

For South Korea, the Rumsfeld plan is seen as ambitious but ambiguous and has been greeted with ambivalence. President Roh Moo-hyun has asserted that his nation should be "self-reliant" in defense against North Korea, but some South Koreans have deplored U.S. plans to reduce troop levels in South Korea and to assign those forces missions elsewhere.

A participant from Southeast Asia drew affirmative nods when he asserted that too often, U.S. leaders insist that "you must do it my way" rather than to seek Asian points of view.

Another participant said Singapore found the plan had little relevance for small powers.

A South Asian contended that most strategists in his part of the world saw the Rumsfeld plan as "too expensive and too expansive." It was "technologically exotic" and not suited to low-level threats, such as terrorism, that plague that region.

The Australian strategist, Michael Evans, did not go into detail about the Pentagon's flaws. Others have pointed to bloated bureaucracies, contorted chains of command, and unending disputes over roles and missions. They have cited warring rivals in the feudal domains within the Pentagon and the anomaly of commanding U.S. forces by a committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Further, Congress adds billions of dollars to defense spending every year with projects that bring money to members' districts but hamper military readiness. Allied with Congress is a defense industry that permits incompetent management, produces shoddy workmanship and is too often guilty of waste or fraud.

Moreover, Rumsfeld and his colleagues have made little effort to explain their plan to Congress or the American voters and taxpayers, whose sons and daughters serve in the armed forces. Nor apparently, have Pentagon officials or American diplomats been successful in persuading friends and allies in Asia of the need to transform and realign the U.S. armed forces in their neighborhood.

In his summary, Evans did not spare his own country from criticism but concluded: "The process of defense transformation in both Australia and the United States is an unfinished symphony whose final form remains unclear since neither country has yet seriously tackled the key issue of organizational culture."

*Richard Halloran is a Honolulu-based journalist and former New York Times correspondent in Asia. He wrote this article for The Advertiser.*

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DEC 16 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*  
SUBJECT: Armstrong Williams

000.17758

Armstrong Williams wants me on his television program, and I have promised to do it. He is a friend of a friend of mine.

It is an hour program. I think I might like to do it for half an hour, and then maybe have someone else do another half hour, like Dick Myers.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Business card

DHR:dh  
121504-15

.....  
Please respond by 1/6/05

Television and Radio Syndication

**Armstrong Williams**  
President & Executive Producer

The Right Side Production  
201 Massachusetts Ave., NE, #C-3  
Washington, DC 20002

(b)(6)

www.armstrongwilliams.com

email: (b)(6)



16 Dec 04

OSD 08132-05

December 16, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Intel Item

350.09

Please talk to the Intel community to try and figure out why the threats never materialize, after the USG has spun up. Is it because of the deterrent effect? Are the terrorists jerking us around? Is the intelligence weak? We ought to be able to begin to get some visibility into this issue, in that it has happened so many times.

What it is costing us? It has to be billions of dollars. Please talk to Tina and see what she can estimate.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
121504-18



*Please respond by* 1/13/05

16 Dec 04

TAB A

~~FOUO~~



12/02

December 2, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
 Gen Pete Pace

CC: ADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Joint Task Force HQ Brief

322

I was impressed with Ed Giambastiani's concept for the **JTF HQ**. Clearly a lot of good work by his staff and the Joint Staff as well went into it.

I do want to see you carefully think through whether it ought to be **an** active cadre of folks instead of reserves. I cannot see any reason whatsoever to **use** reserves. Once you think that through, I'd like to see an implementing document that I can sign in the next two weeks. We need to move out on this.

Thanks.

DHK:ss  
120204-10

.....  
Please respond by 17 Dec 04

Thanks.

*Sir,*  
*Response attached.*  
*4/2*  
*Lt Col Lengyel*  
 FEB 04 2005

Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 08135-05

11-L-0559/OSD/41758

December 2, 2004

TO: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld \$  
SUBJECT: Tilghman Island

800

An acquaintance of mine gave me this material about Tilghman Island. It sounds reasonable to me. Why don't you have someone look into it. I don't know what the arguments, and I don't have a view.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Information on Tilghman Island, MD

DHR:ss  
120204-8

.....  
*Please respond by 11/13/05*

Thanks.

2 Dec 04

**Objective:** To restore Devils Island in Tilghman, Maryland to its former size which could then be used as a wildlife habitat. **Action Required:** The Corps of Engineers periodically dredges the Knapps Narrows channel in Tilghman for navigation purposes. The dredge materials are presently barged to far away Poplar Island. Instead of depositing the dredge at Poplar Island, the Corps may want to consider depositing it at Devils Island...a far closer location with the resultant beneficial results of less costs for transportation and the creation of a wildlife habitat. (The present owner of Devils Island is offering the location for dumping of the dredge at no cost to the government.)

Point which it holds to this day. It is at the end of Poplar Grove Street, and is the location of many modern homes. Sailing past Chicken Point comes in our view a small man made island which is the birthplace of many of the East coast's work and racing canoes, built on Tilghman's Island. Here Capt. John B. Harrison had a boat yard and also a fish packing and oyster house. Mr. Harrison packed his fish in a different method than is done today. They were put in barrels with much salt and packed very hard. The island is reached either by boat or the long board walk that connects it to the main land. This at present has been nearly torn down by storms and high tides. Just who named Devil's Island is not known. However, it no doubt was named by the ones who built it. This landmark is not in use at the present writing.

Just a short distance from here is another man made island, much larger in size. It is that of Avalon. This is where the only post office in the United States, to be on such an island, is located. Just how it received its name is plain to see. The word avalanche meaning a mass of rock, stone, or shells, no doubt is how it came about. There was also a steamboat running there by the name of Avalon, and some to this day feel that it was named after the boat.

As we sail around the shores of Tilghman's Island, some distance from Avalon is another well known name, Pig Pen, where during the War of 1812 stood a very large dwelling. This story may be well considered, as the party telling it made it clear, that it was only handed down to her and may not be at all correct.

The story goes, that an old slave who was freed by his owner, did not want to leave so built himself a little place here. It being so small and all that he could afford, he called it his Pig Pen. Since that time it still holds that name. Just a few more minutes of sailing and we arrive at the village of Barneck, so named because of a long sandy bar that extended from one of its points. Homes at Barneck are somewhat scattered, but it is an ideal place for the man making a livelihood from the water.

Around the shore from this village is another which is some-

(Circles 1950)




DEVIL'S ISLAND



AVALON





*Payson Island*

**BAY**

**KNAPP NARROWS**

*David's Island*

**HARRIS**

**21671**

**CHESAPEAKE**

*Payson Island*


11-L-0559/OSD/41762

**PTANK**



# INDEX TO MAPS

Pages 2, 3 and 4 provide you a complete Step-by-Step guide to using your Street Map Book, Map Legend, Table of Contents and Key to Abbreviations. Take a few minutes to familiarize yourself with this time saving information.



December 2, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci  
CC: Cathy Mainardi  
(b)(6)  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Visits to Bethesda and Walter Reed

I want to go to both Bethesda and Walter Reed sometime before Christmas to see the wounded troops. If I'm not here on a weekend, or traveling too much, I'll have to do it during the week.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
120204-6

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_


333 SD

2 Dec 04

December 2, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci

c c : Cathy Mainardi  
(b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Boy Scout Jamboree

I ought to think about going to the Boy Scout Jamboree on July 24, 2005 at Fort AP Hill, near Richmond.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
120204-4


.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

080

2 DEC 04

OSD 08140-05

December 2, 2004

TO: Jim O'Beirne  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Powell Moore

Here's the material from Powell Moore. I asked him to please try to stay on longer, to be sure we get someone confirmed in time.

You should get hot on this – let's get that list and put it on the top of the priorities.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/1/04 Powell Moore Memo to SecDef  
12/1/04 Powell Moore letter to POTUS

DHR:ss  
120204-2

.....  
Please respond by 12/9/04

02014

2 Dec 04



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

Personal and Confidential

December 1, 2004

FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Powell A. Moore".

SUBJECT: Retirement Plans

- I would like to advise you that I have accepted an offer from the law firm of McKenna, Long and Aldridge to join them on February 1, 2005 to assist them in advising and representing their clients on public policy issues. Before entering discussions with them on October 13, 2004, I consulted with the Office of General Counsel and I disqualified myself from taking any action that might have an impact on the firm, their subsidiaries, affiliates or joint ventures. I share your commitment to strict observance of all ethical standards including post Federal employment restrictions on representational activities.
- In addition, I have asked the Department's benefits personnel to begin processing my retirement from Federal service to be effective on February 1, 2005.
- I have also attached a formal letter of resignation and request that you forward it to the President's staff. In this letter, I restate my interest in an assignment abroad, preferably in Europe.
- Needless to say, I am eager to support in any way possible the urgent task of identifying and recruiting a highly qualified successor. I have a couple of names to add to the list I gave you on July 31 and have given them to Jim O'Beirne.

Attachment:  
As stated

11-L-0559/OSD/41767



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

December 1, 2004

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

With deep appreciation for the opportunity to serve in your Administration, I hereby offer my resignation from the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs to be effective on January 31<sup>st</sup>, 2005.

No honor has ever come to me that exceeds the privilege of serving under the leadership of you and Secretary Rumsfeld for the past four years. Generations of Americans will benefit from the visionary, heroic approach that both of you have brought to the national security challenges of the first four years of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. The two of you have proven to be the right leaders for this important crossroads in the history of our Nation. My gratitude for the experience of being a member of your team and Secretary Rumsfeld's team is beyond my ability to express.

I would like to restate my interest in another opportunity to serve our Nation abroad. The private sector currently has many attractions for me, but I would willingly forego them for an appointment from you for an overseas assignment.

Congratulations on your historic re-election and best wishes for a successful second term.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Powell A. Moore". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "P".

Powell A. Moore

11-L-0559/OSD/41768

December 2, 2004

TO: Dina Powell  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Powell Moore

Here's a background sheet on Powell Moore, and also some points that I have developed with respect to the job he could do as a U.S. Ambassador for this Administration. He is first rate. He is leaving. He would very much like to serve the country. I hope you will see that his name is carefully considered. You never know what might happen, but this is a person who has been carrying the mail, as has his wife, Pam, for many, many decades.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Powell Moore Bio  
Talking Points on Powell Moore

DHR:ss  
120204-1

020 LA

OSD 08143-05

2 Dec 04



## POWELL A. MOORE

Powell A. Moore is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs. He was nominated by President Bush for this position on April 23, 2001 and confirmed by the Senate on May 1, 2001.

Mr. Moore formerly served as the Chief of Staff for Senator Fred D. Thompson, Republican of Tennessee, and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. Mr. Moore held this position from September 1998 until assuming his current duties.

Active in public policy affairs in Washington for more than 37 years, Mr. Moore is a former Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs under President Reagan and served on the White House staff under Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Reagan.

Mr. Moore began his Washington career in 1966 as Press Secretary to Senator Richard B. Russell, Democrat of Georgia, and served in this capacity until Senator Russell's death in January of 1971. He then joined the Nixon Administration, first serving as Deputy Director of Public Information for the Department of Justice and later as a member of the White House Legislative Affairs staff.

He left the White House in 1975, and for the subsequent six years, engaged in government relations and legislative affairs consulting, representing a variety of corporations and associations.

Mr. Moore returned to the White House in January 1981 on the day following Ronald Reagan's inauguration as the 40th President of the United States. As Deputy Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs during 1981, he managed the Senate component of the legislative affairs office at the White House.

In January of 1982, President Reagan nominated him to be Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, and he was confirmed by the Senate on February 4, 1982.

After leaving government in late 1983 and before returning in 1998, Mr. Moore advised and represented business interests as a consultant and as Vice President for Legislative Affairs of the Lockheed Corporation.

Mr. Moore was born in Milledgeville, Georgia, on January 5, 1938. He graduated from the University of Georgia in Athens in 1959 after attending preparatory school at Georgia Military College in Milledgeville. After graduation, he was commissioned as an Infantry officer in the United States Army where he served for three and one-half years with tours in Baumholder, Germany, and Fort Benning, Georgia.

(b)(6)

## Talking Points to Support a Recommendation Of Powell Moore to be an Ambassador

- Powell Moore's career has prepared him to serve as an Ambassador and lead an embassy team to advance the interests of the United States overseas.
- He has a longstanding history of achieving measurable results in developing and implementing strategies to deliver public policy messages.
- As a member of the President's legislative affairs and national security team for the past four years, he has a deep understanding of the President's national security and foreign policy goals
- His career in legislative affairs has provided him with solid preparation for a diplomatic post where accurate reporting and insightful analysis are essential.
- Powell Moore has an in-depth knowledge of the United States government. He has worked for Senators Richard Russell of Georgia and Fred Thompson of Tennessee, on the White House staff under Presidents Nixon, Ford and Reagan and in the Departments of Justice, State and Defense. He also understands the interests and issues of the Nation having worked closely with scores of Senators and Representatives from every region on a variety of issues including trade, manufacturing, agriculture and finance.
- As Assistant Secretary of State and Assistant Secretary of Defense, he has accompanied Members of Congress to more than forty nations where he has participated in meetings with numerous international leaders.
- His introduction to U.S. ties to Europe came early in his career when he served for two years as an Infantry officer in Germany at the time of the Berlin crisis.
- His wife, (b)(6) would be an exceptional representative of our nation.
  - (b)(6) came to Washington from Atlanta in 1989 as a key member of the staff of President G.H.W. Bush's Peace Corp Director, Paul Coverdell. Her association with the late Senator Coverdell spanned more than 20 years in Republican fundraising and political activities in Georgia and in Washington.
  - As Director of the Office of Private Sector Relations for the U.S. Peace Corps, she raised more than \$12 million in private sector donations to support the Peace Corps' initiative into former Warsaw Pact countries.
  - She currently directs the National Blood Foundation, which provides support for transfusion medicine research with an endowment of more than \$4 million.
  - (b)(6) was an alternate delegate from the District of Columbia to the Republican National conventions in Philadelphia in 2000 and in New York in 2004.
  - On November 2, 2004, she won a non-partisan election with more than 70 percent of the vote to represent the eastern section of Georgetown on a District of Columbia Advisory Neighborhood Commission.
- Powell Moore has loyally served in the Administration of President Bush during his first term and is eager to serve the President and the Nation in a challenging assignment abroad in the second term.

December 1, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: For Next Ivanov Meeting

Please tickle a note for the next time I see Ivanov that I want to talk to him about the statements we have made out of the Department concerning Russia moving WMD out of Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
120104-25

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

Russia

1 Dec 04

December 1, 2004

TO: Jim O'Beirne  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld <sup>7/1</sup>  
SUBJECT: Candidates

230.02

Please take a look at the following as possibilities for civilian appointments:

1. Seth Cropsey.
2. Pat Harrison. I believe she is currently acting in the public diplomacy spot over at State.
3. Steve Friedman. He just left as the White House economic person.
4. Terry O'Donnell.

Thanks.


DHR:dl  
120304-24

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

1 Dec 04

May 19, 2004

TO: Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Skelton Letter

Will someone please get me a copy of the letter that I or somebody in the Pentagon sent Ike Skelton about contractors. I was asked about it yesterday in the meeting, and I don't remember anything about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051904-5

.....  
Please respond by 5/28/04

211  
1000

07

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE - 08 07  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

May 28, 2004 5:00 PM

Paul Butler  
Aug  
8/2

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake # 051904-5

- You asked to see a copy of the letter sent to Rep Skelton (Tab 2) in response to his questions (Tab 3) concerning private security personnel in Iraq.
- Response was prepared by Reuben Jeffery's office.

Attachments:


1. SECDEF Snowflake
2. SECDEF's Response
3. Rep Skelton's Letter

11-L-0559/OSD/41775

OSD 08159-04

ATCH 1

May 19, 2004

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rurnsfeld   
SUBJECT: Skelton Letter

Will someone please get me a copy of the letter that I or somebody in the Pentagon sent Ike Skelton about contractors. I was asked about it yesterday in the meeting, and I don't remember anything about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051904-5

.....  
Please respond by 5/28/04

CPA ATCH 2



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAY 4 2004

The Honorable Ike Skelton  
Ranking Minority Member  
Committee on Armed Services  
U.S. House of Representatives  
2120 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Skelton:

Thank you for your letter of April 2 regarding private security personnel in Iraq. A discussion paper provided by the Coalition Provisional Authority responding to the points that you raised is attached.

Some Private Security Companies (PSCs) under contract in Iraq provide personal security services for senior civilian officials as well as some visiting delegations. They also provide physical security for non-military facilities inside the Green Zone and convoy protection for non-military goods. In addition, they provide protection for Governorate Support Teams consisting of CPA personnel and government contractors who team **with** local Iraqi officials to develop local government structures and functions.

It is my understanding that most PSCs doing business in Iraq do not work directly for the U.S. Government. They work under subcontracts to prime contractors to provide for the protection of their employees. Many PSCs are hired by other entities such as Iraqi companies or private foreign companies seeking business opportunities in Iraq. The CPA has established a PSC Working Group to provide a forum in which PSCs exchange information, and approximately 50 PSCs are actively involved in this group. The Attachment includes a current listing of known PSCs operating in Iraq today.

A draft CPA order on regulating PSCs, which will require certain data from each firm, has been prepared with input from the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI). The Iraqi MOI and Ministry of Trade will be largely responsible for the administration of this and any revisions that may be promulgated by the Iraqi Interim Government after June 30.



OSD 04942-04

CPA 01302-04



Finally, the Department of Defense (DoD) is drafting uniform guidance regarding PSCs employed in Iraq under contract using U.S. appropriations.

I hope this is useful. We can provide additional information or a briefing if you would like.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. M. Gates". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

Attachments:  
As stated

cc:  
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer

ATTACHMENT  
DISCUSSION PAPER  
PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES OPERATING IN IRAQ

**SUMMARY**

Private Security Companies (PSCs) operating in Iraq provide **only** defensive services. In the execution of these services, PSCs divide into two broad categories. *The first* category includes PSCs with which the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) contracts directly. The second category includes PSCs to which companies doing work for the CPA have awarded subcontracts. The overwhelming majority of PSCs are subcontractors. Because such information is proprietary and may have privacy implications, subcontracted PSCs and their parent companies generally do not make available details concerning the prices of their contracts, salaries, or number of employees.

