pursuing. A new initiative which I am exploring is the idea of micro-scholarships for learning English and for attending our American Schools overseas. The US has been incredibly successful with micro-credits for entrepreneurs and small businesses. Why not take that same concept and apply it to education and English-language learning?

However we do it, we must engage, listen, and interact—especially with the young. They are the key to a future peaceful world.

Reaching out to the Arab and Muslim world is a top priority. With regard to exchanges, 25 percent of ECA's funding will go to programs in the Middle East and South Asia in FY 2004, compared to 17 percent in FY 2002. We have restarted the Fulbright program in Afghanistan after a 25-year hiatus. Twenty Afghan Fulbrighters will arrive next month. Just a few days ago, 25 Iraqi Fulbright students arrived here for orientation prior to beginning their regular studies.

Of course, the Muslim world extends beyond the Middle East and South Asia. We are mindful that programs in Africa, East Asia, and Eurasia are also priorities in this context. In addition to the Arab and Muslim world and reaching out to young audiences, some of the program priorities we hope to pursue include many recommended by Ambassador Ed Djerejian and others.

For example, we are taking steps to improve interagency coordination. The new State-US Agency for International Development (USAID) Joint Policy Council and State-USAID Management Council is intended to improve program coordination in public diplomacy as in other areas and help ensure the most effective use of program resources at USAID. Regrettably, all too often, our important and meaningful assistance to developing countries is going unnoticed and unappreciated, while other nations' assistance to these same countries is widely known and appreciated. This must change. Government-wide, we have to do a much better job of ensuring the US's efforts are widely known well beyond the foreign government officials. We can no longer afford for recipients overseas to have no idea that the people of the United States provide assistance to their country.

Another program which holds promise is American Corners. In recent years, we have had good results from our American Corners program, which, as you know, are

partnerships between our Embassies and local institutions like libraries, universities, and chambers of commerce. These corners are a source for information outreach at the grass-roots level.

The Bureau of International Information Programs is working with the Near Eastern Affairs and South Asia bureaus to establish 43 more American Corners in those regions in FY 2005. We currently have more than 100 American Corners around the world. In FY 2004, we are planning on opening 194 more in 64 countries. Of these 194, we will establish 58 in the Middle East and South Asia, including ten in Afghanistan and 15 in Iraq.

Virtual consulates, targeted Web-based outreach to cities where we lack an actual presence, may also offer a powerful tool for reaching wide audiences with general information about the United States, as well as specific information about commercial, visa and other issues. Virtual consulates can also provide links between foreigners and counterparts in the US with whom they might want to do business.

**English Teaching:** To strengthen English teaching programs, ECA is devoting an additional \$1,573,000 to these programs, creating five new Regional English Language Officer positions in FY 2005, bringing the total to 20. This is not enough, but it is a start. Whether through direct teaching or training instructors, English-language programs offer great scope for advancing public diplomacy objectives. For example, over the past five years, Embassy Damascus estimates that it has trained over 9,000 of Syria's 12,000 English-language teachers, a terrific example of outreach to the successor generation in Syria.

**Book Programs:** The Department has developed "book sets" about American history, culture, and values for younger audiences around the world. Embassies donate the "book sets" to local libraries and primary/secondary schools. As of September 2003, Embassies worldwide had distributed over \$400,000 worth of book sets. We are examining our overseas book buys and journal publications as well.

**Private Sector Cooperation:** I have created a new unit in my office to explore ways to draw on the expertise of the private sector to advance our public sector objectives. We can expand public-private partnerships, initially focusing on key industries such as technology, health care, and education. There is much more we can do in the field of sports and the arts, and I intend to pursue this.

Through ECA's new Culture Connect program, America's cultural leadership directly communicates with elite and non-elite foreign youth about our country and values. We currently have ten Culture Connect Ambassadors, and we are going to expand the program this year.

Television offers a powerful tool for public diplomacy and public affairs. We are using cooperative programming with local broadcasters and exploiting new distribution channels and technologies to create a fuller, more accurate picture of the US for general

audiences abroad. Over the past two years, we have funded several hundred journalist tours for broadcast and print media overseas, more than half of which have been in Muslim majority countries. We intend to increase these types of journalist tours.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me say again that we all know that there is much work to be done. We all know that our public diplomacy programs, those I have mentioned and others, must advance our national interests and do a better job of explaining not only our policies, but also who we are as a people.

In a world of finite funding, we must ensure that our public diplomacy resources are used as effectively as possible. We must prioritize and ask ourselves, "Is the activity I am doing getting the job done?" We must listen to our field force. Today the State Department has approximately 1,200 employees working in the field of public diplomacy. I maintain that every American, regardless of agency or department, has to make an extra effort to communicate, listen, and engage with not only our traditional audiences, but to audiences to whom we previously have not given as much effort and time. We must move beyond the walls of our Embassies overseas and foreign government offices.

I am realistically optimistic that we can achieve over time a better, healthier, and much more accurate impression of our nation and people. No one, most especially myself, underestimates the challenge and the difficult task at hand. The public diplomacy officials I work with are reaching, questioning, and searching for more effective ways to enunciate our policies and have our values understood. We will continue to make some mistakes but I truly believe we will ultimately get there. We have no choice. We must.

Thank you.\*

---

\* *Editor's Note: Under Secretary of State Margaret Tutwiler delivered this testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary on February 4, 2004.*

## Overcoming our Public Diplomacy Deficit

*Kenton W. Keith*

Chair, Alliance for International Education and Cultural Exchange

Senior Vice President, Meridian International Center

Member, Public Diplomacy Council

Former Director, United States Information Agency Office of North African,  
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

United States Ambassador to Qatar, 1992-1995

If we are to win the war against international terrorism, our public diplomacy will have to play a more effective role than it does at present. In the Islamic world, isolating the extremists within their own societies is a goal that can only be achieved if the majority of non-violent citizens perceive terrorism as unjustified. Unfortunately, the trend is going in the wrong direction; an increasing number of ordinary Egyptians, Turks, Pakistanis and other Muslims perceive the United States (US) as hostile to the Islamic world, determined to control Middle East oil, and hypocritical in its pro-democracy pronouncements. The terrorists draw strength from these broadly held views. Public opinion surveys in the non-Muslim world (including our traditional European allies) show that similar views are present and growing. The terrorists are strengthened by our estrangement from publics in Europe.

These are challenges that cannot be dealt with by the might and skill of our armed forces. To ultimately defeat terrorism, we must also engage the Muslim world in the realms of ideas, values, and beliefs. No previous foreign affairs crisis has been so deeply rooted in cultural misunderstanding, and we must address this gulf of misunderstanding if we are to succeed.

It would be naïve indeed if we failed to acknowledge that American policy in the Middle East as perceived by the Islamic world is a persistent and pervasive source of tension and hostility toward the United States. Nevertheless, policy disagreements alone cannot account for the fact that many in Islamic countries regard the United States as a source of evil. As a nation, we have not done an adequate job of explaining ourselves to the world, or of building the personal and institutional connections with these countries that support healthy bilateral relationships. As a long-term solution to the profound problems of cultural misunderstanding there will be no substitute for public diplomacy (PD). It must be a key component of our long-term effort to eradicate terrorism.

Since the advent of the current administration, no fewer than a dozen studies and reports have focused attention on the shortcomings of our public diplomacy. These studies differ in detail and emphasis, but for the most part they share two conclusions. We don't put enough resources into PD, and we need to make certain that the reorganization that folded the US Information Agency (USIA) into the State Department does not harm our ability to carry out PD's vital functions. I believe that four major areas of concern require urgent attention if public diplomacy is to fulfill its obligations to the American taxpayer:

(1) the need to strengthen our international exchange programs with the Islamic world; (2) the need for a rational, effective visa policy; (3) the need for improved media outreach to the Islamic world; and, (4) the need to correct anomalies in the State Department's bureaucratic structure that I believe diminish the effectiveness of our public diplomacy. Let me turn first to exchange programs.

### The Importance of Exchange Programs: Building Cultural Bridges

People-to-people ties are an essential part of our public diplomacy. As Ambassador Arthur Bums once said, "The achievement, of true understanding between any two governments depends fundamentally on the kind of relationship that exists between the peoples, rather than on the foreign ministers and ambassadors."

In the Islamic world, we clearly have not done an adequate job of fostering relationships between our peoples. A Gallup poll conducted in February 2002 reported that 61 percent of Muslims believe that Arabs did not carry out the attack on the United States. More recent surveys show that Muslims in general doubt America's sincerity in its stated aims in the war against terrorism. They believe that our actions reveal deeply-rooted antipathy toward Islam, and they point to inflammatory anti-Muslim utterances by American religious and social leaders, as well as unsympathetic portrayal of Arabs in films and television as evidence to support this view. Many doubt our commitment to democratic values and basic fairness in our dealings with the region, and they cite our uncritical support of Israel and our strong links to non-democratic regimes in the Middle East and elsewhere. As we struggle to bring some kind of stability and peace to post-Saddam Iraq, the perception has arisen that our promise to promote democracy in that benighted country was insincere, particularly in view of US opposition to early direct elections for the country's leaders. The public manifestations of these views frustrate our ability to advance the nation's interests throughout the Islamic world. It is no exaggeration to say that our policies, our purposes and our fundamental values are under increasing fire in this broad swath of the globe. Our public diplomacy has—in many ways—a more difficult challenge than we faced at the height of the Cold War.

We must recognize that we are facing this challenge from a very unfavorable position. Changing minds—or merely opening them—is a long, painstaking process. There are no quick fixes. And if we are truly to win the war on terrorism, there will be no avoiding the need to build bridges between the American people and the people of the Muslim world. This effort will require us to be creative, disciplined, and patient as we try to reach audiences whose attitudes towards us range from profoundly skeptical to openly hostile. We will not succeed in opening every mind, but we do not need to do so. What we must succeed in doing is challenging and changing a climate of opinion that unjustly paints the United States as a source of evil. Improving the relationships that exist between our peoples is the best way to do that.

America's unique status in today's world as the sole superpower puts new and difficult challenges before us. These new relationships with the people of other nations don't come easy. They can be, and often are, colored by resentment, jealousy, and

suspicion. In this world there is an absolute requirement that we demonstrate a true respect for the opinions of mankind, that we listen as well as speak, and that we hear and understand those opinions and take account of them as we set our policies. Our public diplomats are trained to do exactly that, as well as to articulate clearly and persuasively the true nature of US values and goals. The exchange components of our public diplomacy must serve to deepen that understanding that we must achieve. And if we succeed, terrorists will find it much more difficult to gain support or sympathy, either from their governments or from their societies.

Recognizing the need for more funding for public diplomacy in the Islamic world, the 107<sup>th</sup> Congress acted quickly to increase the State Department's exchanges with the Islamic world. This marked the beginning of an effort to give us the means to build a range of productive, positive relationships based on shared interests. This initiative will engage the American public—in our communities, schools, and universities—in an effort to project American values. We will find no better or more convincing representatives of our way of life. And the engagement of the American public will leverage significant additional resources to support this effort.

Initial efforts were made during the 107<sup>th</sup> Congress to both authorize and fund programs on a broad range of exchange activities to build relationships with the Islamic world and enhance US national security. The Cultural Bridges Act of 2002 called for an additional \$95 million annually for exchanges with the Muslim world. In tandem with the Freedom Promotion Act introduced by House International Relations Committee Chairman Henry Hyde and passed by the House of Representatives, this bipartisan effort led to initial funding for these programs in the supplemental appropriations legislation for fiscal year 2002. The supplemental included \$10 million for a high school exchange program aimed at Muslim youth and an additional \$10 million for the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Exchange (ECA) at the State Department to fund more Fulbright exchanges, programs to promote religious tolerance and values, English language programs, American studies programs, media training and other key initiatives for the Islamic world.

In addition to emergency ECA funding, an independent office was created to administer a Middle East Program Initiative (MEPI). This was a welcome beginning in building new ties to the Islamic world, but only the first steps in what will need to be a major effort, necessitating our engagement in a very broad range of countries, in an arc reaching from Africa to the Middle East, stretching further eastward from Central Asia to the Indian subcontinent to Southeast Asia. Addressing so many countries and cultures will demand thoughtfully differentiated approaches to public diplomacy. In some countries, significant increases in our traditional exchanges, such as the Fulbright and International Visitor programs, will be appropriate, welcome, and effective. In other countries, such an approach may be seen as threatening. Particularly in those cases, we must be creative in finding ways of reaching more skeptical publics, such as journalists and religious communities. And everywhere, we must seek ways of reaching younger participants.



Significant new resources will be required to develop these programs. The scope of the task is too great, and its importance to our national security too critical to be able to accomplish our goals by simply shifting money from other regions of the world. The importance of maintaining a broad, worldwide coalition to combat terrorism suggests strongly that shortchanging one area of the world in order to temporarily emphasize another will be an ineffective strategy. Yet it appears that by mandating that 25 percent of ECA funding must be spent in the Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) region—while keeping the budget virtually flat—Congress has unintentionally taken away resources from other critical areas, notably the New Independent States (NIS), Africa and perhaps even Islamic countries in other regions.

Reductions in public diplomacy over time have limited our reach: we have closed posts and cultural centers, reduced numbers of public diplomacy positions in our embassies, and steeply reduced the number of exchange participants. As populations in significant Muslim countries have increased by approximately 15 percent over the past ten years, the numbers of exchange participants from key countries such as Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan and Turkey have declined by approximately 25 percent.

In the face of those reductions, it is important for us to recognize the dedication, hard work, and effectiveness of the State Department's corps of public diplomacy officers. Faced with diminishing resources and a major reorganization that abolished USIA and moved their function and careers into State, these professionals have performed in their typical fashion: professionally and effectively. It must be noted, parenthetically, that the movement of the public diplomacy function into the State Department has had two important effects on PD officers, one intended, one not. On the positive side, PD officers have easier career access to the tracks that lead to ambassadorial assignments: political and economic jobs, and deputy chief of mission (DCM)-ships. On the negative side, it has been difficult to maintain the critical mass of PD officers with cumulative experience and a commitment to PD careers.

The exchanges community has told Congress that a meaningful and effective Islamic exchange initiative will require \$100 million above the current appropriation for State exchanges. In the current budget circumstances, this is a significant amount of money. Nevertheless, this funding level is necessary and appropriate given the expanse of the Muslim world and the urgency and importance of the task at hand. Redistributing money from a roughly steady appropriation will not do the job. Furthermore, this amount of money spent on promoting our ideas and values is really very small when compared to the sums we are spending on military operations, but it is no less crucial to our success.

One largely unseen area in the realm of exchange is that large group of non-government programs, officially known as the Exchange Visitor Program and often referred to as the "J-visa" programs. It is difficult to overestimate the long-term value to the United States of the thousands of youngsters who come to this country each year on summer work-travel, camp counselor, au pair, high school, and professional training-study programs that don't cost the US government one cent in funding support. On the contrary, these programs add a significant amount to the US economy, are vital sources of workers

for camps, resorts and theme parks, and provide jobs for hundreds of Americans who administer the programs. One example: some 20,000 Polish youngsters come here each summer, generally have a positive experience and return to Poland with an understanding of our country and an affection for our people. Our Embassy in Warsaw rightly regards this as among its most significant public diplomacy assets. I will discuss the visa complications for these and other potential friends of the US below, but it is worth citing these exchange programs as part of our answer to the sliding favorability numbers of the US throughout much of the world, which in turn provide aid and comfort to our enemies. Most important, these programs touch youth, a category that was historically neglected in US core exchange programs.

Today, these programs are in trouble. Visa issues are involved, but the immediate problem is regulation. J-Visa programs are regulated by the State Department. A new set of revised regulations for several program categories has been hung up in the bureaucracy for more than a year, creating uncertainty and difficulty in planning for the operators of the J-Visa programs. Moreover, the trend of regulation over the past decade has generally been to limit these exchange opportunities, rather than to expand them. The exchanges community is urging the Department to expedite the issuance of these regulations, but it is likely that for the foreseeable future, program sponsors will continue to operate in an uncertain regulatory environment.

#### Needed: A Visa Policy that Serves All Aspects of Our National Security

Since the horrific September 11 attacks on the US, the way the United States administers its visa policy has received much scrutiny, and appropriately so. Members of the exchange community, like all Americans, want a visa policy that protects us from those who would do us harm. We understand that greater scrutiny is required, and we support this. The exchanges community also campaigned vigorously to maintain the visa function within the Department of State; State's long-time involvement with the exchanges programs means that the steep learning curve that would accompany a shift of the function to another agency has been avoided.

State's effort to tighten visa adjudication, in consultation with the Department of Homeland Security, is necessarily a work in progress, and has led to unpredictability and confusion. The impact of this somewhat messy process is being felt in virtually all walks of American life: business, medicine, education, scientific research, travel and tourism. The simple fact is that in 2004, there is very little activity in American life that does not have an important international dimension. And by disrupting these activities through slow or inconsistent visa procedures, we pay a high price as a nation.

As spring and summer and their high volume of visa applicants approach, we urgently need to implement a balanced approach to visas, one that addresses our national security concerns and also encourages the many legitimate visitors whose presence benefits the United States. We must not view the issue as a trade-off between security and openness; continued openness contributes to our national security by building a web of positive international contacts. Our true security interest lies in finding the right balance.

As noted above, participants in long-standing summer exchange programs, such as camp counselors and summer work-travel students, are enormously valuable to American businesses and gain first-hand exposure to American life. Often these are individuals who could not afford to come to our country without a job to cover their expenses. Because these programs are of short duration and keyed specifically to the summer season, long delays in visa processing this spring could prove very disruptive both to exchange participants and to the many American businesses that depend on them.

Uncertainty over visas also is having a significant impact on American campuses. I serve on the advisory board for international programs at the University of Kansas, my *alma mater*. KU reports that the international student population for the academic year 2003-2004 is down nearly 40 percent. Universities throughout the country are reporting diminished undergraduate applications, as good students around the world increasingly look to Great Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand for higher education. Growing difficulty in attracting foreign faculty and researchers leads my colleagues in the heartland to the conclusion that many in the international scholarly community, both faculty and students, view the US as inhospitable to them. This perception and the behavior it impels are enormously damaging to our long-term interests, which are well-served by attracting the best and brightest to an American education. What is needed is a visa policy that supports our national security in all its aspects. The exchanges community believes that the consular function is inadequately resourced in the field, particularly given new demands for interviewing nearly every applicant.

Our security requires that we screen more carefully and effectively identify and keep out those who would harm us. Our security also demands that we welcome those with a legitimate purpose for being here, and whose presence manifestly benefits our nation.

#### The Media Challenge: Carrying Our Message More Effectively

It is vitally important that our government-sponsored media and our relationships with foreign media must be improved if we are to succeed in the competition for attention in Islamic nations. As Coalition Spokesman during the campaign to unseat the Taliban government and destroy al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, I faced two challenges. One, facing down the disinformation from the Taliban ambassador in Islamabad, was relatively easy to achieve. The second, convincing a skeptical Islamic world press that the Coalition was at war with terrorism and not with Islam, was far more difficult. In truth, we made little headway in that essential struggle. But a useful lesson was learned: the US must take foreign media more seriously. Our government understandably focuses its attention on the domestic press. It should now be clear that renewed efforts to get our message into foreign media are required. Nine out of ten Middle East adults get their news from either their national television networks or satellite stations such as Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya and others. Most of those outlets, including Al-Jazeera, are open to us, and we should use them. I believe this will not require major new funding, but a change in emphasis.

I applaud the innovative FM radio programming undertaken by the Voice of America. Radio Sawa seems to be steadily gaining listenership among Arab youth. On a

recent trip to Iraq, I heard Radio Sawa from radios from Kurdistan to Baghdad. It has been argued that its “drive time” format has limited impact on political attitudes. This may be true, but Sawa is nevertheless valuable because it reaches a broad youth audience with “light freight” and popular music, and creates a positive, non-threatening image of the US. Moreover, if they’re listening to Sawa, they’re not listening to something more negative toward us.

However, television is the key, and broadcasting on local facilities is politically tricky. Al-Hurra has now gotten off the ground. It faces numerous hurdles as it seeks to find audience share. But the experiment needs to be funded and results carefully measured. It will need to prove itself over time.

### State Department Structure Inhibiting Public Diplomacy

I share the view of many in the public diplomacy community that the merger of USIA into State has inhibited rather than enhanced our efforts. Under the current structure, which I believe to be flawed, the primary purveyors of public diplomacy programs and resources—the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, and the Office of International Information Programs (IIP)—have no direct connection with the public diplomacy sections in our Embassies, and no *formal* connection with the regional bureaus that supervise those posts.

This anomalous structure runs the risk of marginalizing public diplomacy within State, and already has diminished its effectiveness. Those senior officials with responsibility for public diplomacy do not control field resources; those with a direct connection to the field resources are mid-ranking office directors in the regional bureaus, and do not have the clout to take bold action. Instead of sitting in policy-making councils, these public diplomacy office directors spend their very long days responding to task assignments. The structural flaw already is manifesting itself in diminished focus, uncoordinated activities, and reduced field resources.

And then there is the matter of the State Department *culture* as a home for public diplomacy. I led the USIA team that negotiated the merger into the State Department in the summer of 1997. I came to deeply respect my State counterpart, Maura Hardy. With regard to public diplomacy, she—like so few of her State colleagues—actually got it. USIA people worried that in moving to State they would get absorbed in an alien culture in Washington, and would move down the food chain in the field. Maura argued vigorously to the contrary, especially when it came to the merger in Washington. She was convinced that an influx of USIA people would bring a refreshing creativity to the State Department. In fact, USIA’s fears have been largely realized. Public diplomacy was the *only* business of USIA; it is barely visible at State.

The fifteen or so independent reports on public diplomacy have acknowledged these problems and have recommended various prescriptions for change. Congressman Frank Wolf, who godfathered the oft-cited Djerejian report, has called for a White House public diplomacy czar who can produce high-level attention and support to the effort.

Public diplomacy veterans like former director Charles Wick want to see a USJA-like structure within State, with an Under Secretary who has most of the same authorities enjoyed by former **USIA** leadership. Congressman Hyde has proposed another version that would give the Under Secretary more control over resources and program.

The debate, I believe, will continue. Although various Congressional actions are moving forward, it is hard to envision bold action being taken concurrently with the distractions of a presidential election campaign. But *at a minimum* there is one thing that can go some distance toward ameliorating the damage of the structural flaw. Congress should authorize and the Department should create in each regional bureau a Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) position responsible solely for public diplomacy.

Establishing a DAS in each regional bureau would ensure that public diplomacy is actively represented in senior-level meetings and thus an integral component in our approach to every foreign policy issue. A senior officer with these responsibilities could effectively coordinate public diplomacy activities across the region, make the case for additional resources when needed, and play an active role in personnel decisions. The DAS would coordinate closely with the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, creating a policy-level link between these two functions that is not constricted by the competing demands of a DAS who deals with public diplomacy as one of several responsibilities.

Creating and maintaining new DAS positions for public diplomacy would be a critical first step in changing the Department's culture, and would send an unmistakable message to those who work at State: that public diplomacy matters, and matters enough to require senior leadership.

This proposal has surfaced before. It was part of the "bracketed" language of the blue print for the reorganization presented to Secretary of State Albright in August 1997. The Department has not appeared to welcome it. There are two primary arguments against adding public diplomacy DAS positions: that State already has all the DAS positions necessary to do its job, and that there are not enough senior public diplomacy officers qualified for these positions. Neither of these objections holds water.

As to the limitation on the number of **DAS** positions, what we are talking about today is how to increase the effectiveness of public diplomacy, a vital element of our national security strategy. Are we to ignore an opportunity to strengthen our public diplomacy in order to preserve an arbitrary ceiling on DAS positions? I believe the American public is more interested in effective action than it is in the number of senior officers required to accomplish it.

As to the availability of qualified senior officers, my own knowledge of the public diplomacy corps suggests to me that there are any number of experienced officers well suited to this type of leadership role. But State need not exclude senior officers from other career specialties when assessing candidates for these new positions. For example, one can easily imagine many political officers being particularly effective in making the connection between public diplomacy and policy.

The bureaucratic structure imposed on public diplomacy by the merger is not working. The office directors for public diplomacy in the regional bureaus are seeing their people and resources drained away. The NEA public diplomacy office has effectively been placed under the control of the MEPI office, which is headed by people with no public diplomacy experience in the field. The overall trend is to disperse public diplomacy assets, while the need is to create a critical mass. PD officers who get completely absorbed in preparing for the noon briefing or providing background papers for senior level visits *cannot* make sufficient time to coordinate with the producers of public diplomacy educational, cultural and information products the field officers need. That coordination is vital. It is the PD officer who, in an earlier life, insured the proper confluence between Washington-centric ECA and IIP products and actual field needs.

Will the establishment of DAS positions solve all these problems? Perhaps not, but it would add the bureaucratic clout that is the coin of the realm in the Department of State. Change would then be achievable.

## The Pew Global Attitudes Project: Giving World Publics a Greater Voice

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When the Pew Global Attitudes Project was conceived, the original plan was to measure attitudes around the world toward globalization and democratic values in a single major survey. In June 2001, The Pew Charitable Trusts committed \$3.8 million to The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, an opinion research organization we have funded since 1995, to carry out this ground-breaking work. This initiative was in keeping with the Trusts' long-standing commitment to informing the public on a range of important issues through independent, non-partisan research and polling.

When the grant was made, no one realized the full scope and impact the project would have. Well before the survey was ready to go into the field, the terrorists struck the United States on 9/11, and the war on terrorism began. Andy Kohut, who directs the Pew Research Center, responded by reordering priorities to include survey questions about the war on terrorism and America's standing in the rest of the world.

The Pew Global Attitudes Project released the results in two stages: *What the World Thinks in 2002*, issued in December 2002, and *Views of a Changing World*, released in June 2003. The surveys were based on 66,000 interviews in 49 nations and the Palestinian Authority. The reports found widespread acceptance of globalization, particularly in the developing world, and strong support across cultures for democratic values, including in the Middle East. But much of the media's attention focused on the increasing antipathy toward America's policies abroad—especially in Europe and the Muslim world. Anger about the Iraq war appeared to be the principal factor in driving up this level of opposition.

In February of this year, on the eve of the first anniversary of the start of the war, The Pew Research Center went back into the field for a follow-up survey in nine countries, including the United States. The survey set out to determine whether the passage of time since the fall of Saddam Hussein had moderated negative views about America in Europe and the Muslim world. The results, published in the Center's latest report, *A Year After the Iraq War*, were sobering, suggesting an ever-growing divide between this country and its post-war allies.

What follows is an excerpt from this study. It is the most recent set of findings from a project that has expanded its original charge to give world publics a greater voice on a host of important issues that transcend national borders. In a drastically changed world, we now view global polling as an ongoing mission.

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## A Year After the Iraq War: Excerpts

A year after the war in Iraq, discontent with America and its policies has intensified rather than diminished. Opinion of the United States (US) in France and Germany is at least as negative now as at the war's conclusion, and British views are decidedly more critical. Perceptions of American unilateralism remain widespread in European and Muslim nations, and the war in Iraq has undermined America's credibility abroad. Doubts about the motives behind the US-led war on terrorism abound, and a growing percentage of Europeans want foreign policy and security arrangements independent from the United States. Across Europe, there is considerable support for the European Union to become as powerful as the United States.

In the predominantly Muslim countries surveyed, anger toward the United States remains pervasive, although the level of hatred has eased somewhat and support for the war on terrorism has inched up. Osama bin Laden, however, is viewed favorably by large percentages in Pakistan (65 percent), Jordan (55 percent) and Morocco (45 percent). Even in Turkey, where bin Laden is highly unpopular, as many as 31 percent say that suicide attacks against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq are justifiable. Majorities in all four Muslim nations surveyed doubt the sincerity of the war on terrorism. Instead, most say it is an effort to control Mideast oil and to dominate the world.


There has been little change in opinion about the war in Iraq—except in Great Britain, where support for the decision to go to war has plummeted from 61 percent last May to 43 percent in the current survey. In contrast, 60 percent of Americans continue to back the war. Among the coalition of the “unwilling,” large majorities in Germany, France and Russia still believe their countries made the right decision in not taking part in the war. Moreover, there is broad agreement in nearly all of the countries surveyed—the US being a notable exception—that the war in Iraq hurt, rather than helped, the war on terrorism.

In the four predominantly Muslim countries surveyed, opposition to the war remains nearly universal. Moreover, while large majorities in Western European countries

<b>Transatlantic Tensions Unabated</b>			
<i>Support for an Independent European Foreign Policy</i>			
	Apr 2002	Mar 2003	May 2003
	%	%	%
Britain	47	48	45
France	60	67	76
Germany	51	52	57


<b>U.S. Favorability Ratings</b>			
	Summer 2002	Mar 2003	May 2003
	%	%	%
Britain	75	48	70
France	63	31	43
Germany	61	25	45





opposed to the war say Saddam Hussein's ouster will improve the lot of the Iraqi people, those in Muslim countries are less confident. In Jordan, no less than 70 percent of survey respondents think the Iraqis will be *worse off* with Hussein gone.

This is the latest in a series of international surveys by the *Pew Global Attitudes Project*. It was conducted from late February to early March in the United States and eight other countries, with fieldwork under the direction of Princeton Survey Research Associates International.<sup>1</sup> The survey finds a significant point of agreement in opinion on Iraq's future. Overwhelming majorities in all countries surveyed say it will take longer than a year to establish a stable government in Iraq.



But there are deep differences about whether the US or the United Nations should do the best job of helping Iraqis to form such a government. The UN is the clear choice of people in Western Europe and Turkey; Americans are divided over this issue. However, roughly half of Jordanians and a third of Moroccans volunteered that neither the US nor the UN could do best in this regard.

Americans have a far different view of the war's impact—on the war on terrorism and the global standing of the US—than do people in the other surveyed countries. Generally, Americans think the war helped in the fight against terrorism, illustrated the power of the US military, and revealed America to be trustworthy and supportive of democracy around the world. These notions are not shared elsewhere. Majorities in Germany, Turkey and France—and half of the British and Russians—believe the conflict in Iraq undermined the war on terrorism. At least half the respondents in the eight other countries view the US as less trustworthy as a consequence of the war. For the most part, even US military prowess is not seen in a better light as a result of the war in Iraq.

	April 2002 (%)	March 2004 (%)
France	30	57
Germany	33	49
Britain	20	33
Jordan	--	76
Morocco	--	72
Pakistan	--	66
Turkey	--	55
Russia	--	34
U.S.	--	13

A growing number in Western Europe also think that the United States is overreacting to the threat of terrorism. Only in Great Britain and Russia do large majorities believe that the US is right to be so concerned about terrorism. Many people in France (57 percent) and Germany (49 percent) have come to agree with the widespread view in the Muslim countries surveyed that America is exaggerating the terrorist threat.

<sup>1</sup> All surveys are nationwide representative samples except in Pakistan, which was predominantly urban, and Morocco, where the survey was conducted only in urban areas.

Nevertheless, support for the US-led war on terrorism has increased dramatically among Russians, despite their generally critical opinion of US policies. More than seven-in-ten Russians (73 percent) currently back the war on terrorism, up from 51 percent last May. Since the end of the Iraq war, there also have been gains in support for the US anti-terrorism campaign in Turkey (from 22 percent to 37 percent) and Morocco (nine percent to 28 percent). On the other hand, backing for the war against terrorism has again slipped in France and Germany; only about half of the public in each country favors the US-led effort.


**Trend: Favor US-led War on Terrorism**

	Summer 2002 %	May 2003 %	March 2004 %
U.S.	89	--	81
Britain	69	63	63
France	75	60	50
Germany	70	60	55
Russia	73	51	73
Turkey	30	22	37
Pakistan	20	16	16
Jordan	13	2	12
Morocco	--	9	28

Publics in the surveyed countries other than the United States express considerable skepticism of America's motives in its global struggle against terrorism. Solid majorities in France and Germany believe the US is conducting a war on terrorism in order to control Mideast oil and dominate the world. People in Muslim nations who doubt the sincerity of American anti-terror efforts see a wider range of ulterior motives, including helping Israel and targeting unfriendly Muslim governments and groups.

Large majorities in almost every country surveyed think that America and British leaders lied when they claimed, prior to the Iraq war, that Saddam Hussein's regime had weapons of mass destruction. On balance, people in the United States and Great Britain disagree. Still, about three-in-ten in the US (31 percent) and four-in-ten in Great Britain (41 percent) say leaders of the two countries lied to provide a rationale for the war.

In that regard, opinions of both President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair are negative. Large majorities in every country, except for the US, hold an unfavorable opinion of Bush. Blair is rated favorably only by a narrow majority in Great Britain but fully three-quarters of Americans. In contrast, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan is viewed positively in nearly all nine countries surveyed, with Jordan and Morocco as prominent exceptions.



The United Nations itself engenders varied reactions around the world. Just 55 percent of Americans have a favorable opinion of the world body. This is the lowest rating the UN has achieved in 14 years of Pew Research Center surveys. People in Russia and the Western European countries have a considerably more favorable view of the UN. But large majorities in Jordan and Morocco hold negative views of both the UN and the man who leads it.

Majorities in the Western European countries surveyed believe their own government should obtain UN approval before dealing with an international threat. That idea is much more problematic for Americans, and on this issue Russians and people in Muslim countries are much closer to Americans than they are to Western Europeans.

Despite that small piece of common ground, however, there is still considerable hostility toward the US in the Muslim countries surveyed. Substantial numbers in each of these countries has a negative view of the US. Overwhelming majorities in Jordan and Morocco believe suicide attacks against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq are justifiable. As a point of comparison, slightly more people in those two countries say the same about Palestinian suicide attacks against Israelis.

<b>The Gap Over Using Force</b>			
<i>Country Needs U.N. Approval First</i>			
	<u>Yes</u>	No, too difficult	DK/ <u>Ref</u>
	%	%	%
U.S.	41	48	10
Britain	64	30	6
France	63	35	2
Germany	80	15	6
Russia	37	41	21
Turkey	45	44	11
Pakistan	38	34	28
Jordan	47	38	15
Morocco	42	42	16

About half of Pakistanis also say suicide attacks on Americans in Iraq—and against Israelis in the Palestinian conflict—are justifiable. Fewer respondents in Turkey agree, but slightly more Turks view suicide attacks on Americans in Iraq as justifiable as say the same about Palestinian attacks on Israelis (31 percent vs. 24 percent).

#### Other Findings

- ◆ Despite concerns about rising anti-Europe, there are no indications that anti-sentiment has increased over Favorable ratings of Jews now in France, Germany and were in 1991. Nonetheless, Jews in the US than in Germany and Russia, case with Americans, more negative views of Muslims
- ◆ The survey finds, however, much lower ratings in predominantly Muslim countries than do Muslims in mostly Christian countries. Majorities in Morocco (73 percent), Pakistan (62 percent) and Turkey (52 percent) express negative views of Christians.
- ◆ The adage that people in other nations may dislike America, but nonetheless want to move there is borne out in Russia, Turkey and Morocco. Roughly half of the respondents in those three countries say people who have moved to the US have a better life.

<b>Favorability Ratings: Jews</b>			
	<u>Very Fav</u>	Somewhat Fav	Un-Fav
	%	%	%
U.S.	36	41	8
Britain	23	53	9
France	28	53	11
1991	14	58	14
Germany	10	53	20
1991	5	47	24
Russia	18	47	25
1991	9	49	26
Turkey	6	21	49
Pakistan	1	2	80
Morocco	1	5	92

Question not permitted in Jordan.

- ◆ But one of the largest gaps between Americans and Europeans concerns the question of whether people who move to the US have a better life. Americans overwhelmingly believe this to be the case—88 percent say people who move to the US from other countries have a better life. By contrast, just 14 percent of Germans, 24 percent of French and 41 percent of British think that people who have moved to the US from their countries have a better life.<sup>7</sup>

<b>Favorability Ratings:</b>			
<b>Muslims</b>			
	<b>Very Fav</b>	<b>Somewhat Fav</b>	<b>Un-Fav</b>
	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>
U.S.	13	35	32
Britain	18	49	18
France	16	48	29
Germany	5	36	46
Russia	15	38	38
Turkey	66	22	9
Pakistan	a7	10	2
Morocco	70	20	9
<b>Christians</b>			
	<b>Very Fav</b>	<b>Somewhat Fav</b>	<b>Un-Fav</b>
	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>
U.S.	55	29	6
Britain	36	48	6
France	34	50	9
Germany	15	60	16
Russia	44	49	3
Turkey	6	25	52
Pakistan	4	20	62
Morocco	2	21	73
Questions not permitted in Jordan.			

*\* Editor's Note: These excerpts and charts are taken from the March 16, 2004, report, "A Year After the Iraq War." Reprinted by permission of The Pew Global Attitudes Project, a project of The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press.*

## Is American Security Being Lost In Translation?

*Rush Holt*

Member, United States House of Representatives  
Member, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence  
Member, Committee on Education and the Workforce

“The United States [US] today carries new responsibilities in many quarters of the globe, and we are at a serious disadvantage because of the difficulty of finding persons who can deal with the foreign language problem.”

– John Foster Dulles, US Secretary of State, 1953

What was true in the post-World War II world of 1953 is true in the post-9/11 world of 2004. Our national deficiency in the languages and cultures of critical areas around the world is compromising American security interests at home and abroad. In addition to diminishing our opportunities economically and culturally, the deficiency is making our troops overseas more vulnerable and the American people less safe than they should be. We must eliminate the severe shortage of language professionals in our diplomatic corps, our military, and our intelligence agencies. Almost three years after the events of September 11, 2001, we still fail to address one of the most serious security problems facing this nation. So far, the approach has been superficial or temporary, with Congress and senior Administration officials exhorting agencies to hire more linguists. That is not enough.

The current shortage of language professionals is well documented throughout the federal government. In January 2002, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) reported that “diplomatic and intelligence officials have stated that lack of staff with foreign language skills has weakened the fight against international terrorism,” while at the Federal Bureau of Investigation “shortages of language-proficient staff have resulted in the accumulation of thousands of hours of audiotapes and pages of written material that have not been reviewed or translated.” More recently, the 9/11 Joint Inquiry reported last July that our intelligence community is at 30 percent readiness in languages critical to national security, while a State Department commissioned report from October found that our government has only 54 genuine Arabic speakers working in the entire Foreign Service.

When I recently asked David Kay, former head of the Iraq Survey Group, how many of his 1,400 member-team spoke Arabic, he could count the number on the fingers of one hand. I posed similar questions to some members of the Special Forces who have been combing the mountains of Afghanistan looking for Osama bin Laden. I asked them how much Pashto they spoke. They responded that they had “picked up some” during the year they had been there. Although our Special Forces represent some of the best trained soldiers in the world, we’re clearly not giving them all the skills they need to be successful in their mission.

While the Defense Department, the State Department and our intelligence agencies have recently turned their attention to the language problem, their approach remains focused on immediate needs. They're stepping up recruitment efforts and expanding their respective language education programs. These are promising and necessary changes, but they only scratch the surface of what is fundamentally a national problem.

### Federal Language Schools: A Tool, Not the Solution

The federal government long ago recognized that our public education system alone could not provide the advanced language specialists that it required. As a response, the government established language schools to train its own people in the languages of the world. I recently visited the Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterrey, California, where each year approximately 3,700 members of the armed forces study languages ranging from Arabic to Chinese to Spanish. DLI touts itself as the country's largest center of foreign language study.

Indeed, DLI is a remarkable educational facility. I watched students there learning in the classroom from smart boards connected to the Internet from which instructors could call up, highlight, and use text, audio and video streams, and from specially formatted MP3 players (e.g. iPods) to replay foreign news broadcasts and music directly into their headphones. DLI is certainly on the cutting edge of educational technology, but technology alone cannot surmount the challenges of learning a language. I also have visited the language schools of the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department (Foreign Service Institute), and have talked with many officers with the various agencies they serve.

The problem these federal language schools have is two-fold. First, the schools react specifically to the immediate needs of the agencies they serve. If the army needs Arabic speakers, then the DLI hires Arabic teachers. The other schools operate in much the same way. They do not plan for the long term. When a language is no longer designated "high-need," teachers lose their jobs and training in that language is cut back. In short, we are not preparing to meet the potential needs of the future. There is no built-in system to adapt to future and emerging linguistic needs. Unfortunately, as any linguist will tell you, it's simply not possible to produce adequate speakers of difficult languages in a short period of time no matter how good the faculty or how advanced the technology. They take years of training and immersion to cultivate.

Second, the federal language schools alone simply cannot meet the language needs of the armed forces, the State Department, our intelligence agencies, and the larger federal government. Too often, their students have a limited foundation in foreign languages and are starting their language classes with little or no previous language training. This makes them very expensive to train and many of them finish their one-year programs with only basic language skills. As a result, they can only make a limited contribution to the agencies they serve. Ultimately, the language problem cannot be solved at the federal level because the root problem lies in public schools throughout the country.

## The Root Problem: Our Schools

If we are to address adequately the language shortage in the federal government, we have to look past the issues of immediate recruitment and federal language training. Federal language schools are building on a poor language foundation, and the federal government cannot recruit linguists from a pool that does not exist. With this approach, we will always be trying to catch up. We must design and implement a federal language strategy that begins in the earliest years of education and continues through college.

Consider the following sober facts. Al-Qaeda and like-minded terrorist elements operate in over 75 countries, where hundreds of languages and dialects are spoken. However, 99 percent of American high school, college and university programs concentrate on a few (mostly European) languages. In fact, more college students currently study Ancient Greek (20,858) than Arabic (10,596), Korean (5,211), Persian (1,117), and Pashto (14) put together, according to figures from 2002. Last year, American universities granted only six degrees in Arabic and eight in Korean, while they granted more than 7,000 in Spanish. We need to improve the numbers in critical languages if we're going to make sure that America has the language professionals necessary to defend our national security and represent American interests abroad.

## National Security Language Act

In Congress, I have introduced the National Security Language Act, legislation that would expand federal investment in education in foreign languages of critical need, such as Arabic, Persian, Korean, Pashto and Chinese. It would provide federal incentives for high school students to study languages into college, give universities resources to expand language programs overseas, and identify Americans with pre-existing language abilities for recruitment. The main provisions of the bill include:

- ◆ **The International Flagship Language Initiative (IFLI):** Providing federal grants to specific American universities and colleges to establish high quality, intensive in-country language study programs in a broad range of countries around the world. Institutional grants of up to \$400,000 per language would be provided to establish new programs. The initial target will be the languages identified by the government-wide needs assessment conducted regularly by the National Security Education Program (NSEP). The NSEP, which already oversees the National Flagship Language Initiative (NFLI), will also administer the program.
- ◆ **Science and Technology Advanced Foreign Language Grants:** Providing federal grants to institutions of higher education to establish programs that encourage students to develop foreign language proficiency as well as science and technological knowledge. Eligible institutions will develop programs in which students take courses in science, math and technology taught in a foreign language. Funds will also support immersion programs for students to take science and math courses in a non-English speaking country.

- ◆ **Loan Forgiveness for Undergraduate Students in Become Teachers or Federal Employees:** Authorizing the to assume the obligation to repay a total of not more than \$10,000 and interest for a student borrower who has obtained an undergraduate critical need foreign language. To qualify the recipient must be agency of the United States government or in a full-time position or secondary school
  
- ◆ **Encouraging Early Foreign Language Studies:** Establishing language partnerships between local school districts departments at institutions of higher education. Also eligible to partnerships would be state education agencies, an education department of institutions of higher education, a business, a non-organization, heritage or community centers for language study, Resource Center. Priority would be given to partnerships that include a high-local educational agency and to partnerships that emphasize less-
  
- ◆ **National Study of Foreign Language Heritage Marketing Campaign:** Commissioning a national study communities with native speakers of critical foreign languages targets of a federal marketing campaign encouraging students to those languages. Members of heritage communities are a better educational investment than non-heritage speakers with experience. Unfortunately, many heritage communities view language other than English as a problem to be overcome. campaign should educate heritage language speakers about professional opportunities that their language skills

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A few years after Secretary of State John Foster Dulles lamented America's lack foreign language abilities, the Soviet Union surprised America with the launch of the first Sputnik into space in 1957. American leaders vowed never to be second to anyone in proficiency in science and mathematics. In 1958, Congress responded to Sputnik by passing the National Defense Education Act (NDEA), which created a generation of scientists, engineers, and Russian linguists who helped win the Cold War.

Immediately after September 11, 2001, Americans found themselves again facing a Sputnik moment. They realized that they were caught flat-footed, unprepared to confront al-Qaeda terrorists. We need a national commitment to languages on a scale of the NDEA commitment to science, including improved curriculum, teaching technology and methods, teacher development, and a systemic cultural commitment. I offer the National Security Language Act as the first part of a solution that will give us a generation of Americans able to confront the new threats we face today.



# America's Language Challenge: Multidimensional Responses

*Katherine H. Peterson*

Director, Foreign Service Institute

United States Ambassador to the Kingdom of Lesotho, 1998-2001

Secretary Powell has called our diplomatic personnel "America's first line of offense." The overarching goal, therefore, is to get the right people, with the right skills, in the right place at the right time to carry out America's foreign policy. One of the skills that is the hallmark of effective diplomacy is the ability to use a foreign language to carry out our responsibilities. In the wake of the watershed events of September 11, 2001, the press, the public and the United States (US) government have grown painfully aware of the phenomenon that Senator Paul Simon called (in 1980!) "The Tongue-Tied American." Repeatedly, we see compelling evidence of the critical role of high-level foreign language capabilities in our foreign policy, our international responsibilities, and our national security. It has become both obvious and urgent for the foreign affairs community to stand up and address the "language challenge."

## Some Facts: What We Have to Work with to Meet the Challenge

In an article with a stinging title, "Now That We're Comrades, We Don't Care Anymore," Washington Post, November 9, 2003, we learned that:

"The US government is spending 25 percent less today, adjusted for inflation, than it did in 1967 on high-level foreign language training. And that figure includes an additional 20 percent for Arabic and Middle Eastern studies appropriated by Congress after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. A Washington-based consultant on international education [noted] that the number of fellowships in all advanced foreign language and area studies declined from 2,344 in 1967 to 1,640 in fiscal year 2003."

In addition, in the Conference Report accompanying the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, three key pieces of data are given as reasons to support foreign language education:

"82 percent of the US population of 255 million people speaks only English. There are very few US households where languages critical for supporting US national security are spoken. For example, only 0.23 percent, or 596,000 of the US population, speaks Arabic at home, 0.13 percent for Hindi, 0.11 percent for Urdu, 0.09 percent for Serbo-Croatian, 0.27 percent for Russian, 0.18 percent for Japanese, and 0.78 percent for Chinese.

Second, less than one percent (about 144,000 in calendar year 2000) of all US students in higher education study abroad. Study abroad program data

also show that US students historically have not studied in areas that are emerging as critical to national security. In 2000, 60 percent of US study abroad students studied in Western Europe. Less than 2.9 percent studied in the Middle East (a mere 4,100 students, with 3,900 of these studying in Israel); 2.7 percent studied in Africa (3,900 students), and six percent in Asia (8,800, with 5,600 of these in China and Japan).

Third, modern foreign language class registrations in US higher education are down from a high in 1965 of 16.5 foreign language class registrations per 100 overall class registrations to 7.9 registrations per 100 in 1998. Spanish accounts for 55 percent of foreign language registrations, while Arabic accounts for 0.5 percent (5,500 registrations), Chinese for 2.4 percent (28,000), and Russian for two percent (24,000)."<sup>1</sup>

In his "Dear Colleagues" letter in November 2003 inviting fellow House members to co-sponsor his bill, Rep. Rush Holt (D-NJ), notes:

"I am introducing legislation, the National Security Language Act, which would significantly expand our investment in foreign language education on the primary, secondary, and post-secondary level.

Al-Qaeda operates in over 75 countries, where hundreds of languages and dialects are spoken. However, 99 percent of American high school, college and university programs concentrate on a dozen (mostly European) languages. In fact, more college students currently study Ancient Greek (20,858) than Arabic (10,596), Korean (5,211), Persian (1,117), and Pashto (14) put together. We need to do more to make sure that America has the language professionals necessary to defend our national security. This cannot be done overnight. We are already years overdue."

One of the local Washington television garden advisors was asked by a viewer "When is the best time to plant trees?" His answer: "Twenty years ago." Given the unavailability of a reliable time-machine, everyone is now scrambling to propose their own ways to put good will and good money to work to ameliorate the fact that the American public and the educational system, and, yes, we in the government, have fallen short of anticipating and providing for foreign language capability across a broad range of our population. September 11, 2001, was our generation's Sputnik. We rose to that challenge in 1957, and slowly we are rising to this one.

While the Department as a whole is not formally considered part of the Intelligence Community (IC), we share with them the need for strong foreign language capability in order to achieve our mission goals, and Congress has shown special interest in the linguistic capabilities not only of the Department of State, but also the IC and the rest of

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<sup>1</sup> Section 333 of the Conference Report accompanying the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, H. Rpt. 107-789, H.R. 4628, which adopted section 309 of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence's report on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, H. Rpt. 107-592.

the national security agencies and in what initiatives are being undertaken to meet current and future IC language requirements. How do they and others anticipate language demands for the future, and what is being done to meet the emerging demands?

Leadership on this issue will be required from the highest levels to encourage new programs in the elementary and secondary schools and post-secondary schools and to continue the existing ones such as the National Security Education Program in order to build a talent pool from which the government can recruit candidates. This and more creative ways to tap into America's rich diversity of "heritage" language speakers can bring more people into the applicant pool for critical roles across the government and in the nongovernmental organization (NGO) and private sectors as well.

### The State Department's Approach

That is the backdrop, and I would note that many of the concerns and challenges are shared ones on which we in the State Department have been very eagerly collaborating much more intensively since 9/11. There are growing fissures in the stovepipes and cracks in the iron rice bowls. And that is a very good thing.

Ameliorating our shared challenges required us to consider how to better exploit and channel existing language resources and how to create new ones. In other words, how do we recruit, train, assign, retain and further develop the cadres with those language capabilities that are needed in all their various guises to enable us to accomplish our mission? That covers a lot of ground, so where do we begin?

The Department of State has developed and started to implement a coherent, integrated strategic plan for meeting its language proficiency goals. This plan involves close collaboration among the Bureau of Human Resources, the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), the functional and regional bureaus and posts with foreign language requirements. Our approach involves targeted recruitment, credit in the hiring process for language proficiency, and incentives to acquire, maintain, and improve language skills to highly advanced levels, and to re-use over a career the critical and difficult languages that are in high demand as we build the needed language cadres. This strategic plan is reinforced by the high value that the Department's corporate culture places on language proficiency among our Foreign Service employees.

### Getting the People

Language training is time consuming, expensive, difficult, and the resulting proficiency is fragile—use it or lose it. The best language training in the world, and we believe that FSI provides that, only works when there are students who can come to training, stay in training for the required amount of time, and use, maintain, and reuse their hard-won proficiency. But the Foreign Service was "hollowed-out" by the freeze on hiring in the mid-1990s, so Secretary Powell launched a successful move to bring the number of State employees back to what is required to meet critical overseas needs, as well as create a "personnel complement." That would provide for enough staff resources to make training

and crisis response possible. Known as the “Diplomatic Readiness Initiative,” it is bringing record numbers of new employees into the Department, 1,069 over three years in addition to other special hiring for security and consular affairs. This is one factor in a 150 percent rise in the amount of language training delivered in the past six years.

As I noted, one way to increase language capacity is to target the people and places where there are reservoirs of language proficiency. We look to the “heritage” community, but conducting background investigations for clearances on native speakers can be particularly difficult, because many of these individuals have lived abroad, in some cases for years. We also target those who, despite the vagaries of the American educational system, have already developed strong skills in critical languages.

There are several important reasons why we do not require language proficiency or set it as a primary criterion for selection into the Foreign Service. The fluidity of language requirements partially explains this. In other words, the Albanian speakers we would have hired three years ago would not necessarily help us meet today’s needs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Rather, the Department has identified core skills and qualities, which we call “dimensions,” that are far more indicative of a candidate’s long-term prospects for contributing successfully to the conduct of American foreign policy over a full career. These dimensions have proven essential to conducting a long career in an ever-changing environment. They represent skills that cannot be taught easily, if at all: cultural adaptability; leadership; initiative; judgment; composure; interpersonal skills, etc. A person without these skills would not make an effective diplomat even if he or she spoke Chinese just as well as a native speaker.

However, once our applicants have passed the rigorous written and oral examination process, they are placed on a selection register and then can take a speaking-only telephone test to determine whether they are at a “threshold level” at least S-2 in a hard or S-3 in a world language. If so, they are then moved higher on the selection register for possible earlier entry into the Foreign Service. A recent change in that program provides even more bonus points for certain languages and language families designated as “critical needs languages” for national security. As a result, a recent entering class of entry-level Foreign Service Officers (March 8, 2004) is comprised of a majority of candidates who have passed a preliminary screening test in designated languages and who received the extra bonus points for entry into the Foreign Service. (Reinforcing the observation about when to plant trees, it was interesting to note that most of the new officers who came into the Service with strong Japanese skills were not heritage speakers, but likely benefited from the teaching of Japanese in the public schools in the 1980s and 1990s, when the issue was global economic competitiveness.)

These pre-existing skills—in any language—will then play a major role in bids for their first assignments. In general, officers entering with language skills have more options than those who enter with none. With proven language learning ability, they generally make better candidates for more difficult languages, like Arabic or Chinese, and more often are assigned to training for positions requiring proficiency in such languages.

Once hired, and irrespective of whether they enter with language proficiency or not, new officers are acutely attuned to language training issues as part of their overall career development. Entering officers must achieve proficiency in a foreign language to gain tenure, and later in their careers, those desiring to become senior officers must have achieved a professional level of proficiency (S-3/R-3) to cross the senior threshold.

Throughout, employees' career paths are influenced in part—and in many cases, very significantly—by their language skills. When possible, the Department's goal is to assign officers who already speak languages not commonly spoken or studied in the US to a number of tours in which that language may be used. Particularly for the most difficult languages (Arabic, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean), the Department's goal is to ensure that officers with relatively rare language skills or those able to take long-term language training are given priority for assignment and re-assignment to posts where those languages are spoken.

Generous Language Incentive Pay (LIP) is available for those using designated hard languages while on assignment. Additional bonuses are paid for substantial improvement in proficiency and for repeat tours that use the same language. And I also would like to believe that the state-of-the-art language training delivered by the Foreign Service Institute is in itself an incentive to the motivated foreign affairs professional.

#### The Language Continuum: Developing the Needed Cadres

The immediate challenge of 9/11 for our diplomats abroad is to have the language skills to competently and credibly convey America's message to often skeptical and even hostile foreign audiences, to understand the positions of our interlocutors—allies and adversaries alike—and to advance US policy goals and interests. The "Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World," created at the request of Rep. Frank Wolf and the House Appropriations Committee and chaired by Ambassador Edward Djerejian, issued a report on October 1, 2003, recommending steps to strengthen public diplomacy. A major recommendation of that group was a very substantial increase in our capability in Arabic. And it is true that after 9/11 we had to call one of our best Arabic linguists out of retirement to go on Al-Jazeera and debate and present America's story to an Arab audience. While we do have many competent Arabic speakers, we are still too thinly staffed, and there are too many critical jobs for them to fill in the Middle East and elsewhere. And to do what amounts to the equivalent of "Crossfire" or "Meet the Press" in Arabic will take more than a basic course—or even an advanced course in Arabic. It's going to take enormous commitment and effort and experimenting with new approaches.

Over the years we had already been consciously and thoroughly increasing the professional relevance of our language training, and after 9/11 those efforts were redoubled, especially in the areas of consular tradecraft language and public diplomacy practice for all students, not just those in the public diplomacy cone. The "training float" has permitted us to make intensive targeted language training become more of a reality as those outside the Department as well as visionaries within it have put greater emphasis on language proficiency. The electronic wizardry of new multimedia technology and the

Internet have allowed us to expand our reach beyond the school house and provide continuing language education—a mandate that was laid on us by Congress some years ago and remains yearly in our authorization.

As a proactive step in response to the national language challenge, FSI peered ahead and saw beyond the status quo, and in January 2004, we published our *Language Continuum* that parallels FSI's other career and training-related continua. This strategic plan lays out in a coherent fashion a broad range of formal and informal language learning options that have existed as independent elements into the fabric of a Foreign Service career and assignment path. A collaborative effort with the personnel system and the operational bureaus, this *Continuum* outlines for the Department and its employees a way to meld the principles of strategic workforce planning and the "Open Assignments" system, by serving as a roadmap to weave language proficiency development and use into a successful career progression. Some of the elements are opportunities beyond FSI/Washington, such as post language programs, distance learning programs that maintain the hard-won proficiency of those serving away from the area where the language is spoken, FSI's full-time language training programs at overseas field schools, and highly-advanced training at regional universities abroad. The *Language Continuum* is designed to help Foreign Service personnel, including Foreign Service Specialists and eligible family members, plan a long-term integrated approach to language learning and use, leading the motivated and talented more often to attain the advanced language skills that are so difficult to achieve, so fragile to maintain, and so critical to the nation. This is a prudent leveraging of our investment in language training and can build the advanced language cadres that 9/11 and subsequent developments have made so critical to the well-being of the United States and its citizens.

The key to America's success in meeting the global language challenge will be, like the *Language Continuum*, a weaving together of complementary and mutually supportive dimensions of action in Congress, the Foreign Affairs and Intelligence Community, the broader federal government, NGOs, and the state and local educational establishments. Only then will America cease to be tongue-tied.

## Public Diplomacy and the United States Information Agency, Yes!

*Bruce S. Gelb*

Director, United States Information Agency, 1989-1991  
United States Ambassador to Belgium, 1991-1993

In the latter part of the 1950s the phrase, "Missile Gap," initially a political war cry, ultimately became accepted truth. It helped to unseat a political party, damaged not a few foreign affairs and defense establishment professionals and opened up a virtually endless treasure-trove of biting and sarcastic political cartoons. Now we have the "public diplomacy gap" which translates for many perhaps into an over-simplified question, "Why does the world suddenly seem to hate the United States (US)?"

Public opinion polls conducted by respected organizations like Zogby and others have fine-tuned these negative attitudes. We now learn from these polls that it is not Americans who are hated, it is the policies of our government. This, of course, raises immediate questions: "Do these haters understand our policies?; Can polling data in non-democratic countries be accurate?; When one's tongue will be cut off for expressing blasphemous thoughts can people speak freely and honestly?; and finally, with all of these negatives, how can there be such a disconnect between millions of people worldwide trying desperately to enter the US, legally or illegally, and these views that the world hates the US?" Carrying this hatred to the point of absurdity, maybe they hate the US because it's the middle of our President's last name: B-US-H. Who knows?

All of us living here in the United States would prefer to go to sleep at night with the comforting thought that those billions of "foreigners" do think the USA over the long haul has been a benefactor to most countries in the world. Was it not the US with the help and cooperation of our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in Europe who, together, helped bring on the implosion of the communist Soviet dictatorship? Does no one any longer remember something about how the US and Britain led the countries of the world in defeating the evil Axis of Germany and Japan? Then there was that thing called World War I and the small but special role we played there. One fears our (Western) historical memory is getting shorter by the year; not so amongst those peoples of Islam for whom the results of these wars and conflicts present themselves in an altogether different light. It is in our interest, perhaps our very survival, to know and understand our own history. With this understanding we will be better able to present our way of life with its emphasis on personal freedom and human rights.

Once upon a time in the United States there was an organization in Washington that was charged with the task of telling the truth, the whole truth, the un-propagandized truth about the US to the rest of the world. Some un-recognized "geniuses" like Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush using the presidency and a majority in Congress provided the money to create and keep alive the UNITED STATES

INFORMATION AGENCY (USIA). The mission of the USIA was to communicate to the world's populations the true benefits of an open society and the crucial nature of freedom of speech, the rule of law, freedom of religion and the benefit of free and independent labor unions to name just a few. The message was communicated in virtually every method known at the time: the short-wave radio Voice of America, a global TV network, English-language libraries with free and open access to books, magazines and newspapers, specialized media in many different languages to reach in every way possible those billions out there "yearning to breathe free." During the Cold War, President Eisenhower said that peace was too important to be left solely in the hands of diplomats and the military—there must be "People-to-People" exchanges in addition to the more formal kinds of diplomacy. As a result, thousands of carefully selected future leaders came to this country as special guests of the US government.

In addition our ordinary tourists to foreign countries were supplemented by special experts, academics, sports heroes, jazz music greats, scientists, doctors, comedians, dancers, capitalists, clowns and college boys and girls. Way beyond the billions of dollars sent in Agency for International Development (AID) programs and by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the communication of the greatness of our country was achieved through movies of all kinds which showed not just our material wealth but the kinds of people in the US that did the everyday work, raised the families, fought the wars for freedom, followed the religions that they wished and generally despite the many differences in race, religion and ethnicity got along amazingly well.

Our major Achilles heel, the mistreatment of our African-American population began to be explored, faced up to and presented by the Hollywood of the 1950s and 1960s. For the first time, Hollywood moved away from stereotyping and faced up to the race problem in the US. However, the most important message communicated around the world was the passage of specific Civil Rights legislation by Congress and signed by the President in 1964-1965.

There was clear recognition from 1947 until 1993 that in addition to the nuclear threat posed by the Soviet Union we were facing an ideological war between communism and democracy. There was also clear recognition that it was a long-term effort with no deadline set for ending the program until our system of government "won," to use an over-simplified term.

Today we and the West are facing another ideological challenge worldwide in nature, that of extremist, fanatical Moslem sects sponsoring terrorists and teaching hatred of the United States and almost everything associated with Western culture.

To some degree there is a parallel with the British Empire in its prime and the way the US is viewed in the world today: with hatred, fear, respect and some grudging admiration. The United States' position of strength in the world today has created the same kinds of diverse emotions worldwide. There is, of course, one major difference and that is the British people were solidly behind their empire while in the United States there is a panoply of attitudes among our people ranging from generalized rage against just about



everything America stands for to a **self-satisfied glow about our uniqueness as a bastion of freedom.**

There is also a real question if any action that our country takes to help make the world understand what the US really stands for is worth the effort. **Can education end deep-seated hatred? Can an individual driven by a blood-feud tradition of revenge against past grievances change inside? Should we care so much about how foreign populations see this country? In the view of the most experienced practitioners in the study of foreign affairs, human psychology and public diplomacy, the answer is “yes” to all four questions.**

Perhaps the most important question is “Why is anti-Americanism so pervasive around the world and what can we do about it?”

In January of this year Dr. John Brademas, member of Congress for 22 years from Indiana, addressed the Royal Academy of the Kingdom of Morocco. His subject: “Education and Culture - Forces for Peace in a Troubled World.” As President Emeritus of New York University, which today has 4,400 students from countries around the world on its campus (in the heart of New York City), he speaks with authority on this subject. In his address he endorses the position of his colleague, Joseph Nye, Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government, namely, to invest more in “soft power.” Dr. Nye’s stated position is that US military power is essential to global stability and is a critical **part** of the response to terrorism; beyond that “soft power” rises **from** the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideas and policies.

The “masters” of soft power throughout the Cold War were the men and women in the United States and in virtually every country of the world who manned the United States Information Agency. Both US citizens and the thousands of foreign nationals, who represented us locally, were the unsung heroes of the ideological victory of democracy over communism.

Since 2001 with “The Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination” there has been a flood of studies and recommendations on this general subject. It includes blue ribbon organizations such as: the US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy; the Council on Foreign Relations; the General Accounting Office; the Center for the Study of the Presidency; the Heritage Foundation book by Johnson and Dale; the Brookings Institution study by Graham Fuller and in October 2003 the scholarly work of Ambassador Djerejian called “Changing Minds, Winning Peace.”

**All** of the above, one way or the other, agree with Congressman Frank Wolf’s “tentative” conclusion reported in *The New York Times* of February 4, 2003: “Maybe we made a mistake in closing down the United States Information Agency.” Each of the above named reports has a new, modified, re-organized, re-jiggered approach to doing what the USIA did so well, not perfectly, not without a glitch or two along the way, but well enough to have played a crucial role in fending off or bringing down communism in the USSR, Eastern Europe and in countless countries around the world.

For much of the Cold War, the Voice of America was an important part of our public diplomacy effort. While it generally received high marks for “telling America’s story” to that part of the world under the heel of Soviet communism, from time to time it came under political attack for acts of both omission and commission. It is now a part of the overall broadcasting effort of the US and that is where it should remain. It needs more financial support and more technical upgrading to bring it into the 21<sup>st</sup> century but basically it worked well. However, the rest of what constituted the USIA (or as it was known overseas, the United States Information Service, [USIS]) should be brought back to life in tact. It should be removed from its current second-rate citizen status under the State Department. There is hardly one element of what proved so helpful for so many years that needs major overhauling. Starting with its basic organization, the Director held a Sub-Cabinet appointment and reported directly to the President and to the Secretary of State. In organization terms this means a straight line to the President and a dotted line to the Secretary of State. In our political system this kind of individual was almost always readily available.

There is no question that Peter Drucker was right when he advised senior executives to avoid splitting their responsibilities. His dictum was simply “Put half a man on a job and you’ll get half a job.” The State Department focuses on many subjects: foreign politics, foreign economics, foreign military matters to name just a few and fundamentally is charged with executing the President’s foreign policy. Nothing can stand in the way of getting that job done. When the foreign country’s media deal with State Department representatives they know they are receiving the official message from a diplomat. When the USIA was in operation, the local newspaper contacts knew that they were dealing with an information specialist from an agency that reported to the US President, not to the Secretary of State. That small but crucial difference made it possible for USIA officers to develop close personal connections with the media men and women who influence the local population. This was even more true at the academic and cultural level where we clearly have major challenges today in both the Islamic and non-Islamic world.

In the world of business and generally wherever there are many possible courses of action and methods of organizing, it has often been shown that it is prudent to test an approach before using it globally to guard against unforeseen problems. In marketing there is a whole industry devoted to what is known as “test marketing.” All of the many proposals referred to above on how to deal with our country’s image overseas involve interesting and innovative changes from the established USIA experience with barely a reference to why the change was needed. It’s almost as if they were written without full knowledge of the USIA’s history.

There currently exists a nongovernmental organization in Washington, DC called the US Public Diplomacy Council (PDC), which has as its pro-bono members a broad array of the highest performing former USIA officers and Private Sector Specialists. Making a decision and getting the job started quickly is crucial. This organization which will unquestionably have the support of both Democrats and Republicans in Congress could help to put the USIA back together quickly so that it conceivably could be

functioning powerfully by the end of this year at the latest. As of today, the Council's goals are to support awareness of public diplomacy's central importance to the nation's foreign policy and serve as an activist clearing house. By offering information to the press, the public and on the Hill and elsewhere, the PDC can play a key role in helping to rebuild the structures and skills that are so essential. The Council's Web site offers timely insights into the challenges facing our public diplomacy; and its daily electronic news file is the best source anywhere of media reporting on public diplomacy (PD) issues across the country and the world.

This is not to imply that the USIA back in action will be some kind of "quick fix." Because our relationships around the world almost always involve the local publics' attitude toward the US and just about everything encompassed by our democratic system, we must gear up for a long, sustained effort just as we did in the Cold War. The rainbow at the end of this journey is a world as diverse as New York City with its 250 languages and its mix of religious and ethnic groups that goes along and gets along every day of the week.

Let's face the issue honestly and frankly. Everyone made a mistake in closing down the USIA in 1999 and for once, let's admit that mistake, get over it and get back on track.

## Still Needed: A United States Policy for “Soft Power”

*Carl Spielvogel*

United States Ambassador to the Slovak Republic, 2000-2001  
Governor, United States Broadcasting Board of Governors, 1995-2000

“Diplomacy: The Art of Letting Someone Have it Your Way.” These words are inscribed on a paperweight that sat on my desk at the United States (US) Embassy in Bratislava, the Slovak Republic, and it was the first thing I saw when I came to work each morning.

To some, it must sound a bit like a cliché, but to me, it still served as a daily reminder of a thought that unfortunately many of our government decision makers seem to have forgotten these days.

Having spent **30** years of my working life developing commercial strategies for hundreds of multinational corporations and doing business in 54 countries as a Chief Executive Officer, I believed that although I did not speak the language of all of my 10,000 multinational employees—only 1,100 of whom were Americans—I was obliged to try to help them develop “client” strategies that might be successful.

For example, I told them that one has to first understand the “problem” in our case; we call it “US public diplomacy.” Since this is the “client” we are dealing with, our challenge is to:

1. “Explain” the US and the reasons for its actions, to the rest of the world—but most importantly to our allies.
2. Try to win the hearts and minds of the Islamic world, where we have made such a halting start.

Anyone who has tried to sell US products or anyone’s products around the world understands that one cannot sell successfully a “bad” product. Yet we, the most effective democracy in the world, know that we have a superior product—the record of this young nation—and have done such a “unilaterally” poor job of selling it.

Put simply, we need more contemporary and focused communications tools in our diplomatic tool kit, and we need to use them more effectively. We have made a serious and continuing mistake in thinking that we could use our “hard power,” to the exclusion of “soft power.”

It is worth reminding ourselves that George Kennan, writing in *Foreign Affairs* in 1947, said that to win the war against communism, the US had “to create among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a country which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problems of its internal life and with the

responsibilities of a world power and which has a spiritual vitality capable of holding **its** own among the major ideological currents of the time.”

That cogent observation, made some 57 years ago by a brilliant diplomat-public servant has stood the test of time and should still serve as a “client” position statement on which to build an effective program for public diplomacy.