The Ministry of Interior (MOI) is drafting regulations for the registration and vetting of PSCs. The regulations will comply with and complement existing and proposed Iraqi law and CPA orders, such as Iraq's new business law (CPA Order 64, which replaced the Iraqi New Company Law 21 of 1997). We anticipate completion of the PSC regulations sometime in May.

The Department of Defense (DOD) is coordinating with affected agencies to issue uniform guidance regarding PSCs employed in Iraq under contracts using U.S. appropriations.

**DISCUSSION**

CPA's Program Management Office (PMO), CPA Contracting, and the CPA-MOI have records of 60 PSCs in Iraq (Enclosure). Of those 60, the CPA has direct contracts with only 8, for obligations currently totaling about \$147 million: 81.4 million appropriated dollars and 65.5 million dollars in funds from the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI). It is important to note that more subcontracted PSCs will arrive in Iraq in support of the post-transition PMO reconstruction effort.

Approximately 20,000 personnel are employed by PSCs in Iraq. These employees are U.S. citizens, third-country nationals, and Iraqis.

PSCs provide three distinct security services: personal security details for senior civilian officials, *non-military site* security (buildings and infrastructure), and non-military convoy security. These services **are** defensive in nature.

PSCs work *for* the agency that contracts for their services. A PSC works for CPA if it has a contract with the CPA. If a PSC has a subcontract with a prime contractor to the CPA, then the PSC reports to the prime contractor.

Disciplining contractor personnel is the contractor's responsibility, not the CPA's. Normally, an individual who requires discipline is immediately removed from the country by the contractor. In the event that criminal accusations are made against contractor personnel, such accusations would be handled through a complaint made to the local Iraqi Police. In such a case, if the PSC employee was acting within the scope of his or her official employment under the terms and conditions of a contract with the Coalition Forces or CPA, and if the employee was not an Iraqi, then he or she would be immune from Iraqi legal process under the terms of CPA Order Number 17. The parent country of the contractor maintains a right

to waive the immunity. **If**, however, the PSC employee acted outside the scope of his or her official employment, the employee would be subject to Iraqi law. **At** this time, the approval of the CPA Administrator would still be required in order to proceed with legal action against a **PSC** employee.

Enclosure

**LIST OF PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES OPERATING IN IRAQ**

1. AD Consultancy
2. AKE Limited
3. Al Hamza
4. Armor Group
5. Babylon
6. Bechtel
7. BH Defense
8. BHD
9. Blackheart International LLC
10. Blackwater
11. BritAm Defense
12. Castleforce Consultancy
13. Control Risks Group
14. CTU ASIA
15. Custer Battles
16. D.S. Vance
17. Diligence Middle East
18. DTS Security
19. Dyncorp Intl
20. EODT
21. Erinys
22. Excalibre
23. GE International Inc.
24. Genric
25. Global
26. Group 4 Falck A/S
27. Hart Group
28. Henderson Risk Ltd
29. Hill & Associates
30. ICP Group Ltd
31. IRC
32. ISI
33. KBR
34. Kroll Associates
35. Meteoric Tactical Solutions
36. Meyer & Associates
37. MVM
38. NAF Security
39. Neareast Security
40. Olive
41. Omega Risk Solutions
42. Optimal Solution Services
43. Orion Management
44. Overseas Security & Strategic Information, Inc/Safenet - Iraq
45. Parsons
46. RamOPS Risk Management Group
47. Reed
48. RONCO
49. Rubicon
50. SAS/SASI
51. Sentinel
52. SGS
53. Smith Brandon Int
54. SOC-SMG
55. Sumer International Security
56. Tarik
57. Triple Canopy
58. Unity Resources
59. USA Environmental
60. Wade-Boyd and Associates LLC

DUNCAN HUNTER CALIFORNIA CHAIRMAN  
 CURT WELDON PENNSYLVANIA  
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 MAC INCANREPPY TEXAS  
 JEFF V. HOSTETTER INDIANA  
 WALTER D. JUN. S. NORTH CAROLINA  
 L. N. BRYAN KANSAS  
 JIM GIBBONS NEVADA  
 BOB PATES NORTH CAROLINA  
 HEATHER WILSON NEW MEXICO  
 KEN CALVERT CALIFORNIA  
 ROB SIMMONS CONNECTICUT  
 JO ANN DAVIS VIRGINIA  
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 W. TODD ARLIN MICHIGAN  
 RANNEY TURNER VIRGINIA  
 JEFF MILLER FLORIDA  
 JOE WILSON SOUTH CAROLINA  
 FRANK A. LUBIONDO NEW JERSEY  
 OMIGOLE OKLAHOMA  
 JEB BRADLEY NEW HAMPSHIRE  
 BOB BISHOP UTAH  
 MICHAEL TURNER OHIO  
 JOHN KUNE MINNESOTA  
 CANDICE S. MILLER MICHIGAN  
 PHIL GINGREY GEORGIA  
 MIKE ROGERS ALABAMA  
 TRENT FRANKS ARIZONA

**COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**  
**U.S. House of Representatives**  
 Washington, DC 20515-6035

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

April 2, 2004

IKE SKELTON ARIZONA  
 JOHN SPRATT SOUTH CAROLINA  
 SOLOMON P. DANTON TEXAS  
 LANE EVANS INDIANA  
 GENE TAYLOR MISSOURI  
 NEIL ABLINCHAMFORD HAWAII  
 MARTY MULLINAN MASSACHUSETTS  
 SILVESTRE HUYSO TEXAS  
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 CIRIO D. RODRIGUEZ TEXAS  
 ELLEN O. TAUSCHER CALIFORNIA  
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 BARON P. HILL INDIANA  
 JOHN B. LARSON CONNECTICUT  
 SUSAN A. DAVIS CALIFORNIA  
 JAMES A. LANGBEHN RHODE ISLAND  
 STEVE ISRAEL NEW YORK  
 RICK LARSEN WASHINGTON  
 JIM COOPER TENNESSEE  
 JIM MARSHALL GEORGIA  
 RENDRICK B. MEEK FLORIDA  
 MADEINEZ Z. ESCOBALLO GUAM  
 DORNEY ALEXANDER LOUISIANA  
 TAMI RYAN OHIO

ROBERT G. RANDEL STAFF DIRECTOR

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
 Secretary of Defense  
 The Pentagon  
 Washington, D.C. 20301


Dear Mr. Secretary:

I would like to first extend my **sympathy and** dismay over the recent brutal killings in Fallujah. All of the killings in Iraq—both of our troops and of contractors and civilians—have been unacceptable and tragic, but the murder and desecration of the four Americans working for Blackwater USA was particularly barbaric. I would hope that plans are being prepared for a measured **but** powerful response.

**One** of the issues raised by this tragedy is the role being played by private military **firms** such as Blackwater. Media reports indicate that at the time of the **ambush**, the personnel in **question** were providing security for a food delivery convoy. I also understand that Blackwater **provides** the personal security for Ambassador Paul Bremer.

I would like to request that you provide my office with a breakdown of information regarding private military and **security** personnel in Iraq. Specifically I would like to **know** which **firms** are operating in **Iraq**, how many personnel each **firm** has there, which specific **functions** they are performing, how much they **are** being paid, and **from** which appropriations accounts. Additionally, I would like to understand what the chain of command is for these personnel, **what** rules of engagement govern them, **and** how disciplinary or criminal accusations **are** handled if **any** such claims are levied against them.

Firms like Blackwater are clearly serving important functions in Iraq and putting themselves at **risk**. It is important that Congress **have** a clearer sense of the roles they are playing so that we can conduct effective oversight. I appreciate your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,  
  
 Ike Skelton  
 Ranking Democrat

TO: Gen. Richardo Sanchez

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



DATE: June 1, 2004

SUBJECT:

We are pleased with the progress that is being made on the Governance front in Iraq. At least for the first day, it appears to be off to a fine start.

I know that you and your team have played an important part in getting us to this point and I want you to know that we are grateful to you and respectful of the important contribution you have all made.

*JMS*

Regards.


DHR/azn  
060104.47

*1 June 04*

OSD 08186-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41783

8:48 AM

TO: Vice President Dick Cheney  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
DATE: June 2, 2004  
SUBJECT: **Attached**

Attached is an email I received from a Princeton classmate of mine concerning fusion energy. I assume you are up to speed on this. I am not, but I thought you might want to be aware of how enthusiastic he is about it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060204,11

*Attach: Email to SD from GamBurch 6/1/04*

463

25 Jun 04

OSD 08193-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41784

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

---

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, June 01, 2004 5:43 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Meeting at Princeton

Kate and I were pleased at the opportunity to shake your hand at our 50th Princeton Reunion. We could only say a couple of words then, and we both wanted to send this note to tell you how very much we appreciate what you are doing for us and for our wonderful country. We know the job isn't easy, but I can't think of anyone who could take your place and do as well; so thank you again.

One of us (Rodger) has one comment to add. I worked at the Matterhorn Project from 1955 to 1959. At reunions I had a chance to see the progress since then. It appears to me they have developed a capability to actually achieve fusion energy. I thought you might like to know since such a development is the only way to solve the world's energy problem. Such an achievement would dwarf all that have been made *to date*, and **be** a truly historic accomplishment for the Bush Administration.

Yours sincerely,

Rodger Gamblin and Kathleen Burch



TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Adm. Ed Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: June 2, 2004

SUBJECT: Singapore

Attached is a summary on some of the things Singapore is doing with respect to transformation and jointness. I found it interesting. Maybe we ought to think through some steps we should take with respect to jointness that are yet to be done.

Ed, please come back to me with a proposal for consideration.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060204.05bts

*Attach: Singapore & Transformation, Lin Wells 6.2.04*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

6/17

STUD MYERS

2 June 04

OSD 08200-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41786

## Singapore and Transformation

- Singapore is living jointness. Flag and general officers for all three services are chosen by a joint selection board chaired by the DepSecDef-equivalent. Command and control (C2) programs are "born" joint, and have been since the late 1970s.
- Singapore recently has designated an active duty general officer (BG Jimmy Khoo) as the "Future Systems Architect" for the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). One percent of Singapore's defense budget is "fenced" for experimentation and future architecture.
- The Singapore Armed Forces are putting special emphasis on Integrated, Knowledge-based Command and Control (IKC2), trying to think through C2 in a network-centric environment. In November 2003 the "SAF Centre for Military Experimentation" was opened, incorporating a C4I Lab, a Command Post of the Future, and a Battlelab, along with a 12-experiment program scheduled for 2004. They want to cooperate more with the US in experimentation, and have expressed an interest in putting a liaison officer at JFCOM.
- In January 2004 Singapore's Ministry of Defence hosted a meeting entitled Island Forum II, focused on "Information in Conflict." Based on DoD's "Highlands Forum," the session was attended by all the senior civilian and military leadership of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) and about 20 foreign invitees from the US, UK, Australia, Sweden, India and Israel.
  - One of the most interesting insights from the Forum was into Singapore's response to the 2003 SARS crisis. Their actions represented a classic use of the full spectrum of information operations (IO) tools against an asymmetric and unexpected national security threat. Singapore's leadership assembled quickly a national-level team and supporting groups to counter both the Corona Virus itself and the panic, fear and hype surrounding it. The command, control and coordination of information, combined with an approach of being upfront and honest with the public from the first, was a key part of a global battle to enlist community backing, maintain morale, allay fears, and develop international support. High technology, internet services, and even rap groups, plus tough calls like the "culling" of popular animals, were formed into an integrated, multi-lingual, global campaign that ultimately succeeded. US public affairs and IO personnel could use Singapore's actions as a case study for a wide variety of unconventional national security responses.
  - A two-page summary of the Forum is available, if desired.

TO: Secretary Gordon England

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 2, 2004

SUBJECT:

Thanks for your note in response to my memo of March 17 concerning updating systems and procedures. It is helpful, except it does not address my memo.

I would appreciate your going back and addressing the issues in my memo. In the meantime, I will think about your memo of May 28<sup>th</sup>.

Thanks.

DHR/uzm  
060204.060ts

Attach: 3/17/04 memo re: Updating Systems/Procedures & SecNav Response

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*6/5*

*381*

*25 Jun 04*

OSD 08201-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41788

C 6/2

March 17, 2004

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: updating systems and Procedures

*D.A.*

*S14,  
SecNAV Response  
is last under.  
4/CDE Nosenzo  
6/2*

*101*

We have had a series of difficulties over the past three years, where only after a period of serious problems with a DoD system or process have we realized that we were still in the industrial age, rather than the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

For example:

- DoD Contingency Plans were out of date, and the process for preparing them was antiquated, excessively long and not suitable for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Now we are fixing them.
- The deployment process for the Iraq conflict was broken. Now we are fixing it.
- The balance between the Active component and the Reserve component was clearly out of whack. Now we are rebalancing the AC/RC.
- Our SRO procedures were sluggish and out of date. Now they have been revamped.
- Today we read that the pay systems for the Guard and Reserve are okay if the Guard and Reserve are doing one weekend per month and a two-week active duty period per year, but seriously inadequate when we are mobilizing to the extent we have had to during the Iraq conflict.

*11110407*

OSD 03937-04

*3*

I am concerned about what we'll discover next that **is broken**. We've made lots of progress on the operational side, but please review the systems, procedures and business practices that you use and/or are responsible for, and advise me of those that you believe we need to fix now, before we need them and before we discover they are not suited to the 21<sup>st</sup> century. I'd like to try to get ahead of the curve.

Please coordinate your responses with Ken Krieg in PA&E.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031504-23

.....  
Please respond by 4/16/04

DISTRIBUTION

CJCS

VCJCS

DJS

DSD

USD(P)

USD(C)

USD(P&R)

USD(AT&L)

USD(I)

GC

ASD(LA)

ASD(PA)

ASD(NII)

SecArmy

SecNav

SecAF

CoS Army

Cos Air Force

CNO

CMC

COCOM: EUCOM, NORTHCOM, TRANSCOM, STRATCOM, PACOM,  
SOUTHCOM, JFCOM, CENTCOM

USFK

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

May 28, 2004

2004 MAY 29 PM 3:08

Paul Butler  
PWB →  
4/2

To: SECDEF

Fr: SECNAV

Subj: Updating Systems and Procedures Response

Mr. Secretary,

You asked that the CNO, the *Commandant* and I review systems, procedures and business practices and let you know what I think *needs* fixing. In our judgment, concentrating on one specific initiative will provide many other benefits for the DOD. Specifically, responsibility and accountability between *OSD staff* and the Services need to be aligned.

Discussion:

The Goldwater-Nichols Act clarified the chain of command from the President to the SECDEF to the Combatant Commanders; however, it left the relationship between OSD staff and the Service Secretaries vague.

Title 10 specifies that Service Secretaries have the responsibility and authority to carry out their obligations. Title 10 also specifies that all authority and responsibility flow from the SECDEF. Conflicts arise when it is not clear what authorities and responsibilities have been passed to the OSD staff. This is a fundamental management issue; that is, we need to align and document authorities and responsibilities. Today, confusion and frustration exist.

Recommendation:

We need to systematically address the problem starting with a SLRG level discussion. I would be happy to lead that discussion and offer approaches to move toward resolution. If, after the SLRG, you agree that this is an important issue, I would be pleased to lead or serve on a team to bring back options to clarify responsibility between the OSD Staff and the Services. The objective should be to align and publish authorities, responsibilities and accountability for all operating departments in the Pentagon and especially between Service Secretaries and OSD staff.

TSA SD	6/1
SRMA SD	6/1
MA SD	6/1
EXEC SEC	6/1

OSD-08024-04

1

SECRET  
2011 L 01 23

June 9, 2004

To: SECDEF

Fr: SECNAV

Subj: Updating Systems and Procedures

Mr. Secretary,

Sorry we missed the mark on answering your memo – although I still strongly urge we align responsibility and accountability between OSD staff and the Services. That said, a more responsive list is attached.

Attachment:  
As stated

OSD 08201-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41792

### Defense Health Care

-For FY 05 through FY 11, Defense Health Care is estimated to increase from 30B to **42B** per year, but the Department of the Navy is unaware of any cost containment strategies.

-There is a need for a mechanism to derive and execute a strategy that explicitly links effective management of resources to an enterprise-wide system of providing for all medical activities within DoD.

### Total Workforce Master Plan (TWMP)

-DoD is in the process of rebalancing the active and reserve components, but is doing so without the benefit of a Total Workforce Master Plan.

-The civil service and contractor components of the workforce are not being addressed. There is not a system for reporting past or current inventory and costs of contractor support personnel that is department-wide in coverage, accurate, widely accepted, and timely.

-Creating a TWMP that provides new organizational strategies for planning and accomplishing workloads, inventories, skills/education/training, and costs is a crucial step in addressing manpower issues that pose challenges to the Department.

### Technical Competence

-We need a strategy for managing DoD technical expertise vice solely relying on contracting for the expertise. We are creating managers, with little technical and engineering know-how. Education is emphasized in the Services, but only with a management, or joint warfighting focus (e.g., EMBNJPME). Organic technical competency needs to be revitalized. During the Cold War, technical skill and analysis leading to a technical edge was important and were proficient at it. Today, we have lost our vision with respect to technology as a result of losing a peer competitor to measure our progress against.

### BMMP/ERP

-Performance measurements and budget performance integration is impossible without a real-time, responsive financial management system.

-Uniformity of systems across DoD is desirable but not essential and probably not achievable at a reasonable cost and in a reasonable time frame. Private sector organizations with different systems-achieve effectiveness and efficiency by focusing on the right interfaces and so can DoD. BMMP, in its current form, is likely to both eliminate Service systems with great potential and fail to develop into the uniform, overarching system that has been projected.