To round out this strategy and include our currently alienated democratic allies in the fight against terrorism and fundamentalism, one needs to incorporate in our “soft power” initiative such shared basic values as individual freedoms, free trade, open markets, democracy, women’s rights, the rule of law, transparency, health care, public education, etc.

The new report just issued by the non-partisan Pew Research Center, about how foreign publics view America, confirms many of our worst fears about how hardened anti-American views have become in Europe and in Muslim countries.

This alarming report, entitled, “A Year After the Iraq War,” and its predecessors, “What the World Thinks in 2002” and “Views of a Changing World,” should be read carefully by everyone concerned about the future of our great country.

It is to be hoped that Margaret D. Tutwiler, recently named Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, can start to rectify this long neglected policy area.

As a person highly regarded by the Bush administration, her words carried weight, when in testifying before the House of Representatives in February, she said in referring to public diplomacy: “Unfortunately, our country has a problem in far too many parts of the world.”

Space limitations in this article do not permit further discussion of the many remedies available to start to cure this problem of “lack of trust” in the US although I presented some suggested solutions in the article I wrote for this publication in the spring 2003 issue, entitled “Needed: A US Policy for ‘Soft Power.’”

From my view, the most effective analysis of what needs to be done is contained in the excellent Task Force report recently released by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). It is entitled, “Finding America’s Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating US Public Diplomacy.” If one reads this report, one will find a road map for what should be done to achieve a results-oriented program for public diplomacy.

However, whatever we do in the area of public diplomacy to attempt to restore our global status as the world’s leading democracy, which cares about all of the peoples around us, we: (a) must communicate that we realize we cannot defeat terrorism alone, and (b) make certain that all of our messages are free of political spin.

In our free democratic society, White House administrations come and go, but we must communicate that “these truths are self-evident” about our democracy and that they will go on forever. Our young democracy has stood the test of time, and we must do all we can with soft power to continue to hold it up **as** a model.

One does not need to reinvent the wheel: The CFR analysis, and others like it such as the Pew report, identify the problems and the solutions. Why don't we “just do it!”?

# America's New Diplomacy: Winning the Race for Hearts and Minds

*Nancy G. Brinker*

United States Ambassador to Hungary, 2001-2003

**I**n a country where cancer is still discussed in whispers, it was a remarkable sight—hundreds of resolute Hungarian breast cancer survivors walking across Budapest's historic Chain Bridge, illuminated in pink, the international color of breast cancer.

As the American Ambassador to Hungary at the time, I had the privilege of working with Hungarian-based nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and multinational corporate sponsors to organize last year's "Bridge of Health"—that nation's first fundraiser for women's health.\* As one woman told us afterwards, "We were not sure such a huge event could be done in Hungary. Maybe we were not brave enough. So we thank you."

With Washington engaged in a global campaign to win hearts and minds, particularly in the Muslim world, such gratitude underscores one of America's greatest foreign policy tools for promoting America's image and interests around the world—healthcare.

Today, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is rebuilding public health systems in Afghanistan and Iraq. President Bush has proposed an historic 50 percent increase in foreign aid and a \$15 billion initiative to fight AIDS overseas. Secretary of State Colin Powell has elevated health care as an element of US foreign policy.

At the same time, USAID is pulling out of countries across Eastern Europe, and the European Union is doing little to assist fledgling NGOs that provide the building blocks of democracy. Who will fill the void?

It's time for a new model of diplomacy, one that communicates American values and serves US interests by harnessing the combined strength of the US government, industry, non-profits and the idealism of the American people. I have seen this model in action, and it works.

First, engage the man (and woman) on the street. Whereas traditional diplomacy concentrates on influencing foreign leaders, the new diplomacy reaches out to average citizens using nontraditional gateways of influence. Effective diplomacy need not cost billions of dollars or require another government agency.

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\* *Editor's Note: The walk across the Chain Link Bridge, illuminated in pink, was so successful that it was repeated in October 2003 under the auspices of Ambassador George Herbert Walker.*

For example, an essential component of any healthy society is awareness, education, prevention and healthy lifestyles. Our walk across Chain Bridge ignited a national dialogue in Hungary about women's health. By sponsoring Walks for Health through Budapest with government officials, business leaders and local celebrities, we helped empower Hungarians with the life-saving knowledge that they can take charge of their own health.

Second, grow the grassroots of democracy. Traditional diplomacy forges alliances and coalitions among nations. The new diplomacy forges civil societies within nations. In countries like Hungary, the American spirit of volunteerism is still largely a foreign concept. Only now—more than a decade after the lifting of the Iron Curtain—is something akin to an independent civil society and non-profit sector taking hold.

Americans experienced in the NGO community and coalition building can help by promoting a new culture of civic activism in developing countries. I shared with Hungarians my experience as a founder of one of America's largest breast cancer organizations. A new partnership between Hungarian and American physicians is one of dozens of USAID initiatives to promote community-based approaches to health. With active citizens comes more public faith in the ability of a democratic system to deliver a better future.

Finally, foster a spirit of corporate citizenship. Traditional diplomacy emphasizes government assistance. The new diplomacy recognizes that 80 percent of US humanitarian aid now comes from the generosity of the American people and the private sector.

Our effort to illuminate the Chain Bridge would have been impossible without the financial support of General Electric, one of the many ways GE is reaching out to Europe after the European Commission blocked its bid to takeover Honeywell in 2001. Yet after decades of communist domination, countries like Hungary have yet to develop their own sense of corporate philanthropy.

In Hungary, I explained how non-profits and the business community can partner to achieve common ends. Likewise, American business leaders can advise their foreign counterparts on how to embrace corporate philanthropy.

As Ambassador, I had the privilege of working in the office once used by Cardinal Joseph Mindszenty who took refuge in the US Embassy in Budapest for 15 years after Moscow crushed the 1956 Hungarian uprising. "Democracy," Cardinal Mindszenty once said, "implies that every citizen and every social class is equally entitled to participate in the shaping of the common fate of all of us."

The West won the Cold War with both its "hard" military power and the "soft" power of its ideals and values. Imagine how many hearts and minds the US could win today by making the promise of democracy—including the common human need for healthcare—a foreign policy priority.



Reaching out to ordinary citizens around the world and communicating America's values is no longer just a job for the US government. It's a job for all Americans, including the private sector.

~~FOUO~~

November 30, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Paper on Abu Ghraib

383.6

Here's a Tillie Fowler piece on Abu Ghraib. I don't know if she ever got it published.

Thanks.

Attach.  
"Read the Report, Know the Facts" by Tillie K. Fowler

DHR:ss  
113004-6

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

3000004

~~FOUO~~

OSD 04242-05

# READ THE REPORT, KNOW THE FACTS

By Tillie K. Fowler

During the time I represented the people of northeast Florida in Congress, it was not unusual to be forced to wrangle with political distortions and misrepresentations of various issues reported in newspapers and on television. However, none ever rose to the level of what has been recently reported on the work of the Independent Panel to Review Department of Defense Detention Operations, which was chaired by former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and included myself, President Carter's Defense Secretary Harold Brown and retired *Air Force* General Charles Horner. Together, we conducted the first independent and comprehensive investigation into the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and other Department of Defense detention facilities.

Our investigation found leadership failures up the chain of command and chronicled a series of missed opportunities for effective and aggressive leadership and proper exercise of duty. We very specifically concluded that had there been stronger leadership and more effective oversight within the chain of command, the abuses could have been prevented or discovered and halted much earlier.

Contrary to recent editorial and political characterizations, our report details these primary failures and assigns responsibility appropriately. Americans did not want a political witch hunt, they rightfully demanded objective answers to why and how the abuse happened and our report provides those answers.

We did not shy away from the facts and certainly did not shelter anyone from their failures. Our report was explicit as we found the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander of U.S. Central Command failed to develop a war plan to include effective alternatives to post-major combat operations. We also reported the leadership failures of senior civilian and military officials in the Pentagon who did not adequately clarify and enforce how the various categories of detainees were to be treated throughout the military detention facilities.

I am truly surprised every time I read or hear that our report failed to hold officials responsible for their failures. To those detractors, I would recommend taking the time to fully read the 125-paged report in which the largest section explicitly addresses command responsibility. In fact, we provide specific examples where four Generals and four Colonels failed to exercise the judgment, awareness and resourcefulness necessary to prevent the abuses. These commanders showed little signs of the leadership expected of them and certainly did not set a good example for their subordinates to follow.

Throughout our investigation, we were committed to providing an objective and independent examination of the issue. We presented the facts as we found them and did not create scenarios to fulfill political motivations and much to the chagrin of those looking for political opportunity, we found no explicit United States government policy calling for the torture or inhumane treatment of detainees.

When our report was released it was initially praised for being the first to find accountability for the scandal up to the highest levels in the chain of command, but somehow that fact has fallen victim to a variety of political agendas which are being furthered through imprecise and inaccurate reporting.

The Pentagon has moved quickly to reform its entire detention system to ensure abuses like those at Abu Ghraib never happen again. Now they must ensure that the military justice system proceeds without delay to punish those within the chain of command whose action or inaction allowed the abuse to happen. We owe it to the young men and women honorably serving in our Armed Forces in Iraq and elsewhere to restore the trust that has been tarnished by these horrible acts.

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*Tillie K. Fowler served on the Armed Services Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1993-2001. She is the Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee and led the independent investigation into allegations of sexual abuse at the U.S. Air Force Academy last year.*

November 30, 2004

TO: David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
 Fran Harvey  
 Gen Pete Schoomaker

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Paper on Saving the All Volunteer Force

320.2

Attached is an interesting paper from an expert on the subject. Why don't you take a look at it, and let me know what you think.

Thanks.

**Attach.**

11/04 Paper on Saving the All-Volunteer Force by Charley Moskos

DHR:ss  
112904-40


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Please respond by 12/21/04

302004

November 19,2004

For: Secretary of Defense

From: W.J. Haynes 

Subject: Email from Newt Minow concerning the All-Volunteer Force

- Newt asked me to pass along to you a note from his friend Charley Moskos.
- Newt says Moskos is the leading military sociologist in the nation. I've heard similar descriptions.
- Moskos will be meeting soon with Pete Schoomaker, and has written the attached note on "Saving the All-Volunteer Force."

Attachment: a/s

11-L-0559/OSD/40854

11/04  
Charley Moskos

Subject: Saving the All-Volunteer Force

The desirable end-strength of our armed forces, especially that of the Army has become a subject of concern. All agree, however, that the military manpower demands are heightened owing to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and other deployments. In particular, there is apprehension that reserve components will confront severe recruitment and reenlistment problems in the near future.

The most practical way of alleviating impending shortfalls and excessive reliance on reserve components is to introduce a short enlistment option targeted at college attendees and college graduates. This would entail a 15-month active duty commitment. Such 15-month enlistees could well perform many of the roles now being met by reserve components as well as some number of active duty personnel.

There is a definite, albeit limited, market of college graduates who state a propensity for military service if the active-duty commitment is 15 months coupled with generous educational benefits. In the fall of 2002 enlistment propensities of undergraduates were assessed through surveys conducted at four representative universities: Northwestern University, University of Arizona, University of California-Los Angeles, University of Illinois-Chicago. A similar survey was completed in October, 2004, at Northwestern University. These were the first and only surveys on enlistment propensity ever conducted on a university campus.

Options were given with different enlistment lengths and educational benefits. The educational benefits options ranged from \$60,000 for a four-year enlistment to \$15,000 for the 15-month enlistment. Across all universities, shorter terms had a notable positive effect on enlistment propensity. Twenty-three percent indicated an enlistment propensity for the 15-month option (with 15K in educational benefits) compared to two percent for the four-year option (with 60K in educational benefits).

Very significantly, the October 2004 survey at Northwestern specifically asked how many of the students would consider serving as a prison guard in places like Abu Ghraid and Guantanamo. In return, they

would have their student loans forgiven and be given G.I. Bill benefits for graduate school. A remarkable 11 percent that this would be a "very likely" option and another 18 percent would "consider" such an option.

Context. Two-thirds of American high school graduates now go directly on to some form of higher education. Of these, about half will graduate with a bachelor's degree. Each year 1.2 million young people graduate with a bachelor's degree. Yet military recruitment of college graduates at the enlisted level is minuscule. The average college graduate today leaves with about \$19,000 in debt.

Very significantly, among the college graduates, 40 percent intend to go on to some form of graduate work. In point of fact, a higher percentage of youth now go on to graduate school than went to undergraduate school in the post-WWII years of the original G.I. Bill. The average debt of one who attends graduate school is \$38,000!

Few of the students at the more selective universities had close relatives or friends who were serving in the military. Noteworthy, there was no correlation between military knowledge (half of the students did not know a colonel was higher than a major). There was also no correlation between political values and enlistment with liberals and conservatives having the same propensity.

Arguments Against a 15-Month Enlistment. Three major arguments are raised against the short enlistment. These are given below with rejoinders.

(1) "Short enlistments would increase demands on the training base." Let us remember that almost one-third of our service entrants now fail to complete their initial enlistments. In fact, soldiers signing up for long enlistments -- four to six years - have attrition rates one and a half times greater than those who enter on the two-year enlistment. Completion of an enlistment term is also strongly correlated with higher education. Much better to have a soldier serve 15 months honorably than be prematurely discharged. A 15-month enlistment option would both reduce personnel turnover and counter shortfalls in end strength.

(2) "Today's military requires highly technical skills that cannot be met by short-termers." Precisely. Higher compensation should be aimed at

those who skills require extended training and experience. In the draft era, the pay ratio between a senior NCO and a private was seven to one; today it is three to one. Future pay raises must be focused on the career soldier. 15-month enlistees could readily fill the multitude of jobs that require only a short formal training period or even just on-the-job training. It is well documented that higher educated recruits not only have markedly lower attrition rates, but also have the skills and motivation to quickly learn a wide variety of military jobs.

A major morale problem among reservists is pulling guard duty for various installations. This could be an appropriate task for a short-term enlistee. Item: the total length of a training for an military police officer -- from service entry to completion is 14 weeks. The short-term enlistee, moreover would be ideally suited for duties in peacekeeping missions such as in Bosnia, Kosovo, the Sinai (and perhaps Korea). These are the very missions the surveys show are most appealing to college students. Indeed, short enlistment soldiers are especially well suited to those MOS's now confronting recruitment shortfalls and excessive reliance on reserve components.

(3) "A short enlistment option would attract soldiers who otherwise would sign up for longer enlistment." Quite the contrary. A 15-month enlistment coupled with educational benefits would attract college attendees and graduates who heretofore would have never considered entering the armed forces. The short-term option recognizes that there is a dual market in recruitment. One based on salary, skill training, and career benefits; the other on those seeking a temporary break between college and graduate studies or between school and career.

Recommendations. The following is a list of preliminary recommendations in conjunction with the 15-month enlistment option.

1. Consider a cohort enlistment for certain colleges to serve in a specified peacekeeping mission.
2. Emphasize military service as a rewarding experience between undergraduate and graduate school or between school and career. Use single-term veterans as part-time recruiters.



3. Now is the time to consider linking federal aid to college students to some form of national service. Under the present system, we have created a G.I. Bill without the G.I. Through federal grants and loan subsidies we now pay students not to serve their country,

4. Establish a commission to look at military recruitment, homeland security needs, civilian national service, and federal student aid.

Conclusion. Without attracting significant numbers of college graduates, military recruitment will most likely experience; (a) a lowering of entrance standards, (b) higher entry pay and larger enlistment bonuses, (c) an expanded recruitment force, (d) increased contracting out of military functions, (e) more recruitment of non-American citizens.

Let us also keep in mind the long-term benefits for the country if military service becomes more common among privileged youth. We will have future leaders in civilian society with a rewarding military experience - - and who will be future informal recruiters. This can only be to the advantage of the armed services and the nation.

OIF Follow Up. What follow are recommendations in areas unrelated to military recruitment. Rather, these observations can be considered a follow-up to my earlier report on OIF (14 December 2003). They are based on discussions with Arabs and Muslim knowledgeable. (1) Do not assign female guards to deal directly with Muslim male prisoners. This to avoid the cultural reality of what is considered demeaning treatment. (2) Avoid using power point presentations to Arabs in general and Iraqis in particular. Again cultural realities make such presentations seem impersonal and aloof. (3) Consider establishing something along the lines of a short-term warrant officer program to recruit native-Arab speakers for interpreters, civil affairs, and the like.

~~FOUO~~

November 29, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Acquisition Reform

400.13

Please read this material on acquisition reform and come to me with your proposal.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/21/04 SecDef Memo to USD (AT&L) re: Acquisition Reform

11/23/04 USD (AT&L) Memo to SecDef re: Interim Response to Bold Ideas for Acquisition

DHR:ss  
112904-26

.....  
Please respond by 12/17/04

400.13

~~FOUO~~

OSD 04244-05

October 21, 2004

**TO:** Mike Wynne

**CC:** Gen Dick Myers                      Paul Wolfowitz  
 Gen Pete Pace                              Jim Roche  
 Gordon England                            Les Brownlee  
 Jim Haynes                                  Powell Moore  
 Ken Krieg

**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

**SUBJECT:** Acquisition Reform

DoD has a long way to go to ensure that our acquisition process achieves the appropriate jointness and interoperability needed in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Despite the progress with JROC and the work by AT&L and JFCOM on Command and Control, we still end up with the Marine Corps and Army procuring, driving, and training with different kinds of heavy trucks, for example. As we move forward with the QDR, we absolutely must transform the acquisition process. There are numerous suggestions floating around including:

- Have those in acquisition stay in their jobs longer
- A process to select the best people with the right backgrounds for key acquisition jobs
- Develop a Congressional strategy that gets the legislation needed to cut through red-tape and minimize bureaucratic roadblocks
- Consider improving joint acquisition by having more truly joint programs, and perhaps having officers from one service head up programs for other services
- Other?

Please get back to me with some bold proposals. This needs to get fixed.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
102004-18

*Sir,  
 Response attached.  
 ✓/n  
 LTCol Lengyel*

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

NOV 24 2004



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

## THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3 0 1 0 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3 0 1 0

### ACTION MEMO

November 23, 2004, 12:00pm

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: Michael W. Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition  
Technology and Logistics)

Subject: Interim Response to Bold Ideas for Acquisition

- The purpose of this memo is to give you some early returns in response to your snowflake on *Bold Ideas in Acquisition Management*. The ideas are relatively easy to implement and would better align key organizations to incentivize jointness, the first step in improving acquisition. These ideas would be steps towards a bolder concept but would be useful whether or not you, and perhaps the Congress, embrace a bolder proposal. Since jointness is a Department objective, you can also achieve a major refocus by aligning resources with a policy directive.
- For aligning resources, it will be necessary to direct Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) to protect funding for joint, transformational and international programs, which AT&L will identify in each of the Services' fiscal guidance. Changes to those programs would require my approval prior to POM submission. This change would put your objectives for Joint, Transformational, and those International programs you support, at the top of the priority list. Unfortunately, as you know, joint programs are at or near the lowest priority for the Service programmers. As Secretary Roche ruefully puts it: "Joint means Navy won't pay." Transformational programs usually mean new programs and in any budget end-game, current programs beat new programs. Currently, international programs compete for the dubious distinction of being the lowest priority for the Services. Attached is a memo which gives such budgeting direction (**Tab A**) I recommend you sign it.
- Most of the objectives of Secretary Aldridge's Study regarding acquisition, and even an earlier study (1992) by Secretary Yockey, were to achieve jointness and to address capabilities, not individual systems. As I construct a bold proposal, driving jointness and avoiding duplicate systems, such as trucks, will be the overarching objectives -- saving slots should be secondary and should not therefore be the objective. In the interim, the following steps would be effective in promoting jointness and could be implemented this cycle:




11-L-0559/OSD/40861

- Realign all Service research and development (R&D) commands and laboratories under the Director Defense Research and Engineering (D,DR&E). Establish Centers of Excellence with the current DoD/Service lab resources (including the universities doing basic research) in order to concentrate Science & Technology (S&T) and R&D efforts in specific areas. Developmental priorities would be addressed without duplicative structures. If you agree, I will task D,DR&E to come back to me in forty five days with a recommendation on how they would organize these capabilities. Examples of organizations that will be realigned can be found at **Tab B**.
- Realign all Logistics organizations and functions, currently resident within the Services, under the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Material Readiness) (DUSD(L&MR)). If you agree, I will task the DUSD(L&MR) to come back to me in forty five days with a recommendation on how they might organize to accomplish this objective. This consolidated logistics focus would facilitate efficiencies, balanced workloads and make public private partnerships more productive. Examples of organizations that will be realigned can be found at **Tab C**.

COORDINATION: **Tab D**

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Recommend you sign the memo at **Tab A**.
2. Recommend you approve development of implementation plans for realigning R&D commands and laboratories as well as Material Management and Maintenance organizations (**Tabs B and C**) – with response within **45** days.



Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove: \_\_\_\_\_

See Me: \_\_\_\_\_

CC: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT  
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION  
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT  
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION  
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES  
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Priority for Joint, Transformational, and International Acquisition Programs

In order to ensure appropriate emphasis is given to Joint, Transformational, and International programs, I am directing Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) to protect funding, in the budgeting process, for programs in these categories. The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Technology and Logistics) USD(AT&L) will identify the program funding for each of these programs in the Services' fiscal guidance.

Changes to these programs shall require USD(AT&L) approval prior to Program Objective Memorandum submission. This process is intended to ensure the integrity of these Joint, Transformational, and International programs critical to transforming the Department of Defense and meeting the capability needs of our warfighters.

# Proposed RDT&E Realignment

- Office of Defense Research (Science)
  - Office of Naval Research (Naval Research Lab as the Defense Research Lab)
  - Army Research Office
  - Army Research Lab
  - Air Force Office of Scientific Research
  - Air Force Research Lab
  - Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
- Office of Technology and Engineering (Demonstrations and Prototypes)
  - R&D Components of the Naval Systems Commands and Warfare Centers (Non-ACAT I)
  - Marine Corps Warfighting Lab
  - R&D Components of Army Research, Development & Engineering (Non-ACAT I)
  - R&D Components of the Air Force Systems Program Offices(Non-ACAT I)

# Proposed Logistics Realignment

- Materiel Management
  - Army, Navy and Air Force Inventory Control Points
  - DLA Supply Centers
  - Other Materiel Mgt storage locations from the Services and Defense Agencies
  - Army Arsenals
  - Marine Corps Logistics Base
- Maintenance and Repair Facilities
  - Army and Marine Corps Maintenance Depots
  - Naval and Marine Corps Aviation Depots
  - Naval shipyards
  - Air Logistics Centers
- Distribution Centers/Depots
  - Defense Distribution Depots
  - Weapons stations and ammunitions depots
  - Operational (retail level) stock points
- Logistics Information Services



COORDINATION

General Counsel

---

November 23, 2004

7201

~~FOUO~~

file

November 19, 2004

I-04/015675

ES-1454

Japan

TO: Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Japanese

Please coordinate with me on dates when we do the Japanese 2+2.

Thanks.

DHR ss  
111904-22

.....

Please respond by 12/3/04

Sir,

dt 12/10

Response Attached.

V/R, Col B

12/9

19 Nov 04

19-11-04 17:37 IN

~~FOUO~~

OSD 04245-05

11-L-0559/OSD/40867

DA 12/10

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef \_\_\_\_\_  
USD(P) \_\_\_\_\_  
ASD/ISA \_\_\_\_\_  
I-04/015675

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

SUBJECT: Update on U.S.-Japan 2+2 Scheduling

- This memo provides an update on efforts to coordinate dates for a 2+2 meeting with the Japanese, per your request (Tab 1).
- The Japanese Foreign and Defense Ministers want to hold a 2+2 soon to maintain momentum on alliance transformation and force posture discussions.
  - o We think this is a good idea.
- The Japanese proposed February 11 or 12, but those dates conflict with your NATO ministerial commitments.
- We have proposed a one day event during February 18-23, but have not received a reply from the Japanese.
  - o State Department officials believe the SecState designate will support an early 2+2 meeting and that these dates would work, but they cannot make commitments until she is confirmed.
- DUSD Lawless will continue to follow up with the Japanese.

Attachment as stated

PDASD/ISA \_\_\_\_\_  
DUSD/AP \_\_\_\_\_ 9.12.2004  
PDIR/AP \_\_\_\_\_ 12/1/04

Prepared by: Maj Jason Perry, Country Director for Japan, ISA/AP, (b)(6)

November 17, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*  
SUBJECT: Tax Exclusions

*012*

Please look at this note from David Chu on tax exclusions for the military. We ought to think through what else we might want to propose in that area.

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/3/04USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: History of the Combat Zone Tax Exclusion [OSD 13958-04]

DHR:dh  
111704-20



*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*11/17/04*

~~FOUO~~

September 2, 2004

TO: Dr. Chu  
Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: History of the Combat Zone Tax Exclusion

Please give me the history of this benefit, with a particular emphasis on how it works in Congress as between the Ways and Means Committees and the Armed Services Committees. I'd also be interested in thinking through how we might creatively leverage similar arrangements as we continue to find good incentives for *the* force.

Thanks.

DHR:ms  
090204-7

Please respond by

*9/10*

*U.S. Get Answer*

*Sir,*  
*9/11/17*  
*Response Attached*  
*W/C OCLB*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 13958-04

11-L-0559/OSD/40870

*1314*



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

2004 NOV 13 11 3 01



November 3, 2004, 9:11 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S.C. Chu, *USD (P&R)*

SUBJECT: History of ~~the~~ *David S.C. Chu* ~~Combat Zone Tax~~ Exclusion—SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- Prior to **the** Korean conflict, income **tax** benefits for members of the Armed Forces were **part** of individual revenue acts **passed** to finance war efforts, and the exclusion was not dependent on combat zone designation.
- Beginning **with** the Korean conflict, the law excluded military compensation earned in a combat zone.
  - o The Internal Revenue Code exclusion is generally triggered by the President establishing a combat zone by Executive Order, not by Congressional action.
  - o Presidents have designated five combat zones: Korea, Vietnam, Arabian Peninsula, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Korea and Vietnam have been terminated.
  - o Treasury regulations allow the Secretary, or his delegate, to extend combat zone **tax** benefits to members serving outside of but in "direct support" of the combat zone.
- Congress acted only twice to extend combat zone tax benefits to members by establishing in **law** Qualified Hazardous **Duty** Areas: the Former Yugoslavia (1995) and Kosovo (1999).
  - o **Both** of these bills originated in **the** House Ways and Means Committee.

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: LTC Janet Fenton, USA, (b)(6)

TSA SD	11/6
SRMA SD	
MA SD	SP5 11/7
EXEC SEC	M 11/10



DSD 13958-04

3143

file

November 4, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Letter to Karzai

If I have not sent a letter to Karzai, congratulating him on his election, I should.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
110404-11

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

11/5 *DR* 11/4  
Sir \_\_\_\_\_  
Already sent.  
v/r  
*Jim*

Afghanistan

420604

DA 11/4

PAAUZYUW RUEWMFU3307 2911821-UUUU--RUEKNMA.  
ZNR UUUUU ZUI RUEKJCS3307 2911821  
P 171820Z OCT 04

FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
TO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL  
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
ZEN/OSD SECDEF  
ZEN/PTC OTC SPT

UNCLAS

SUBJ: SECDEF LETTER TO PRESIDENT KARZAI

PLEASE DELIVER TO PRESIDENT KARZAI FROM SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
RUMSFELD

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

CONGRATULATIONS ON THE SUCCESS OF ELECTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN. SO MUCH HAS BEEN ACHIEVED OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS, MUCH OF IT THROUGH YOUR HARD WORK AND DETERMINATION. YOU HAVE LED YOUR NATION WELL THROUGH AN EXTRAORDINARY AND DEMANDING TIME, AND THE FUTURE IS BRIGHT. YOU SHOULD BE PROUD.

THE AFGHANI BALLOT YOU SIGNED IS DISPLAYED IN MY OFFICE, WHERE I WILL PROUDLY SHOW IT TO VISITORS. IT WILL ALWAYS BE A TREASURED POSSESSION, REFLECTING AN IMPORTANT EVENT INDEED.

I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU IN THE TIME AHEAD.

DONALD RUMSFELD

ORIGINAL SIGNED LETTER TO FOLLOW SEPARATELY  
BT

SECDEF V2  
ACTION SECDEF WASH DC(\*) (U,6,8) 2  
INFO CMAS(\*) CMAS(1) CHAIRS(\*) CHAIRS TESTBED(\*)  
CHAIRS2(\*) SECDEF-C(1) SECDEF-C(\*) USDAT:STS(\*)  
ASD:PA-SMTP(\*) DIR:PAE-RAM(\*) USDCOMP(\*)  
DACS-ZK:POLAD(\*) OSDONNIPRDA(\*) OSDONSIPRDA(\*)  
TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 2

#3307

NNNN

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file

November 4, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: **HAG** Program

373.24

Please see if you can find anything out about a high altitude guidance program. It is called **HAG**. I think it's connected to missile defense and believe it has to do with a bullet hitting a bullet.

Let me know if you can figure out what it is and what its status is.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
110404-3

.....  
Please respond by 11/19/04

Sir,  
Response attached.  
✓/R  
Lt Col Bengyel  
11/5

42004

## High Accuracy Guidance (HAG)

- HAG is a homing guidance and missile command generator whose proponents claim can achieve a small miss distance in homing missile engagements, especially against highly maneuvering endoatmospheric targets.
- HAG technology is proprietary and has been offered for sale to the Government as a sealed “black box” by HAG Technologies.
- In simulations of U.S. missile engagements conducted by DoD, academia, and industry from 1994 to 2000, HAG sometimes outperformed classical homing guidance algorithms but was not evaluated against modern algorithms.
- HAG’s inventor is no longer available, complicating the understanding of its underlying principles. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has suggested that HAG Technologies give DoD access to HAG source code in order to ascertain the true nature and potential of HAG algorithms.
- Radiance Technologies has proposed that MDA fund an ongoing program sponsored by HAG Technologies to reverse engineer HAG. The proposed program would assess HAG performance in simulation testing, rewrite HAG computer code in maintainable format, and determine its weaponization potential.
- MDA has an open Broad Agency Announcement for technologies such as HAG, MDA suggested to the HAG owners to submit a proposal to allow an in-depth evaluation.



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY  
7100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-7100

DT

04 2004

The Honorable Jon Kyl  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510-0304

Dear Senator Kyl:

In my response to your letter of June 24, 2004, I promised to provide an assessment of the High Accuracy Guidance (HAG) algorithms for defense against high speed maneuvering reentry vehicles, as it may be applied within the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).

We formed a team of missile guidance experts and they have concluded that given extremely good seeker measurements, HAG generally outperforms classical homing guidance techniques against some classes of targets. Without access to the HAG source code, the true nature and potential of the HAG algorithms cannot be ascertained. With access to the code we could avoid the current "black box" approach and allow a more thorough comparison to similar modern guidance, estimation and control techniques against threatening targets.

Since the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has an open Broad Agency Announcement (BAA, Solicitation Number HQ0006-04-MD A-BAA) for technologies such as HAG, I suggest the HAG owners consider some of the questions raised by our assessment team, which we will forward to them directly, and then submit a proposal to us through this BAA. Again, thank you for your support of Ballistic Missile Defense and the technologies that will keep us outpacing the threat.

Sincerely,

HENRY A. OBERING III  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Director

11-L-0559/OSD/40876

NOV 04 2004

311ccc

TO: Ray DuBois  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace  
Paul McHale  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: SITE R and other Alternate Command Sites

I enjoyed the visit to Site R and learned a great deal. Thanks for setting it up. Please come back to me about our path ahead on all of our alternate command sites – including the NAOC.

We should also work to ensure that each of these sites are laid out in a way that correctly reflects the chain of command, e.g., the Services do not need large staff spaces because they are not in the operational chain.

Finally, we need to be cost conscious. We have many priorities.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110304-1

.....  
Please respond by 12/5/04

4 NOV 04

~~FOUO~~

*foto*

November 15, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Canal Zone Security Brief

*Panama*

The administrator of the Canal Zone offered to come up and brief whoever we want at the Pentagon on other security arrangements and other plans.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111504-3

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

~~FOUO~~

*15 NOV 04*

OSD 04250-05

MODE = MEMORY TRANSMISSION

START=NOV-18 08:47

END=NOV-18 08:47

FILE NO.=359

STN NO.	COMM.	ONE-TOUCH/ ABBR NO.	STATION NAME/TEL NO.	PAGES	DURATION
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**CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED**

TO:	Gen Craddock	FROM:	VADM Stavridis
OFFICE:	Southcom	OFFICE:	Immediate Office of the Secretary of Defense
PHONE:	(b)(6)	COMM:	(b)(6)
FAX:		UNCLASS:	(b)(6)
PAGES W/ COVER	3	DSN:	

SUBJECT/REMARKS:

Gen Craddock,  
 Passed to you sir from VADM Stavridis.

vlp  
 (b)(6)

The attached document(s) has been reviewed for classified information. I certify that no classified information is contained within and hereby authorize its release.

Releaser's Name

Date/Time



# OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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**CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED**

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FAX:		UNCLASS:	(b)(6)
		DSN:	
PAGES W/ COVER	3		

**SUBJECT/REMARKS:**

Gen Craddock,

Passed to you sir from VADM Stavridis.

vlo  
(b)(6)

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The attached document(s) has been reviewed for classified information. I certify that no classified information is contained within and hereby authorize its release.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Releaser's Name

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date/Time

November 2, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Energy Idea

463

George Shultz called on the topic of energy. He says there's an outfit that can take solar energy and ~~turn~~ it into electricity by a process that puts an ink spray on a thin foil. The panels that result from this process are cheap, about one-quarter the cost. The folks who discovered this are ready to build a factory. The military possibilities might be to use it in remote locations. You could take the ink and foil and operate a radio.

Shultz and a personal friend, Dr. Paul Berg, who is a Nobel Laureate in Chemistry, sat in on the presentation. When it was finished, Berg said the presenters (chemists) know what they are talking about. They use nanotechnology. They can make a nano-molecular membrane - designed with various orifices - and put it on a thicker membrane. The cost for desalination is in electric power. Their membrane apparently has so little resistance that it means dramatically reduced costs. There are, undoubtedly, other applications as well.

Shultz sent the attached white paper, including points of contact. I told Shultz you would get in touch with these folks and see whether anyone in DoD is interested.

Thanks.

Attach.

November 2004 Agua Via, LLC White Paper: "Nano-Molecular Membranes for Water Desalination and Purification"

DHR:ss  
110204-8

.....  
Please respond by 12/3/04

2 NOV 04



# WHITE PAPER

## Nano-Molecular Membranes for Water Desalination and Purification

November 2004

**Agua Via, LLC**

**agua: water  
via: way, path**

**AGUA VIA, LLC  
330 Beach Road  
Burlingame, California 94010  
Contact: Gayle Pergamit  
Phone: 650/888-9373**

(b)(6)

AGUA: water

VIA: way, path

Based on research work which began in 1997, a novel filtration technology has been developed by mimicking the naturally occurring filtration mechanisms in the membranes of biologic cells. Desalination and water purification based on this Smart Membrane™ technology is anticipated to deliver the purest water **possible** at the lowest energy thermodynamically possible. Energy is the largest cost component of desalination. **By** cutting over 60% of energy required by current reverse osmosis membranes – and concomitantly eliminating high pressure pumps, energy recovery systems (little **wasted** energy to recover), certain pretreatment systems, and other maintenance costs – Smart Membranes may provide overall cost reductions of **up** to 60 or 70%. Smart Membranes are ideally suited to deliver pure water in settings **where** this **has** not been economically or technically possible, or to deliver pure water in a smaller, less energy intensive, less costly manner than any conventional system.

*"Water, like energy in the late 1970s, will probably become the most critical natural resource issue facing most parts of the world by the start of this century."*

- The Financial Times of London

Originally created for use in medical devices, Smart Membranes are now being adapted for use in desalination and water purification. It is estimated that purification applications using membranes will be demonstrable in 18 months, and desalination applications ready in an additional 18 months following adequate funding.

Smart Membrane technology is configurable in both performance and **scale** to the wide range **of** physical circumstances under which desalination **or** purification must be performed: point of use solutions **for** individuals in the field, small group systems, mobile systems on land or sea, and municipal sized systems in industrial, recreational, commercial, medical, agricultural, military, and municipal settings. At its simplest, a filtration cartridge at the bottom of a tube with a 27" head **of** water is sufficient to eliminate chemical, biologic and most radioactive hazards. With an additional component in place to handle osmotic gradient, the 27" tube is **also** sufficient for desalinate brackish water and seawater. **The** membrane is anticipated to be packaged in a variety of reliable, low maintenance, easy to use systems **designed** to produce high purity water in a full range of demanding environments.

#### EXAMPLES OF SMART MEMBRANE IMPACTS.

Calculations indicate that these membranes could produce 205 gallons per square foot per day (gfd) operating **at** **<1psi**, utilizing techniques other than **high** pressure to accommodate the osmotic gradient during desalination. At this filtration rate, high volume, high quality water purification and desalination **could** be provided within a small footprint: a Smart Membrane cube measuring **165mm** (6.5 **inches**) per side **could** produce 100,000 gallons per day at 1 psi. The implications **are**:

- reduction in **filtration** plant size, energy **requirements**, and **cost** The Office of Naval Research has the goal of using cutting edge conventional technologies to get a 300,000 gallon per day filtration system onto a flatbed truck. A Smart Membrane system would deliver **the** 300,000 gallons via **3** of the 6.5 inch cubes.

- useful where **small** size and low energy requirements are critical such as in emergency and military applications, or rural use off the **power grid**,
- useful in a range **of** scales: from municipalities down to individual use
- useful as a wide spectrum water purifier in military or terrorist-impacted environments: by filtering out all contaminants and leaving only safe water, water can **be** provided without identifying contaminants or **taking** special steps to **deal** with the contaminants' concentration or nature
- **sufficiently** low cost to be useful for waste water remediation, elimination of endemic biologic threats (**e.g.**, Giardia), toxic solutes or other contaminants.

Today, desalinization can cost over \$1,000US per acre-foot. Although Tampa Bay, Florida had hoped to desalinate water at a cost of only \$650US per acre-foot, much of the potential cost reduction was due to favorable financing terms and projected operating efficiencies which have fallen short of the goal by 50%.

Today, energy **is** a dominating cost of creating a gallon of clean water. In desalination, the most energy-intensive water treatment, annual energy costs equal or exceed total capital cost. The **final** stage of purification – separating water from salt – accounts for 99% of the energy. **Of** that energy, roughly **2/3<sup>rd</sup>** is spent overcoming 1) the length, and 2) the **tortuous** path of the pores **in** conventional membranes. Only 1/3<sup>rd</sup> is due to overcoming the osmotic gradient of the **salt**.

The **Smart** Membrane's extreme thinness (1 atomic layer thick) and complete **lack** of tortuous paths eliminates **both** length and tortuosity as factors in determining flow, **and so** eliminates **2/3<sup>rd</sup>** of the energy penalty experienced by conventional membranes. This reduction in energy translates to a major reduction in overall cost **of** desalinating water from energy savings alone.

Significant as a 66% energy cost reduction is, **the** impact of moving to a low-energy/low pressure mode ripples through the overall design of any water system, accounting for an additional reduction of capital cost and labor costs. For example, eliminating the high pressure pumps and energy recovery systems of Conventional **desalination** plants translates into further reduction in capital cost, system complexity, **and** maintenance costs. With capital costs alone for desalination plants running between \$40M and \$400M, the value from a **Smart** Membrane system could be regarded as significant.

Additional examples of reduced maintenance demands may be seen in fouling reduction. Fouling is a major **cause** of reduced performance and high maintenance **in** conventional membranes. The Smart Membrane is so thin that there is no ability for substances to get trapped in its pores, as is the case with thick, tortuous polymer membranes. A second cause of membrane fouling is **biofilm** formation by bacteria. Bacteria begin **biofilm** formation by establishing a beachhead on a surface through dropping glycoprotein-based grappling hooks. The Smart Membrane's pores are too small to **admit** these grappling hooks. The area surrounding the pore has the ability to be covered with surface molecules in a precise fashion to minimize bacterial attachments. This ability to cover the membrane surface in a discrete fashion **led**, in a biomedical setting, to a **powerful** strategy for implementation of biocompatibility. In water filtration and purification, this capability allows for developing surfaces with unique anti-fouling properties.

## TECHNICAL BACKGROUND.

A Smart Membrane is the thinnest membrane physically possible (1 atomic layer thick) with the ability to have custom crafted pores which filter in or out virtually any class of substances desired. For example, by sizing down slightly from the pores suitable for filtering water, one could build membranes which act as a light weight, long-lived gas mask - filtering out nerve toxins (organic molecules) while allowing oxygen, carbon dioxide and nitrogen to pass freely. Rather than absorbing and quickly saturating in the manner of conventional carbon gas masks, the Smart Membrane would reflect undesired substances.

Smart Membranes result from the creation of a new class of extremely selective, biomimetic Smart Pores™ which assemble into thin (0.5nanometer-22nanometer) porous nanomembranes. These porous monolayer membranes have specific structures that provide a low energy barrier to the passage of water or specific solutes, while providing a high barrier to other solutes. This technology shows highly specific molecular filtration at the atomic scale and profound transport properties such as exquisite ion selectivity characteristics.

Because these membrane structures are so thin, it is **useful** to think about them in quantum mechanical terms rather than classical fluid mechanical terms. Dr. William Dean of MIT has described these pores as "orifices" offering no impedance to flow, rather than as conventional "pores." With a low pressure drop across a **nanomembrane** 0.5 nanometers thick, high flux is produced at very low pressure differential.

To date, Smart Pores and Smart Membranes have been targeted on difficult and novel medical filtration applications. In the **course** of this work, filtration abilities have been developed which were unprecedented and considered major advances in filtration capability.

Certain modifications, however, are necessary to meet the demands of water purification and desalination. For example, in order to meet the demanding medical criteria of biocompatibility, cost had not been a relevant factor in materials selection. Because a water filtration membrane must be rugged, low cost and able to tolerate a range of chemical insults, modifications are needed to replace the high cost biocompatible materials selected for the medical applications with more suitable ones. After the basic modifications for desalination and purification, additional modifications are planned for dealing with extreme water feedstocks, such as the cyanide-rich water resulting from mining operations.

## APPLICABILITY.

The technology is anticipated to be applicable and superior for applications in:

- Purification applications with uses ranging from high purity drinking water through higher purity water for medical uses, such as Water for Injection.
- Desalination applications, including both seawater and brackish water.
- Remediation of both waste water and polluted ground water, producing ultra high quality water.



## WHERE SMART MEMBRANES CAN BE USED FOR DESALINATION

Almost 40 per cent of the world's population (UNEP) lives within 60 kilometres of the coast, placing them within immediate reach of 97.5% of the world's available water. Inland, abundant saline aquifers often lie unused only a few feet below the surface. Because of the high energy cost of desalination, desalination is currently used only in places with abundant energy or wealth: Saudi Arabia alone has 24% of the world's desalination plants. Price elasticity effects from the introduction of the Smart Membrane's cost-reducing technology should enable desalination to flourish worldwide.

Much of world is either in or facing an imminent water crisis. General consensus among economists and scientists is that the world is coming to the end of **cheap groundwater**. Some examples:



- Wars driven by water shortages are predicted to escalate over the next decades. More than a dozen nations receive >50% of their fresh water from rivers that cross borders of hostile neighbors.
- According to the World Bank, the health and economies of more than 80 countries are threatened by current water shortages.
- With-Israel buying water via pipeline from Turkey and farm land in the Galilee turning saline, Shimon Perez has made desalination a goal of Israel's nanotechnology program.
- The aquifers underlying the western United States are fast depleting, with exhaustion predicted in 15-20 years.

The U.S. Government has provided small initial funding for programs to find a breakthrough in desalination to solve the U.S.'s approaching **drought**.

### Ogallala Aquifer

*Ninety-five percent of the United States' fresh water is underground. As farmers in the Texan High Plains pump groundwater faster than rain replenishes it, the water tables are dropping. North America's largest aquifer, the Ogallala, is being depleted at a rate of 72 billion cubic metres (bcm) a year. Total depletion to date amounts to some 325 bcm, a volume equal to the annual flow of 9 Colorado Rivers. The Ogallala stretches from Texas to South Dakota and waters one fifth of US irrigated land.*  
- The BBC

- A program driven by New Mexico's Senator Pete Domenici, whose state is acutely affected by the Ogallala aquifer water shortage, is funded within the Office of Naval Research.
- Wafer 2025, a Department of the Interior program, is seeking to develop technologies to avert water disaster in the western U.S. The chart on the left maps the drought probabilities for the U.S. by the year 2025. The chart on the right indicates the abundance of saline aquifers under the continental United States. This distribution is frequently found throughout the world. Therefore, by tapping these abundant saline aquifers, low cost desalination would make **fresh** water readily available to non-coastal populations. (Charts are from a presentation by the Director of the Water 2025 program.)



**CONCLUSION**

Through decades of creativity and diligence, scientists and engineers addressing water purification and desalination have made dramatic improvements in cost, quality and ability to address a range of water feedstocks. As a result, water purification and desalination are today based on mature technologies from which it is increasingly difficult to wring efficiencies, let alone breakthroughs.

**Smart Membranes** represent a new technology based on building materials which mimic the way nature performs filtration and selection. The benefits include operating in an ultra-low energy mode, operating in a small footprint, and producing highly pure and highly specific filtration **from virtually** any feedstock water, fresh or saline. Such characteristics suit Smart Membrane filtration to highly demanding applications such as total water recycling for space missions (low weight, **small** footprint, low energy, high purity), as well as to highly demanding military applications in hostile environments (rugged, simple, low cost, high purity, scalable, without regard to contaminant type or concentration, capable of processing salt water or fresh).

Smart Membrane technology holds **the** potential to provide significant benefit to the **U.S.** military and civilian populations. For the civilian population, adequate pure water represents our ability to continue agricultural and industrial productivity. For the military, better water technology lifts a logistic burden. Used as a tool for diplomacy, the technology could prevent water wars in developing countries, **and** with that allow better allocation of the U.S. military's resources.

#####

November 11, 2004

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
Jim Roche  
Gen John Jumper  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Air Force End Strength

320.2

What do you propose we do to get the Air Force end strength down faster?

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/8/04 USAF slide: End Strength Glideslope , *SNOWFLAKE # 100704-12*

DHR:dh  
111104-40

.....  
Please respond by 12/3/04

11 Nov 04



October 7, 2004

TO: Jim Roche  
Gen John Jumper

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: USAF End Strength

Please give me a monthly update on your efforts to reduce excess end strength, showing me how you are doing relative to the goals you have set for the months ahead.

It would be helpful for me to see the progress on a regular basis.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
100704-12

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Det 10/15*


Sir,  
Response attached.  
These are numbers  
as of 30 Sep 04.

v/r,  
Lt Col Lengyel  
*10/15*



U.S. AIR FORCE

# End Strength Glideslope



\* May 04 SecAF-to-SecDEF Memo citing lead time for Force Shaping to affect end strength

*Integrity - Service - Excellence*

8 Oct 04  
Data a/o 30 Sep 04

11-L-0559/OSD/40891

November 11, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iraqi Elections

IRAQ

Let's make sure everyone in the interagency and in Iraq understands the ~~point~~  
Dick Myers makes in this memo, namely that the UN is doing a relatively small  
amount of the election effort, and if they move out it does not mean that the  
election cannot go forward.

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/9/04 CJCS Memo to SecDef re: Iraqi Elections *SNOW FLAKE # 101904-12*

DHR:dh  
111104-34



Please respond by 11/26/04

11 NOV 04

~~FOUO~~

TAB

OCT 31 2004

884

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*

SUBJECT: Iraqi Elections

I'm concerned that Prime Minister Allawi may be counting too heavily on UN participation in the upcoming elections. If the UN pulls out, I think the elections should still go forward.

I wonder what we should do about GEN Casey and Amb Negroponte beginning the process of working them on that, so it doesn't just stop if the UN gets skittish

Thanks.

DHR:m  
101904-14

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

*Sir,* *DA 11/11*  
*Response attached.*  
*v/r*  
*Lt Col Lengyel*  
*u/10*

14 OCT 28 04 5:02

~~FOUO~~

Tab

OSD 17924-04

A-27-2

20 11/11



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-3000

CH-2172-04  
9 November 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 11/7*

SUBJECT: Iraqi Elections

- **Issue.** "I'm concerned that Prime Minister Allawi may be counting too heavily on UN participation in the upcoming elections...I wonder what we should do about GEN Casey and Amb Negroponte beginning the process of working them on that, so it doesn't just stop if the UN gets skittish." (TAB)
- **Conclusion.** General Casey, Commander, Multinational Forces in Iraq (MNF-I), and Ambassador Negroponte should reinforce to Prime Minister Allawi the US commitment to sustain support for the Iraqi elections and stress that while the UN presence is important, it is not a requirement. Mr. Allawi and other key leaders of the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) have been consistent and public about the importance of executing the national elections in January 2005. In coordination with the US Embassy and the IIG, MNF-I has developed detailed plans for support.
- **Discussion.** MNF-I's plans include security for distribution of materials, key officials and polling places. The Joint Staff, USCENTCOM and MNF-I are also working with the UN leadership on the ground in Baghdad and in New York to demonstrate US commitment to the elections and the security of UN personnel and facilities. The United Nations has a small number of election officials in Iraq, with plans to expand over the next several months. While important, their presence would not be the deciding factor in the success of the elections; in the end, it is Iraqi participation that will decide that outcome.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

TSA SD	X
SRMA SD	
MA SD	<i>F 11/10</i>
EXEC SEC	<i>M 11/7</i>

USD 17924-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-27-3

A-27

From: Lt Col Lengyel

To: SECDEF

November 11, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Rollout Plan for NDS and NMS

381

Here is the rollout plan for the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy.

I think you should take over the rollout. I ~~am~~ not going to inform the SecState and NSA by telephone of the imminent release. It should be done by memo. You ought to decide how it ought to be handled and execute it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Undated Policy paper: Rollout Plan for the 2004 NDS and NMS

DHR:dh  
111104-29

.....  
*Please respond by* 11/16/04

11 Nov 04

# ***Rollout Plan for the 2004 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS)***



*Gold*  
*PW*

*Office of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy*





# *Interagency*

O The NDS and NMS have important USG audiences (e.g. Dept of Homeland Security, State Department, NSC)

➤ State, NSC, HLS are aware of some, but not all elements of the Defense and Military Strategies

P Approach:

- 5 Nov - Secretary informs SecState and NSA of the imminent release of the strategies during the morning phone call
- 5 Nov - Secretary calls Secretary Ridge to inform him of the release of the Strategies
- Mid-Nov - PDUSD-P/J-5 conduct appropriate staff briefings

*No Memo*



# Congress

**O**The Congress will be in session for a very narrow window during second and third weeks of November

## ➤ **Background:**

- *Representative Skelton asked the DepSecDef about the status of the NMS during his testimony in August*
- *Congressional Staffers have inquired regularly about the release of both strategies*

## **Approach:**

- *Week of 8 Nov - Briefings to SASC, HASC, SAC-D, and HAC-D staffs by DASD-Strategy and J-5 Staff*
- *Mid- Nov - Formal written notification to majority and minority leadership of the SASC, HASC, SAC-D, and HAC-D*



# Public Affairs

- **Coordinated public affairs effort that balances Strategic level guidance of the NDS and the operational character of the NMS**

## ➤ **Approach:**

- ***Press release and briefings to accompany rollout of the Strategies***
- ***Targeted venues for the Secretary, DSD, CJCS, USD-P, and PDUSD-P for presentation of main strategic themes***
  - e.g. Council on Foreign Relations (DC, NY, and National Series);
  - Chairman at War College Foundation Events; and
  - Radio and Print Press interviews
- ***Articles by key foreign policy and military affairs experts***
- ***Brief Defense Policy Board members***



# *International*

- Draw on the strategies as DoD promotes a Common Global Security Assessment with foreign allies and partners

➤ Approach :

- . *USDP-led “road show” on the Common Global Security Assessment which will cover:*
  - United States assessment of the global and regional security environments;
  - NDS & NMS; and
  - Evolving Posture
- . *PDUSD-P and J-5 briefings to:*
  - The State Department Coalition Group;
  - The foreign press corps; and
  - 8 Nov - Transmit Diplomatic Cables with country tailored talking points
- . *Outreach briefings in appropriate venues e.g. the Foreign Officers attending U.S. War Colleges*



# *Internal DoD*

**□ Previously we have not done a good enough job in informing Department components of changes in defense strategy**

**➤ Approach:**

- *Transmit a formal combined notification message for NDS & NMS release directing components to web links for the strategies, and associated briefings and talking points*
- *DASD-Strategy and J-5 staff briefings to:*
  - **Department Principals;**
  - **Combatant and Component Commands; and**
  - **Advisory groups to the Joint Staff and Services**
- *PDUSD-P/DASD-Strategy and the J-5 conduct several Town Hall presentations which can be taped and transmitted to AFRTS*
- ***SD, DSD, USD-P, CJCS, and VCJCS** conduct interviews with AFRTS on themes from the new strategies*

November 11, 2004

**TO:** Doug Feith  
**c c :** Gen Dick Myers  
**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
**SUBJECT:** Southern Command

Attached is Tom Hill's farewell statement on Southern Command. He has a lot of important points here that I think we need to think through and develop action plans on.

I hope you'll get your folks working it.

*Thanks.*

Attach.  
11/9/04 Commander, SOUTHCOM memo to SecDef: Opportunities and Challenges in the US Southern Command Area of Responsibility

DHR:dh  
111104-12

.....  
*Please respond by* 12/10/04

*SOUTHCOM*

*11 Navy*



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
**UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND**  
**OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER**  
**3511 NW 91ST AVENUE**  
**MIAMI, FL 33172-1217**

SCCC

9 November 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, 1000 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1000

SUBJECT: Opportunities and Challenges in the US Southern Command Area of Responsibility

1. Sir, as I relinquish command of USSOUTHCOM, I want to thank you for your leadership, guidance and trust over the past two years and three months. Command of such an important and diverse unit has enriched my life and deepened my appreciation for the greatness of our nation. As I depart, I'd like to highlight a few opportunities and challenges that I see in the Southern Command AOR.
  
2. Although I do not see a current or potential conventional military threat in the AOR, Latin America has become the most violent region in the world. I see the issues of violence and poverty as two sides of the same coin: the rampant violence impedes the economic growth necessary to pull up the **43%** of the population who live below the poverty line. The poverty and hopelessness foment discontent, creating ready recruits for gangs, narco-terrorists and other illegal armed groups. The issue of gangs has the potential to be, over the next **five** to ten years, the greatest destabilizing force in the AOR. Gangs are currently most prevalent in Central America and Brazil, but the problem will spread if we do not address the threat quickly. The size, transnational nature and financial power of the gangs has outstripped the region's police. The fact that gangs are considered a law enforcement issue prevents the military from confronting the threat in most countries. The security forces of the **AOR** must change in order to combat the current array of threats. We must help our partner nations find a solution that makes sense, respects human rights and recognizes the historic mistrust of uniformed military acting in a police role. In order to do so, we must transform ourselves and readdress our current restrictions against training police. This will require DoD leadership in the interagency and within the Congress.
  
3. Islamic Radical Group (**IRG**) activity in the AOR is concentrated on fundraising and logistical support for worldwide terrorism. We do not see in our AOR operational cells of IRG terrorists staging for an attack on the United States. I take no comfort in that fact, however, since what we don't know about the IRG activity in the region greatly outweighs what we do know. We are vulnerable to an airborne threat because our outdated laws on aerial interdiction limit our actions and prevent our neighbors from taking action. We now have the technology to be able to detect and monitor an airplane that takes off from Panama, flies through all the countries of Central America and Mexico and crashes into a key target in the southern extreme of the United States and we will have done nothing about it because the current policy assumes that the worst thing that plane could be carrying is drugs. September 11<sup>th</sup> showed us the fallacy of this policy and we must **fix** it regionally for it to be effective. The regional approach is critical in Central America

SOUTHCOM

9 NOV 04

11 NOV 04

due to the short flight time required to fly from the airspace of one country into the airspace of another. Regional airbridge denial is a sensitive and controversial issue across the interagency, and I believe that only you will be able to take this on effectively.

4. You can be proud of what the men and women of Southern Command do to support the Government of Colombia. The armed forces of Colombia, for the first time since the 1960s, are conducting sustained offensive operations in the old "*despeje*" region, which previously gave sanctuary to narco-terrorists. Those efforts are beginning to bear fruit as we are seeing greater numbers of desertions and decreased activity on the part of the illegal armed groups. We must stay the course in Colombia by continuing to provide logistical, intelligence and planning assistance to the Colombian military while interdicting the illicit trafficking that sustains the narco-terrorist groups. We must seek to regionalize our support, especially to Perú, Ecuador and Bolivia, whose fragile democracies must be shored up or we risk pushing the problem out of Colombia and into her neighbors. Again, DoD leadership is essential, both in the interagency and on the Hill.

5. In 1978, sixteen of the countries in this hemisphere had communist or totalitarian governments. Today, all of Latin America and the Caribbean, save Cuba, have made the shift to democracy and the militaries in the region are supporting democracies. USSOUTHCOM has played a key role in this maturation by close, continuous, personal interaction with the armed forces of the AOR. This engagement is necessary if we are to assist in the transformation of Latin American security forces to meet 21<sup>st</sup> century threats and it is vital to our continued understanding of the realities on the ground in the AOR. I am seeing the effects of the negative impact of ASPA sanctions on our engagement, especially in terms of IMET. Several of our key partners are already looking to Europe and China to fill the gap that ASPA is creating in Professional Military Education and exchange programs. Current limits on information sharing, security clearances and access are at cross-purposes with our professed goals of regional cooperation. The SOUTHCOM staff is working on ways to ameliorate the impact of these limitations. We must overcome these barriers if we are to continue to be the security partner of choice for the nations in this hemisphere.


6. Disenchantment with failed institutions and unfulfilled economic promises in Latin America and the Caribbean have resulted in tremendous social upheaval in the region. One manifestation of the dissatisfaction with the existing political institutions is the fact that several presidents in the AOR find themselves in the presidency as their first elected public office. As a result of the latest referendum in Venezuela, President Chávez appears to be a fixture in the region. From a strictly military point of view, I am concerned that President Chávez is turning his armed forces into a highly politicized praetorian guard, which will choose loyalty to him over loyalty to the constitution. On a larger scale, I am concerned about the exportation of his "Bolivarian Revolution" to countries in the AOR where governments can ill afford added instability. I urge the pursuit of an interagency consensus around a policy designed to limit the detrimental impact that Chávez is likely to have on the region.



7. I have seen the ongoing suffering of Haiti first hand, both under the UN mandate back in 1994 and as commander of our more recent efforts there. Until the Haitian people are able to lift themselves from abject misery to at least dignified poverty and develop some semblance of working institutions, Haiti's problems will continue to haunt the United States. Short of a comprehensive long-term international effort to support Haiti, we will always be just one step away from the next migration crisis or political collapse. DoD has a leadership role to play in Haiti and must find a way to support Haiti's security forces.

8. The stabilization of SOUTHCOM Headquarters stands without resolution. As you are well aware, I remain convinced, as did my predecessors, that Miami is the right location for the headquarters from a strategic point of view. The recent proposal by the Governor of Florida presents us with an opportunity to make a sound fiscal decision as well. I strongly encourage DoD to consider the Governor's proposal as a means to resolve the command's stabilization in Miami. We should come to closure on this issue for both the strategic and fiscal reasons I mentioned as well as for the quality of life of our people.

9. I thank you again for the opportunity to have served as the Commander of United States Southern Command. I have been privileged to work shoulder to shoulder with great patriots and I have been blessed by having known some of the most brilliant leaders of this hemisphere. I thank you for your steadfast leadership in this critical phase of our country's history. I am enthusiastic and optimistic about USSOUTHCOM's role in helping the people of the Americas fully enjoy the fruits of democracy and economic opportunity.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J/T Hill". The signature is stylized with a checkmark-like symbol above the "J" and a horizontal line above the "Hill".

JAMES T. HILL  
General, US Army  
Commander

CF:  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

November 8, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci

CC: VADM Stavridis  
Cathy Mainardi

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meeting on Rotations

*DONE*

*2004*

I need to have a meeting with the Army, the Joint Staff and the Chairman to talk about this memo on rotation periods and what we are facing.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/1/04 Memo to SecDef re: Army Rotation Lengths

DHR:ss  
110804-9

.....  
Please respond by 12/5/04

*8 Nov 04*

September 16, 2004

TO: Les Brownlee  
Gen. Schoomacher

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Gen. Pete Pace  
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Army Tour Lengths

At our recent discussion of deployment rules with David Chu, you said you would get back to me with a view of how we might be able to reduce Army tour lengths from 12 months down toward 9 or even 6-7 months, like the Marines.

I know these are very difficult choices in the short term, but I am very curious how that analysis is going, and I look forward to hearing from you about it fairly soon.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
091604-15

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_


11/8  
 Sir,  
 Response attached.  
 Yr  
 Lt Col Lengyel  
 10/5



~~FOUO~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON, DC 20310

OCT 1 2004



DA

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT Army Rotation Lengths

In response to your September 16, 2004, memo, while the **Army** would prefer to reduce deployment durations to **six** or nine months, the increased deployment tempo generated by shorter rotation lengths would have a negative impact on the force at this time.

Army studies and operational experience have shown that in a perfect world, six **months** is the optimal deployment length, allowing the **Army** to balance its operational requirements to provide trained and ready forces to the combatant commanders against the **stresses** separation generates on our volunteer force. However:

- There is insufficient depth within the **Army's** Combat Support and Combat Service **Support** capabilities to reduce rotation lengths below **12 months** without producing significant dwell time and remobilization violations.
- Shorter rotation lengths would affect the **Army's** ability to meet **CENTCOM's** total requirements for combat forces as well. For instance, at current commitment levels, reducing the **Army's** combat unit deployment length to nine **months** could generate a 21 brigade combat team shortfall over the next two years. This problem would only be exacerbated by **shortening** unit rotations to six months in duration.

Even under the current **12-month** rotation policy, meeting **CENTCOM's** requirements for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom 04-06 will require the remobilization of 18 Reserve Component units and the premature redeployment of 61 Active Component units - measures which will impact approximately 4,000 Soldiers, **This** number is projected to increase to approximately 10,000 Soldiers for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom **05-07**.

PETER J. SCHOOMAKER  
General, US Army  
Chief of Staff

R. L. Brownlee  
Acting Secretary of the Army

~~FOUO~~

40903166



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3  
400 ARMY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0400



G-35-SSW

23 SEP 2004

MEMORANDUM THRU ~~DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3~~ *AC*  
~~VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY~~ *AC*  
~~CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY~~ *2/1.10.04*

FOR ACTING SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

**SUBJECT: Army Rotation Lengths - ACTION MEMORANDUM**

1. Purpose: Reply to the September 16, 2004 **SECDEF** memo on the length of Army deployment rotations.

2. Discussion:

a. There is insufficient depth within CS/CSS capabilities to reduce rotation lengths below 12-months without significant dwell ~~time~~ and remobilization violations.

b. While it is possible to shorten the rotation lengths for the Active Component Maneuver Brigades and still maintain the Army's Campaign Plan, doing so would require maintaining an increased level of Reserve Component participation.

c. While shorter unit rotations may provide the Army with potential retention and quality of life advantages, the increased operational tempo would have a negative impact on the force. Disadvantages of 9-month rotations are:

- An increased role of the Reserve Component
- An increase in number of units that become dwell violators
- An increase in number of units that become remobilization violators
- Less time available for units to conduct professional development, training, and maintenance before redeploying
- An increased burden upon strategic air/sea lift


40903166

**SUBJECT: Army Rotation Lengths**

d. These disadvantages are only exacerbated under 6-month rotations.

3. (U) Recommendation: Acting SECARMY approve information memorandum for the SECDEF.

Encl



KEITH W. DAYTON  
Major General, *CS*  
Director of Strategy,  
Plans and Policy

CPT KELLY L. WEBSTER (b)(6)

OFFICE OF THE  
SECURITY ASSISTANT  
**DEC 10 2004**  
2005 MAR -3 AM 9:07

TO: Paul McHale  
CC: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: 9/11 Commission Report Item

*000.5*

Do we have a piece of paper that explains who is responsible for defending us at home that is clear, succinct and bullet pointed? I notice this from the 9/11 Commission Report, which is really an amazing lack of knowledge for a commission that is being widely praised.

Shouldn't we write the members of the commission a note referencing this page in their report, and explaining the answer to the question?

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/11 Commission Report (ref. page 26)

DHR:ss  
110204-6

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*12 Dec 04*

agency will **not** solve America's problems in collecting and **analyzing** intelligence within the United States. We do not **recommend** creating one.

- We propose the **establishment** of a specialized and **integrated** national security workforce at **the FBI**, consisting of agents, **analysts**, linguists, and surveillance specialists who are **recruited**, **trained**, rewarded, and retained to **ensure** the development of an institutional culture imbued with a deep expertise in intelligence and national **security**.

At **several points** we asked: Who **has** the **responsibility** for defending us at home? **Responsibility** for America's **national** defense is **shared** by the Department of **Defense**, with its new Northern Command, and by **the** Department of Homeland Security. They must **have** a clear delineation of roles, missions, and **authority**

- The Department of **Defense** and its oversight committees should **regularly** assess the **adequacy** of Northern Command's **strategies** and planning to defend against **military** threats to **the** homeland.
- The Department of **Homeland Security** and its oversight committees should **regularly** assess the **types** of **threats** the country faces; in order to determine the adequacy of the government's **plans** and the **readiness** of the **government** to **respond** to those *threats*.

\* \* \*

.We call on the American people to **remember** how **we** all felt on 9/11, to **remember** not **only** the unspeakable horror but **how** **we** came together as a nation—one nation. **Unity** of **purpose** and unity of **effort** are the way **we** will defeat **this** enemy and make America **safer** for our children and grandchildren.

We look forward to a **national** debate on the merits of what **w e** have **recom-** mended, and **we** will participate vigorously in that debate.

A-4-32



*Aut Rev.  
7 pages*

# THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT

**Final Report of the  
National Commission on Terrorist  
Attacks Upon the United States**

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**WE PRESENT THE NARRATIVE** of this report **and** the **recommendations that flow** from it to the President of the United States, the United States **Congress**, and the American people **for their** consideration. **Ten** Commissioners—five **Republicans and five Democrats** chosen **by** elected leaders from our nation's capital at a time of great partisan division—have come together to present this report without **dissent**.

We **have** come together with a **unity of purpose** because our **nation** demands it. September 11, 2001, **was a day** of unprecedented **shock and** suffering in the history of the United States-The **nation** was unprepared.

### A NATION TRANSFORMED

At 8:46 on the morning of September 11, 2001, the United States became a **nation** transformed.

An airliner traveling at hundreds of **miles** per hour and **carrying** some 10,000 **gallons of** jet fuel plowed into the **North Tower** of the World Trade Center in Lower Manhattan. At 9:03, a second airliner hit the **South Tower**. **Fire** and smoke billowed upward. Steel, **glass**, ash, and **bodies** **fell** below. The Twin Towers, where up to 50,000 people worked each **day**, **both** collapsed less **than 90 minutes** later.

At 9:37 that same **morning**, a third airliner slammed into the western face of the **Pentagon**. At 10:03, a fourth airliner **crashed in a field in southern Pennsylvania**. It had been aimed at the United **States** Capitol or the White House, and **was** forced **down** by heroic passengers armed with the knowledge that America **was** under attack.

**More** than 2,600 people died at the **World Trade Center**; **125** died at the

Pentagon; 256 died on the four planes. The death toll surpassed that at Pearl Harbor in December 1941.

This immeasurable pain was inflicted by 19 young Arabs acting at the behest of Islamist extremists headquartered in distant Afghanistan. Some had been in the United States for more than a year, mixing with the rest of the population. Though four had training as pilots, most were not well-educated. Most spoke English poorly, some hardly at all. In groups of four or five, carrying with them only small knives, box cutters, and cans of Mace or pepper spray, they had hijacked the four planes and turned them into deadly guided missiles.

Why did they do this? How was the attack planned and conceived? How did the U.S. government fail to anticipate and prevent it? What can we do in the future to prevent similar acts of terrorism?

### A Shock, Not a Surprise

The 9/11 attacks were a shock, but they should not have come as a surprise. Islamist extremists had given plenty of warning that they meant to kill Americans indiscriminately and in large numbers. Although Usama Bin Ladin himself would not emerge as a signal threat until the late 1990s, the threat of Islamist terrorism grew over the decade.

In February 1993, a group led by Ramzi Yousef tried to bring down the World Trade Center with a truck bomb. They killed six and wounded a thousand. Plans by Omar Abdel Rahman and others to blow up the Holland and Lincoln tunnels and other New York City landmarks were frustrated when the plotters were arrested. In October 1993, Somali tribesmen shot down U.S. helicopter, killing 18 and wounding 73 in an incident that came to be known as "Black Hawk down." Years later it would be learned that those Somali tribesmen had received help from al Qaeda.

In early 1995, police in Manila uncovered a plot by Ramzi Yousef to blow up a dozen U.S. airliners while they were flying over the Pacific. In November 1995, a car bomb exploded outside the office of the U.S. program manager for the Saudi National Guard in Riyadh, killing five Americans and two others. In June 1996, a truck bomb demolished the Khobar Towers apartment complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 U.S. servicemen and wounding hundreds. The attack was carried out primarily by Saudi Hezbollah, an organization that had received help from the government of Iran.