-Navy has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on four Enterprise Resource program pilots. This effort will dramatically improve the Navy's supply chain, reduce costs and improve combat capability. It can also be modified to feed into any financial system eventually developed at the OSD level for the entire department. It is important to incentivize military departments to initiate bottom-up programs of this type while OSD is developing a longer-term top-level approach. If BMMP is overly prescriptive, the probability of failure significantly increases.



### Working Capital Fund

-The Working Capital Fund concept is an attempt to instill commercial business practices into the Department to improve efficiency and effectiveness. Neither of these goals is being met, primarily because the stove-piped underlying business processes have not been reengineered to adopt best practices of the commercial market.

### Long Term Maintenance

-The ongoing wear and tear on combat equipment in the current GWOT will have long-term negative implications if a strategy for coping with it is not established immediately.

-The deterioration of equipment exceeds that anticipated in life-cycle planning when the equipment was programmed and purchased.

If current OPTEMPO levels continue past FY 2006, this will be problematic. It will require serious strategy and budgetary decisions. Supplementals are not the answer if this truly becomes a long-term issue.

-As operations continue in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Marine Corps will lose more vehicles to battle damage and drastically increased wear and tear than it can replace or repair within current budgetary resources.

-Requires a long-term strategy to compensate for the potential of increased OPTEMPO across the FYDP and beyond.

TO: George Tenet  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: June 2, 2004  
SUBJECT: Memo of Agreement

I just received your memo on the Memorandum of Agreement for TTIC. I can't believe we haven't answered you in over a year. I don't know that you have ever raised this issue in our lunches. I'll get somebody on it trying to figure out what the problem is, but it is all news to me.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060204.06bts

350.09

25 Jun 04

OSD 08202-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41795

2/12  
1900

In reply refer to EF-8435 and 04/001760

February 8, 2004

2/18

Sec Def

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Sudan Peace Agreements

I take it you are up to speed with what is going on with respect to the Sudan peace agreements.

Thanks.

DHR:di  
020804-87

.....

Please respond by

2/11/04

2/18 ✓ 2/20  
C 2/19  
Rodman is. See  
attached memo.

2/18

TEN 2/19

11-L-0559/OSD/41796

OSD 08254-04

In reply refer to EF-8407 & 001639-ES

SECRET  
2007-03-08 08:30:07

February 8, 2004

TO: Mira Ricardel  
CC: Doug Feith  
Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Repair of Libyan Ship

How do we deal with the issue that the President of Croatia raised about being able to repair that Libyan ship?

I think we ought to pursue it. First we have to get the facts. So far as I understand it, at the present time it seems to me that it may be reasonable to let them do it, since it is \$210 million for Croatia.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-29 (is computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 3/1/04

*Close snowflake  
C 2/11*  
*Sir C 2/11*  
*Snowflake response attached*  
*LT Swope*

OSD 08323-04

In reply refer to EF-8439 & 04/001779-ES

SEC 1  
2004 FEB 08

February 8, 2004

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Terrorist Financing

I think it is time for DoD to get involved in how the interagency is handling shutting down fundraising and financing for terrorists. I think we ought to start seeing a weekly report. We ought to know who is doing what, who has the responsibility.

I think it is critical to our success in the global war on terrorism, and I have no visibility into it at all.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-57

.....  
Please respond by 2/18/04

11-02-04 12:25 PM

0 SD 08324-04

2/18 1800

120

✓  
2/26

In reply refer to EF-8405 & 04/001634-ES

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2004 FEB 08 PM 3:07

February 8, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

→ SecDef

SUBJECT: Coalition Forces for Afghanistan

Should we be trying to get more coalition forces for Afghanistan?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-34 (is computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 3/1/04

aligloy  
C 2/26

S.,  
Response attached.

✓R  
(b)(6)

OSD 08325-04

09-02-04 11:31 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/41799

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY  
AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

JAN - 8 2004

2004 JAN - 7 08 48 52

EF-8019

I-04/000165

USDP

*Handwritten notes:*  
1/6/04  
1/2/04  
1/1/04

INFO MEMO

FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
Peter Rodman (b)(6)

06 JAN 2004

SUBJECT: US Advisors to Afghan Government Ministries

- On January 5 you asked about the status of US advisors to Afghan government ministries and whether we want them in the ministries.
- The Afghan Reconstruction Group (ARG) is comprised of 15 senior advisors and 8 support personnel.
  - Six senior advisors and four staff (including an ARG Chief of Staff) have been hired and are at work in Kabul.
  - None of the senior advisors work in Afghan government offices.
    - They are based at the Embassy and provide advice to Zal Khalilzad.
    - They also work closely with Afghan ministry officials.
- Separately, USAID has approximately 800 technical experts and contractor hires working in Afghan ministries on health, education, economic reform, and agricultural programs.
- The Department of State requested and received \$25 million in the FY-04 supplemental to hire approximately 200 technical experts to work in Afghan ministries.
  - These experts, in accordance with the June 18, 2003, Action Plan to Accelerate Progress, will be "imbedded" in the ministries and will offer specific, needed skills.

OSD 00258-04




11-L-0559/OSD/41800


11-L-0559-08

- The ARG is to design a program to hire and place these technical experts.
  - A contractor (e.g., Dyncorp) would run the program.
  - To date the ARG has not designed such a program.
  - The program will likely include technical experts to be imbedded in the Ministry of Interior to monitor the police training program.

Prepared by: Kurt E. Amend, ISA/NESA

(b)(6)

~~OSD (NESA)~~ 

PDISA 



2/19  
0800

7201

In reply refer to EF-8401 & 04/001626

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 FEB -4 PM 5:02

February 8, 2004

TO: Sec Def

Purnea  
2/19

TO: Mira Ricardel  
CC: Doug Feith  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Andy Hoehn

SUBJECT: Base at Zader, Croatia

How do we sort through the issue on the Zader base? Please talk to Andy Hoehn. The following facts sound attractive – there is an air base and a port at the same location; it was used during the Balkan war; it has 350 days per year of sunshine; and Croatia has a history of cooperating in exercises.

Let's get it added to our list of things to think about with Andy Hoehn.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-40 (ts computer).doc

Please respond by 3/1/04

✓ 2/20  
C 2/20  
2/19/04

Sis,  
Response attached  
V/R

(b)(6)

09-02-04 11:31 AM

OSD 08327-04

SECRET  
2004 FEB 08 PM 3:02

February 8, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz

*Larry Di Rita*  
*3/1*  
*Secret*

SUBJECT: Elements of National Power

We have to get the Department organized to **push** the National Security Council on all elements of national power that are outside of DoD - their authorities, their metrics, their funding, the leadership, their success/failure rates.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-60

.....  
Please respond by 2/18/04

*2/29*  
*Secret-*  
*Two related snowflakes*  
*plus Feith response,*  
*attached.*  
*D, R*

OSD 08329-04  
11-02-04 12:25 PM

3/19/04

720

In reply refer to  
EF-8385  
04/001505-ES

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2004 FEB -5 PM 13:33

February 5, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Global Force Posture

*DR/DI Rite*  
*3/29*

On the global force posture, it seems to me we ought to have a pretty good idea in each country where we are going to keep or put forces not only what the sitting government thinks about it, but what the opposition political parties think about it. For stability over time, we cannot rely on the governments that just happen to be in office when we are making these decisions.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020304-9 (to computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 3/1/04

*Sir,*  
*Response Attached.*  
*vr/CDR Nocenzo*  
*3/30*  
*DR 4/19*

3/30

OSD 08358-04

24 Sep-1630  
Scanned

September 29, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Graybeard Group

334

Please see attached memo.

What do you think?

Thanks.

Attach.  
Memo "Possible Graybeard Group"

DHR:ss  
092804-18

.....  
Please respond by 10/16/04

*Reply: id*

*I think this is a very good idea.*

NOV 29 2004  
1148

29 Sep 04

September 13, 2004

SUBJECT: Possible Graybeard Group

I want to think about whether the President should appoint a graybeard group right after the election to sort through the issues of how the U.S. Government can bring all elements of national power to bear and sort the inter-agency issues.

3/12.  
1730

120

In reply refer to EF-8542 & 04/002313-ES

SEARCHED

2004 FEB 7 5 00 PM EST February 7, 2004

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

Latvia Di File

3/29

*Se Def*

SUBJECT: Latvia

The President of Latvia is ready to help with respect to Russia.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020704-7 (ts computer).doc

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

✓  
3/30

Sir,  
Response attached. 3/30  
vr/CDR Nosenzo  
3/30

OSD 08371 -04

20-02-04 15:28 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/41807

12/13/00

720

SECRET  
2004-02-04 11:39:24

EF-8366  
I-04/001438  
February 4, 2004

**TO:** Doug Feith  
**CC:** Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

**FROM:**

**SUBJECT:** Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

Doug—

You have the action on this Moscow cable.

Thanks.

Attach.

USDAO MOSCOW RS Cable R 0214392 FEB 04

DHR:dh  
020404-5

.....  
Please respond by 2/20/04

Need your  
inputs?

Thanks.

J  
Durnan  
2/17

OSD 08372-04

04-02-04 17:39 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/41808

C2/2

RTTUZYUW RUEHMOA6973 0331439-UUUU--RUEKNMA.  
ZNR UUUUU

TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP.RUE//  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OUSD-P/ISP/TSPCP/CTR//  
INFO RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHO-2/RAR/NMJIC-J2//  
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5/RUE//  
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//EUR/RUS/INR//  
RUEAADN/DTRA DULLES WASHDC//CT//  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC  
RUFGNOA/CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE  
RUFGNOA/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//J2/J5//

DF-  
Action

UNCLAS MOSCOW RS

U-0056-04

SUBJECT: LETTER TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD RUMSFELD  
FROM SERGEI ((IVANOV)), MINISTER OF DEFENSE, RUSSIAN  
FEDERATION, RE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

1. FOLLOWING IS AN UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF A LETTER FROM  
MINISTER OF DEFENSE SERGEY IVANOV TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DONALD RUMSFELD RECEIVED AT USDAO MOSCOW BY DIPLOMATIC NOTE  
NO. 239 ON 2 FEBRUARY 2004.

//BEGIN UNOFFICIAL DAO TRANSLATION//

MOSCOW, 24 JANUARY 2004

DEARMR. RUMSFELD,

I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY DEEP RESPECT AND GRATITUDE FOR  
YOUR GREAT CONTRIBUTION TO THE PREVENTION OF THE  
PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND MATERIALS  
FOR THEIR PRODUCTION. IT GIVES US PLEASURE TO NOTE THAT OUR  
COOPERATION UNDER THE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM IS  
MOVING FORWARD ON A POSITIVE COURSE. AND TODAY WE CAN SAY  
WITH CERTAINTY THAT THE ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY THE UNITED  
STATES IS HELPING RUSSIA IN THE FULFILLMENT OF OUR  
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES WITH REGARD TO THE ELIMINATION  
AND PREVENTION OF PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS  
DESTRUCTION STOCKPILES, ACCUMULATED DURING THE YEARS OF THE  
"COLD WAR."

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

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\*\*+ UNCLASSIFIED \*\*\*



I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO NOTE THE POSITIVE COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR MINISTRIES IN THE AREA OF TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE SECURITY FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS ELIMINATED IN RUSSIA.

UNDERSTANDING FULLY THE NEED TO ENDOW OUR COOPERATION UNDER THE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM WITH THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL STATUS, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AS WELL AS OTHER INTERESTED FEDERAL EXECUTIVE AGENCIES ARE WORKING TO PREPARE THE DOCUMENTS NECESSARY FOR RATIFICATION OF THE PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING THE SAFE AND SECURE TRANSPORTATION, STORAGE AND ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS PROLIFERATION.

RESPECTFULLY,

//SIGNED//

S. IVANOV  
RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
MINISTER OF DEFENSE

//END UNOFFICIAL DAO MOSCOW TRANSLATION//

2. POC RDML M.B. WACHENDORF, DEFENSE ATTACHE, TEL

(b)(6)

JOINT STAFF V1

ACTION (U,6,8,F) 1  
INFO CMAS(\*) CMAS(1) JS(\*) SHAPE LNO(\*)  
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SECDEF V2

ACTION (U,6,8,F) 2  
INFO SJS-C(\*) SJS-C(1) CHAIRS(\*)  
CHAIRS TESTBED(\*) SECDEF-C(1) SECDEF-C(\*)  
DASD I/O&IS(\*) C3I DASDI(\*) C3I-DASD-DCIO(\*)  
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TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 3

#6973

NNNN

SECRET

04/001438-ES

INFO MEMO

27 FEB 2004 12:27

USD(P) *[Signature]*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mira Ricardel *MR* FEB 12 2004

SUBJECT: Cooperative Threat Reduction: Sergey Ivanov Reply to Your Message

- On December 30, 2003 you wrote to Ivanov asking him to help ratify the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) "Umbrella Agreement" between the U.S. and Russia.



REF X04575-03

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- Ivanov's reply states that Russian agencies are "preparing documents necessary for ratification." Consensus in USG is that ratification will happen when Putin says so - at a minimum not before Russian elections in March 2004.
- We will continue supporting Bolton's efforts.

COORDINATION: ISP-Eurasia (Jim MacDougal)

Approved: Lisa Bronson *LB*  
Prepared by: Ken Handelman, Princip. Dir.,

(b)(6)

OSD 08372-04

SECRET

04 001438-ES

INFO MEMO

2007 02 -5 PM 12: 27

USD(P) *J. RUSCOP*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mira Ricardel *MR* FEB 12 2004

SUBJECT: Cooperative Threat Reduction: Sergey Ivanov Reply to Your Message

- On December **30,2003** you wrote to Ivanov asking him to help ratify the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) "Umbrella Agreement" between the U.S. and Russia.
- The Umbrella Agreement protects DoD when it provides CTR assistance.
- John Bolton has been pressing Moscow to ratify the Umbrella Agreement – Secretaries Powell and Abraham sent identical letters to their counterparts.
  - Bolton is trying to use CTR Umbrella ratification to protect legal standards covering other U.S. non-proliferation assistance programs in Russia.
  - The agreement has been applied provisionally since Moscow has refused to ratify.
  - DoD has been able to make the agreement work even without ratification, but we are strongly supporting Bolton's efforts. Ratification now will strengthen our hand for negotiations in **2006** when the agreement needs to be extended.
- Ivanov's reply states that Russian agencies are "preparing documents necessary for ratification." Consensus in USG is that ratification will happen when Putin says so – at a minimum not before Russian elections in March **2004**.
- We will continue supporting Bolton's efforts.

COORDINATION: ISP-Eurasia (Jim MacDougal)

Approved: Lisa Bronson *LB*  
Prepared by: Ken Handelman, Princip. Dir.,

(b)(6)

OSD 08372-04

12-02-04 13:54 BUT

11-L-0559/OSD/41812

2/23  
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720

EF-839E  
04/00160  
9  
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SECRET

2004 FEB -5 THU 12:33

February 7, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

Larry Di Rita  
3/11

SECRET

SUBJECT: Kosovo

Please give me a sense of where we are in Kosovo, and what it would take to get someone to take our place there and get us out.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
020704-14 (ts computer) doc

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Please respond by 3/1/04

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OSD 08373-04

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/41813

09-02-04 10:19 IN

2/13 1300

200

In reply refer to EF-8399 & 04/001611

SECRET

February 8, 2004

2004 FEB -5 PM 12:33

TO SD

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz

Durnan  
2/17

SUBJECT: For Next Meeting w/Ivanov

Please tickle a note the next time I see Sergei Ivanov that I want to talk to him about the foldout page 29 from his Defense Ministry report on priority tasks.

It is just totally inaccurate and misrepresents the situation. It must have been written by Bolyevski. Save it for me and tickle it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
"The Priority Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation"

DHR:db  
020804-8 (ts computer).doc

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Please respond by 3/1/04

✓  
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
Sir, 2/19  
Response attached.  
vr/CDR Nossing  
2/19

OSD 08374-04

# SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY SITUATION IN ZONES OF RUSSIA'S INTEREST

The possibility of the deployment of considerable groups of foreign troops and creation of strike groups in the territory of new NATO members and countries that aspire to join the bloc.

A zone of peace and stability created within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, with large-scale confidence-building measures and border co-operation, and the need to resist extremism and international terrorism.



The possibility of a military operation with the use of the infrastructure located in the territory of some former Soviet countries.


A region of potential military tensions where some countries are working to implement nuclear weapons programmes.

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TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: Media

Mr. President –

If you have not seen this, you should. I think you will find it pretty close to the mark.

Respectfully,

DHR/azn  
060604F.05ts

*Attach: FD-Day Had Been Reported on Today*

000,7

6 Jun 04

Date: 6/4/2004 10:25:13 AM Eastern Daylight Time  
From: "Schmautz, Kurt" (b)(6)  
To: "Dayton, Soren" (b)(6) & "Latimer, Matt" (b)(6)  
Sent from the Internet ([Details](#))

## If D-Day Had Been Reported On Today

by William A. Mayer

Tragic French Offensive Stalled on Beaches (Normandy, France - June 6, 1944) - Pandemonium, shock and sheer terror predominate today's events in Europe.

In an as yet unfolding apparent fiasco, Supreme Allied Commander, Gen. Dwight David Eisenhower's troops got a rude awakening this morning at Omaha Beach here in Normandy.

Due to insufficient planning and lack of a workable entrance strategy, soldiers of the 1st and 29th Infantry as well as Army Rangers are now bogged down and sustaining heavy casualties inflicted on them by dug-in insurgent positions located 170 feet above them on cliffs overlooking the beaches which now resemble blood soaked killing fields at the time of this mid-morning filing.

Bodies, parts of bodies, and blood are the order of the day here, the screams of the dying and the stillness of the dead mingle in testament to this terrible event.

Morale can only be described as extremely poor--in some companies all the officers have been either killed or incapacitated, leaving only poorly trained privates to fend for themselves.

Things appear to be going so poorly that Lt. General Omar Bradley has been rumored to be considering breaking off the attack entirely. As we go to press embattled U.S. president Franklin Delano Roosevelt's spokesman has not made himself available for comment at all, fueling fires that something has gone disastrously awry.

The government at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue is in a distinct lock-down mode and the Vice President's location is presently and officially undisclosed.

Whether the second in command should have gone into hiding during such a crisis will have to be answered at some future time, but many agree it does not send a good signal.

Miles behind the beaches and adding to the chaos, U.S. Naval gunships have inflicted many friendly fire casualties, as huge high explosive projectiles rain death and destruction on unsuspecting Allied positions.

The lack of training of Naval gunners has been called into question numerous times before and today's demonstration seems to underlie those concerns.

At Utah Beach the situation is also grim, elements of the 82nd and 101st Airborne seemed to be in disarray as they missed their primary drop zones behind the area believed to comprise the militant's front lines. Errant paratroopers have been hung up in trees, breaking arms and legs, rendering themselves easy targets for those defending this territory.

On the beach front itself the landing area was missed, catapulting U.S. forces nearly 2,000 yards South of the intended coordinates, thus placing them that much farther away from the German insurgents and unable to direct covering fire or materially add to the operation.



were wounded in the haphazardly coordinated attack, which seems to have no unifying purpose or intent. Of this number at least 3,000 have been estimated as having been killed, making June 6th by far, the worst single day of the war which has dragged on now--with no exit strategy in sight--as the American economy still struggles to recover from Herbert Hoover's depression and its 25% unemployment.

Military spending has skyrocketed the national debt into uncharted regions, lending another cause for concern. When and if the current hostilities finally end it may take generations for the huge debt to be repaid.

On the planning end of things, experts wonder privately if enough troops were committed to the initial offensive and whether at least another 100,000 troops should have been added to the force structure before such an audacious undertaking. Communication problems also have made their presence felt making that an area for further investigation by the appropriate governmental committees.

On the home front, questions and concern have been voiced. A telephone poll has shown dwindling support for the wheel-chair bound Commander In Chief, which might indicate a further erosion of support for his now three year-old global war.

Of course, the President's precarious health has always been a question. He has just recently recovered from pneumonia and speculation persists whether or not he has sufficient stamina to properly sustain the war effort. This remains a topic of furious discussion among those questioning his competency.

Today's costly and chaotic landing compounds the President's already large credibility problem. More darkly, this phase of the war, commencing less than six months before the next general election, gives some the impression that Roosevelt may be using this offensive simply as a means to secure re-election in the fall.

Underlining the less than effective Allied attack, German casualties--most of them innocent and hapless conscripts--seem not to be as severe as would be imagined. A German minister who requested anonymity stated categorically that "the aggressors were being driven back into the sea amidst heavy casualties, the German people seek no wider war."

"The news couldn't be better," Adolph Hitler said when he was first informed of the D-Day assault earlier this afternoon.

"As long as they were in Britain we couldn't get at them. Now we have them where we can destroy them."

German minister Goebbels had been told of the Allied airborne landings at 0400 hours. "Thank God, at last," he said. "This is the final round."

TO: Vice President Dick Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: **Speech**

Attached is a speech that was made by Steve Cambone back in January that I found interesting. There might be some material there that you would find useful.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060604E.05ts

*Attach: Security Affairs Support Assoc. 1/22/04 by Cambone*

350.001

16 JUN 04

Security Affairs Support Association

22 January 2004

Speech by S. Cambone

We are a nation at war.

We do not know how long it will last, but it is unlikely to be short.

We cannot know where or against whom all of its battles will be fought.

There are multiple fronts in this war, and

There is no single theater of operations.

We do know that we are all at risk,

at home and abroad,

civilians and military alike.

We do know that battles and campaigns will be both conventional and unconventional in their conduct.

Some of those battles and campaigns will be fought in the open, and

Others will be fought in secret, where our victories will be known to

only a few.

Success in every battle, in each campaign, will depend in some way on the contributions of the men and women of the intelligence community. If they are to provide the support demanded by their colleagues in uniform, we will need to transform that community even as we transform the Department of Defense.

Before laying out the goals of that effort, allow me to underscore the urgent need for the transformation of our intelligence capabilities.

We are facing a turbulent and volatile world populated by a number of highly adaptive state and non-state actors. Some of these are weighing whether, to what extent, or how, they might oppose the interests of the United States and its friends. Others, such as the terrorist organizations responsible for attacks in the United States, Turkey, Indonesia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Kenya, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and other places have committed themselves to war.

In such a world, where largely ungoverned areas can serve as sanctuary for terrorists, and where political-military affairs in Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America continue to evolve, it is impossible to predict with confidence what nation

or entity will pose a threat, in five, 10, or 20 years, to the United States or to our friends and allies.

In such a world, where our vulnerabilities are all too well understood by potential adversaries, we should expect to be surprised.

But not everything that unfolds in the coming years should be a surprise. We can expect that an adversary will continuously search for effective means to attack

- our people;
- our economic, military, and political power; and
- the people and power of our friends and allies.

We can also expect that an adversary will have access to a range of modern technologies and will be prepared to use them to magnify the destructiveness of their attacks, using

- truck bombs and improvised explosives,
- cyber intrusions to attack the computer systems upon which we rely,
- radio transmitters to jam our space assets,
- small laboratories to develop new biological or genetically altered agents,

- and chemical and nuclear technology and materials delivered by missile, plane, boat or backpack to poison our environment and destroy human lives.

In this era of surprise, lack of preparation is the harbinger of catastrophe. Being prepared—by which I mean taking measures to avoid surprise, if possible; to mitigate its effect when it occurs; and to bring appropriate force to bear to defeat those who would surprise us—is essential.

Such preparation may dissuade those who might otherwise choose to make an enemy of the United States. It could deter those who wish to make war on us. And it certainly promises those who choose war that we can—and will—defeat them even as we protect and preserve that which our enemies hate most, our way of life.

The United States brings to the challenges of preparing for surprise a unique set of political, economic, technological, and military advantages.

We have a way of life—moral, political social—to which our citizens are deeply, passionately attached. We have:

- strong allies, developed through patient diplomacy and steadfast commitment displayed for nearly 60 years by succeeding U.S. administrations,
- a powerful economic and technology base,
- a military capable of projecting power on a global basis, and
- the power to dominate combat in any environment: on land, across the seas, in the air, and in space and cyber-space.

In addition to these, the nation possesses another preeminent advantage: intelligence organizations comprised of the very best people, employing some of the finest technology available.

The nation's intelligence capability provides to our political leadership information essential to its decisions on how to keep the peace—and whether and when to wage war.

It enables the application of the nation's power in peace and war.

Intelligence figures prominently in the judgments made by the nation's leaders in

- assuring allies and friends of our purpose and resolve,
- dissuading adversaries from threatening ambitions,
- deterring aggression and coercion, and, when necessary,
- decisively defeating an adversary
- while creating the conditions so that those who would free themselves from tyranny might succeed and prosper.

The close coupling of military capability with intelligence results in a powerful combination. But our intelligence capability must be remodeled—transformed—to function successfully in an environment of ever-increasing complexity.

- Knowledgeable adversaries know far too much about the nation's sources and methods for collecting and analyzing intelligence.
- Espionage, unauthorized leaks, the inexorable progress of commercial science and technology, all advantage our adversaries.
- The extent of ungoverned spaces around the world give potential adversaries places to train and prepare for war.
- The ability to identify, track, and disrupt the manufacture and transport of materials of use in assembling weapons of mass



destruction is frustrated by contemporary business practices and the existence of dual-use technologies.

- The speed, volume, and diversity of financial transactions that take place on a global scale permit financiers of terror and horror to hide, for all practical purposes, in the open.

To overcome these challenges, the nation will need to set goals for the transformation of its intelligence community. Those goals include:

- First, knowing something of intelligence value about everything of interest to us all the time. This “universal situational awareness,” pursued to the limits of what physics will permit and the law will allow, must be coupled with a capacity to dive deeply into the fine-grained details of specific issues to support timely political and military decisions. This is a daunting challenge, but meeting it is absolutely necessary if intelligence is to support our national security needs in the future.
- Second, having reliable strategic warning, not only of potential threats, but across the full spectrum of reporting. For the DOD, such

warning is essential to permit us to refashion our forces and their posture in a timely way. For other agencies, warning is equally precious to shape diplomatic, economic, commercial, and associated legal and regulatory responses. Averting crises is nearly always preferable to managing them.

- Third, we will need an agile and adaptable intelligence collection and analysis capability far less dependent for its operations than today's systems are on linear and hierarchical processes. Such a level of flexibility could give rise to a culture
  - that always expects the unexpected;
  - that has prepared for surprise; and
  - that has developed the capability to deal rapidly and with assurance in response to unforeseen developments.
  
- Fourth, we will need an intelligence capability that supports a national strategy of forward deterrence. Deterring future adversaries will require a detailed understanding of their goals, motivations, history, networks, relationships—all the dimensions of human political

behavior—on a scale that is broader, and to a level of granularity that is far deeper, than what we enjoy today.

- At the very least, this requires a regeneration of our human intelligence capabilities and an overhaul of our analytic processes and culture.
- It implies, as well, a commitment by those who rely on intelligence to invest greater time and effort into understanding its strengths and weaknesses. Such an investment by the political leadership could reduce the burden borne by the intelligence community for warning while increasing the capacity of decision-makers to anticipate surprise.
- Fifth, with specific reference to military operations, we will need, when our forces are employed, intelligence that enables the swift defeat of the enemy. We need intelligence that enables us to act quickly, secretly, and effectively—intelligence that enables us to anticipate war fighters' needs and provide predictive intelligence that stays ahead of the battle. That intelligence support will need to extend to the post-conflict, stabilization phase of a campaign.

- Sixth, ensuring that knowledgeable adversaries do not compromise our secrets. This will require obtaining robust capabilities to acquire an adversary's secrets in ways he cannot comprehend even as we ensure that our own capabilities are not vulnerable. My former colleague USD/AT&L Pete Aldridge described this as "exquisite intelligence."

An effort to transform intelligence to achieve these goals will take time, effort, and money. That effort will range across the technologies we use to collect, process, and disseminate information. It will require changes to our organizations and cause us to take greater interest in our people – their recruitment, training, retention and promotion. Let me begin with technology.

## **Technology**

With respect to technology, we have made the necessary investment in our remote sensing capabilities to bridge the period of service between our extant systems and those capabilities that we might bring on line in the next decade.

These near-term capabilities will provide improved performance over extant systems. They have the benefit of having been designed in the aftermath of the last war, the Persian Gulf War. They respond well to the “lessons learned” from that war.

By definition, however, they will not satisfy the emergent needs we have identified as critical to our preparation in an era of surprise.

Nor will existing communications structures and protocols support the transport of the large volume of data needed to perform collection and analysis tasks we now know we will need to accomplish.

Nor will these near-term systems liberate us from the collector-based processes for classifying and, hence, regulating the distribution and use of intelligence.

For these reasons, the defense and intelligence communities have moved—more in concert than not—to invest in a new generation of technology. This effort is guided by the work Don Kerr completed before moving to be Director, S&T, at

the CIA. Follow-on efforts sponsored by the DCI's Community Management staff and especially Charlie Allen, ADCI/Collection, have helped us frame our investment preferences.

### **Space-Based Radar**

Most prominent among the new investments is the space-based radar. It was conceived with the aim of increasing the persistence of surveillance and contributing to a variety of defense and intelligence missions. If the technology involved proves affordable, it has the potential to free us from building our imagery intelligence as we do today—as if it were a jigsaw puzzle for which we earnestly hunt for the pieces while uncertain of the picture we are seeking to construct.

The unique contribution of SBR comes into focus if we think of space-based radar as an “illuminator,” throwing into relief both geographic features and activity on the earth's surface. By creating a reference baseline and then permitting us to constantly refresh our picture of those features and activities, it can allow us to detect change and alert us to matters of interest or concern.

Then, either by shifting the radar from an “illuminator” to a “spotlight,” if you will, or by “tipping” or “cueing” other systems, space-based radar can provide the means for diving deeply into specific matters.

The persistent surveillance provided by a space-based radar, in combination with other complementary space and airborne systems, could allow us to approach a number of the goals I outlined. Most obviously it could form the basis for “knowing something about everything”, “strategic warning”, and an “agile intelligence enterprise.”

The promise of space-based radar will go unrealized, however, if we think of it in the terms most comfortable to today’s collectors and users. Constrained in its development by the extant paradigm, space-based radar will not be able to make a meaningful contribution to either military or intelligence missions. USecAF Pete Teets, under whose direction the system is being developed, is working to loose those constraints. Industry is ready to have them removed. I can assure you I will continue to push for concepts and a system that delivers on the promise of SBR.

I noted that space-based radar alone cannot meet the goals of persistence. Other systems, operating in all media and venues, will need to contribute. And, indeed, investments are being made in such technology.

### **Processes and Networks**

Improvements to collection, alone, will not provide bring us very close to achieving the six operational goals. Collection needs to be coupled to a process that allows the data collected to be accessed by the user—the analyst or the military operator. That process, moreover, must allow for more than collaborative activity. It must allow the user to drive collection even as it allows the collector to provide the user with a tailored product.

Toward this end, substantial investment is being made in laser satellite communications, the expansion of the global information grid, creation of a distributed common ground system, and joint command and control systems.

This includes both space and airborne platforms along with ground and sea-based sensors. Once we can organize our collection assets more along the lines of a combined arms team, than say a football team, the better off we will be.



That is, instead of one team for imagery, another for signals and special teams made up of core officers, MASINT operators and technical experts, we might have a single team capable of bringing the right combination of capabilities to bear to address the problem at hand.

Under such a combined arms approach the limits of one system – say SBR versus cruise missiles – could be compensated for by other elements – say airborne radars, dispersed ground sites. But these capabilities could be combined and recombined in packages adapted to the problem we face.

These, in turn, are being fashioned into a networked operating environment that both the defense and intelligence community can share. As this capability comes on line, the need for “direct downlinks” will dissipate as “reach-back” both on and through the military and intelligence networks takes hold.

## **Organization**

Let me turn now to organization and doctrine.

The defense and intelligence communities have embraced a vision for horizontal integration, or HI. Without suggesting that translating the vision into

system concepts, hardware, and practice will be easy, I do think the benefit is an intuitive one to grasp.

Imagine that the processes by which collection and analysis, production, and dissemination of intelligence information were similar to those that govern contemporary web sites. Refresh rates at those sites are driven by the interaction between customer demand and what the purveyor (collector) of information can supply.

Demand for that information and its supply are regulated by a rules-based set of protocols. Neither the customer nor the supplier is independent of each other, yet each has separate responsibilities.

The customer defines his preferences by his selection. He has access to all information that he needs to know—

- rather than access based on security limitations imposed by considerations of “sources and methods”
- or by distribution constraints dictated by the originating agency.

The supplier, in turn, attracts the customer by satisfying the customer's range of choice or by offering new products or services of interest to the user.

Information is not owned by either party, and the system is run not by a particular discipline, but by an administrator.

That kind of networked environment and process, with which we are so comfortable in every other facet of our lives, is at the heart of HI.

Its incorporation into the world of intelligence will change that world's organization and doctrine in ways we cannot now imagine. But if our experience in the DOD is any guide, it means that hierarchical tasking, reporting, and decision-making, stretched over long periods of time, resulting in least-common-denominator solutions, will be a thing of the past.

At the same time, this emerging environment will require the advent of new methods for validating and verifying information, and providing senior leaders with finished recommendations and products, and assessing the utility of the products created. Most important, it will change the role of analysts and probably the distribution of analysts. That is, in so far as machine-to-machine interfaces and

processes do the hard work of shipping the “noise away from the signal,” the analyst can concentrate on what the signal means. Analysts operating at the front lines should be able to isolate the data of interest for tactical operations without having to wait on analysts at higher headquarters. UAV operations today illustrate this point. The future is here.

## **People**

Which brings us to people.

Those who are entering the intelligence ranks today will be the leaders and conductors of the organizations we are now setting out to build, and they will be the operators of any technology we design and deploy, and they will be the full beneficiaries of the world of HI that I have described.

They will encounter a world very different from our own. The regions and cultures of the world they will be concerned with, the entities they will need to penetrate, the secrets they will be asked to acquire and safeguard, will demand skills possessed today by a small, though ever-growing, cadre.

The talent certainly exists that is needed to

- lead the nation's intelligence organizations,
- design its systems,
- operate in the midst of our adversaries—potential and actual—and
- to provide the strategic warning and current intelligence needed to safeguard the nation in a complicated and dangerous world.

It is our task to motivate this rising generation to take on the challenge that lies before us.

We must recruit, train, compensate, and mentor those willing to accept the challenge,

- and we must be able to do so in creative, flexible ways that will make government service attractive to those with rare talent.

But the transformation of our intelligence capabilities will need to be matched by a transformation in how we think about the affairs unfolding around us. Policies, strategies, plans, and activities predicated on years of warning are no longer adequate to our purposes.

Coming to grips with the reality that we live in an era of surprise is imperative.

Achieving the goals I have outlined will improve our access to information. But our analysis of that information needs improvement, as well.

Thomas Schelling, in his forward to Roberta Wohlstetter's book, Pearl Harbor, reminds us that information alone is not sufficient.

"If we think of the entire U.S. government and its far-flung military and diplomatic establishment, it is not true that we were caught napping at the time of Pearl Harbor. Rarely has a government been more expectant. We just expected wrong. And it was not our warning that was most at fault, but our strategic analysis. We were so busy thinking through some "obvious" Japanese moves that we neglected to hedge against the choice that they actually made."

Schelling accounts for this faulty strategic analysis as follows:

“There is a tendency in our planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable. The contingency we have not considered seriously looks strange; what looks strange is thought improbable; what is improbable need not be considered seriously.”

This is not a mistake we can afford to make again. The acts of 9/11 have put us on notice. They inform with a painful impact—in an age of surprise, we have only ourselves to blame if we do not prepare. There is little we should consider “improbable” when contemplating the possible acts of terrorists and those who would harbor or support them. In this age of surprise, we cannot afford to suffer what Schelling describes as “a poverty of expectations—a routine obsession with a few dangers that may be familiar rather than likely.”