Until 1997, the U.S. intelligence community viewed Bin Ladin as a financier of terrorism, not as a terrorist leader. In February 1998, Usama Bin Ladin and four others issued a self-styled fatwa, publicly declaring that it was God's decree that every Muslim should try his utmost to kill any American, military or civilian, anywhere in the world, because of American "occupa-

tion" of Islam's holy places and aggression against Muslims.

In August 1998, **Bin Ladin's** group, **al Qaeda**, carried out near-simultaneous **truck** bomb attacks on the **U.S.** embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and **Dar es Salaam**, Tanzania. The attacks killed **224** people, including **12** Americans, and wounded **thousands more**.

In December 1999, Jordanian police foiled a plot to **bomb** hotels and other sites frequented by American **tourists**, and a U.S. Customs agent arrested Ahmed Ressam at the U.S. **Canadian** border as he was smuggling in explosives intended for an attack on **Los Angeles International Airport**.

In October 2000, an **al Qaeda** team in Aden, Yemen, used a motorboat filled with explosives to blow a hole in the side of a destroyer, the **USS Cole**, almost **sinking** the vessel and **killing** 17 American **sailors**.

The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were far more elaborate, precise, and destructive **than any** of these earlier assaults. But by September 2001, the executive branch of the U.S. government, the **Congress**, the **news** media, and the American public had received clear warning that Islamist terrorists meant to **kill** Americans in high numbers.

### **Who Is the Enemy?**

**Who** is this enemy that created an **organization** capable of **inflicting** such horrific damage on the United **States**? We now know that these attacks were **carried** out by various **groups** of Islamist extremists. The 9/11 attack **was** driven by Usama **Bin Ladin**.

In the 1980s, young Muslims from around the world went to Afghanistan to **join** as volunteers in a jihad (or holy struggle) against the Soviet Union. A wealthy Saudi, **Usama Bin Ladin**, was one of **them**. Following the defeat of the **Soviets** in the late 1980s, **Bin Ladin** and **others** formed **al Qaeda** to **mobilize** jihads elsewhere.

The history, culture, and **body** of beliefs from which **Bin Ladin** shapes and spreads **his** message are largely **unknown** to many Americans. Seizing on **symbols** of Islam's past greatness, he promises to restore pride to people **who** **consider** themselves the **victims** of successive foreign masters. **He** **uses** cultural and **religious** allusions to the holy **Qur'an** and some of its interpreters. He **appeals** to people disoriented by cyclonic change as **they** confront modernity and **glob-**  
**alization**. **His** rhetoric selectively draws from multiple sources—Islam, history, and the **region's** political and economic malaise.

**Bin Ladin** also stresses grievances against the United States widely shared in the **Muslim** world. He inveighed against the presence of U.S. mops in Saudi Arabia, which is the home of Islam's **holiest** sites, and against **other U.S. policies** in the Middle **East**.

Upon this political and ideological **foundation**, Bin Ladin built over the course of a decade a dynamic and lethal **organization**. He built an **infrastructure and organization** in Afghanistan that could attract, train, and use recruits against ever **more** ambitious **targets**. He **rallied** new zealots and new **money** with each demonstration of al Qaeda's **capability**. He had **forged** a close alliance with the **Taliban**, a regime providing **sanctuary** for al Qaeda.

By September 11, 2001, al Qaeda possessed

- leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and **direction** of a major **operation**;
- a personnel system that could recruit candidates, indoctrinate them, vet **them**, and give them the necessary training;
- communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of **operatives and those who would** be helping **them**;
- **an** intelligence **effort** to gather required **information** and form assessments of enemy **strengths and weaknesses**;
- the ability to move people **great distances**; and
- the ability to raise **and move** the **money** necessary to **finance an attack**.

#### 1998 to September 11, 2001

The August 1998 bombings of **U.S.** embassies in Kenya and Tanzania established al Qaeda as a potent adversary of the United **States**.

After launching cruise missile strikes **against** al Qaeda **targets** in Afghanistan and Sudan in **retaliation** for the embassy bombings, the Clinton **administration** applied diplomatic pressure to **try to persuade** the **Taliban regime in Afghanistan** to expel **Bin Ladin**. The administration **also** devised **covert operations** to use CIA-paid foreign agents to capture or kill **Bin Ladin** and his chief lieutenants. **These actions** did not stop **Bin Ladin** or **dislodge** al Qaeda from its sanctuary.

By late 1998 or early 1999, **Bin Ladin** and his advisers had agreed on an idea brought to **them** by Khalid **Sheikh Mohammed** (KSM) called the "planes operation." It would eventually culminate in the 9/11 attacks. Bin Ladin and his chief of operations, **Mohammed Atef**, occupied undisputed leadership positions atop al Qaeda. Within al Qaeda, **they** relied heavily on the ideas and enterprise of **strong-willed field commanders**, such as **KSM**, to **carry out** worldwide terrorist **operations**.

**KSM** claims that his **original plot** was even grander than those carried **out** on 9/11—ten planes would attack **targets** on both the East and West **coasts** of the United States. This plan **was modified** by **Bin Ladin**, **KSM** said, owing to its **scale** and complexity. **Bin Ladin** provided **KSM** with four **initial operatives** for suicide plane **attacks** within the United States, and in the fall of 1999 **training**

port the Taliban's enemies. The CIA also produced a plan to improve intelligence collection on al Qaeda, including the use of a small, unmanned airplane with a video camera, known as the Predator.

After the October 2000 attack on the USS *Cole*, evidence accumulated that it had been launched by al Qaeda operatives, but without confirmation that Bin Ladin had given the order. The Taliban had earlier been warned that it would be held responsible for another Bin Ladin attack on the United States. The CIA described its findings as a "preliminary judgment"; President Clinton and his chief advisers told us they were waiting for a conclusion before deciding whether to take military action. The military alternatives remained unappealing to them.

The transition to the new Bush administration in late 2000 and early 2001 took place with the *Cole* issue still pending. President George W. Bush and his chief advisers accepted that al Qaeda was responsible for the attack on the *Cole*, but did not like the options available for a response.

Bin Ladin's inference may well have been that attacks, at least at the level of the *Cole*, were risk free.

The Bush administration began developing a new strategy with the stated goal of eliminating the al Qaeda threat within three to five years.

During the spring and summer of 2001, U.S. intelligence agencies received a stream of warnings that al Qaeda planned, as one report put it, "something very, very, very big." Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet told us, "The system was blinking red."

Although Bin Ladin was determined to strike in the United States, as President Clinton had been told and President Bush was reminded in a Presidential Daily Brief article briefed to him in August 2001, the specific threat information pointed overseas. Numerous precautions were taken overseas. Domestic agencies were not effectively mobilized. The threat did not receive national media attention comparable to the millennium alert.

While the United States continued disruption efforts around the world, its emerging strategy to eliminate the al Qaeda threat was to include an enlarged covert action program in Afghanistan, as well as diplomatic strategies for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The process culminated during the summer of 2001 in a draft presidential directive and arguments about the Predator aircraft, which was soon to be deployed with a missile of its own, so that it might be used to attempt to kill Bin Ladin or his chief lieutenants. At a September 4 meeting, President Bush's chief advisers approved the draft directive of the strategy and endorsed the concept of arming the Predator. This directive on the al Qaeda strategy was awaiting President Bush's signature on September 11, 2001.

Though the "planes operation" was progressing, the plotters had problems of

gration **regulations**. In late August, officials in the intelligence community realized that the terrorists spotted in Southeast Asia in January 2000 had arrived in the United States.

These cases did not prompt urgent action. No one **working** on these late leads in the **summer** of 2001 connected them to the **high** level of threat **reporting**. In the **words** of one **official**, no **analytic work** foresaw the **lightning** that could connect the thundercloud to the ground.

As **final preparations** were under way during the summer of 2001, **dissent** emerged among al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan over whether to proceed. The Taliban's chief, **Mullah Omar**, opposed attacking the United States. Although facing opposition from **many** of his senior lieutenants, Bin Ladin effectively overruled **their objections**, and the attacks went **forward**.

it was not communicated to the pilots. In short, while leaders in Washington believed that the fighters circling above them had been instructed to "take out" hostile aircraft, the only orders actually conveyed to the pilots were to "ID type and tail."

Like the national defense, the emergency response on 9/11 was necessarily improvised.

In New York City, the Fire Department of New York, the New York Police Department, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the building employees, and the occupants of the buildings did their best to cope with the effects of almost unimaginable events—unfolding furiously over 102 minutes. Casualties were nearly 100 percent at and above the impact zones and were very high among first responders who stayed in danger as they tried to save lives. Despite weaknesses in preparations for disaster, failure to achieve unified incident command, and inadequate communications among responding agencies, all but approximately one hundred of the thousands of civilians who worked below the impact zone escaped, often with help from the emergency responders.

At the Pentagon, while there were also problems of command and control, the emergency response was generally effective. The Incident Command System, a formalized management structure for emergency response in place in the National Capital Region, overcame the inherent complications of a response across local, state, and federal jurisdictions.

### Operational Opportunities

We write with the benefit and handicap of hindsight. We are mindful of the danger of being unjust to men and women who made choices in conditions of uncertainty and in circumstances over which they often had little control.

Nonetheless, there were specific points of vulnerability in the plot and opportunities to disrupt it. Operational failures—opportunities that were not or could not be exploited by the organizations and systems of that time—included

- not watchlisting future hijackers Hazmi and Mihdhar, not trailing them after they traveled to Bangkok, and not informing the FBI about one future hijacker's U.S. visa or his companion's travel to the United States;
- not sharing information linking individuals in the Cole attack to Mihdhar;
- not taking adequate steps in time to find Mihdhar or Hazmi in the United States;



- not linking the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui, described as interested in flight training for the purpose of using an airplane in a terrorist act, to the heightened indications of attack;
- not discovering false statements on visa applications;
- not recognizing passports manipulated in a fraudulent manner;
- **not** expanding **no-fly lists** to include names from terrorist watchlists;
- not searching airline passengers identified by the computer-based CAPPS screening system; and
- not hardening aircraft cockpit doors or taking other measures to prepare for the possibility of suicide hijacking.

## GENERAL FINDINGS

Since the plotters **were** flexible and resourceful, **we** cannot **know** whether **any** single step or series of steps would **have** defeated them. What **we can say** with confidence is that none **of** the measures adopted **by the U.S. government** from 1998 **to** 2001 disturbed **or** even delayed the progress **of** the al Qaeda plot. Across the government, **there were failures of** imagination, policy, capabilities, and **management**.

### Imagination

The most important **failure was** one of imagination. **We do not believe leaders** understood the **gravity of the threat**. The terrorist danger from Bin Ladin and al Qaeda was not a major topic **for policy** debate among the **public**, the media, **or** in the Congress. Indeed, it barely came up **during the 2000** presidential campaign.

Al Qaeda's **new** brand of terrorism presented **challenges to U.S. governmental institutions** that they were not **well-designed** to meet. Though top officials all told **us** that they understood **the danger**, **we** believe there was **uncertainty among them** as to whether this was just a new and especially venomous version of the ordinary terrorist threat the United States had lived **with** for decades, or it was indeed radically **new, posing a** threat beyond any yet experienced.

**As late as September 4, 2001**, Richard Clarke, the White House staffer **long** responsible **for** counterterrorism **policy** coordination, asserted **that** the government had not yet made up its mind **how** to answer the question: "Is al Qida a big deal?"

**A week** later came the answer.

### Policy

Terrorism was not *the* overriding national security concern for the U.S. government under either the Clinton or the pre-9/11 Bush administration.

The policy challenges were linked to this failure of imagination. Officials in both the Clinton and Bush administrations regarded a full U.S. invasion of Afghanistan as practically inconceivable before 9/11.

### Capabilities

Before 9/11, the United States tried to solve the al Qaeda problem with the capabilities it had used in the last stages of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. These capabilities were insufficient. Little was done to expand or reform them.

The CIA had minimal capacity to conduct paramilitary operations with its own personnel, and it did not seek a large-scale expansion of these capabilities before 9/11. The CIA also needed to improve its capability to collect intelligence from human agents.

At no point before 9/11 was the Department of Defense fully engaged in the mission of countering al Qaeda, even though this was perhaps the most dangerous foreign enemy threatening the United States.

America's homeland defenders faced outward. NORAD itself was barely able to retain any alert bases at all. Its planning scenarios occasionally considered the danger of hijacked aircraft being guided to American targets, but *only* aircraft that were *coming* from overseas.

The most serious weaknesses in agency capabilities were in the domestic arena. The FBI did not have the capability to link the collective knowledge of agents in the field to national priorities. Other domestic agencies deferred to the FBI.

FAA capabilities were weak. Any serious examination of the possibility of a suicide hijacking could have suggested changes to fix glaring vulnerabilities—expanding no-fly lists, searching passengers identified by the CAPPS screening system, deploying federal air marshals domestically, hardening cockpit doors, alerting air crews to a different kind of hijacking possibility than they had been trained to expect. Yet the FAA did not adjust either its *own* training or training with NORAD to take account of threats other than those experienced in the past.

### Management

The missed opportunities to thwart the 9/11 plot were also symptoms of a broader inability to adapt the way government manages problems to the new challenges of the twenty-first century. Action officers should have been able to

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**draw** on all available knowledge about al Qaeda in the government. Management should have ensured that information was shared and duties were clearly assigned across agencies, and across the foreign-domestic divide.

There were **also** broader management issues with respect to **how** top leaders set priorities and allocated resources. For instance, on December 4, 1998, DCI Tenet issued a directive to several **CIA officials** and the DDCI for **Community Management**, stating: "We are at war. I want no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the Community." The memorandum had little overall effect on mobilizing the CIA or the intelligence community. This episode indicates the limitations of the DCI's authority over the direction of the intelligence community, including agencies within the Department of Defense.

The U.S. government did not find a **way** of pooling intelligence and using it to guide the planning and assignment of responsibilities for joint operations involving entities as disparate as the CIA, the FBI, the State Department, the military, and the agencies involved in homeland security.

## SPECIFIC FINDINGS

### Unsuccessful Diplomacy

Beginning in February 1997, and through September 11, 2001, the U.S. government tried to use diplomatic pressure to persuade the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to stop being a sanctuary for al Qaeda, and to expel Bin Ladin to a country where he could face justice. These efforts included warnings and sanctions, but they all failed.

The U.S. government also pressed two successive Pakistani governments to demand that the Taliban cease providing a sanctuary for Bin Ladin and his organization and, failing that, to cut off their support for the Taliban. Before 9/11, the United States could not find a mix of incentives and pressure that would persuade Pakistan to reconsider its fundamental relationship with the Taliban.

From 1999 through early 2001, the United States pressed the United Arab Emirates, one of the Taliban's only travel and financial outlets to the outside world, to break off ties and enforce sanctions, especially those related to air travel to Afghanistan. These efforts achieved little before 9/11.

Saudi Arabia has been a problematic ally in combating Islamic extremism. Before 9/11, the Saudi and U.S. governments did not fully share intelligence information or develop an adequate joint effort to track and disrupt the finances of the al Qaeda organization. On the other hand, government officials of Saudi Arabia at the highest levels worked closely with top U.S. officials in major initiatives to solve the Bin Ladin problem with diplomacy.

### Lack of Military Options

In response to the request of policymakers, the *military* prepared an array of limited strike options for attacking Bin Ladin and his organization from May 1998 onward. When they briefed policymakers, the military presented both the pros and cons of those strike options and the associated risks. Policymakers expressed frustration with the range of options presented.

Following the August 20, 1998, missile strikes on al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan and Sudan, both senior military officials and policymakers placed great emphasis on actionable intelligence as *the* key factor in recommending or deciding to launch military action against Bin Ladin and his organization. They did not want to risk significant collateral damage, and they did not want to miss Bin Ladin and thus make the United States look weak while making Bin Ladin look strong. On three specific occasions in 1998–1999, intelligence was deemed credible enough to warrant planning for possible strikes to kill Bin Ladin. But in each case the strikes did not go forward, because senior policymakers did not regard the intelligence as sufficiently actionable to offset their ~~assessment~~ of the risks.

The Director of Central Intelligence, policymakers, and military officials expressed frustration with the lack of actionable intelligence. Some officials inside the Pentagon, including those in the special forces and the counterterrorism policy office, also expressed frustration with the lack of military action. The Bush administration began to develop new policies toward al Qaeda in 2001, but military plans did not change until after 9/11.

### Problems within the Intelligence Community

The intelligence community struggled throughout the 1990s and up to 9/11 to collect intelligence on and analyze the phenomenon of transnational terrorism. The combination of an overwhelming number of priorities, flat budgets, an outmoded structure, and bureaucratic rivalries resulted in an insufficient response to this new challenge.

*Many* dedicated officers worked day and night for years to piece together the growing body of evidence on al Qaeda and to understand the threats. Yet, while there were *many* reports on Bin Laden and his growing al Qaeda organization, there was no comprehensive review of what the intelligence community knew and what it did not know, and what that meant. There was no National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism between 1995 and 9/11.

Before 9/11, no agency did more to attack al Qaeda than the CIA. But there were limits to what the CIA was able to achieve by disrupting terrorist activities abroad and by using proxies to try to capture Bin Ladin and his lieutenants in Afghanistan. CIA officers were aware of those limitations.

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many problems in national security and domestic agencies that became apparent in the aftermath of 9/11.

So long as oversight is undermined by current congressional rules and resolutions, we believe the American people will not get the security they want and need. The United States needs a strong, stable, and capable congressional committee structure to give America's national intelligence agencies oversight, support, and leadership.

### Are We Safer?

Since 9/11, the United States and its allies have killed or captured a majority of al Qaeda's leadership; toppled the Taliban, which gave al Qaeda sanctuary in Afghanistan; and severely damaged the organization. Yet terrorist attacks continue. Even as we have thwarted attacks, nearly everyone expects they will come. How can this be?

The problem is that al Qaeda represents an ideological movement, not a finite group of people. It initiates and inspires, even if it no longer directs. In this way it has transformed itself into a decentralized force. Bin Ladin may be limited in his ability to organize major attacks from his hideouts. Yet killing or capturing him, while extremely important, would not end terror. His message of inspiration to a new generation of terrorists would continue.

Because of offensive actions against al Qaeda since 9/11, and defensive actions to improve homeland security, we believe we are safer today. But we are not safe. We therefore make the following recommendations that we believe can make America safer and more secure.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Three years after 9/11, the national debate continues about how to protect our nation in this new era. We divide our recommendations into two basic parts: What to do, and how to do it.

### WHAT TO DO? A GLOBAL STRATEGY

The enemy is not just "terrorism." It is the threat posed specifically by Islamist terrorism, by Bin Ladin and others who draw on a long tradition of extreme intolerance within a minority strain of Islam that does not distinguish politics from religion, and distorts both.

The enemy is not Islam, the great world faith, but a perversion of Islam. The

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enemy goes beyond al Qaeda to include the radical ideological movement, inspired in part by al Qaeda, that has spawned other terrorist groups and violence. Thus our strategy must match our means to two ends: dismantling the al Qaeda network and, in the long term, prevailing over the ideology that contributes to Islamist terrorism.

The first phase of our post-9/11 efforts rightly included military action to topple the Taliban and pursue al Qaeda. This work continues. But long-term success demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense. If we favor one tool while neglecting others, we leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our national effort.

What should Americans expect from their government? The goal seems unlimited: Defeat terrorism anywhere in the world. But Americans have also been told to expect the worst: An attack is probably coming; it may be more devastating still.

Vague goals match an amorphous picture of the enemy. Al Qaeda and other groups are popularly described as being all over the world, adaptable, resilient, needing little higher-level organization, and capable of anything. It is an image of an omnipotent hydra of destruction. That image lowers expectations of government effectiveness.

It lowers them too far. Our report shows a determined and capable group of plotters. Yet the group was fragile and occasionally left vulnerable by the mar- &, unstable people often attracted to such causes. The enemy made mistakes. The U.S. government was not able to capitalize on them.

No president can promise that a catastrophic attack like that of 9/11 will not happen again. But the American people are entitled to expect that official will have realistic objectives, clear guidance, and effective organization. They are entitled to see standards for performance so they can judge, with the help of their elected representatives, whether the objectives are being met.

We propose a strategy with three dimensions: (1) attack terrorists and their organizations, (2) prevent the continued growth of Islamist terrorism, and (3) protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks.

### Attack Terrorists and Their Organizations

- **Root out sanctuaries.** The U.S. government should identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries and have realistic country or regional strategies for each, utilizing every element of national power and reaching out to countries that can help us.

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- Strengthen long-term U.S. and international commitments to the future of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
- Confront problems with Saudi Arabia in the open and build a relationship beyond oil, a relationship that both sides can defend to their citizens and includes a shared commitment to reform.

#### Prevent the Continued Growth of Islamist Terrorism

In October 2003; Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asked if enough was being done "to fashion a broad integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists." As part of such a plan, the U.S. government should:

- Define the message and stand as an example of moral leadership in the world. To Muslim parents, terrorists like Bin Ladin have nothing to offer their children but visions of violence and death. America and its friends have the advantage—our vision can offer a better future.
- Where Muslim governments, even those who are friends, do not offer opportunity, respect the rule of law, or tolerate differences, then the United States needs to stand for a better future.
- Communicate and defend American ideals in the Islamic world, through much stronger public diplomacy to reach more people, including students and leaders outside of government. Our efforts here should be as strong as they were in combating closed societies during the Cold War.
- Offer an agenda of opportunity that includes support for public education and economic openness.
- Develop a comprehensive coalition strategy against Islamist terrorism, using a flexible contact program of leading coalition governments and fashioning a common coalition approach on issues like the treatment of captured terrorists.
- Devote a maximum effort to the parallel task of countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
- Expect less from trying to dry up terrorist money and more from following the money for intelligence, as a tool to hunt terrorists, under-

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sion of how they are used, including a new board to oversee the implementation of the guidelines needed for gathering and sharing information in these new security systems.

- Base federal funding for emergency preparedness solely on risks and vulnerabilities, putting New York City and Washington, D.C., at the top of the current list. Such assistance should not remain a program for general revenue sharing or pork-barrel spending.
- Make homeland security funding contingent on the adoption of an incident command system to strengthen teamwork in a crisis, including a regional approach. Allocate more radio spectrum and improve connectivity for public safety communications, and encourage widespread adoption of newly developed standards for private-sector emergency preparedness—since the private sector controls 85 percent of the nation's critical infrastructure.

## HOW TO DO IT? A DIFFERENT WAY OF ORGANIZING GOVERNMENT

The strategy we have recommended is elaborate, even as presented here very briefly. To implement it will require a government better organized than the one that exists today, with its national security institutions designed half a century ago to win the Cold War. Americans should not settle for incremental, ad hoc adjustments to a system created a generation ago for a world that no longer exists.

Our detailed recommendations are designed to fit together. Their purpose is clear: to build unity of effort across the U.S. government. As one official now serving on the front lines overseas put it to us: "One fight, one team."

We call for unity of effort in five areas, beginning with unity of effort on the challenge of counterterrorism itself:

- unifying strategic intelligence and operational planning against Islamist terrorists across the foreign-domestic divide with a National Counterterrorism Center;
- unifying the intelligence community with a new National Intelligence Director;

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- unifying the many participants in the counterterrorism effort and their knowledge in a network-based information sharing system that transcends traditional governmental boundaries;
- unifying and strengthening congressional oversight to improve quality and accountability; and
- strengthening the FBI and homeland defenders.

### **Unity of Effort: A National Counterterrorism Center**

The 9/11 story teaches the value of integrating strategic intelligence from all sources into joint operational planning—with both dimensions spanning the foreign-domestic divide.

- In some ways, since 9/11, joint work has gotten better. The effort of fighting terrorism has flooded over many of the usual agency boundaries because of its sheer quantity and energy. Attitudes have changed. But the problems of coordination have multiplied. The Defense Department alone has three unified commands (SOCOM, CENTCOM, and NORTHCOM) that deal with terrorism as one of their principal concerns.
- Much of the public commentary about the 9/11 attacks has focused on “lost opportunities.” Though characterized as problems of “watch-listing,” “information sharing,” or “connecting the dots,” each of these labels is too narrow. They describe the symptoms, not the disease.
- Breaking the older mold of organization stovepiped purely in executive agencies, we propose a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) that would borrow the joint, unified command concept adopted in the 1980s by the American military in a civilian agency, combining the joint intelligence function alongside the operations work.
- The NCTC would build on the existing Terrorist Threat Integration Center and would replace it and other terrorism “fusion centers” within the government. The NCTC would become the authoritative knowledge bank, bringing information to bear on common plans. It should task collection requirements both inside and outside the United States.


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- The NCTC should perform joint operational planning, assigning lead responsibilities to existing agencies and letting them direct the actual execution of the plans.
- Placed in the Executive Office of the President, headed by a Senate-confirmed official (with rank equal to the deputy head of a cabinet department) who reports to the National Intelligence Director, the NCTC would track implementation of plans. It would be able to influence the leadership and the budgets of the counterterrorism operating arms of the CIA, the FBI, and the departments of Defense and Homeland Security
- The NCTC should *not* be a policymaking body. Its operations and planning should follow the policy direction of the president and the National Security Council.

#### Unity of Effort: A National Intelligence Director

Since long before 9/11—and continuing to this day—the intelligence community is not organized well for joint intelligence work. It does not employ common standards and practices in reporting intelligence or in training experts overseas and at home. The expensive national capabilities for collecting intelligence have divided management. The structures are too complex and too secret.

- The community's head—the Director of Central Intelligence—has at least three jobs: running the CIA, coordinating a 15-agency confederation, and being the intelligence analyst-in-chief to the president. No one person can do all these things.
- A new National Intelligence Director should be established with two main jobs: (1) to oversee national intelligence centers that combine experts from all the collection disciplines against common targets—like counterterrorism or nuclear proliferation; and (2) to oversee the agencies that contribute to the national intelligence program, a task that includes setting common standards for personnel and information technology.
- The national intelligence centers would be the unified commands of the intelligence world—a long-overdue reform for intelligence comparable to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols law that reformed the organization of national defense. The home services—such as the CIA, DIA,



Unity of Effort in Managing Intelligence

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

0-4-0

NSA, and FBI—would organize, train, and equip the best intelligence professionals in the world, and would handle the execution of intelligence operations in the field.

- This National Intelligence Director (NID) should be located in the Executive Office of the President and report directly to the president, yet be confirmed by the Senate. In addition to overseeing the National Counterterrorism Center described above (which will include both the national intelligence center for terrorism and the joint operations planning effort), the NID should have three deputies:
  - For foreign intelligence (a deputy who also would be the head of the CIA)
  - For defense intelligence (also the under secretary of defense for intelligence)
  - For homeland intelligence (also the executive assistant director for intelligence at the FBI or the under secretary of homeland security for information analysis and infrastructure protection)
- The NID should receive a public appropriation for national intelligence, should have authority to hire and fire his or her intelligence deputies, and should be able to set common personnel and information technology policies across the intelligence community.
- The CIA should concentrate on strengthening the collection capabilities of its clandestine service and the talents of its analysts, building pride in its core expertise.
- Secrecy stifles oversight, accountability, and information sharing. Unfortunately, all the current organizational incentives encourage overclassification. This balance should change; and as a start, open information should be provided about the overall size of agency intelligence budgets.

#### Unity of Effort: Sharing Information

The U.S. government has access to a vast amount of information. But it has a weak system for processing and using what it has. The system of "need to know" should be replaced by a system of "need to share."

- The President should lead a government-wide effort to bring the

A-4-30

major national security institutions into the information revolution, turning a mainframe system into a decentralized network. The obstacles are not technological. Official after official has urged us to call attention to problems with the unglamorous "back office" side of government operations.

- But no agency can solve the problems on its own—to build the network requires an effort that transcends old divides, solving common legal and policy issues in ways that can help officials know what they can and cannot do. Again, in tackling information issues, America needs unity of effort.

### Unity of Effort: Congress

Congress took too little action to adjust itself or to restructure the executive branch to address the emerging terrorist threat. Congressional oversight for intelligence—and counterterrorism—is dysfunctional. Both Congress and the executive need to do more to minimize national security risks during transitions between administrations.

- For intelligence oversight, we propose two options: either a joint committee on the old model of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy or a single committee in each house combining authorizing and appropriating committees. Our central message is the same: the intelligence committees cannot carry out their oversight function unless they are made stronger, and thereby have both clear responsibility and accountability for that oversight.
- Congress should create a single, principal point of oversight and review for homeland security. There should be one permanent standing committee for homeland security in each chamber.
- We propose reforms to speed up the nomination, financial reporting, security clearance, and confirmation process for national security officials at the start of an administration, and suggest steps to make sure that incoming administrations have the information they need.

### Unity of Effort: Organizing America's Defenses in the United States

We have considered several proposals relating to the future of the domestic intelligence and counterterrorism mission. Adding a new domestic intelligence

H-4-31

agency will not solve America's problems in collecting and analyzing intelligence within the United States. We do not recommend creating one.

- We propose the establishment of a specialized and integrated national security workforce at the FBI, consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited, trained, rewarded, and retained to ensure the development of an institutional culture imbued with a deep expertise in intelligence and national security.

At several points we asked: Who has the responsibility for defending us at home? Responsibility for America's national defense is shared by the Department of Defense, with its new Northern Command, and by the Department of Homeland Security. They must have a clear delineation of duties, missions, and authority

- The Department of Defense and its oversight committees should regularly assess the adequacy of Northern Command's strategies and planning to defend against *military threats* to the homeland.
- The Department of Homeland Security and its oversight committees should regularly assess the types of threats the country faces, in order to determine the adequacy of the government's plans and the readiness of the government to respond to those threats.

\* \* \*

We call on the American people to remember how we all felt on 9/11, to remember not only the unspeakable horror but how we came together as a nation—one nation. Unity of purpose and unity of effort are the way we will defeat this enemy and make America safer for our children and grandchildren.

We look forward to a national debate on the merits of what we have recommended, and we will participate vigorously in that debate.

A-4-32

7201

~~FOUO~~

SECRET  
November 2, 2004

2005 MAR -3 AM 9:30

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Photo in Kazakhstan

Please have the photographers find a copy of a photograph of me taken in Kazakhstan where I have on a coat and hat like Ivanov does – preferably a photo with this same person, the Kazakh Minister of Defense. I want to send a copy of my photograph to Sergey.

Thanks.

**Attach.**  
Ivanov photos

DHR:dh  
110204-1



Please respond by 11/12/04

06050

honor &

~~FOUO~~

OSD 04279-05

October 18, 2004

2005 MAR -3 AM 9:43

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Note from Jay Garner

*(Handwritten circled 'D')*

37324

Please take a look at this note from Jay Garner and tell me what you think I ought to do with it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/15/04 Letter to SecDef from Jay Garner

DHR:ss  
101804-10

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

18 OCT 04

OCT 26 2004

*Gen Cartwright, et. al, are briefing you on the issues associated with missile defense engagements. I believe the timelines for engagement are so short that pre-delegated authority for specified events is essential. We'll all be better educated in the next few weeks.*

15 OCT 04

OSD 04280-05



VIA  
FAX

OFFICE OF THE  
~~NOVEMBER 1, 2004~~  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 MAR -3 AM 9: 49

TO: Jay Garner  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Missile Defense

Thanks for the heads up on missile defense. We are working with General Cartwright and Steve Cambone on it, and I think we are making headway.

Regards,

DHR:dh  
110104-7

373.24

1 NOV 04

15 OCT 04

OSD 04280-05

11-L-0559/OSD/40938

4

October 15, 2004

Mr. Secretary,

In the next several weeks you will be asked to make decisions regarding the Ground Based Mid-Course Missile Defense System. Among them is the decision to delegate Weapons Release Authority (WRA).

In the case of launches against either Hawaii or the Aleutians, the timelines are so short (around 5 min or less) and the engageable Battlespace so small that any delays to weapons release could result in a failure to engage.

As you know this is an incredibly complex issue and my impression is that some have attempted to relate this to Noble Eagle scenarios which should not be done as they are completely different.

If we are wrong in execution of Noble Eagle there are enormous political implications. If we are wrong in our decision to launch the GMD Missile, we will expend a missile in the exoatmosphere.

For your consideration.

Thanks

Jay (Gamer)

373.24

15 Oct 04

OSD 04280-05

November 1, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iraq Info Memo

Attached is a piece on Iraq that is of interest.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/21/04 DIA Info Memo to SecDef

DHR:ss  
110104-2

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Iraq*

*1 Nov 04*

OSD 04281-05



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-

INFO MEMO



U-0790/DR

21 October 2004

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

FROM: *L. E. Jacoby* L. E. Jacoby, Vice Admiral, USN, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: (U) Iraqi Public Anger Toward Coalition/Interim Iraqi Government

This IM is the response to a question I asked last week of one of our senior civilians who is a retired USMC Arab FAO, about why the Iraqi public was not becoming angry at the perpetrators of the car bombings which have killed so many civilians: **“The onlookers were uniformly angry at the US, but more specifically at their government for not being able to protect them and prevent such attacks. Nobody seemed angry at the attackers. I don’t know what polling shows about public disgust with these attacks, but calling upon your days as a FAO and in the IO cell, what would you suggest that we/IIG do to focus anger on the perpetrators and enlist the public to rise up against the violence? Is there anything reasonable that could be done, or is there a cultural underpinning here that I don’t understand?”**

**Why do they blame us, not the terrorists?** The role of government in Islamic--particularly Arab--society is “to promote the good and prevent the evil.” This is a fundamental concept articulated by Islamic political thinkers over the centuries. Accordingly, when we went into Iraq and took on the task of governance, we also took on the responsibility of protecting the population from threats, whether it be from crime, terrorism or foreign invasion. The general perception on the street is that we have failed at this very basic duty of government. That is why we are blamed.

At the street level, criminals, terrorists and insurgents pose a threat to the public, and it is the function of government to protect the populace. To do so, Islamic political philosophers over the years have condoned authoritarian measures in order for the government to do its job. Several medieval Islamic political philosophers even went so far as to make the case that bad (Islamic) government is better than anarchy or “the imposed government of a non-Muslim invader, such as the Crusaders or the Mongols with whom the Arab world had rather distasteful experiences in medieval times.”

11-L-0559/OSD/40941

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

These old established attitudes were reinforced by the experience of British and French colonialism in the 19th-20th centuries. Accordingly, one can make the case that this is why Muslims have been willing to support bad government and helps explain not only why Arabs have accepted authoritarian leaders like Saddam, Nasser, Asad, Qadhafi, Mubarak and hosts of emirs, kings and sultans over the years. Moreover, in order to rule with an effective mandate, these leaders all exaggerated the foreign threat which made their authoritarian rule more palatable.

At the cultural level, within the Arab world – where immediate and extended family, then tribe, characterizes the basic social units and identification – people see government as a distant and alien institution. There is a high degree of “anomie” within the population; governments are only embraced when they are seen as promoting one's interests. This is why the streets are so filthy and so much doesn't get done. Opposite from our sense of civic pride and duty, their refrain is: “That's the government's job.” Employment as a public servant is not held in any degree of esteem, and more particularly, police and the functions they are supposed to enforce are widely derided as unwanted and unsanctioned infringements on the personal freedoms that the Koran extols for the faithful.

Given the population's cultural predisposition, then, to see government's role as promoting the good and proscribing the evil, we have failed them. Not only are many people in the Sunni triangle unemployed and poorer since regime change, but they have to cope with violent competing centers of power (resurgent tribal rivalries, Islamic guerillas, former regime insurgents, Iraqi police and security, and Coalition forces). At the street level, this anarchical environment is frightening. Then somebody explodes a car bomb, killing dozens of relatives, friends or neighbors who just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Who do the survivors and relatives blame? The faceless/nameless terrorists or the people whose job it is to protect society? Bad guys are simply doing their job; government, in not protecting the population, is failing in its duties. Finally, a veneer over all of this is the long-recognized characteristic within Arab culture of not accepting responsibility for one's actions or one's fate. It is always a case of others, whether individuals or nations, being at fault for the misfortune of those particular Arabs who feel they have been treated unjustly. This is pervasive throughout Arab society and its history.

Perhaps the case of Palestine best portrays this tendency. For nearly 60 years Palestinians and Arab loyalists have incessantly blamed Israel and the US for the Palestinian problem. One never hears any Arab spokesman or Arab admit that the Palestinians had an opportunity in 1948 to claim a substantial portion of Israel/Palestine but they refused to accept what was offered them at that time. Instead we only hear that they had it taken away illegally or their human and political rights were violated. What we are witnessing in Iraq is yet another example of Arabs refusing to admit who has been responsible for the casualties their own population have been suffering...the Iraqi

insurgents, Baathists and terrorists who live among them. It is the cultural norm to blame the outsider rather than expose oneself to shame, criticism or ridicule by admitting one's weaknesses and failures which are exposed when one admits responsibility.

**What to do about it?** This is a policy question. The best I can give are observations.

Saddam ran a police state which believed it was better to arrest nine innocent men to ensure security than to let one guilty man go free. We have the opposite approach. Also, our forces never quite understood the operational environment...language, customs and cultural do's and don'ts, power structure and brokers, etc., and when they figured it out, they PCS'd and a new group came in. The compromise move is to beef up the Iraqi security forces, which is being done already; but this will still take years to accomplish, especially if we don't want to empower a coup force for the bad guys who have been trying to infiltrate the security services and armed forces.

Aside from ensuring security, major improvements in the economy...or more accurately a jobs program that takes young men (65% of Iraq's population is under 25) off the streets would make an impact. These are the same young men who have grown up lionizing Palestinian suicide bombers and see firing AK-47s and RPGs at enemies as cool and macho. Lots of young Iraqi males have joined the resistance because they can make a few hundred bucks a month and fire weapons. If you are 18, high on testosterone, and too poor to get married, being a Mujahed isn't a bad life. Get them off the street and you will have reduced the pool of insurgents. A pre-war suggestion to create a Civilian Conservation Corps-type organization where lots of cheap labor is thrown at projects to rebuild Iraq was not pursued. Maybe it was the security situation that precluded it, but this would have had the effect of getting lots of bored young men off the streets, putting some money in their pockets, providing remittances to their families, and conducting a large-scale public works campaign--that actually might change engrained cultural attitudes about civic pride.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
November 8, 2004  
2005 MAR -3 AM 10: 12

TO: COL Steve Bucci  
c c : Cathy Mainardi  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Lunch with John Kasich

I want to have lunch with John Kasich in early December. He'll be coming down from Ohio.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
110804-13

.....  
Please respond by 12/5/04

000,71 SD

8  
nr  
04

March 24, 2004

Haiti

TO: Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Haiti

Tom Hill was in and had a couple of thoughts that you ought to be aware of:

1. He said that the UN representative in Haiti says he would prefer to extend by several months the period between the time we went in and the time the UN comes in. We sure want to push back on that.
2. Tom also said he hoped that the Embassy would go back in pretty soon now. He thinks it is sufficiently secure and that we ought to be able to go back to the normal security protection soon, rather than the extra security he currently has in there.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
032504-14

24 MAR 04

OSD 04391-04



3-2-04

120

March 1, 2004

TO: David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: AID Employees

040 AID

Please check and tell me if 60 percent of the Agency for International Development employees are eligible for retirement.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030104-31

.....

Please respond by 3/19/04

1 Mar 04

25 Mar 04

04434-04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

INFO MEMO

March 25, 2004, 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *DC* David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) *Charles Bell 3-25-04*

SUBJECT: U.S. Agency for International Development Employees (USAID)

- You asked (Tab A) if 60 percent of USAID employees are eligible for retirement.
- USAID personnel staff indicate that between 2003 and 2008, 53 percent of its Foreign Service Officers will be eligible to retire. During that same time period, 32 percent of its civil service employees will be eligible to retire.
- By contrast, between 2003 and 2008, 57.1 percent of DoD's civilian employees will be eligible to retire.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: Kay Burrus, ODUSD (CPP), (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/40947

OSD 04434-04



**UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

1 100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1 100

**ACTION MEMO**

COMPTROLLER

March 19, 2004, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

Subject: Memorandum on Allocation of DFI Resources for Iraqi Security Forces

- Attached for your signature is a memorandum that asks Ambassador Bremer to discuss with you his philosophy for allocating the additional \$4.9 billion of Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) resources that have been deposited before he approves the revised Iraqi budget for 2004. It advises him that you want to create a reserve in the \$18.4 billion Supplemental by funding critical programs such as those for Iraqi security forces with DFI resources and then using the Supplemental funds later in the year to fund the deferred projects or other emerging requirements. **(Tab A)**.
- The CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council are in the process of revising the 2004 financial plan to account for the additional DFI funding and certain additional expenses.
  - As I have reported to you, significantly more funds were deposited in the DFI than the 2003 and 2004 Iraqi budgets had planned due to an increase in Oil-for-Food refunds, the transfer of frozen Iraqi assets, and an increase in Iraqi oil revenue.
  - In January and February 2004, \$200 million in frozen Iraqi assets were deposited into the DFI. These resources are in excess of what is planned for in the revised 2004 financial plan. These resources should be used to fund immediately the highest priority requirements for Iraqi security forces.
- There is agreement among the Department of Defense and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that unplanned DFI resources should be used to finance the cost of some reconstruction and Iraqi security projects.
- In my discussions with Ambassador Bremer, he appeared receptive to using more DFI resources for security. There are, however, competing priorities from the Ministries for additional resources. The Iraqi Governing Council, for example, is looking to make cuts in the 2004 budget in order to fund increased pension payments.

Iraq

19m 04-04

- The more DFI resources that we allocate for security forces before the transfer of authority on June 30, the more U.S. appropriated funds we will have available for security forces and other U.S. priorities after the transfer of authority.
- It is my understanding that the revised 2004 Iraqi budget presented to Ambassador Bremer for his approval includes the following increases:
  - o \$627 million for security-related initiatives (attached is a chart from CPA **(Tab B)**)
  - o \$200 million reserve for security forces. *The CPA staff did this based on discussion in my biweekly teleconferences with Dave Nash.*
  - o \$60 million for the Commander's Emergency Response Fund (CERP), and
  - o \$20 million for the local Governorates CERP-like program.
- We were told this morning that Ambassador Bremer is just about ready to approve revised 2004 Iraqi budget so we need to send this memorandum to him soonest.

RECOMMENDATION: SECDEF sign the attached memorandum **(Tab A)**.

COORDINATION: **Tab C**

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by: Mary E. Tompkey, (b)(6)



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

*Final*

*I assume this is the one I should edit?*

TO: Ambassador Bremer

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
General Abizaid  
Reuben Jeffery  
Dov Zakheim

SUBJECT: Allocation of Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) Resources for Iraqi Security Forces

*Had  
Robins  
Chop*

I understand that you are close to approving a revised 2004 Iraqi budget. Before you make your final decisions on the Iraqi budget, I would like to discuss with you some ideas that Paul and I have to preserve as much flexibility as possible inside the Supplemental, both to respond to changing priorities for reconstruction funds and to preserve as much leverage as possible for the U.S. after July 1<sup>st</sup>.

*P- I agree with your goal but think "flexibility" may be a better word choice.*

As you know, our highest priority is to stand up capable Iraqi security forces and transition responsibilities to them as soon as possible. I appreciate the fact that you have allocated \$600 million of DFI resources to cover the salaries of Iraqi security forces and that you recently reserved another \$200 million of DFI funds to meet General Abizaid's most urgent equipment requirements. That is tremendously helpful.

However, we need to consider creating a "reserve" within the Supplemental appropriation to cover the growing needs of Iraqi security forces. This could be done by reallocating some DFI resources to cover reconstruction projects within the Supplemental.

*don't we want him to spend it? Perhaps say "dedicated to"*

My understanding is that the 2004 Iraqi budget of \$19.6 billion includes \$2.7 billion for capital investment and another \$4.6 billion of "one-time expenditures" identified as "nationbuilding, regional projects and transfer payments." If funds were temporarily reallocated from some of that \$7.3 billion to fund immediate investments that would otherwise be funded out of the Supplemental, this would create room in the Supplemental that could be used in any number of the following ways:



*Alma* 2 of 2

- In the event that we came to conclude that other projects were more urgent, for example in the security area, we would have created some flexibility within the Supplemental to cover those more urgent priorities;
- If you or the new ambassador conclude later in the year that the original DFJ project is the right priority of funds, then that project could be funded out of the Supplemental;
- Even in that case, you or your successor would have some leverage over whatever Iraqi ministers are involved because it would not be an automatic approval;
- Moreover, your current oil revenue projections appear to be based on a projected decline to \$21 per barrel for the last eight months of '04. While that may be a prudent assumption, with world oil prices running at their current high levels, there seems to be a significant possibility of a revenue surplus. It would be nice if the U.S. had some direct control over how such a surplus would be spent toward the end of the year.

Accordingly, I would like you to take an urgent look at what projects are within the \$7.3 billion and let me know how much of that money might be reallocated to projects within the Supplemental. I would think at least \$50 million or more should be reallocated as a reserve to cover likely addition requirements for security forces.

I understand that you are in the process of finalizing a revised budget. I am prepared to move on this fast, as soon as you get back to me.

I look forward to discussing this with you.

# Security Spending (\$M)

## Security

Facility Protection Service Guard Pay	60
Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) Pay	33
Security Hazardous Duty Pay	150
Railroad Security	50
Iraqi Police Pay	200

## Increased Security Spending since January

ICDC	25
CPA (South) Security	6
Ministry of Defense	15
Ministry of Interior	86
Railway Security	2

---

Total	627
-------	-----



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

TO: Ambassador Bremer

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

CC: Dick Cheney Vice President Richard Cheney  
Condi Rice -  
Colin Powell - (by hand)  
Paul Wolfowitz  
General Abizaid  
Dov Zakheim  
Reuben Jeffery

SUBJECT: Allocation of Development Fund for Iraq (DE Security Forces)

I understand that you are close to approving a revise Before you make your final decisions on the Iraqi budget, I with you some ideas that Paul and I have to preserve as mu possible inside the Supplemental, both to respond to changi reconstruction funds and to preserve as much flexibility as after July 1<sup>st</sup>.

As you know, our highest priority is to stand up cap: forces and transition responsibilities to them as soon as pos: fact that you have allocated \$600 million of DFI resources t Iraqi security forces and that you recently dedicated another funds to meet General Abizaid's most urgent equipment rec tremendously helpful.

However, we need to consider creating a "reserve" w appropriation to cover the growing needs of Iraqi security forces. This could be done by reallocating some DFI resources to cover reconstruction projects within the Supplemental.

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CC: VP  
+ Powell  
Rice  
Dick  
Condi Rice  
Colin Powell







THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

TO: Ambassador Bremer

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
General Abizaid  
Reuben Jeffery  
Dov Zakheim

SUBJECT: Allocation of Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) Resources for Iraqi Security Forces

I understand that you are close to approving a revised 2004 Iraqi budget. Before you make your final decisions on the Iraqi budget, I would like to discuss with you some ideas that Paul and I have to preserve as much flexibility as possible inside the Supplemental, both to respond to changing priorities for reconstruction funds and to preserve as much flexibility as possible for the U.S. after July 1<sup>st</sup>.

As you know, our highest priority is to stand up capable Iraqi security forces and transition responsibilities to them as soon as possible. I appreciate the fact that you have allocated \$600 million of DFI resources to cover the salaries of Iraqi security forces and that you recently dedicated another \$200 million of DFI funds to meet General Abizaid's most urgent equipment requirements. That is tremendously helpful.

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11-L-0559/OSD/40954


- In the event that we came to conclude that other projects were more urgent, for example in the security area, we would have created some flexibility within the Supplemental to cover those more urgent priorities;
- If you or the new ambassador conclude later in the year that the original DFI project is the right priority of funds, then that project could be funded out of the Supplemental;
- Even in that case, you or your successor would have some leverage over whatever Iraqi ministers are involved because it would not be an automatic approval;
- Moreover, your current oil revenue projections appear to be based on a projected decline to \$21 per barrel for the last eight months of '04. While that may be a prudent assumption, with world oil prices running at their current high levels, there seems to be a significant possibility of a revenue surplus. It would be nice if the U.S. had some direct control over how such a surplus would be spent toward the end of the year.

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I understand that you are in the process of finalizing a revised budget. I am prepared to move on this fast, as soon as you get back to me.

I look forward to discussing this with you.

September 29, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Iraq

Attached is an interesting article that says a great deal about what we are dealing with in Iraq.

Attach.  
Leo, John. "Atrocities Trade-off."

DHR:dh  
092903-4

*Sample  
titles from  
previous  
snowflakes.*

*170-9*

*275805*

U22005 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/40956

January 29, 2004

TO: Honorable Colin Powell  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: January 24 Event

Attached is some material my staff received from Richard Perle in response to our inquiry about the conference that was held by a consortium of Iranian-American groups last weekend at the Washington Convention Center.

**Attach.**

1/14/04e-mail

DHR:dh  
012904-8

*Iran*

*to Mr. SLZ*

## COORDINATION

Joint Staff (J-8)	Lt. Gen James Cartwright	March 19,2004
USD(P)	Ryan Henry Principal Deputy	March 10,2004
General Counsel	Dan Dell'Orto Principal Deputy	March 11, 2004\
OMB	Robin Cleveland	March 15,2003



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAR 25 2004

TO: Ambassador Bremer  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
cc: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
Paul Wolfowitz  
General Abizaid  
Dov Zakheim  
Reuben Jeffery

SUBJECT: Allocation of Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) Resources for Iraqi Security Forces

Iraq

I understand that you are close to approving a revised 2004 Iraqi budget. Before you make your final decisions on the Iraqi budget, I would like to discuss with you some ideas that Paul and I have to preserve as much flexibility as possible inside the Supplemental, both to respond to changing priorities for reconstruction funds and to preserve as much flexibility as possible for the U.S. after July 1<sup>st</sup>.

As you know, our highest priority is to stand up capable Iraqi security forces and transition responsibilities to them as soon as possible. I appreciate the fact that you have allocated \$600 million of DFI resources to cover the salaries of Iraqi security forces and that you recently dedicated another \$200 million of DFI funds to meet General Abizaid's most urgent equipment requirements. That is tremendously helpful.

However, we need to consider creating a "reserve" within the Supplemental appropriation to cover the growing needs of Iraqi security forces. This could be done by reallocating some DFI resources to cover reconstruction projects within the Supplemental.

My understanding is that the 2004 Iraqi budget of \$19.6 billion includes \$2.7 billion for capital investment and another \$4.6 billion of "one-time expenditures" identified as "nationbuilding, regional projects and transfer payments." If funds were temporarily reallocated from some of that \$7.3 billion to

25 Mar 04 19 Mar 04



fund immediate investments that would otherwise be funded out of the Supplemental, this would create room in the Supplemental that could be used in any number of the following ways:

- In the event that we came to conclude that other projects were more urgent, for example in the security area, we would have created some flexibility within the Supplemental to cover those more urgent priorities;
- If you or the new ambassador conclude later in the year that the original DFI project is the right priority of funds, then that project could be funded out of the Supplemental;
- Even in that case, you or your successor would have some leverage over whatever Iraqi ministers are involved because it would not be an automatic approval;
- Moreover, your current oil revenue projections appear to be based on a projected decline to \$21 per barrel for the last eight months of '04. While that may be a prudent assumption, with world oil prices running at their current high levels, there seems to be a significant possibility of a revenue surplus. It would be nice if the U.S. had some direct control over how such a surplus would be spent toward the end of the year.

Accordingly, I would like you to take an urgent look at what projects are within the \$7.3 billion and let me know how much of that money might be reallocated to projects within the Supplemental. I would think at least \$500 million or more should be reallocated as a reserve to cover likely additional requirements for security forces.

I understand that you are in the process of finalizing a revised budget. I am prepared to move on this fast, as soon as you get back to me.

I look forward to discussing this with you.

3/25  
3/25



From the Desk of  
Paul Wolfowitz

Don -

I've redone the memo  
for your signature (Tab A)  
substantially based on several  
new developments.

I think it's actually  
self-explanatory so you can  
skip Don's cover memo if you want.

Paul W.



March 29, 2004

TO: Honorable Colin Powell  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
Honorable George Tenet

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Clarke and Gorton

In case you folks missed it, here is the exchange between Richard Clarke and Senator Slade Gorton last week.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Transcript

DHR:dh  
032504-14

*000.5*

*89 Mar 29*

OSD 04509-04

**MR. GORTON:** Now, since my yellow light is on, at this point my final question will be this. Assuming that the recommendations that you made on January 25th of 2001... based on Blue Sky, including aid to the Northern Alliance which had been an agenda item at this point for two and a half years without any action, assuming that there had been more Predator reconnaissance missions, assuming that that had all been adopted, say, on January 26, year 2001, is there the remotest chance that it would have prevented 9/11?

**MR. CLARKE:** No.

**MR. GORTON:** It just would have allowed our response after 9/11 to be perhaps a little bit faster?

**MR. CLARKE:** Well, the response would have begun before 9/11.

**MR. GORTON:** But ... there was no recommendation on your part or anyone else's part that we declare war and attempt to invade Afghanistan prior to 9/11?

**MR. CLARKE:** That's right.

**MR. GORTON:** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

February 8, 2004

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Thank Pete Aldridge

3355D

I don't think I have thanked Pete Aldridge for all the work he did on that organizational study.

Please get something drafted if I haven't.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-80




*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

8 Feb 04

OSD 04514-04

29mar04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

MAR 29 2004

3355D

The Honorable E. C. "Pete" Aldridge, Jr.

(b)(6)

Dear Pete,

I don't know if I ever thanked you personally for the fine work you did on the OSD organization study. I know it was a big project and took a great deal of time.

I do want you to know how much I appreciate it. We're working the problem, my friend.

Stay in touch.

Regards,

29MAR04

OSD 04514-04

11-L-0559/OSD/40965

*Via Facsimile*

TO: Secretary Colin Powell  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: March 27, 2004  
SUBJECT: **Attached Email**

Haiti

Attached is a quick note from Gen. Hill which in view of our conversation yesterday, might be of interest to you.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
032704.08

*Attach: Email from Gen. James Hill to LTG Craddock Re: Haiti Experts Conference  
3/25/04*

27 March 04

OSD 04579-04

3/26

**Craddock, John J, LTG, OSD**

---

**From:** Hill, James, GEN (H) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 25, 2004 6:45 PM  
**To:** LTG Craddock (E-mail)  
**Cc:** Dick Myers (E-mail); Bill Caldwell (E-mail); Pete Pace (E-mail); Doug Feith (E-mail)  
**Subject:** Haiti Experts Conference 25 Mar 04

Sir, I just completed the Haiti expert's conference that I mentioned to you yesterday morning. I held the conference to get the views from experts on Haiti regarding our current operations and way ahead. We had a great mix from academia, media and business. Additionally, we had representatives from OSD and the Joint Staff. All have spent considerable time in Haiti and still maintain extensive contacts with significant access. Their views were insightful and useful, particularly regarding issues of law and order, the political environment and information operations.

One theme was to carefully manage the Haitian people's expectations of the role of the multinational force. The group stressed that the multinational force must be balanced in its approach to dealing with various and divergent factions in Haiti. It is important to send the signal that violence and destabilizing actions will not be tolerated from any element, regardless of affiliation. We discussed in detail the continuing disruptive role of Aristide and agreed that he needs to move on and keep quiet. However, an interesting point was that the majority of Lavalas members accept Aristide's fate and are willing to move forward, and that we and the interim government need to include, rather than exclude, this viewpoint to maintain stability. Consequently, all participants were concerned that the interim government did not include any Lavalas members. All agreed that Haiti should not reestablish the Army, but rebuild the police force into a competent and respected organization. The group confirmed that the multinational force was the proper strength providing that it does not remain static and extends its presence to critical cities and villages through temporary shows of force.

They confirmed for me and my staff that our current CONOPs is on track. Their thoughts will be useful as we continuously update our plan, particularly regarding information operations.

Very Respectfully, Tom.

March 29, 2004

TO: Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)

CC: Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
 Jerry Bremer  
 Gen. John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Security in Iraq Post-June 30

*D.A.*

Our folks in Iraq keep getting told that the Iraqis are not going to be ready to take over security of the country on June 30. The implication of that, obviously, is that they think the Coalition forces are going to leave on June 30, when sovereignty passes.

That suggests we need to do a much better job of explaining to the people in Iraq that that is not the case. I hope you would get the people who handle information helping to work on that problem.

DIR:dh  
 032904-16

IRAK

20040404

OSD 04581-04

March 29, 2004

TO: Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)  
CC: Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Another UN Resolution

There continues to be pressure by the Brits to have another UN resolution in Iraq.  
What is the status?

DHR:dh  
032904-14

UN

29 Mar 04

OSD 04582-04



3/29  
0800

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE <sup>29</sup> March 25, 2004

2004 MAR 30 PM 4: 15

0004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Ray DuBois *RD*  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Pentagon Memorial Fund

I just went through these two pieces of paper on the Pentagon Memorial. It doesn't tell how someone can give money.

It ought to have on it "Send check to:" with an address, a website where they can use a credit card, whether or not it is a charitable contribution and tax deductible, who is allowed to give and who is not - anything that makes it easy to give money. It is not wise to put out brochures like this and not have that information. I gave them to some people today from the BPOE Elks thinking it had the right info on it, and it didn't.

Please get something done.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Pentagon Memorial Brochure and paper

*3/30*  
*Ray DuBois*  
*?*  
*Larry Di Rita*  
*3/30*

DHR:dh  
032504-1

.....  
Please respond by 4/16/04

29 Mar 04



# Pentagon M

*The Pentagon Memorial is a me  
commemorating the September  
terrorist attack on the Pentagon  
184 innocent lives lost in the Pe  
and on American Airlines Flight*

*For information about the Pentagon Memorial  
Project please visit: <http://memorial.pentagon.mil>.  
This web site contains the most recent information  
on the Memorial as well as information about  
making donations.*




Washington

11-L-0559/OSD/40971

About the designers: Julie Beckman  
Keith Kaseman  
New York, New York

Beckman holds a master's degree in architecture from Columbia University's Graduate School of Architecture, Planning and Preservation, and a bachelor's degree in growth and structure of cities from Bryn Mawr College. Kaseman holds a master's degree in architecture from Columbia University's Graduate School of Architecture, Planning and Preservation and a bachelor's degree in architecture from Arizona State University. They have founded their New York City design studio, Kaseman Beckman Amsterdam Studio, in 2011.



**Architectural details:**

One hundred eighty four innocent lives were lost in a single moment at the Pentagon - one hundred eighty four individuals forever tied together through the horrific events that unfolded on September 11, 2001.

Collective contemplation through silence, a tactile field of sensuous experience and an intimate setting are the objectives that fostered the birth of the concept for the chosen Pentagon Memorial design. The design sets out to permanently record and express the sheer magnitude of loss through an architectural experience of a place radically different than what we encounter in our daily lives. In this light, the space itself serves as the memorial at all scales of experience and engagement - from within, driving by, and from above.

A Memorial Park is inscribed with one hundred eighty four Memorial Units. Each unit is dedicated to an individual victim - its placement and place within the collective field are a unique instance. The field is organized as a timeline of the victims' ages, spanning from Dana Falkenberg, 3 years old, to John D. Yamnicky, 71. While each memorial unit locates itself on its respective age-line, the units are then organized by birth-date along the age line. The highly specific and qualitatively objective organizational strategy yields seemingly random results. Inherent tendencies - the clustering of certain age groups, the gap between the children and adults - are clearly evident and meaningful, though infinitely interpretive.

Personal interpretation is further sparked by embedding layers of specificity into the orientation of each memorial unit within the expansive site. Fifty nine memorial units face one way, one hundred twenty five face the other - thus distinguishing victims on board American Airlines flight 77 from those who were inside the Pentagon. When visiting a memorial dedicated to a victim who was in the Pentagon, the visitor will see the engraved name and the Pentagon in the same view. Conversely, one would see the engraved name of a victim on flight 77 with the sky. Though highly

specific, this distinction is quite subtle when deployed consistently throughout the site. A level of difference to the visual and spatial field, thus provoking visitors' curiosity, while simultaneously telling the story of those involved in the events that took place here that day.

In addition to supporting the memorial unit at each glowing light pool, a wooden bench and a place for the permanent inscription of each victim's name. Using computerized CNC technology, the clear-anodized aluminum units are easily mass produced and incredibly articulate. The cast aluminum prototype/detail model was fabricated in this manner. Its structural cross-section not only reflects radiant light from the glowing light pool but also allows that field to be continuous. A polyester composite, matrix-gravel mix is poured into the memorial unit, thus integrating gravel and light pool. This surface is polished to attain a "terrazzo" seating finish at the horizontal bench portion of the memorial unit. As the memorial unit grows out of the ground, the stabilized gravel field is interrupted only by moments of glowing light and water, and the engraved names float above these moments.

Dispersed throughout the entire site, the porous stabilized gravel field is contained within two perimeter benches that serve as planters for ornamental grasses. These grasses act as a soft screen demarcating the boundary of the memorial park. Further, the combined length of the perimeter benches plus the bench portion of each memorial unit provides more than 2,100 linear feet of polished "terrazzo" seating surface. Birth years, used to locate the age lines, are inlaid aluminum numbers set flush with the "terrazzo" finish of the perimeter benches. The birth years are flanked by the aluminum age lines that permeate the whole site.

The western edge of the site is defined with the AGE Wall - a wall that "grows" in height one inch per year relative to the age lines that organize the site at large. As one moves deeper into the site, the wall gets higher - it grows from 3 inches above the perimeter bench (at Dana's memorial age-line) to 71 inches above the bench (at John's). Strategically, this wall grows as a barrier is needed between the memorial park and the delivery lane that encroaches the site at its northwestern edge. Experientially, this wall communicates the organizational strategy to the drivers passing by the freeway, while allowing them to peer into the site from afar. From within the site it provides a shadow backdrop for the lacy ornamental grasses that are planted along its base.

A vivid canopy of color and light provides shade throughout the site, as trees are clustered in conjunction with the disbursement of memorial units. Three varieties of maple trees could serve this scheme well - the Trident Maple, Field Maple (in red varieties) and the Paper Bark Maple. All three exquisite trees are late falling, retaining their beautiful fall foliage well into the winter months - this suspension of time will contribute to the sublime beauty of this place. On an intimate level, the interplay between leaves, light, bark, gravel, grasses, water, and the senses will be greatly enhanced with any of these elegant trees.



**UNITED IN MEMORY**  
Pentagon Memorial Fund

We need **your** immediate help to raise in excess of a million dollars from Department of Defense personnel in the National Capital **Area**, to **construct** at the site of the attack, a Pentagon Memorial Park honoring those lost on September **11,2001** here at the Pentagon. We need to **reach this** fund-raising goal **by** August **15,2003**. Your donation is needed now to **finance** final design **costs** and to begin construction in September. We estimate the Memorial will be completed in **June 2005** at a **cost** of approximately **510** Million. **Only** contributed funds will be used to **build** the Pentagon Memorial—no taxpayer funds will be used. We can lead the **way** to **ensure** our fallen comrades **and** fellow Americans and their families will never be forgotten. For **detailed** memorial information visit the Pentagon Memorial Website at: **<https://private.ref.whs.mil/pentagonmemorial/>**

**Please give generously now to your organizational contact to help us create a lasting memorial for those lost on September 11,2001 or mail your donation to:**

**Washington Headquarters Services**  
Directorate for Budget & Finance  
Attn: Pentagon Memorial Fund  
**Room 3B269, The Pentagon**  
Washington, DC **20301-2255**

**Contributions are tax deductible.**

**Campaign Managers**

Maj Phredd Evans	DODIG
Dan McGinty	DCMA
Thelma Jones	US Army
COL Karla Torrez	Joint Staff
Willie Wright	Navy
Sheron Richardson	Air Force
Lewis O'Bryant	DTRA
Rich Dooley	PFPA
JohnGuardiani	DLA
Diane Worthington	OSD(PA)
Suellen Raycraft	DSCA
Yolanda Holmes	DISA
Don Nau	DIA
Claire Gilstad	DSS
JaniceSiemsen	MDA
Veronda Powell	WHS
Dwayne Lehman	USUHS
Ernie Peters	NIMA
Carla Little-Kopach	DARPA
Bethany Williams	DFAS

(b)(6)

*Richard McGraw*  
Richard McGraw  
On behalf of the DoD Personnel  
for a Pentagon Memorial



**UNITED in MEMORY**  
Pentagon Memorial Fund

**Washington Headquarters Services**

**Directorate for Budget & Finance**

**Attn: Pentagon Memorial Fund**

**Room 3B269, The Pentagon**

**Washington, DC 20301-1155**

11-L-0559/OSD/40974



ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

April 12, 2004, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois

SUBJECT: Pentagon Memorial Donations

- In the attached snowflake you directed that DoD Pentagon Memorial brochures and handouts be updated to provide helpful information for Pentagon visitors who express an interest in donating to the Pentagon Memorial project.
- I have attached the updated material that will provide complete information for anyone interested in making a contribution. (Tab A). As you can see, new "How to Donate" inserts have been placed in our latest Pentagon Memorial information brochures. The old "Employee fundraiser" letters that you have seen in the past are obsolete and we have pulled these from circulation.
- In summary, there are two ways to make a contribution for the Pentagon Memorial project: 1) by check directly to DoD, or 2) by check, cash or credit card to the private foundation, *Pentagon Memorial Fund, Inc.* (PMF, Inc.) which in-turn donates to DoD. ANYONE can make a donation to either, or both. Contributions to either are tax deductible.
- The private foundation has much more flexibility to solicit, publicize, and utilize wide-ranging fundraising techniques and collection methods - thus is expected to be able to raise the vast majority of funds donated to DoD for this project.
- Now that PMF, Inc. has launched its aggressive campaign, led by Lynda Webster, we expect that donations will greatly increase. I will continue to monitor and update you on the status.

Attachment

COORDINATION: none

Prepared by: Bill Brazis, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/40975

OSD 04625-04

000, 4

12 APR 04

29 12 04



# Pentagon Memorial


*The Pentagon Memorial is a memorial commemorating the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the Pentagon and the 184 innocent lives lost in the Pentagon and on American Airlines Flight 77*



Washington Headquarters Services

About the designers: **Julie Beckman**  
**Keith Kaseman**  
 New York, New York

Beckman holds a master's degree in architecture from Columbia University's Graduate School of Architecture, Planning and Preservation, and a bachelor's degree in the growth and structure of cities from Bryn Mawr College. Kaseman holds a master's degree in architecture from Columbia University's Graduate School of Architecture, Planning and Preservation and a bachelor's degree in architecture from Arizona State University. The pair founded their New York City design studio, Kaseman Beckman Amsterdam Studio, in 2001.



Architectural details:

One hundred eighty four innocent lives were lost in a single moment at the Pentagon - one hundred eighty four individuals forever tied together through the horrific events that unfolded on September 11, 2001.

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A Memorial Park is inscribed with one hundred eighty four Memorial Units. Each unit is dedicated to an individual victim - its placement and place within the collective field are a unique instance. The field is organized as a timeline of the victims' ages, spanning from Dana Falkenberg, 3 years old, to John D. Yannicky, 71. While each memorial unit locates itself on its respective age-line, the units are then organized by birth-date along the age line. The highly specific and qualitatively objective organizational strategy yields seemingly random results. Inherent tendencies - the clustering of certain age groups, the gap between the children and adults - are clearly evident and meaningful, though infinitely interpretive.

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The Department of Defense is authorized to accept donations for the establishment of the Pentagon Memorial.

Anyone wishing to make a contribution may either:

1) Donate directly to DoD by check made payable to U.S. Treasury - Pentagon Memorial Account and forward to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Attention: Pentagon Memorial, Room 3B269, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1155.

or

2) Make a contribution by cash, **check** or credit card to the Pentagon Memorial Fund, Inc. (PMF, Inc.). PMF, Inc. is a tax exempt, non-profit corporation, organized and led by the families of those lost at the Pentagon. PMF, Inc. is dedicated to raise and donate funds to DoD for the design, construction and maintenance of the Pentagon Memorial. Those interested in **making a contribution through** the PMF, Inc. can send donations to **Pentagon Memorial Fund, Inc., 1850 K St. NW, Suite 380, Washington, DC 20006.**

PMF, Inc. fundraising inquiries should be addressed to Lynda Webster of the Webster Group - [lynda@websterconsulting.com](mailto:lynda@websterconsulting.com) or by phone at **202-775-9797.**

Donations are tax-deductible.

For more information please visit the PMF, Inc.'s web site at [www.PentagonMemorial.net](http://www.PentagonMemorial.net).





specific, this distinction is quite subtle when deployed consistently throughout the site. It adds a level of difference to the visual and spatial field, thus provoking visitors' curiosity, while simultaneously telling the story of those involved in the events that took place here that day.

Elegant in its self-supporting form, the memorial unit is at once a glowing light pool, a cantilevered bench and a place for the permanent inscription of each victim's name. Using Computer Numerically Controlled (CNC) technology common to the aerospace industry, the cast, clear-anodized aluminum memorial unit is easily mass-produced and incredibly articulate. The cast aluminum prototype/detail model was fabricated in this manner. Its structural cross-section not only reflects radiant light from the glowing pool of water onto the surrounding gravel field, but also allows that field to be continuous. A polyester composite, matrix-gravel mix is poured into the memorial unit, thus acting as glue to support and float the gravel above the light pool. This surface is polished to attain a "terrazzo" seating finish at the horizontal bench portion of the memorial unit. As the memorial unit grows out of the ground, the stabilized gravel field is interrupted only by moments of glowing light and water, and the engraved names float above these moments.