Let me conclude by returning to where I began. Pursuit of the six goals I have outlined will contribute to the transformation of the nation’s intelligence capability. As we achieve those goals, our level of preparation will increase. Whether that increase will be sufficient to substantially decrease the likelihood of surprise will only be known in the future.

But a failure to prepare is to invite surprise, and, with it, catastrophe.

Responsible members of the government, within the executive and legislative branches, have a singular obligation to those they represent to prepare them for surprise.

Those same officials owe the American people plain talk about what they think they know, what they know they don't know, and the reality that there are, at this moment, unknown means and methods being devised and developed by our enemies to do us harm.

In assessing our progress both toward preparing for future surprises and victory in the present war, it is imperative that the contribution of intelligence—to our successes or any failures—not be misestimated.

I spoke earlier of "exquisite intelligence." A profound secret gleaned by U.S. intelligence, without the knowledge of the adversary, is no small accomplishment.



Its relevance to our security, its contribution to our preparation, however, is directly proportionate to the conversion of that secret into action by the agencies of the U.S. government.

### **Sense of Urgency**

There should be no doubt, about the urgency to transform intelligence. Defining and achieving operational goals of the sort I postulated earlier is essential. We must not permit ourselves to remain wedded to past practices, policies, technologies, and products. We do so at our peril.

### **Conclusion**

So, let me conclude by recalling then-candidate Bush's 1999 Citadel speech. As a way of underscoring his determination to bring about the transformation of the military forces of the United States, the President reminded his audience of an earlier time when a free people confronted what he called "rapid change and momentous choices."

That time was the 1930s. Nazi Germany was rearming, and the British government was reluctant to take forceful steps to stave off war.

To give voice to his own concerns, candidate Bush quoted Winston Churchill, who repeatedly called upon his countrymen to respond to the gathering storm:

“The era of procrastination, of half-measures, of soothing and baffling expedience, of delays, is coming to a close,” Churchill said. “In its place, we are entering a period of consequences.”

That period of consequences arrived not only for the military, but for those who practice intelligence, just two years after the President’s Citadel speech, on September 11, 2001.

Like our colleagues in the military forces, we will be judged by our successors on our response to this period of consequences.

We face few substantial impediments to transforming intelligence.

SecDef and DCI are committed to strengthening intelligence for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

We are led by individuals in the DoD and agencies who embrace the need for and who likewise are committed to this effort.

The Congress has provided resources.

Industry has it well within its grasp to supply the technology and systems to enable transformation.

Our colleges, universities, laboratories, and think tanks are replete with talent.

What remains, then, is to embrace the urgency of the President and to summon the energy of Churchill, who, when presented with a memo containing a compelling idea, would note in the margin, "Action this day!"

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: **Attached Media Release**

Mr. President –

Attached is the speech that was presented by Prime Minister Goh of Singapore at the Third International Institute of Strategic Studies session last week. I found it most interesting and thought you would as well, given the series of speeches you have been giving.

Respectfully,

DHR/azn  
060604B.05ts

*Attach: Singapore Government Media Release 6.5.04.*

Singapore

6 JUN 04

**EMBARGOED TILL FULL DELIVERY  
PLEASE CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY**

**KEYNOTE ADDRESS BY PRIME MINISTER GOH CHOK TONG AT THE  
THIRD INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES ASIA  
SECURITY CONFERENCE IN SINGAPORE AT THE SHANGRI-LA  
HOTEL, ISLAND BALLROOM, ON FRIDAY, 4 JUNE 2004, AT 8.00 PM**

**POST-COLD WAR GEOPOLITICS**

1 This is the third meeting of the Shangri-La Dialogue. It is a tribute to the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) that the Shangri-La Dialogue has so quickly become entrenched as a 'must attend' event on the regional calendar. It clearly fulfils an important need. I thank the IISS for the opportunity to share my views with such a distinguished audience.

2 Last month, I gave two speeches on themes relevant to this conference. The first was to the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington DC. I dwelt on the ideological aspects of the war against terrorism. We must have no illusions about our enemy. This enemy, terrorism, is most dangerous as it is fuelled by an extremist religious belief that brooks no compromise with non-believers whom they label *infidels*. Even fellow Muslims who oppose their strain of Islam are their enemies.

3 Unless all of us in the civilised world - Muslims and non-Muslims alike - unite and fight them ideologically, we will be tormented for a long time. There will be no dearth of terrorist foot soldiers willing to martyr themselves. The Al-Qaeda *jihadi* ideology which uses violence to bring the world back to the 7th Century Arabian way of religious life must be debunked and defeated. But this ideological battle on how Islam should be practised in today's world, and indeed the battle for Islam's future, must be fought primarily by Muslims. In Washington, I pointed out that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict constrained mainstream Muslims from speaking out against extremists for fear of being labelled pro-American. I also emphasised the crucial role of education, especially of women, and economic development to create the necessary conditions for democracy to be transplanted to the Middle East.

4 My second speech was at an event in Singapore celebrating the enlargement of the European Union. I stressed the imperative of Europe and America working together to meet the challenge of terrorism. A Transatlantic rift only serves the terrorists' agenda. I also highlighted the importance of Europe and Asia working together, not in opposition to America, but with America to advance our common interests.

5 This evening, I would like to draw together the threads of these arguments. I have entitled my talk "Post-Cold War Geopolitics". Let me elaborate.

### **The New Geopolitics of Terrorism**

6 The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 symbolised the end of the Cold War. But I believe that the real post-Cold War era did not begin until September 11, 2001. Of course, few people really thought history ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. History proved far more resilient. Crises did not abate. But there was no widespread sense of a serious global security threat such as had infused the Cold War period and galvanised the free world to hold together. Even the 1991 Iraq invasion of Kuwait was dealt with in a relatively straightforward way by a broad American-led coalition, giving rise to the hope that a peaceful New World Order could be achieved.

7 That hope proved illusory as did the expectation that 'democratic enlargement' was an irresistible trend that would stabilise international relations. Still, as the threat of superpower nuclear conflict receded, there was a sense that the world had reached a geopolitical equilibrium. None of the conflicts in Africa, the Balkans or the Middle East were thought to really threaten the global equilibrium.

8 9/11 swept away these comfortable assumptions. It shook America's sense of security and changed America's definition of its role in the world. Suddenly, America felt vulnerable. To protect itself, America was determined to take the battle to its enemies wherever they might be. Because of its global supremacy, America could and would go it alone, if necessary. Post-Cold War geopolitics is the geopolitics of the war against terrorism.

9 I believe the fight against terrorism will last as many decades as the Cold War. However, I do not think that everyone sees or understands the challenge in such stark terms. And this is one of the principal dangers of post-Cold War geopolitics. There is no overarching strategic consensus on the threat of terrorism and the means to combat it. I hope to persuade you

that while there are differences with the Cold War period, the fight against terrorism is no less a mortal struggle and certainly far more complex.

10 Like the Cold War, the fight against terrorism is both an ideological and a geopolitical struggle. But there are crucial differences. Since the 1930s, the Soviet Union gave priority to state interests over ideology. Therefore, whatever the differences with its adversaries, the Soviet Union calculated the costs and benefits, foremost among which was the primacy of survival. The West could use the time-tested tools of diplomacy, deterrence and containment to hold the line against Communism, until internal and inherent contradictions led to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

11 But how do you conduct diplomacy with a religious ideology that sees the struggle as a zero sum game with no room for compromise except as a tactical expedient? How do you contain an adversary that occupies no fixed territory but resides in the minds and hearts of men? How do you deter an enemy that is not afraid, indeed eager, to die for its ideology?

12 These complexities define the new geopolitics of terrorism. But they do not make diplomacy, deterrence and containment irrelevant. The geopolitics of terrorism has not displaced the old geopolitics of conflict and collaboration between states. The new forms an overlay over the old. It is the interaction between the old and new that will shape post-Cold War geopolitics for many years to come.

### **How to Defeat the Terrorists**

13 The terrorists are driven by an ideological desire to force their strain of Islam on others but their goals and methods are geopolitical. The war against terrorism must therefore be simultaneously fought on both fronts: the ideological as well as the geopolitical. While the US cannot lead the ideological struggle, only it has the capacity to lead the geopolitical fight. In this contradiction lie the complexities.

14 The terrorists want to overthrow secular governments: initially in the Middle East to secure control of oil that will give them the wherewithal to achieve their ultimate goal of a Caliphate of the entire *ummah* or global Islamic community. It will be a mistake to dismiss them as mere fanatics. The terrorists have strategic thinkers amongst them and their reach is global. Indeed they seem to be able to think more strategically and globally than do some governments.

15 The terrorists have accurately identified the principal threat to their goal as the geopolitical trend of the Americas, Europe and Asia coalescing into regional blocs. They see the spread of development, democracy and

the modern way of life as corrupting their vision of an ideal society based on their interpretation of the Koran. America is their main enemy because America is the vanguard of this modern civilisation and the main obstacle to their designs. They know that a combination of America, Europe and Asia will be formidable. Hence I believe they would give priority to splitting the US from its European and Asian allies.

16 The terrorists are a deviant minority in the Muslim world. According to Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi of Malaysia, "*Many Muslims refuse to acknowledge that there can be bad Muslims, and that Islamic teachings have been corrupted by some groups to serve their militant cause.*" Prime Minister Abdullah was schooled in Islamic studies and has just won the General Elections convincingly with his vision of "Progressive Islam" or *Islam Hadari* against the opposition party's vision of an austere Islamic state based on *Shariah* law.

17 The terrorists are definitely bad Muslims as they are ready to commit mass murders and take innocent lives to achieve their ends. Hence the civilised world must do everything in its power to prevent them laying their hands on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). But even if we succeed, they will still pose a serious threat. The terrorists do not need large armies or sophisticated weaponry to fight their battle. They need only self-assembled bombs, unconventional home-made weapons of destruction and suicide bombers. Their chief tactic is to create fear and a perpetual sense of vulnerability to disrupt our way of life. They will exploit the discomfort that even close US friends and allies feel at America's global primacy and some of its policies. The Madrid bombing in March is a classic example.

18 Anti-Americanism is high around the world. A principal cause is the sheer scale of American power and the indispensability of the US to the post-Cold War international system. This leaves other major powers uncertain of their own roles and insecure about their own status. In certain intellectual circles, it is fashionable to be anti-American. But wishing for a more balanced world will not make it so. All the more necessary, therefore, to state what ought to be obvious but is unfashionable: America is not the enemy; the terrorists are the enemy.

19 The central battleground is the Middle East. The difficulties America currently faces in Iraq offer the greatest opportunities for the terrorists. The terrorists know that America cannot be defeated militarily. Their target is psychological: America's resolve and the resolve of America's coalition allies. If they succeed, first in breaking the coalition allies' resolve, and later, America's resolve, extremists everywhere will rejoice and be emboldened. They will know that they can defeat even the world's mightiest



nation. They will go on the offensive with renewed vigour. This is why it is so vital that, whatever the difficulties, the US and its allies do not waver in Iraq but persevere to bring about a good outcome.

20        Whatever the differences of views over America's actions in Iraq, Europe and the US must set aside pre-war recriminations, go beyond saying "I told you so", and work together with the UN to stabilise Iraq. The US has paid a price for going into Iraq. The price is worth it if out of the ashes of war emerges a stable, peaceful and new Iraq which Iraqis are proud of and their neighbours can live with, and an Iraq which contributes to Middle East peace and stability. Europe will pay a higher strategic price if the chaos in Iraq leads to turmoil in the Middle East. And the civilised world will pay the full price if the US loses, or is seen by the terrorists, to have lost in Iraq.

21        The abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib was a hideous crime. It must be dealt with transparently and decisively. The guilty must be punished. But Abu Ghraib must not be allowed to cloud the central strategic issue that is at stake.

22        The Middle East is also where US friends and allies are most disquieted by America's seemingly unconditional support for Israel. I know this is a delicate issue. I know that whatever the criticisms of its policies, the US plays an irreplaceable role in stabilising the Middle East. But this is too important an issue to dress in diplomatic niceties. The US is essential to the solution but is also part of the problem. A more balanced and nuanced approach towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict - an approach that recognises that there are equities and inequities on both sides - must become a central pillar of the global war against terrorism. Given the post-Cold War geopolitical battle against terrorism, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is no longer just a regional problem. The Islamic terrorists know this. They have exploited this conflict to win sympathy and recruits for their own cause.

23        The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a rallying cause of terrorism. We know that a solution to it will not end terrorism, given the ideologically-driven motivations of the Al-Qaeda terrorists. But the discomfort that mainstream Muslims around the world feel with America's Middle East policies limits their ability to fight the ideological battle. Even the Europeans and other friends of the US will be constrained to support the US in the fight against the terrorists. This weakens the US-led geopolitical struggle against terrorism.

#### **Unity of US, Europe and Asia is Critical**

24        Strategically, the terrorists will want to break the transatlantic partnership, and thereby isolate the US. The so-called "truce" that Osama

bin Laden offered to Europe in April was so crudely put as to blatantly expose his intentions. But the terrorists will refine this strategy. Europe is internally preoccupied with enlargement. Several European governments face strong domestic pressures over support for the US on Iraq. Many Europeans want to believe that some tacit accommodation with the terrorists is possible. They fail to see the threat as a long-term problem and that any accommodation by the terrorists will be out of expediency. This threat is not the same as what Europe faces from, say, the Basque terrorists whose goals are limited. So long as the terrorists think that the European public can be used to pressure their governments, they will try to manipulate it. They will dangle the sword of another Madrid.

25 Asia will not be spared. The terrorists have similar goals in Asia. The secular governments of India and Pakistan have been on the frontlines of the struggle against Islamic extremism for many years. Whatever their differences over Kashmir, they have no illusions about the nature of the enemy. Southeast Asia is waking up to this. Post 9/11 and the Bali bombing, it has emerged as a major front in the war against terrorism. The secular governments of Southeast Asia know the stakes.

26 Northeast Asia, however, is less aware. China has its own problems with Muslim separatists but may be less worried about terrorism. In Japan and Korea, ethnic and religious homogeneity has, until relatively recently, shielded their public from the dimensions of the problem and the extent to which they too are in the sights of the *jihadist* terrorists.

27 Japan was recently shaken by the discovery that Al-Qaeda was operating in its territory. I believe that Northeast Asian governments will sooner or later have to confront the threat of a terrorist attack on international waterways in Southeast Asia. Should an attack take place, it would have catastrophic consequences, and not just for Southeast Asia. The vital lifelines of Japan, Korea and China pass through Southeast Asia. Such an attack would seriously disrupt the international trade and energy supplies on which all the economies of Northeast Asia are critically dependent. It would be designed for maximum economic disruption and to turn the public against governments which support the US.

28 In Asia, as in Europe, unease with America's overwhelming global dominance is high. But Asia is more keenly aware than Europe of the vital role that the US plays in maintaining global stability. No matter what their misgivings, only a few Asian countries, and certainly no major US ally, opposed the US on Iraq. There is a clearer appreciation in Asia than in Europe that the fundamental issue in Iraq now is the credibility and resolve of the US.

29 This is because Asia still faces many serious security challenges. Kashmir, North Korea and cross-strait relations between Beijing and Taipei are potential flashpoints. If things go terribly wrong, the conflicts could even turn nuclear. The US is central to the management of all three potential flashpoints. All three conflicts also have a direct impact on the global struggle against terrorism. Let me conclude therefore with a few words on each.

### Potential Flashpoints in Asia

30 The India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir is a longstanding one, difficult to resolve because of religion and history. If a conflict breaks out, it is not difficult to imagine Kashmir becoming a new theatre for *jihād* and a fertile ground for breeding terrorists. But India and Pakistan know that a conflict over Kashmir will have devastating consequences for each other and the entire South Asian region. The US holds the ring. The desire of both Islamabad and New Delhi to maintain good relations with the US gives Washington leverage that it exercised in 2001 to avert a possible nuclear war.

31 North Korea is another potential trouble spot. The terrorists could try to exploit the situation to acquire materials for WMD. Fortunately, the six-party talks have lowered tensions and the issue is being managed. Whatever their differences, the key actors share a common interest in the peaceful containment of the issue. I have been told by several leaders who have met Kim Jong Il that he is a rational, well-informed man who calculates his moves. He must know that an outbreak of conflict with the US will lead to the very outcome that he fears most: regime change or even the disappearance of North Korea as a sovereign state. He may go to the brink but not step over the edge. The credibility of the US military option is vital to maintaining peace.

32 The dangers of miscalculation are highest over Taiwan. The issue is extremely complex because it involves the domestic politics of China, the US and Taiwan and relations between the three parties. Economic forces are integrating Taiwan with the Mainland but this trend conflicts with Taiwan's desire for a separate identity. Chen Shui-bian's inauguration speech took a conciliatory tone. He must have taken into account US concerns about maintaining stability in cross-strait relations. But he did not renounce independence. Yet independence for Taiwan is a non-starter. No Asian, and I believe, no European government, would recognise Taiwan's independence. To do so would earn China's permanent enmity. And China is the economic story of this century. No Chinese leadership can lose Taiwan and still survive. If Taiwan pushes beyond a certain red line, the

Chinese leaders must respond or be rejected by their people. The result will be war and a permanent rise in Chinese nationalism and hostility.

33 The consequences of such a war will make Iraq seem a small problem. The US has no reasons to open another front with China over Taiwan, given its strategic priorities in Iraq, the Middle East and the global fight against terrorism. Indeed, President Bush has stated explicitly that he does not support Taiwan's independence. He has also publicly stated that the US opposes any unilateral action by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo. Still, the likelihood of the US being drawn into a cross-strait conflict is there if wrong signals are emitted by the US. Should such a conflict arise, China might not prevail; at least not in the first round. China's physical infrastructure would be damaged and economic development set back many decades. But the Chinese leaders have said that they would be prepared to pay this price and more. Taiwan, however, would be physically and economically devastated. Investor confidence in Taiwan would be shattered. The economy will go downhill, and not recover for a long time. If the Taiwanese know that this will be the outcome, they may pause to ask whether this price is worth paying for a bid for independence.

34 Stable US-China relations are the foundation of East Asian stability. If the long-term stability of US-China relations can be assured, East Asia will grow and benefit the US as well. If there is permanent enmity between China and the US, not only will East Asian growth be set back but the entire region will be dragged down. Only the terrorists will benefit. And terrorism is the key issue of post-Cold War geopolitics.


Thank you.

-----

June 7, 2004

TO: Honorable Tillie Fowler

cc: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Look at Intelligence

Please consider having a session at the next Defense Policy Board meeting on the subject of intelligence reform.

You might want to have Chris Williams get with Steve Cambone and figure out how to structure a portion of the day on that subject. It looks like there are a lot of proposals floating around from the Scowcroft Commission, the Senate Intelligence Committee, the 9/11 Commission, and the House Intelligence people.

A thoughtful meeting, hearing some good ideas, discussion and information from the members of the Policy Board, would be a big help to us.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
060704-4

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
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OSD 08510-04

TO: President George W. Bush

CC: Vice President Dick Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



DATE: June 7, 2004

SUBJECT: **Framing the War**

Mr. President -

Attached is an interesting paper Steve Cambone prepared after our DoD discussions about how best to describe the struggle we are in.

His paper came out of discussions we had at the Pentagon in preparation for the briefings we presented you on the same subject.

Respectfully,

DHR/azn  
060704.01

*Attach: Framing the War., S. Cambone, 5/24/04*

0005

7 Jun 04

CSTW

25 May 2004, 09:21

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: STEVE CAMBONE *SC*

SUBJECT: FRAMING THE WAR

The discussion yesterday morning on how to frame the war was important. I would like to offer my own thoughts.

The phrase “global war on terror” suffers, in my estimation, from a number of shortcomings.

1. Global. The prominence of the word, “global,” connotes to those abroad who read or hear it an American notion that the conflict is everywhere, or “universal,” and that the response and solution to it is the “singular” approach pursued by the United States. Some who might otherwise be partners — willing or grudging — find the war and its conduct and solution conceived and defined in American terms. For a variety of reasons, most are unwilling to accept such a definition even as they recognize their vulnerability.
2. War. The United States is at war, certainly with Al Qaeda and possibly with other terrorist networks. But here, again, state actors who might partner with us find joining in a “war” unappealing for domestic reasons.
  - Yet, we know that a large number of nations are fighting, some quite intensely, against the objectives and operations of terrorists within their own countries.
  - Most of these countries are aligned and cooperating with us through law enforcement or intelligence channels. However, in many cases, they do not wish to be publicly associated with us in a “war” as they battle their domestic problems. Some are even willing to be accounted as “against us,” even as they fight domestic terrorism.
3. Terrorism. I am of the view that terrorism is a method or tactic that has been chosen by our adversaries. I believe our adversaries seek, as you said

yesterday, to advance radical Islam as the basis for civil society for the better part of 2 billion people on the face of the earth.

- This effort has gained force and coherence over the last 10 to 15 years. It is a response to earlier defeats, for example: in Egypt in the 1990s and their continuing failure to destabilize the Saudi regime, among others.
- The 9/11 attack on the United States had the strategic effect of “enlarging the war.” The fact that the United States is fighting against “jihad” is being used to motivate, and perhaps radicalize, a large sector of the Islamic population in support of the objective of overthrowing western-leaning and/or corrupt regimes.

An alternative formulation to the phrase “global war on terror” might be that the political objective of radical or extremist Islam is to destroy international civil society through a combination of methods to include: terrorism, political manipulation, blackmail of ruling elites, corruption of Muslim educational institutions, and the radicalization of the Muslim faith. That is, our adversaries have brought to bear, on behalf of their objectives, a wide variety of elements of power against which we are, for the most part, employing military power. That is not a winning strategy.

Who are the adversaries? That is a more difficult question to answer. However, I believe they are to be found in the elite society of countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia and Indonesia and Thailand—as well as within western countries—those who, for a variety of reasons, are disaffected from the government and societies in which they live and are inclined to support radical Islam. They also possess, in addition to their elite standing, the financial means and the ruthlessness needed to pursue their objectives. The names of these individuals pass by us every day in the lists of financiers, industrialists, educators, scientists, and the like, associated with the terrorists, terrorist activities, and state sponsors.

For now, the United States has no choice but to continue the tactical engagement against Al Qaeda and other terrorist networks. But it is time for us to realize that we have a larger problem than Al Qaeda, and that its solution will require a multi-variant approach. That approach ought to allow for the creation of “alliances of convenience” between the United States and other states such that



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

those states can address their domestic problems in ways conducive to their own political realities while, at the same time, and without attribution, contribute to the overall objectives of the United States.

The objective of the United States, in short, is to ensure for itself and to assist others in the pursuit of the defense of international civil society in the modern world.

copy to:  
DepSecDef  
CJCS  
USDP

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

June 8, 2004

VIA FACSIMILE

(b)(6)

Captain M -  
This should prob be  
FAXED b/c it's  
Urgent. CSC w/s

TO: Amine Gemayel (c/o Michael Dravis)  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

Dear Amine,

Thanks so much for your note concerning the passing of President Ronald Reagan.

I have asked my staff to try to find a way to have you included in the service on Friday. We will be back in touch with you to let you know whether or not we have been successful.

With my best personal regards,

Sincerely,

DIIR:dh  
060804-19

OK

OSD 08577-04

Jun 08 2004 7: 11pm

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**Last Transaction**

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Identification</u>	<u>Duration</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Result</u>
Jun 8	7:10pm	Fax Sent	(b)(6)	0:48	2	OK

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Jun 08 2004 6:55pm

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**Last Transaction**

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Identification</u>	<u>Duration</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Result</u>
Jun 8	6:54pm	Fax Sent	(b)(6)	0:00	0	No answer

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**Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD**

**From:** Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD  
**Sent:** Wednesday, June 09, 2004 5:20 AM  
**To:** Marriott, William P, CAPT, OSD; Sherrod, Jimmy, CIV, WHS/ESCD  
**Subject:** Done - FW: Secretary Rumsfeld Letter to His Excellency Amine Gemayel

CAPT Marriott, Jimmy,

Receipt confirmed & acknowledged to Mr. Dravis. Done deal.

V/r,

John

(JS - stopped by on my morning run - vr, JL)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD  
**Sent:** Wednesday, June 09, 2004 5:15 AM  
**To:** 'Michael Dravis'  
**Subject:** RE: Secretary Rumsfeld Letter to His Excellency Amine Gemayel

\* Mr. Dravis,

Good morning,

Thank you for the word back confirming receipt - it is much appreciated.

Respectfully,

John Larson  
Executive Services & Communications  
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Michael Dravis (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, June 08, 2004 9:24 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: Secretary Rumsfeld Letter to His Excellency Amine Gemayel

Dear Mr. Larson,

This is to confirm my receipt of the advance copy of Secretary Rumsfeld's letter to His Excellency Amine Gemayel.

I apologize for the trouble you had faxing the letter to me, and thank you for your persistence.

I will pass the substance of Secretary Rumsfeld's letter to Mr. Gemayel tonight.

Sincerely,

Mike Dravis  
Assistant to Amine Gemayel

>>> "Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD" (b)(6) 06/08/04 7:47 PM

>>>  
Mr. Dravis,

6/9  
Jimmy,  
done  
- JL  
need to let VCB know  
it was successful  
- JL

Good evening,

Attached, please find an advance copy of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's letter to His Excellency Amine Gemayel. The original letter will follow via postal channels.

(Fax transmittal to (b)(6) appears successful, while attempts to (b)(6) were met with a busy signal).

Secretary Rumsfeld's staff, as indicated in his response, will be in touch regarding President Gemayel's request for the service this Friday.

Respectfully,

John Larson  
Executive Services & Communications

(b)(6)

<<08577-04.pdf>>

**Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD**

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**From:** Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD  
**Sent:** Tuesday, June 08, 2004 8:22 PM  
**To:** Sherrod, Jimmy, CIV, WHS/ESCD  
**cc:** Marriott, William P, CAPT, OSD  
**Subject:** FW: Secretary Rumsfeld Letter to His Excellency Amine Gemayel

Jimmy,

Good morning,

Mr. Michael Dravis, of the University of Maryland, is an assistant to His Excellency Amine Gemayel, former President of Lebanon (during the Reagan years).

The former President requested (via his June 6th letter faxed by Mr. Dravis on June 7th) to be present for President Reagan's service in Washington this Friday, if possible. He would also like to meet briefly with the SecDef as well.

Due to the short turn, advance copy of SecDef's reply was to be faxed, but we were repeatedly met with a busy signal.

A fax to an alternate number appears to have been successful (copies of transmittal sheets on your desk).

I left a voice message (b)(6) for Mr. Dravis, indicating that we had attempted to forward an advance copy of Secretary Rumsfeld's acknowledgement, but were not certain it went through.

If you would, please call him in the a.m. to confirm receipt (fax or electronic) (he may very well call back also). Voice:

(b)(6)

John

(I don't know that the attached bio for Gemayel is "official" - it was one of the first that came up when I searched on his name when looking for background info)



Dravis & Gemayel 08577-04 Incoming  
Info.pdf & Draft.pdf

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD  
**Sent:** Tuesday, June 08, 2004 7:47 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**cc:** Marriott, William P, CAPT, OSD; Sherrod, Jimmy, CIV, WHS/ESCD  
**Subject:** Secretary Rumsfeld Letter to His Excellency Amine Gemayel

Mr. Dravis,

Good evening.

Attached, please find an advance copy of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's letter to His Excellency Amine Gemayel. The original letter will follow via postal channels.  
(Fax transmittal to (b)(6) appears successful, while attempts to (b)(6) were met with a busy signal).

Secretary Rumsfeld's staff, as indicated in his response, will be in touch regarding President Gemayel's request for the service this Friday.

Respectfully,

John Larson  
Executive Services & Communications

(b)(6)



08577-04.pdf





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**Contact**

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**Faculty Research Assistant**

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**Projects:**

- Kahlil Gibran Research and Studies



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University of Maryland . 0145 Tydings Hall . College Park, MD 20742 . 301.314.7703

Last Modified: December 01, 2003

11-L-0559/OSD/41866

## **AMINE GEMAYEL**



### **Former President of Lebanon**

Sheikh Amine Gemayel, the eighth President of the Lebanese republic was born in the village of Bikfaya - Lebanon in 1942, to a family which has played a major political role in modern Lebanon. His father, Sheikh Pierre Gemayel, founded in 1936 the democratic and social **party: The Lebanese Kataeb**. His brother Sheikh Bashir was elected President in August 1982, ( Bashir was assassinated three weeks later ). Sheikh Amine Gemayel graduated from Saint-Joseph University with a law degree; He started practicing as attorney at law in 1965. In 1970 at the age of 28, Sheikh Amine Gemayel was elected to the Lebanese parliament, and became thus the youngest member. On September 21st 1982, he was elected President of the Lebanese Republic by 77 votes out of 80. His term of office ended in September 1988, ( Six years as per the Lebanese Constitution ). He then joined the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University as fellow and lecturer (1988-1989). He is affiliated with the University of Maryland as a distinguished visiting professor. From 1990 to July 2000, he resided in Paris as an exiled leader of the opposition, and lectured extensively on Lebanon and the Middle East in various countries worldwide. Since July 2000, he lives and pursues his political agenda in Lebanon.



### **Career history**

When he became President, the new head of state set himself three main objectives which form the basis of his political activity today:

- Re-establishing the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon.
- Maintaining an effective dialogue between Lebanon's different communities.
- Restoring and modernizing the institutions of the state.

Concerning Syria, in 1982, presided by Amine Gemayel, the Lebanese government dissolved the Arab Deterrence Force which legitimized Syrian military presence in Lebanon and in September 1983, he addressed a letter to the Syrian President Hafez El Assad requesting the withdrawal of his forces from the country.

As for the PLO in 1987 he annulled the Treaty of Cairo signed with the PLO in 1969, which authorized them to use Lebanon as a base for military operations against Israel. His position on the Israeli issue, is the implementation of the SC/UN resolution 425 - 426, and that he is opposed to any measures which would work against restoring Lebanon's sovereignty.

On the domestic front, Amine Gemayel's activities are aimed at establishing strong foundations for intercommunal dialogue. He is also working towards restoring the state's role by making its institutions credible, efficient and unified.

Paradoxically, although the major criticisms of Amine Gemayel during his presidency were his desire to appear as the President of all Lebanon and the pre-eminence of the state, today, these are the factors which give him credibility in the eyes of the Lebanese people.

Currently, he is continuing his battle to restore Lebanon's independence and sovereignty, and endow it with democratic institutions.

Apart from his political activities, in 1976, Amine Gemayel created the INMA Foundation, a non-profit organization, which brings together a number of institutions dealing with social, political, and economic issues concerning Lebanon and the Middle East. One of these is Beit-al-Mustakbal, (the house of the future), which is a combination of think-tank and research center, publishing a quarterly journal in three languages called: Haliyyat (Panorama of Events).

---

#### Publications:

1986: Peace and Unity ( Colin and Smythe ).

**1988:** L'Offence et le Pardon ( Gallimard ), reflections on the events in Lebanon.

1990: Mediation d'espoir ( JC. Lattes ), a collection of lectures delivered in the United States in 1989.

1992: Rebuilding Lebanon's Future, published by Harvard University ( C.F.I.A. ).

AMINE GEMAYEL

*Stated*

June 6, 2004

293

The Honorable Mr. Donald Rumsfeld  
The Pentagon  
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. Secretary,

It was with profound sadness that I learned of the passing of President Ronald Reagan yesterday. On behalf of my wife Joyce and myself, I should like to express our heartfelt condolences to you, your family, and your colleagues from the Reagan Administration.

I recall my years of working alongside President Reagan and your good self on Middle East issues with a fondness tinged with sadness. The fondness springs from the warm personal relations we all maintained throughout, even during the most difficult of times. Indeed, I will never forget the generous time and attention that both you and President Reagan devoted to the cause of peace, freedom and democracy in the region and to helping my country achieve its national aspirations.

Similarly, despite ongoing turbulence in Iraq, I am certain that history will credit President Bush, your good self, and your colleagues in the Administration with bold leadership for your efforts to transform a troubled region.

Finally, Mr. Secretary, if at all possible I would very much treasure the opportunity to pay my last respects to President Reagan during the state funeral that will take place in Washington on Friday. If that can be arranged, please let me know as soon as possible so that I can schedule my travel. A visit to Washington might also permit us to hold a brief meeting to review the latest developments in Lebanon and the Middle East.

*copy to MCM to handle - am*

As on previous occasions, I can be reached via my assistant, Mr. Michael Dravis, whose contact information is as follows:

0145 Tydings Hall  
Center for International Development  
and Conflict Management  
University of Maryland  
College Park, MD , 20742  
Telephone: (b)(6)

Sincerely, OSD 08577-04

*Amine Gemayel*

6 JUN 04



**FAX COVER SHEET**

**Date:** 7 June 2004

**To:** Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

**Recipient's Fax Number:** (b)(6)

**Recipient's Telephone Number:**

**Number of Pages:** 2 (including this cover sheet)

-----  
**From:** Amine Gemayel (through Michael Dravis)

**Sender's Telephone Number:** (b)(6)

**Message:**

**Original will follow via mail.**



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

June 8, 2004

His Excellency Amine Gemayel  
c/o Mr. Michael Dravis  
0145 Tydings Hall  
Center for International Development  
and Conflict Management  
University of Maryland  
College Park, MD 20742

Dear Amine:

Thanks so much for your note concerning the passing of  
President Ronald Reagan.

I have asked my staff to try to find a way to have you  
included in the service on Friday. We will be back in touch  
with you to let you know whether or not we have been  
successful.

With my best personal regards,

Sincerely,

OS5 08577-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41871

203


8 JUN 04

6 JUN 04

June 8, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Military Confirmations

We have a serious problem with military confirmations.

I am told that we have some 20 military nominations pending in the White House and the Senate. We have to get them to the President for signature and up to the Senate, so we can get hearings. We are going to end up having senior officers revert to lower ranks, and having to put three-stars into four-star jobs. We have a problem with General Casey, who we need to get to Iraq in close proximity to Ambassador Negroponte. Vern Clark may not get confirmed by the date his current term expires.

I would appreciate it if you could figure out what the delays are and help get the nominations in to the President. If there are any questions, please call me and I will try to be helpful.

I am going to work the Hill at the same way to see if we can talk Senator Warner into scheduling hearings and getting on with it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
060804-22

210 (384)

25 m 04

OSD 08591-04



June 8, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. Rumsfeld*  
SUBJECT: Thoughts on Iraq

Attached are some remarks on the subject of Iraq that I dictated the other day. I don't know whether or how I might use them, but I felt better after dictating them.

Respectfully,

Attach.  
6/7/04 "Some Thoughts on Iraq"

DHR:dh  
060804 16

*Iraq*

*8 Jun 04*

OSD 08593-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41873



June 7, 2004

SUBJECT: Some thoughts on Iraq and how to think about it

Military commanders and other visitors to Iraq have confidence and conviction about the progress being made and what they see as the solid prospects for success. But, television and press reports in the United States and in much of the world generally focus on the problems and the difficulties, creating pessimism and even despair. And it is the media that is shaping public opinion here and across the globe.

It is fair to ask: Which of the two widely differing perspectives is correct, or more correct, and, therefore, which view ought to be shaping U.S. policy and world thinking on this important matter?

One reason for the disparity in perspectives may be the standard that one measures progress against. The dedicated volunteer soldiers engaged in the struggle against extremists are on the front lines. They see first-hand the extremists trying to hijack a religion from the majority of moderate Muslims. They see the terrorist insurgency that the Iraqi people face. They see, first-hand, ground truth. Further, they seem to understand that war has never been tidy, orderly or predictable.