Though loose enough to hear and feel footsteps upon it, stabilized gravel is a hard, ADA-compliant surface. Dispersed throughout the entire site, the porous stabilized gravel field is contained within two perimeter benches that serve as planters for ornamental grasses. These grasses act as a soft screen demarcating the boundary of the memorial park. Further, the combined length of the perimeter benches plus the bench portion of each memorial unit provides more than 2,100 linear feet of polished "terrazzo" seating surface. Birth years, used to locate the age lines, are inlaid aluminum numbers set flush with the "terrazzo" finish of the perimeter benches. The birth years are flanked by the aluminum age lines that permeate the whole site.

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*For information about the Pentagon Memorial  
Project please visit: <http://memorial.pentagon.mil>.  
This web site contains the most recent information  
on the Memorial as well as information about  
making donations.*

3/29  
0800

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
March 25, 2004  
29  
Z001 MAR 30 PM 4:15

4004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Ray DuBois *RD*  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Pentagon Memorial Fund

I just went through these two pieces of paper on the Pentagon Memorial. It doesn't tell how someone can give money.

It ought to have on it "Send check to:" with an address, a website where they can use a credit card, whether or not it is a charitable contribution and tax deductible, who is allowed to give and who is not - anything that makes it easy to give money. It is not wise to put out brochures like this and not have that information. I gave them to some people today from the BPOE Elks thinking it had the right info on it, and it didn't.

Please get something done.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Pentagon Memorial Brochure and paper

*5/30*  
*Ray DuBois*  
*?*  
*LARRY DI RITA*  
*3/30*

DHR:dh  
032504-1

.....  
Please respond by 4/16/04

2004

720  
March <sup>31</sup>~~29~~, 2004

TO: Adm. Ellis  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: British Officers

Mira Ricardel advises me we are making progress on assigning British officers to Strategic Command.

I hope it is helpful.

Thanks.

Attach.  
3/18/04 ASD(ISP) memo to SecDef [OSD 04268-04]

DHR:dh  
032904-24

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*OK*  
*31 Mar 04*

OSD 04649-04

11-L-0559/OSD/40981

3/24  
0930

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

2004 MAR 23 PM 5:07

EF 8919

IO-04/002809-OMDP  
MAR 23 2004 USDP (for (POKSDP))  
OSD

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY  
POLICY

INFO MEMO

To: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
From: Mira Ricardel, ASD/ISP (Acting) *MR* MAR 18 2004  
Subject: Assignment of UK Military Personnel to USSTRATCOM

- In response to your memo of February 5 (Tab 1) regarding the U.S. Strategic Command's (USSTRATCOM) desire to assign UK officers to key billets without providing U.S. officers in exchange, my staff has been working with the General Counsel, Comptroller, the Joint Staff and USSTRATCOM to find an appropriate solution.
- We have developed a draft arrangement under which UK military personnel would perform tasks assigned by the USSTRATCOM chain of command, and would be permitted to share relevant information with the UK Ministry of Defence.
  - Under this arrangement, the U.S. would not be required to provide officers to the UK in exchange.
- The General Counsel has advised that we are authorized to enter into such an arrangement under Title 10 U.S.C. 2608, which states:
  - *"The Secretary of Defense may accept from...any foreign government or international organization...any contribution of services made by such foreign government or international organization for use by the Department of Defense."*
- Acceptance authority under this provision has been delegated to the Comptroller.
- My staff is working with the Comptroller's office on such an arrangement, with the objective of having this mechanism in place by late March.
- We believe that this type of arrangement could be used not only for this USSTRATCOM assignment, but also to provide for similar assignments to other combatant commands.
  - Specific approval would be required from USD(P) consistent with DoD Directive 5230.20, "Visits, Assignments, and Exchanges of Foreign Nationals," each time this authority is requested.

Coordination: Tab 2

11-L-0559/OSD/40982

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SRI MA GRADDOCK	3/24
MA BUCCI <i>Nasima</i>	3/29
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	3/24

Prepared By: Frank Rose, ISP/FP/MDP, (b)(6)

190509 04268 04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



FEB 5 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY  
 GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
 DEFENSE

SUBJECT: UK Officers on USSTRATCOM Staff

Commander, USSTRATCOM (CDRUSSTRATCOM), wants to assign UK officers to key USSTRATCOM staff billets without having to provide US officers to the UK in exchange. Current DOD policy allows exchange officers or foreign liaison officers, but not officers who function in both capacities and on a non-reciprocal basis.

Please review the officer exchange/liaison policy to determine if the policy supports this closer cooperation across all combatant commands. If it does not, please advise me as to what courses of action may be taken to meet this goal.

Please report back to me by February 20, 2004.

2	<del>GENERAL COUNSEL</del>
1	DEPT. GENERAL COUNSEL
3	EA

OSD 75194-04



March 31, 2004

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Jerry Bremer

*Advance copy 3/31 1100*

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Security

*Iraq*

You all heard the discussion on security for CODELs, the UN and the CPA. John Abizaid, I would appreciate it if you would press forward as promptly as possible on developing options for the handling of these important and increasingly urgent matters.

I talked to Colin, and he is working his side of the problem to develop options so the Department of State will be prepared to provide security for his people by the time State takes over.

Our task is to find solutions for the issues Jerry Bremer has raised and for our portion of the responsibility that continues after June 30.

John, whatever help you need is available from the Joint Staff or the Comptroller's office. However, I am going to ask that by Friday, April 2, you and the Joint Staff provide a first cut at how these issues should be handled.

*31 Mar 04*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
033004-23

.....  
Please respond by 4/2/04

OSD 04388-04

TAB A

January 27, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT Personnel as Better Sensors

One of the things Pete Schoomaker said at the CINC conference that was interesting was that we need to do a better job of making all US military people better sensors."

Please have some folks think about that and get back to us.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012704-15

.....  
Please respond by 2/27/04

OSD 04699-04

Tab A





CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1659-04

31 March 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMS/30*

SUBJECT: Personnel as Better Sensors

- **Issue.** One of the things Pete Schoomaker said at the CINC conference that was interesting was that we need to do a better job of making all US military people better "sensors." Please have some folks think about that and get back to us (TAB A).
- **Conclusion.** Improving the capability of US military personnel to act as "sensors" will require a concerted effort across Service, command and agency lines to define operational requirements, design appropriate training programs and develop processes and technologies to facilitate and fully exploit collected data. Additional comments are provided at TAB B.
- **Discussion.** Changes in our operating environment require additional emphasis on training all military personnel to observe and report information. Streamlined reporting and faster processing and analysis capabilities are needed to effectively capture and exploit this data. Finally, we must foster force-wide cultural changes to ensure all DOD personnel understand the relationship between intelligence and operations and their personal role in the operations-intelligence cycle. There are many Service, Joint and intelligence community efforts underway to improve the capability of military personnel to act as "sensors" as well as to use the data they collect.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: MG Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., USA; Director, J-2;

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/40986

OSD 04699-04

TAB A

January 27, 2004

**TO:** Gen. **Dick** Myers  
**CC:** Paul Wolfowitz  
**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
**SUBJECT:** Personnel as Better Sensors

One of the things Pete Schoomaker said at the **CINC** conference that was interesting was that we need to do a better job of **making** all US military people better "sensors."

Please have some folks think about that and get back to us.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012704-15

.....  
Please respond by 2/27/04

12 March 2004

TAB B

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Personnel as Better Sensors

1. Purpose. To provide SecDef comments on improving the capability of US military personnel to act as “sensors.”

2. Analysis

- e The operational environment is changing. Iraq and Afghanistan are contemporary examples in which forces on the ground have access to information that cannot be collected by technical means and limited HUMINT resources. We must be able to efficiently incorporate and exploit this information.
- e Services and commands currently train military personnel to report battlefield observations; however, much of this training is highly specialized for select intelligence and special operations personnel or broadly based but narrowly focused.
- e Military personnel need systematic training on their role as information receptors and reporters beginning in basic military training and commissioning programs and reinforced during subsequent skills training, unit training and exercises. Training should include basic observation and reporting techniques as well as familiarization with legal and policy limitations on these activities. We need to establish clear joint operational requirements for this training and work to harmonize Service, agency and combatant commander efforts. Experimentation and Service doctrine should reflect and support these changes.
- e Military personnel must also be acclimated to their specific operating environment, to include language training and area studies when possible, and be informed of priority operational and intelligence requirements. This may require increasing unit-level resources, including intelligence (often HUMINT) personnel who normally provide this type of pre-mission preparation.
- e Increasing the effectiveness of personnel as “sensors” also requires end-to-end improvements in technologies and processes to avoid information

overload and turn this potential flood of raw information into actionable intelligence that can be rapidly used to direct or plan future operations.

- Smart/interactive technologies that improve battlefield reporting without unduly interfering with the primary mission are essential to improving timely reporting. Transformational communication systems and networks that support “comms on the move” are also critical. Finally, we must improve information technologies to rapidly correlate, validate and fuse inputs from multiple human and technical sources for our battlespace awareness systems and increase investment in personnel and technical resources for all-source analysis and fusion.
- There are already many initiatives underway to address these requirements. The Army’s Task Force Soldier and Task Force Actionable Intelligence are examining the issue across the board, from training to technology, including the use of Personal Data Assistants, digital imaging and “smart”/interactive systems to improve timely reporting from the field. Systems such as Land Warrior and Joint Tactical Radio System are beginning to fill the need for improved communications. More broadly, the Intelligence Community’s Horizontal Integration initiative is addressing the need to make information widely available vertically among echelons as well as horizontally across operating environments.

Prepared by: MG Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., USA, J-2, (b)(6)

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

Unit	Name	Date
US Army	COL Hooker	2 March 2004
US Navy	CAPT Dossel	3 March 2004
US Air Force	Col Murphy	4 March 2004
US Marine Corps	Col Van Dyke	3 March 2004
USCENTCOM	Col Smith	2 March 2004
USEUCOM	Col Knopp	3 March 2004
USJFCOM	COL Perkins	3 March 2004
USNORTHCOM	Mr. Tavik	2 March 2004
USPACOM	CDR Metts	5 March 2004
USSOCOM	Lt Col Crawford	3 March 2004
USSOUTHCOM	LTC Fisher	8 March 2004
USSTRATCOM	Copy provided	
USTRANSCOM	CAPT Cooney	1 March 2004

December 15, 2004

2005 12 15 11:00 AM

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Outside Look at Sentencing Equity

Please come back to me with a proposal on having an outside look at sentencing equity, if in fact we *think* it might be worthwhile.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
121504-23

.....  
Please respond by 1/13/04



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600

2005 MAR 4 PM 1:05

INFO MEMO

March 4, 2005; 1:00 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

*DJ Dell'Orto*  
3/8/05

SUBJECT: Outside **Look** at Sentencing Equity in Courts-Martial

- In answer to your question, at Tab A, I do not recommend **an** outside look at establishing a system to enhance sentencing equity in courts-martial.
- In 1984, Congress exempted the military justice system when it established the Federal Sentencing Guidelines system.
  - o The U. S. Supreme Court recently held unconstitutional certain mandatory provisions of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, making them advisory only, because they conflicted with a defendant's "jury trial" rights.
  - o Congress is expected to direct a review of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines system.
- By contrast, Congress created the military judicial system to be separate and distinct from its civilian counterpart in order to recognize and maintain the military's specialized requirements for good order and discipline in widely varying environments and circumstances.
  - o Discretion in command actions and broad sentencing considerations apply in order to tailor sentences to both the needs of the Service and the accused.

RECOMMENDATION: Stay the course.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared By: Robert E. Reed (b)(6)



OSD 04702-05

11-L-0559/OSD/40992

720  
TAB A

March 7, 2004

719

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Larry Di Rita  
David Chu  
Powell Moore  
Les Brownlee

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Rollout on Rebalancing

326

I talked to the President yesterday about the plans for rebalancing the active and reserve components.

We certainly have to make sure that we have a fabulous rollout plan for this. We want to be sure that the governors get briefed and everybody gets signed on.

We do not want to have an explosion over it. It ought to be a "good news" story, and we have to handle it so that it is.

Thanks

DHR:dh  
030404-24

.....  
Please respond by 3/26/04

8 Mar 04

OSD 04758-04

Tab A



**TAB B**

**COORDINATION**

<b>US Army</b>	<b>Responded direct to OSD-RA</b>	
<b>US Navy</b>	<b>CAPT Dossel</b>	<b>22 March 2004</b>
<b>US Air Force</b>	<b>Col Ball</b>	<b>22 March 2004</b>
<b>US Marine Corps</b>	<b>Col Rawson</b>	<b>22 March 2004</b>
<b>US Coast Guard</b>	<b>CAPT Quigley</b>	<b>22 March 2004</b>
<b>National Guard Bureau</b>	<b>Maj Gen Sullivan</b>	<b>30 March 2004</b>

**Tab B**



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1663-04  
1 APR 11 2004

4/2

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJC

SUBJECT: Rollout on Rebalancing

- **Issue.** "I talked to the President yesterday about the plans for rebalancing the active and reserve components. We certainly have to make sure that we have a fabulous rollout plan for this. We want to be sure that the governors get briefed and everybody gets signed on. We do not want to have an explosion over it. It ought to be a "good news" story, and we have to handle it so that it is."
- **Conclusion.** The next step for the Department of Defense should be the formation of a team to develop a comprehensive strategic communication plan supporting the department's rebalancing actions.
- **Discussion.** It is critical that we develop a plan that lays out a comprehensive strategy on how to implement planned and approved rebalancing actions, linked to key events and focused on stakeholders. I understand that OSD-(PA) will be leading this effort. Here are some recommendations to consider:
  - At a minimum, the effort should include the Services, key staff elements from OSD, CNGB, and elements of the Joint Staff as core members, charged with determining the critical stakeholders, timing, and the best way to get our message out.
  - This effort must map a strategy identifying key processes and events such as the Joint Planning Guidance, association meetings such as the Reserve Officers Association and the Adjutant Generals' Association of the United States, and Congressional hearings. Information must be delivered to stakeholders in a timely and appropriate manner.
  - To maximize success, all communications should be part of a carefully crafted and coordinated departmental level strategic communications plan.

326

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

copy to:  
DepSecDef

Prepared By: MG C. A. Vaughn, USA; ACJCS/NG; (b)(6)  
Maj Gen J. A. Bradley, USAF; ACJCS/RM; (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	X
SR MA CRADDOCK	4/1
MA BUCHANAN	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	4/1

(8 MAR 04)

OSD 04758-04

TAB B

COORDINATION

US Army		Responded direct to OSD-RA
US Navy	CAPT Dossel	22 March 2004
US Air Force	Col Ball	22 March 2004
US Marine Corps	Col Rawson	22 March 2004
US Coast Guard	CAPT Quigley	22 March 2004
National Guard Bureau	Maj Gen Sullivan	30 March 2004

379/04

720

March 8, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Calling Back Retired Personnel

Have we made any attempt to get retired civil affairs personnel back on active duty to help out in Afghanistan or Iraq? They may be in the Individual Ready Reserve.

Have we made any effort to get the retired executive international corps going?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030804-20

.....  
Please respond by 3/26/04

326

8 Mar 04

OSD 04799-04

472  
1530



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

2004 152-2 11 7-42

April 1, 2004 - 8:00 AM

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

*David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)*

SUBJECT: SNOWFLAKE - Calling Back Retired Personnel

- e You asked if we have made any attempts to get retired civil affairs personnel back on active duty to help out in Afghanistan or Iraq. You also referred to the IRR.
- e Our guidance of January 15, 2002, encouraged the Military Services to use both Active and Reserve retiree volunteers to support GWOT requirements.
- e Our data indicate only about 1,300 out of 3,500 retirees may be considered useable civil affairs resources. This is due to the amount of time elapsed since leaving active status; physical and administrative issues; age restrictions; and expired/withdrawn security clearances.
- e Consistent with this overall picture, about 125 Army civil affairs retirees have volunteered for active duty, but only 3 have met the physical, skills currency, age, and security clearance requirements.
- e I believe that we need to reenergize, primarily the Army and Marine Corps, to conduct a more aggressive examination of CA retiree capability and how to better employ that capability to meet CA requirements. We will take the steps to accomplish this-and for other skills in short supply-absent contrary direction from you.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Colonel Nesselrode, OASD/RA(M&P), (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	4/1
SR MA CRADDOCK	4/15
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	4/2

DSD 04799-04



326

1 Apr 04

8 Mar 00

3/7/04  
March 8, 2004

**TO:** Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
David Chu

**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

**SUBJECT:** Calling Back Retired Personnel

Have we made any attempt to get retired civil affairs personnel back on active duty to help out in Afghanistan or Iraq? They may be in the Individual Ready Reserve.

Have we made any effort to get the retired executive international corps going?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030804-20

.....  
Please respond by 3/26/04

OSD 04799-04

11-L-0559/OSD/40999



RESERVE AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1500

ACTION MEMO

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (P&R)

FROM: T. F. HALL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (RA)

*TF/Hall  
3/24/04*

SUBJECT: SNOWFLAKE – Calling Back Retired Personnel

- SECDEF sent you a SNOWFLAKE asking if we have made any attempt to get retired civil affairs personnel back on active duty to help out in Afghanistan or Iraq? He also referred to the Individual Ready Reserve (TAB B).
- I have emphasized the Department's policy on the use of Active and Reserve retirees, dated, January 15, 2002 (TAB C), through my memorandum of November 5, 2002 (TAB D). We have encouraged the Military Services to use retiree volunteers to fill mobilization billets, provide volunteer services, as a civilian, to a military organization, and provide volunteer services to FEMA or other organizations.
- Regarding Civil Affairs, the Army's retiree inventory, which constitutes most of the Department's retired civil affairs (CA) assets, is limited—approx. 3,500 individuals—but only 1,300 potential resources. Skill degradation, physical and administrative issues, and age restrictions impacts the useable resource. To date, only 3 of 124 volunteer Army CA retirees have served on GWOT active duty due to such criteria.

- I believe that we need to reenergize, primarily the Army and Marine Corps, to conduct a more aggressive examination of CA retiree capability and how to better employ that capability to meet CA requirements. ~~We previously reported that about 450 civil affairs resources are in the IRR. We will take the steps to accomplish this—and to other skills in short supply—above~~
- ~~ALTAB A~~ is a proposed response to the SECDEF SNOWFLAKE. *country direction*

RECOMMENDATION: USD(P&R) sign Info Memo at TAB A responding to the SECDEF SNOWFLAKE. *from you*

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: Colonel Nesselrode, OASD/RA(M&P), (b)(6)

3/8/04

# SNOWFLAKE

DR. CHU FOR ACTION \_\_\_\_\_

ASSIGN ACTION TO RA / PLANS

SUSPENSE DATE BACK TO DR. CHU 3/19

SUBJECT: Calling Back Retail Personnel





PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

JAN 15 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (M&RA)  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (M&RA)  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE (M&RA)  
DIRECTOR, RESERVE AND TRAINING, USCG

**SUBJECT:** Strategy for Use of Military Retiree Volunteers

As you know, there has been an outpouring of support for our military following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Many of those who have offered to help support the military during the current national emergency are military retirees, both Active and Reserve. They have expressed a desire to once again serve our country in some capacity. These retired service members have a variety of skills that may be used to assist in the homeland defense mission, serve overseas in our war on terrorism, or possibly backfill a position left vacant by a service member who has been deployed.

I ask that you consider, when practical, the use of retirees who have volunteered. Attached is a conceptual strategy for the use of volunteers. The strategy is based on a hierarchical approach, which suggests possible ways to take advantage of retiree-volunteers. It also requests the Services establish a systematic approach for capturing information about volunteers. Maintaining information on volunteers appears to be a logical first step that some of you have already taken.

I request that you use this strategy as a guide, and tailor it to fit the specific needs of your respective Services. We want to take advantage of the patriotism that is being demonstrated. This strategy enables us to do that. I request that you report quarterly to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs on the number of military retirees who have volunteered their services; of these, the number ordered to active duty and the number supporting DoD in a volunteer civilian capacity, during the current national emergency. The first report should be provided NLT March 31, 2002. If you have any questions, please contact Dr. John Winkler, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel, at (b)(6)

(b)(6)

David S. C. Chu

Attachment:  
As stated



11-L-0559/OSD/41002

SUBJECT: Strategy for Use of Military Retiree Volunteers

BACKGROUND: Subsequent to the attack on America on September 11, thousands of retired members of the Military Services (Active and Reserve) have volunteered to be of assistance during the current national emergency. OASD/RA developed a strategy, in coordination with the Reserve components, for capitalizing on the willingness of military retirees to serve during the current national emergency.

OBJECTIVE: To establish guidelines for identifying options, opportunities, and conditions under which retirees may volunteer their services in a military or civilian capacity.

STRATEGY GUIDELINES:

Military retirees seeking to volunteer for active duty in support of the current national emergency should be encouraged to contact the personnel command within their respective Military Service that is responsible for managing military retirees. These include:

- Army Reserve Personnel Command
- Commander, Naval Military Personnel Command
- Deputy Commandant, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, U.S. Marine Corps
- Commander, Air Reserve Personnel Center
- Coast Guard Headquarters

There are three major ways in which retiree volunteers could be utilized. The overriding priority for use will be to the operational needs of the force (i.e., mobilization billets), to military organizations providing support to military institutions and to civilian organizations in that order.

1. Fill a Mobilization billet.

It is DoD policy that **military** retirees shall be ordered to active duty (as needed) to **fill** personnel shortfalls due to mobilization or other emergencies.

The Military Services should consider using retirees to meet operational military requirements in support of Operations Noble Eagle or Enduring Freedom when they possess a critical **skill** that is not available in the Active component, the Selected Reserve, or the Individual Ready Reserve.

In addition, the Services should consider using military retirees to meet military requirements in support of Operations Noble Eagle or Enduring Freedom, provided the military retiree volunteers for active duty, meets a critical or essential **skill** requirement (e.g., linguists or translators, administrative specialists, security augmentation) that could otherwise be filled only through *involuntary activation* of an Individual Ready Reservist, **and** meets any other specified qualifications for active duty.

Military retirees may not be used to fill mobilization billets in a non-pay status, but should be ordered to active duty with full pay and allowances. As with any other full-time military asset, military retirees serving on active duty may be reassigned to meet the needs of the military service.

2. Provide volunteer services, as a civilian, to a military organization.

In accordance with the authority to accept certain voluntary services under section 1588 of title 10 US Code, military retirees may also volunteer their services in a civilian capacity in support of local military organizations. However, unless under contract, this is uncompensated service. This may include: DoD and Service family support and family service programs; child development and youth services programs; library and education programs; religious programs; housing referral programs; programs providing employment assistance to spouses of such members; and morale, welfare, and recreation programs.

Military Services should assess their needs in these and other areas and identify opportunities to use retiree volunteers in their local areas. Installation commanders and program managers should identify support requirements where retiree volunteers within reasonable commuting distance of the installation or facility could be used to provide assistance.

It would be useful to issue regulations regarding the acceptance of voluntary services. (Under 10 U.S.C. 1588(f)(4), the Secretary concerned must prescribe regulations prior to installing telecommunication equipment in the home of a volunteer.)

3. Provide volunteer services to FEMA or other civilian organizations.

Military retirees may also volunteer, as civilians, to assist civilian disaster relief organizations, many of which encourage and accept volunteerism.

As appropriate, the Services should communicate through newsletters, websites, articles and other media volunteer opportunities within the civilian sector for military retirees who want to provide their services in support of the current national emergency and for whom no military requirement has been identified.

**ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE:**

**To facilitate the acceptance of services of retiree-volunteers: OASD/RA will encourage the Military Services to: (1) capture in an automated database the identity and skills, including both military and civilian-acquired skills of those military retirees who volunteer for active duty in support of the current national emergency; (2) compile a list of functions for which retirees may volunteer and organizations where assistance would be welcomed; and (3) assist retirees in identifying suitable opportunities within their organization or direct them to other organizations that might capitalize on their willingness to serve. Retirees' interest in volunteerism should be acknowledged and receive strong support and encouragement.**



RESERVE AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1500 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1500

26 NOV 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (M&RA)  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (M&RA)  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE (M&RA)  
DIRECTOR, RESERVE AND TRAINING, USCG

SUBJECT: Use of Military Retiree Volunteers

Dr. Chu has noted on several occasions the importance of considering all available manpower resources as we continue to support the ongoing Global War on Terrorism. In this vein, the Under Secretary issued a conceptual strategy for the use of military retiree volunteers, last January. That strategy suggested a systematic approach to capturing information on retiree volunteers and identifying possible opportunities for them to serve to reduce the demands on active and reserve forces.

As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, I would like to encourage you to continue your efforts to use retiree volunteers, particularly in view of the prospect that the war on terrorism may extend for several years. We have mobilized nearly 100,000 Reserve component members from all Services since we commenced Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom. While the number of reservists currently mobilized has declined, a significant number of reservists have already begun their second year of mobilization, and future planning could lead to many more being called to active duty. Employing military retiree volunteers, where practical, would help to ensure active duty members and reservists are available in sufficient numbers to meet deployment and other essential requirements.

In addition to reemphasizing Dr. Chu's guidance to keep open the option of using military retiree volunteers and identifying requirements where they might serve, I also want to call to your attention a specific request. The Director of Washington Headquarters Services, which includes the Defense Protective Service, has expressed strong interest to Under Secretary Chu concerning the potential use of recent or younger military retirees on limited civil service term appointments to help secure the 280-acre Pentagon reservation. Active and Reserve military police have been augmenting the Defense Protective Service for over a year now and it is expected that this augmentation requirement will continue for at least another two years, if not longer. Recently retired military personnel, trained as military police, masters at arms or security forces, and still physically capable of wearing a uniform, carrying a weapon and performing security functions, may be able to relieve some of our active duty or activated Reserve members from this important requirement.



11-L-0559/OSD/41005

If you have recent retirees who might meet the requirements and would be interested in such a position, please contact my Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Manpower and Personnel), Dr. John Winkler. He can be reached at (b)(6)

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "T. F. Hall".

T. F. Hall

412  
15320

7201



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

2004 APR 1 9 37

INFO MEMO

CM-1664-04  
1 April 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM/41*

SUBJECT: Reimbursement

- **Issue.** I would like to see what the reimbursement is on this photo-journalist and how much the paper pays for it (TAB A).
- **Conclusion.** Total costs incurred by DOD are approximately \$50,000; these charges have been or are in the process of being billed to Mr. Laughlin's insurance company, Blue Cross/Blue Shield (TAB B).

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: LtGen James E. Cartwright, USMC; Director, J-8; (b)(6)

Haiti

1 Apr 04

(10 Mar 04)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	<i>JL</i>
SR MA CRADDOCK	<i>CR</i>
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	<i>42</i>

OSD 04801-04

TAB A

March 10, 2004

731

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

SUBJECT: Reimbursement

I would like to see what the reimbursement is on this photo-journalist and how much the paper pays for it.

Thanks.

Attach.

3/9/04 *Miami Sun Sentinel* Photojournalist Wounded in Haiti, 7 March 2004 (ISRC 5x8)

DHR:db  
031004-15

.....  
Please respond by 4/2/04

Tab A

OSD 04801-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41008

## Miami Sun Sentinel Photojournalist Wounded in Haiti, 7 March 2004 (U)

**Purpose.** To answer Secretary of Defense questions concerning Miami Sun Sentinel photojournalist Michael Laughlin who was wounded in Haiti Sunday, 7 March 2004.

**Issue.** Secretary of Defense asked if the wounded photojournalist had life threatening wounds, if he was imbedded, and if his care and transportation were reimbursable.

- The CCATT is a 3-me  
Puerto Rico.

- Mr. Laughlin was evacuated  
air ambulance back to J  
- ISOS is a civilian o:

Prepared by: LtCol R. S. LaS

### Bottom Line

- The wounded photojournalist, Michael Laughlin from the Sun Sentinel, arrived in Haiti Friday, 5 Mar 04 and was not imbedded with the military.
- Mr. Laughlin received two gunshot wounds on Sunday 7 March, one to the shoulder and one to the neck. The wounds are not life threatening. He was stabilized at a local hospital (Canapé Vert Hospital), transported to GTMO Naval Hospital, then evacuated to Jackson Memorial in Miami arriving 8 Mar 1615 EST.
- US Ambassador in Haiti requested Laughlin's transportation to GTMO. Commander SOUTHCOM approved the request in accordance with DoDI 6000.11.
- JS J-4 is researching if and how the reimbursement will take place for medical care and transportation from Haiti to GTMO. The Sun Sentinel paid for flight from GTMO to Miami.

*Show me reimbursement*

### Background

- Mr. Laughlin was alert and oriented, on a cardiac monitor, had an IV and his arm in a sling when he was transported to GTMO.
- Mr. Laughlin was transported on a US C-130 from Haiti to GTMO and was accompanied by a Critical Care Air Transport Team (CCATT).



Date: 22 March 2004

### **Miami Sun Sentinel Photojournalist Wounded in Haiti, 7 March 2004**

**Purpose.** To answer Secretary of Defense questions concerning the reimbursement for Miami Sun Sentinel photojournalist Michael Laughlin, who was wounded in Haiti Sunday, 7 March.

**Issue.** The Secretary of Defense asked what the reimbursement is on the photojournalist and how much the paper pays for it.

#### **Bottom Line**

- The US government is seeking reimbursement for the cost of transportation from Haiti to GTMO, cost of transportation from GTMO to Miami and for medical care received at the GTMO Naval Hospital from Mr. Laughlin's health insurance company, Blue Cross/Blue Shield.
- The cost of the C-130 flight from Haiti to GTMO was \$19,189. USTRANSCOM is preparing documents (not yet officially filed) seeking reimbursement.
- The cost of transportation from GTMO to Miami, provided by ISOS, was \$12,324. ISOS has billed the Naval Hospital. The hospital has filed a claim with Mr. Laughlin's insurance provider.
- The cost of Medical Care at GTMO Naval Hospital was \$12,741. The hospital has filed a claim with Mr. Laughlin's insurance provider.

#### **Background**

- The wounded photojournalist, Michael Laughlin from the Sun Sentinel, arrived in Haiti Friday, 5 March and was not imbedded with the military.

- Mr. Laughlin received two gunshot wounds on Sunday 7 March, one to the shoulder and one to the neck. The wounds were not life threatening. He was stabilized at a local hospital (Canapé Vert Hospital), transported to GTMO Naval Hospital and then evacuated to Jackson Memorial in Miami arriving 8 March 1615 EST.
- US Ambassador in Haiti requested Laughlin's transportation to GTMO. Commander USSOUTHCOM approved the request in accordance with DOD Instruction 6000.11.
- Evacuation was made pursuant to DOD Instruction 6000.11, para. 6.6.2.2.1, which authorizes the theater surgeon "to approve movement of US civilians (on a reimbursable basis) when it is determined that an emergency involving immediate threat to life, limb or sight exists, adequate care is locally unavailable or unsuitable, and suitable commercial transportation is neither available nor adequate."
- Mr. Laughlin was alert and oriented, on a cardiac monitor, had an IV and his arm in a sling when he was transported to GTMO.
- Mr. Laughlin was transported on a US C-130 from Haiti to GTMO and was accompanied by a Critical Care Air Transport Team (CCATT).
  - The CCATT is a 3-member USAF medical team from Puerto Rico.
- Mr. Laughlin was evacuated by International SOS (ISOS) air ambulance to Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami. ISOS is a civilian organization routinely used by GTMO to evacuate patients to CONUS.

Prepared by: LTC Gele, J-8/PBAD, (b)(6)

4/22  
1330



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OSD 4/28

CM-1870-04  
5 April 2004

ACTION MEMO

Paul Butler  
4/27

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS 4/3

SUBJECT: Worldwide Airlift Usage

580

- **Issue.** "Let's send a note out to the White House, to the State Department and the CPA that to the extent possible they should avoid committing or seeming to commit or urging that we be committed the use of airlift to assist others during the period that we have heavy responsibilities in Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc. We should include... Please get back to me with a proposal."
- **Conclusion.** The proposed cover memorandum (TAB B) discourages commitment of airlift during the period of heavy responsibilities in Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo. It also forwards a list (Enclosure to TAB B) of significant non-DOD airlift requests over the last several years.
- **Recommendation.** Sign proposed memorandum at TAB B for further transmission to the White House, Executive Departments and Coalition Provisional Authority.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Vice Admiral Gordon S. Holder, USN; Director, J-4

4/7  
Larry Di Rita

(b)(6)	
SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	4/27
SR MA CRADDOCK	4/27
MA BUCCI NOSENZO	4/27
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	Cox 7/5

4/27/04

OSD 04867-04

April 28, 2004

7:34 AM

LTG Craddock:

ExecSec is ready to send the attached, however we had a conversation about who in the building should also get BCC. Would appreciate your concurrence/suggestions:

DSD

AT&L

SECAF

TRANSCOM

REUBEN JEFFERY

CENTCOM

CJCS

SECNAV

SECARMY

\_\_\_\_\_

V/R

(b)(6)

P.S. I assume we can send SecState via fax?

yes

1:24 PM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: March 4, 2004

SUBJECT: **Worldwide Airlift Usage**

*SF-714*

Let's send a note out to the White House, to the State Department and the CPA that to the extent possible they should avoid committing or seeming to commit or urging that we be committed the use of airlift to assist others during the period that we have heavy responsibilities in Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc.

We should include an attachment of all the things that we've done by way of charitable airlifts over the last three years and show all the other requests we've received and declined. We ought to fashion a cover memo from me saying here's what has been going on, and there needs to be a limit to it. Ask them to discourage embassies and CPA and others from such recommendations and putting the US. in an awkward position when it is turned down. If things are dissuaded or turned down at the earliest stage, it is better than if it comes all the way up to Washington and it looks like the President is turning it down. The bias in favor of doing something starts at the bottom. It is the taxpayer's money, but during this period it is more - it is the stress on the force.

Please get back to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
030404.06

---

**OSD 04867-04**

11-L-0559/OSD/41013

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

USTRANSCOM	MG Pair	12 March 2004
	Col (S)Faulise	30 March 2004
DSCA/HA	Ms. Judith McCallum	12 March 2004
CPA	Mr. Don Eberly	12 March 2004



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



MEMORANDUM FOR WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
ADMINISTRATOR, COALITION PROVISIONAL  
AUTHORITY

SUBJECT: Worldwide Airlift Usage

*essential critical to meeting*

As Secretary of Defense, I have the responsibility to ensure the Defense Transportation System (DTS) supports our national security objectives. Using DTS resources to support non-U.S./non-DOD charitable airlift requests competes directly with our ability to airlift critical cargo, especially during this time of heavy responsibilities in Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Committing or seeming to commit this type of transportation places the United States in an awkward situation when non-U.S./non-DOD airlift requests are subsequently declined because of heavy demand on the DTS. As such, we need to discourage all agencies, at the earliest stages, from recommending use of DOD airlift assets to move any cargo not in direct support of national security.

*it would be best to military missions*

Since October 2001, <sup>has</sup> airlift requirements have grown dramatically. Our airlift resources have operated nearly continuously at, or above, maximum sustainable levels. ~~When justified, we endeavor to support these requests, but in certain instances we must choose between declining or further stressing the force.~~ In 2003 alone, the demand on our airlift assets exceeded our 2001 baseline by over 180 percent. ~~period, the DTS supported 16,642 tons of cargo and 13,133 airlift. This equates to 607 fully loaded C-17 aircraft, enough capacity to deploy 8+ Army brigades.~~

We simply cannot afford to unconditionally ~~honor these~~ <sup>most non-military</sup> transportation requests, & request your assistance in discouraging embassies, agencies, and subordinate organizations from either directly or indirectly recommending airlift that does not support national security.

*even for worthy causes such as charitable lift. There are many organizations in the U.S. and around the world that probably would appreciate the opportunity to respond to charitable lift requests from charities and other worthy non-profit organizations and I ask your assistance in encouraging people to be creative in seeking out such organizations.*

- Attachment:  
1. Charitable Airlift Listing



TAB A

1:24 PM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: March 4, 2004

SUBJECT: **Worldwide Airlift Usage**

*SF-714*

Let's send a note out to the White House, to the State Department and the CPA that to the extent possible they should avoid committing or seeming to commit or urging that we be committed the use of airlift to assist others during the period that we have heavy responsibilities in Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc.

We should include an attachment of all the things that we've done by way of charitable airlifts over the last three years and show all the other requests we've received and declined. We ought to fashion a cover memo from me saying here's what has been going on, and there needs to be a limit to it. **Ask** them to discourage embassies and CPA and others from such recommendations and putting the **U.S.** in an awkward position when it is turned down. If things are dissuaded or turned down at the earliest stage, it is better **than** if it comes all the way up to Washington and it looks like the President is turning it down. The bias in favor of doing something starts at the bottom. It is the taxpayer's money, but during this period it is more - it is the stress on the force.

Please get back to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
030404.06

\_\_\_\_\_

Tab A

**OSD 04867-04**

11-L-0559/OSD/41016



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

APR 28 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
ADMINISTRATOR, COALITION PROVISIONAL  
AUTHORITY

SUBJECT: Worldwide Airlift Usage

The Defense Transportation System (DTS) is critical to meeting national security objectives. Using DTS resources to support non-U.S./non-DOD charitable airlift requests competes directly with our ability to airlift critical cargo, especially during this time of heavy responsibilities in Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Committing or seeming to commit this type of transportation places the United States in an awkward situation when non-U.S./non-DOD airlift requests are subsequently declined because of heavy demand on the DTS. As such, it would be best to discourage all agencies, at the earliest stages, from recommending use of DOD airlift assets to move any cargo not in direct support of military missions.

Since October 2001, the demand for airlift has grown dramatically. Our airlift resources have operated nearly continuously at, or above, maximum sustainable levels. In 2003 alone, the demand on our airlift assets exceeded our 2001 baseline by over 180 percent.

We simply cannot afford to unconditionally meet non-military transportation requests even for worthy causes such as charitable lift. There are many organizations in the United States and around the world that probably would appreciate the opportunity to respond to lift requests from charities and other worthy non-profit organizations, and I ask your assistance in encouraging people to be creative in seeking out such organizations.

Attachment:  
1. Charitable Airlift Listing

S 80

28 Apr 04

Y Mar 04



OSD 04867-04



## ATTACHMENT

### REQUESTS FOR CHARITABLE AIRLIFT, SEPTEMBER 2001 TO PRESENT

From September 2001 to the present, the DOD has received many requests to move non-DOD / non-U.S. Government forces, equipment, personnel or supplies. Many of these requests were for a significant level of support. Overall numbers for 2003 and 2004 are as follows.

1. Requests to provide support to coalition partners:
  - a. Completed: 7,048 passengers and 12,709 short tons of cargo (2003).  
10,165 passengers and 1,880 short tons of cargo (2004 to date).
  - b. Pending: 786 passengers and 1,251 short tons of cargo.
  - c. Denied: No data available.
2. Requests to provide support for non-DOD U.S. Government:
  - a. Completed: 6,085 passengers and 3,933.2 short tons of cargo (2003).  
2,324 passengers and 892 short tons of cargo (2004 to date).
  - b. Pending: On the Morning Show, actor Gary Sinise announced plans for troops to collect school supplies for U.S. troops to donate to local Iraqi schools.
  - c. Denied: No data available.
3. Total for coalition and non-DOD USG for 2003: 13,133 passengers and 16,642.1 short tons of cargo, equating to 607 x C-17s - enough to lift 8+ Army brigades.
4. Total for coalition and non-DOD USG to date for 2004: 12,489 passengers and 2,771.5 short tons of cargo equating to 204 x C-17s - enough to lift 3 Army brigades.
5. Requests to provide support for charitable donations to troops in Iraq:
  - a. Completed  
Containers in support of Operation Salute - Anheuser-Bush (1,920 short tons).  
Red Cross quality of life items (937.5 short tons)  
Donuts (including vehicles and trailers) - Krispy Kreme (81 short tons)  
Miscellaneous personal items from the VFW (65 short tons)

Restaurant food/equipment - Outback/Gough Restaurants (70 short tons)  
Magazines - Senator Saxton request (20 short tons)  
Air conditioners - Senator Biden request (15.6 short tons)  
USO care packages (12.5 short tons)  
NASCAR promotional cars and drivers for MWR visit (7.5 short tons)  
WWE equipment and wrestlers for MWR visit (5 short tons)  
Telephone calling cards (2.5 short tons)  
Cookies for shipboard Sailors (2.5 short tons)  
Clothing for wounded troops in German hospital (0.5 short tons)  
Snacks - Slim-Jim (0.5 short tons)  
Clothing for wounded troops in Landstuhl, Germany (0.4 short tons)  
Baseball equipment - Congressman Tiahrt (0.4 short tons)  
Chapel supplies (0.02 short tons)

b. Pending:

Air conditioners for troops in Iraq (22.5 short tons)  
25-inch televisions (4.5 short tons)  
Miscellaneous goods for deployed troops (2.5 Short tons)

c. Denied:

Restaurant food/equipment for Operation Feed the Troops (35 short tons)  
BBQ restaurant food, grills, and cooks for deployed troops (35 short tons)  
Magazines for deployed troops (19 short tons)  
Freezer pops for deployed troops (2.5 short tons)  
Snow Cone machine for deployed troops (0.05 short tons)

April 2, 2004

VIA FACSIMILE

(b)(6)

TO: The Honorable Caspar Weinberger

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



Dear Cap,

They tell me you are under the weather in the hospital. I sure hope that by the time this note reaches you, you are well on your way to recovery. Stay healthy, my friend - we need you!

Warm regards,

DHR:dli  
040204-4

335 SD

2 Apr 04

OSD 04895-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41020

\* \* \* COMMUNICATION RESULT REPORT ( APR. 2. 2004 10:50AM ) \* \* \*

FAX HEADER:

TRANSMITTED/STORED : APR. 2. 2004 10:49AM  
FILE MODE OPTION

ADDRESS

RESULT

PAGE

247 MEMORY TX

(b)(6)

OK  
OK

1/1  
1/1

REASON FOR ERROR  
E-1) HANG UP OR LINE FAIL  
E-3) NO ANSWER

E-2) BUSY  
E-4) NO FACSIMILE CONNECTION

April 2, 2004

VIA FACSIMILE

(b)(6)

TO: The Honorable Caspar Weinberger

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



Dear Cap.

They tell me you are under the weather in the hospital. I sure hope that by the time this note reaches you, you are well on your way to recovery. Stay healthy, my friend - we need you!

Warm regards,

DHR.db  
040204-4

91  
1330

720

March 15, 2004

TO: David Chu  
Dov Zakheim  
Les Brownlee  
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

4/2

FROM Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Pay Systems for Guard and Reserve

326

I am concerned about the pay systems for Guard and Reserve that seem to be broken and causing a great deal of unhappiness and difficulty. If we are going to ask people to serve, we need to treat them right.

Please tell me what is being done to fix this problem, how much it is going to cost and when it will be finished.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031504-24

.....  
Please respond by 4/2/04

15 Mar 04

Sir,  
Sec Army Response attached.  
vt/CDR Nosunzo

4/2

4/1

OSD 04918-04



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0200

INFO MEMO

March 31, 2004, 8:00 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Pay Systems for the Guard and Reserve

- In response to your query of March 15, 2003, I fully agree that we need to ensure our Soldiers receive the best possible support, especially with respect to their pay. We have been working to resolve the systemic causes of the problems even before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. We have since intensified our efforts.
- In the near term, the Forward Compatible Pay System (FCPS) will provide a commercial, off the shelf, interim solution, beginning in March 2005. Current development cost estimates for FCPS total \$17.3 million. The ultimate solution is the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS), which is being developed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. The deployment of the system will not begin until January 2006. The Army Budget Office is working with the Joint Requirements Integration Office to validate the full DIMHRS development costs.
- Until FCPS is fielded, the Army is providing training teams to finance battalions, mobilization/demobilization sites, and units in Kuwait, as well as establishing workarounds for current pay systems to correct specific, problematic input. Additionally, an information campaign to inform Soldiers and family members of the Guard and Reserve Pay Task Force (telephonic and e-mail hot line) is already proving beneficial in resolving pay issues.
- We continue to monitor progress in resolving this issue as outlined in the attached Pay Improvement Plan (Tab A).

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: LTC Susan Beausolcil, (b)(6)

OSD 04918-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41023

326

31 Mar 04

15 Mar 04

*Brownlee*



Summary Action/Task List for Improving Pay Support for Mobilized Soldiers

<u>Control Number</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Primary Organization</u>	<u>Suspense</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>GAO Response</u>	<u>Memo to Congress</u>
<u>Completed Actions</u>						
2	Training team to Kuwait	DFAS	Nov-03	completed	10	1a(2)
3	35 specific training events for finance battalions and mobilization/demobilization site personnel	USARC		completed	10	1a(3)
7	US Army Reserve help lines for individuals and finance units	USARC		completed	N/A	1a(7)
8	Deploy integrated Active Component/Reserve Component input system (DMO) to all Army	DFAS		completed	N/A	1b(1)
9	Retroactive entitlement input	DFAS		completed	N/A	1b(2)
10	Leave Accrual	DFAS		completed	N/A	1b(3)
11	Revise Defense Finance & Accounting Service (DFAS) Military pay message from 19 Dec 02	DFAS	Nov-03	completed	1, 3, 18	1c(1)
12	Publish matrix of responsibilities by action	USAFINCOM	Dec-03	completed	1, 3	1c(2)
13	Publish standardized entitlement explanation flyer for distribution at mobilization sites	USAFINCOM	Dec-03	completed	13	1c(3)
15	Add warning screens on input system (DMO and JUSTIS) for tour cancellations	DFAS, ARNG		completed	4, 21	1e
18	Published guidance on processing orders for medical extensions	Army GI		completed	4	1g
20	Review grades of US Property and Fiscal Office (USPFO) military pay technicians	ARNG		completed	9	1i
25	Produce exportable DJMS-RC training package	Finance School	Mar-04	completed	10	2c
43	Joint Uniform Standard Terminal Input System (JUSTIS - ARNG input system) change to require remark on miscellaneous credit input	ARNG	Apr-04	completed	20	N/A
44	DMO change to require remark on misc. credit input	DFAS	Apr-04	completed	20	N/A
50	Establish policy for supervisory control/review of tour cancellations	DFAS/ARNG	Apr-04	completed	N/A	N/A
<u>Ongoing Actions</u>						
1	Training at US Army Reserve Pay Operations Center	USARC		ongoing	10	1a(1)
4	National Guard mobilization finance classes	ARNG		ongoing	10	1a(4)
5	Notification to US Property & Fiscal Offices of pending mobilizations	ARNG		ongoing	N/A	1a(5)
6	Notification to US Property & Fiscal Offices of recent demobilizations	ARNG		ongoing	N/A	1a(6)
14	Initiate compliance reviews of mobilization/demobilization sites	USAFINCOM	Dec-03	ongoing	1	1d
16	Defense Joint Military Pay System - Reserve Component (DJMS-RC) automated reconciliation to in-theater database for monitoring stops/starts of theater entitlements	DFAS		ongoing	3	1f(1)
17	DJMS-RC automated reconciliation to demobilization site records for stopping all pay/curtailing tours	DFAS		ongoing	3	1f(2)
19	Publish memorandum to reserve commands on importance of using pay management report	USAFINCOM	Dec-03	ongoing	5	1h
21	Ensure pay issues for units identified by General Accounting Office are all resolved	ARNG	Oct-03	ongoing	15	1j
40	Continue to add functionality to myPay for discretionary actions	DFAS		ongoing	14	N/A
42	Add JUSTIS table of mobilized soldiers' accounts with recurring input required	ARNG	Apr-04	ongoing	19	N/A
45	Provide Defense Military Pay Offices (DMPO) and Finance Battalions (FB) with NG newsletter	DFAS		ongoing	20	N/A
51	Establish ombudsmen program for National Guard Soldiers	ARNG	Apr-04	ongoing	N/A	N/A



Summary Action/Task List for Improving Pay Support for Mobilized Soldiers

<u>Control Number</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Primary Organization</u>	<u>Suspense</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>GAO Response</u>	<u>Memo to Congress</u>
<u>Near Term Actions (3 to 6 months)</u>						
22	Automate Hardship Duty Pay - Location (HDP-L)	DFAS	Apr-04	open	17	2a(1)
23	Develop/publish revised comprehensive procedures	USAFINCOM	Mar-04	open	1	2b(1)
24	Clarify who does what how & develop metrics/standards tailored to mobilization/demobilization	USAFINCOM	Mar-04	open	2	2b(2)
38	Evaluate support for surge staffing of USPFOs	ARNG	Apr-04	open	7,8	N/A
41	Evaluate Standard Installation/Division Personnel System - National Guard (SIDPERS-NG) - JUSTIS interface for mobilization	ARNG	Mar-04	open	16	NIA
46	Evaluate potential DJMS-RC systems change for debt threshold	DFAS	Apr-04	open	21	N/A
<u>Mid-Term Actions (6 to 36 months)</u>						
26	Internet soldiers' pay account access (myPay) for dependents (view-only)	DFAS	Aug-04	open	14	3a
27	Forward Compatible Pay system (FCP) approval from DoD/ Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP)	DFAS	Sep-04	open	17,18,20	3b(3)
28	Complete FCP Development-Dec 04	DFAS	Dec-04	open	17,18,20	3b(4)(a)
29	Start FCP deployment to the Army RC- Mar-05	DFAS	Mar-05	open	17,18,20	3b(4)(b)
30	Start FCP deployment to the Army AC-Jul 05	DFAS	Jul-05	open	17,18,20	3b(4)(c)
31	Update regulations to eliminate outdated entitlements and processes- DoDFMR	DFAS	Sep-04	open	6	3c
32	Update regulations to eliminate outdated entitlements and processes - AR 37-104-4	USAFINCOM	Sep-04	open	6	3c
33	Update regulations to eliminate outdated entitlements and processes - NGR 130-6	ARNG	Sep-04	open	6	3c
34	Evaluate placement and monitoring mechanisms for FCP/reserve pay training	Finance School	Sep-04	open	10,12	3d
39	Add pay support doc review & monthly reconciliations to precommand course	ARNG	Sep-04	open	11	N/A
49	Automate Continental US Cost of Living Allowance (CONUS COLA)	DFAS	Mar-05	open	NIA	N/A
52	Procedures for reviewing high dollar payments	DFAS	Sep-04	open	24	N/A
<u>Long Term Actions (36+ months)</u>						
35	Initial Army operational capability DIMHRS-Sep 05	OSD	Sep-05	open	22, 23	4a(4)(a)
36	Start deployment of DIMHRS to the Army-Jan 06	OSD	Jan-06	open	22, 23	4a(4)(b)
37	Complete DIMHRS implementation-Sep 07	OSD	Sep-07	open	22, 23	4a(4)(c)
47	Incorporate Army Guard pay problems in Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) development	OSD	Sep-05	open	22	N/A
48	Include full reengineering in DIMHRS	OSD	Sep-05	open	23	N/A





720  
 COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY  
 BAGHDAD

MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld

FROM: Paul Bremer *4/6/04*

SUBJECT: Iranian Charge

We will remove the Iranian Charge. The Iraqi Foreign Minister agrees with our moving against him. However, he insisted that the MFA be given a chance to ask the Iranians to remove the charge on their own decision. He put this question to the Iranians. In fact, the Iranian Charge is out of the country at this time but it is not yet clear whether that is a quiet removal or only for consultations.

With the business in the south, thousands of Iranian pilgrims coming in the next few days for the Shia festival of Arba'een, and the British pressing to hold back until the end of the festival, we delayed implementing the order until the festival is over. I have directed my staff to have the Foreign Ministry implement the formal order to expel the Charge on April 12, the day after Arba'een.

OSD 04927-04

SECURITY CABLES DISTRIBUTION

SECDEF	SECSTATE	SECDEF	SECDEF	SECDEF
OSD	OSD	OSD	OSD	OSD

*12/1*

*6 APR 04*

*5 APR 04*



**Lavoie, Lynn L, Capt, OSD**

---

**From:** Lavoie, Lynn L, Capt, OSD  
**Sent:** Monday, April 05, 2004 12:42 PM  
**To:** Norwood, Scott, Col; ExecSec; McCormack, Brian; Mike Adler  
**Cc:** SecDef Cables ESO  
**Subject:** Iranian Charge Snowflake in SIPR

You have an Iranian Charge Snowflake in SIPR.

V/R  
Capt Lavoie

## RSS - SecDef CablesESO

---

**From:** Administrator [Administrator@orha.centcom.smil.mil]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 05, 2004 12:39 PM  
**To:** RSS - SecDef CablesESO  
**Subject:** Delivery Status Notification (Success)



ATT228386.TXT



Iranian Charge  
Snowflake

Your message

**To:** Brian McCormack (E-mail); Executive Secretariat CPA (E-mail);  
Mike Adler (E-mail); Scott Norwood (E-mail)  
**Subject:** Iranian Charge Snowflake  
**Sent:** Mon, 5 Apr 2004 20:44:33 +0400

was delivered to the following recipient(s):

McCormack, Brian V. (GS-13) on Mon, 5 Apr 2004 20:38:51 +0400  
<exchgs1.orha.centcom.smil.mil. #2.0.0>  
CPA Executive Secretary on Mon, 5 Apr 2004 20:38:51 +0400  
<exchgs1.orha.centcom.smil.mil. #2.0.0>  
Adler, Michael J. (FS-02) on Mon, 5 Apr 2004 20:38:51 +0400  
<exchgs1.orha.centcom.smil.mil. #2.0.0>  
Norwood, Scott on Mon, 5 Apr 2004 20:38:51 +0400  
<exchgs1.orha.centcom.smil.mil. #2.0.0>

## **RSS - SecDef CablesESO**

---

**From:** CPA Executive Secretary [execsec@orha.centcom.smil.mil]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 05, 2004 12:46 PM  
**To:** RSS - SecDef CablesESO  
**Subject:** RE: Iranian Charge Snowflake  
**Importance:** High

Confirming Receipt – many thanks.

Sincerely,  
S. Sita Sonty  
Exec Sec

-----Original Message-----

**From:** RSS - SecDef CablesESO [mailto:CablesESO@osd.smil.mil]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 05, 2004 8:45 PM  
**To:** McCormack, Brian V. (GS-13); CPA Executive Secretary; Adler, Michael J. (FS-02); Norwood, Scott  
**Subject:** Iranian Charge Snowflake

**Classification: UNCLASSIFIED**

Please pass to Amb Bremer and confirm receipt.  
V/R  
Capt Lavoie

3/16/04

7201

March 15, 2004

TO: David Chu  
 Dov Zakheim  
 Les Brownlee  
 Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
 Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Pay Systems for Guard and Reserve

326

I am concerned about the pay systems for Guard and Reserve that seem to be broken and causing a great deal of unhappiness and difficulty. If we are going to ask people to serve, we need to treat them right.

Please tell me what is being done to fix this problem, how much it is going to cost and when it will be finished.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031504-24

.....

Please respond by ~~4/2/04~~  
 31 MAR

15 Mar 04

OSD 04986-04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

2004 APR 06 11:00 AM  
April 6, 2004, 1:00 PM

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

**FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**FROM: David S.C. Chu, USD (P&R)**

*David S.C. Chu to [unclear]*  
**SUBJECT: Personnel Systems for Guard and Reserve -- SNOWFLAKE**

- Pay for active, reserve, and Guard personnel is one of the many problems caused by our ineffective legacy military personnel systems.
- The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) is developing an interim pay system (Forward Compatible Pay) that will address some of the pay problems. The Services are also putting in place manual workarounds. However, many of the pay problems are caused by the personnel systems and the lack of integration between personnel and pay.
- My office, working with the Services and other DoD offices, designed the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) that will address the problems with our current legacy military personnel and pay systems. It is a fully integrated, all-Service, all-Component personnel and pay system built on a commercial off-the-shelf base (PeopleSoft) and designed to streamline business processes and incorporate best practices. We recently developed an accelerated schedule for implementation that will bring the Army **up** beginning in September 2005 with full implementation in all Services by October of 2006.
- The accelerated program requires some additional near-term funding, which I will work with the Comptroller to secure.

RECOMMENDATION: INFORMATION ONLY

COORDINATIONS: NA

Prepared By: Norma St. Claire, Director, Joint Requirements and Integration Office,

(b)(6)



OSD 04986-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41032

3/16/04

March 15, 2004

TO: David Chu  
Dov Zakheim  
Les Brownlee  
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Pay Systems for Guard and Reserve

I am concerned about the pay systems for Guard and Reserve that seem to be broken and causing a great deal of unhappiness and difficulty. If we are going to ask people to serve, we need to treat them right.

Please tell me what is being done to fix this problem, how much it is going to cost and when it will be finished.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031504-24

.....  
Please respond by ~~4/2/04~~  
31 MAR

OSD 049



7201



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

INFO MEMO  
ACTION

USDP *[Signature]* MAR 29 2004  
DSD  
I-04/002780  
EF-8646

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6)) *[Signature]* 25 MAR 2004

SUBJECT: Metrics

- You asked us to incorporate Andrew Krepinevich's suggestions about metrics into our process of measuring progress in the war in Iraq.
- We have forwarded these suggestions to the appropriate offices within OSD Policy, and will use them as part of our reevaluation of the metrics process.
- **Recommend you sign attached letter to Dr. Krepinevich thanking him for his suggestions.**

Attachments: As stated

DUSD (NESA) *[Signature]*

PDASD/ISA *[Signature]*

MAR 25 2004

Iraq

25 March

17 Feb 04

OSD 05027-04



EF-8646

March 1, 2004

I 04/002780

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Suggestions from Krepinevich

Attached is a letter from Andrew Krepinevich, which has some useful suggestions.  
You might want to feed that into the process on metrics.

Thanks.

Attach.  
2/17/04 Krepinevich memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
030104-47

.....  
Please respond by 3/19/04.

*(L) Letter attached*

Larry Di Rita  
4/1

OSD 05027-04

02-03-04 08:09 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/41035

I  
9  
Mar 04  
17 Feb 04

MEMO

---

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: Andrew Krepinevich  
DATE: February 17, 2004  
SUBJECT: Metrics for Iraq

---

cc: Di Rita  
LTG Graddock

Iraq

Thank you for inviting me to meet with you last week. During our session, I asked you what metrics you were employing to gauge progress in Iraq. You said my question was "mean" and did not offer any metrics, even though you are a strong believer in their importance, as am I.

Let me suggest two metrics that might be of use to you:

1. *The Percentage of Incidents Initiated by Coalition Forces.* This ~~war~~ is dominated by intelligence. If we **know** who the enemy is, and where he is, we will win, as the enemy cannot hope to match our military capabilities. **Thus** it is not the overall number of incidents between enemy and coalition forces that matters, but rather our *ability to initiate such engagements.*
2. *The Number of Enemy Defectors that Offer Useful Intelligence.* Again, **this** pertains to winning the intelligence war, but it also speaks to an erosion in the enemy's ability **to win** the "hearts and minds" of the Iraqi people. People defect when they believe their side will not win, **or** when they lose faith in the cause for which they are fighting.

17 February

As you know, in this kind of war it is important to establish metrics at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, **and** across its military, political, social and economic dimensions. There are lots of metrics. Which ones do we put our stock in? Which take priority? The choice ought to be informed by our goals and our strategy. On the other hand, if we don't have a coherent strategy, **any** metrics will do.

In a protracted competition such as this, the public will want to know that we are making progress in Iraq (and Afghanistan, and in **GWOT**) . Persuasive metrics are needed for this purpose **as well.**

Hope **this** is useful. It was good to see you. I am personally grateful for your efforts on behalf of our nation, and wish you every success.

OSD 05027-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41036



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

APR 7 2004

Mr. Andrew Krepinevich  
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments  
1730 Rhode Island Avenue, NW  
Suite 912  
Washington, DC 20036

Imag

Dear Andy:

Thank you for your insightful memo. I forwarded it to Doug Feith for inclusion in our review of the metrics process. Please feel free to pass along any other suggestions you may have regarding the measurement of progress in Iraq.

7 Apr 04

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

17 Feb 04

OSD 05027-04

2/20/04

72

7:35 PM

TO: Powell Moore  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
cc: DAVID CHU  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

20040218-0 11:22

DATE: February 18, 2004

SUBJECT: Congressman Tiart

Congressman Tiart talked about a fellow who lost \$4,000 because of a gap in his healthcare. Would you please check that out and get me the precise details?

701

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
021804.09

2/27

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

18 Feb 04

OSD 05034-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41038



UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECRET  
704 APR -5 11:21

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

April 6, 2004 - 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

SUBJECT: Representative TIART - SNOWFLAKE

- e You asked for the precise details on a constituent of Representative Tiart who lost \$4,000 because of a gap in his healthcare (attached).
- e Representative Tiart's Office was contacted and provided the name of the constituent, Mr. Ryan York, but was unable to provide additional details.
- e We have made numerous attempts to contact Mr. or Mrs. York and have been unsuccessful to date. We will continue our efforts to contact the Yorks, and will provide additional information after we have discussed the situation with them.
- e Our policies are structured to try to preclude any such loss for a reservist called to active duty, so we are eager to learn more to understand if there is a situation we need to correct.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment

Prepared By: Colonel Kathleen Woody, OASD/RA(M&P)



OSD 05034-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41039

2/20/04

7:35 PM

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
cc: DAVID CHU  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
ZBL 100 -3 2/11/22

DATE: February 18, 2004  
SUBJECT: Congressman Tiart

- Congressman Tiart talked about a fellow who lost \$4,000 because of a gap in his healthcare. Would you please check that out and **get** me the precise details?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
021804.09

2/27

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 05034-04

MPPD

December 27, 2003

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Recruiting

We **need** to make sure our recruiting accurately reflects the kinds of deployments we expect.

Do you have **a** sense of how closely the Services are **with** respect to the accuracy and likelihood of deployments?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
122703-32(ts computer)



Please respond by 1/31/04





UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

April 7, 2004; 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (Personnel & Readiness)

*David S. C. Chu*  
8 Apr 04

SUBJECT: SNOWFLAKE - Recruiting that Accurately Reflects Deployment

- You recently asked (Tab A) for a sense of how well the Services' recruiting efforts reflect the likelihood of deployments. This responds.
- The topic of deployments is a standard part of training and information provided to recruits during discussions with the recruiter and through Delayed Entry Program activities.
- The Air Force is the most explicit. All Air Force recruits are required to review the Air Force Expeditionary Force Policy prior to accession. Each applicant must indicate with initials or signature that he or she received information on the policy, which clearly states that, although most Air Force personnel are away from their home stations less than 120 days per year, some may be required to exceed this level. Air Force advertising and marketing also depict Airmen in deployed environments.
- Similarly, Navy advertising and marketing prominently feature sailors on sea duty or in a warrior context.
- Army recently shifted its communications strategy away from a focus on tangible benefits, such as money for college and bonuses, to a more balanced approach. Army advertising and marketing reflect all aspects of Army training, including the combat arms, and portray the full rigor of Army service, including mobilizations and deployments.
- We will use our next survey of active personnel to ensure recruits understand these messages accurately.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Capt Angela Giddings, ODUSD(MPP)AP; (b)(6)

Maj Heidi Schwenn, ODUSD(MPP)AP; (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/41042

OSD 05055-04

**TAB**

**A**

MPP

December 27, 2003

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Recruiting

We need to make sure our recruiting accurately reflects the **kinds** of deployments we expect.

Do you have a sense of how closely the Services are **with** respect to the accuracy and likelihood of deployments?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
122703-32 (ts computer)



Please respond by 1/31/04

720  
EF-8783  
04/003223

March 5, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
CC: Doug Feith  
Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Defense Policy Board

334

Here is a draft memorandum on the Defense Policy Board.

I wonder if we ought to do an update on it and then work it with Tillie Fowler.  
Once we have a good piece of paper, we can circulate to people who might focus it better.

Thanks.

Attach.  
March 2001 Draft Memorandum Concerning the Defense Policy Board

DHR:dh  
030504-29

.....  
Please respond by 3/26/04 4/9

SM on 04

Ryan - It maybe better if you could pull it all together for SecDef with a single piece of paper and action recommendations as appropriate.  
4/8 L...  
D. H.

INFO MEMO

MAR 29 2004

EF-8783

DepSecDef  
USD(P) *[Signature]* APR 7 2004

I-04/ 003223

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Proposed Revisions to Defense Policy Board Charter

- You asked us to consider updating the March 2001 Draft Defense Policy Board memorandum (Tab A).
- Besides the memo you provided us, the DPB is also governed by a charter which is updated every two years and signed by the USD(P). The latest charter, filed August 3, 2003, is attached (Tab B).
- Since both the memorandum and charter are similar in nature, I recommend doing away with the memorandum as a document.
- I have provided three additional ideas to utilize the DPB in other ways (Tab C).
- I have also spoken with Tillie Fowler and Walt Slocombe and have attached their inputs (Tab D). Tillie recommends merging the ideas in the attached memorandum and those in Tab C into the DPB charter when it is updated next summer.

COORDINATION: Defense Policy Board (Tillie Fowler)

Attachments: As stated.

Prepared by: Mark Ellis, Special Assistant, OUSD(P), (b)(6)

OSD 05109-04

334  
29 Mar 04  
5 Mar 04

**DRAFT MEMORANDUM CONCERNING THE DEFENSE POLICY BOARD**

The Defense Policy Board **was** founded during the Reagan administration: (1) to bring new thinking to the Department of Defense; (2) to **analyze** and assess policies and programs with the detachment **that** distance from day-to-operations allows; (3) to provide the Secretary with early warning of potential problems **and** early advice concerning emerging opportunities; **and** (4) to **help** develop support for **the** Secretary **and** his program among members of Congress, other executive branch officials, the press **and** intellectual communities.

The Board's products are ideas, assessments **and** advice. These can only be produced by a group of intelligent, experienced and innovative individuals brought together with a sense of purpose **and** a close relationship to the Secretary of Defense. **If** the Secretary takes the Board seriously, so will the officials who come before it to discuss their policies **and** programs. **If** it is known that the Secretary counts on the Board to keep him informed, to develop ideas, to evaluate current programs **and** propose **new** ones, the Board will be able to recruit talented members **and** enlist the help of a wider community.

To **make** the Board effective, I believe that: (1) you should be available to meet with *the* Board at least quarterly for 1-2 hours; **and** (2) the Board should be described as reporting to you (even **though**, for administrative purposes, it should continue to **be** managed by the Under Secretary for Policy.)

y+1  
y e1  
w) th my bl

I would **like** to reinvigorate the Board by a **combination of new** members, the establishment of working groups **assembled as necessary** to look at **and** report on specific matters of interest to you, **and** by allocating a small budget for outside consulting/research **services**. (Board **members** serve without compensation).

The priorities of the Board will, of course, be your **priorities**. I would imagine that you would want us to work on missile defense, on a strategy for **Iraq**, on the transformation of our current force posture to one less oriented to cold war contingencies, on the realignment of NATO/EU "arrangements," and the like. We should be broad and deep enough to take on any assignment you choose to give us **and** you may well have others in mind.

p.w.

**As I** see the **Board** it is not a substitute for the **staff work** that will be coming to you from a vast department. **But** as you **know** it is often difficult

4

to look much beyond the next inter-agency meeting, the next Presidential speech, the next NATO ministerial meeting, the next budget decision. The Board can make its most important contribution, not by looking into the distant future or at today's immediate concerns, but at new policies that can be initiated during your tenure as Secretary.

In a separate memo I have indicated the current membership **and some** preliminary ideas about new members. If we were to go forward I would propose to conduct an immediate review of the current membership with a view to recommending a reconstituted Board.

Aug 3, 2002  
DoD Charter

CHARTER  
DEFENSE POLICY BOARD ADVISORY COMMITTEE

**A. Official Designation:** This committee will be officially designated the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee (referred to as the Defense Policy Board, abbreviated DPB).

**B. Objectives and Scope of Activities:**

1. The Defense Policy Board will provide the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy with independent, informed advice and opinion concerning matters of defense policy. It will focus on issues central to strategic planning for the Department of Defense and will be responsible for research and analysis of topics raised by the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

2. Individual Defense Policy Board members will be selected by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. Members will be appointed to serve for a term of two years. Membership will consist primarily of private sector individuals with distinguished backgrounds in national security affairs, but may include no more than four (4) government officials. Board membership will be approximately twenty-six (26).

3. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy may appoint consultants to support the Board and Board task forces.

4. The Defense Policy Board's sole function will be advisory and it will operate under the provisions of Public Law 92-463.

**C. Period of Time Necessary for the Committee to Carry Out Its Purpose:** Indefinite.

**D. Official to Whom the Committee Reports:** The Defense Policy Board reports to the Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

**E. Agency Responsible for Providing the Necessary Support:** The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy will provide personnel, facilities and other administrative support necessary for the performance of the Defense Policy Board's functions. Information and assistance as required may be obtained from the Military Departments and other agencies of the Department of Defense.



**F. Duties:** The Defense Policy Board will perform the following functions:

1. Review the long-term policy implications of (a) U.S. force structure and force modernization and transformation on the ability of the Department of Defense to execute the U.S. defense strategy; (b) U.S. regional defense policies; and (c) any other issues identified by the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary or Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

2. When required, the Chairman may establish task forces comprising members of the Board to analyze specific short-term policy issues identified by the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary or Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

3. Serve as individual advisors to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as required.

**G. Annual Operating Costs and Man-Years:** Members will serve without compensation but will be reimbursed for travel and other necessary expenses of Defense Policy Board business as approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The Defense Policy Board's annual support costs are estimated to be \$710,000 to include salaries for 2 full-time professional staff, 1 full-time administrative assistant, consultants as required, travel expenses, and miscellaneous fees and administrative costs.

**H. Number and Frequency of Committee Meetings:** The Defense Policy Board will meet quarterly or as required by the Secretary of Defense or the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Task forces established by the Chairman may meet at other times as determined by the Chairman. Necessary notices will be filed at least 15 days prior to each meeting with the Federal Register and all procedures required for closed meetings will be followed.

**I. Termination Date:** The Defense Policy Board will terminate two years from the chartering date, unless, before that period's expiration, its charter is renewed.

**J. Filing Date:** August 3, 2003

## **Tab C: Other ways to utilize the DPB**

1. Integrated Policy Teams (IPT): To help advise the Secretary on multi-disciplinary queries, joint-board task forces could be assembled drawing on membership from the DPB, DSB, DBB, Highlands Forum, and other equivalent and relevant DoD-related boards.

2. War Games: DPB members could inform NDU and other relevant entities about the nature of senior government advisory positions based on their own experiences so as to help make war game exercises more realistic. Specific members may also participate in war game exercises if need be.

3. Team B view-point: The Secretary can direct DPB task forces to develop contrarian positions on policies under review within DoD to provide the Secretary with further option(s) in addition to OUSD(P)'s policy guidance.



DEFENSE POLICY  
BOARD

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2100



March 26, 2004

FOR RYAN HENRY

FROM: Tillie Fowler, Chairman

SUBJECT: Defense Policy Board

This is in response to the Secretary's note regarding the Defense Policy Board. I understand that in the previous administration the Board was little utilized and, therefore, Richard's memo in March 2001 was appropriate at the time. During his tenure, he brought the Defense Policy Board into the forefront.

What the Secretary may not be aware of is that our charter is required to be reviewed every two years. The Defense Policy Board charter was last updated in August 2003 (Tab A). This was shortly after I took over as chair (May 2003) and provided the perfect opportunity to modify and focus the Board's future. I was thoroughly engaged in the effort and the charter was rewritten after consultations with Doug Feith. In rewriting the Charter, we made several positive changes to the Board:

- We reduced the number of Members. 26, vice 30, is a more manageable number and has allowed our discussions to be more thorough.
- We modified the composition of the Board. We removed non-participants and have added expertise where we needed it.
- We established Task Forces. The first involving the Proliferation Security Initiative, as you know, recently concluded, and we have begun the Irregular Warfare/USSOCOM task force. Additionally, I will be speaking with the Secretary on April 26<sup>th</sup> to determine the next one.
- I meet regularly with the Secretary regarding the Board's meetings and seek his input as to the topics to be discussed at each meeting.

We continue to look for ways to be more responsive to the Secretary and welcome ideas on how to do that. As to your suggestions regarding IPTs, or Joint Task Forces between the DPB, DSB, DBB, RFPB etc., I welcome this if there is a topic that crosses our boundaries. Additionally, cross flow communication between these boards is useful. Denis Bovin and Bill Schneider, both of the DSB, regularly attend our quarterly meetings, Kiron Skinner, now attends the DBB quarterly meetings and several of our

11-L-0559/OSD/41052

members (i.e. Fred Ikle, Chris Williams, Barry Blechman) have participated in DSB task forces and summer studies.

Regarding participation of our members in war games with NDU and other relevant entities, I am sure the members would be interested in participating depending upon their schedules.

Finally, with the balance of opinions on the board today, the Secretary already receives both pro and contrarian views regarding the subjects that are before us at our quarterly meetings. Developing contrarian viewpoints regarding policy guidance could certainly be a subset of our task forces for a certain policy issue.

The priority of the Defense Policy Board is to be responsive to the Secretary by providing him with independent, outside advice, assessments and ideas.

Attachments:

As stated

Ann:

Here are my quick comments on how to respond to SecDef's request for suggestions on how to make the DPB serve him and DOD better. They are not particularly geared to the 3/01 paper attached, which is more in the nature of telling him what the DPB does and how to restructure its membership. (The list of topics to address, for example, is clearly the product of 2001 not 2004.)

Based on my still relatively brief service - and 8 years of working with the DPB as a DOD official - I have these suggestions:

- The Board cannot practically meet as a corporate body more than about quarterly, especially if the Secretary is to meet with them for a serious discussion. However, it would be useful if there was more opportunity for members both to learn about what is going on in DOD and to work on specific projects between meetings. The task forces are a *good* initial step in that direction, but I should think more could be done to ask members to contribute in between meetings. It would be a mistake to over-organize, but it might make sense to have several sub groups working most of the time, on topics the Board had earlier identified. (I realize this process has already started.)
- The agenda should reflect first of all the Secretary's preferences/concerns, and those should take absolute priority. However, it would also be useful if there were a more systematic way for members to suggest items which the Board should address. Would it, for example, be possible to canvass the board a month or so before each meeting for suggestions for topics?
- It is useful for Board members to know what are the Secretary's and the Department's long-term policy concerns even if they are not (at least initially) on the DPB's agenda for any meeting. It might, for example, be useful for USDP to appear briefly at alternate meetings to give an overview of "strategic business," not yesterday's cable clearing crisis, but long-term projects on his agenda - both to sensitize the board to what's on his (and, by hypothesis, SecDef's) mind, but also to get suggestions at a relatively early stage from the board both as to considerations for what he is working on and also what is conspicuous by absence.
- The Board should focus on long-term issues, not current affairs. The focus at the last meeting on China is an example of doing just this. It would be useful to bring in experts from both inside government and outside to address - sometimes with a different perspective - these longer term issues. (An example is the presentation by Lord Guthrie on Pakistan - and, in fact, the controversial briefing on Saudi Arabia.)
- The main utility of the Board, as I see it, is to give the Secretary *outside* advice. He has a couple of a million direct employees to tell him how to manage details and implement the policies that he has established (or that they think he should) and to congratulate him and his staff on how well they are doing. The Board should not be a debating society and it may not need to include bitter partisan enemies (though Richard

Perle served usefully and with integrity throughout the Clinton years, and it did us no harm to be informed as to our manifest failings on a regular basis) but it should include some but who don't, in general, agree with the Administration of the day

- In order to fulfill its potential, the Board should be understood as strictly advisory and deliberately somewhat contrarian — for the sake both of the Secretary and for the integrity of its advice. Its members are not government officials, they are not even, at least not by reason of their membership, confidants of the DOD leadership who for one reason or another don't want to work in the government, but whom the Secretary wants to be able to call on for counsel. They are independent sources of comment and suggestions, without authority or official status. In today's Washington, that may be hard to convince anyone of, but it should still be the message.

Walt Storz

215070/27 Mar 04

**ACTION MEMO**

MAR 11 2004  
*[Handwritten signature]*

I-04/003253-ES  
DepSecDef  
USDPCopy provided  
11/3/04

Haiti

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

SUBJECT: Thank You Letters to the Chilean and Canadian Ministers of Defense.

11 MAR 2004

- You asked us to prepare letters from you to your Chilean and Canadian counterparts thanking them for their prompt deployment of troops to Haiti (Tab B).

RECOMMENDATION: That Secretary of Defense sign the attached letters and release the transmittal cables at Tab A.

COORDINATION: Tab C.

Attachments:  
As Stated

Prepared by: Luis Sanchez, ISA/WHA, (b)(6)

11 MAR 04

9 MAR 04

OSD 05114-04

2/15 0800  
4/1030

EF-8801

04/003253-ES

March 9, 2004

**TO:** Doug Feith  
**CC:** Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

**SUBJECT:** Chile and Canada in Haiti

Please draft a letter for me to send to the MoD of Chile and the MoD of Canada thanking them for sending troops to Haiti so promptly - I appreciate it.

Thanks.

*Larry Di Rita*  
*fy Sam*

DHR:dh  
030804-98

.....  
Please respond by 3/12/04

*(15 DP)*  
*He said Chile*  
*we got France?*  
*Dick*  
*Exec Sec - 3/29*  
*This is UNSAT. Please*  
*pay attention*  
*I did not ask*  
*for a letter to*  
*France*  
*Dick*

???????

03-04 10:24  
4/2





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

APR 8 2004

APR 17 1

Her Excellency  
Michelle Bachelet  
Minister of National Defense  
Santiago, Chile

Dear Madame Minister:

Please accept my appreciation for sending Chilean troops as part of the Multi-national Interim Force to Haiti. Their presence is making an important contribution toward setting Haiti back on the road to stability and security.

Sincerely,

SMILEY



OSD 05114-04

9/11/04

11-L-0559/OSD/41058



**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

Her Excellency  
Michelle Bachelet  
Minister of National Defense  
Santiago, Chile

Dear Madame Minister:

Please accept my appreciation for sending Chilean troops as part of the Multi-national Interim Forces to Haiti. Their presence is making an important contribution toward setting Haiti back on the road to ~~democracy~~. *democracy, stability and security*

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/41059



**THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

APR 8 2004

His Excellency  
David Platt  
Minister of National Defense 14 rue St. Dominique  
Ottawa, Canada

Dear Mr. Minister:

Please accept my appreciation for sending Canadian troops as part of the Multi-national Interim Force to Haiti in such an expeditious manner. Their presence is making an important contribution toward setting Haiti back on the road to stability and security.

Sincerely,



OSD 05114-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41060

EA 17 1

8 APR 04



**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

His Excellency  
David Platt  
Minister of National Defense 14 rue St. Dominique  
Ottawa, Canada

Dear Mr. Minister:

Please accept my appreciation for sending Canadian troops as part of the  
Multi-national Interim Forces to Haiti. Their presence is making an important  
contribution toward setting Haiti back on the road to

*stability and security*

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/41061

720

APR 07 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Senator Bond

Thanks for the call on Kit Bond. I talked to him, and we will work it.

DHR:dh  
040504-10

335 SD

7 APR 04

OSD 05131-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41062

72

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
204 102 -9 AM 10:04

APR 07 2004

TO: ADM Ed Giambastiani


c c : Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT: Visit

Thanks so much for your hospitality. It was a good visit, and I am delighted you are enjoying what you are doing so much. Stay in touch.

Regards,



DHR:dh  
040604-10

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

33350

7 APR 04

OSD 05135-04



April 8, 2004

TO: Dina Powell  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Jan Boyer

Here is the background sheet of someone who wants to work on the Millennium Challenge Account. He is bright and capable.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Jan Boyer's background sheet

DHR:dh  
040804-15

*230 02*

*8 Apr 04*

OSD 05147-04

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I trust you are well. I moved from Argentina to come to DC about a year ago to take up a post as Senior Advisor to Peter Watson, the President of OPIC.

I remain appreciative for your time and counsel after the Dole campaign and up to the time you moved back to Washington. I haven't wanted to burden you since my arrival since I can only imagine how busy you must be. Frank Carlucci suggested I ask for your counsel and support in my next step in public service.

I have an interest in serving on the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), the President's new foreign aid initiative. This new organization will be headed by Paul Applegarth, whose name has been submitted to the Senate for confirmation. I have been told that the WH is making personnel decisions regarding the next tier of leadership of the organization and that my name is "in the mix". The decisions are being made in the next few days and, not surprisingly, it is a very competitive process.

I would very much appreciate your help in the form of a call to share your opinion on my qualifications. I would understand if, for whatever reason, you were unable or unwilling to do so.

In the event you decide to support my interest, I thought you might find useful some relevant background :

1. Position sought: "VP Country Relations", reporting to the CEO. As I understand it, this position has operational responsibility for negotiating the agreements with foreign aid recipient governments.
2. The key challenge for MCA is implementation. I have a proven track record of negotiating agreements and deploying capital in the developing world. In addition, my time at OPIC has taught me about launching initiatives inside the USG.
3. Of the 18 countries initially eligible for MCA aid, I speak fluently one of the official languages of 14 of these countries and have traveled or done business in several.

I am attaching my CV. I am available to talk to you and would welcome your counsel. Many thanks and sorry for the bother.

Best regards,

Jan Boyer



# JAN BOYER

(b)(6)

## EXPERIENCE

2003-present

**OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION (OPIC)**, Washington, D.C.

Senior Advisor to the President.

- Involved in strategic projects for the private equity, structured finance and insurance activities.

1994-2002

**VENTURE CAPITAL/PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTOR** (in US and Emerging Markets)

Have launched and led three successful private investment initiatives in emerging markets. Responsible for strategy, implementation, budget, oversight, personnel and media relations. Reviewed more than 1,200 investment proposals from over 30 countries. Negotiated agreements with more than 150 companies, organizations and NGOs.

### Positions:

Managing General Partner and Founder, Softbank Latin America Ventures, L.P. (2000-2002)

- Chief executive of investment activities of **Softbank Corp.** (a Tokyo Stock Exchange listed company) in Latin America and the US Hispanic market.
- Responsible for investment funds of \$155 million; annual budget of \$7 million; oversight of companies with over 400 employees, more than \$100 million of invested capital and offices in 7 countries.
- Served on Board of Directors of Connectmed, Spring Wireless, Dineronet, BitTime, Tiixa, LearningSoft, iCaramba and others.

President, BancBoston Capital Southern Cone; Partner and Director, BancBoston Capital, Inc. (1997-2000)

- Private equity business of **FleetBoston Financial Corporation** (a NYSE listed company) with investments of \$1.4 billion in over 350 companies.
- Established franchise in region and partnerships in four countries. Responsible for all operations and deal flow.

Director, Member of the Board, MBA Holdings, S.A. (1994-1996)

- Private equity business of Merchant Bankers Asociados, Argentine affiliate of **Salomon Smith Barney**.
- Managed investments of \$60 million fund.

1984-1993

**INVESTMENT BANKER** (in US, Europe and Emerging Markets)

### Positions:

**Lehman Brothers Inc.**

Director, based in London (1989-1993)

Vice President, Associate, Analyst, based in New York (1984-1989)

Mergers, Acquisitions, Principal Investments and Corporate Finance.

- Completed international and domestic strategic transactions for US, European and South American companies.
- Negotiated acquisitions, divestitures, leveraged buyouts, strategic alliances, cross-border joint ventures and recapitalizations.
- Raised financing (debt and equity) in the public and private markets.

Government Financial Advisory.

- Provided economic policy advice to the Governments of Nigeria, Mozambique, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Honduras, Guatemala and others. Negotiations with multilateral institutions (IMF and World Bank).
- Undertook financial restructuring, privatization and recapitalization work for state-owned entities.
- Negotiated debt-rescheduling agreements with commercial bank and government creditors.

## EDUCATION

1993-1994

**HARVARD UNIVERSITY**, John F. Kennedy School of Government.

Master in Public Administration Degree (MPA). Course work at Harvard Business School and Law School. Co-taught graduate level course: "Financial Aspects of Privatization".

1980-1984

**STANFORD UNIVERSITY**

B.A. Degree in Economics and International Relations (Honors). Awarded competitive scholarships to conduct thesis research in Tanzania (summer 1983). Rowed Varsity Crew; Captain (1981).

11-L-0559/OSD/41066

**LANGUAGES** English and Spanish mother-tongues. Fluency in Italian, French and Portuguese.

#### **POLITICAL ACTIVITIES**

- Full-time staff member, Dole Presidential Campaign, Washington, D.C. (1996).
- Financial advisor to Cabinet Ministers and Heads of Central Bank in Latin America and Africa.
- Legislative intern, Senator Hayakawa (R-CA), US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C. (summer 1982).
- Elected representative, Kennedy School Student Government at Harvard, Only Republican member (1993-1994).

#### **PUBLIC SERVICE**

- **Endeavor**, US non-profit organization pioneering economic development in emerging markets through entrepreneurship. Member of the Global Advisory Board (1999-present).
- **World Economic Forum**, Served on the Global Digital Divide Initiative Task Force and the Steering Committee on Entrepreneurship (2001).
- **Hispanic-Net**, Non-profit organization dedicated to fostering Hispanic entrepreneurship in the high technology sector. Member of the Advisory Board (2001-present).
- **Catholic Big Brothers**, New York City (1987-1989). Served as mentor to Hispanic youth. Chosen Big Brother of the Year Speaker.
- **Heritage Fund**, Chairman. Selected to direct fund-raising organization with 50 volunteers at Stanford University (1981-1984).

#### **MEDIA/PUBLIC SPEAKING**

- Interviewed in several languages by CNN, The Wall Street Journal, Business Week, Time, ABC, CBS, NBC, Institutional Investor, Latin Finance, Latin CEO and by more than a hundred other US and international television, radio, print and on-line media.
- Featured speaker and participant at over **fifty** conferences and seminars organized by the World Economic Forum, the Aspen Institute, The Economist, The Wall Street Journal, Harvard and other similar institutions. Topics include: international finance and investments, entrepreneurship, foreign policy, minority investing, private equity and technology.
- Editorial columnist: Diario El Financiero, Chile (1997-1999); Stanford Daily (1982-1983).

#### **PERSONAL**

- Born in (b)(6) 1961. Married to (b)(6)
- Multicultural upbringing, education, and professional experience having lived outside the US for more than 20 years. Traveled and worked extensively in Africa, Asia, Middle East, Europe and the Americas.
- Enjoy high altitude mountain climbing, parachuting, motorecycling and flying.

~~FOUO~~  
OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2004 11 17 PM 3:02

November 22, 2004  
I-04/015791  
ES-1478

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen Dick Myers  
Larry Di Rita  
Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Paper

Attached is a paper that was prepared at my request. It resulted from a dinner I had with the three authors, Joe Duffey, Ed Feulner and Lew Manilow. Please read it and let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach  
11/2/04 Private Report to the Secretary of Defense

DHR:ss  
112204-5

.....

Please respond by 12/10/04

2004 11 17 PM 3:02

~~FOUO~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/41068

0 SD 05203 -05

*Private Report to the  
Secretary of Defense*

Submitted Respectfully by:  
Joseph Duffey  
Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.  
Lewis Manilow

*November 2004*

11-L-0559/OSD/41069

## Executive Summary

To win the War on Terror, the United States must capture, kill, or deter more terrorists than our extremist allies can win over to their side. Moreover, it is crucial that we convince a significant number of people to be actively on our side. As such, the challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and central component of the War on Terror. Dozens of studies offering prescriptions for the deficiencies in America's foreign communication effort have already been produced. This paper does not seek to add to this cacophony of voices. Rather, we present two substantial and vital recommendations, which will allow America to bring to bear the full force of the greatest communications society in the history of the world to the challenge of shaping hearts and minds and changing viewpoints in the War on Terror.

It is important to note from the start, however, that any attempt at changing the attitudes and behaviors of foreign publics towards the United States is futile unless it enjoys the full support of the President. Just as the President serves as commander-in-chief of the United States military, he must similarly view himself as the lead spokesman for the United States to the citizens of foreign nations beyond foreign government leaders. This role must be a priority commitment that is followed through on a day-to-day basis and is an integral component of each of the President's decisions.

In order to communicate with foreign publics in a manner that changes attitudes and behavior towards America, the United States government should:

### 1) Establish a Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis

**OBJECTIVE:** Listen, ask questions, and analyze foreign public opinion as well as test the effectiveness of various USG messages.

It is startling how little the U.S. government (USG) currently engages in public opinion polling and how irrelevant much of the research it does do is. An effective public diplomacy effort must monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and then inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. By listening to the opinions of various groups and tailoring our message and - to an

appropriate degree - our policies to the information they are giving us, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world.

Winning the War on **Terrorism** will require unprecedented use of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and communications resources. To this end, the Administration should establish a private sector institution similar to **RAND** charged with gathering the information required by the USG to advance America's position in the communications aspect of the **War** on Terror.

The mission of this "Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis" (CFOA) will be to use the resources and capabilities of the United States of America to fully engage in a long-term market research effort aimed at better understanding foreign public opinion. It will be tasked with contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, ask questions, and analyze foreign public opinion in a manner that is not being done today, as well as test the effectiveness of various USG messages. Crucially, CFOA would only provide the research product - coordination of message and broad strategic decisions must be made through the National Security Council, the Departments of State and Defense, and relevant agencies.

## 2) Prepare the Government Bureaucracy to Apply Information

**OBJECTIVE:** Provide senior policy makers with immediate input so they are aware of the effect an impending policy action or statement will have on foreign public opinion.

Because the USG has so many official messengers, the need to have all of them singing off the same sheet is especially important. CFO.4 will provide the data that allows America to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly reevaluate and refine the U.S. government's message into the future. The USG must create a mechanism by which it can utilize this information effectively.

As such, a new staff position on the National Security Council should be created and charged with coordinating the U.S. government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with providing senior policy makers with immediate input based on CFOA data so that they are aware of the effect an impending policy action

or statement will have on foreign **public** opinion. Further, a senior interagency group should be created that brings the NSC staff member charged with the **U.S. government's** foreign public opinion **programs together** with the Under **Secretary** of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, **representatives of USAID**, all other relevant members of the Executive Branch, and other participants on an **ad hoc** basis.

A dialogue between America and the **rest** of the world must be seen as a long-term commitment central to **America's** vital national interest. **The** creation of a private institution, *performing* government contract work, charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of **America's** message, **and** the **impact of** **American** policy on foreign public **opinion** would *give* the USG the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the **rest** of the world. Further, **bringing** public **diplomacy** to the highest level of **NSC** deliberation will ensure that we communicate *our* message more **effectively** in **the** future.

## Introduction

Shortly after the American Revolution, John Adams was asked who supported it and who didn't. He said about a third of the population had supported it; about a third had opposed it; and about a third was waiting to see who won. In many ways, this is the situation America is faced with today in the court of world opinion – and of particular importance in the Arab and Muslim World. The scorecard in the War on Terror, however, is not simply one of battles or casualties. The simple (in theory) challenge of the War on Terror is to capture, kill, or deter more terrorists than our extremist adversaries can win over to their side. As such, the communications challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and central component of the war.

As the 9/11 commission bluntly stated, “The small percentage of Muslims who are fully committed to Usama Bin Ladin’s version of Islam are impervious to persuasion.” To win the War on Terror, America needs a strong policy aimed at increasing the ranks of our supporters, decreasing the small percentage of Muslims who are “impervious to persuasion,” and impacting those who, while not actively supportive of extremists, have sat on the sidelines due to resentment of America. Put bluntly, America needs to embark on a long-term project to improve her standing in the public opinion of individuals in other nations around the world.

There have been a number of recent studies looking at the problem of public diplomacy. All have acknowledged a problem exists and there is significant agreement that there must be reform of the U.S. government’s public diplomacy infrastructure.<sup>2</sup> Yet just as the War on Terror has required a rethinking of many aspects of American foreign policy, it similarly justifies a strategic reevaluation of our public diplomacy efforts. Changing foreign public opinion is not simply a matter of allocating more resources or reshuffling bureaucratic boxes. Rather, the U.S. government needs to consider all available tools of public diplomacy – old and new – and how they can be properly targeted at various audiences in order to reach them effectively.

<sup>1</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, “The 9/11 Commission Report,” pg. 375.

<sup>2</sup> Studies by The Heritage Foundation (including Heritage Backgrounder 1645 as well as a section in the 2005 *Mandate for Leadership*), The Brookings Institution, The American Enterprise Institute, The Council on Foreign Relations, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency, along with the U.S. Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World have all come to the same conclusion that there is a need to improve Islamic world perceptions of the United States and that there is inadequate structure to the U.S. public diplomacy effort.



This project must be whole-heartedly embarked upon by the Administration not because it will play well in the American media or because of a philosophical commitment to Wilsonian multilateralism. Rather, it is a challenge that lies at the very core of America's own vital national interest.

## **I. How America Is Viewed Abroad**

America's standing in the rest of the world has taken a beating in recent years. In the Republic of Korea, for example, 50% of respondents to a poll taken by the Pew Research Center in May 2003 have a negative view of the United States. This negative view of the U.S., however, is sharply divided based on the respondent's age: only 30% of respondents over 50 had a negative view of the U.S. while 71% of respondents between the ages of 18 and 29 view America unfavorably.<sup>3</sup> This stark contrast suggests that older Koreans are perhaps more cognizant of the North Korean threat – and, therefore, look more favorably on the security provided by the United States – than the younger generation, and that older Koreans remember the shared sacrifices of the United States and South Korea in the 1950s.

America's standing is also highly negative in the Arab and Muslim World. A Zogby International Poll taken in March 2003 finds only 14% of Egyptians, 11% of Jordanians, 9% of Moroccans, 3% of Saudis, and 11% of citizens of the United Arab Emirates hold a favorable view of the United States.

These numbers are particularly shocking in light of the fact that in that same month Zogby found strong similarities between the citizens of the Arab World and Americans. Arabs, for example, list "Quality of Work," "Family," and "Religion" as the three most important concerns of their personal life; Americans list "Family," "Quality of Work," and "Friends" as their three most important values. "Foreign policy," seen by many as an important cause of the strained view many Arabs hold of the United States, is only the eighth most important concern for Arabs.

In addition to sharing values on a personal level, Americans and Arabs share core political values. 92% of respondents in Turkey, 92% in Lebanon, 53% in Jordan, and 79% in Uzbekistan and Pakistan feel it is important to be able to criticize their

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<sup>3</sup> "International Public Concern About North Korea," *The Pew Research Center*, August 22, 2003.

government. There is also strong support among **Arabs** for honest elections, a fair judicial system, and freedom of the **press**.<sup>4</sup> The question these statistics beg is: "Why, given the amount we have in common, is the United States seen in such a negative light in the rest of the world?" While each of us could come **up with** a number of answers to this question – some of which might even prove accurate – the best way to reverse this troubling trend of anti-Americanism **is** to comprehensively study the question and formulate policy based on accurate, scientific data. Collecting these data **is** a crucial first step towards engaging the rest of the world in a public diplomacy dialogue.

## II. If It Isn't Measured, It Won't Be Improved

It is startling how little the U.S. government currently does by way of public opinion polling. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. government only spends **\$5** million annually on this type of analysis? Further, much of the research the U.S. government does **fails** to address important **questions**. For example, *The Washington Post* has reported on a **draft** report prepared by the State Department's inspector general on the effectiveness of **Radio Sawa**, a key organ of the United States government's Middle East public diplomacy effort:

The **draft** report said that while Radio Sawa **has** been **promoted** as a "heavily researched broadcasting network," the research concentrated primarily on gaining audience share, not on measuring whether Radio Sawa **was** influencing its audience. **Despite** the larger audiences, "it **is** difficult to ascertain Radio Sawa's impact in countering anti-American views and the biased state-run media of the **Arab world**," the draft report said.<sup>5</sup>

Comprehensive research into how foreign audiences feel **about** America, specific American policies, **and** how the United States can best change **attitudes** and behavior needs to be conducted.<sup>7</sup> Doing so would require a significant **increase** to the miniscule

<sup>4</sup> Hady Amr, "The Need to Communicate: How To Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World," *The Brookings Institution*, January 2004.

<sup>5</sup> 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. 6.

<sup>6</sup> Glenn Kessler, "The Role of Radio Sawa in Mideast Questioned," *The Washington Post*, October 15, 2004, page A12. The draft report was leaked to the *Post* "by a source who said he feared that the inspector general's office was buckling under pressure and would water down the conclusions"

<sup>7</sup> U.S. foreign opinion polling and analysis is fragmented and poorly focused. Senior State Department managers moved USIA's Office of Research and Media Reaction out of the public diplomacy hierarchy when the agency was folded into the Department in 1999. Today, it sits in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) where it contributes most to all-source intelligence reports than to strategic communication efforts. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has contracts with Intermedia, a private firm, which conducts surveys of audience share. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) collects and assesses print.

budget public diplomacy research currently receives. **This** investment is essential to building an effective program.

An effective public diplomacy effort would monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and would inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. Public diplomacy experts have long sought to have public diplomacy present at the "takeoff" as well as the "crash landing" of American policy. Rather, public diplomacy should be seen as a crucial component of the aircraft itself.

At its best, information gathered by public diplomacy researchers would be passed along to policymakers in relevant agencies. As a result, policymakers would be aware of the implications of policy decisions and statements on foreign public opinion and public diplomacy officers would be able to honestly inform foreign publics that their opinions were considered - if not always agreed with - in the formation of American policy.

Clearly, American officials should be making public policy decisions based on America's vital national interest; they should, however, recognize that it is conceivable the benefits of a policy might in fact be outweighed by the negative impact that policy has on foreign public opinion. Informing policymakers of how an issue will "play" in foreign public opinion can help them determine whether a seemingly beneficial policy will unintentionally create more terrorists than it deters, captures, or kills.

Up-to-date information on foreign publics is not only important for policy makers, but also for public diplomacy officers. With a wide variety of tools at their disposal - from visas to speeches, advertisements to interviews, and so forth - information about the people with whom they are communicating can only help public diplomacy officers in applying the correct tools to the correct audience at the right time and in the right proportion. In this way, public diplomacy research allow for a dialogue between America and the rest of the world by seeking feedback from foreign audience. Public diplomacy is not just about getting our message out, but also listening to the sentiments

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radio, TV, and Internet-based publications. Some U.S. Embassies, individual military commands, and the CIA also engage in limited opinion and media research. None of these products are combined and analyzed in ways for policymakers to use. Many are available to restricted user sets. Collection takes precedence over analysis and "issue of the day" palling often trumps media content and trend assessments. See the "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Washington, DC, September 2004, p. 26-27.

of foreigners. By incorporating a serious research component into the overall public diplomacy effort of the U.S. government, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world. It *is* a dialogue *that has been* ignored for *too long*.

### III. A Serious Reevaluation of Public Diplomacy in the War on Terror

The U.S. government might be well-advised to remember the words of MIT professor Norbert Wiener, who said "I never know what I say until I hear the response." This *is* certainly not the *case* for the U.S. government, which consistently fails to attempt to research the reasons for anti-Americanism abroad or to use research in formulating a *clear* communication strategy that engages foreign audiences in a dialogue. As the General Accounting Office found in its 2002 analysis of the State Department's public diplomacy efforts, "State Lacks a Strategy for Public Diplomacy Programs." America *is* the best in *the world at* market research – it is a crucial *part* of domestic politics – but *we* are notably uninformed about audiences abroad. Changing this situation must be an immediate priority of the **U.S.** government.

In *trying* to improve America's standing in the eyes of the rest of the world American public diplomacy officers need to understand that public opinion cannot be changed *either* solely on the basis of reason *nor* solely on the basis of emotion. Rather, it requires the foundation of reason to persuade people and the associated emotional relevance *to* motivate their decision-making and behavior. Further, the *bottom* line of public diplomacy ought to be changing the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics. If the end product of a particular program is only a change in mental state, it is not effective public diplomacy.

Underlying this change in behaviors *is* an exchange process *between* the **U.S.** (including the **U.S.** government *as* well as the private sector) and foreign audiences. To be successful, foreign audiences must believe that the ideas advocated by the United States are better than any reasonable alternative – including world views promoted by their governments, other segments of the population they are exposed to, and extremists who can often be quite persuasive. This relationship between the United States and foreign audiences can only be cultivated if the United States pursues a broad strategy that

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<sup>5</sup> U.S. General Accounting Office, "U.S. Public Diplomacy," September 2003, pg. 13

identifies what audiences we are **trying** to persuade and **what** tools we have **at** our disposal to attempt to influence these audiences **as well as** how **and** when these **tools** should be utilized.

In order to convince foreign audiences to support America's vision of freedom and prosperity under the rule of law for, at the **very least**, oppose **extremist** visions of death and destruction), we must begin by identifying the different segments that exist around the world **that we** are trying to persuade. That is, a one-size-fits-all public diplomacy effort **is less likely** to be successful **than** one that recognizes **that** the arguments that **are** successful in the Muslim world might **be different** from the persuasive arguments **we** should highlight in Asia. Further, **we** might package our message differently to one religious or ethnic group within a country **than** we would another group. The same could be true for different age groups - older Koreans who remember the Korean War, for example, will be persuaded by a different message **than** their younger countrymen who only know of the war from distorted history books accounts.

Crucially, this does not mean America should **be** delivering contradictory messages to different groups. Not only does delivering false messages or propaganda go against many of the basic principles our country stands for, but **also** it would be unwise from a practical standpoint, as audiences worldwide would quickly catch on to any contradictions. Rather, America **should** simply recognize that our **message** should be delivered **differently to** different groups.

To spread our message, the **U.S** government should employ all available tools of public diplomacy. **This** would include utilizing the President, the Secretary of State, **and** other Cabinet officers and senior government officials as well as **Americans** in the private sector, including teachers, students, journalists, **business** people, and so forth. These "public diplomacy ambassadors" can speak to foreign audiences using a variety of promotional tools such as advertisements, speeches, interviews, lectures, and educational exchanges. The key is for the U.S. government to invest in the research necessary to effectively pair a message with a messenger and a medium.

The **U.S.** government should also not be hesitant to use the private sector in doing research into foreign audiences **and** their reactions to the United States. **As** an Independent Taskforce sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations noted in 2003:

11-L-0559/OSD/41078

The "U.S. private sector leads the world in most of the key strategic areas required for effective public diplomacy: technology, film and broadcast, marketing research, and communications."<sup>9</sup> Ultimately, effective communication with the rest of the world will require not only the tools of traditional government-run public diplomacy (though these tools will remain vital), but also the resources and expertise of the American private sector.

#### IV. Incorporating Research Into the US Government Bureaucracy

A vital part of this new framework for engaging the public opinion aspect of the War on Terror is making sure that American policy makers and advocates have the most accurate and up-to-date information about foreign audiences available to them at all times. Doing so requires two important actions from the Administration that will allow the U.S. government to bring the best work of the American public and private sectors to bear in the fight to shape the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics.

#### *The U.S. Government should create an independent foreign public opinion institution*

At the conclusion of World War II, the Commanding General of the Army Air Force, Hap Arnold, wrote to Secretary of War Henry Stimson:

"During this war the Army, Army Air Forces, and the Navy have made unprecedented use of scientific and industrial resources. The conclusion is inescapable that we have not yet established the balance necessary to insure the continuance of teamwork among the military, other government agencies, industry, and the universities. Scientific planning must be years in advance of the actual research and development work."<sup>10</sup>

Out of this understanding of the importance of technology research and development for success on the battlefield, representatives of the War Department, the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and private industry established Project RAND, the precursor of today's RAND Corporation. The Articles of Incorporation bluntly set forth RAND's purpose: "To further and promote scientific, educational, and charitable purposes, all for the public welfare and security of the United States of America."

<sup>9</sup> Peter G. Peterson, et al., "Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy Toward the Middle East", *The Council on Foreign Relations*, 2003, pg. 6.

<sup>10</sup> The Rand Corporation, "History and Mission" (<http://www.rand.org/about/history/>)

Similarly, winning the **War on Terrorism** will require **unprecedented use** of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and communications resources. In order to best utilize those resources it is vital to insure the **teamwork** of the State Department, Defense Department, other government agencies, universities, and the private sector. **To** this end, the Administration should push for the creation of a private sector institution **similar** to RAND charged with gathering the information required by the **U.S. government** to advance America's position in the ideological aspect of the War on Terror.

The mission of this "Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis" (CFOA) would be to **use** the resources and capabilities of the United States of America to **fully** engage in a long-term market **research effort** aimed at **better** understanding foreign public opinion. **It would** be tasked **with** contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, ask question, and analyze foreign public opinion in a manner **that** is **simply** not done today. There are knowledge gaps with regard to **issues** of anti-American sentiment **and** this institution would be **tasked** with reviewing all existing data plus contracting for any original research **needed** to fill remaining knowledge gaps."

There are a number of significant advantages to creating this **corporation**. First, the corporation's **independence** avoids creating bureaucratic fights **over** what budget the money for foreign public opinion research comes from, who controls **the focus** of the research, and so forth. Second, CFOA would provide a useful product for consumption across **many areas** of government - from the Broadcasting **Board** of Governors to the National **Security Advisor** - **and** keeping it **independent** would **allow** its resources to be used by a wide-array of interests. Finally, it would provide a method for coordinating different aspects of government engagement with **the rest** of the world while **still** maintaining crucial separation between various entities. **That is**, given how vital it is that public diplomacy be differentiated from public affairs, public relations, information warfare, and psyops, **creating** an independent corporation would **allow** each to continue to work completely **in** its own sphere while still having access to research when **necessary**.

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<sup>11</sup> See the testimony of Keith Reinhard, President of Business for Diplomatic Action, Inc., before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations (August 23, 2004) for an excellent analysis of how America's communications expertise can be applied to the communication aspect of the War on Terror.

### *Create a mechanism for using CFOA*

Because the U.S. government has so many official messengers, the need to have all of them singing off the same sheet is especially important. Yet, over recent years, public diplomacy coordination has deteriorated.<sup>12</sup> CFO. 4 will provide the data that allows America to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly reevaluate and revise that strategy into the future. The U.S. government must create a mechanism by which it can utilize this information effectively.

A vital first step is to make sure that someone is empowered with coordinating all activities, behaviors, and messages so that they are aligned with the U.S. government's overall communication strategy. The current Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy position is clearly not this empowered individual as he or she lacks authority over both budgets and personnel assignments. It is also vital that this individual have the ability to easily get information to the highest levels of government.

As such, a new staff position on the National Security Council should be created and charged with coordinating the U.S. government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with receiving information from CIOA and disseminating it to policy makers so that they are aware of the effect a policy action will have on foreign public opinion. This coordination does not currently exist. As the 2004 report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy states, "Along with the White House and the Department of State, nearly all government agencies engage in

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<sup>12</sup> The former U.S. Information Agency had a Director and senior staff that coordinated with other government agencies, and a budget to accomplish its mission, even though it declined toward the end of the Cold War. Moreover, a public diplomacy coordinator position was staffed in the National Security Council during the Reagan Administration. Since President Clinton issued PDD 6E (Presidential Decision Directive on International Public Information) April 30, 1999, there has been no Presidential directive on public diplomacy. The NSC terminated it in 2001 pending a review of U.S. public diplomacy policy. Since then, the Department of Defense created and abolished the Office of Strategic Influence. The State Department has had two Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy with large gaps in service. In June 2002, the White House created the Office of Global Communications which keeps U.S. officials "on message," but does not direct, coordinate, or evaluate public diplomacy activities. And in September 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice established the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee to coordinate inter-agency activities. It reportedly met twice and has had little impact. A small inter-agency working group was created within the State Department Under Secretariat for Public Diplomacy, but lacks a budget, contracting authority, sufficient communications support, and attention from State and other Cabinet agency leaders. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," p. 25, 26.



some public diplomacy efforts. **While a few structures link federal officials, coordination often does not extend to embassy practitioners.**<sup>13</sup>

In order to keep all pans of the government bureaucracy moving towards the same goal, a senior interagency group (SIG) should be created that brings the NSC staff member charged with the U.S. government's foreign public opinion programs together with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, all other relevant members of the Executive Branch, and other participants on an ad hoc basis. This formal consulting mechanism would encourage closer cooperation among the various parties involved. Acting on the information provided by CFOA, this SIG would allow the relevant Under Secretaries to implement the government's long-term communications strategy.

The NSC staff member would also be responsible for ensuring that all U.S. government messengers are given the information required to effectively communicate with their audiences. Something similar to the daily "Talking Points from the Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs" or "The Global Messenger" produced by the White House Office of Global Communications should be disseminated to all U.S. government messengers as well as information that is specific to particular audiences.<sup>14</sup> Thus, a U.S. government public diplomacy officer in the Republic of Korea should be given instructions as to what information the U.S. government communication strategy calls for him or her to communicate to young Koreans, old Koreans, businessmen, opinion makers, and so forth. Once again, it is vital that each of these segments only be given accurate information from the U.S. government, but the style and tone of America's message must be fine-tuned for various foreign audience segments. Importantly, this fine-tuning must be based on continuous research.

#### *A Serious Commitment From the President*

Regardless of how well-structured the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus is, however, it will only be effective if changing foreign public opinion is signaled as a

<sup>13</sup> 20M Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. E.

<sup>14</sup> The effectiveness of these talking points would be drastically improved by comprehensive audience research allowing them to explain not only what America wants to say, but how it should be said as well as what questions audience segments around the world are looking for America to answer. Further, it is striking that the State Department does not appear to produce any daily talking points.

national security priority by the President. Just **as** the President serves as commander-in-chief of the United **States** military, he must similarly view himself **as** the lead spokesman for the United States to foreign nationals beyond foreign governmental leaders. This **commitment** must be made not only through public statements and private consultation and analysis *within* the White House, but also in the President's continuing contacts with Department of State officials, including diplomatic Chiefs of Mission. It must be **a** priority *commitment* that is followed through on **a** day-to-day **basis** and in each of the President's decisions. Foreign public opinion **is** no less important to American national security than American public opinion **is** to an election.

### **Conclusion**

**While** one might be understandably skeptical of **a** proposal for "further study" of a problem, in the case of altering foreign beliefs **and** behavior **a** short pause to **hammer** out **a** comprehensive *strategy* **is** called for. The temptation of **many** in Washington - including **many** who have written reports on how to revitalize public diplomacy - **is** to try **and** rekindle the glory years of the United States Information Agency (USIA) during the Cold War. While USIA-type programs are important - and should be seen **as** vital components of the **War** on **Terrorism** - **it** **is** **far** **more** important **for** the **U.S.** **government** to fully understand and conceptualize a long-term communications program with the rest of the world. America needs to do more than broadcast our message to foreign audiences; we need to listen to their complaints and respond to them appropriately.

The framework laid out in **this** paper does just that. It **starts** with an intense stage of information gathering where **American** **government** **officials** - with the help of the private-sector - evaluate **all** of the information currently available **and** **procures** whatever other information is needed to accurately and fully understand foreign public opinion at a specific point in time. This baseline is then given to policy makers, so prior policy can be reevaluated and future policy evaluated in light of the benefits America **gains** and the cost **is** may or may not have on foreign public opinion. Further, **this** information is **given** to **American** public diplomacy and public affairs officials - under the guidance of **a** newly created NSC staff **member** chairing a SIG - who use **this** information to craft an effective, informed, **and** flexible communications effort for America.

Finally, **this** dialogue between America and the **rest** of the world - and the responsive framework established that incorporates government and the private sector - is seen **as** a long-term commitment. The creation of a private institution charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of **America's** message, and the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion would **give** the **U.S. government** the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the **rest of** the world.

As John Adams famously observed, "**The** Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people." For a **small, extremist segment of** the world *population values like* freedom **and** prosperity **are** meaningless. Yet **the** vast majority of people around **the** globe **is** more interested in security for themselves and their families than **war** and destruction. America **has** a peaceful message and **strives** to be a force for freedom and prosperity around **the world**. **Yet we** are doing incredible harm to ourselves by **not** advocating for ourselves effectively. **As** the 9/11 commission stated "If the United States does not act aggressively to **define** itself in the Islamic world, the extremists will **gladly** do the job for us."<sup>15</sup> Richard Holbrooke put it best, "**How** can a *man in a cave* out communicate the world's leading communications society?"<sup>16</sup>

American national security **requires** that **we** harness the wealth of **resources we** have available to **communicate with** the rest of the **world**. We must speak and listen to the **rest** of the world clearly, accurately, and effectively. If we do **so**, we will prevail.

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<sup>15</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States. "The 9/11 Commission Report," pg. 377.

<sup>16</sup> Richard Holbrooke, "Get the Message Out," *Washington Post*, Oct. 28, 2001, p. B7

INFO MEMO

MAR 16 2005

2005 MAR 17 PM 3:24

POUSDP  
I-04/015791-ES  
ES-1478

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs  
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6))

*WMC* 02 MAR 2005

SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Paper (SD Snowflake)

- You asked for Policy's thoughts on the Strategic Communications Paper submitted by Joe Duffey, Ed Feulner, and Lew Manilow.
- The general premise is that the more we know our audience, the more effective we will be in communicating with it.
- The paper recommends increasing funds for foreign opinion research and polling, and establishing a government-funded private sector institution to conduct this research.
- The paper points out that no one in the USG is "empowered with coordinating all activities, behaviors, and messages so that they are aligned with the U.S. government's overall communication strategy."
  - The paper recommends a new staff position on the National Security Council to do this.
- The paper points to real problems. But this cannot be solved until we have answered the larger question of how to conduct public diplomacy. Until that larger question is resolved
  - It is not clear that we need a new government-funded corporation to do an increased amount of foreign opinion research.
  - It might be just as effective to increase the funding (currently around \$6 million) of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
  - The paper's emphasis seems to be on reacting, not on setting the agenda.
  - It is not clear that the new NSC position would have the executive authority to do the job.

**Bottom Line:** The findings and recommendations of this paper are very similar to the Defense Science Board's recommendations on strategic communications.

OSD 05203-05

~~FOUO~~

Attachments: As stated

Peter Flory (PDASD/ISA) \_\_\_\_\_

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/41086



~~FOUO~~

SECRET

2005 MAR 17 PM 3:10

November 22, 2004

I-04/015791

ES-1478

**TO:** Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen Dick Myers  
Larry Di Rita  
Doug Feith

**FROM:**

**SUBJECT:** Strategic Communications Paper

Attached is a paper that was prepared at my request. It resulted from a dinner I had with the three authors, Joe Duffey, Ed Feulner and Lew Manilow. Please read it and let me know what you think.

Thanks.

**Attach.**

11/2/04 Private Report to the Secretary of Defense

DHR:js  
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.....  
*Please respond by* 12/10/04

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28-11-04 1 433 037  
OSD 05203 -05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/41088

*Private Report to the  
Secretary of Defense*

Submitted Respectfully by:  
Joseph Duffey  
Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.  
Lewis Manilow

*November 2004*



## Executive Summary

To win the War on Terror, the United States **must** capture, **kill**, or deter more terrorists than our **extremist allies** can win over to their side. Moreover, it is crucial that **we** convince a significant number of people to be actively on our side. **As** such, the challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and central **component** of the **War** on Terror. Dozens of studies offering prescriptions for the deficiencies in America's foreign communication effort have already been produced. This paper does **not** seek to add to this cacophony of voices. **Rather**, we **present** two substantial **and** vital recommendations, which will allow America to bring to bear the full **Force of the greatest** communications **society** in the history of the world to the challenge of shaping **hearts** and minds and changing **viewpoints** in the **War** on Terror.

It is important to note from the start, however, **that any** attempt at changing the attitudes and behaviors of foreign publics **towards the** United States is futile unless it enjoys the full support of the President. Just **as** the President serves as commander-in-chief of the United States military, he must **similarly view** himself as the lead spokesman for the United States **to the** citizens of foreign nations beyond foreign government leaders. **This** role must be a priority commitment that is followed through on a day-to-day basis and is **an** integral component of each of the President's decisions.

In order to communicate with foreign publics in a manner that changes attitudes and behavior towards America, the **United States** government should

### 1) Establish a Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis

**OBJECTIVE:** Listen, **ask** questions, and **analyze** foreign public opinion as well as test the effectiveness of various **USG** messages.

It is startling how little the U.S. government (**USG**) currently engages in public opinion polling and how irrelevant much of the research it does do is. An effective public diplomacy effort must monitor **how** the opinions of **various** demographic groups are changing over time and then inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. By listening to the opinions of various groups **and** tailoring our message **and** to an

appropriate 'degree - our policies to the information they are giving us, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world.

Winning the **War on Terrorism** will require unprecedented **use** of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and communications **resources**. To **this** end, the Administration should establish a private sector institution similar to **RAND** charged with **gathering** the information required by the **USG** to advance America's position in the communications **aspect** of the **War on Terror**.

The **mission** of this "Corporation for **Foreign Opinion Analysis**" (**CFOA**) will be to use the **resources** and capabilities of the United States of America to fully engage in a **long-term** market research **effort** aimed **at** better understanding foreign public opinion. It **will** be **tasked with** contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, **ask** questions, **and** analyze foreign public opinion in a manner that **is** not being done **today**, as **well as** test the effectiveness of various **USG messages**. **Crucially**, **CFOA would** only **provide** the research product - **coordination of message** and broad strategic decisions must be made through the National Security **Council**, the **Departments** of **State** and **Defense**, and relevant agencies.

## 2) Prepare the Government Bureaucracy to Apply Information

**OBJECTIVE**: **Provide senior policy makers with immediate input so they are aware of the effect an impending policy action or statement will have on foreign public opinion.**

*Because* the **USG** has so many official messengers, the need to have **all** of them singing off the **same** sheet is especially important. **CFO. 4** will provide the **data** that allows **America** to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and **constantly** reevaluate and *refine* the **U.S. government's** message into the future. The **USG** must create a mechanism by which it **can utilize this** information effectively.

*As such*, a new staff position on the National Security Council should be created and charged with coordinating the **U.S. government's overall** communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with providing senior policy makers with immediate input based on **CFOA data** so that they are aware of the effect an impending policy **action**

or statement will have on foreign public opinion. Further, a senior interagency group should be created that brings the NSC staff member charged with the U.S. government's foreign public opinion programs together with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, all other relevant members of the Executive branch, and other participants on an ad hoc basis.

A dialogue between America and the rest of the world must be seen as a long-term commitment central to America's vital national interest. The creation of a private institution, performing government contract work, charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of America's message, and the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion would give the USG the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the rest of the world. Further, bringing public diplomacy to the highest level of NSC & liberation will ensure that we communicate our message more effectively in the future.

## Introduction

Shortly after the **American** Revolution, John Adams was asked who supported it and who didn't. He said about a third of the population had supported it: about a third had **opposed it**; and about a third was waiting to **see who won**. In many ways, this **is the situation America is** faced with today in the court of world opinion - and of particular importance in the Arab and Muslim World. The scorecard in the **War** on Terror, however, is not simply one of battles or casualties. The simple (in theory) challenge of the **War** on Terror is to capture, kill, or deter more terrorists **than** our extremist adversaries can **win over** to their side. As such, the communications challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a viral and central component of the **war**.

As the 9/11 commission bluntly stated, "The **small** percentage of Muslims who are fully committed to Usama Bin Ladin's version of **Islam** are **impervious to persuasion**."<sup>1</sup> To win the War on Terror, America needs a strong policy aimed at increasing the **ranks of** our supporters, decreasing the **small** percentage of Muslims who are "impervious to persuasion," and impacting those who, **while** not actively **supportive of** extremists, have sat on the sidelines **due to resentment of** America. Put bluntly, **America needs** to embark on a long-term project to improve her standing in the public opinion of individuals in other nations **around the world**.

There have been a number of recent studies looking at the **problem** of public diplomacy. All have acknowledged a problem **exists** and there is significant agreement that there must be reform of the U.S. government's public diplomacy infrastructure.<sup>2</sup> Yet just as the **War** on Terror has required a rethinking of many aspects of American foreign policy, it similarly justifies a **strategic** reevaluation of our public diplomacy efforts. Changing foreign public opinion is not simply a matter of allocating more resources or reshuffling bureaucratic boxes. Rather, the U.S. government needs to consider *all* available tools of public diplomacy - old and new - and how they can be properly **targeted** at various audiences in order to reach them effectively.

<sup>1</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, "The 9/11 Commission Report," pg. 375.

<sup>2</sup> Studies by The Heritage Foundation (including Heritage Backgrounder 1645 as well as a section in the 2005 *Mandate for Leadership*), The Brookings Institution, The American Enterprise Institute, The Council on Foreign Relations, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency along with the U.S. Advisor! Group and Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World have all come to the same conclusion that there is a need to improve Islamic world perceptions of the United States and that there is inadequate structure to the U.S. public diplomacy effort.

**This project must** be whole-heartedly embarked upon by the Administration not because it will play well in the **American** media or **because** of a philosophical commitment to Wilsonian multilateralism. Rather, it is a challenge that lies **at the very** core of **America's own vital national interest.**

## **I. How America Is Viewed Abroad**

America's standing in the rest of the world has taken a beating in recent years. In the Republic of Korea, for example, 50% of respondents to a poll taken by the Pew Research Center in May 2003 have a negative view of the United States. This negative view of the U.S., however, is sharply divided based on the respondent's age: only 30% of respondents over 50 had a negative view of the U.S. while 71% of respondents between the ages of 18 and 29 view America unfavorably.<sup>3</sup> This stark contrast suggests that older Koreans are perhaps more cognizant of the North Korean threat – and, therefore, look more favorably on the security provided by the United States – than the younger generation, and that older Koreans remember the shared sacrifices of the United States and South Korea in the 1950s.

America's standing is also highly negative in the Arab and Muslim World. A Zogby International Poll taken in March 2003 finds only 14% of Egyptians, 11% of Jordanians, 9% of Moroccans, 3% of Saudis, and 11% of citizens of the United Arab Emirates hold a favorable view of the United States.

These numbers are particularly shocking in light of the fact that in that same month Zogby found strong similarities between the citizens of the Arab World and Americans. Arabs, for example, list "Quality of Work," "Family?" and "Religion" as the three most important concerns of their personal life; Americans list "Family," "Quality of Work," and "Friends" as their three most important values. "Foreign policy," seen by many as an important cause of the strained view many Arabs hold of the United States, is only the eighth most important concern for Arabs.

In addition to sharing values on a personal level, Americans and Arabs share core political values. 92% of respondents in Turkey, 92% in Lebanon, 53% in Jordan, and 79% in Uzbekistan and Pakistan feel it is important to be able to criticize their

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<sup>3</sup> "International Public Concern About North Korea," *The Pew Research Center*, August 22, 2003.

government. There is also strong support among Arabs for honest elections, a fair judicial system, and freedom of the press.<sup>4</sup> The question these statistics beg is: "Why, given the amount we have in common, is the United States seen in such a negative light in the rest of the world?" While each of us could come up with a number of answers to this question — some of which might even prove accurate — the best way to reverse this troubling trend of anti-Americanism is to comprehensively study the question and formulate policy based on accurate, scientific data. Collecting these data is a crucial first step towards engaging the rest of the world in a public diplomacy dialogue.

## II. If It Isn't Measured, It Won't Be Improved

It is startling how little the U.S. government currently does by way of public opinion polling. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. government only spends \$5 million annually on this type of analysis.<sup>5</sup> Further, much of the research the U.S. government does fails to address important questions. For example, The Washington Post has reported on a draft report prepared by the State Department's inspector general on the effectiveness of Radio Sawa, a key organ of the United States government's Middle East public diplomacy effort:

The draft report said that while Radio Sawa has been promoted as a "heavily researched broadcasting network," the research concentrated primarily on gaining audience share, not on measuring whether Radio Sawa was influencing its audience. Despite the larger audiences, "it is difficult to ascertain Radio Sawa's impact in countering anti-American views and the biased state-run media of the Arab world," the draft report said.<sup>6</sup>

Comprehensive research into how foreign audiences feel about America, specific American policies, and how the United States can best change attitudes and behavior needs to be conducted.<sup>7</sup> Doing so would require a significant increase to the miniscule

<sup>4</sup> Hady Amr, "The Need to Communicate: How to Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World," *The Brookings Institution*, January 2004.

<sup>5</sup> 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. 6.

<sup>6</sup> Glenn Kessler, "The Role of Radio Sawa in Mideast Questioned," *The Washington Post*, October 13, 2004, page A12. The draft report was leaked to the *Post* "by a source who said he feared that the inspector general's office was buckling under pressure and would water down the conclusions."

<sup>7</sup> U.S. foreign opinion polling and analysis is fragmented and poorly focused. Senior State Department managers moved USIA's Office of Research and Media Reaction out of the public diplomacy hierarchy when the agency was folded into the Department in 1999. Today, it sits in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) where it contributes more to all-source intelligence reports than to strategic communication efforts. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has contracts with Intermedia, a private firm, which conducts surveys of audience share. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) collects and assesses print,

budget public diplomacy research currently receives. This investment is essential to building an effective program.

An effective public diplomacy effort would monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and would inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. Public diplomacy experts have long sought to have public diplomacy present at the "takeoff" as well as the "crash landing" of American policy. Rather, public diplomacy should be seen as a crucial component of the aircraft itself.

At its best, information gathered by public diplomacy researchers would be passed along to policymakers in relevant agencies. As a result, policymakers would be aware of the implications of policy decisions and statements on foreign public opinion and public diplomacy officers would be able to honestly inform foreign publics that their opinions were considered – if not always agreed with – in the formation of American policy.

Clearly, American officials should be making public policy decisions based on America's vital national interest; they should, however, recognize that it is conceivable the benefits of a policy might in fact be outweighed by the negative impact that policy has on foreign public opinion. Informing policymakers of how an issue will "play" in foreign public opinion can help them determine whether a seemingly beneficial policy will unintentionally create more terrorists than it deters, captures, or kills.

Up-to-date information on foreign publics is not only important for policy makers, but also for public diplomacy officers. With a wide variety of tools at their disposal – from visas to speeches, advertisements to interviews, and so forth – information about the people with whom they are communicating can only help public diplomacy officers in applying the correct tools to the correct audience at the right time and in the right proportion. In this way, public diplomacy research allows for a dialogue between America and the rest of the world by seeking feedback from foreign audience. Public diplomacy is not just about getting our message out, but also listening to the sentiments

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radio, TV, and Internet-based publications. Some U.S. Embassies, individual military commands, and the CIA also engage in limited opinion and media research. None of these products are combined and analyzed in ways for policymakers to use. Many are available to restricted user sets. Collection takes precedence over analysis and "issue of the Jay" polling often trumps media content and trend assessments. See the "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Washington, DC, September 2004, p. 26-27.

of foreigners. By incorporating a serious research component into the overall public diplomacy effort of the U.S. government, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world. It is a dialogue that has been ignored for too long.

### III. A Serious Reevaluation of Public Diplomacy in the War on Terror

The U.S. government might be well-advised to remember the words of MIT professor Norbert Wiener, who said "I never know what I say until I hear the response." This is certainly not the case for the U.S. government, which consistently fails to attempt to research the reasons for anti-Americanism abroad or to use research in formulating a clear communication strategy that engages foreign audiences in a dialogue. As the General Accounting Office found in its 2002 analysis of the State Department's public diplomacy efforts, "State Lacks a Strategy for Public Diplomacy Programs." America is the best in the world at market research - it is a crucial part of domestic politics - but we are notably uninformed about audiences abroad. Changing this situation must be an immediate priority of the U.S. government.

In trying to improve America's standing in the eyes of the rest of the world, American public diplomacy officers need to understand that public opinion cannot be changed either solely on the basis of reason nor solely on the basis of emotion. Rather, it requires the foundation of reason to persuade people and the associated emotional relevance to motivate their decision-making and behavior. Further, the bottom line of public diplomacy ought to be changing the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics. If the end product of a particular program is only a change in mental state, it is not effective public diplomacy.

Underlying this change in behaviors is an exchange process between the U.S. (including the U.S. government as well as the private sector) and foreign audiences. To be successful, foreign audiences must believe that the ideas advocated by the United States are better than any reasonable alternative - including world views promoted by their governments, other segments of the population they are exposed to, and extremists who can often be quite persuasive. This relationship between the United States and foreign audiences can only be cultivated if the United States pursues a broad strategy that

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\* U.S. General Accounting Office, "U.S. public Diplomacy," September 2003, pg. 13



identifies what audiences we are **trying** to persuade and **what** tools we **have** at **our** disposal to attempt to influence these audiences **as well as** how and **when these** tools should be utilized.

In order to convince foreign audiences to support America's vision of freedom and prosperity under the rule of **law** (or, at the very least, oppose extremist visions of death and destruction), **we** must begin by **identifying** the different segments that **exist** around the world that **we** are trying to persuade. That is, a **one-size-fits-all public** diplomacy effort **is** less likely to be successful than one **that recognizes that the** arguments that are successful in the Muslim world might be different from the persuasive arguments **we** should highlight in Asia. Further, we might package our message differently to one religious or ethnic group within a country than we **would** another group. The same could be true for different age groups - older **Koreans** who remember the Korean War, for example, will be persuaded by a different message than their younger countrymen who only know of the war from distorted history **books** accounts.

Crucially, **this** does not mean America **should** be delivering **contradictory** messages to different groups. Not only does delivering false messages or **propaganda** go against many of the basic principles our country stands for, but **also** it would be unwise from a practical standpoint, **as** audiences worldwide would quickly catch on to any contradictions. Rather, America should simply recognize that our message should be delivered differently to different groups.

To spread our message, the U.S. government should employ **all available** tools of public diplomacy. This would include utilizing the President, the Secretary of State, and other Cabinet officers and senior government officials **as well as** Americans in the private sector, including teachers, students, journalists, **business** people, and so forth. **These** "public diplomacy ambassadors" can speak to foreign audiences using a variety of promotional tools such as advertisements, speeches, interviews, lectures, and educational exchanges. The key is for the U.S. government to invest in the **research** necessary to effectively pair a message with a messenger and a medium.

The **U.S.** government should **also** not be hesitant to use the private sector in doing research into foreign audiences and their reactions to the United States; **As an** Independent Taskforce sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations noted in 2003:

The "U.S. private sector leads the world in most of the key strategic areas required for effective public **diplomacy**: technology, film and broadcast, marketing research, and communications." Ultimately, effective communication with the rest of the world will require not only the tools of traditional government-run public diplomacy (though these tools **will** remain vital), but also the resources and expertise of the American **private** sector

#### IV. *Incorporating Research Into the US Government Bureaucracy*

A vital part of this new framework for engaging the public opinion aspect of the War on **Terror** is making sure that American policy makers and *advocates* have the most accurate and up-to-date information about foreign audiences available to them at all times. Doing so requires two important actions from the Administration that will allow the U.S. government to bring the best **work** of the American public and private sectors to bear in the right to **shape** the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics.

#### *The U.S. Government should create an independent foreign public opinion institution*

At the conclusion of World War II, the Commanding General of the Army Air Force, **Hap Arnold**, wrote to Secretary of War Henry Stimson:

"During this war the Army, Army Air Forces, and the Navy have made unprecedented use of scientific and industrial resources. The conclusion is inescapable that we have not yet established the balance necessary to insure the continuance of teamwork among the military, other government agencies, industry, and the universities. Scientific planning must be years in advance of the actual research and development work."<sup>10</sup>

Out of this understanding of the importance of technology research and development for success on the battlefield, representatives of the War Department, the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and private industry established Project RAND, the precursor of today's RAND Corporation. The Articles of Incorporation bluntly set forth RAND's purpose: "To further and promote scientific, educational, and charitable purposes, all for the public welfare and security of the *United States of America*."

<sup>9</sup> Peter G. Peterson, et al., "Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy Toward the Middle East", The Council on Foreign Relations, 2003, pg. 6.

<sup>10</sup> The Rand Corporation, "History and Mission" (<http://www.rand.org/about/history/>)

Similarly, winning the War on Terrorism will require unprecedented use of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and communications resources. In order to best utilize those resources it is vital to insure the teamwork of the State Department, Defense Department, other government agencies, universities, and the private sector. To this end, the Administration should push for the creation of a private sector institution similar to RAND charged with gathering the information required by the U.S. government to advance America's position in the ideological aspect of the War on Terror.

The mission of this "Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis" (CFOA) would be to use the resources and capabilities of the United States of America to fully engage in a long-term market research effort aimed at better understanding foreign public opinion. It would be tasked with contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, ask question, and analyze foreign public opinion in a manner that is simply not done Today. There are knowledge gaps with regard to issues of anti-American sentiment and this institution would be tasked with reviewing all existing data plus contracting for any original research needed to fill remaining knowledge gaps."

There are a number of significant advantages to creating this corporation. First, the corporation's independence avoids creating bureaucratic fights over what budget the money for foreign public opinion research comes from, who controls the focus of the research, and so forth. Second, CFOA would provide a useful product for consumption across many areas of government - from the Broadcasting Board of Governors to the National Security Advisor - and keeping it independent would allow its resources to be used by a wide array of interests. Finally, it would provide a method for coordinating different aspects of government engagement with the rest of the world while still maintaining crucial separation between various entities. That is, given how vital it is that public diplomacy be differentiated from public affairs, public relations, information warfare, and psyops, creating an independent corporation would allow each to continue to work completely in its own sphere while still having access to research when necessary.

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<sup>11</sup> See the testimony of Keith Reinhard, President of Business for Diplomatic Action, Inc., before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations (August 23, 2004) for an excellent analysis of how America's communications expertise can be applied to the communication aspect of the War on Terror.

### *Create a mechanism for using CFOA*

Because the U.S. government has so many official messengers, the need to have all of them singing off the same sheet is especially important. Yet, over recent years, public diplomacy coordination has deteriorated.<sup>12</sup> CFOA will provide the data that allows America to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly reevaluate and revise that strategy into the future. The U.S. government must create a mechanism by which it can utilize this information effectively.

A vital first step is to make sure that someone is empowered with coordinating all activities, behaviors, and messages so that they are aligned with the U.S. government's overall communication strategy. The current Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy position is clearly not this empowered individual as he or she lacks authority over both budgets and personnel assignments. It is also vital that this individual have the ability to easily get information to the highest levels of government.

As such, a new staff position on the National Security Council should be created and charged with coordinating the U.S. government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with receiving information from CFOA and disseminating it to policy makers so that they are aware of the effect a policy action will have on foreign public opinion. This coordination does not currently exist. As the 2004 report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy states, "Along with the White House and the Department of State, nearly all government agencies engage in

<sup>12</sup> The former U.S. Information Agency had a Director and senior staff that coordinated with other government agencies, and a budget to accomplish its mission, even though it declined toward the end of the Cold War. Moreover, a public diplomacy coordinator position was staffed in the National Security Council during the Reagan Administration. Since President Clinton issued PDD 68 (Presidential Decision Directive on International Public Information) April 30, 1999, there has been no Presidential directive on public diplomacy. The NSC terminated it in 2001 pending a review of U.S. public diplomacy policy. Since then, the Department of Defense created and abolished the Offices of Strategic Influence. The State Department has had two Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy with large gaps in service. In June 2002, the White House created the Office of Global Communications which keeps U.S. officials "on message," but does not direct, coordinate, or evaluate public diplomacy activities. And in September 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice established the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee to coordinate inter-agency activities. It reportedly met twice and has had little impact. A small inter-agency working group was created within the State Department Under Secretariat for Public Diplomacy, but lacks a budget, coordinating authority, sufficient communications support, and attention from State and other Cabinet agency leaders. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," p. 25, 26.

some public diplomacy efforts. **While a few structures link** federal officials, coordination **often** does not extend to embassy practitioners.<sup>13</sup>

In order to keep **all parts** of the government bureaucracy **moving towards** the same goal, **a senior** interagency group (SIG) should be created that brings the NSC staff member charged with the U.S. government's foreign public opinion programs together **with** the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, all other relevant members of the Executive Branch, and other participants on **an ad hoc basis**. This **formal** consulting mechanism would **encourage** closer cooperation **among** the various parties involved. Acting on the information provided by CIOA, this SIG would **allow** the relevant **Union Secretaries** to implement the government's long-term communications strategy.

The NSC staff member would **also be** responsible for ensuring **that all U.S. government messengers are given** the information required to effectively communicate **with their audiences**. Something similar to the **daily** "Talking Points **from** the Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs" or "The Global Messenger" produced by the White House Office of Global Communications **should be disseminated** to all U.S. government messengers **as well as** information that is specific to particular audiences.<sup>14</sup> **Thus, a U.S. government public diplomacy officer in the Republic of Korea should be given** instructions **as to what information the U.S. government communication strategy calls** for him or her to communicate to young **Koreans**, old **Korea**, businessman, opinion makers, **and so forth**. **Once again, it is vital** that each of these segments only be **given** accurate information **from the U.S. government**, but the **style and tone** of America's message **must be** fine-tuned for various **foreign** audience segments. **Importantly, this fine-tuning must be based** on continuous research.

#### *A Serious Commitment From the President*

Regardless of how well-structured **the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus is**, however, it will only be effective if changing foreign public opinion is signaled as a

<sup>13</sup> 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. E.

<sup>14</sup> The effectiveness of these talking points would be drastically improved by comprehensive audience research allowing them to explain not only what America wants to say, but how it should be said as well as what questions audience segments around the world are looking for America to answer. Further, it is striking that the State Department does not appear to produce any daily talking points.

Finally, **this** dialogue between America and the rest of the **world** – and the **responsive framework** established that incorporates government **and the private sector** – is seen **as a** long-term commitment. **The creation of a private** institution charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of **America's** message, **and** the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion **would** give the **U.S.** government **the real-time information necessary** for effective communication with **the** rest of the world.

**As John Adams** famously observed, "**The Revolution** was in the **minds and hearts** of **the** people." **For a** small, extremist segment of the world population values like **freedom** and prosperity are meaningless. Yet the **vast** majority of people around the **globe** is more interested in **security** for themselves and their families than **war** and **destruction**. **America** has a peaceful message and strives to **be a** force for **freedom** and **prosperity** around **the** world. **Yet we are** doing incredible harm to **ourselves** by not advocating for ourselves effectively. **As the 9/11 commission stated:** "If **the United States** does not act **aggressively** to **define** itself in the Islamic world, the **extremists** will gladly do the job for us."<sup>15</sup> **Richard Holbrooke** put it best, "How can a **man** in a cave out communicate the world's leading communications society?"<sup>16</sup>

American national security requires **that** we **harness the** wealth of resources **we** have available to **communicate with** the **rest** of the world. We must speak and listen to the **rest of** the world clearly, accurately, and effectively. **If we** do so, **we** will prevail.

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<sup>15</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States. "The 9/11 Commission Report," pg. 377.