Our troops recognize that conflicts have always been difficult, that people get killed and wounded. They see the Iraqis who courageously step forward and become targets of assassins. They know that the purpose of terrorism is to terrorize, to frighten and to alter behavior – and it works. There have always been those who, when terrorized, change course and seek to appease the terrorists. It has been so throughout history. So, those brave souls on the front line of this

11-L-0559/OSD/41874

struggle see the conflict for what it is, and their expectations tend to be realistic. Their perspectives are rooted in an understanding of history and their own personal experiences.

Conversely, those removed from the battle, who receive their information from the media, tend to see it differently. Their perspectives are shaped by those who seem to compare the many difficulties and challenges, not against history or personal experience, but against a false standard of countries that have already succeeded in their struggles for freedom, countries that today enjoy relative tranquility. The media report events in Iraq that are not tranquil and, in many cases, are ugly. So, our publics risk falling prey to the argument that all is lost, that the terrorists are sure to win, and that what is being done is imperfect, or wrong, or misguided, or even malevolent.

The more correct perspective, I believe, is to look to history, to consider the struggles that have taken place over the decades and the experiences of countries that have made that difficult and dangerous journey from dictatorship to civil societies. Only by considering history can one fully appreciate that the path to freedom has always been difficult, dangerous, and marked by ugliness. So, to measure the Coalition's progress against countries that have successfully achieved their freedom misses the point.

What is taking place in Iraq is not unusual. The Iraqi people are on a tough road, a road filled with lethal dangers. But, as tough as it is, it is the right road. It is a road that has been successfully, if perilously, traveled by a number of countries over the decades. So, despite understandable concerns, it can be done. It has been done. Our own country went through tough periods, surviving demonstrations, riots, battles, deaths – but we made it. We succeeded because the American people were steadfast and courageous and did not listen to counsels of despair.

Many contended that Japan, Germany and Italy could not successfully move from fascism to civil societies. But, although it was not easy, they made it. In each case, it was hard. It took time. But they succeeded, to the benefit of the civilized world.

For a people to achieve great things requires that they be purposeful and steadfast. They must have a concentration span of something greater than a 30-second sound bite. They need to appreciate why Thomas Jefferson said of the path to democracy, "One ought not to expect to be transported on a featherbed."

What is taking place in Iraq is hard, to be sure. It is far from perfect and certainly not predictable. But it should not be expected to be perfect or predictable. But is it failing? No. Is there a good chance it will succeed? You bet. One thing is certain. U.S. and Coalition forces cannot be defeated on the battlefield in Iraq. Coalition nations will suffer casualties, as they are, but they cannot be defeated. The only way this noble cause can be lost is if people become falsely persuaded that the struggle cannot be won or that winning it is not worth the cost.

Those who seek the truth should challenge any who would measure progress in Iraq against unrealistic expectations. Ask: When in history it has ever been easy or predictable? When has a country gone from a repressive dictatorship to a peaceful, stable, constitutional, civil society without difficulties or loss of life – "on a featherbed"? Why should Iraq be measured against an unrealistic standard?

What is taking place is tough. It is uncertain. It is dangerous. It is ugly. It is requiring the sacrifice of fine young men and women – each a volunteer – and may God bless them all. But the very least they deserve is a totally honest assessment by their countrymen of what it is they are doing. The least they deserve is an accurate, truthful recognition of the progress that has been and is being achieved in Iraq, as well as in Afghanistan – the hospitals built, the clinics

opened, the schools staffed and provided new textbooks and the economic progress. And the least the Iraqi people deserve is an appreciation of the courage they have demonstrated – by their security forces and by the hundreds of Iraqis who have stepped up to become governors, city council members and police chiefs, at risk to their lives.

The test of wills we face – and it is a test of wills, let there be no doubt – calls for balance and historical perspective. The American people deserve that. They deserve it from the media that benefits from the constitutional protections, and, with those protections, has a responsibility to be fair, honest, and accountable.

The Iraqi people want their freedom, their security and the opportunities that will flow from them. More than 80 percent of the Iraqi people say they want Iraq to be whole. They are opposed to a breakup of the country. We know, despite terrorist attacks, assassinations, and disruptions to services, and despite the fact that terrorists and extremists kill innocent Iraqi citizens by the dozens each week – and have killed some 400 Iraqi security forces – that 70 percent of Iraqis say that getting rid of Saddam Hussein was worth the hardships they face today. Over 90 percent of Iraqi Kurds and 80 percent of Shia agree. Even among the minority Arab Sunnis, many of whom governed the country under Saddam Hussein, the figure is only slightly below 50 percent. So the Iraqi people understand that their lives are better today, despite the drumbeat to the contrary.

It is instructive to ask: What might be the alternatives to the course we are on for the 25 million recently liberated Iraqis, for that troubled region, and for the United States? What alternatives do those who criticize and contend that all that is lost suggest? Some say leave. What if the coalition were to leave? The possibilities are not attractive. They include:

- A failed state, anarchy, with terrorists taking over and creating a safe haven to attack the United States and other civil societies.

- A civil war and ethnic cleansing, filling up still more of Saddam's mass grave sites.
- Takeover by a neighboring country and radical clerics.
- A split up of Iraq into several parts, or
- A new Saddam Hussein could take control and re-impose a vicious dictatorship.

Which of those options would any argue would be better than the goal of Iraq as a single country, at peace with its neighbors, not trafficking with terrorists and respectful of women and all ethnic, religious and minority groups within their borders?

We are on the right course. The difficulties we face are understandable, given the history of countries that have navigated through these difficult seas. There is no better alternative for the Iraqi people, for the region, for the United States or for the world.

I repeat: there is no way this struggle can be lost on the ground in Iraq. It can only be lost if people come to the conclusion that it cannot be done. This struggle is being waged during an era of 24-hour news, seven days a week – for the first time in history. And it is being waged during a Presidential election year, when there seems to be a suspension of civil discourse. So, we are in for a rough period of months. But, when we are successful, it will be a fresh 21<sup>st</sup> century demonstration of the good center of gravity of the American people, and their common sense ability to separate fact from fiction and perseverance from paralysis.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

JUN 9 2004

The Honorable Alan Greenspan  
Chairman, Board of Governors  
Federal Reserve System  
20th Street and Constitution Ave., NW  
Washington, DC 20551

Iraq

Dear Alan,

Enclosed are some remarks I dictated on Iraq.

If you have any thoughts, please let me know. I don't know what I will do with them, but I am thinking of doing something.

Best regards,

Enclosure

9 Jun 04

OSD 08600-04

June 7, 2004

SUBJECT: Some thoughts on Iraq and how to think about it

Military commanders and other visitors to Iraq have confidence and conviction about the progress being made and what they see as the solid prospects for success. But, television and press reports in the United States and in much of the world generally focus on the problems and the difficulties, creating pessimism and even despair. And it is the media that is shaping public opinion here and across the globe.

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11-L-0559/OSD/41880

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Conversely, those removed from the battle, who receive their information from the media, tend to see it differently. Their perspectives are shaped by those who seem to compare the many difficulties and challenges, not against history or personal experience, but against a false standard of countries that have already succeeded in their struggles for freedom, countries that today enjoy relative tranquility. The media report events in Iraq that are not tranquil and, in many cases, are ugly. So, our publics risk falling prey to the argument that all is lost, that the terrorists are sure to win, and that what is being done is imperfect, or wrong, or misguided, or even malevolent.

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DHR:dh  
Current MFRs/Thoughts on Iraq

6/12  
1300

no

File

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June 24, 2004

I-04/00865-3  
EF-9989

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Ray DuBois

J 8/17

383.6

SUBJECT: Policy on Images

Attached is a problem. It looks as though we do not have a uniform, Department-wide policy on photographing, filming and videotaping in prisons.

Please come back to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

Attach.

2450004

DHR:dh  
062304-12

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

TO SecDef

Paul Butler  
8/17  
8/17

Sir,

Response attached

10/8/18

4/8  
CO 73  
8/17

24MAY04

OSD 08603-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41885

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GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

May 24, 2004/4 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

*WJ Haynes*  
6/10/04

SUBJECT: Photographs in DoD Detention and Confinement Facilities

- In all DoD detention facilities, photographing/filming/video taping of individual detainees for other than internal facility administration or intelligence purposes is strictly prohibited by a joint service regulation (Tab A). The rule is specific, clear and applicable to all persons including guards.

- As a general rule, the taking of unofficial photographs of confinees at DoD confinement facilities is not authorized (Tab B). DoD confinement facilities primarily house military personnel who have been convicted at courts-martial and sentenced to confinement.

- This general rule regarding confinement facilities is written in the context of photographs by civilian visitors, including the media. No rule expressly addresses unofficial photographs by guards. I understand, however, that the "no unofficial photographs" rule is applied to guards in practice.

- The two primary reasons for the rule at both facilities are the same: security of the facility and protection of the detainees/confinees from humiliation and public curiosity.

COORDINATION: None.

ATTACHMENTS:  
as stated

Prepared by: Jim Schwenk/DoDOGC (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/41886

OSD 08603-04

Army Regulation 190-8  
OPNAVINST 3461.6  
AFJI 31-304  
MCO 3461.1

Military Police

# **Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees**

Headquarters  
Departments of the Army,  
the Navy, the Air Force,  
and the Marine Corps  
Washington, DC  
1 October 1997

**U  
NCLASSIFIED**

11-L-0559/OSD/41887

Headquarters  
Departments of the Army,  
the Navy, the Air Force,  
and the Marine Corps  
Washington, DC  
1 October 1997

\*Army Regulation 190-8  
\*OPNAVINST 3461.6  
\*AFJI 31-304  
\*MCO 3461.1

Effective 1 November 1997


## Military Police

# Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees

By Order of the Secretary of  
the Navy:

By Order of the Secretary of  
the Air Force


By Order of the Secretary of  
the Navy




TOGO D. WEST, JR.  
Secretary of the Army

J.L. JOHNSON  
Admiral, United States Navy  
Chief of Naval Operations  
Acting

RICHARDA COLEMAN  
Colonel, USAF  
Chief of Security Police



GENERAL J.L. JONES USMC  
Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff  
for Plans, Policies and Operations



J.S. Mobley  
Rear Admiral, United States Navy  
Director, Navy Staff

**History.** This printing publishes a revision of this publication. Because the publication has been extensively revised the changed portions have not been highlighted.

**Summary.** This regulation implements Department Of Defense Directive 2310.1 and establishes policies and planning guidance for the treatment, care, accountability, legal status, and administrative procedures for Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, Retained Persons, and Other Detainees. This regulation is a consolidation of Army Regulation 190-8 and Army Regulation 190-57 and incorporates SECNAV Instruction 3461.3 and Air Force Joint Instruction 31-304. Policy and procedures established herein apply to the services and their capabilities to the extent that they are resourced and organized for enemy prisoner of war operations.

**Applicability.** This is a multi-service regulation. It applies to the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps and to their Reserve components when lawfully ordered to active duty under the provisions of Title 10 United States Code.

**Proponent and exception authority.** The proponent of this regulation is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. The proponent has the authority to approve

exceptions to this regulation that are consistent with controlling law and regulation. Proponents may delegate the approval authority, in writing, to a division chief within the proponent agency in the grade of colonel or the civilian equivalent.

**Army management control process.** The Regulation contains management control provisions in accordance with AR 11-2, but does not contain checklists for conducting management control. Reviews are used to accomplish assessment of management controls.

**Supplementation.** Army supplementation of this regulation and establishment of command or local forms is prohibited without prior approval from HQDA (DAMO-ODL), WASH DC 20310. Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force supplementation of this regulation is authorized, but is not required. If supplements are issued, major or second echelon commands will furnish one copy of each supplement to their headquarters, as follows: Navy, to the Chief of Naval Operations (N511), 2000 Navy Pentagon, Washington DC 20350-2000, Marine Corps, to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, HQ USMC (POS-10) 2 Navy Annex, Washington DC, 20380-1775 11), and Air Force, to HQ USAF/SPO,

1340 Air Force Pentagon, Washington, DC 20330-1340.

**Suggested Improvements.** Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements through channels as follows: HQDA (DAMO-ODL), WASH DC 20310-0440.

**Distribution.** *Army:* Distribution of this regulation is made in accordance with initial distribution number (IDN) 092120, intended for command levels A, B, C, D, and E for Active Army, Army National Guard, U. S. Army Reserve.

*Navy:* SNDL A (Navy Department); B5 (Coast Guard); (COMDTCOGARD, only) 21A (Fleet Commanders in Chief); 22A (Fleet Commanders); 23 (Force Commanders); 24 (Type Commanders); 26A (Amphibious Groups); 28 (Squadron, Division, and Group Commanders—Ships); 41A (COM-SC); SECNAV/OPNAV Directives Control Office, Washington Navy Yard Bldg 200, 901 M Street SE, Washington DC 20374-5074  
*Air Force:* F

*Marine Corps:* PCN 10203324000

\*This regulation supersedes AR 190-8, 1 June 1982, and rescinds AR 190-57, 4 March 1987. This regulation also rescinds DA Form 5451-R, August 1985; DA Form 5452-R, August 1985; and DA Form 5976, January 1991.

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/41888

medical annex of OPLANs, OPORDs and contingency plans includes procedures for treatment of EPW, CI, RP, and ODs. Medical support will specifically include:

(a) First aid and all sanitary aspects of food service including provisions for potable water, pest management, and entomological support.

(b) Preventive medicine.

(c) Professional medical services and medical supply.

(d) Reviewing, recommending, and coordinating the use and assignment of medically trained EPW, CI, RP and OD personnel and medical material.

(e) Establishing policy for medical repatriation of EPW, CI and RP and monitoring the actions of the Mixed Medical Commission.

h. U. S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC). USACIDC will provide criminal investigative support to EPW, CI and RP Camp Commanders per AR 195-2.

### 1-5. General protection policy

a. U.S. policy, relative to the treatment of EPW, CI and RP in the custody of the U.S. Armed Forces, is as follows:

(1) All persons captured, detained, interned, or otherwise held in U.S. Armed Forces custody during the course of conflict will be given humanitarian care and treatment from the moment they fall into the hands of U.S. forces until final release or repatriation.

(2) All persons taken into custody by U.S. forces will be provided with the protections of the GPW until some other legal status is determined by competent authority.

(3) The punishment of EPW, CI and RP known to have, or suspected of having, committed serious offenses will be administered IAW due process of law and under legally constituted authority per the GPW, GC, the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Manual for Courts Martial.

(4) The inhumane treatment of EPW, CI, RP is prohibited and is not justified by the stress of combat or with deep provocation. Inhumane treatment is a serious and punishable violation under international law and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

b. All prisoners will receive humane treatment without regard to race, nationality, religion, political opinion, sex, or other criteria. The following acts are prohibited: murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation, the taking of hostages, sensory deprivation, collective punishments, execution without trial by proper authority, and all cruel and degrading treatment.

c. All persons will be respected as human beings. They will be protected against all acts of violence to include rape, forced prostitution, assault and theft, insults, public curiosity, bodily injury, and reprisals of any kind. They will not be subjected to medical or scientific experiments. This list is not exclusive. EPW/RP are to be protected from all threats or acts of violence.

d. Photographing, filming, and video taping of individual EPW, CI and RP for other than internal Internment Facility administration or intelligence/counterintelligence purposes is strictly prohibited. No group, wide area or aerial photographs of EPW, CI and RP or facilities will be taken unless approved by the senior Military Police officer in the Internment Facility commander's chain of command.

e. A neutral state or an international humanitarian organization, such as the ICRC, may be designated by the U.S. Government as a Protecting Power (PP) to monitor whether protected persons are receiving humane treatment as required by the Geneva Conventions. The text of the Geneva Convention, its annexes, and any special agreements, will be posted in each camp in the language of the EPW, CI and RP.

f. Medical Personnel. Retained medical personnel shall receive as a minimum the benefits and protection given to EPW and shall also be granted all facilities necessary to provide for the medical care of EPW. They shall continue to exercise their medical functions for the benefit of EPW, preferably those belonging to the armed forces upon which they depend, within the scope of the military laws and regulations of the United States Armed Forces. They shall be provided with necessary transport and allowed to periodically visit EPW situated in working detachments or in hospitals outside the

EPW camp. Although subject to the internal discipline of the camp in which they are retained such personnel may not be compelled to carry out any work other than that concerned with their medical duties. The senior medical officer shall be responsible to the camp military authorities for everything connected with the activities of retained medical personnel.

g. Religion.

(1) EPW, and RP will enjoy latitude in the exercise of their religious practices, including attendance at the service of their faith, on condition that they comply with the disciplinary routine prescribed by the military authorities. Adequate space will be provided where religious services may be held.

(2) Military chaplains who fall into the hands of the U.S. and who remain or are retained to assist EPW, and RP, will be allowed to minister to EPW, RP, of the same religion. Chaplains will be allocated among various camps and labor detachments containing EPW, RP, belonging to the same forces, speaking the same language, or practicing the same religion. They will enjoy the necessary facilities, including the means of transport provided in the Geneva Convention, for visiting the EPW, RP, outside their camp. They will be free to correspond, subject to censorship, on matters concerning their religious duties with the ecclesiastical authorities in the country of detention and with international religious organizations. Chaplains shall not be compelled to carry out any work other than their religious duties.

(3) Enemy Prisoners of War, who are ministers of religion, without having officiated as chaplains to their own forces, will be at liberty, whatever their denomination, to minister freely to the members of their faith in U.S. custody. For this purpose, they will receive the same treatment as the chaplains retained by the United States. They are not to be obligated to do any additional work.

(4) If EPW, RP, do not have the assistance of a chaplain or a minister of their faith. A minister belonging to the prisoner's denomination, or in a minister's absence, a qualified layman, will be appointed, at the request of the prisoners, to fill this office. This appointment, subject to approval of the camp commander, will take place with agreement from the religious community of prisoners concerned and, wherever necessary, with approval of the local religious authorities of the same faith. The appointed person will comply with all regulations established by the United States.