<sup>16</sup> Richard Holbrooke, "Get the Message Out." *Washington Post*, Oct. 28, 2001, p. B7

INFO MEMO OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

MAR 16 2005

POUSDP

2005 MAR 17 PM 3: 241-04/015791-ES  
ES-1478

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6) )

*[Signature]* 02 MAR 2005

090

SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Paper (SD Snowflake)

- You asked for Policy's thoughts on the Strategic Communications Paper submitted by Joe Duffey, Ed Feulner, and Lew Manilow.
- The general premise is that the more we know our audience, the more effective we will be in communicating with it.
- The paper recommends increasing funds for foreign opinion research and polling, and establishing a government-funded private sector institution to conduct this research.
- The paper points out that no one in the USG is "empowered with coordinating all activities, behaviors, and messages so that they are aligned with the U.S. government's overall communication strategy."
  - The paper recommends a new staff position on the National Security Council to do this.
- The paper points to real problems. But this cannot be solved until we have answered the larger question of how to conduct public diplomacy. Until that larger question is resolved:
  - It is not clear that we need a new government-funded corporation to do an increased amount of foreign opinion research.
  - It might be just as effective to increase the funding (currently around \$6 million) of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
  - The paper's emphasis seems to be on reacting, not on setting the agenda.
  - It is not clear that the new NSC position would have the executive authority to do the job.

**Bottom Line:** The findings and recommendations of this paper are very similar to the Defense Science Board's recommendations on strategic communications.

MA SD	SMA DSD		
TSA SD	SA DSD	3/18	
EXEC SEC	M3/18	070	

~~FOUO~~

**Attachments:** As stated

**Peter Flory (PDASD/ISA)**\_\_\_\_\_

~~FOUO~~

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OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
205 MAR 17 PM 3:09

November 22, 2004

I-04/015791  
ES-1478

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen Dick Myers  
Larry Di Rita  
Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Paper

Attached is a paper that ~~was~~ prepared at my request. It resulted from a dinner I had with the three authors, Joe Duffey, Ed Feulner and Lew Manilow. Please read it and let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.

11/2/04 Private Report to the Secretary of Defense

DHR:as  
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Please respond by 12/10/04

23-11-04 10:35 OUT

~~TOGO~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/41106

OSD 05203-05

*Private Report to the  
Secretary of Defense*

Submitted Respectfully by:  
**Joseph Duffey**  
**Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.**  
**Lewis Manilow.**

*November 2004*

## Executive Summary

To win the War on Terror, the United States must capture, kill, or deter more terrorists than our extremist allies can win over to their side. Moreover, it is crucial that we convince a significant number of people to be actively on our side. As such, the challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and central component of the War on Terror. Dozens of studies offering prescriptions for the deficiencies in America's foreign communication effort have already been produced. This paper does not seek to add to this cacophony of voices. Rather, we present two substantial and vital recommendations, which will allow America to bring to bear the full force of the greatest communications society in the history of the world to the challenge of shaping hearts and minds and changing viewpoints in the War on Terror.

It is important to note from the start, however, that any attempt at changing the attitudes and behaviors of foreign publics towards the United States is futile unless it enjoys the full support of the President. Just as the President serves as commander-in-chief of the United States military, he must similarly view himself as the lead spokesman for the United States to the citizens of foreign nations beyond foreign government leaders. This role must be a priority commitment that is followed through on a day-to-day basis and is an integral component of each of the President's decisions.

In order to communicate with foreign publics in a manner that changes attitudes and behavior towards America, the United States government should:

### 1) Establish a Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis

**OBJECTIVE:** Listen, ask questions, and analyze foreign public opinion as well as test the effectiveness of various USG messages.

It is startling how little the U.S. government (USG) currently engages in public opinion polling and how irrelevant much of the research it does do is. An effective public diplomacy effort must monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and then inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. By listening to the opinions of various groups and tailoring our message and -- to an

appropriate degree - our policies to the information they are giving us, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world.

Winning the War on **Terrorism** will require unprecedented use of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and **communications resources**. To this end, the **Administration** should establish a private sector institution similar to RAND charged with gathering the information required by the **USG** to advance **America's** position in the communications aspect of the War on Terror.

The mission of this "Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis" (**CFOA**) will be to use the resources and capabilities of the United States of **America** to fully engage in a long-term market research effort aimed at better understanding foreign public opinion. It will be tasked with contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, ask questions, and analyze foreign public opinion in a manner that is not being done today, as well as test the effectiveness of various **USG** messages. Crucially, **CFOA** would only provide the research product - coordination of message and broad strategic decisions must be made through the **National Security Council**, the Departments of State and Defense, and relevant agencies.

2) Prepare the Government Bureaucracy to Apply Information

**OBJECTIVE: Provide senior policy makers with immediate input so they are aware of the effect an impending policy action or statement will have on foreign public opinion.**

Because the **USG** has so many official messengers, the need to have all of them singing off the same sheet is especially important. **CFOA** will provide the data that allows **America** to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly reevaluate and refine the **U.S.** government's message into the future. The **USG** must create a mechanism by which it can utilize this information effectively.

As such, a new staff position on the **National Security Council** should be created and charged with coordinating the **U.S.** government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with providing senior policy makers with immediate input based on **CFOA** data so that they are aware of the effect an impending policy action

or statement will have on foreign public opinion. Further, a senior interagency group should be created that brings the NSC staff member charged with the U.S. government's foreign public opinion programs together with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, all other relevant members of the Executive branch, and other participants on an ad hoc basis.

A dialogue between America and the rest of the world must be seen as a long-term commitment central to America's vital national interest. The creation of a private institution, performing government contract work, charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of America's message, and the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion would give the USG the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the rest of the world. Further, bringing public diplomacy to the highest level of NSC deliberation will ensure that we communicate our message more effectively in the future.

## Introduction

Shortly after the American Revolution, John Adams was asked who supported it and who didn't. He said about a third of the population had supported it; about a third had opposed it; and about a third was waiting to see who won. In many ways, this is the situation America is faced with today in the court of world opinion - and of particular importance in the Arab and Muslim World. The scorecard in the War on Terror, however, is not simply one of battles or casualties. The simple (in theory) challenge of the War on Terror is to capture, kill, or deter more terrorists than our extremist adversaries can win over to their side. As such, the communications challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and central component of the war.

As the 9/11 commission bluntly stated, "The small percentage of Muslims who are fully committed to Usama Bin Ladin's version of Islam are impervious to persuasion." To win the War on Terror, America needs a strong policy aimed at increasing the ranks of our supporters, decreasing the small percentage of Muslims who are "impervious to persuasion," and impacting those who, while not actively supportive of extremists, have sat on the sidelines due to resentment of America. Put bluntly, America needs to embark on a long-term project to improve her standing in the public opinion of individuals in other nations around the world.

There have been a number of recent studies looking at the problem of public diplomacy. All have acknowledged a problem exists and there is significant agreement that there must be reform of the U.S. government's public diplomacy infrastructure.<sup>2</sup> Yet just as the War on Terror has required a rethinking of many aspects of American foreign policy, it similarly justifies a strategic reevaluation of our public diplomacy efforts. Changing foreign public opinion is not simply a matter of allocating more resources or reshuffling bureaucratic boxes. Rather, the U.S. government needs to consider all available tools of public diplomacy - old and new - and how they can be properly targeted at various audiences in order to reach them effectively.

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<sup>1</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States. "The 9/11 Commission Report," pg. 375.

<sup>2</sup> Studies by The Heritage Foundation (including Heritage Backgrounder 1645 as well as a section in the 2005 *Mandate for Leadership*), The Brookings Institution, The American Enterprise Institute, The Council on Foreign Relations, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency, along with the U.S. Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World have all come to the same conclusion that there is a need to improve Islamic world perceptions of the United States and that there is inadequate structure to the U.S. public diplomacy effort.

- This project must be whole-heartedly embarked upon by the Administration not because it will play well in *the American media* or because of a philosophical commitment to Wilsonian multilateralism. Rather, it is a challenge that lies at the very core of America's own vital national interest.

## I. How America Is Viewed Abroad

America's standing in the rest of the world has taken a beating in recent years. In the Republic of Korea, for example, 50% of respondents to a poll taken by the Pew Research Center in May 2003 have a negative view of the United States. This negative view of the U.S., however, is sharply divided based on the respondent's age: only 30% of respondents over 50 had a negative view of the U.S. while 71% of respondents between the ages of 18 and 29 view *America* unfavorably.<sup>3</sup> This stark contrast suggests that older Koreans are perhaps more cognizant of the North Korean threat - and, therefore, look more favorably on the security provided by the United States - than the younger generation, and that older Koreans remember the shared sacrifices of the United States and South Korea in the 1950s.

America's standing is also highly negative in the Arab and Muslim World. A Zogby International Poll taken in March 2003 finds only 14% of Egyptians, 11% of Jordanians, 9% of Moroccans, 3% of Saudis, and 11% of citizens of the United Arab Emirates hold a favorable view of the United States.

These numbers *are* particularly shocking in light of the fact that in that same month Zogby found strong similarities between the citizens of the Arab World and Americans. Arabs, for example, list "Quality of Work," "Family," and "Religion" as the three most important concerns of their personal life; Americans list "Family," "Quality of Work," and "Friends" as their three most important values. "Foreign policy," seen by many as an important cause of the strained view many Arabs hold of the United States, is only the eighth most important concern for Arabs.

In addition to sharing values on a personal level, Americans and Arabs share core political values. 92% of respondents in Turkey, 92% in Lebanon, 53% in Jordan, and 79% in Uzbekistan and Pakistan feel it is important to be able to criticize their

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<sup>3</sup> "International Public Concern About North Korea," *The Pew Research Center*, August 22, 2003.

government. There is also strong support among Arabs for honest elections, a fair judicial system, and freedom of the press.' The question these statistics beg is: "Why, given the amount we have in common, is the United States seen in such a negative light in the rest of the world?" While each of us could come up with a number of answers to this question - some of which might even prove accurate - the best way to reverse this troubling trend of anti-Americanism is to comprehensively study the question and formulate policy based on accurate, scientific data. Collecting these data is a crucial first step towards engaging the rest of the world in a public diplomacy dialogue.

## II. If It Isn't Measured, It Won't Be Improved

It is startling how little the U.S. government currently does by way of public opinion polling. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. government only spends \$5 million annually on this type of analysis.<sup>4</sup> Further, much of the research the U.S. government does fails to address important questions. For example, *The Washington Post* has reported on a draft report prepared by the State Department's inspector general on the effectiveness of Radio Sawa, a key organ of the United States government's Middle East public diplomacy effort:

The draft report said that while Radio Sawa has been promoted as a "heavily researched broadcasting network," the research concentrated primarily on gaining audience share, not on measuring whether Radio Sawa was influencing its audience. Despite the larger audiences, "it is difficult to ascertain Radio Sawa's impact in countering anti-American views and the biased state-run media of the Arab world," the draft report said.<sup>5</sup>

Comprehensive research into how foreign audiences feel about America, specific American policies, and how the United States can best change attitudes and behavior needs to be conducted.<sup>7</sup> Doing so would require a significant increase to the miniscule

<sup>4</sup> Hady Amr, "The Need to Communicate: How To Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World," *The Brookings Institution*, January 2004.

<sup>5</sup> 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. 6.

<sup>6</sup> Glenn Kessler, "The Role of Radio Sawa in Mideast Questioned," *The Washington Post*, October 13, 2004, page A12. The draft report was leaked to the *Post* "by a source who said he feared that the inspector general's office was buckling under pressure and would water down the conclusions."

U.S. foreign opinion polling and analysis is fragmented and poorly focused. Senior State Department managers moved USIA's Office of Research and Media Reaction out of the public diplomacy hierarchy when the agency was folded into the Department in 1999. Today, it sits in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) where it contributes more to all-source intelligence reports than to strategic communication efforts. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has contracts with Intermedia, a private firm, which conducts surveys of audience share. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) collects and assesses print,



budget public diplomacy research currently receives. This investment is essential to building an effective program.

An effective public diplomacy effort would monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and would inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. Public diplomacy experts have long sought to have public diplomacy present at the 'takeoff' as well as the "crash landing" of American policy. Rather, public diplomacy should be seen as a crucial component of the aircraft itself.

At its best, information gathered by public diplomacy researchers would be passed along to policymakers in relevant agencies. As a result, policymakers would be aware of the implications of policy decisions and statements on foreign public opinion and public diplomacy officers would be able to honestly inform foreign publics that their opinions were considered - if not always agreed with - in the formation of American policy.

Clearly, American officials should be making public policy decisions based on America's vital national interest; they should, however, recognize that it is conceivable the benefits of a policy might in fact be outweighed by the negative impact that policy has on foreign public opinion. Informing policymakers of how an issue will "play" in foreign public opinion can help them determine whether a seemingly beneficial policy will unintentionally create more terrorists than it deters, captures, or kills.

Up-to-date information on foreign publics is not only important for policy makers, but also for public diplomacy officers. With a wide variety of tools at their disposal - from visas to speeches, advertisements to interviews, and so forth - information about the people with whom they are communicating can only help public diplomacy officers in applying the correct tools to the correct audience at the right time and in the right proportion. In this way, public diplomacy research allows for a dialogue between America and the rest of the world by seeking feedback from foreign audience. Public diplomacy is not just about getting our message out, but also listening to the sentiments

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radio, TV, and Internet-based publications. Some U.S. Embassies, individual military commands, and the CIA also engage in limited opinion and media research. None of these products are combined and analyzed in ways for policymakers to use. Many are available to restricted user sets. Collection takes precedence over analysis and "issue of the day" polling often trumps media content and trend assessments. See the "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Washington, DC, September 2004, p. 26-27.

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of foreigners. By incorporating a serious research component into the overall public diplomacy effort of the U.S. government, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world. It is a dialogue that has been ignored for too long.

### III. A Serious Reevaluation of Public Diplomacy in the War on Terror

The U.S. government might be well-advised to remember the words of MIT professor Norbert Wiener, who said "I never know what I say until I hear the response." This is certainly not the case for the U.S. government, which consistently fails to attempt to research the reasons for anti-Americanism abroad or to use research in formulating a clear communication strategy that engages foreign audiences in a dialogue. As the General Accounting Office found in its 2002 analysis of the State Department's public diplomacy efforts, "State Lacks a Strategy for Public Diplomacy Programs."<sup>6</sup> America is the best in the world at market research - it is a crucial part of domestic politics - but we are notably uninformed about audiences abroad. Changing this situation **must** be an immediate priority of the U.S. government.

In trying to improve America's standing in the eyes of the rest of the world American public diplomacy officers need to understand that public opinion cannot be changed either solely on the basis of reason nor solely on the basis of emotion. Rather, it requires the foundation of reason to persuade people and associated emotional relevance to motivate their decision-making and behavior. Further, the bottom line of public diplomacy ought to be changing the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics. If the end product of a particular program is only a change in mental state, it is not effective public diplomacy.

Underlying this change in behaviors is an *exchange* process between the U.S. (including the U.S. government as well as the private sector) and foreign audiences. To be successful, foreign audiences **must** believe that the ideas advocated by the United States are better than any reasonable alternative - including world views promoted by their governments, other segments of the population they are exposed to, and extremists who can often be quite persuasive. This relationship between the United States and foreign audiences can only be cultivated if the United States pursues a broad strategy that

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<sup>6</sup> U.S. General Accounting Office, "U.S. Public Diplomacy," September 2003, pg. 13

identifies what audiences **we are trying to persuade** and **what tools we have at our disposal to attempt to influence these audiences as well as how and when these tools should be utilized.**

In order to convince foreign audiences to support **America's** vision of **freedom** and prosperity under **the rule of law** (or, **at the very least, oppose extremist visions of death and destruction**), we must **begin by identifying the different segments that exist around the world that we are trying to persuade.** That is, **a one-size-fits-all public diplomacy effort is less likely to be successful than one that recognizes that the arguments that are successful in the Muslim world might be different from the persuasive arguments we should highlight in Asia.** Further, we might package our message differently to one religious or ethnic group **within a country than we would another group.** The **same** could be true for different **age groups - older Koreans who remember the Korean War, for example, will be persuaded by a different message than their younger countrymen who only know of the war from distorted history books accounts.**

Crucially, this **does not mean America should be delivering contradictory messages to different groups.** Not only **does** delivering false messages or propaganda go against many of the **basic principles our country stands for, but also it would be unwise from a practical standpoint, as audiences worldwide would quickly catch on to any contradictions.** Rather, **America should simply recognize that our message should be delivered differently to different groups.**

**To spread our message, the U.S. government should employ all available tools of public diplomacy.** This would include utilizing **the President, the Secretary of State, and other Cabinet officers and senior government officials as well as Americans in the private sector, including teachers, students, journalists, business people, and so forth.** These "public diplomacy **ambassadors**" can speak to foreign audiences **using a variety of promotional tools such as advertisements, speeches, interviews, lectures, and educational exchanges.** The **key is for the U.S. government to invest in the research necessary to effectively pair a message with a messenger and a medium.**

The **U.S. government should also not be hesitant to use the private sector in doing research into foreign audiences and their reactions to the United States.** As an **Independent Taskforce** sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations noted in 2003:

The "U.S. private sector leads the world in most of the key strategic areas required for effective public diplomacy: technology, film and broadcast, marketing research, and communications."<sup>9</sup> Ultimately, effective communication with the rest of the world will require not only the tools of traditional government-run public diplomacy (though these tools will remain vital), but also the resources and expertise of the American private sector

#### IV. Incorporating Research Into the US Government Bureaucracy

A vital part of this new framework for engaging the public opinion aspect of the War on Terror is making sure that American policy makers and advocates have the most accurate and up-to-date information about foreign audiences available to them at all times. Doing so requires two important actions from the Administration that will allow the U.S. government to bring the best work of the American public and private sectors to bear in the fight to shape the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics.

*The U.S. Government should create an independent foreign public opinion institution*

At the conclusion of World War II, the Commanding General of the Army Air Force, Hap Arnold, wrote to Secretary of War Henry Stimson:

"During this war the Army, Army Air Forces, and the Navy have made unprecedented use of scientific and industrial resources. The conclusion is inescapable that we have not yet established the balance necessary to insure the continuance of teamwork among the military, other government agencies, industry, and the universities. Scientific planning must be years in advance of the actual research and development work."<sup>10</sup>

Out of this understanding of the importance of technology research and development for success on the battlefield, representatives of the War Department, the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and private industry established Project RAND, the precursor of today's RAND Corporation. The Articles of Incorporation bluntly set forth RAND's purpose: "To further and promote scientific, educational, and charitable purposes- all for the public welfare and security of the United States of America."

<sup>9</sup> Peter G. Peterson, et al., "Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy Toward the Middle East", The Council on Foreign Relations, 2003, pg. 6.

<sup>10</sup> The Rand Corporation, "History and Mission" (<http://www.rand.org/about/history/>)

Similarly, **winning the War on Terrorism** will require unprecedented **use** of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and communications **resources**. In order to **best utilize those resources it is vital** to insure the teamwork of the **State Department, Defense Department, other government agencies**, universities, and the **private sector**. To this end, the Administration **should push for the creation of a private sector institution similar to RAND** charged **with gathering the information** required by the **U.S. government to advance America's position in the ideological aspect of the War on Terror**.

The **mission** of this "Corporation for **Foreign Opinion Analysis**" (CFOA) would be to **use** the resources and capabilities of the United States of **America** to fully **engage in a long-term market research effort aimed at better understanding foreign public opinion**. It would be **tasked with** contracting with specialist firms around **the world to listen, ask question, and analyze foreign public opinion in a manner that is simply not done Today**. **There are** knowledge gaps with regard to **issues of anti-American sentiment and this institution would be tasked with reviewing all existing data plus contracting for any original research needed to fill remaining knowledge gaps.**"

There are **a number of significant advantages to creating this corporation**. First, **the corporation's independence avoids creating bureaucratic fights over what budget the money for foreign public opinion research comes from, who controls the focus of the research, and so forth. Second, CFOA would provide a useful product for consumption across many areas of government - from the Broadcasting Board of Governors to the National Security Advisor - and keeping it independent would allow its resources to be used by a wide-array of interests**. Finally, it would **provide a method for coordinating different aspects of government engagement with the rest of the world while still maintaining crucial separation between various entities. That is, given how vital it is that public diplomacy be differentiated from public affairs, public relations, information warfare, and psyops, creating an independent corporation would allow each to continue to work completely in its own sphere while still having access to research when necessary.**

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<sup>11</sup> See the testimony of Keith Reinhard, **President of Business for Diplomatic Action, Inc.**, before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations (August 23, 2004) for an excellent analysis of how America's **communications expertise** can be applied to the communication aspect of the War on Terror.

### *Create a mechanism for using CFOA*

Because the U.S. government has so many official messengers, the need to have all of them singing off the same sheet is especially important. Yet, over recent years; public diplomacy coordination has deteriorated.<sup>12</sup> CFOA will provide the data that allows America to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly reevaluate and revise that strategy into the future. The U.S. government **must** create a mechanism by which it can utilize this information effectively.

A vital first step is to make sure that someone is empowered with coordinating all activities, behaviors, and messages so that they are aligned with the U.S. government's overall communication strategy. The current Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy position is clearly not this empowered individual as he or she lacks authority over both budgets and personnel assignments. It is also vital that this individual have the ability to easily get information to the highest levels of government.

As such, a new staff position on the National Security Council should be created and charged with coordinating the U.S. government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with receiving information from CFOA and disseminating it to policy makers so that they are aware of the effect a policy action will have on foreign public opinion. This coordination does not currently exist. As the 2004 report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy states, "Along with the White House and the Department of State, nearly all government agencies engage in

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<sup>12</sup> The former U.S. Information Agency had a Director and senior staff that coordinated with other government agencies, and a budget to accomplish its mission, even though it declined toward the end of the Cold War. Moreover, a public diplomacy coordinator position was staffed in the National Security Council during the Reagan Administration. Since President Clinton issued PDD 68 (Presidential Decision Directive on International Public Information) April 30, 1999, there has been no Presidential directive on public diplomacy. The NSC terminated it in 2001 pending a review of U.S. public diplomacy policy. Since then, the Department of Defense created and abolished the Office of Strategic Influence. The State Department has had two Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy with large gaps in service. In June 2002, the White House created the Office of Global Communications which keeps U.S. officials "on message," but does not direct, coordinate, or evaluate public diplomacy activities. And in September 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice established the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee to coordinate inter-agency activities. It reportedly met twice and has had little impact. A small inter-agency working group was created within the State Department Under Secretariat for Public Diplomacy, but lacks a budget, contracting authority, sufficient communications support, and attention from State and other Cabinet agency leaders. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," p. 25, 26.

some public diplomacy efforts. While a few structures link federal officials, coordination often does not extend to embassy practitioners."<sup>13</sup>

In order to keep all parts of the government bureaucracy moving towards the same goal, a senior interagency group (SIG) should be created that brings the NSC staff member charged with the U.S. government's foreign public opinion programs together with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, all other relevant members of the Executive Branch, and other participants on an ad hoc basis. This formal consulting mechanism would encourage closer cooperation among the various parties involved. Acting on the information provided by CFOA, this SIG would allow the relevant Under Secretaries to implement the government's long-term communications strategy.

The NSC staff member would also be responsible for ensuring that all U.S. government messengers are given the information required to effectively communicate with their audiences. Something similar to the daily "Talking Points from the Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs" or "The Global Messenger" produced by the White House Office of Global Communications should be disseminated to all U.S. government messengers as well as information that is specific to particular audiences.<sup>14</sup> Thus, a U.S. government public diplomacy officer in the Republic of Korea should be given instructions as to what information the U.S. government communication strategy calls for him or her to communicate to young Koreans, old Koreans, businessmen, opinion makers, and so forth. Once again, it is vital that each of these segments only be given accurate information from the U.S. government, but the style and tone of America's message must be fine-tuned for various foreign audience segments. Importantly, this fine-tuning must be based on continuous research.

### *A Serious Commitment From the President*

Regardless of how well-structured the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus is, however, it will only be effective if changing foreign public opinion is signaled as a

<sup>13</sup> 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. E.

<sup>14</sup> The effectiveness of these talking points would be drastically improved by comprehensive audience research allowing them to explain not only what America wants to say, but how it should be said as well as what questions audience segments around the world are looking for America to answer. Further, it is striking that the State Department does not appear to produce any daily talking points.

national security priority by the President. Just as the President serves as commander-in-chief of the United States military, he must similarly view himself as the lead spokesman for the United States to foreign nationals beyond foreign governmental leaders. This commitment must be made not only through public statements and private consultation and analysis within the White House, but also in the President's continuing contacts with Department of State officials, including diplomatic Chiefs of Mission. It must be a priority commitment that is followed through on a day-to-day basis and in each of the President's decisions. Foreign public opinion is no less important to American national security than American public opinion is to an election.

### Conclusion

While one might be understandably skeptical of a proposal for "further study" of a problem, in the case of altering foreign beliefs and behavior a short pause to hammer out a comprehensive strategy is called for. The temptation of many in Washington - including many who have written reports on how to revitalize public diplomacy - is to try and rekindle the glory years of the United States Information Agency (USIA) during the Cold War. While USIA-type programs are important - and should be seen as vital components of the War on Terrorism - it is far more important for the U.S. government to fully understand and conceptualize a long-term communications program with the rest of the world. America needs to do more than broadcast our message to foreign audiences; we need to listen to their complaints and respond to them appropriately.

The framework laid out in this paper does just that. It starts with an intense stage of information gathering where American government officials - with the help of the private-sector - evaluate all of the information currently available and procures whatever other information is needed to accurately and fully understand foreign public opinion at a specific point in time. This baseline is then given to policy makers, so prior policy can be reevaluated and future policy evaluated in light of the benefits America gains and the cost it may or may not have on foreign public opinion. Further, this information is given to American public diplomacy and public affairs officials - under the guidance of a newly created NSC staff member chairing a SIG - who use this information to craft an effective, informed, and flexible communication effort for America.



Finally, this dialogue between America and the rest of the world – and the responsive framework established that incorporates government and the private sector – is seen as a long-term commitment. The creation of a private institution charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of America's message, and the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion would give the U.S. government the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the rest of the world.

As John Adams famously observed, "The Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people." For a small, extremist segment of the world population values like freedom and prosperity are meaningless. Yet the vast majority of people around the globe is more interested in security for themselves and their families than war and destruction. America has a peaceful message and strives to be a force for freedom and prosperity around the world. Yet we are doing incredible harm to ourselves by not advocating for ourselves effectively. As the 9/11 commission stated: "If the United States does not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic world, the extremists will gladly do the job for us."<sup>15</sup> Richard Holbrooke put it best, "How can a man in a cave out communicate the world's leading communications society?"<sup>16</sup>

American national security requires that we harness the wealth of resources we have available to communicate with the rest of the world. We must speak and listen to the rest of the world clearly, accurately, and effectively. If we do so, we will prevail.

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<sup>15</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States. "The 9/11 Commission Report," pg. 377.

<sup>16</sup> Richard Holbrooke, "Get the Message Out," *Washington Post*, Oct. 28, 2001, p. B7

SECRETARY OF STATE  
2004 MAR 12 PM 8:18

EF-8772

March 8, 2004

I-04/003198

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Liberia and Haiti *DL*

Let's get the Department of State to put pressure on Taylor to start behaving and stop making trouble in Liberia, and pressure on Aristide to start behaving and stop making trouble in Haiti.

092

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030804-21

.....  
Please respond by 3/12/04

3/11/04

→ SD

At the March 10 DC meeting on Haiti, Hadley and I asked State to develop and implement a "Plan Aristide" to do what you suggest.

8 Mar 04

Part of plan is to gather what we know of his corruption and human rights abuses and get US and foreign spokesmen to publicize this to counter Aristide's possible efforts to return as President.

09-03-04 12:13 IN

We had a similar discussion about Taylor at a Liberia DC meeting some time ago. I'll push on implementation.

Doug Feith

SECRET  
201 APR 12 AM 8:55

February 9, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock  
CC: Trip Coordinators  
(b)(6)  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: April Function

ASD(ISP) —  
Need to sort out  
quickly (per our  
conversation yesterday)

ROMANIA

C 3/4

Nick Burns says there is some sort of function in early April. I don't know what it is. I think it is maybe near Romania. Please see what that is and tell me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020704-1 (to computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 3/1/04

— FOREIGN MINISTERIAL IN BRUSSELS 2 APR (FRIDAY)  
7 INVITEES BECOME FORMAL MEMBERS  
FOR JUNE SUMMIT.  
Accessions Ceremony held to the Foreign Ministers

— ROMANIA IS 12-13 OCT (MAYBE)  
Scheider may want Def Ministers a day only


9Feb04

OSD 05216-04

April 8, 2004

TO: Steve Hadley

c c : Gen. Dick Myers  
Gen. Pete Pace  
Lt. Gen. Norton Schwartz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Requests of Joint Staff

If you have requests of the Joint Staff or the Vice Chairman, you should run them through John Craddock's office. Then we will know what is going on and be able to make sure that appropriate information required by the National Security Council staff gets to you.

I have asked the folks in the Joint Staff to refer such requests to my office.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
040804-4

OSD 05217-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41125

72

APR 07 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Senator Bond

Thanks for the call on Kit Bond. I talked to him, and we will work it.

DHR:dh  
040504-10

335 SD

7 Apr 04

OSD 05234-04

March 29, 2004

CJCS HAS SEEN

MAR 29 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA

SUBJECT: *The Hunt for Bin Laden*

Would you please do me a favor and read the book, *The Hunt for Bin Laden* by Robin Moore, and tell me what you think of it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
032404-15

.....  
Please respond by 4/30/04

DA 4/14

Sir,  
Response attached.  
w/ CDR Nosenzo  
4/12

04 MAR 29 PM 1:59

OSD 05246-04

Afghanistan

24 March

12 APR 04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

SECRET

APR 23 2004

CM-1684-04

12 April 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS, CJCS *RBM 4/12*

SUBJECT: Robin Moore, *The Hunt for Bin Laden*, 2003

ISSUE: Your request for an assessment of Moore's book (TAB A)

CONCLUSION: Moore's book is well written, duly appreciative of Special Forces, but riddled with inaccuracies that undermine his account.

DISCUSSION:

- *The Hunt for Bin Laden* is an engaging account of Task Force Dagger in Afghanistan. Moore is understandably impressed with, and sympathetic to, the Special Forces community. He does a solid job of depicting the unique warfighting synergies that emerge when special operations are used in conjunction with the latest technologies.
- Moore's account, however, lacks analysis of the overall strategic and operational picture for the Afghanistan operation. Moreover, when Moore describes non-SF personnel or organizations his comments can be gratuitously insulting assertions (e.g., "while generals fretted about body bags and downed aircraft, bin Laden was escaping," p244; "the CIA was still as inept as ever," p298)
- Finally, several members of the 5SFG expressed concern with various aspects of Moore's account (TAB B). These comments make a compelling case that *The Hunt for Bin Laden* is more of a historical novel than a purely factual account.

RECOMMENDATION: None, for information only.

Attachments

As stated

Prepared by: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS, (b)(6)

OSD 05246-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41128

March 2<sup>5</sup>, 2004

CJCS HAS SEEN

MAR 27 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: *The Hunt for Bin Laden*

Would you please do me a favor and read the book, *The Hunt for Bin Laden* by Robin Moore, and tell me what you think of it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
032404-15

.....  
Please respond by 4/30/04

'04 MAR 29 PM 1:59

11-L-0559/OSD/41129



## **Comments from 5SFG Personnel Involved in Task Force Dagger**

### **Comment 1:**

The best description that I have heard given about the book is that it is "based on a true story". What I mean by this is that most of the story lines about the various elements are relatively accurate, but the comments attributed to many of the individuals are fictional. Additionally, there were comments made about CW3 Way, as the Rear Detachment CDR for 3rd BN, about how he tried to avoid going down range, etc., etc. [158-59] This irritated many within the FRG, to include my wife (which I still hear about now), as they felt he did a great job, especially with many of the casualties coming from 3rd BN. He held everything together. The thought line being if CDRs truly feel that the Rear D and FRG are important and we want to take care of families, you have to leave back competent people. The book trashed him. The families loved him.

### **Comment 2:**

I read the first 50 pages or so of the book before my stomach began to hurt too much from laughing so hard. I was sitting in Baghdad, escorting COL Mulholland around to talk to all of the big wigs and brought the book along to while away the hours. I was with Todd and some other guys and we started passing it around reading out loud. We were in stitches from laughing so hard. It was the equivalent of reading a "Sergeant Rock" comic book when I was younger--everything and everybody was a caricature. The whole thing read like some Mack Bolan book. Frankly, we were all kind of embarrassed to be associated with the generally fictitious account, however, we couldn't help but try and figure out which actors would play which role in the movie version (Costner for Mark Mitchell?).

Honestly, I didn't read anything that would withstand true historical scrutiny--all of the people I talked to about their interaction with Moore is that he twisted their words and thoughts and misrepresented them and are pretty pissed at him. Were you aware of all of the "back channel" dealings that went on with that book (e.g., the pressure by MG Lambert to accept the project and USASFC having to disapprove the first draft of the book because it was so factually flawed)?

### **Comment 3:**

WRT to Mr. Moore's book, I have only read portions of the book...and scanned through others. I will tell you that his accounts are far from accurate and in some cases embarrassingly inaccurate. The book, like his new book on Iraq, strike me as nothing more than transparent attempts to capitalize on his relationship with the Special Forces community by being the first on the market - without regard to truth or accuracy. He never interviewed me for the portion of the book about Qala-I Jangi and I can't recall talking to a single person who was there that has spoken with him. Again, this is a small portion of the book but it appears to be indicative of the overall quality of scholarship/journalism that went into writing the book. I have also spoken with some of my peers here at the SOC who had firsthand knowledge of events described in the book and they have had the same reaction.

The other part of the book that was particularly galling was his characterization of CW2 Rob Way and Rob's actions following the friendly fire incident with ODA 574 on 05 Dec 01. LTC Bowers had gone to great pains to ensure that casualty notification was done properly, out of respect for the soldiers and their families, and was explicit in his

instructions to the rear detachment. CW2 Way, following established Army procedure, would not confirm or deny whether specific individuals had suffered casualties until the official notification of the NOK. Mr. Moore finds fault with **this** and even goes so far as to claim that Mr. Way was failing to uphold the SF tradition of taking care of our own. However, the logical consequences of telling spouses that their husbands are OK while not commenting to other spouses is a process of elimination that precedes the official notification, with potentially dire consequences for the NOK. This is precisely why Mr. Way would not comment and Mr. Moore, who claims a long association with the military, should know better.

Finally, Mr. Moore's association with a man named Keith Edema (the man shown on the front cover) leads me to call into question his judgment. Mr. Edema is a charlatan and provocateur who somehow made his way into Afghanistan. We had standing orders to detain him because he was falsely claiming to be an ex-SF soldier now working for the CIA and was making mischief by representing himself as a USG official. I believe that Mr. Edema is the basis for a character in the book that claims that COL Beckwith made him a Green Beret after witnessing him do the swim test - underwater. Any basic fact checking would likely reveal Mr. Edema's claims as the specious BS that they are.

Bottom line is that there are probably some portions of the book that are substantially accurate but there are more than a few whoppers thrown in. The book is probably a great recruiting tool but not something that we, the SF community...should associate ourselves with. Whenever somebody asks me to sign a copy of it for them, I always write "Based on a true story" on the top of the title page before signing it.

For full disclosure, I am compelled to reveal that I have spoken with Mr. Doug Stanton who is writing a book about SF in AFG. Mr. Stanton is the author of "In Harm's Way," a critically acclaimed recounting of the tragedy of the USS Indianapolis and, in my personal opinion, a serious author more concerned with getting it right than getting there first.

#### **Comment 4:**

Jeff Stein wrote a great review of Moore's new book ("Hunting Saddam"?) for the Washington Post (it was in the "Early Bird"). He pretty well captures all of my heartburn with Moore.

More specific comments:

Chapter 2, subsection: "Miller's Finest Hour". This is total creative writing. I was at SOCCENT for the OEF planning when it started in earnest on 16 Sep 01 and the guy who pushed the UW campaign plan through SOCCENT and then to GEN Franks was LTC Bob Kelley (now 1/5 battalion commander). The noted LTC Miller is a very decent man, but he was totally ineffective as a planner at SOCCENT. He had been working on some SOCCENT UW plans for quite awhile, but they were very methodical, based on the sequential phases of insurgency. The younger guys (Kelley, CW3 Bett Brown) developed a simultaneous plan that was based on the current environment, as opposed to the Vietnam-era work that Miller did. Miller was out on point pushing the UW campaign plan for Afghanistan for a couple of days before he was moved to a vault to conduct interagency coordinations. The aforementioned section is essentially fiction.

Chapter 19, subsection: "Blue-on-Blue Snafu". I was in the JOC with COL Mulholland--that's not how I remember it (i.e., "screams in the background"). Moore's general scheme of maneuver is correct although he misidentifies units and helicopters

(i.e., "160th **SOAR** MH-53J Special Operations helicopters"). The MH-53's were out of AFSOC and 160th wasn't involved in this operation (nor do they have MH-53s).

Chapter 22; subsection: "Take-Down of Mir Wais Hospital". I was the ground tactical commander for this operation (ref. page 265 in the hardcover). I would describe Moore's depiction as "inspired by a true story" like they caveat made-for-TV movies. Most of the events (although the language is b.s.) occurred, but his sequence is all wrong as well as his supposition that the operation was designed to let U.S. forces conduct it under the "cover" of the Afghans. The whole plan was predicated on the Afghans conducting the operation. Only when they had failed twice and sustained significant casualties, was the decision made to have U.S. forces lull the A.Q. in the hospital.

Finally, I'm sure everyone is aware that the center guy in the photo on the hard cover is Keith Idema who claims to be some "old school" Green Beret. He was actually in Afghanistan (don't ask me how) purportedly claiming to be an agent of the U.S. government. To the best of my understanding, it was determined that in fact he was in Afghanistan on his own accord (perhaps as a mercenary for the Northern Alliance). Mr. Idema is one of the prominent figures in the book. Additionally, it has been purported that Mr. Idema's wife was one of Mr. Moore's project managers for the book. I don't know the veracity of any of the above, but it is definitely one of the more firmly planted rumors (urban myths?) in the 5<sup>th</sup> SFG.

#### **Comment 5:**

Before I begin, please understand that I can speak accurately only about what I personally know from my own experience...

I estimate that -- AT BEST -- 60% of Moore's work about my team is truth, fact, or accurate. Worst case, I estimate that some sections approach 33% accuracy, and in many cases, his writing is pure fiction, reckless embellishment, and gross exaggerations. There are entire paragraphs in the chapter devoted to my team that are completely false. Well over 50% of the paragraphs in that same chapter have something wrong or completely blown out of proportion. Worse still, a significant amount of material that he presents as fact in reality is just plain wrong.

To ice the cake, please know neither Moore nor his surrogate author ever interviewed a single person on my team -- not one, not ever. He **and** his surrogate author had approached our compound in Mazari Shariff requesting interviews, but for a variety of understandable reasons (including ongoing ops), we had to refuse. He never asked again, and we didn't exactly run him down.

Despite not speaking to us, his surrogate author and he put together an entire chapter. Probably 80-90% of the hard data he has about us comes from the Jan 2002 Newsweek article by Donatella Lorch. Ms. Lorch had lived with us in the team house for 3 days as one of the first four experimental embeds in the WOT. Moore's chapter pretty much takes her article and retells it with a dramatic flair that would make Dick Marcienko jealous. He completely fabricates scenes and events that never happened in order to fill in gaps between Ms. Lorch's work. In the remaining 10-20% of the chapter's data, he just completely fabricates things. Where it isn't pure fiction, he dilutes his work with speculation, hearsay, and 'bullogna.' Whatever the example, his embellishment far exceeds any author's dramatic license, and honestly, it makes me sick.

My experience in Afghanistan was limited only to my UWOA, but notwithstanding, I feel pretty confident that I have a decent understanding of the region's culture. Working in Central Asia for several months before 9/11, I also think I know a

little bit about the region and its history. I feel reasonably confident in challenging a lot of his facts and analysis in his presentation of either Afghanistan's history or its culture.

Lastly, I know from conversations with one of my best friends... that both he and Pelton have each published many team photos that 595 gave those authors strictly for their personal collections. For that matter, Moore's book remains the absolute single source anywhere that has published my last name: at the time in direct breach of USASOC's PAO guidance and more importantly, my consent... Although this is probably no big deal to most people, it is to us, and was especially more so at the time. Hell, the guy never even asked.

In short, I have concluded that he will never allow facts, research, or command guidance to get in the way of his storyline. I wouldn't trust this guy or his surrogate to write my nephew's 1st grade homework assignment, and to this day, I have still not purchased the book in protest. My wife wants a souvenir copy for kicks, and though I recognize that I am just the XO in this relationship, I have delayed her efforts successfully thus far.

**Comment 6:**

I only reviewed one chapter of the book, and that was the one... that dealt with the seizure of Mazar-e-Sharif, the defense of that city, and the prison uprising at Qala-i-Jangi. What I remember is that the information recited in that chapter was not factually correct, full of conjecture, and the research did not appear to be thorough. I say that because at that time I was the Battalion XO for 3/5th SFG(A) and our unit was heavily involved in everything related to the liberation of Northern Afghanistan.

**Comment 7:**

In general, my response is that anything that overpraises the capture-kill portion is drawn to the shiny object of movie action. The true impact of special operations is on the achievements through or with indigenous troops. This is operational value added to the national defense scheme, vice capture-kill which turns into tactical value added. We don't need higher paid rifle squads. We need captains, warrants, and great NCOs who can merge with tribal chiefs and warlords to shape and direct them. US Air Power is the element that gives these small, independent teams their ability to work in a very risky environment. It turns us (and our indig) into a force to be reconed with. And it harnesses indig eyes on situational awareness and intelligence that American eyes cannot see.

SECRET  
2004 APR 13 11 09 17



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY  
BAGHDAD

MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: Paul Bremer *4/11/04*  
SUBJECT: Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) in Iraq

I agree with your memorandum of April 7, 2004 regarding OSC, the importance of unity of command within OSC, and its subordination to MNF-I for the foreseeable future. That arrangement is in place and is working well.

The issue which I believe may have occasioned this exchange was a discussion with Secretary Powell in which we agreed that the OSC Commander should be "double hatted" in the sense that, as in most missions, he would continue to seek policy guidance from the Chief of Mission just as he does from me today. That is, I believe, in accordance with the coordinated policy among OSD, JCS and CPA.

I do want to clarify one point, which is the operational control of law-enforcement organizations. As part of OSC, the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) will monitor, advise, and certify law enforcement personnel and organizations. However, under normal circumstances law enforcement organizations will not be operationally employed by OSC or MNF-I. Command and control of law enforcement organizations will exist within standard civilian authority structures. Certainly there will be close coordination between military and law enforcement in many situations, but operational ownership falls within the purview of the civilian authorities.

Finally, you mention the issue of a three-star flag officer to advise the Chief of Mission. I completely agree -- the current template for MNF-I provides sufficient expertise and lines of communication for dialogue between MNF-I and the Chief of Mission.

EXCERPT CABLES DISTRIBUTION				
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URM	CAD	POD	CABLECH	FILE

OSD 05285-04

**Bakalorz, Marion P, MAJ, OSD**

---

**From:** Executive Secretary [execsec@orha.centcom.mil]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 12, 2004 2:24 PM  
**To:** MLA dd - SecDef Cables  
**Cc:** Executive Secretary  
**Subject:** Memo from LPB to SecDef - Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) in Iraq  
**Importance:** High

This is in response to the Snowflake SecDef sent to Ambassador Bremer on 7 April regarding same subject.

Please confirm receipt.

April 5, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Paul Butler  
LTG John Craddock

335 SA

~~Larry Di Rita~~  
4.2

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Larry Congleton

I want to make sure I send a note to the awards dinner for May 6 and also a personal congratulatory letter to Larry Congleton.

Thanks.

Attach.  
4/3/04 Craddock memo

*ce*


DHR:dh  
040504-14

.....  
Please respond by 4/23/04

*ul 10*  
~~in sec / Connie See~~  
~~flora draft two~~  
~~letters TH~~  
*D.H.*

5 APR 04

OSD 05314-04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

APR 13 2004

335 SA

Special Agent Larry Congleton  
Protective Services Unit  
701<sup>st</sup> MP Group  
60106<sup>th</sup> Street  
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

Dear Special Agent Congleton:

Congratulations on your selection as the **Army** Criminal Investigation Division's Noncommissioned Officer Special Agent of the Year.

What a fine achievement! Keep up the good work.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

13 APR 04

You ARE A  
STAR!

5 APR 04

OSD 05314-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41137





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

APR 13 2004

Special Agent Larry Congleton  
c/o Colonel Don Salo  
Commander, 701<sup>st</sup> MP Group  
6010 6<sup>th</sup> Street  
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

Dear Special Agent Congleton:

Congratulations on your selection as the Army Criminal Investigation Division's Noncommissioned Officer Special Agent of the Year!

I understand this is the first time that an Army Reserve NCO has been honored in this way. It is a testament to your dedication, and recognizes your superior performance and the high expectations for your future service.

On this important occasion, I am delighted to join your colleagues, family, and friends in saluting your outstanding service to our country.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Donald Rumsfeld".

OSD 05314-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41138



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

ADMINISTRATIVE AND

INFO MEMO

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: RAYMOND F. DUBOIS, DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATIVE AND  
MANAGEMENT

*Ray D. Dubois* 4/14/04

SUBJECT: Review of DoD Directives Status Report

- In an October 27, 2003, snowflake (Tab A) you expressed concern about the currency of DoD Directives. Principal Staff Assistants (PSAs) were asked to review the Directives under their purview (TAB B). Of the 653 Directives in effect in November 2003, they identified 384 for revision or cancellation.
- Your February 13, 2004 memorandum (Tab C) told the PSAs they had prepared very few revisions or cancellations and to complete those actions by April 1, 2004. The weekly rate of submissions increased by more than 60 percent afterward, so we are making progress.
- As shown in the table at Tab D, to date 120 Directives have been submitted for revision or cancellation.
- We are monitoring this closely and will keep you advised of our progress.
- Additionally, my office has worked closely with USD(P) to address your concerns regarding an OSD review of JCS Directives. That issue is addressed in the memo from Ryan Henry at Tab E.

300.8

14 Apr 04

COORDINATION: None

cc:  
Deputy Secretary of Defense  
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Mr. Dan Cragg, ES&CD, (b)(6)

OSD 05379-04

October 27, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Old Directives

I don't know if **you** were in the room when we found out that the SOLIC directive is dated 1995. It seems to me that you ought to set up a system where **we** review every directive that exists, listed by date and name, and let me look at it. I can select the ones I want to **start** having people review, so that we can get them up to date.

September 11 changed the world, and if we keep using the same directives that existed before, we are making a bad mistake. We owe it to ourselves. It **may** require getting some outside outfit like IDA to assist with a systematic review. I **am sure** there are a lot of directives.

Please let me know, and let's put some structure into this problem.

Thanks.

DfR:dh  
102403-17

.....

*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

U180260/03

11-L-0559/OSD/41140



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301

OCT 29 2003

Administration  
& Management

**MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE  
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION**

**SUBJECT** Mandatory Review of DoD Directives

Reference: DA&M Memorandum, "Mandatory Review of DoD Issuances for Currency," dated December 30, 2002.

In the referenced memorandum, addressees were requested to certify the currency of all DoD issuances under their cognizance that were over five years old. Since that effort was initiated, the Secretary of Defense has noted out-of-date DoD Directives and has directed that they be reviewed and recertified for currency. He is concerned that the DoD Directives should reflect recent actions taken within the Department to respond to world events and the realignment of functions.


Because the Secretary has asked for a current listing of all directives, a timely review and certification of each directive (see attached list) is required by the responsible Principal Staff Assistant (PSA). Your response is requested by November 21, 2003, and shall indicate whether the listed directives are current, need revision or should be cancelled. Upon receipt and compilation of your input, this information will be provided to the Secretary.

For directives no longer current, proposed revisions should be processed through the DoD Directives System for signature by the Deputy Secretary of Defense within 90 days. Requests to cancel a directive should be processed within 45 days. The support and cooperation of coordinating officials are requested to ensure that these suspenses are met.

In order to facilitate implementation of a systematic review process for maintaining the currency of DoD Directives, the mandatory review period for directives in DoD Directive 5025.1, "DoD Directives System," Will be reduced from five years to two years. This change is effective immediately and will be reflected in a forthcoming revision to that Directive.

11-L-0559/OSD/41141

Your certification of the listed directives should be provided to the Directives and Records Division, C&D, 1111 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 501 , Arlington, VA 22202. My action officer is Mr. H.D.Neeley, Chief, Directives and Records Division, who may be contacted at telephone (b)(6) or by e-mail at [hdneeley@cd.whs.mil](mailto:hdneeley@cd.whs.mil).

  
Raymond F. DuBois  
Director

Attachment:  
As stated



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

FEB 13 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

SUBJECT: Review of DoD Directives

More than two months ago the Director, Administration and Management responded to concerns I have about the currency of DoD Directives and asked each of you to review those under your purview. You identified 384 Directives that you intend to revise or cancel. I expect these actions to be completed by April 1, 2004. I understand that, to date very few revisions or cancellations have been prepared.

Our policy directives must be kept updated to reflect our approach to meeting the ever changing national security environment or they are simply of no use. Therefore, I expect you to personally review all of the directives you earmarked for revision or cancellation and ensure those proposed updates be coordinated expeditiously.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. M. [unclear]".



OSD 01776-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41143

**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES  
PROGRESS REPORT  
FOR WEEK ENDING  
4/16/04**

<u>COMPONENT</u>	<u>NUMBER OF DIRECTIVES</u>	<u>REVISIONS</u>		<u>CANCELLATIONS</u>		<u>SIGNED</u>	
		Reported*	Submitted	Reported*	Submitted	Revisions	Cancellations
USD(AT&L)	113	49	<b>17</b>	25	20	1	0
USD(P)	<b>64</b>	<b>51</b>	2	2	0	0	0
USD(P&R)	193	79	32	9	3	<b>2</b>	1
USD(C)	15	<b>6</b>	1	0	0	0	0
USD(I)	<b>58</b>	45	5	5	3	0	2
ASD(NII)	<b>40</b>	12	4	9	<b>8</b>	0	0
ASD(PA)	14	2	2	0	0	0	0
ASD(LA)	3	3	0	0	0	0	0
DPA&E	2	1	0	0	0	0	0
IG, DoD	<b>14</b>	7	6	0	0	2	0
GC, DoD	36	<b>16</b>	9	1	0	0	0
DA&M	85	<b>46</b>	<b>4</b>	9	1	1	0
WHS/B&F	2	1	1	0	0	0	0
WHS/C&D	2	2	<b>2</b>	0	0	0	0
WHS/DPO	2	2	2	0	0	0	0
WHS/FOIA	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
WHS/FV	2	1	1	0	0	0	0
WHS/P&S							
<b>TOTALS:</b>	<b>652</b>	<b>324</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>

\* Number identified by each Component in responseto Mr. DuBois' memo of October 29,2003.

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INFO MEMO

DepSecDef \_\_\_\_\_

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1-04/002818

EF-8656

FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy  APR 8 2004

SUBJECT: OSD Review of Joint Staff Directives

- This responds to *your* question about *the* desirability of an OSD review of Joint Staff Directives. .
- The Chairman transmits policy, procedures and guidance through CJCS instructions, manuals, notices, guides, handbooks, and pamphlets. Although not currently required by DoD Directive, a recent Joint Staff data call indicated that about two-thirds of these documents were coordinated with OSD prior to publication.
- As the Chairman mentioned to you, there is an ongoing effort to update CJCS publications, analogous to the OSD endeavor. Along those lines, Joint Doctrine Publications are staffed with OSD at the action officer level during the update process.
- There is a broad effort underway to update JCS and OSD instructions to reflect the post-9/11 environment and the transformation vision as it applies to existing capabilities.
- CJCS publications that apply to the Services, combatant commands, and Defense agencies are required to be formally coordinated with those organizations during update/revision.
- I believe that the formal and informal staff coordination that occurs throughout the review process provides requisite OSD visibility and oversight over Joint Staff publications.

Attachments: AS stated.

Prepared by: Pam Mirelson, WHS/Executive Services and Directives, (b)(6)  
Steven Netisben, OPDUSD(P), (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Policy Info Memo Template



In reply refer to EF-8656 & 04/002818-ES

4:05 AM

**TO:** Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

**DATE** February 24,2004

**SUBJECT** Directives

Attached is a memo I sent to Dick Myers and his response.

I wonder if we ought to think about having OSD review the Joint Staff Directives.

If so, who do you think ought to do it?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
0202404.01tz

**Attach:** Info Memofrom Gen Myers to SD 2/23/04 Re: Directives

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ 3/5 \_\_\_\_\_

01-03-04 15:11 IN



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315-5000

INFO MEMO

CH-1546-04  
23 February 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers*

*DSD*  
*Permy*

SUBJECT: Dives

- **Question.** "Where do we stand on getting all of the Joint Staff and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs' directives reviewed and updated to reflect when we are today?"
- **Answer.** From January through March 2003, the Joint Staff conducted a special review of all 263 CJCS instructions and manuals to address the impact of organizational and policy changes. A total of 179 directives were identified for revision or cancellation action. To date, 127 (71 percent) of these actions are complete. Actions on the remaining 52 (29 percent) are scheduled for completion by May 2004.
- **Analysis.** The special review encompassed all CJCS directives, including those already undergoing a regularly scheduled assessment at the time. My staff continues to manage this regular scheduling system to keep guidance current, while monitoring the remaining out-of-cycle updates.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: MG Michael D. Maples, USA; Vice Director, Joint Staff; (b)(6)

684 1/24

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

cc: Ray Dibos

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 31, 2004

SUBJECT: Directives

Where do we stand on getting all of the joint staff and chairmen of the joint chiefs' directives reviewed and updated to reflect where we are today?

Thank you.

DWR/aw  
103194.12

Respond by:

2/12/04

300.8

*Handwritten notes:*  
Sgt.  
...  
attached.  
...

31 Jan 04  
5 Feb 04

OSD 01776-04

APR 14 2004

TO: David Gompert  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: New MoD



Iraq

Thanks so much for your note on the new MoD. I appreciate your keeping me posted.

Regards,

Attach.  
4/13/04 Gompert e-mail to SMA re: Iraq's Defense Minister

DHR:dh  
041304-01

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

14 Apr 04

OSD 05407-04

**Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD**

---

**From:** Gompert, David Mr. (CIV) [gompertd@orha.centcom.mil]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 13, 2004 2:27 PM  
**To:** Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD  
**Cc:** L. Paul Bremer; Abizaid, GEN John P.; Jones, Richard (AMB)  
**Subject:** Iraq's Defense Minister

John,

I thought SecDef might be interested in my personal assessment of Iraq's Defense Minister after two weeks on the job.

Ali Allawi is a good organizer and builder. He's set clear and sound priorities in forming and mobilizing his team at MoD. His excellent eye for talent is proving valuable as we select the generals to lead the army. Allawi has grasped quickly the limitations of the IAF and ICDC. He is willing to take responsibility and initiative – he was the first to propose an Iraqi Task Force, drawn from capable extant and former units. He speaks his mind in private, e.g., in the give-and-take of the new Ministerial Committee on National Security. He is circumspect in public; actually, we'd prefer a higher media profile. He is receptive to advice and not afraid to take decisions.

Early on, the Minister displayed an aversion to the use of force, especially against Muqtada Sadr, whom he assessed – wrongly, in our view – as having the ability to mobilize a mass movement. After discussion and reflection, he came to accept the need for operations other than in holy sites. Also, he was quite prepared to admit that his initial estimation of Sadr's potential was wrong. It is hard to say whether his inhibitions about operations against Sadr in Najaf were based on his analysis of the consequences or some generic distaste for force.

I would like to reiterate my suggestion that Ali Allawi be invited to visit Washington in the first half of May, perhaps sooner. He is needed here now to build the MoD, help manage crises, and give confidence to both the public and the troops. Let's hope conditions will permit a visit in three or four weeks.

David

**Lowery, Michael, CIV, WHS/ESCD**

---

**From:** Lowery, Michael, CIV, WHS/ESCD  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 14, 2004 3:06 PM  
**To:** 'gompertd@orha.centcom.mil'  
**Cc:** Lowery, Michael, CIV, WHS/ESCD  
**Subject:** New MoD, OSD 05407-04


The attached Secretary of Defense Snowflake, dated April 14, 2004, Subject: New MoD, OSD 05407-04, is forwarded in PDF format.



OSD 05407-04.pdf

APR 14 2004

TO: Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)  
Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
Honorable George Tenet  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Barham Salih April 9, 2004 *Washington Post* Op-ed

Iraq

This piece is worth reading.

Attach.

Salih, Barham. "A Year After Liberation," *Washington Post*, April 9, 2004, p. A19.

DHR:dh  
041204-14

14 Apr 04

OSD 05409-04

washingtonpost.com

## A Year After Liberation

By Barham Salih

Friday, April 9, 2004; Page A19

SULAIMANI, Iraq -- The toppling of the statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad a year ago today was a symbol of the victory of freedom over despotism in Iraq and the Middle East. But liberation from tyranny is only the first step. Building a democracy that protects freedom requires a long-term and sustained effort.

A year after liberation, we need to acknowledge both the achievements behind us and the difficulties ahead. The upsurge in violence over the past 10 days underscores the truth that democracy will not be implanted throughout Iraq easily or quickly. But the progress of the past year shows that it can be done.

For those of us who have spent a lifetime battling to free the Iraqi people from the grip of the merciless Baathist tyranny, the past 12 months have been a vindication. That Hussein and many of his cronies are now behind bars and awaiting trial is just.

For the representatives of Iraq's various communities, whom Hussein had played against each other, to have engaged in a peaceful political process to draft an interim constitution was remarkable. The document drawn up by Arabs, Kurds, Turkomens and Assyrians, men and women, Christians and Muslims, is the most liberal in the Islamic Middle East and is an achievement we can all take pride in.

It is worth remembering that historically Iraqi political disputes have generally been settled through violence. Iraq is a failed state in which there have been more coups than free elections. Yet, during the constitutional negotiations, the only weapons that were deployed were ideas, the only exchanges were of words.

While there is a grave and continuing terrorist threat, Iraq is not the violent disaster that naysayers depict. Rather, for Iraqis, most of whom have known nothing but the murder and mayhem of Hussein's rule, the past year has provided a taste of the benefits of peace. More than a million Iraqi refugees have come back to their homeland, despite being told by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees that it was unsafe to do so.


The refugees have returned to a thriving economy characterized by improving services. A year into the new Iraq public health care funding is more than 25 times as much than under Hussein, and child immunization rates have risen 25 percent. The supply of drinking water has doubled. The historical marshlands of southern Iraq, an environment devastated by Hussein, are being restored. Iraqi Kurdistan, protected from Hussein for 12 years by Britain, the United States and Turkey, is experiencing a cultural and economic boom.

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11-L-0559/OSD/41153



For the first time in living memory, Iraqis feel optimistic. According to a recent Oxford Research International poll, 56.5 percent of Iraqis said their lives were much better or somewhat better than a year ago. Only 18.6 percent said they were much or somewhat worse. And 71 percent expect their lives will be much or somewhat better a year from now.

It is in response to this political and economic progress that the terrorists' onslaught is being stepped up. The terrorists know there is no room for them and their sterile ideas in our nascent democracy. These attacks are not, as some imagine, "resistance" to foreign presence. Rather, the terrorists are fighting against the right of Iraqis to choose for themselves. What they are trying to do is drive out all those who would extend a helping hand to Iraqis.

The terrorists will stop at nothing in their quest to drive out the friends of Iraq. The contemptible minority that murdered those brave Americans in Fallujah and desecrated their bodies in no way represents Iraq. By contrast, the Americans who were lost in such terrible circumstances represent all that so many Iraqis admire about the United States.

The thugs of Fallujah are the Iraqi past: men who committed similar atrocities against their fellow Iraqis with utter impunity for decades. Iraqis are most well placed to find the murderers, to develop, collect and exploit the intelligence that will defeat the remnants of the Baathist regime and their al Qaeda allies.

There are more Iraqis under arms today than there are coalition soldiers in Iraq. The contrast between the forced conscription that characterized Baathist rule and the willing engagement of so many Iraqis in the defense of democracy is striking and heartening.

The year ahead will be critical. On June 30 the awful label of "occupation" ends, and Iraq sovereignty is to be restored. After no more than seven months, there should be free and direct elections for a legislature that would be the first directly elected government in the country's history. These will not be easy benchmarks to attain. While we need sustained international support, the onus of responsibility will be on Iraqis themselves to build national institutions. Priorities for Iraqi democrats will be to promote civil society and protect a nascent political process against corruption and organized extremists.

The terrorists, the fundamentalist extremists -- and their sponsors -- know that Iraq is the decisive battle in their war against freedom. They are determined and resourceful. The violence of the past 10 days is a testament to the grave challenge they pose to Iraq's new political process. We have to respond to the present threat but also anticipate that this challenge may escalate as June 30 and then the U.S. presidential election approach. While a robust military response from the coalition is unavoidably the immediate requirement, Iraqis must be empowered to assume a more active role in protecting their country and taking responsibility for their own fate. Iraqi political leaders must be unequivocal in facing their responsibilities. There is no margin for political opportunism in confronting terrorism and extremism in our midst. If the terrorists and extremists are seen to win in any way, seen in any manner to inflict setbacks upon Iraq's burgeoning democracy, then the whole of the Middle East could be set ablaze. If the terrorists lose, then there is hope not just for the stability of the Middle East but for the rest of the world and our common battle against terrorism.

*The writer is prime minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Sulaymaniyah. He will answer questions about this article at 11 a.m. today at [www.washingtonpost.com](http://www.washingtonpost.com).*

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11-L-0559/OSD/41154

7201  
TAB A

March 22, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Ammo Dumps

Apparently the UK is complaining about unguarded ammo dumps in Iraq. Someone ought to find out what they are complaining about, and either get them to fix it or get somebody else to fix it. It is not the first time.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
032204-9

.....  
Please respond by 4/2/04

IRAQ

22 March 04

OSD 05416-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/41155

72  
OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 APR 19 PM 1: 22 APR 19 2004

TO: Dina Powell  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Peter Kunkel

Peter Kunkel has been doing terrific work in the DOD Legislative Affairs shop. He is a real team player and an enthusiastic supporter of President Bush.

I would like to appoint him as a Schedule C. Please help that process along.

Thanks.

Attach.  
**Kunkel** fact sheet

DHR:dh  
041504-2

*23002*

*19 Apr 04*

OSD 05631-04

# Peter E. Kunkel, Esq.

(b)(6)

## experience

- 2003- **ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS, *Special Assistant*** WASHINGTON, D.C.  
Legislative Action Officer, International Security Policy and International Security Affairs.  
Developing and/or implementing strategies to communicate Bush administration defense policy to the respective U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives committees of jurisdiction over the Defense Department and State Department
- 2000-2002 **UBS WARBURG, LLC, *Associate Director, Investment Banking*** NEW YORK, NY  
2001-2002 Aerospace and Defense Corporate Finance  
Advised on means to exploit strategic markets in the commercial aerospace and defense industries  
General Electric Aircraft Engines: Penetration into additional defense markets for value-added systems  
The Boeing Company: Space-based air traffic management, electronic flight bag, and real time scheduling opportunities  
Originated and executed merger and acquisition, equity and debt financing transactions  
Raytheon Company: \$1 billion secondary equity offering  
Lockheed Martin: Investment grade revolving line of credit  
TRW: Tax free spin-off and strategic acquisition talks
- 2000-2001 Leveraged Finance: Originated and executed high yield bond, senior bank debt, and bridge financing transactions  
Industries served: health care providers, telecommunications providers, paper mills and petrochemical producers
- 1992-1996 **UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS, *Infantry Company Commander*** TWENTYNINE PALMS, CA  
1996 Commanding Officer, Company G, Second Battalion, Seventh Marines  
Commanded 214 Marines, solely responsible for their combat preparedness, professional character and welfare  
Coordinated with US Embassy in Argentina, Air Force transportation authorities, and local California USMC units for USMC to mount an expedition up Cerro Aconcagua, the Western Hemisphere's Tallest Mountain.
- 1995-1996 Executive Officer, Company G  
In both 1995 and 1996, operational segment of the Company Ranked Number 1 of 24 in USMC Combat Preparedness Competition
- 1996 Personal Honors: Ranked #1 of 35, Summer Mountain Leaders Course. Also, top 5%, Winter Mountain Leaders Course, Bridgeport, CA
- 1992-1995 Platoon Commander, Company G  
Commanded 41 Marines. Mentored 2 junior Marines to become the #1 and #3 small unit leaders in a field of 100

## student internships

- 1999 **J.F. LEHMAN & CO., *Summer Associate*** NEW YORK, NY  
Quantitative debt service analysis of potential leveraged buyout opportunities and other related transaction execution duties.  
Identified 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> tier aerospace/ defense manufacturing businesses and OEM segments for potential purchase
- 1998 **MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS, *Summer Clerk, Judge William C. Whitbeck*** LANSING, MI
- 1997 **THE HON. PETER HOEKSTRA, U.S. House of Representatives, *District Intern*** HOLLAND, MI

## education

- 1997-2000 **UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO SCHOOL OF LAW** SAN FRANCISCO, CA  
*J.D.*, Best Brief, First Year Moot Court Competition, 1998. CALI Award for excellence, Maritime Law, 1999, Recipient, Moot Court Case Counsel Scholarship, 1998. Participant, Judge John R. Brown Admiralty National Moot Court Competition, 1999. Participant, Advocate of the Year Competition, 1998
- 1988-1992 **NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY** EVANSTON, IL  
*B.A., Economics; Naval Science Curriculum*, 1992. Honor Graduate, Marine Corps Association Midshipman Award, 1992. Recipient, Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps Scholarship, 1989-1992. President, Semper Fidelis Association, 1992

## affiliations

- 2001 Student Sponsor Partnership of New York City, mentor  
2001 New York Bar Association, member in Good Standing  
2001 University Club of New York, social club member

## personal

- 1997 **HIGH ALTITUDE MOUNTAINEERING:** Successful Ascent of Cerro Aconcagua, Argentina (Elev. 22,856')

11-L-0559/OSD/41157

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3  
March 1, 2004

2004 APR 12 PM 1:35

TO: Ken Krieg  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Study Teams

Please *take* a look at these PA&E Defense Resource Management Study Teams.

Why aren't they in **Iraq** and Afghanistan?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030101-77

.....  
Please respond by 3/12/04

092

3 Mar 04

16 Apr 04

OSD 05633-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41158



PROGRAM ANALYSIS  
AND EVALUATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1800



OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
INFO MEMO

709 APR 19 PM 1:33

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ken Krigg, Director, PA&E

APR 16 2004

SUBJECT: Future DRMS Studies

- You asked me to take a look at the Defense Resource Management Study (DRMS) program and see if it could be applied in Iraq and Afghanistan (Tab A).
- The DRMS program is co-sponsored by Policy and PA&E. It is focused on reforming the defense resource management process of allied countries.
  - To do this, DRMS provides participating countries a methodology and computer tools for producing resource-constrained, multi-year defense programs.
  - The DRMS methodology is more sophisticated than either country is ready for now.
- We are resourced to conduct two DRMS studies per year. Policy selects the countries and secures their agreement to participate; PA&E conducts the studies.
  - For 2004, Policy has made DRMS commitments to the Philippines and Kuwait.
  - For 2005, Policy will give priority to Iraq and Afghanistan.
- To prepare the Iraqis for DRMS, DoD is conducting programs such as the Defense Planners Workshop at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies.

COORDINATIONS : None

Attachment :  
As Stated

cc: Ryan Henry  
Andy Hoehn

Prepared By: Gary Morgan (b)(6)

OSD 05633-04



11-L-0559/OSD/41159

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

<sup>3</sup>  
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030101-77

.....  
Please respond by 3/12/04

OSD 05633-04


11-L-0559/OSD/41160

(b)(6)

TOTAL P.01  
P.01

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

c c : Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: April 16, 2004

SUBJECT:

Do you know a Kurdish leader on the Talibani Peshmerga group named Kosrat?  
Apparently he's quite a good military officer and quite popular.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
041604.10

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ 4/27/04 \_\_\_\_\_

000.5

16 Apr 04

OSD 05671-04



RSS - SecDef CablesESO

From: System Administrator [postmaster@(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, April 19, 2004 7:04 PM
To: CablesESO@ (b)(6)
Subject: Delivered: Urgent - Time sensitive response from GEN Abizaid from SD



Urgent - Time sensitive respon...

<<Urgent - Time sensitive response from GEN Abizaid from SD>> Your message

To: CENTCOM Command Center (E-mail); CENTCOM NCOIC (E-mail); COL
Reynes (E-mail); Abizaid John P Gen CENTCOM/CCCC
cc: (b)(6) Swope, Mark , LTC, OSD
Subject: Urgent - Time sensitive response from GEN Abizaid from SD
Sent: Mon, 19 Apr 2004 19:02:47 -0400

was delivered to the following recipient(s) :

Reynes Col Joseph Jr (USAF) on Mon, 19 Apr 2004 19:03:27 -0400
(b)(6)
Thompson, LTCol H. Earle on Mon, 19 Apr 2004 19:03:27 -0400
(b)(6)

COMPLETED

Table with columns: SECDEF, DEPRC, EPL AUST, SECDEF, and others. Includes handwritten 'CDR REF' at the bottom.

No Classification in Message Body

RSS - SecDef CablesESO

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MSEXCH [b](6)

RSS - SecDef CablesESO

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Cmd Ctr WATCHO on Mon, 19 Apr 2004 19:03:08 -0400  
[b](6)  
Cmd Ctr NCOIC on Mon, 19 Apr 2004 19:03:08 -0400  
[b](6)

APR 19 2004

1830  
4/19

*Advance  
copy*

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Petition

Here is a petition about something that happened a year ago.

What is the status?

I will probably get asked about this during some public press events this week, so the 80 percent answer today will be better than the 90 percent answer on Friday.

Thanks.

Attach.  
E-mail about petition

DHR:dh  
040504-15

.....  
Please respond by 4/21/04

OSD 05673-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41165

Larry,

FYI -- there is a petition originated by the Newspaper Guild an, CWA and the International Federation of Journalist that is circulating online.

<http://cwa-union.org/IFJpetition/>

#### Tell Donald Rumsfeld That Journalists' Lives Matter

It has been nearly a year since journalists at the Palestine Hotel in Baghdad came under fire from U.S. forces on April 8, 2003. Two journalists were killed and three others wounded. In all, seven journalists have perished in four separate incidents of so-called "friendly fire" by U.S. troops in Iraq since hostilities began in March 2003.

To date, the Pentagon's internal "investigation" of the Palestine Hotel tragedy, as well as other catastrophes involving media workers in Iraq, has remained classified. No details of these incidents have been released to their families, news organizations, or the American public. The Pentagon, meanwhile, has ignored repeated calls by journalists and other organizations in the U.S. and around the world for a detailed, independent inquiry into these tragic events as well as the development of protocols to assure the safety of war correspondents.

Reporters, camera operators and others who cover war zones must be reasonably secure that the U.S. military is doing everything possible to ensure their safety. Independent and accurate news coverage of military conflicts depends on the ability of journalists, no matter what news agency they work for, to stay out of harm's way and be free from fear that they are being targeted.

Add your name to the petition below which will be presented to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and members of the House and Senate Armed Service Committees on the anniversary of the Palestine Hotel bombing.

We, the undersigned, have not forgotten the sacrifice of those who gave their lives to report on the Iraq war and its aftermath.

We call upon the Pentagon to make public the results of its own investigations.

We again call for an independent investigation of so-called "friendly fire" incidents involving journalists and U.S. troops.

We demand to know what steps, if any, have been taken by the U.S. government to reduce the likelihood that tragedies such as the Palestine Hotel will not occur in other conflicts.

These actions are necessary to provide closure for the families and colleagues of those who died trying to tell the story in Iraq and to minimize the risk to media workers in the future.

First Name Last Name E-mail Address Media Organization  
(if applicable)

Only your name will appear on the petition when it is submitted.

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(b)(6)

LETED

Table with columns: RECD, DIR, IN, OUT, FILE, etc. and a handwritten signature 'P A Keat'.

No Classification in Message Body

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SECRET  
2001 APR 20 11 9:35

EF-9145  
I-04/004593-ES  
APR 5 2004

Eritrea

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: ~~SECRET~~  
SUBJECT: Eritrea

Feb

Please get somebody to draft a memo from me to the NSC people on Eritrea, saying that we have to balance these two State Department local nationals who are in jail against the fact that we are suddenly getting cut out.

Abizaid needs to get in. He needs to work with them. It is important. The question is what is the cost-benefit ratio here? It sounds to me like we are on the wrong side of it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
040104-19

.....  
Please respond by 4/16/04

4/19

Sec Def: Draft  
Memo Attached

SAPROH

OSD 05701-04  
05-04-04 12:03 IN  
TEN  
4/19

June 9, 2004

TEN  
6/15

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Larry Di Rita

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Press in CENTCOM

CENTCOM

You will recall our discussion at Round Table this morning about lowering the profile of CENTCOM's press activities in Iraq and how that might be done.

What we did not talk about is when it should start. My instinct is that it ought to start fast and not wait until June 30.

Let's discuss this.

Thanks.

DHR dh  
060904-12

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

6/15 [Signature] 6/16

Please see my note attached  
D.Rub

hournb

OSD 15961-04

June 15, 2004

MEMO TO SECDEF from Di Rita (cc: CJCS)

We will brief you soon on this issue in broader detail — For your information now, though, we have already scaled back the CentCom profile significantly.

Senor and Kimmitt already have reduced their briefing schedule to not more than twice per week; they had been briefing daily.

At the same time, Prime Minister Allawi is briefing daily.

We will continue on those trend lines and further reduce our own profile as we further increase the Iraqi profile.

The tenor of the media coverage is beginning to shift as the face of Iraq begins to shift. See the attached article, which ~~was~~ on the front page of the New York Times on Sunday.

Other Iraqi ministers and officials are conducting extensive press activities for local and regional Arab media.

The national security advisor, Mowaffek al Rubaei, holds briefings several times a week for regional and local press, in Arabic.

Our own perception of who is briefing may be skewed because U.S. stations won't carry Iraqi briefers speaking in Arabic.

Allawi is also being booked for a lot of U.S. press interviews. This morning, for example, he was on CNN **and** Fox.

There is unanimous sentiment that the public face of Iraq must be Iraqi. There are other considerations, though, and we will brief you, soon.

7201  
OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 APR 21 AM 9: 41

15  
March 12, 2004

TO: Gordon England

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA

SUBJECT: Hamre Report Recommendations

Please get the briefing from John Hamre. If you have not already received it, and then help me figure out ways we can implement those recommendations that are appropriate and can be readily implemented.

Thanks.

DHR:ah  
031204.15

.....  
Please respond by 4/16/04

OSD 05774-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41174

# SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL

Print Date: 4/21/2004

DOCUMENT TYPE: FRONT OFFICE DOC

OSD CONTROL **OSD 05774-04**

DOC **3/15/2004**

DOR **4/21/2004**

SIGNATURE CASE:

FROM SECDEF

TO SN

SUBJECT **HAMRE REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS**

KEYWORDS

COMMENTS **CAF**

FN **020 DOD**

SEC **U**

OCN

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

STATUS CODE

DECISION

DECISION DATE

PRIORITY ACTION REPORT:

AGENCY

ACTION ASSIGNED

SUSPENSE

DOC SUSPENSE:

SUSPENSE COMPLETE

ACD

COORDINATION

PAGES 1

ENCLOSURES 0

PACKAGE VIEW:

SUSPENSE STATUS

**FRONT OFFICE DOC**

CREATED BY: **barnwell**

DISTRIBUTION: OFFICE COPIES

**ADC R**

April 26, 2004

To: Larry DiRita

Fr: Gordon England

Subj: Hamre Report Recommendations

*Larry*  
Larry

Although we concur with the problem set identified by CSIS, it does not appear evident that we would want to implement the recommendations. My suggestion would be to convene a small group with representatives from each of the services and OSD to discuss a more wholesome way ahead. The exception is the recommendations dealing with personnel. I am inputting those recommendations into NSPS.

If you would like, I will organize some review groups from within DoD to provide more comprehensive recommendations than those provided by CSIS. In essence, we will expand the CSIS recommendations into approaches that hopefully will be better accepted by DoD.

Let me know and I will proceed.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Gordon

*Gordon*

020 1000

26 APR 04

15 APR 04

OSD 05774-04

SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL

B4-27 04

Print Date: 4/26/2004

DOCUMENT TYPE: NOTE REPLY

OSD CONTROL OSD 05774-04

DOC 4/26/2004

DOR 4/26/2004

SIGNATURE CASE:

FROM SN ENGLAND

TO TSADIRITA

SUBJECT HAMRE REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

KEYWORDS

COMMENTS

FN 020 D04

SEC U OCN

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

STATUS CODE DECISION

DECISION DATE

PRIORITY ACTION REPORT:

AGENCY ACTION ASSIGNED

SUSPENSE

DOC SUSPENSE:

SUSPENSE COMPLETE ACD

COORDINATION

PAGES 1 ENCLOSURES 0

SUSPENSE STATUS

PACKAGE VIEW:

FRONT OFFICE DOC  
RESPONSE

QUESTION/NOTE

NOTE REPLY

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ADC R

TSA 0



OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 APR 21 AM 9:41

<sup>15</sup>  
March 12, 2004

TO: Gordon England  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Hamre Report Recommendations

Please get the briefing from John Hamre, if you have not already received it, and then help me figure out ways we can implement those recommendations that are appropriate and can be readily implemented.

Thanks.

DHR:ar  
031204-15

.....  
Please respond by 4/16/04

4/21

→ Sec Nav -

I know you're not looking for any more work, but I think SecDef was interested in your thoughts on a way ahead for those recommendations that made sense.  
OSD 05774-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41178

*D. L. H.*

Larry Di Rita

4/22

April 20, 2004

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 APR 21 AM 9:51

To: SECDEF

Fr: SECNAV

Subj: CSIS (HAMRE) REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

Mr. Secretary,

By your note of March 15, 2004, you asked that I review the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, CSIS Report recommendations and provide input on ways to implement those recommendations that are appropriate and can be readily implemented.

With enclosure (1) you will find my thoughts on the recommendations provided by the CSIS Report. In general, I believe many of the underlying problems identified in the report are accurately identified and feed well into facilitating discussion on many of DoD's transformation initiatives. However, most of the specific recommendations put forward by CSIS are not appropriate and are integrated "point" solutions that lack analytical bases and do not reflect principles I think important in achieving a more efficient and effective organization in DoD.

I believe that the CSIS Report expresses many of the concerns of senior leadership and that the report is a good starting point for more substantive discussion about strategic managerial objectives within the Department of Defense. A lot more discussion is needed before we can implement any reorganization of staffs and processes. I look forward to contributing in a forum that will address these issues.

Attachment:

(1) DoN input on CSIS Recommendations

OSD 05774-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41179

# Department of the Navy

## Input on CSIS Recommendations

20 April 2004



11-L-0559/OSD/41180

# Strengthening Civilian Professionals

## CSIS Objectives

1. Increase quality of DoD's civilian workforce by recruiting and retaining the best and brightest.
  - Create a more flexible "in/out" personnel system.
2. Strengthen civilian career professionals in DoD in policy and oversight.
  - Create training and professional development alternatives.
3. Create greater "jointness" at the interagency level.

CSIS Recommendations	Effect	DoN Comments
Establish a Defense Professional Corps	1,2	-All four Hamre recommendation will be reviewed as part of the NSPS design and development that has just begun.
Increase opportunity for professional development and training by adding 1000 career civilian billets over the next 5 years	1,2	-But probably no need to create a Defense Professional Corps and 1000 additional career civilian billets. Manageable within a civilian career force that numbers 743,000.
Require a 2-3 year interagency rotation prior to SES appointment	3	-DoD needs an overarching SES strategy to help manage professional development and career rotations. Development of such a strategy should be integrated with the NSPS process (SES process is currently not part of NSPS however).
Open more senior positions in DoD to career professionals	1,2	- Pursuing a strategy that creates a more flexible "in/out" and rotates personnel at the interagency level for greater jointness has merit. NSPS will provide flexibility to accomplish this objective.



# Organizational Structure

## CSIS Objectives

1. Build an integrated civ/mil staff by consolidating or eliminating duplicative staffs that create excessive wasteful coordination processes. Need to preserve diversity of ideas and perspectives.
2. Staffs should focus on their essential functions.
  - OSD should focus on policy formulation and oversight not program management.
  - Joint Staff should focus on roles in support of CJCS.
3. Create oversight to improve effectiveness in policy formation and strategic thinking.
4. Strengthen joint advocacy to solve joint capability needs.
  - Resolve lack of C2/C3 jointness by strengthening oversight.
5. Strengthen advocacy for joint programs and requirements.
  - Removes processes that are resistive to change.
6. Tie resource allocation decisions to DoD strategy and planning processes.
7. Create stronger roles for key players that have a stake in strategy and planning.
  - Forces the tough trade-off decisions at a higher level.



# Organizational Structure

CSIS Recommendations	Effect	DoN Comments
Merge each Service and Secretariat staff into an integrated staff.	1	-Growing OSD staff is not the answer. We need to clarify staff roles and processes in order to provide better advice to senior leaders.
Create an integrated civ/mil J1 and OSD (P&R) staff.	1	-Staff alignment is required given process overlap and redundant, ill-defined "lanes." a. JCIDs, EPP, Analytic Agenda and JROC exemplify that nobody has the authority to rationalize competing staff efforts that overlap. b. OSD Staff is not organized to resolve conflicts or set priorities among OSD staff elements or across DoD entities.
Create an integrated civ/mil J4 and OSD (AT&L) staff.	1	-Organizations and processes must enable the presentation of divergent ideas and independent analysis to senior decision-makers. - Collapsing the Joint Staff or other agencies into OSD may impact the ability to provide disparate advice to appropriate senior decision-makers.
Consolidate J6 and elements of DISA and create a joint C2 task force with SOCOM-like budgetary and acquisition authority.	1,4,5	Consolidating into OSD will greatly complicate decision-making, roles/responsibilities, and fragment budget and acquisition authority. Does not address the organizational processes to assess and integrate competing priorities for senior leadership decisions. The alignment of requirements/budget and acquisition in this area is rich for discussion.



# Organizational Structure

CSIS Recommendations	Effect	DoN Comments
Expand the Under Secretary of Intelligence to include C3.	1,2,4	Dilutes intelligence operational support, budgetary and policy authority; creates budget and mission misalignment and inserts two acquisition offices – USD (C3I) and (AT&L).
Disband J7 and transfer responsibilities to the J5 and the Joint Forces Command.	1,2,4	JFCOM has conceptual/training focus and should not own Joint Doctrine. Joint Doctrine better coordinated by current process between the Services and CJCS staff. J7 adds value, expertise with specific orientation on OPLANs and independent review process.
Build a strong PA&E capable of providing broad strategic choices for DoD.	6,7	-A more vital PA&E could solidify and institutionalize the OSD decision integration process for internal OSD issues and support the ability to assess and better present Service and COCOM positions.
Create an Office of Implementation and Execution Review that is tied directly to SECDEF.	6,7	-Shift PA&E to a strategic and capability-based process that is able to evaluate policy, operational and cost effectiveness for senior leadership. Proposal requires a cultural shift from long-standing major program focus. Better long-term solution would be to stand up a USD for Force Analysis over an organization that would implement a more capability-based process to evaluate policy, operational and cost effectiveness for senior leadership. -Implementation and execution review is already inherent in USD roles. Potentially, requirement could be tied into a USD for Force Analysis organization.



# Organizational Structure

CSIS Recommendations	Effect	DoN Comments
OSD consolidate housekeeping functions under an Assistant Secretary for Administration.	1,3	OSD needs an entity that would set staff priorities, run an executive decision-making agenda and ensure appropriate preparation of materials for senior leadership. Empowering Executive Secretary could potentially fix problem by setting priorities and resolving conflict through an executive decision making agenda.
Build capabilities in the COCOM for a stronger role in the resource allocation process.	5,7	<p>-COCOMs require mechanism to play a more effective role in the DoD decision-making process.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Geographic COCOMs address near-term theater requirements and are not equipped to provide inputs into the resourcing process.</li> <li>b. COCOM priorities diverge across theaters and generally exceed available resources. Requires a decision-making construct to vet and integrate COCOM inputs with longer-term, overarching perspective of Services.</li> </ul> <p>-A "J-8" like organization in the COCOM's would provide an input mechanism, but alone, does not address the organizational process to assess and integrate competing priorities for senior leadership decision.</p> <p>- A "J-8" organization would create duplicative requirements generation, increase friction, and will not effectively balance COCOM's resource risks (long term v.s. short-term outlook). Would incur Service manpower bills and grow COCOM headquarters.</p>





# Interagency Planning

## CSIS Objectives

1. Integrate political, military, economic, humanitarian and other agencies into complex contingency planning.
2. Achieve greater unity of effort in interagency planning for post conflict operations.
  - Establish procedures for developing integrated strategies and coherent plans.
3. Develop expertise by incorporating dedicated planning staffs and professional training.
4. Achieve a level of jointness at the interagency levels
5. Create stronger roles for key players that have a stake in strategy and planning

CSIS Recommendations	Effect	DoN Comments
President should establish a new NSC office with the mandate to integrate agency plans.	1,2,4	Strongly support active and robust interagency functions and processes.
Establish SOP for the planning of complex interagency operations.	2,3	
All agencies establish planning offices to lead the development of plans in the interagency process.	1,2,3, 4	



# Interagency Planning

CSIS Recommendations	Effect	Recommendation
Designate one senior official in charge of interagency operations.	1,2,4	Strongly support active and robust interagency functions and processes.
Congress establish a new Agency for Stability Operations with a civilian stability operations corps.	1,2,3,4	
Congress create a new Training Center for Interagency Operations and fund international training and exercise programs.	2,3	
Congress increase funding for programs that support building operational capabilities of allies in complex operations.	2,3	
Enhance opportunities for civilian planners and operators to work with counterparts.	2,3	
Congress seek a bipartisan "BRAC" like" process in overseeing DoD.	5	DoN supports efforts to increase Congressional expertise on defense issues.



OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 APR 21 AM 9:41

15  
March 12, 2004

TO: Gordon England  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Hamre Report Recommendations

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Thanks.

DHR:cb  
031204-15

.....  
Please respond by 4/16/04

0 SD 05774-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41188

TAB A  
FOUO

DJS

OCT 18 2004

882

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Options

Qatar

I believe you are going to get back to me with options on Qatar headquarters.

Thanks.

DHR:sm  
101504-20

.....  
Please respond by 11/1/04

FOUO

OSD 05782-05

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/41189

18 Oct 04

EF-9230  
I-04/004944  
APR 9 2004

RUSSIA

TO: Mira Ricardel  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM:  
SUBJECT: Liability Language

Let's make sure we get this liability language surfaced that came up with Ivanov.  
I want to see what the problem is.

Please get it teed up for me, and maybe I can help get it solved.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
040604-14

.....  
Please respond by 4/23/04

9APR04

OSD 05935-04

APR 23 2004

TO: Honorable Colin Powell

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Haiti

*D.R.*

We have 2,000+ folks in Haiti who, needless to say, I would like to get out.

My hope is that you are pressing hard on the UN, so that there won't be any slippage in their replacing our forces there at the end of the 90 day period.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
042004-7

*Haiti*

*23 APR 04*

OSD 05955-04

720  
TAB A

February 20, 2004

704

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Afghan Security Forces

*Afghanistan*

I assume that your two organizations will get to work on a longer-range plan for Afghanistan that looks at the total number of Afghan security forces, a program of their use and their phasing out or their integration with other elements, funding levels, the ultimate disposition of these forces, what other countries might be available to assist, and the like—in short, all the questions I raised at the meeting today.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
022004-24

.....  
Please respond by 3/2/04

*20 Feb 04*

Tab A

OSD 05984-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

JAN - 8 2004

*Jr*

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

2004 JAN - 7 08 48 52

EF-8019

I-04/000165

USDP

*1/6/04  
1/2/04  
1/1/04*



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY  
AFFAIRS

INFO MEMO

FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
Peter Rodman (b)(6) *PR* 06 JAN 2004

SUBJECT: US Advisors to Afghan Government Ministries

- On January 5 you asked about the status of US advisors to Afghan government ministries and whether we want them in the ministries.
- The Afghan Reconstruction Group (ARG) is comprised of 15 senior advisors and 8 support personnel.
  - Six senior advisors and four staff (including an ARG Chief of Staff) have been hired and are at work in Kabul.
  - None of the senior advisors work in Afghan government offices.
    - They are based at the Embassy and provide advice to Zal Khalilzad.
    - They also work closely with Afghan ministry officials.
- Separately, USAID has approximately 800 technical experts and contractor hires working in Afghan ministries on health, education, economic reform, and agricultural programs.
- The Department of State requested and received \$25 million in the FY-04 supplemental to hire approximately 200 technical experts to work in Afghan ministries.
  - These experts, in accordance with the June 18, 2003, Action Plan to Accelerate Progress, will be "imbedded" in the ministries and will offer specific, needed skills.

OSD 00258-04



11-L-0559/OSD/41193

11-L-0559-03



- The ARG is to design a program to hire and place these technical experts.
  - A contractor (e.g., Dyncorp) would run the program.
  - To date the ARG has not designed such a program.
  - The program will likely include technical experts to be imbedded in the Ministry of Interior to monitor the police training program.

Prepared by: Kurt E. Amend, ISA/NESA, (b)(6)

~~OSD (NESA)~~ 

PDISA 

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

700

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DR

DATE: February 11, 2004

SUBJECT: **Duncan Hunter**

I talked to Duncan Hunter today. Here is a memo that Pete Geren gave me. He said he is going to send in a **paper**. What we need to do is *see* that your folks work it with John Abizaid and get it down the chain.

333

Then **30** days from now, let's get a report back **and** find out what Gen. Abizaid has done off of **the** recommendations that Hunter made.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
021104.04

*Attach: Hunter Phone Call to SD 2/11/04*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

3/11/04

11 Feb 04

04 FEB 18 AM 9:18

OSD 05985-04

Tab A

①

UNCLASSIFIED

SECDEF

MEMO

February 11, 2003, 11:00 a.m.

FOR: LTGEN CRADDOCK

FROM: MR. PETE GEREN

SUBJECT: HUNTER PHONE CALL TO SECDEF

- Duncan Hunter has a call into the SECDEF to discuss his recent CODEL to Iraq, specifically force protection issues. I accompanied Hunter on the CODEL. He pressed everyone he met with about force protection against IEDs and returned unsatisfied with the situation.

The issues he raised were:

- 1) HMMWV:
  - i. He questioned why we have HMMWVs carrying troops in threat areas at all. Why not armored vehicles, trucks, Bradleys, or Strykers?
  - ii. Slow rate of installation of armored kits on HMMWVs;
  - iii. Concerned that Commanders were forced to resort to "homemade" armored kits, generated in local machine shops rather than being supplied with standardized kits for installation. Why not deliver standardized armor plating to Commanders to install in theater to supplement the rate of kit installation in Kuwait?
  - iv. Lack of reinforced glass in vehicles; and
  - v. Vulnerability of gunner atop vehicles.
- 2) IED Detection: In general, he believes that we are not doing all we can do to detect IEDs, that the effort lacks intensity. He offered suggestions about increasing surveillance on high threat highways and gathering intel on IEDs. Specific suggestions:
  - i. Install cameras along highways.
  - ii. Hire Iraqis to walk/drive high threat stretches of road throughout the night (he compares them to NVA "trail walkers" in Vietnam)
  - iii. Raise the priority for IED detection with CIA.
  - iv. He believes we are relying too heavily on "walk in" tips on IEDs. Hire "every Iraqi we can buy" to gather intel in IEDs.
- 3) He also raised questions about the value of HMMWV patrols in hostile areas. Is the return worth the risk?

Need VAUS  
B Problem in Stago

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/41196

TAB B



OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF THE HOUSE  
2004 FEB 13 PM 2:36

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

DUNCAN HUNTER  
CHAIRMAN

February 13, 2004

Mr. Secretary,

I appreciated our discussion regarding my CodeL to Iraq.

As promised, I am sending along our trip report and a memo detailing our findings & hope these materials are useful.

Sincerely,

Duncan Hunter

P.S. Should your staff need additional details, Bob Simmons on the HASC staff is available.

OSD 02262-04

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/41197



# Memo

February 13, 2004

To: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld  
Cc: Secretary of the Navy Gordon England  
Secretary of the Air Force James Roche  
Acting Secretary of the Army Les Brownlee  
Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vernon Clark  
Commandant of the Marine Corps General Michael Hagee  
Chief of Staff of the Air Force General John Jumper  
Chief of Staff of the Army General Peter Schoomaker

From: Duncan Hunter, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee

RE: CODEL Hunter & Force protection

The purpose of this memo is to highlight the force protection observations obtained during CODEL Hunter. Further, this memo suggests a number of opportunities to correct the seeming inability of the military acquisition system to properly meet the needs of our troops in theater.

From February 5 through 9, 2004, a bipartisan delegation of four House members visited major operational units in Iraq to assess ongoing military operations with a particular emphasis on self protection techniques and equipment. The CODEL reached three conclusions that highlight the urgent need for the acquisition system to more fully address the force protection issue:

- Force protection continues to be a severe challenge and priority for operational units. The delegation found numerous examples where units, through the innovative application of simple equipment modifications and changed tactics, have started to improve the safety of U.S. troops. However, additional resources and priority must be applied to this problem to ensure that all possible technical and material solutions are made available to our troops in the field.

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/41198

Memo: Force Protection

- The **continued and** varied use of **Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)** by opposition forces **stands as** the most pressing force protection challenge **facing** coalition forces **and** must accordingly receive the highest priority attention of the military acquisition system.
- Operational commanders identified a number of equipment **and** capability shortfalls that will require the **urgent** attention **of** the Department of Defense **and** the Congress. Among others, the **critical** need for organic tactical **Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)**, increased up-armored/add-on-armor **High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV)** **and** Rapid Fielding Initiative infantry equipment were of particular concern.

For further background, please find attached a copy of the CODEL trip report.

Given these conclusions, I have begun a review of the performance **of** the military acquisition system in meeting the material needs of our soldiers in theater. **Based on** my preliminary review of two critical **war fighting** systems, I am very concerned that our acquisition system is operating in a **manner** that lacks urgently needed innovation **and** an ability to "think outside the box" resulting **in** the traditional, **lengthy, and** ponderous deployment of urgently needed capabilities.

#### Up-Armor & Add-on Armor Vehicles

- M1114 Up Armor **HMMWV** production at **O'Gara Hess** (OGH) is not at maximum capacity. Further, the **Army has** not placed requirements on this manufacturer to produce at maximum **rate**. Current Army contract **requirements are** for 220 **units** per month but **are not** fully contracted for the **entire** year (see Table 1). Considering the lead time for materials **and** subcontractors, the **Army's** leisurely acquisition **strategy is** inadequate to support the urgent need to field this critical force protection system in significant numbers **as rapidly as** possible. Further, there are **only** 818 **M1114 units** in the **FY05** budget request. The contractor reports that without any additional capital **investment**, production could be increased to 360 **units per** month by July and by November reach 500 **units per month**. The 4<sup>th</sup> ID, 1<sup>st</sup> AD **and** the 82<sup>nd</sup> ABN each have about 250 M1114's. These units report they need at least 800 vehicles each. The **Marines** report the 1<sup>st</sup> MEF needs 270 M1114 above the Army requirement.

CY04	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
M1114	150	166	202	205	220	220	220	220	205	188	167	140	2303

Table 1 - O'GaraHess Conti-act Schedule  
(source: Armor Holdings, Inc)

- The O'Gara Hess Facility which manufactures HMMWV **A2** Chassis Add-on Armor **Kit is** also **not running** at maximum capacity. The **Army** position is that there is no requirement for a **higher** rate.

Tab B

Memo: Force Protection

- Production for the **Army** Research Lab Add-on Armor kit for the A0 HMMWV Chassis is scheduled to fulfill the objective for 8,400 kits in Iraq by December. The U.S. and Canadian mills producing the Rolled **Homogenous** Armor (**RHA**) Steel are not producing at **maximum** capacity nor are there any **Army** requirements to **ramp up**. As a result of the less than **maximum** RHA production, the five **Army** Arsenals producing the Add-on Armor kits are not producing at **maximum** rate. **Kits** are delivered to Kuwait for installation at the Oshkosh facility. **Rotating** 8,400 HMMWV's to Kuwait leads to unnecessary delay in delivery to the **area** of operation. **Kits** should be delivered directly to the divisions for installation at their motor pool compounds, an effort that can be effectively carried out by military or contractor personnel in the field
- There is still an opportunity to transfer some of the additional M1114 Up Armor HMMWV's currently outside Iraq to the theater and then backfill these vehicle transfers. Of the 3,272 M1114 in the inventory, 18 are in **CONUS**, 24 in **Alaska**, 246 in **Korea**, and 43 afloat in **APS**.
- The 4<sup>th</sup> ID reported to the CODEL that transporting troops in support of missions has proven to be extremely **dangerous** for two reasons. 1) The **lack** of ballistic protection and 2) the troops face inward, not allowing them to employ their **weapons** and exposing their **backs to attack**. Innovative soldiers are **using** plywood to make benches in the center of the cargo bed and sand bags with Kevlar blankets to provide minimal protection. Further, they **would** like to mount **.50 caliber** machine guns in the beds of these trucks to provide additional firepower. In response to this **pressing** need, Lawrence Livermore Lab is just completing an armor protection kit for the cargo/troop **area** of the Army's 5-ton Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) and the Marine's 7-ton Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR). This development project, an effort independent of the Army acquisition system, is scheduled to be completed in less than 60 total days on February 18<sup>th</sup>.

### Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)

The CODEL consistently heard from unit operations and intelligence staffs of the urgent **need** for more UAVs for two different applications. **First**, the most effective tactic to defeat the IED threat is to catch the perpetrators installing these devices. Thermal/Visual surveillance or Change Terrain Detection capability from UAVs would allow **the more than** 1,600 daily patrols and convoys to perform more securely. **During** the CODEL, it **was** learned that these assets are so important and in such short supply that commanders are constantly competing at all levels for these **resources**. Second, **the** extensive border **areas** of concern must have better surveillance. The 82<sup>nd</sup> ABN must have more positive control of the 825 km of border with Syria and Saudi Arabia. High persistence UAV's are essential to successfully accomplishing this mission.

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/41200

## Memo : Force Protection

- The Army has 32 Hunter UAVs. Six are in Iraq and 12 are being returned to the U.S. for "reset." Availability of these assets in theater **must** be **maximized**. The reset effort has two **components**: 1) overhauling the UAVs and 2) rotating Army operators and support staff. **As** a more operationally effective alternative, the Hunter contractor could provide **support** personnel and overhaul materials and **perform the reset** in theater. Further, the **lack of operations** personnel could be overcome in the **short term** through the use of contractor operators to support missions and the deployment of additional **Army** personnel to be **trained in place**.
- The **Army** has 32 **Shadow** UAVs of which 16 are in Iraq and 8 of these are being returned to the **U.S.** for reset. **Again**, the same approach could be used for the **Shadow** UAV — overhaul in theater and then use contractor operators to support missions while training additional **Army** personnel.
- There are 13 Predator high persistence UAVs in storage in the U.S. The contractor, General Atomics Aeronautical Systems can provide operators, support personnel and training. **Further**, General Atomics reports the Lynx Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) system which includes 4 inch resolution and Coherent and Amplitude Change Detection capability is available and can be deployed on the Predator UAVs within two months. This SAR system could also be deployed on Blackhawk helicopters. Change Detection SAR can detect disturbance along roadways or pipelines which suggest the planting of IEDs. General Atomics has at least 6 system available for immediate deployment. The Predator with the Lynx SAR would be effective for both IED missions and border surveillance.
- There are several variants of UAVs in or starting production such as Shadow, Silver Fox, etc. that could be ramped up over a very short period.

### Summary

The pressing operational demands of the military activities in Iraq and Afghanistan require that we, as a nation, look beyond the conventional approach to acquiring critical military systems and capabilities. Nowhere is this more the case than in systems that significantly increase the force protection of our troops in the field. While it **must** be recognized that no technological solution will ever eliminate the inherent risks of combat operations, we owe it to our troops and their families to be doing everything humanly possible to knock down all bureaucratic barriers and pursue all innovative solutions to field enhanced force protection systems as rapidly as possible. I urge you to press the military services in their Title 10 role to pursue their responsibility with this in mind and I stand ready to do anything I can from the legislative end to facilitate this objective. I will continue to make this effort a priority issue for myself and the House Armed Services Committee in the months ahead and look forward to continuing to work with you on this common goal.

Attachment

Tab B





## CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION (CODEL) HUNTER VISIT TO IRAQ

February 5 - 9, 2004

From February 5 through 9, 2004, a **bipartisan** congressional delegation (**CODEL**) of four House **members** visited **major** operational units in **Iraq** to assess **ongoing** military operations with a particular emphasis on **self** protection techniques and **equipment**.

The delegation was led by **Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA)**, Chairman of the House **Armed** Services Committee, **Rep. Jim Saxton (R-NJ)**, Chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on **Terrorism** and Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, **Rep. Silvestre Reyes (D-TX)** a member of the House **Armed Services** and Intelligence committees, and **Rep. Ron Lewis (R-KY)**, **member** of the House Government Reform Committee.

During the first day, the delegation visited the Combined Forces Land Component Commander **headquarters** in **Kuwait**. On the second day, the delegation traveled to **Baghdad** and visited the Combined Joint Task Force - 7 headquarters, the **Iraqi** Survey Group headquarters, the First Armored Division headquarters and with the **2/2 Armored Cavalry**. **The next day**, the delegation **visited** the **4<sup>th</sup>** Infantry Division in Tikrit and the **3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade** of the **82<sup>nd</sup>** Airborne Division in **Ar** Ramadi. **On** the **final** day, the delegation visited the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany.

### CONCLUSIONS -

**Following** its review, the delegation reached the following conclusions:

- Operational commanders and individual **units** all report continued **progress** in stabilizing the **security** environment within their respective area of operations. While **attacks** against coalition and Iraqi security forces continue to **pose** a serious challenge, the rate of frequency of these attacks is trending in the **right** direction.

- 
- a The Iraqi Survey Group estimates it is **only** halfway **through** with its **mission** to identify **and** quantify all evidence of Iraqi efforts to develop a **Weapons of Mass** Destruction capability.
  - Force protection continues to **be** a severe challenge and priority for **operational** units. The delegation **found numerous** examples **where** units, **through** the **innovative** application of **simple** equipment **modifications** and changed tactics, have **started** to improve the **safety** of **U.S. troops**. However, additional resources **and** priority **must** be applied to this problem to ensure that **all possible technical** and material **solutions are made** available to **our** troops in the field.
  - a The continued **and** varied use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) by opposition forces **stands as** the **most** pressing force protection challenge facing coalition **forces and** must accordingly receive the **highest** priority attention of the military acquisition **system**.
  - a Operational commanders identified a number of equipment **and** capability shortfalls that will **require** the urgent attention of the Department of Defense **and** the Congress. **Among** others, the critical need for organic tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), increased up-armored High Mobility Multi Wheeled Vehicles (**HMMWV**) **and** Rapid Fielding Initiative infantry equipment were of particular concern.
  - o The plan **for the** large scale rotation of **U.S.** forces in *Iraq* **appears** to be proceeding **apace** with **virtually every** unit beginning **some phase of** rotation in the **weeks** ahead.
  - a **The** effort to identify, **secure** and destroy the extensive inventory of **Iraqi** ammunition **and** explosives appeared to **lack focus** and priority at the higher levels of command. At the unit level, **this** effort **was** recognized **as an** important component of stabilizing the security situation **and** denying **bomb making materials** to insurgents. **Accordingly**, the rate **of** progress in eliminating and **securing this** material within the individual **area of operations** of the units visited by the delegation **was** uniformly positive.
  - o Proper and expeditious equipping **of the Iraq** security elements remains a priority **as** the June 30<sup>th</sup> handoff approaches **and** coalition forces increasingly **look** to these elements to shoulder responsibility for internal security in **Iraq**.

## ITINERARY -

### Kuwait - Friday, February 6, 2004

The delegation **arrived in** Kuwait and met **with** the command element of the Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) in **Camp Doha**.

The delegation received a briefing **on current CFLCC operations with** a particular emphasis **on** the OIF 1/2 force rotation that **has** begun. **CFLCC** is presently generating sustainment convoys involving 600-800 trucks per day to support coalition forces within Iraq. The majority **of** these convoys consist **of** commercial vehicles. However, CJTF-7 is responsible **for** providing force protection support **for** this sustainment effort through the use of military assets. The force protection challenge facing the sustainment **and** force rotation activities is concentrated in the urban areas of Iraq **with** attacks rarely occurring in the open transit areas.

One force protection initiative discussed **with CFLCC officials is** the modification **of** baseline HMMWVs with armor kits produced in the **US**. These **kits** improve the protection of the ubiquitous HMMWV by **adding** steel **and** Kevlar components to better shield troops **from** the **dangers** posed by Improvised Explosive Device (IED) **and** small arms fire employed by the Iraqi insurgency. These modifications are **being** conducted in Kuwait. **CFLCC** staff **confirmed** that they could perform a higher number **of** these modifications per month if more **kits** were provided **from** the US. The delegation **was** also **told that** a critical capability that they require is enhanced tactical surveillance that would allow the extension of visibility of convoys to **threats** they might face. **The Hunter UAV system was** mentioned **as** one option to achieve such **an** enhanced capability.

### Iraq - February 7, 2004

#### Combined Joint Task Force - 7 (CJTF-7)

The delegation met with the commander of the **3rd Corps**, Lieutenant General Metz and his **staff**. LTG Metz is responsible **for** tactical operations within the country.

Major General **Miller, G3** (operations) **provided** an overview **of** operations with a focus on the current force rotation. **This** force rotation **also** includes international coalition troops. Force protection equipment such **as** Up-Armor HMMWV, **and** Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) will **remain** in theater for **the** use of forces rotating **into** Iraq. MG Miller discussed the change in **area** of responsibility (AOR) for the **3<sup>rd</sup>** Brigade **2<sup>nd</sup>** Infantry Division Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT). Originally, the **3/2 SBCT** was deployed to the Sunni Triangle. CJTF-7 decided to redeploy the **3/2 SBCT** to the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division AOR in Northern **Iraq around Mosul**. The rationale for **this** move is the advanced capability and mobility of the SBCT allows this brigade **to** replace the whole 10<sup>1<sup>st</sup></sup> Division. The delegation questioned **the** use **of** the highly survivable **and**

lethal Stryker **Brigade** in Northern Iraq **where** the threat of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) is lower. The **Stryker** vehicle **has** already successfully survived two IED and two rocket propelled grenade (RPG) attacks. The delegation suggests **an** evaluation of deploying the SBCT in the Sunni Triangle **and** utilizing units of motorized **infantry** based on thin-skinned HMMWV's in Northern Iraq. Mr. Saxton requested a geographical map showing the location and frequency of attacks on coalition forces, **infrastructure** **and** civilians.

**Chairman** Hunter inquired **about** the security status of **former** regime ammunition dumps and caches. MG Miller **reported** that progress had been made in securing and destroying **ammunition** from these sites. Considering the amount of **ammunition** stored by the former regime, destruction of these stockpiles **will** take several years. **The** delegation was told that over 600,000 tons of former-regime **ammunition** **has** been found at 200-300 separate sites **and** that more continues to be found. Private **sector** contractors **have** been retained to carry out a significant portion of this destruction **effort**. **A** definitive accounting for how many sites **are** the under **actual** security control of coalition forces and **how** many sites remain un-guarded was not available at the brief from CJTF-7. **Chairman** Hunter **requested** that **this information** be provided to the delegation. **The** Captured **Enemy** Ammunition (CEA) program will require \$800 million in funding which is presently pending consideration and review by the Department of Defense. Chairman Hunter inquired **as** to the availability of serviceable AK-47 rifles **from** discovered caches **and was** told that not very many **were** being found and those that of **those** that were, most were unserviceable.

Brigadier General **Fast**, C2 (intelligence) provided a comprehensive overview of the **situation** in Iraq. **Human** intelligence (**HUMINT**) gathering is steadily improving **as** Iraqi's gain **confidence** in the coalition forces. **HUMINT** **as** monitored through Iraqi's walking in to military **and** police facilities with information is **up 300%** since the capture of Saddam Hussein. The coalition forces continue to make progress in the killing **or** capture of former regime **elements**. **Gaining security** control of the lengthy Iraqi borders is essential to combating the small but potent **threat** posed by foreign fighters. BG Fast highlighted that **along** with standing **up** the Iraqi Border **Guards**, essential tools in controlling the **borders** were not available in sufficient **quantity** **at this** time. These tools include long **and** medium endurance **unmanned** aerial vehicles and sensors.

#### Iraqi Survey Group, (ISG)

The delegation met with Major General Keith **Dayton**, Director of the Iraqi **Survey Group** (ISG) and his staff. **MG Dayton** briefed on the **current status** of the ISG effort **and the** recent controversy over **remarks** by the **former** special advisor, Mr. David Kay.

Mr. Kay began working with the **ISG** on June 22, 2003. Originally, the mission of the **ISG was** very broad involving several tasks **beyond** the hunt **for** Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (**WMD**) capabilities (**war** crimes, Iraqi intelligence service, counter

terrorism). Mr. Kay was assigned to the effort to bring focus and emphasis to the WMD hunt. He saw his mission as a "sprint to December." Accordingly, the ISG shifted its focus to principally conduct the WMD hunt and kept as its only other mission to continue the search for leads as to the status of the Desert Storm Navy pilot Spicher. All other remaining missions were to be conducted only on a "non-interference" basis with the WMD mission.

By October, CENTCOM was increasingly concerned with the growing threat against US and coalition military personnel in Iraq and began to advocate that the ISG focus more attention on the counter terrorism mission. This resulted in a reshuffling of priorities that added counter terrorism to the mission list but only on a "as capacity is available" basis. On November 13, 2003, additional personnel were added to the ISG to carry out the additional counter terrorism duties. This arrangement resulted in no assets being diverted or reduced from the pre-existing WMD effort:

The delegation explored the organizational arrangement of the ISG and how Mr. Kay fit into the structure. Mr. Kay was designated as the "strategic advisor" to the ISG, however, he clearly had the mandate to focus and direct ISG assets in the search for WMD. Given that the ISG was and remains a military organization, this arrangement was used to graft a civilian into a military chain of command. MG Dayton stated there was no question in his mind that Mr. Kay came to the theater with the authority to change the mission to WMD.

MG Dayton stated that with regard to Mr. Kay's statement to Congress that the WMD search effort is 85 percent done, he "doesn't know where he got that." He and his team believe that a more accurate ballpark estimate is that they are 50 percent done. All his teams believed they were operating on a timeline to complete activities by June-July, 2004 and not the December, 2003 target used by Mr. Kay. MG Dayton stated that his technical teams have compiled a single-spaced, one and a half page long list of items that they believe require further work before completing their work. 24 million pages of documents thought to be related to the Iraqi WMD effort have yet to be translated and analyzed for useful information.

#### 1st Armored Division

The delegation met with Brigadier General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver) and staff from the 1st Armored Division. General Scaparrotti briefed members on the status of transitioning forces, which includes greater participation of the reserves (14% National Guard, 7% Reserve), an overview of the current security situation, and equipment requirements. The Division staff stated that the efforts to stand up Iraqi Civil Defense (ICDC) units was going well. The Division has been successfully conducting joint missions with ICDC personnel. All but 2 Iraqis from the ICDC units returned to their post following a recent leave period. Recruiting for the Iraqi National Police Force continues to be strong despite the continued targeted attacks.

The challenge is **training capacity**, not Iraqi interest-injoining. Presently have 9,000 police personnel and need 19,000.

The delegation discussed the **force protection challenge facing the Division and was told that early casualties to personnel were largely due to small arms fire. However, this trend changed to IEDs leading to both fatalities and many traumatic injuries to soldiers. The Killed in Action (KIA) profile is now mostly from IEDs and less from direct fire engagements. The Division experience is that Iraqis in their area of operations do not support the E D activity and don't want them to occur in their neighborhoods. This has led to an increase in walk-in and other tips as to the location of IEDs resulting in the discovery of 55% of IEDs before they detonate.**

**The 1<sup>st</sup> AD staff identified the Division's most critical material needs as more M114 up-armored HMWVs, More E D counter electronic measure systems, more tactical UAV system, explosive vapor sniffers and more bomb dogs.**

The delegation also met with Colonel Brockman, Field Artillery Commander, and **soldiers from the Division Artillery Headquarters. The command touched on the need to maintain and fund the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) . Members also had the opportunity to speak with the soldiers and discuss training and operational tactics, techniques and procedures, inspect equipment and vehicles, and tour a recently constructed barracks.**

Iraq - February 8, 2004

4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division - Task Force Ironhorse

The delegation met with Major General Odierno, Commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division/Task Force Ironhorse and his staff.

MG Odierno provided the delegation with an operations and intelligence update and discussed the success and challenges faced within the 4<sup>th</sup>'s area of operations (AO). MG Odierno informed the delegation that all ammunition storage areas in his AO are now secure. As the slide below details, a total of 3,103 ammunition sites were found in the TF Ironhorse AO.



MG Odierno stressed the value and need to continue allowing Division and Brigade level organizations to provide funding for civic projects within their AO. The Commander Enhanced Response Program (CERP) has been very successful and should be continued. The following slide summarizes the status of CERP activity:

<b>Division and Brigade CERP</b>			
	Total Projects	Projects Completed	\$ Funds Expended
Education	727	482	16,401,390
Security	307	193	15,838,250
Public Works	174	105	5,265,665
Government	267	160	1,965,843
Public Health	135	85	690,883
Communications	63	37	134,025

**STEADFAST AND LOYAL**

As of 3 Feb 04

The delegation also discussed equipment and material needs of the Division. Tactical UAVs was highlighted as an area of critical need. The Division currently only has 2 Shadow tactical UAVs and needs 4 platoons to equip all of its brigades. In addition, division and battalion-level UAV capability is also urgently needed.

Other issues identified for the delegation were:

- Need to increase police training throughput. Jordan facility is good, but need to stand up more capability within Iraq.
- Equipping of Iraqi security forces remains a problem. Not being able to properly outfit forces is a further impediment in being able to hand of day to day security responsibilities.
- Additional Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) are needed in Iraq to assist with the reconstruction efforts.
- "Debaathification" policy can create unintended effects if not implemented wisely and with flexibility. Blanket exclusion of mid-level or Baath party members that joined solely for economic or employment reasons leads to yet another contingent of Iraqis with no incentive to support coalition effort or turn to insurgent activity. Only the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) now has the authority to issue waivers or exemptions to the Debaathification rule and this is leading to a significant backlog. Example was given of the University of Tikrit faculty, all of which were required to join the Baath party as a condition of employment. When the CPA policy went into effect on October 1, all had to be fired creating a dangerous degree of unrest among the student and faculty population. Discretion to issue waivers should be extended to the Task Force commanders.

The delegation also witnessed several equipment and force protection measures demonstrations and discussed their effectiveness and shortfalls with operational units. The delegation was told that a number of soldiers used their own personal funds to acquire certain enhanced equipment (rifle scopes, tac lights, knee pads, etc.) since they



were not being readily provided **through** the Army acquisition system. **Chairman** Hunter requested a list of the Division's Rapid Fielding **Initiatives** requirements.

### 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade, 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division

The delegation met with Major **General Swannack**, Commander of the **82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division** and his staff.

Major Bredenkamp, deputy G2 (intelligence) provided a **situation** overview for the **82<sup>nd</sup>'s** area of responsibility (AOR). The AOR includes the major population centers along the **Euphrates** River including Ar Ramadi and Fallajah, 825 km of border with Syria and Saudi Arabia, **and** the western desert **region**. Consistent With the other AOR visited by the delegation, the **82<sup>nd</sup>** has experienced a continued increase in **Iraqi walk-ins** providing information on **former** regime elements and foreign **extremists**. **This human** intelligence is essential in defeating the **IED and** terrorist threat, **The** G2 reported on the challenges in securing the **825 km of** border. **The 82<sup>nd</sup>** has secured the **major** border crossings and conducts patrols over the balance **of** the border area. Providing the necessary security against foreign extremist crossing the expansive border requires addition **assets to improve** surveillance. **Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and sensors** are not available in sufficient supply.

Lieutenant Colonel Farris, G3 (operations) reviewed the **rotation** plan for the **82<sup>nd</sup>**. The 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Expeditionary Force will take over the **AOR LTC** Farris **discussed** the **securing** of the former regime ammunition dumps and **caches**. **The 82<sup>nd</sup> has secured** or cleared of all known caches in their AOR.

**Shortages** of basic infantry **equipment** are a concern for the commander. Essential pieces of equipment **necessary for** conducting **security** patrols and operations are not available for **the** soldiers. **Many** of these items are a **part** Army's Rapid Fielding Initiative and yet are not made available to **the** deployed units. **Additional IED** counter-measures equipment **is** also required.

**Many** patrols and missions **are now** conducted in concert with the **Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC)**. Such cooperative missions provide **valuable** training for the **ICDC and** help put **an Iraqi** face on security missions. **The 82<sup>nd</sup>** continues to recruit trainees to further **build this security** force. Quipping the ICDC and the **Iraqi** Police is a source of frustration because of the delays in purchasing vehicles, weapons **and** ballistic vests.

Civilian Affairs Operations were presented for the **82<sup>nd</sup>** AOR. Economic stability **is** established by creating jobs. **Using** the **Commanders** Emergency Relief Program (**CERP**) funds, **12,000 Iraqi** **will** be employed in reconstruction projects by June. Local self-governance continues to mature **as 35** of 41 elected positions have been filled in the creation of the provincial governing council.

Germany - February 9, 2004

U R I L Center

The delegation visited with injured military and civilian personnel evacuated from Afghanistan and Iraq at the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center. The delegation heard from medical providers that the interceptor body armor vest is very effective in protecting the soldiers from blast and small arms fire. However, the protection is limited to the chest and back of soldiers, and as a result, trauma is now concentrated to the face and extremities. Col. Rhonda Cornum, Commander of the hospital also briefed the delegation on the status of efforts to modernize the facilities at Landstuhl. The delegation learned that, although this facility serves as the principal medical treatment and evacuation point for all US military forces in the EUCOM and CENTCOM AORs, the wards and other areas of the facility are in dire need of modernization and reconfiguration. In fact, the wards where injured soldiers are kept to recuperate have yet to be air conditioned.

**DELEGATION -**

**Members of Congress**

**Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA)**

**Rep. Silvestre Reyes (D-TX)**

**Rep. Jim Saxton (R-NJ)**

**Rep. Ron Lewis (R-KY)**

**Department of Defense Officials**

Mr. Pete **Geren**, **Special Assistant** to the **Secretary** of Defense

**Committee Staff**

Robert **Rangel**, **Staff Director**

**Bob Simmons**, **Professional Staff**

Debra Wada, **Professional Staff**

**U.S. Marine Corps Escorts**

**Col. Mike Shupp**

**LTC Rich Simcock**

**Gunnery Sergeant Lorenzo Chance**

March 2, 2004

TO: Jaymie Duman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Operational Industrial Centers

Please dig up some information on "Operational Industrial Centers." They were started by Leon Sullivan, and he has them around the world. I believe Philadelphia is the headquarters.

If we call in, they will send us some material and information on it. I would like to see if they might be appropriate for Afghanistan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030204-2

.....  
Please respond by 3/26/04

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

3/28

TO:  
Mr. DuBois

Ray Dubois -  
Are you doing  
this?

*Scott Dubois*

Mar 04

Larry Di Rita

3/29

Larry Di Rita  
3/29

RFD to respond to  
SF + fwd to MRN.

11-L-0559/OSD/41213

06000-04

A-04-753

080

4/27  
1030

573



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

2004 APR 23 12:42

ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration & Management

4/22/04

080

SUBJECT: Opportunities Industrialization Centers

In the attached snowflake, dated March 2, 2004, you requested information on Opportunities Industrialization Centers (OIC), with regard to their suitability for Afghanistan. Initial internet research and subsequent correspondence with the President/CEO of OIC International yielded the following information.

- OIC International is an international aid organization providing general International Development programs, ranging from vocational training to food security to microfinance. The organization's objective is "to improve lives in developing countries through training and sustainable organizational development." Specifically, they focus on vocational and technical-skills training; agriculture and rural development; and business and entrepreneurial development. A more detailed information summary of their global program operations is provided at Tab A.
- Regarding your question about their appropriateness for Afghanistan: in addition to their general vocational training and business development programs, they provide Post-war Rehabilitation Services (Liberia, Sierra Leone), Health and Nutrition Education, and they emphasize *Empowerment of Women*—all of which indicates some suitability toward Afghanistan. However, from a cultural-regional perspective, they seem oriented primarily around Africa (although they have centers in the Philippines, Poland and the Caribbean). They have no current plans for establishing centers in Afghanistan.

22 APR 04

Ron Howard, President/CEO of OIC International has sent an information packet with a capability statement, program reports, a study summary and additional organizational information (Tab B). He is willing to discuss potential opportunities with the Department. Accordingly, I will work with Marty Hoffmann to arrange a meeting with Ron Howard.

4/30  
Ray  
- forward info to Secty  
LARRY DUBOIS  
5/3

COORDINATION: None

Attachments: As Stated

Prepared By: Kimball Brown (b)(6)

Patton 5/4  
Back to AGM

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	4/22/04
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	4/26

OSD 06000-04

2 MAR 04

## **Information Summary**

### **Opportunities Industrialization Centers International**

- **History.** As noted in your snowflake, Leon H. Sullivan created Opportunities Industrialization Centers (OIC) to empower African American youth through training and job placement. Patterned after these stateside centers, the first overseas centers were established in Africa in the 1970s. As a thriving Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), *OIC International* now has over **40** affiliate programs in 18 countries, and they remain one of several organizations supported by the Leon H. Sullivan Foundation.
  
- **Local Institution Building.** The goal of Opportunities Industrialization Centers (OIC) International is not simply to accomplish “projects,” but to build local *institutions* that will continue after they are established. They do this by establishing affiliated centers as individual legal NGOs within the host country. The centers are staffed, managed and controlled by host-country nationals, and function at the request of their communities. They continue to receive support and guidance from the OIC International parent organization, but by being localized, they are better able to focus their efforts on the specific needs of their communities. The local NGO status also facilitates their ability to interact better with their local and national governments than an imported NGO might.
  
- **Business Development Emphasis.** At their beginnings in Africa in the 1970s, the organization emphasized vocational/skills training and job placement. Because of the decline of viable private sectors within many developing countries over the years, however, the emphasis has shifted to vocational/skills training coupled with entrepreneurial and business skills development. This model seeks to achieve truly sustainable development.
  
- **Funding/Partnerships.** OIC International-at-large was initially funded primarily by a grant from USAID, but due to grant policy changes, they no longer receive this umbrella support. Now, their individual centers receive USAID grants on a country-by-country or program-by-program basis. Individual Centers also engage in income-generating activities and solicit funding through local channels, as well as internationally. Additionally, OIC International has collaborated with other international aid organizations and charities to share costs and accomplish common development goals. Such organizations include the UN Development Programme, the World Food Programme, Catholic Relief Services, Africare and Latter Day Saints Charities.



**INFORMATION  
PACKET**

**OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS INTERNATIONAL  
CAPABILITY STATEMENT**

---

**OIC INTERNATIONAL**  
**240 WEST TULPEHOCKEN STREET**  
**PHILADELPHIA, PA 19144**  
*(215) 842 0860 Telephone*  
*(215) 849 7033 Fax*  
*website: [www.oicinternational.org](http://www.oicinternational.org)*  
*email: [oici@oicinternational.org](mailto:oici@oicinternational.org)*





# CAMEROON OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS

IMPROVING THE LIVES AND LIVELIHOOD OF YOUNG CAMEROONIANS  
THROUGH SKILLS TRAINING AND JOB PLACEMENT **AND** JOB CREATION

Program Director:  
Bernard Mwarbo

P.O. Box 57, Buea,  
Southwest Province  
Republic of Cameroon

Tel.: (237) 32-25-86

Fax: (237) 32-22-02

Email:

(b)(6)

### Courses Offered:

Carpentry

Masonry

Motor Mechanics

Hotel Catering

Management/  
business development

## Program Description

Cameroon OIC (COIC) was established in the town of Buea in the south-west Province of Cameroon as a vocational **and** entrepreneurship training center. Today, COIC is a well run organization that is doing an excellent job of training young men and women with a combination of entry level technical skills and the positive personal character attributes necessary to be employed by businesses or be self-employed. COIC also runs a strong Management and Business Development unit that has distinguished itself by providing short-term workshops in various



cities and towns for local established business persons **and** others considering opening businesses. These practical seminars have been well attended and well received.



## Accomplishments

Since its start in October 1986, Cameroon OIC has graduated more than 1,764 technical skills trainees of which 1268 were males and 496 were females. Despite severe economic pressures, job placement rates for program graduates have ranged between 51% and 75%. In

addition, an estimated minimum of 10% of program graduates have created their own jobs through self-employment. Even further, more than 2,230 small business persons have been trained through Cameroon OIC small business outreach workshops **and** programs.

### Future Goals

- Construction of additional classrooms
- Development of a computer training course
- Development of an electronic appliance maintenance course
- Construction of an extension onto the COIC owned Pavilion Hotel

### Training Centers

- Buea

Cameroon OIC



## History

OIC International's first thrust into Central Africa occurred in FY 1986 with the birth of the Cameroon OIC project. Buea, a city in Cameroon's Southwest Province, is the site of this vocational skills/management/business development training institution which was initially funded through a grant from the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) **and** the Government of the Republic of Cameroon.

The center is designed to provide technical skills training in the areas of carpentry, masonry, motor mechanics, hotel catering, **and** management/business development. Training offered at the center is geared to both the basic **and** advanced skill levels. The beneficiaries of the Cameroon OIC program has been focused on young unemployed school drop-outs, **and** artisans in need of upgraded skills training. The selection of these target groups reflect the national desire to address the problems of youth unemployment **and** the emerging skilled labor needs of the region.

## Pavilion Hotel

Cameroon OIC currently operates the Pavilion Hotel in Buea. The hotel was built specifically for COIC in September of 1992 in order to provide hands-on training for the hotel catering students. The Pavilion hotel currently has 10 rooms; however, an upcoming expansion project (funded by Bread for the World) will raise the capacity of the hotel to over 20 rooms.



# O P P O R T U N I T I E S I N D U S T R I A L I Z A T I O N C E N T E R S C E N T R A L A F R I C A N R E P U B L I C

CONTRIBUTING TOWARD IMPROVING THE LIVING CONDITIONS OF RURAL YOUTH OF BOTH SEXES, AGES 17 TO 28, WHO ARE OUT OF SCHOOL AND UNEMPLOYED, WITHOUT REGARD TO RACE, RELIGION, OR NATIONALITY, AND ALSO CONTRIBUTING TOWARD CURBING THE EXODUS FROM RURAL AREAS, THROUGH A TRAINING PROGRAM IN PRODUCTION AND MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES FOR SMAU AND MEDIUM AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES.

**Board Chair:**  
Jean du Dieu Dessande

Executive Director:  
Victor Bissekoin

OIC Centre Afrique  
B.P. 134  
Lakouanga, Bangui  
Central African  
Republic

Tel. 236-61-29-32  
Fax 236-61-35-61

### Courses Offered:

- Agro-forestry
- Animal Husbandry
- Cereal production
- Market gardening
- Farm management
- Fish farming
- Rural construction
- Product marketing
- Masonry
- Carpentry
- Metal-working
- Information technology
- Small business devt

### Future Goals:

To introduce:

- Nutritional monitoring of children ages 0 to 5
- Catering
- Environmental protection
- Coffee and rice production
- Household economy and savings
- AIDS Prevention

## Program Description

OIC-Centrafricque consists of the national executive office in Bangui and satellite training centers in Mbaïki, Berengo, and Sibut. Current objectives of OIC-CA at the national level are:

- ♦ To ensure the collective representation of the OIC centers;
- ♦ To organize the and diffusion of and knowledge among OIC centers and similar
- ♦ To facilitate exchanges between communities and various partners new programs;
- ♦ To assist the Government in its plans for training administrators;
- ♦ To stimulate cooperation between OIC-CA and local industries and businesses as well as governmental and non-governmental agencies; and
- ♦ To contribute to transporting to rural milieux appropriate technologies aimed at protecting the environment and reducing poverty.



## Accomplishments

- OIC-Mbaïki has trained more than 500 youths, with 415 now employed in agriculture, animal husbandry, artisanal crafts, commerce, and fashion design and the others employed in private companies.
- OIC-CA extension units have trained 285 farmers, offered farm extension services to 420 men and women in neighboring villages, and organized seminars including 180 participants from Village Development Associations, government agencies, and non-governmental organizations.
- The training provided at the Bérengo Center so impressed the Government of the CAR that three Ministers participated in the graduation ceremonies of the first class to graduate: the Ministers of Agriculture and Animal-Raising, of Youth, and of the Promotion of Women.
- OIC-CA has received funding support from a wide variety of government agencies and international donor organizations, including among others the UN Development Program, IFESH, the USAID, the Government of the Central African Republic, and the African Development Bank.

## History

The first OIC local program in the CAR was established in Sibut in 1987 through an agreement between OIC International and the Government of the Central African Republic (RCA). In 1990 OIC-CA and OICI signed an affiliation agreement, with the national office located in Bangui, and in December 1991 the local OIC training center in Mbaïki was established with financial support from the African Development Fund (FAD) and the Government of the RCA for a Center of Training and Placement for Rural Youth. In 1992 work was begun to convert the Bérengo Complex into a training center, and in 1993 the Bérengo Center conducted its first training activities under the direction of Mr. Henry Taylor-Cline.

The communities of Bouar and Bambari hoped to see OIC centers constructed in their large cities, but politico-military turmoil in the RCA in 1996 and 1997 prevented establishing centers in these locations. These two cities may well serve as future sites of OIC training centers, with encouragement and support from OIC-Mbaïki and the Bérengo Center.

OIC Centre Afrique

Training Sites



- Bangui
- Mbaïki
- Sibut
- Berengo



# OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS COTE D'IVOIRE

INSTITUTIONALIZING A NON-FORMAL SKILLS TRAINING AND RESETTLEMENT/  
JOB CREATION PROGRAM FOR UNEMPLOYED YOUTH, MICROENTREPRENEURS,  
AND MARGINAL FARMERS

**Board Chair:**  
Armand Yao

**Executive Director:**  
N'Doua Affket

**OIC-Cote d'Ivoire**  
20 B.P. 1523  
11 Rue des Pêcheurs  
Abidjan 20  
Cote d'Ivoire  
West Africa

**Tel. 225-21-26-74-87**  
**Fax 225-21-26-74-07**

**E-mail:**  
(b)(6)

**Courses Offered:**

Crop production

Animal husbandry

Business training

Computer training

Credit services

Health education

Literacy training

**TRAINING  
SITES**

- Abidjan
- Bouake



**Program Description**

Both agriculture and business training programs are offered, and a new computer program is thriving. OIC-CI offers training for youth, particularly school drop-outs between the ages of 17 to 35 and low-income adults. The Agro-Pastoral training component provides young men and women with skills to engage in farming, therefore reducing urban migration. The Outreach Programs for adult farmers are short term training programs to reach hundreds of people in their



village through agriculture extension and health education services. The Small Enterprise Development component is aimed at providing men and women with entrepreneurship and business development skills to improve their business practices and provide them with access to credit that would enable them to start businesses.



**Accomplishments**

- Since 1986, OIC-CI has trained roughly 5,000 clients
- 80% of clients have either been resettled or now have jobs

In anticipation of the USAID grant ending, OIC-CI initiated a series of income generating activities aimed at reducing down or dependency and improving their prospects for achieving sustainability. Two of the most successful activities at the centers were fee-for-service training seminars and production of goods for sale. Both the private sector and the government were targets of OIC-CI's business development initiatives. One of the successful contracts completed by OIC-CI was a government contract. OIC-CI also provided literacy training services to government workers for a fee.

**History**

Based on requests for assistance from members of the community in the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire, OICI initiated an indigenous NGO that was awarded legal recognition in 1986 by the government. The OIC Cote d'Ivoire program began operation in Bouake and Angouayakro. It is managed by a local Board of Directors and staff. A grant from USAID enabled OICI to provide technical assistance services in organizational development and in technical training.

**Technology**

In 1996, OIC-CI initiated a computer-training center in Abidjan with four computers with funding from the International Foundation of Self-Help. Today, it has 9 computers and is managed by nine full-time staff members. The centers services are marketed towards clients who own medium and large scale businesses and people interested in upgrading their skills, such as secretaries, unemployed youth who are hoping to break into the job market and other. The two month intensive program provides an overview of computers and specific training in the use of Windows and DOS applications. Training fees of 75,000 CFA franc or an equivalent of US \$136 is charged per client.

**Future Goals**

OIC-CI is exploring ways to achieve financial sustainability while continuing to fulfill its mission of helping the poor and the disadvantaged. It plans to increase the number of clients served to approximately 1,500 a year, while diversifying its funding sources. To date, OIC-CI has mobilized over a billion CFA franc from sources such as BND, BIAO, BICICI, COOPEC, CREP, the government of Cote d'Ivoire, foundations, and income generation activities. Future financing strategies include increasing local income generation while reducing resources from the government and donors.



# OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS

## ETHIOPIA

PROVIDING HIGH QUALITY JOB TRAINING SERVICES TO THE  
UNEMPLOYED YOUTH OF ETHIOPIA

**Board Chair:**  
Fitawrari Amede  
Lemma

**Executive Director:**  
Ato Melesse Yalew

**OIC Ethiopia**  
P.O. Box 2486  
Addis Ababa  
Ethiopia

**Tel. 251-1-50-78-47**  
**Fax 251-1-61-14-40**

**E-mail:**  
(b)(6)

### Courses Offered:

Carpentry

Electrical wiring

Building masonry

Plumbing

Computer training

Tailoring

Agricultural skills

Carpentry skills

## Program Description

OIC Ethiopia is a nationally recognized local NGO registered by the Ministry of Justice and under the umbrella of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs of Ethiopia. Its Board of Directors consists of community leaders, private sector representatives (including the Chamber of Commerce of Addis Ababa) and representatives from line Ministries such as the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Ministry of Education, and the Addis Ababa City Administration. OIC Ethiopia is an indigenous community based informal skills training and employment organization, which is headquartered in Addis Ababa. OIC Ethiopia operates two centers, one in Addis Ababa for unemployed ur-



ban youth and the second one in the town of Dimma, the Gambella Region of Ethiopia for Sudanese Refugees in collaboration with the UNHCR and the Ethiopian Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs office. OIC Ethiopia receives sponsorship from organizations such as the Oromia Regional Government of Ethiopia, various international NGO's such as CONCERN, Red Barna, Plan International, the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia and others.

## History

OIC Ethiopia was established in 1973 with the initiative of concerned Ethiopian community leaders who now administer it in their capacity as Board of Directors of the Program. OIC Ethiopia is thus an indigenous Ethiopian NGO, which has been serving the unemployed youth of the Addis Ababa community for almost 30 years. OIC Ethiopia was started with funding solicited from USAID and with direct technical assistance from OIC International. Despite some early funding hardships, OIC Ethiopia has continued to offer its services and has grown through the years attracting support from local and other European development assistance organizations. Since its inception, OIC Ethiopia has been training an average of 150 unemployed youth yearly.

## Future Goals

OIC Ethiopia plans to offer high quality, affordable training in new courses such as auto-mechanics, metal work, electronics, catering and business skills development.

## Accomplishments

Since its establishment, OIC Ethiopia has trained over 4000 youth (25% young women) in building trades at its center in Addis Ababa and over 700 Sudanese refugees (51% of them women and young women). In addition, OIC Ethiopia has trained over 500 youth (7% of them young women) in short-term training programs. Because of its track record, flexibility and cost effectiveness, OIC Ethiopia has been selected by the Prime Minister's office of Ethiopia to organize and conduct informal skills training programs for four peripheral regional states of the country, namely Affar, Somalia, Gambella and Beni Shangul-Gumuz. One cycle of training has been successfully conducted for three of the four peripheral regions. Preparations are underway for the fourth region and second-round of training has been requested by the other three regional states.





**OPPORTUNITIES  
INDUSTRIALIZATION  
CENTERS  
GHANA**

PROVIDING **JOB TRAINING AND PLACEMENT ASSISTANCE TO  
YOUNG UNDEREMPLOYED YOUTH**

**Board Chair:**  
J.E.K. Moses

**Executive Director:**  
KA. Keelson

OIC Accra Training  
Center  
P.O. Box AN 6241  
Accra-North, Ghana  
West Africa

Tel. 224-40-49-89  
Fax 224-40-49-89

**E-mail:**  
(b)(6)

**Courses Offered:**

- Computer training
- Agricultural production
- Agricultural marketing
- Food processing
- Motor mechanics
- Carpentry
- Office skills
- Electronics
- Ceramics
- Textile design
- Auto-body repair
- Masonry
- Business-skills
- Plumbing
- Catering
- Graphic arts

## Program Description

Established in 1971, OIC Ghana (OICG) provides training in vocational skills, creates employment opportunities, and offers counseling, job-placement, and follow-up services to disadvantaged, unskilled, and un-employed Ghanaian youth. Over the past 30 years, OICG has grown into a solid organization with a strong and dedicated Board of Directors, a capable staff, and well-institutionalized structures. Now operating at four program sites



throughout Ghana, OICG has actively demonstrated its commitment to sustainability by seeking greater involvement from individuals and communities in decisions that affect their well-being.



## Accomplishments

- Since its inception, OICG has trained over 9,400 disadvantaged men and women.
- Each year, OIC Ghana trains over 1,500 youths.
- Computer training is now offered at three of the OICG Centers

## History

Established in 1971, OICG provides young men and women with personalized training in eleven skill areas at four training centers around the country. Since its inception, the organization has trained over 10,000 disadvantaged youth.

OICG fosters democratic participation at the grassroots level, and its beneficiaries are exposed to and trained in democratic governance. It is a community-based program imbued in the principle of "self-help" which empowers poor people to solve their own problems rather than depend upon government. In 1996 the Government of Ghana granted OICG the National Good Corporate Citizen Award, to recognize the organization's "immense contributions to the country's socio-economic development."

The first OICG center opened its doors in Accra in 1971 to offer skills training and job-placement services to disadvantaged Ghanaian youth. The OICG Head Office was created in 1977 to co-ordinate the activities of the three local OICG programs then existing in Accra, Kumasi, and Sekondi/Takoradi. The newest OICG center opened in 1999 in Tamale and features agricultural, micro-enterprise, and water and sanitation programming to advance food security in the region.

## Future Goals

- To assist the trainees in acquiring entrepreneurship skills
- To enable the trainees to establish their own businesses

## Special Project

The Poverty Alleviation Initiative Program targets groups in Kumasi, Tamale, and Sekondi-Takoradi and seeks to reduce rural poverty in Ghana by increasing household incomes within rural communities. The program seeks to:

- Improve farm productivity and marketing,
- Improve farm income and rural employment,
- Improve access to microcredit resources
- Strengthen Ghana OIC staff capacity and organizational sustainability,

## Training Sites

- Accra
- Tamale
- Kumasi
- Sekondi-Takoradi





# OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS GUINEA

SUPPORTING THE ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED BY INCLUDING THEM IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS OF THEIR COUNTRY THROUGH STRATEGIES OF **NON-FORMAL** TRAINING AND SELF-HELP

Chairman:  
**Sekou M. Sylla**  
Executive Director:  
Lamine Barry

OIC Guinea  
Dixonn Port  
**BP 719 Conakry**  
Republic of Guinea

Tel. 224-40-49-89  
Fax 224-40-49-89

E-mail:  
(b)(6)

### Courses Offered:

- Traditional fishing
- Reforestation/nursery
- Seed banks
- Grain silos
- Vegetable gardening
- Natural Resource Mngmt
- Secretarial skills
- Carpentry skills
- Masonry
- Metal forging
- Tile-setting
- Industrial painting
- Restaurant management
- Textile weaving & dying
- Soap-making
- Health education
- Business/financial debt
- Micro-community credit

### Program Description

OIC Guinea has operated since 1986 as an independent non-governmental organization in Guinea, created under the **Ministry** of the Interior and Decentralization. Whereas many development projects come and go, OIC Guinea has maintained sufficient local and international partnerships to continue to serve the impoverished sectors of the population today. OIC Guinea maintains a steering committee in Mamou and a board of directors in Conakry to oversee and provide leadership to the diverse array of development OIC Guinea. These volunteer members, who



no monetary support from OIC Guinea or OIC International, serve and guide the project managers, providing a basis for the long-term sustainability of OIC Guinea. Programs offered at OIC Guinea include a Professional Training School in Conakry, an Agriculture Development and Natural Resource Management project, the Garafiri Resettlement Project, and "Project Equity" which aims to construct and furnish 5 primary schools in Fria and Gaoual.

### History

OIC Guinea was created in 1986 to provide skills training in carpentry, masonry, and secretarial sciences. OIC Guinea has received financial support from OIC International, the International Foundation for Education and Self-Help, the United Nations, the Canadian Development Office, and the Canadian Government. OIC Guinea's Small Business Enterprise program, established in 1990 with financing from USAID, has organized seminars throughout Guinea in business management, cooperative organization, textiles weaving and dying, soapmaking, and restaurant management. Throughout the country, OIC Guinea has taught literacy courses — usually translated into local languages — and courses on organizing women's collectives, credit and time management, industrial painting, and tile setting.

### Accomplishments

- 837 trainees graduated from OIC Guinea and Professional Training Center in Conakry since 1986, with 85% obtaining gainful employment after graduation.
- 500 women entrepreneurs initially trained through Small Business Enterprise program, extended to an additional 2,000 beneficiaries through supplemental project funding.
- 749 women recipients received loans totaling \$40,000 in FY 1999 through Credit with Education program activities, benefiting 33 women's associations in 5 project zones. Credit repayment rates averaged 97%.

### PAVE Project

The PAVE (Profitable Agriculture Village Extension) project began in 1996. Since its inception the PAVE program has achieved many accomplishments, including the following:

- Creation of a local community structure composed of local education, health, business, and agriculture leaders, plus recruitment of 70 full-time staff
- Construction of a livestock production farm with a 14,000-chicken capacity
- Creation of an agriculture credit section for distributing tools and improving seed varieties
- Promoting environmentally sound practices through the specific efforts of project extension agents

### Training Sites

- Conakry: National Office & OIC Guinea Training Center
- Mamou & Tolo: Agriculture Training Project
- Mamou: Credit with Education
- Garafiri: Resettlement Project
- Fria & Gaoual: Project Equity school construction projects





# THE GAMBIA

## OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS

PROVIDING GAMBIAIS WITH THE NECESSARY KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS  
AND TOOLS TO INCREASE FOOD PRODUCTION AND INCOME

Board Chair:  
Adeiade Sosseh-Gaye

Executive Director:  
Kalifa A.M. Kambi

Ministry of Agriculture  
Banjul  
The Gambia, W. Africa

Tel. 220-464-558  
Fax 220-497-353

E-mail:  
(b)(6)

### Courses Offered:

Sewing

Crop production

Animal husbandry

Resettlement services

Handicraft skills

Agricultural marketing

NGO capacity building

### Future Goals

The Gambia OIC plans to create two new centers in the Central River Region and the Lower River Region. Both of these programs will imitate the training already offered at the Farafenni center so that more Gambians will attain food security.



### Program Description

The GOIC program offers a variety of courses ranging from vegetable gardening to cash crops and from animal husbandry to rural development.

Most of the clients are rural youth who have left the formal track of education. Graduates tend to be self-employed as farmers. In order to increase food security, GOIC is maintains the following objectives:

- Increase agricultural production by training young adult farmers modern, appropriate



and environmentally-sound agricultural techniques

- Provide training in agro-processing and value adding to farmers and provide credit for purchase of necessary equipment
- Strengthen and expand OIC Gambia's training and production units in order to reach more farmers and generate more income for sustainability




### Accomplishments

Since its reactivation in 1987, up until 2000, the on-campus young farmer training program, at the Chamen Self Development and Training Center, has trained over 200 men and 100 women. Of those, 115 men and 45 women have settled.

From 1991-99, the Outreach Women Training project trained a total of 400 women in 10 different villages. [in the following villages: Maka-Farafenni (40), 1991-99; Tankento (40); Chamen (20); Jerekaw-wolof (70); Jerekaw-fulla (30); India (60); Jarjarr (30); Kubandarr (60); Dutabullu (30); Wallaland (20) -- 400 total]

### History

Established in 1977, The Gambia OIC seeks to provide Gambians with the necessary knowledge to attain food security. GOIC is the only center in the country that provides agricultural training and resettlement, and handicraft skills training for women and youth. GOIC operates with support from the Gambia Government through the Department of State for Agriculture (DOSA), and therefore works very closely with all the departments under DOSA's authority. The Department of Agriculture recognizes the center's important role in farmer training and collaborates closely with GOIC. The National Agricultural Research Institute (NARI) also works extensively with GOIC and is currently conducting trials at the Farafenni center.



The Gambia OIC

### TRAINING SITES

- Farafenni



# LESOTHO OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS

CONTRIBUTING IMMENSELY TO THE HUMAN RESOURCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT NEEDS OF LESOTHO THROUGH SKILLS TRAINING FOR YOUTH

Board Chair:  
Ms. S.M. Seelso

Executive Director:  
Petrose Lesela

Lesotho OIC  
P.O. Box 2542  
Maseru, 102  
Kingdom of Lesotho  
Southern Africa

Tel. 266-31-31-19  
Fax 266-31-01-19

E-mail:  
(b)(6)

#### Courses Offered:

Bricklaying

Feeder

Carpentry

Plumbing

Metal work

Foreman training

Management

Business development

Microenterprise  
development

#### TRAINING SITES

- Maseru



## Program Description

Lesotho Opportunities Industrialization Centers (LOIC) is a significant contributor to human resource development for the small, Southern African mountain kingdom of Lesotho. Since its inception as an active skill development center in 1978, LOIC has developed the technical, vocational, and business management skills of well over 4,000 young Basotho. In an age where the southern African regions and economics suffer from slow economic growth and high unemploy-



ment, LOIC graduates still enjoy a job placement rate of at least 85%. LOIC graduates place particularly well in the Ministry of Works of the Lesotho Government and with private sector construction contractors. Some 20 graduates have started and continue to sustain viable small businesses.

## Accomplishments

LOIC counts among its accomplishments the following:

- Fundraising and program support from a diverse set of donors.
- Over 4,000 young trainees to date,
- 85% job-placement rate for trainees soon after graduation.
- Over 20 trainees who started and continue to operate viable small businesses.
- Expansion of LOIC to double its capacity for the intake of trainees; currently with 150 trainees enrolled in courses of brick laying, plumbing, carpentry, sheet metal work, and welding. 117 of the 150 are enrolled in ETMD courses.
- 24 total staff, including 7 technical instructors, 3 feeder instructors, 3 ETMD instructors, 1 counselor, and 1 job developer.



## History

In 1975, a group of concerned individuals from the Kingdom of Lesotho requested OICI assistance in establishing a vocational training institution in Maseru to serve the needs of disadvantaged school dropouts. In 1977, the Lesotho OIC was established with assistance from OICI and USAID. Lesotho OIC is still operational and serves a vital need of the community. Lesotho OIC offers training in carpentry, masonry, metal work, plumbing, small business development and foreman's skills. Individuals who graduate are assisted in finding jobs or in creating new jobs. OICI's direct assistance to Lesotho OIC ended in 1985. Lesotho OIC exists today as an independent affiliate of OICI but continues to participate in OICI conferences and seminars. The Lesotho Program is run and managed by a local board of directors and receives support from the Lesotho government, the UN and from contracts.

## Future Goals

- Construction and use of a training center in Semonkong. This center, whose construction is being funded by the government, will accommodate 60 skills trainees at any one time in such low-cost areas as brick-laying and welding. It is planned that during the parts of the years the center is not being used for training, it will accommodate up to 20 residents such as tourists.
- Create income generation programs to create revenue for LOIC. Areas under consideration include poultry raising, swine, dairy cows and fruit trees.
- Increase networking with such organizations as the Lesotho Council of NGOs, Africa Skillshare, and the Technical and Vocational Division of the Ministry of Education.





# LIBERIA

## OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS

ASSISTING WITH LIBERIA'S POST-WAR RECOVERY, RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT THROUGH HUMAN CAPACITY BUILDING, SOCIAL SERVICE DELIVERY AND REHABILITATION OF WAR-AFFECTED INDIVIDUALS.

Rev. Walter D. Richards,  
Chairman, LOIC Board  
of Directors

Edmund C. Dillon  
National Executive Dir.

Liberia OIC  
P.O. Box 3596  
Monrovia,  
Liberia  
West Africa

Tel. (231)-226337

### Courses Offered:

Agriculture

Animal Husbandry

Metalwork

Functional Crafts

Plumbing

Tailoring

Electricity

Masonry

Carpentry

Small Enterprise Devt

Blacking

Shoemaking/Repair

Building Construction

Life Skills

Counseling Services

### Program Description

The goals of the LOIC Rehabilitation and Resettlement Program are to resettle war-affected individuals and to rebuild rural societies and economics. Liberia OIC serves four war-affected groups: returning refugees, former combatants, internally displaced and severely affected local citizens. Due to the horrific events experienced by the Liberian people during prolonged civil conflict, LOIC offers trauma



counseling in addition to vocational of 17 to 35. Vocational skills training focuses on agriculture, building trades such as masonry and carpentry, and other skills needed to rebuild Liberia's war-torn infrastructure and to create productive rural communities.

### Accomplishments

- 3 Enabled 7,000 LOIC graduates to become employed or self-employed
- ◇ Assisted 3,000 families with resettlement in rural areas.
- ◇ Built 12 centers throughout Liberia providing practical skills training and job development services to unskilled and disadvantaged Liberians.
- ◇ Provided counseling and training services throughout the entire Liberia Civil Conflict.
- ◇ Pioneered war trauma counseling in Liberia.




### History

LOIC began training high school dropouts in marketable skills in 1977. During a 1990 civil conflict, program facilities in Monrovia and Foya were looted and destroyed, forcing these programs to close. In Foya, LOIC staff were displaced and the center lay dormant for several years. But LOIC's commitment to its communities, coupled with assistance from donors, enabled the center to successfully recover, even during sporadic fighting. In 1995, LOIC rebuilt and reopened its centers as the LOIC Rehabilitation and Resettlement Program, a transitional assistance service focusing on rehabilitation and resettlement of victims of war. Between 1994 and 1999 LOIC established six satellite-training programs.

### Goals for 2003

- 0 Become a leader in addressing the psychological and emotional problems of war-affected youths through appropriate counseling, healing and stress reduction activities.
- 0 Train 10,000 Liberians in agricultural and rural development skills.
- 0 Cultivate 25,000 acres of rice on farms established by LOIC graduates.
- 0 Generate 50% of operating costs through social enterprises and cost recovery initiatives designed to ensure program sustainability.

### Liberia OIC



### Training Locations

- Monrovia
- Buchanan
- Gbarnga
- Ganta
- Foya
- Sinje
- Harbel
- Voinjama
- Zwedru
- Cape Palmas

### Program Services

- Trauma counseling for clients
- Trauma counseling seminars for teachers and social workers
- Training in basic skills useful in rural communities
- Resettlement materials (tools and farm inputs) for graduates
- Guidance counseling and farm planning assistance



# OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS PHILIPPINES

PROVIDING TRAINING TO THOSE WHO NEED IT, WANT IT, AND CAN PROFIT BY IT THROUGH LEADERSHIP, LIVELIHOOD SKILLS, MICRO-ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT, AND CONTINUING EDUCATION.

**Board Chair:**  
Dr. Melquiades F. Pugne

**Executive Director:**  
Mr. Nemesio C. Daitao

OIC Philippines, Inc.  
12-U.S. Lopez, Jeana St.  
Lapaz, Iloilo City  
Philippines 5000

Tel. 63-320-65-62  
Fax 63-33-74-230

**Email:**  
(b)(6)

- Courses Offered:**
- Small-scale, income generating activities
  - Community projects management
  - Micro-enterprise devt.

**Future Goals :**  
To replicate the experience of OIC Philippines in neighboring provinces so that many more low income Philippines will benefit from the same self-help philosophy and similar human resource development services.

**Training Locations:**

- Cabatuan



## Program Description

OIC Philippines is a self-help initiative established in the U.S. and several African countries. OIC Philippines evolved from a small interest group to a highly visible and successful local NGO with wide acceptance and support from the community. The leadership and day-to-day operations of this program have been totally in the hands of local Filipino community leaders since inception. Program highlights include:

- ◆ **OIC Philippines-People's Empowerment in Action for Community Enhancement.** This is a community-based training program focused on institutional development for local empowerment, leadership, and job development.




- ◆ **OIC Philippines-Credit/Loan with Education Development.** This is a small business funding assistance program to further community and economic development in the country. It assists microenterprises by providing working capital to existing small businesses and entrepreneurs.

- + **OICP-Training Skills and Micro-Enterprise Development Center;** This center provides training in development projects leadership, management and livelihood skills initiatives to selected officers/representatives from OIC Philippines, the Government, and private agencies.

## Accomplishments

- Established Consumers' Cooperative that operates with both paid and voluntary services, with assets now worth several times the initial amount.
- Microloan program has already served over 300 clients and is gaining in popularity, financing a variety of economic activities such as stuffed-toy making, bamboo craft, garment-making, bakery, vegetable gardening, and swine fattening.
- OIC Philippines has succeeded in helping people to improve their economic conditions. It provides training opportunities for them to learn or strengthen their livelihood skills, credit access to improve business performance, and leadership training to enhance the capacity of community leaders.



## History

OIC Philippines formally came into being in 1991 through its registration as a Philippine NGO with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the Philippine Government. It was the first and currently the only OIC in Asia and the Pacific region.

The program's history dates back to 1989 when a group of **Philippino-Americans** (Partners for Philippine Progress or **PPP**) in South Jersey, USA, wanted to establish an OIC-type skills training program in Iloilo. Several PPP members were natives of Iloilo. They contacted OICI and discussed how to import the OIC model into their country. The collaboration between PPP and OICI resulted in the development of an OIC Philippines Interest Group in Iloilo, supported by the Department of Foreign Affairs, Government of the Philippines, and the Provincial Government of Iloilo and the Municipal Government of Cabatuan for a local OIC program initiative.

Since 1989, PPP occasionally raised funds in the U.S. in support of OIC Philippines. Some members of PPP also visited OIC Philippines during their home visits. OICI conducted a feasibility study in addition to a follow-up visit. Through OICI intervention, the Chase Manhattan Foundation has contributed a cumulative total of over US \$25,000 to assist the program, the latest donation consisted of US \$12,000 earlier this year (1999). About 1,500 women and men from hundreds of families in Cabatuan and neighborhood have already benefited from the services of OICP.



OPPORTUNITIES  
INDUSTRIALIZATION  
CENTERS  
**NIGER**

PROVIDING FOOD SECURITY THROUGH TRAINING AND CREDIT ACCESS

**Board Chair:**  
M. Djibo Garba

**Program Director:**  
Mr. Assoumane  
Karanta

**OIC Niger**  
B.P. 12671  
Niamey, Niger

**Tel. 227-73-39-56**  
**Fax 227-75-26-34**

**E-mail:**  
(b)(6)

**Courses Offered:**

Small-scale, income  
generating activities

Business Training

Micro-enterprise devt.

**Program Description**

OIC-Niger has put a high performance economy in motion and promoted plurality at the heart of Niger's society. OIC-Niger also has encouraged regional participation in developing countries. OIC-Niger attacks the causes of poverty, reinforces the ability of people to help themselves, and fights poverty with new strategies that build the capacity of the poor.



**History**

In March 1997 OIC International conducted a feasibility study to determine the viability of an OIC affiliate in Niger. The study showed a high demand for training and for credit among low-income women. Partnerships were formed with Africare and CARE. OICI obtained a grant from the International Foundation for Education and Self-Help (IFESH) on October 1, 1998 to improve food security for low-income Niger women through job creation and improved income, business training, and credit access. Programming began in March 1999.

**Success Story**

The micro-credit loan funds Madame Zara Hamidou received have met her needs and expectations. The funds have led to some significant developments for her business. Mme Zara studio now has three modern sewing machines, including one very advanced model used for embroidery. Before encountering OIC-Niger, she was unable to approach commercial banks for a loan. Now, her association has its own bank account. Her workshop is now prospering as she continues to see her clientele grow. With her steady income, she is now able to pay her children's school enrollment and medical fees.

**Future Goals**

- As a priority, we hope to improve our performance in the office and in the field. We need to develop resources to acquire some capital equipment – a small computer, a safe, motorcycles, etc. – to help ensure our future expansion.
- We also hope to make credit funds consistently enough available to cover the needs of the groups affiliated with OIC-Niger and to begin making commercial transactions.
- OIC-Niger has provisional plans to commercialize agricultural products and to begin offering services in management, building partnerships, governance, audits and project evaluation, and conference organizing.

**Accomplishments**

- With help from IFESH, OIC-Niger ran a credit-lending agricultural program in Beylandé for 26 women entrepreneurs in agri-business.
- An additional IFESH grant allowed OIC-Niger to track 360 women entrepreneurs and their use of credit for 14 months. This project also permitted the development and expansion of the businesses belonging to this group of beneficiaries. The grant from IFESH also strengthened OIC-Niger's capacity and visibility.
- The Women's Entrepreneurship and Income Generation Development Project is in full swing! In its first year, the project enabled 253 women to benefit from training.
- OIC-Niger has developed positive relations with other NGOs: Lutheran World Relief, ONDPH, Catholic Relief Services, and Africare.



**Training Sites**

- Niamey



# NIGERIA

## OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS

IMPROVING LIVES BY TEACHING APPROPRIATE AND MARKETABLE SKILLS THAT ENABLE  
DISADVANTAGED YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN TO BECOME SELF-RELIANT, ECONOMICALLY  
PRODUCTIVE, AND CAPABLE OF IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LIFE FOR THEMSELVES AND THEIR  
FAMILIES

**Board Chair:**  
Mrs. Odu

**National Director:**  
Okadipo Afia

Plot A14 Gbagada  
Industrial Estate  
Oworonsoki-Oshodi  
Expressway  
Gbagada, PO Box 4251  
Shomolu, Lagos  
Nigeria, West Africa

Tel. 224-40-49-89  
Fax 224-40-49-89

E-mail:  
(b)(6)

**Courses Offered:**

Refrigeration

Air conditioning

Metal fabrication

Electronics

Carpentry

Auto mechanics

Fashion design

Hotel catering

Secretarial studies

Computer studies

Snail farming

Fish farming

Agricultural development

Animal husbandry

Microcredit lending

Entrepreneurship

### Program Description

Nigeria OIC offers vocational, technical, and agricultural skills training and small-enterprise development support to over a thousand economically disadvantaged youth each year. With program fees much lower than at similar institutions, NOIC's training programs are highly sought, after and waiting lists are often long. Financial support for the programs comes from student fees, corporate donors, and national, intergovernmental, and international humanitarian assistance offices and agencies such as



the International Foundation for Education and Self-Help (IFESH), the Royal Netherlands government, the US Agency for International Development, and UN agencies.

NOIC courses are typically 12 to 18 months long but are presently being streamlined into a more-efficient 12-month model to enable the more-efficient training of greater numbers of youth.



### Accomplishments

- Set up a pilot catfish farm and a snail farm in Lagos as well as a catering economic venture in the Lagos and Delta programs with funding from the Chase Manhattan Foundation
- Set up a gari-processing plant for women in Ilupeju, Ekiti State with funds from the Royal Netherlands Embassy
- Implemented a technical skills acquisition project (TSAP) in Warri, jointly funded by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and Chevron, to train disadvantaged youth in computers, metal fabrication, and welding skills, and implemented a Youth Technical Skills training program in Port Harcourt, Rivers State
- Started a one-year vocational training project in Bori, Rivers State with funds from Shell
- Trained youth in Warri through a grant from Texaco

### History

Nigeria OIC, celebrating its 30th anniversary this year, was the first OIC program to be developed outside of the United States. Visiting Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in 1968 for medical treatment, Dr. Folorunsho Salawu, the Nigerian founder of NOIC, learned of the success Rev. Leon Sullivan's OIC America was having in providing job skills training to disadvantaged American youth. Dr. Salawu invited Rev. Sullivan and other OIC executives to visit Nigeria, and NOIC was established in Lagos in 1970.

Although initial funding support from the US Agency for International Development dried up in 1976, NOIC has succeeded in providing training with support through other channels, including support from the NOIC parent-teacher association. Additional IFESH funding in the 1990s helped NOIC grow, and in 1997 NOIC agricultural skills-training started in Ekiti State. In the mid-1990s an NOIC interest group formed in Kano in Nigeria's northern region, and by early 2000 two site visits by OIC International staff and NOIC National Secretariat members had been made, leading to the formal establishment of the Kano Interest Group at the NOIC National Board of Directors Meeting in Lagos in February 2000. An NOIC program in Edo State was also recently begun.

### Future

- Peace building and conflict resolution courses to be added to Lagos, Delta, and Kano Programs.
- Community peace building workshops to be held 2-3 times yearly in Warri and in Kano.
- Community Peace Centers to be set up at Lagos, Delta, and Kano Program sites.
- New cooperatives specialists in Delta and Kano Programs to train small cooperative groups and offer microcredit support.

### Training Sites

- Warri (2)
- Ekiti State
- Edo State
- Kano





# OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS **POLAND**

PREVENTING UNEMPLOYMENT AND PROMOTING ECONOMIC  
DEVELOPMENT BY DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EDUCATIONAL  
AND ADVISORY PROGRAMS

**Board Chair:**  
Stanislaw Weglarz

**Executive Director:**  
Teresa Bogacka

**Poland OIC**  
Ul. Szewska 4,  
20-086  
Lublin, Poland

**Tel. 48-81-532-6368**  
**Fax 48-81-532-5929**

**E-mail:**

(b)(6)

**Courses Offered:**

Planning and marketing

Human resource management

Health care units management

Controlling

Quality management

Entrepreneurship for teachers

Real estate market services

In-company training

Finance

Law

Planning

Technology transfer

## Program Description

The main activities of the **Polish Foundation of the Centers of Economic Development Support, or OIC Poland**, are programs and ventures of an educational character. OIC Poland provides the highest



quality educational and professional services through the most modern and up-to-date programs. The programs are custom designed by OIC Poland, or in collaboration with other organizations. Competent trainers deliver the services in well equipped training facilities.

The programs of OICP are aimed at: school graduates, unemployed people, NGO activists and managers, private business people as well as managers and professionals interested in furthering their own education and increasing their skills.

The service delivery activities of OICP have different organizational forms but fall into two main

**groups:**

- a. Program Activities – targeting youth and youth education, the labor market and workforce preparation, the physically challenged, and the entrepreneur and the promotion of entrepreneurship.
- Professional Educational Services – offer full commercial training services for individuals interested in getting new qualifications, and for commercial businesses, interested in the further development of their employees through management training and information technology.



## History

Polish Foundation of the Centers of Economic Development Support, OIC Poland, based in Lublin was founded in 1991 in

cooperation with OIC International. OIC Poland Foundation is an independent, private, not-for-profit Polish NGO. The initiators of the OIC Poland were representatives of the local community who were interested in starting activities to stimulate economic and social development of the Lublin Region. This

local interest OIC Poland group modeled the initiative's development on the American NGO, OIC International, Inc. headquartered in Philadelphia, PA, USA. Affiliating and replicating a successful 30-year model has enabled OIC Poland to create an efficient operating model that enjoys a close cooperation with the state, the private business sector and other non-governmental partners. OIC Poland's training and advisory programs are aimed at school graduates, unemployed people, NGO Activists and managers and the business community. More than 50% of OIC Poland's clients are women who have chosen to pursue a career as an alternative to staying at home. Programs and educational services receive some funding from various sponsors and thus are fully or partially free of charge to participants.

## Training Sites

- Lublin



## Accomplishments

- OIC Poland has created a modern, fully professional educational institution.
- OIC Poland is recognized, not only in Poland, but abroad for its quality of services
- Since OIC Poland's inception, over 40,000 people have directly participated in its programs.

## Future Goals

OIC Poland plans to create an International Center of Education and Development (ICED), in Lublin. This challenging project will be a complex of modern, multifunctional and effectively managed facilities for the present and future educational, social and economic development program run and delivered by the Foundation OIC Poland.



# SIERRA LEONE OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS

CONTRIBUTING TO THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SIERRA LEONE THROUGH VOCATIONAL SKILLS DEVELOPMENT, PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT, AND BUSINESS TRAINING, AND ASSISTING DISADVANTAGED YOUTH AND MEMBERS OF WAR-AFFECTED COMMUNITIES DEVELOP THEIR POTENTIAL AND FIND ECONOMICALLY PRODUCTIVE WAYS OF ENHANCING THEIR LIVES

**Board Chair:**  
Gabriel A.S. Balon

**Executive Director:**  
Samuel J.M. Maligil II

**SLOIC National Office  
Nat. Workshop  
Compound  
PMB 388, Freetown  
Sierra Leone**

**Tel. 232-22-22-6884  
Fax 232-22-27-2013**

**E-mail:**  
(b)(6)

### Courses Offered:

Building construction

Automechanics

Electricity

Blacksmithery

Metalworking

Business management

Secretarial science

Tailoring

Agriculture

Rural development

Cottage industries

### Training Sites

- Bo (2)
- Freetown (2)
- Makeni (2)
- Matru-Jong



### Program Description

Since its inception 23 years ago and through nearly a decade of civil conflict, SLOIC has maintained its proactive and dominant role in technical and vocational skills education in Sierra Leone. With seven major training sites and several outreach programs, SLOIC has achieved many successes:

- Pioneered institutionalized, private vocational, skills training and job development for underprivileged, unemployed, and underemployed youth.
- Pioneered small-enterprise development training and credit assistance to small busi-



ness entrepreneurs. Since 1989, trained over 2,000 individuals in basic business management skills and provided over 500 persons (mainly women) with credit assistance from SLOIC's revolving loan fund.

In 1994 became the first national NGO to develop a project proposal to fund a rehabilitation, training, and resettlement program for former combatants - including child soldiers and local militias - and internally displaced persons and widows of military personnel killed or missing in action.

### Accomplishments

- Personal development and career-counseling workshops for former combatants were organized and run by SLOIC in Lungi and Freetown.
- SLOIC staff are assisting UN peacekeepers and Sierra Leone's National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in demobilizing former combatants at Rot Loko and Lungi.
- SLOIC outreach programs in agricultural development and cottage industries began in January 2000 in Moyamba, Kissy, Wellington, and Calaba. These programs emphasize rural development, reintegration of former combatants, and the resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees.
- Training of lay trauma counselors have been offered through SLOIC workshops in Bo, to provide better psychosocial counseling support for persons severely affected by war.

### History

In 1977, Bo became the first SLOIC training site when the Bo Vocational Training Center was established. One year later, SLOIC began offering training in business development in Freetown, with the relocation of the SLOIC national office soon following. Additional SLOIC programs began operating in Makeni in the north and Matru-Jong in the south in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Though SLOIC operated programs throughout the civil conflict that started in 1991, all programs were significantly reduced in scope after the May 1997 military coup and the January 6, 1999 invasion of Freetown. Currently, over 10,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) are living in the SLOIC National Workshop Compound in Freetown, where the national office and training programs are housed. Some of these IDPs will be trained by SLOIC in new skills useful for resettling the communities, towns, and villages throughout Sierra Leone from which these people came.

SLOIC has over 178 staff and has received support from numerous organizations over the years, including USAID, various European organizations and agencies such as EZE, GIZ, and DFID, and Plan International. The Government of Sierra Leone provides some support to the programmes in the form of salaries for staff members and also through cost subvention. Parent organization OIC International provides technical assistance as needed.



# SOUTH AFRICA OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS

PROVIDING SKILLS TRAINING THAT BUILDS SELF-WORTH IN PEOPLE  
AND EMPOWERS DISADVANTAGED COMMUNITIES

**Board Chair:**  
Mayu Sisibo

**Program Director:**  
Vasco Seleona

SA-OIC  
P.O. Box 11251  
Dorpsruit, 3206  
Kwazulu Natal  
South Africa

Tel. 228-42-00-04  
Fax 228-42-01-94

E-mail:  
(b)(6)

### Courses Offered:

- Carpentry
- Electrical wiring
- Plumbing
- Brick laying
- Automotive maintenance
- Welding
- NGO capacity building
- Computer studies
- Small business devt

### Future Goals:

- To build contacts with private-sector companies
- To expand SA-OIC programming beyond the Kwazulu Natal Midlands Region
- To locate financing to set up a production facility whose outputs can be sold to different companies

## Program Description

South Africa OIC is one of the newest OIC programs in Africa, having been established in 1996. Under the dynamic leadership of Board Chair Mrs. Mayu Sisibo and Program Director Vasco Seleona, South Africa OIC has quickly become a leader among the OIC affiliates in Southern Africa. SA-OIC training is conducted in modern facilities located in the center of Pietermaritzburg, and attracts black youth from Pietermaritzburg and the surrounding communities. Outreach programs target community development committees and focus on



capacity building and the development of social infrastructure.

SA-OIC features practical skills training in vocational areas such as the building trades, provides new educational opportunities using computers and customized software packages for developing basic educational skills as well as technical expertise, and provides specialized courses in small-business development for entrepreneurs.

## Accomplishments

SA-OIC has succeeded in training people who are now self-employed as sub-contractors in plumbing, welding, and automotive mechanics workshops. Its technical skills trainees in the building trades all sit for the national certification exams in their training areas. Because of SA-OIC's innovative training programs:

- 30% of its graduates are employed by companies on a full-time basis;
- 50% of its graduates are employed part time
- 15% of its graduates have started their own businesses



## Training Sites

- Pietermaritzburg



South Africa OIC

## History

South Africa Opportunities Industrialization Centres was founded in June 1996 with the assistance of the Government of National Unity. It operates from 19 Prince Edward Street in Pietermaritzburg. SA-OIC also offers outreach training programs, especially in the areas of business development and NGO/CBO (non-governmental and community-based organization) capacity building.

Initial funding for SA-OIC came in May 1996 from a two-year sub-grant agreement between OIC International and the International Foundation for Education and Self-Help (IFESH). Under the terms of the agreement, SA-OIC was to establish and institutionalize a community-based training program in Kwazulu Natal, South Africa. This grant ended in September 1998. The same year, SA-OIC received a three-year grant from the USAID/South Africa Mission Office.

In late 1999 SA-OIC received a grant from Johnson & Johnson to help establish a computer-based learning center, utilizing software developed by EDL ("Educate Develop and Learn for Life") Foundation. EDL has assisted with the acquisition of computers for SA-OIC to begin its computer-based training model, which may soon be expanded to other training centers in South Africa and other sub-Saharan African countries. Other funds for SA-OIC have come from the British Council and the Chase Manhattan Foundation. The South African Ministries of Labor and Education have provided additional funding through contracted projects with SSA-OIC.



# OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS TANZANIA

IMPROVING THE INCOME-GENERATING SKILLS OF TANZANIAN  
WOMEN, MEN AND YOUTHS THROUGH HIGH QUALITY TRAINING AND  
OTHER BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT SERVICES

Board Chair:  
Bernadetta Ndunguru

Executive Director:  
Christine Mwanukuzi-  
Kwayu

OIC Tanzania  
Bibi Titi Mohamed St.  
PO Box 12474  
Dar es Salaam,  
Tanzania

Tel. 255-51-152-991  
Fax 255-51-112-752

E-mail:  
(b)(6)

## Courses Offered

Business training

Food processing

tie dye/Batik

Poultry farming

Furniture making

Professional video

NGO capacity building

Consulting services

## Future Goals:

OIC Tanzania • In collaboration with OICI plans to upscale its services and adopt a high performance program model to effectively serve thousands more Tanzanian business women and men beginning in the year 2000. It intends to further develop into a sustainable NGO that will help people to achieve a better life through income creation and successful businesses.

## Program Description

OIC Tanzania's program are highly individualized to meet the needs of each client. Whether the client is an individual, a small business, an NGO or a government organization, OIC Tanzania provides high quality services to improve business and income.

### Program services include:

- Business Initiation— targets youth that are scheduled to graduate from training institutions and are on the threshold of entering the job market. The training modules focus on self-employment orientation, how to start a business and business planning.
- Business Improvement— training modules for existing micro-entrepreneurs, many being served by credit-improving NGOs that are tailored to individual



client needs. Some topics that have been covered are business expansion strategies, record keeping, costing and pricing, and production and quality control. Some contracts with local NGO's provides for training with an emphasis on credit access and loan management.

- Training of Trainers
- Technical Training— is provided to apprenticeship trainers through technology improvement. The technical targets improvement of skill in business lines such as poultry raising, furniture marking, and tie-dye.




## Accomplishments

- Over 6,000 clients have been served since the program's inception in 1996. Of the total, 57% were women.
- A 1997 OIC Tanzania Study, following a business development training session for female clients that:
  - 100% believed their business performance had improved
  - 100% believed that their sales had increased
  - 27% of the respondents generated employment
  - Capital assets of respondents increased by 87%
- A tracer study in 1998 showed that:
  - 82% of clients claimed to have an increase in customers
  - 83% noticed increased daily sales

## History

Established in 1996, OIC Tanzania is the result of a collaborative effort between OICI, the National Income Generation Programme (NIGP) of Tanzania, and a local OIC interest group whose members volunteered their services for the creation and management of OIC Tanzania as a local NGO. The UNDP initially provided US\$1.2 million for a three-year program effort implemented with the technical assistance of OICI. An end-of-project evaluation in 1998 indicated OIC Tanzania as an effective contribution to local income generation effort through business skills development. In December 1998, the NIGP board of directors approved a Phase II through assistance funds from the Belgian government and other revenues additionally raised by OIC Tanzania.



## Tanzania OIC

### TRAINING SITES

- Dar es Salaam
- Zanzibar





# OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS

## Togo

FIGHTING POVERTY IN THE RURAL POPULATION THROUGH  
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

**Board Chair:**  
Arouna Sema

**Program Director:**  
Tchaytza Donja

**OIC Togo**  
B.P. 3685  
Lome, Togo  
West Africa

**Tel. 228-42-00-04**  
**Fax 228-42-01-94**

**E-mail:**  
(b)(6)

### Courses Offered:

Crop production

Livestock and poultry  
production

Farm management

Nutrition

Animal traction

Feeder courses

### Program Description

OIC Togo is located in the Plateau region of Togo, in Todome-Notse, and serves youth from the Plateau and Maritime regions. The OIC Togo center reaches out to subsistence farmers, women and unemployed rural youth in the villages within a one hundred kilometer radius of the center. The activities of OIC Togo are focused on agropastoral training, resettlement and extension.

- Training - students are trained in agropastoral techniques: animal husbandry, vegetable gardening, yam seed



multiplication, and soybean cultivation and processing.

- Resettlement - students are resettled into their own villages after training with credit assistance and food for work programs from OIC Togo. Graduate trainees who can not find land are resettled on land obtained by the OIC center in Notse.

### History

OIC Togo was created in 1976 as the first OIC agricultural training program. OIC Togo has provided training and settlement assistance in improved crop production and animal husbandry skills to youth and subsistence farmers in the plateau region of Togo.

OIC Togo has created the most important resettlement site for young farmers in the country. It is a 1900 hectare plot of land located at Agoto in the HAHO Prefecture. The center has settled 84% of its graduate trainees since 1985. These young farmers have formed a farmer's cooperative name "Union des Groupements des Producteurs Agricoles d'Agoto" (UGPA). They have created their own school and have paid teachers that they recruit. The UGPA have also created a Saving and Credit Union. Due to their success, they have shared among themselves a credit of 51 million francs (CFA) which they have reimbursed 100%.

### Future Goals:

- Increase crop production with a special emphasis on soybean production.
- Encourage people to consume more soybean in order to fight malnutrition
- Increase livestock and poultry production in the farming community by improving upon tradition techniques.
- Support agricultural production and provide agricultural credit
- Continue agropastoral training for school dropouts and the unemployed

### Accomplishments

- 78% of trainees have been resettled into farming and animal husbandry activities.
- The UGPA (a group of farmers trained and resettled by OIC Togo) have created a Saving and Credit Union establishment.
- In 1996, the UGPA were named the best association for young farmers in the Plateau region.
- In 1997, the Saving and Credit Union was named the best rural Saving and Credit Union in Togo.

### Training Sites

- Todome-Notse



### Current Project

The Togo Farm Income Improvement Project seeks to improve agricultural practices of small and subsistence farmers by providing them training in modern agricultural practices. The program also aims to increase farmers' access to agricultural credits to upgrade the skills of agricultural technicians, monitors, and young farmers who will be organized into cooperatives for the procurement of inputs and marketing of produce. This project involves:

- Training of village level extension agents
- Upgrading farmers' cooperatives into procurement and marketing cooperatives.
- Development of saving and credit federations
- Seminars for the training of trainers



# ZIMBABWYE

## OPPORTUNITIES

### INDUSTRIALIZATION

### CENTERS

ERADICATING POVERTY THROUGH EMPLOYMENT CREATION  
AND TRAINING OF ENTREPRENEURS

Board Chair:  
Pamldzai Nyatsambo

Executive Director:  
Phillip Bohwasi

Zimbabwe OIC  
P.O. Box A1626  
Avondale  
Harare, Zimbabwe

Tel. 263-4-708-909  
Fax 263-4-708-889

E-mail:  
(b)(6)

#### Courses Offered:

Business Initiation  
(pre-start)

Business Initiation  
(startup)

Business Development

Training of Trainers

Tailor made courses

Microenterprise

Office skills

#### Future Goals:

##### Program

##### Development:

- Construction of computer and business telecenters

##### Resource Development:

- Local resource development

## Program Description

ZOIC provides a service to the informal sector operators and microenterprises. ZOIC was initiated in response to employment creation demands. The main objectives of ZOIC are:

- To develop ZOIC's micro-entrepreneurship training program.
- To improve business management skills of the informal sector.
- To develop training material, curricula and methodology for entrepreneurship training and business development support in collaboration with OICI and selected local microfinance partners.
- To strengthen the capacity of microfinance NGO's and institutions dedicated to the promotion and support of entrepreneurship development.
- To network for institutional support and resource mobilization.



## Accomplishments

- Training manuals were developed with particular sensitivity and relevance to the target group
- ZOIC has become a member of the Micro Finance Association of Zimbabwe (ZAMFI)
- ZOIC has become a member of the steering committee for Zimbabwe National Network Advocacy group (ZMNNAG) for Jobs for Africa—Poverty Reduction Employment Strategies for Sub-Saharan Africa (JFA-PRESSA).
- With only US \$30,000 ZOIC was able to institutionalize and fund raise for more resources to continue to offer training to the informal sector in 1999.
- ZOIC is now receiving training requests from organizations and associations of informal sector operators.


#### Service Delivery:

- Career and post conflict counseling
- Micro-credit/



## History

ZOIC opened its offices in 1998, following an agreement for a grant from UNDP for US \$30,000, and OICI's involvement in the institutionalization process. The organization works in collaboration with community based organizations, local communities, host governments, donors and the informal sector association in Zimbabwe. ZOIC is supported by UNDP and the Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa and receives technical support from OIC International. Zimbabwe OIC continues to work towards its vision of uplifting the living standards of economically disadvantaged Zimbabweans by equipping them with skills to start and run their businesses.



#### Training Sites

- Harare

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# The Institutionalization and Sustainable Development of Indigenous Affiliated OICs

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Lessons Learned from 25 Years of  
OIC International's Institution-Building  
Activity in the Developing World

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**Prepared by**  
Stanley A. Barnett and Associates  
Westport, Connecticut

**Under contract to**  
Opportunities Industrialization Centers International, Inc.  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

**June 1994**

**The Institutionalization and Sustainable Development  
of Indigenous Affiliated OICs  
Lessons Learned from 25 Years of OIC International's  
Institution-Building Activity in the Developing World**

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**June 1994**

Prepared by Stanley A. Barnett and Associates, Westport, CT

Under contract to  
Opportunities Industrialization Centers International  
Philadelphia., PA

Pre USAID Cooperative Agreement OTR-0244-A-00-0102-00

11-L-0559/OSD/41237

## **I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

For the past quarter-century, OIC International (OICI) an American PVO, has dedicated itself to the creation, institutionalization and sustainability of indigenous, community-based NGOs that provide non-formal training, primarily to the poor and unemployed, in the Third World, and more recently, Second World. OICI is one of the earliest—perhaps the earliest --and one of the most successful USAID grantees to have focused on that aspect of humanitarian assistance.

OICI believes that the development of democratic, indigenous NGOs to teach appropriate marketable skills for employment and self-employment enables beneficiaries to become self-reliant, economically productive, capable of improving the quality of their lives, and reinforces the spread of democratic processes to the community at large.

The strength of OICI's program lies in its emphasis on "graduating" its affiliate OICs, i.e., making them self-governing and financially independent of OICI and the U.S. Government. Towards this end--and with program support via USAID/FVA/PVC cooperative agreement grants--OICI provides OICs technical assistance in all areas of institutional development, including training of their indigenous boards of directors and staff, management and financial systems, and resource mobilization. The program support grants have helped make OICI and its affiliate OICs increasingly effective and efficient in serving an increasingly numerous and diversified clientele with ever greater numbers of relevant services.

OICI was founded in 1969 in response to requests by Africans that the Reverend Leon H. Sullivan replicate in their countries the entry-level OIC vocational skills centers training disadvantaged youth in the United States. OICI's first vocational skills training affiliate was opened in Nigeria in 1970, its first agricultural training OIC was established in Togo in 1976, and its small enterprise development centers began in Lesotho and Sierra Leone in 1978.

OICI's strategy focuses on a motivational philosophy, a long-term sustainable development objective, and an integrated approach to program growth and support that empowers OIC affiliates with the skills and tools for effective local program leadership, management and operations. Over the years, the OIC model, originally designed to meet conditions in the U.S., has been adapted to the distinctly different economic, social and political realities and needs of African, East European, Asian and Caribbean nations.

During the past decade, the number of countries in which OICs operate has almost doubled from from nine to 17, and the number of separate OIC non-formal training centers has jumped from 12 to 30. By mid-1994, 10 of the OIC centers focused exclusively on vocational/technical skills training, eight on agricultural and rural development training, and six

on small enterprise development. Two OICs featured vocational **and** agricultural training. Three concentrated on vocational **and** small business training; and a fourth (OIC Poland), in addition, conducted workshops to strengthen indigenous NGOs **as** agents of democratic change.

OIC vocational and agricultural **skills** training centers concentrate on transforming unskilled youth into productive members of society. The target beneficiaries tend to come from the poorer families in generally poor societies, lack marketable job skills and generally **are** undereducated. Without OIC training, most would have been doomed **to** a lifetime of part-time casual labor. Business management and development training at the OICs **runs** a gamut from short seminars for (mostly female) microentrepreneurs, **to** part-time skills-upgrading courses for middle management of indigenous private firms and government agencies.

**Through** FY 93, affiliate OICs had graduated almost 35,000 trainees: 51% of them by vocational skills centers, 26% by agricultural training centers and 23% by small business development units. In FY 93, 13 (of the 17) OICs for which data **are** available graduated 4,634 trainees, **an** increase of 1,728, or 59.5% over the FY 92 total. Thirty-nine percent of the graduates were female.

**To** ensure maximum impact on beneficiaries, the OIC training model is almost "cradle-to-the grave" in scope: enrollees generally are provided with: individual counseling throughout their training; three-months of intensive pre-skills-training motivational courses; **and** an average of 9-12 months of practical "hands-on" skills instruction and on-the-job training. Vocational trainees are provided with job-placement **and/or** self-employment assistance, and agricultural trainees with settlements services. Affiliate OICs accept qualified applicants **on** a first-come first-accepted basis **and** training generally is tuition-free.

Although the OICs' aims, aspirations and operations **are** philosophically and methodologically similar, reflecting a common OICI heritage, each indigenous OIC develops a distinctive format and personality that reflects its original program design **as** well **as** modifications made during implementation in response to its unique set of national and community concerns, interests and cultural traits; variations in donor support; and changing external conditions.

Surveys conducted over the years by external evaluators among employers of hundreds of OIC vocational skills graduates have shown strikingly similar results. Between 94% and 96% of OIC graduates' direct supervisors judge them above-average or average in work-attitude, technical knowledge and practical skills; and prefer the graduates to counterparts not OIC-trained. Evaluators have considered the survey results **proof** that the OICs have largely succeeded in transforming their "unpromising" targets beneficiaries into viable participants in the world of work. Evaluations of several affiliate vocational programs in 1987 and 1992 indicate that graduates **earn** several times more after OIC training than they would have, had they entered the job market **as** part-time, unskilled laborers.

A comprehensive cost-effectiveness study of the OICs in 1987 revealed that their cost-per-beneficiary (enrollee) was generally lower than corresponding costs at similar institutions serving similar clientele, and that the OICs' annual cost-per-trainee tended to decline over successive years. The analysis also concluded that OICI has been cost-effective in the use of its limited resources, particularly the initial cooperative grant agreement funds. OICI performance through the third year of its current cooperative agreement appears similarly effective.

Testimony to the validity of USAID's focus on institution-building as a **cost**-effective **target** for Agency financing is the OIC's ability to continue churning out skilled graduates, year after year, subsequent to the cessation of **USAID** direct funding of the affiliate's **program**

**The intermediate outputs of OICI's current support grants are couched in terms of OICI support services,** through which affiliates are transformed into sustainable institutions. Enumerated **OICI** services comprise: (a) new program development (i.e., forming and assisting interest **groups**, conducting **appraisals** and feasibility **studies** and preparing funding proposals); (b) providing continuing **technical** support during project implementation (i.e., through **OICI** specialists **stationed at** the **OICs**, **TDY technical** support visits by field-based and headquarters-based specialists, regional training conferences and exchanges of experience, a **battery of critical** programmatic and financial planning and control systems and manuals, and periodic external evaluations and **annual** independent audits); and (c) a variety of backstopping services provided by OICI headquarterm).

Analysis reveals that **OICI** generally meets and surpassing designated levels of **support** services outputs. And external **consultant** surveys among **OIC** board chairmen and program directors in 1986 and in 1994 reveal a generally **high** degree of satisfaction with OICI support **services** among recipient **OICs**.

**The final outputs of the program support grants are mature and self-sustaining grassroots-based OICs, i.e.,** affiliates that **possess**: relevant training criteria and effective training methods, an effective board of **directors**, capable staff in place and functioning, sound **program** management structure and operating systems, a resource development strategy, host-government and community acceptance and support, adequate appropriate facilities, and program replication potential. These outputs are detailed in the text and summarized below.

Institutionalization of indigenous **NGOs** takes years. To some degree, the slowness **reflects** the generally chronic instability of the external environments in which **OICs** **operate**. Yet the record of survival of individual **OICs** and the **OIC** network--indeed the **demonstrated** ability of the **OICs** to continue growing under the most difficult and protracted of adverse conditions--is a hallmark that appears to verify the **essential** correctness of **OICI** institution-building **methodology**.

Over the years, **OICs** have become leaner and increasingly **cost-effective--results of** OICI's and the affiliates' increasing professionalism, and **of** changing economic and donor environments. Emphasis on self-employment **has** increased, **as** job placement has grown more difficult. Geographic dispersion of **OICs** has accelerated. Affiliate budgets have **shrunk**. Support from host-governments (always strong) continues to grow. Inter-OIC networking and **OIC** joint activities **are** rising. And **strong resource** developments have increased funding from international donors.

Recurring evaluations report that the autonomous **OIC** policy-making boards of directors, reflecting their democratic **nature**, vary in effectiveness from **affiliate** to affiliate. Generally, however, they are composed of busy, dedicated man and women who donate **scarce** time and much energy to the cause of their **OIC** and the young people it **serves**. Board members represent a wide **spectrum of** community leaders from the public sector (national or **regional** local government), private sector (professionals, educators, bankers, businessmen), the

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\* Five years ago, vocational OICs job-placed an average of 75% of trainees; incomplete anecdotal evidence suggests that the current average may be in the 651-7096 range.

clergy and civic organizations. The vast majority of evaluations agree on the high quality and commitment of the locally-based personnel who staff the affiliates. **Because** of tight budgets, almost all **OICs use** (and find quite helpful) **technical** volunteers and interns, provided by **donor** agencies to augment limited affiliate staff and/or add needed expertise.

Overall, the U.S. Government (overwhelmingly via USAID) has been the largest funding **source** for **OICI** and the affiliates--having provided \$39,974,700 between FY 84 and FY 93. During the decade, non-U.S. Government donors contributed the equivalent of dramatic--\$25,194,200.

The ratio of non-U.S. Government to **U.S.** Government funding **rose** dramatically from the first to the last year of that decade. In FY 84, the ratio was one-to-two: **32.7%** came from non-U.S. Government **sources**, while 67.3% **came** from the **U.S.** Government. By FY 93, the **ratio** had declined almost to one-to-one--48.9% to 51.1%--slightly bettering OICI's projected FY 95 **goal of 48.0%** as the non-U.S. Government share under the current program **support grant**.

Host-government contributions equalled \$11,825,000 (three-fourths in cash), or **47%** of the non-U.S. funding from FY 84-FY 93.\* Other donors (nine bilateral agencies; 10 multi-lateral agencies; and 27 foundations, NGOs and PVOs; and U.S. businesses and individuals) contributed the equivalent of additional \$13,369,200.

To supplement donor funds, the **OICs** conduct community-based self-help **resource** mobilization efforts that include: community drives and economic ventures (**e.g.**, sale of farm by-products, vocational-trainee work contracts and fee-for-services contracts, and for-profit enterprises--some of which have produced modest profits, but which **are** most valuable for their public relations impact).

Seven of the 13 larger **OICs** have replicated and by mid-1994 were operating a **total** of 20 training centers.\*\* Affiliates also **are** adding new training components to mature programs. **External** evaluations of OICI and/or individual **OICs** during the past dozen years overwhelmingly agree that the affiliate institutionalization process **has** been accelerating. The overall ability demonstrated by **OICs** to continue benefitting ever-larger target **groups**; their progressive growth in institutional and professional capability; and their continually increasing financial and in-kind support from donor agencies--all in the face of severe economic and **political** dislocations--indicate that their sustainable development is well under way.

#####

The final portion (Part Three) of this study is a compendium of 50 lessons learned (and overwhelmingly implemented) over the course of a quarter century of OICI's institution building of indigenous NGOs in the developing world. The lessons **are** documented with pertinent quotations extracted programmatic evaluations of **OICI** and of its affiliates, and from OICI's annual reports to USAID. They will be of interest (and hopefully of value) to other NGOs, to the donor community, to the OICs--and **as** a reminder--to OICI itself.

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\* Although most of OICI's mature programs now receive government subventions, the affiliates without exception maintain their integrity as independent private NGOs, because host-governments are well aware of their contributions to the nation and know that they cannot duplicate OIC training on their own.

\*\* The four other OICs are either small, underfinanced "bootstrap" options or brand-new.






# Opportunities Industrialization Centers International

**Rev. Leon Sullivan**  
Founder

**Rev. Gus Roman**  
Chairman

**C.L. Mannings, Ph.D**  
President & CEO

**Mission:**  
To improve the lives of people in developing countries through training and sustainable development services.



## *Our Founder and History:*

Reverend Leon Sullivan, our founder, started the first OIC training center in an abandoned jail house in **1964**. His goal was to help African Americans in Philadelphia acquire the skills necessary for employment and economic self sufficiency. What began as a national movement out of Philadelphia expanded internationally in **1970**.

The first OICs in Africa were established in Ghana, Nigeria, and Ethiopia as vocational/technical skills training and job placement centers. In **1976**, an agricultural skills training center was developed in Togo, and small enterprise development programs were developed in Lesotho and Sierra Leone. Our center in Sierra Leone has since become a refugee, war rehabilitation, and trauma counseling center, as have other programs in war torn countries, further broadening the scope of OICI's work in our affiliate programs.


New programs are developing income generating and job creation activities as an integral part of program design in order to maintain program relevancy and enhance sustainability.

### *Who we are:*

Opportunities Industrialization Centers International (OICI) is a United States based non-profit, non-governmental organization. OICI operates in partnership with local communities, host governments and donors. Its primary role is to provide technical assistance for the institutionalization of affiliate OICs into sustainable social enterprises and human resource development centers. Each affiliate OIC operates with its own Board of Directors and Local staff. OICI currently operates over 40 affiliate programs in 18 countries.

### *Where we are in the world:*

- Cameroon
- Central African Republic
- Cote d'Ivoire
- Ethiopia
- Ghana
- Guinea
- The Gambia
- Lesotho
- Liberia
- Niger
- Nigeria
- The Philippines
- Poland
- South Africa
- Sierra Leone
- Tanzania
- Togo
- Zimbabwe




### *How to contact us:*

OIC International Headquarters  
240 West Tulpehocken Street  
Philadelphia, PA 19144

**Phone:** (215) 842-0220  
**Fax:** (215) 849-7033  
**Email:** [oici@oicinternational.org](mailto:oici@oicinternational.org)  
**Web:** [www.oicinternational.org](http://www.oicinternational.org)

# OIC International Affiliates



# A global citizen passes away

*James Butty, Washington*

**T**he Reverend Leon Sullivan, one of the outstanding African Americans who fought against apartheid in South Africa, and originator of the African-African American summits, has died at the age of 78. A press release from the family headquarters in Phoenix, Arizona, said he died from leukemia. His wife of 57 years, Grace Banks, and three children - Howard, Julie and Hope - and seven grandchildren survive him.

"It is my father's wish that we continue our efforts in his mission and keep his fight for Africa, particularly the Sixth African-African American Summit on course," said daughter Hope Sullivan-Rose. Ms Sullivan-Rose is Deputy Summit Manager and will spearhead the Summit efforts on her father's behalf. As West Africa has reported (April 23, 2001), the Sixth African-African American Summit, scheduled to be held in Abuja from May 21 to 25 has been postponed.

"Reverend Sullivan was a good man," said Melvin Foote, president of the Washington-based Constituency for Africa. "A lot of us are good men and good women, but he was a great one. In terms of what I do, he was one of the people I looked forward to as my mentor. I think the challenge now is for us to pick up the mantle and move forward. He did us a favour in getting us to this date. It is up to all of us to do our part to ensure that his legacy lives on," Foote said.

This reporter was one of the few journalists who interviewed the Reverend Sullivan in March this year. He described how he would like to be remembered: "I'm not the type of person that goes around looking for stories. I don't need someone to take my picture. I have thousands of pictures. The thing I'm trying to do as a minister of God is to help little people. Nobody is paying me for what I do except the Lord. But I want people to realise that there was a man by the name of Leon Sullivan who worked and died in order to help little people help themselves in America and the world and in Africa. That's my mission. That's

what I'm setting out to do, as far as I can do it"

The Rev. Sullivan left behind a huge legacy. For more than five decades, he was the champion of the people. Sullivan was the first African-American to serve on the board of directors of the General Motors Corporation. In 1977, he formulated the Sullivan Principles, a set of ethical directives that called for equitable treatment for Black workers in apartheid South Africa. These principles were instrumental in the abolition of apartheid. At the Fifth African-African American Summit in Accra, the Rev. Sullivan announced the expansion of the original Sullivan Principles to the Global Sullivan Principles for corporate social responsibility. Today, these guidelines enforce fair employment practices around the world.

In 1969, the Rev. Sullivan founded Opportunities Industrialization Centers (OIC) International, a training programme that he said had provided skills training to over three million people. To date, the OIC has more than 75 training facilities in the United States and 17 countries in Africa.

In 1983, Sullivan founded the International Foundation for Education and Self-Help (IFESH), a non-profit organisation that trains farmers and workers. IFESH operates programmes such as Teachers for Africa, SOS (Schools Supplies for the Children of Africa), the International Fellows Program, Debt for Development, Schools for Africa, the African-African American Summit, the Liberia Reconstruction Program and the Angola Training Center.

"The Teachers for Africa Program is perhaps the most successful teaching programme ever attempted in Africa," Leon Sullivan said. "It is really led by my daughter, Julie. We have sent 750 master teachers from America who have already trained 40,000 African teachers. We are training every teacher in Benin. We're teaching people not only literacy but also how to use the electronics. I will not be satisfied until I send at least 2,500 master teachers teaching at least 100,000 African teachers to improve their skills because if you can't read you can't lead. We've got



**Leon Sullivan: remembered for the Sullivan Principles in South Africa**

to find the way - African-Americans and friends of Africa - to help Africans help themselves."

The Rev. Sullivan created the bi-annual African-African American Summit in 1991 to bring American corporations, business leaders, and African heads of state together to discuss political, economic, educational and social development of the African continent.


In 1992 Sullivan was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom by President George Bush Sr for his "voice of reason for over forty years" and a lifetime of work in helping the economically and socially disadvantaged people of the world. In December 1999 he received the Eleanor Roosevelt Award from President Clinton for his humanitarian efforts around the world.

Leon Sullivan was a champion of the people, particularly the people of Africa. The question is, what happens now? "Well, I think we are better off in terms of US policy toward Africa today than we were 10 years ago, and Sullivan certainly gets a great deal of credit in that regard," said Melvin Foote. "We've got to see who now will step in to do their part, and I don't think it's going to be one person. I think the days of the charismatic giant, the Martin Luther King, the Malcolm X, the Leon Sullivan, those days may well be on their wane. So I just think the debate's being broad, and a lot of this got its origin from Sullivan, but Sullivan will be the last one to tell you that he's looking for another messiah to step forward. It's going to be determined by people like you, me and everybody who's been working on Africa."

April 27, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Gen. John Abizaid  
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Observations for the Future

My feeling is that in several areas decisions on Iraq apparently were made that, in retrospect, might have been different. For example:

1. We may have had several changes in military leadership very fast in some places in Iraq. I am told we have had at least four different military leaderships in Fallujah, with the result being we may have lost situational awareness and given an uncertain signal to the people in the area. We may be paying a penalty now.
2. At the end of major combat operations the in-place military picked up and left.
3. We have just realized that there are different rules of engagement for Coalition countries. We need to get them all to be the same. And, where that is not possible or they are not sufficiently robust, we should put them in locations where it would matter less.
4. The 17-nation multi-national division went in a calm area, but conditions changed.

Iraq

27 Apr 04

OSD 06042-04

5. Finally, most important, in retrospect, may have been creating a multi-national division and keeping together all of the 17 nations. There are good reasons for not putting all of them in one sector. Specifically:

- It is good to have US forces work with foreign forces, in that it creates more combined capability for the alliance for the future.
- When we mix foreign forces in with US forces, they learn working with our military and become better.
- Further, rather than putting all 17 Coalition countries in one division, if Spain or Honduras and the others had been embedded in US forces spread around the country, and then some nations pulled out, it would have made less difference, since we are now having to rearrange forces to fill the gaps. The task would have been easier if we had had small numbers of the 17 Coalition forces with our units.

Please look at these issues and any others you can think of, if you think I am right, then let's continue to address conditions, discuss our options and make sure we are flexible.

Let's discuss.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
042304-10

.....  
Please respond by 5/7/04

APR 27 2004

PACOM

TO: ADM Tom Fargo  
 CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Updating Systems and Procedures

Thanks so much for sending along your memo, "Updating Systems and Procedures." We'll work it from here - you keep pushing from there.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
 042604-29



*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

AMAPROY

OSD 06115-04

April 27, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Book Review on *Anti-Americanism*

Attached is a review on a book written by Jean-François Revel, *Anti-Americanism*.  
I think you will find it both interesting and enjoyable.

Respectfully,

Attach.  
**Book** review

DHR:dh  
042704-9

092

27 Apr 04

**OSD 06192-04**

11-L-0559/OSD/41248

## ***130 Research, Inc. 4/22/04***

Much has been made of how America is detested in the rest of the world. Critics particularly point to the almost complete reversal of positive opinion about the U.S. immediately after 9/11.

As we have written, even before Iraq, the U.S. has two cultures: land of economic opportunity, *habeas corpus*, the rule of law, transparency, immigration and assimilation of diverse peoples, human rights, democracy and the First Amendment, etc.

But most of the world doesn't see this—what they see is Hollywood, MTV and McDonald's and these are considered economic and cultural imperialism. No developed country hates America more than France, which is why we follow French intellectual and public opinion very closely.

Jean-Francois Revel, a well-known French journalist, recently weighed in with a new book, *Anti-Americanism*. While Revel is known to be pro-American, he lives in one of the centers of anti-Americanism, and therefore, has a unique insight into why America is so disliked. We have asked our French correspondent to review the book.

Revel argues that what he calls the “anti-American obsession” is mostly based on a faulty analysis of the most obvious facts about American political and social life, its economic freedom and democratic traditions.

According to Revel, the mixed and often contradictory sense of envy and contempt that the United States inspires abroad was long established, and the aftermath of 9/11 only encouraged the resurgence of negative attitudes towards America.

Of course, the question of cultural superiority is more debatable, depending on whether “culture” is narrowly or broadly defined, but it is obvious that America's popular culture and tastes in dress, music, recreation and fast food have attracted young people everywhere and will continue to do so.

America's role as a “superpower” is undeniable. But, Revel makes the following interesting observation:

“American ascendancy is indebted only in part to the creativity and determination of the American people; it also sprang by default from the cumulative failures of the rest of the world: the fall of Communism, the



ruin of Africa, the divisions within Europe, the Asian and Latin American slowness to evolve towards democracy.”

For Revel, what is lacking in European thinking about America’s “ascendancy” is “an inquiry into its primary causes.”

“Europeans in particular should force themselves to examine how they have contributed to that preponderance. It was they, after all, who made the twentieth century the darkest in history; it was they who brought about the two unprecedented cataclysms of the World Wars; and it was they who invented and put into place the two most criminal regimes ever inflicted on the human race.”

What Revel emphasizes is that the current American “hyperpower” status is the direct consequence of European powerlessness, both past and present.

What America truly does is “fill the void” caused by the world’s inadequacy to think and act for itself.

And for the author, this unwillingness to act is not dictated by incompetence or laziness, but by a blind “attachment to *idée fixe*” and an intentional “turning away from facts.”

Revel presents many of France’s self-contradictory criticisms of the United States as a way of demonstrating the absurdity of the French and European condemnation of the U.S.

The American society is criticized for being both too free-market oriented and too protectionist; too lawless and too controlled by the judiciary; having too little culture and being too influential of a culture; being too isolationist and too interventionist.

In the chapter “*The Worst Society That Ever Was*,” Revel points out the misrepresentations by the French of life in the United States and the deliberate distortions and contradictions. He compares healthcare in the U.S. and Europe, studies crime statistics and looks at the American melting pot versus the large non-integrated Muslim minorities in France.

One of the “*idée fixe*” about the U.S. is its “pandemic violence”. Everywhere you go, according to the conventional wisdom in France, violence reigns, with uniquely high levels of delinquency and criminality and a feverish state of near-open revolt in the ghettos.

But, Revel deftly puts the shoe on the other foot. He points out that for a long time, the French closed their eyes to their own rapidly-rising crime levels. The result is that during the last fifteen years of the twentieth century, crime steadily diminished in the United States, whereas in Europe it took off.

The “New York Miracle,” when Rudolph Giuliani, who was elected mayor in 1993, succeeded over a period of five years in cutting by half the previously very high levels of crime in that city, was first mocked in French newspapers.

This “Giussolini,” as he was frequently called, was too repressive and brutal and the French government had “no desire to copy the American model.” But, as their own violence escalated, the French made a sharp U-turn in 2001 with a new policy that is best expressed as follows: “The Left no longer favors social explanation of delinquency. Zero tolerance—the new watchword on crime control.”

Overwhelmed by their failure to combat this delinquency curse, and unable to keep hiding from the obvious, in 2001, the French authorities were forced to acknowledge that their analysis of crime’s causes was flawed and that their remedies, based upon supposed prevention, didn’t work. Giuliani was now held up as an example of success by a number of elected officials.

For Revel, “this pout of disdain for American solutions, in law enforcement and many other social and economic areas, on the part of numerous countries that do much less well than the U.S.A. verges on ineptitude and even absurdity.”

Revel believes that anti-Americanism is really a struggle against liberalism.

Much anti-Americanism is simply anti-capitalism in disguise supported by people in Europe and the rest of the world who are still committed to doctrines that are illiberal or even totalitarian.

Turning his attention to anti-globalism, Revel reveals the left’s hypocrisy.

It is not that the left has anything against globalism, they just don’t like the fact that people worldwide will be able to freely trade with one another without government interference.

“Dirigisme” (state control of economic and social affairs) and state-controlled economies want a globalization imposed and sanctioned by concerted governments.

The drawback of the “dirigiste” ambition and the paradox of “its resurgence nowadays,” says Revel, “is that putting it into practice has never in the past resulted in anything but disastrous economic decline, poverty or even destitution of the people and pronounced technological backwardness, accompanied more often than not by political tyranny.”

This assessment is as valid for communist-socialist states as for Hitlerian National Socialism.

What the developing countries are asking for is greater access to the world’s best markets for their products, especially agricultural products. **Developing countries want more globalization, not less.** India and China are now following Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea because they understand economic growth is the only true escape from poverty.

**Revel also sees globalization as an engine of enrichment for cultural diversity and believes that state protection of local culture only leads to stagnation.**

“Isolation breeds sterility.” He warns that anti-American phobias and anti-globalism will prevent progress in Europe and contrary to what Jacques Chirac maintains, he clearly believes that globalization is not a “cultural steamroller.”

In response to the ideas that Europe should abandon nuclear energy, genetic engineering and research using embryonic cells, Revel cites the work of Claude Allegre: “Should the pressure groups that agitate against progress win the day, in 20 years, the European states will regress to the level of the underdeveloped countries, in a world that will be dominated by the United States and China.”<sup>12</sup>

In the chapter “*Being Simplistic*”, Revel goes after another “*idée fixe*”, the argument that poverty is the root cause of terrorism.

Quoting Francis Fukuyama, **Revel agrees that the conflict is not one of clashing civilizations, but rather a reaction by people who feel themselves threatened by modernization and by its moral component: respect for human rights.**

For the jihadists, the ultimate enemy is “the secular character of the Western conception of rights, a conception that lies at the heart of the liberal tradition.” Al-Qaeda terrorists do not mention economic inequalities, but reproach the West for opposing the teachings or (more specifically the fundamentalist interpretations) of their religion.

“The path to equality is through modernization: this truth is precisely what the Islamists most despise, for to modernize effectively means deviating from the Sharia.”

As for negotiation and the search for a “political solution” that most European states support, Revel asks: “I’d like the clever minds who advocate this brilliantly original idea to explain how effective it would be with the likes of Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein.”

The fundamentalists blame our civilization not for what it does, but for what it is; not for having failed, but for having succeeded. “The endless talk about the need to find a ‘political solution’ to the problem of Islamist terrorism is founded on the illusion that rational policy could have any bearing on a mental universe so divorced from reality.”

To the anti-American humanitarians who accused the U.S. of wanting to kill civilians by dropping food packages along with the bombs, he responds, let’s not forget that “the United States from 1980 to 2001 was the principal supplier of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan and that 80% of the aid distributed by NGOs (non-governmental organizations) within the framework of the World Food Program was paid for by Americans.”

In his last chapter, entitled “*Scapegoating*”, Revel concludes that anti-Americanism and the notion that America is the source of all evil—imperialistic, greedy and ruthlessly competitive—is not a position, but a disease and his prognosis is quite pessimistic. “The disinformation in question is not the result of pardonable, correctable mistakes, but rather of profound psychological need.”

The most important lesson from this book is that “anti-American obsession, in effect, aggravates the evil it aims to extirpate, namely the unilateralism famously ascribed to the United States. By criticizing the Americans whatever they do, and on every occasion—even when they are in the right—we Europeans (and we are not alone in this, although we lead the dance) compel them to disregard our objections—even when we are in the right.”

The irrational criticism, the deliberate disregard of the facts, the opinionated ill will in much of the European media will only lead to Americans rejecting the idea of consultation. The biases currently reigning will only weaken Europe and the rest of the world and encourage American unilateralism.

In short, America is no different from Standard Oil in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and Microsoft now—hated for its success and power—and nothing short of America's loss of power will change it.