### 1-6. Tribunals

a. In accordance with Article 5, GPW, if any doubt arises as to whether a person, having committed a belligerent act and been taken into custody by the US Armed Forces, belongs to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, GPW, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.

b. A competent tribunal shall determine the status of any person not appearing to be entitled to prisoner of war status who has committed a belligerent act or has engaged in hostile activities in aid of enemy armed forces, and who asserts that he or she is entitled to treatment as a prisoner of war, or concerning whom any doubt of a like nature exists.

c. A competent tribunal shall be composed of three commissioned officers, one of whom must be of a field grade. The senior officer shall serve as President of the Tribunal. Another non-voting officer, preferably an officer in the Judge Advocate General Corps, shall serve as the recorder.

d. The convening authority shall be a commander exercising general courts-martial convening authority.

e. Procedures.

(1) Members of the Tribunal and the recorder shall be sworn. The recorder shall be sworn first by the President of the Tribunal. The recorder will then administer the oath to all voting members of the Tribunal to include the President.

(2) A written record shall be made of proceedings.

(3) Proceedings shall be open except for deliberation and voting by the members and testimony or other matters which would compromise security if held in the open.



## Schwenk, James, Mr, DoD OGC

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**From:** Strong, Steven, T., COL, OSD-P&R  
**Sent:** Monday, May 24, 2004 08:06  
**To:** Schwenk, James, Mr, DoD OGC  
**Subject:** AR 190-47, The Army Corrections System, April 5, 2004

Jim:

Here is what the Army corrections reg has to say about photographing prisoners and facilities. The paragraph heading pertains to public access, but the wording of subparagraphs 10-12a and b is not limited to the public, and their rationale would apply to correctional staff as well.

Steve

### **10-12. Public access to facilities**

Access by the public to ACS facilities should be limited to authorized tours and visits. Care should be taken to avoid criticism on grounds of defamation, embarrassment, and mental anguish to prisoners confined within the facility resulting from visit and tour policies.

**a. Photographing prisoners.** Prisoners will not be photographed, except in support of medical documentation and for official identification purposes. Photography that does not reveal the identity of individual prisoners when undertaken for official purposes and that will not reflect adversely upon the Army may be authorized per paragraph 10-12b(1)(b), (c) and (d) below.

**b. Photographing facilities.** Photographing ACS facilities is not permitted unless authorized by the facility commander as an exception to policy when the stated purpose justifies such action. When photography is authorized, it will not include—

- (1) Areas where detailing fences, restraining walls, bars, locks, and other restraining devices are located.
- (2) Scenes including prisoners who are identifiable.
- (3) Scenes depicting prisoners under custodial control.
- (4) Use of irons or similar restraining devices.

**c. Prisoner communications with the news media.** Face-to-face and telephonic communications between military prisoners and members of the news media (print and broadcast) are not authorized. Written communications including those prepared by prisoners for publication on the internet, are permitted subject to the provisions of paragraphs 10-10 and 10-13d of this regulation.

#### **d. Release of material prepared by prisoners for publication.**

(1) Written material prepared by prisoners for publication, in whole or in part, in print or through the broadcast media, other than clearly identified expressions of personal opinion, must be submitted for review prior to release under the criteria contained in paragraph 10-11b of this regulation.

(2) In addition, such material may, as appropriate, be subject to national security and policy review under the provision of AR 360-1.

**e. Institutional publications.** MACOMs may approve establishment of institutional publications containing prisoner prepared articles when such publications are for use within a facility *only*.

## Schwenk, James, Mr, DoD OGC

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**From:** Strong, Steven, T., COL, OSD-P&R  
**Sent:** Monday, May 24, 2004 09:09  
**To:** Schwenk, James, Mr, DoD OGC  
**Subject:** SECNAVINST 1640.9B, Department of the Navy Corrections Manual, December 1996

Chapter 8, section 8301, paragraph 16

### 16. Official, Press and Civilian Visits

a. Requests ,for general visiting of the brig by groups or individuals shall be coordinated with the local PAO and in accordance with-"Chapter 18 of OPNAVINST 5510.1H, Navy Information Security Program (NOTAL) and SECNAVINST 5720.44A, Department of the Navy Public Affairs (pAO) policY and Regulations= Each request shall include a specific reason for the visit. The brig officer will g-ant or deny such requests based upon the brig's ability to maintain good order and discipline and availability of staff to supervise the visit. Official, press, and civilian visits shall normally be conducted within the brig's regular visitation schedule and shall strictly prohibit photographing or recording of names of prisoners.

b. Current DoD policy is that personal interviews and telephonic communications between prisoners and the media are not authorized.

**Schwenk, James, Mr, DoD OGC**

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**From:** Strong, Steven, T., COL, OSD-P&R  
**Sent:** Monday, May 24, 2004 08:51  
**To:** Schwenk, James, Mr, DoD OGC  
**Subject:** AFI31-205 7 APRIL 2004, The Air Force Corrections System

**Jim:**

**This is all there was in the Air Force reg.**

**Steve**

**5.11. Public Affairs.** Access by the public to AFCS facilities should be limited to authorized tours and visits. Care should be taken to avoid criticism, grounds of defamation, embarrassment and mental anguish to detainees/inmates confined within the facility resulting from visit and tour policies.

5.11.1. Videotaping and photographing detainees/inmates will not be permitted except in support of medical documentation, for official identification purposes, (i.e., criminal activities) or IAW AFI 35-101, *Public Affairs Policies and Procedures*. If the inmate consents to a photograph, the inmate must sign a consent statement.

5.11.2. Photographing an AFCS facility is not permitted unless authorized by the confinement officer or as **an** exception to policy when the stated purpose justifies such action. When photography is authorized, it will not include:

5.11.2.1. Areas where detaining fences, restraining walls, bars, locks and other restraining devices are located.

5.11.2.2. Scenes including inmates who are identifiable.

5.11.2.3. Scenes depicting detainees/inmates under custodial control.

5.11.2.4. Use of restraining devices.

5.11.3. All requests for media interviews (face-to-face, on camera or telephonic) with military detainees/inmates should be coordinated with public affairs and security forces personnel. Media interviews must be conducted without compromising security procedures established by the confinement/corrections facility. Authorize written communication subject to the provisions of paragraph **6.3.2**.

5.11.4. Written material prepared by detainees/inmates for publication must be submitted to the confinement officer or delegated representative for review prior to release. In addition, such material is subject to national security and policy review by Public Affairs under the provisions of AFI 35-101.

INFO MEMO

DEPSECDEF

AUG 10 2004

USD(P) *copy*

I-04/008653

EF 9989

*QA 8/18  
noted  
8/11/04*

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, PD Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *Ryan Henry*

SUBJECT: Policy on Images (U)

- (U) You requested a proposal regarding the use of photographic imagery in DoD prison facilities.
- (U) The Department has a clear and comprehensive policy regarding imagery taken by US soldiers or others at USG detention facilities so as to ensure compliance with our obligations under the Geneva Conventions and Department regulations or directives. (Tab B)
- (U) According to a current Joint Service Regulation, "Photographing, filming, and video taping of individuals for other than internment facility administration or intelligence/counterintelligence purposes is strictly prohibited." (Tab C).
- ~~(FOUO)~~ The General Counsel for the Department of Defense advised you on January 24, 2002, as to the legal requirements of executing our regulations with respect to detention and photography. (Tab D).
- ~~(FOUO)~~ The policies outlined in Mr. Haynes' memorandum have become our operating procedures at our detention facilities per your directive of March 29, 2003. (Tab E)
- (U) I do not believe that additional policy guidance is required, but, I have asked the DASD/Detainee Affairs to inquire through the Department Joint Detainee Coordinating Committee whether any gaps remain to be filled.

COORDINATION: Copies provided to the Office of General Counsel (OGC) and discussed with OGC (Ms. Diane Beaver) on August 5, 2004.

Attachment: As stated.

Prepared by: Bryan C. Del Monte, Detainee Affairs, (b)(6)

383.6  
10 Aug 04  
24 May 04

December 8, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Response to Editorial Pieces

383.6

Take a look at these two editorials (item 43 and 44), and please do something about them.

Thanks.

Attach.

"Tortured Principles." Boston Globe, December 6, 2004

"Tantamount to Distortion?" Washington *Times*, December 6, 2004

DHR:dh  
120804-5

.....  
Please respond by 12/16/04

8 Dec 04

OSD 08652-05

Harry

the military's employment practices are generally admirable -- with minorities, for example -- its "Don't ask, don't tell" policy, bars openly gay men and women from service.

Several groups -- including the Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights -- are challenging a 1995 law, called the Solomon Amendment, on behalf of university law schools. The law allows the federal government to stop funding to colleges and universities that deny or obstruct campus recruiting by the military. Billions of dollars are at stake because all federal funding to colleges and universities, not just law school funding, can be blocked. The court sided with the schools, saying the government can't stop funding because the military is booted out. The appeals court used the same rationale that the U.S. Supreme Court used in its 2000 decision allowing the Boy Scouts of America to exclude a gay scoutmaster. Just as the Boy Scouts believe that homosexual conduct and lifestyles are inconsistent with Scout values, so too, are U.S. military anti-gay policies inconsistent with the law schools' values, the FAIR lawyers argued. Thus, requiring schools to support discrimination by permitting military recruiters on campus is the same as requiring the Boy Scouts to accept a gay scoutmaster, they said.

What makes the universities' position difficult is that the use of federal funds in a carrot-and-stick approach to enforce good government policies -- usually those supportive of civil rights, inclusion of women and other worthwhile objectives -- has been a practical method of achieving beneficial societal goals. But the carrot-and-stick approach is just a tactic toward an end. It mustn't be confused with something as intrinsic to human decency as fair and equal treatment of all persons.

The former is a means to an end; the latter is the destination itself.

The Pentagon now must decide if it wants to accept the appeals court's decision, ask for a review by the full appellate court or ask the Supreme Court to hear the case. Whichever route the military chooses, our hope is that the ultimate outcome reinforces the basic principles of fairness and equality.

Boston Globe  
December 6, 2004

### 43. Tortured Principles

Years from now, the mistreatment of Afghan war detainees at Guantanamo and Iraqi war detainees at Abu Ghraib will likely rank with the internment of Japanese-American civilians in World War II as a violation of the nation's principles. But the Bush administration continues to stonewall criticism of its actions, whether it comes from US courts or the International Red Cross. Congress must act to steer the nation back toward compliance with the Geneva Conventions and US law.

In a confidential report to the administration based on visits to Guantanamo in June, the International Red Cross found that detainees had been subjected to psychological and physical forms of coercion that were severe enough to be "tantamount to torture." The report, parts of which were leaked to The New York Times last week, also charged US doctors and other medical personnel with providing interrogators with information about prisoners' health and vulnerabilities. Because of this, the report said, prisoners were reluctant to seek medical assistance.

Physicians for Human Rights, which has been calling on the Defense Department to set and enforce ethical guidelines for medical personnel at prison camps for months, said that "any involvement of health

professionals in the practices of torture and/or ill treatment, in any way, violates the international principles of medical ethics." The executive director of the group, Leonard Rubinstein, said the United Nations Principles of Medical Ethics rule out the activities alleged in the Red Cross report.

A court proceeding last week also demonstrated how the United States is turning its back on its own due process standards in its treatment of detainees. For decades, evidence obtained from defendants after torture has not been admissible in US courts. But on Thursday, a deputy associate attorney general told a federal judge that there was nothing to stop military officials at Guantanamo from using torture-induced statements in deciding whether a detainee should be held indefinitely as an enemy combatant.

In another case last month, a federal judge found that the procedures at Guantanamo for determining enemy combatant status do not comply with the Geneva Conventions and US law, which state that any battlefield detainee is presumed to be a prisoner of war until a "competent tribunal" puts him in the less protected status of enemy combatant.

Far from correcting policies that violate medical and legal standards, President Bush has nominated for attorney general his chief counsel, Alberto Gonzales, who in 2002 wrote a memo calling parts of the Geneva Conventions "quaint" and "obsolete." Congress should thoroughly investigate conditions at the detainee camps and, if necessary, pass laws to keep the administration's human rights violators in check.

Washington Times  
December 6, 2004  
Pg. 20

### 44. Tantamount To

### Distortion?

This page does not condone the use of torture for extracting information. A new report by the International Committee of the Red Cross alleging that detainees in Guantanamo Bay have been abused has a number of flaws. The Pentagon has refuted the report's claims of abuse.

According to a detailed memorandum on the ICRC report obtained by the New York Times, apparently from a U.S. government source, the ICRC has alleged that psychological and sometimes physical coercion used at Guantanamo was "tantamount to torture." That report was made after a Red Cross inspection team spent most of last June at the facility. The report said that coercion consisted of "humiliating acts, solitary confinements, temperature extremes, use of forced positions."

For starters, just what does tantamount to torture mean? While those practices do sound like they could elicit both physical and mental discomfort and duress, they do not appear to rise to the level of torture, or something tantamount to it.

Also, the ICRC's bases for its allegations of abuse are the reports of the detainees themselves, not any first-hand observation of the alleged abuse, said a Pentagon official. That fact calls into question the findings, for obvious reasons. The official maintains that claims of ongoing conflict between the Pentagon and ICRC are also false. "It actually is a pretty good relationship we have with the ICRC," he said. "They continue to make valuable comments and suggestions."

The ICRC, which is based in Geneva and is separate from the American Red Cross, defines itself as "an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them

with assistance." Also, it endeavors "to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles." Given that mission, the ICRC's credibility in alleging acts of torture, or anything related to torture, is critical. It must be careful to ensure the practices it complains about rise to that level.

It is difficult to believe, though, that some stress on detainees doesn't need to be exerted in order to produce intelligence.

The White House has repeatedly said it is upholding international law in its treatment of Guantanamo detainees. Without more concrete and substantiated evidence to the contrary, there seems little reason to pay the ICRC report much heed.

APR 20 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Air Traffic Control

You might ask Ray DuBois if he wants to think about talking to the air traffic controllers about the closeness of these airplanes to our front here.

It seems to me they are getting closer and closer. I don't know why. I thought they were supposed to fly out over the river. They are flying right over the top of our building.

Thanks.

DJR:dh  
041904-B

.....  
Please respond by 4/30/04

OSD 08773-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41897



April 30, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT Proximity of Aircraft

An airplane went by my window here at about 1444 on April 30. It was very close. You might want to check into it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
043004-15

.....  
Please respond by 5/7/04



ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

851  
2008 JUN 2 12 47

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

*Ray DuBois 6.9.04*

SUBJECT: Proximity of Air Traffic to the Pentagon

- In the attached snowflakes, you expressed concern regarding the proximity of air traffic to the Pentagon and requested that I look into the matter.
- I have been in contact with officials from the Federal Aviation Administration and the Washington Metropolitan Airports Authority, and they have disseminated a request throughout the Reagan National Airport (DCA) aviation community that includes the following:
  - "...all air crews arriving DCA for 'Landing Rwy 15' are encouraged to operate their aircraft at optimum decent profiles and whenever practicable avoid directly over flying the Pentagon (PNT) building. All Departures from 'Rwy 33' are also encouraged to avoid over flying the Pentagon building itself whenever practicable."
  - "Over flights of the Pentagon are not prohibited and not in violation of any FAA airspace course rules for operating at DCA according to the FAA. However, the Department of Defense has requested all air carriers and their flight crews avoid over flying the Pentagon building itself to the maximum extent possible."
- An aerial photograph of the Pentagon's proximity to the flight path of DCA Rwy 15/33 is attached at Tab A.


COORDINATION: None

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Jennifer S. Cole, (b)(6)



**DCA Rwy 15/33 Extended Centerline and PNT**



11-L-0559/OSD/41901

June 8, 2004

TO: Powell Moore

CC: Larry Di Rita  
Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Congressional Letter of Support

Please give me a piece of paper with the names of each of these Congressmen – I cannot read their handwriting.

Then draft a letter to each one of them from me, thanking each of them for that. Please give the draft letter to me so I can edit it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
5/13/04 Congressionaltr to POTUS

DHR:dh  
060804-27

.....

Please respond by 6/18/04

335 SD

8 Jun 04

The Honorable \_\_\_\_\_  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 205 15

Dear Representative \_\_\_\_\_

Thank you for the statement of support in the letter to the President signed by you and 42 of your colleagues. I appreciate your friendship and will redouble my effort to merit your confidence.

Sincerely,

Mike Rogers (AL)  
Duncan Hunter  
Jim Saxton  
Joe Wilson  
Eric Cantor  
Randy "Duke" Cunningham  
John Sullivan  
Sam **Johnson**  
Terry Everett  
Roy Blunt  
Edward Whitfield  
Tom Cole  
Devin Nunes  
Cass Ballenger  
Candace Miller  
Bob Beauprez  
Spencer Bachus  
Mario Diaz-Balart  
Joe Pitts  
Trent Franks  
Chris Chocola  
Peter King  
Tom Feeney  
Charles "Chip" Pickering, Jr.  
Jim Gibbons  
Steve King  
Mark Kennedy  
Jennifer Dunn  
Wally Herger  
Roscoe Bartlett  
William "Mac" Thornberry  
Scott McInnis  
J. Gresham Barrett  
Melissa Hart  
Jack Kingston  
Todd Tiahrt  
John Carter  
Tim Murphy  
John Doolittle  
Sam Graves  
Jim Ryan  
Clay Shaw

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, DC 20515**

May 13, 2004

The Honorable George W. Bush  
President  
United States of America  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing today to express our strong and unwavering support for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. He is serving with honor and distinction.

Since September 11, 2001, Secretary Rumsfeld has demonstrated exceptional leadership in service to you and our nation. He has led our nation's military through two wars, the continuing global war of terror, and a revolutionary period of transformation. He is doing a tremendous job at a tremendous task.

Mr. President, we strongly support your comments made on May 10, 2004 when you told Secretary Rumsfeld, "You're doing a superb job. You are a strong Secretary of Defense, and our nation owes you a debt of gratitude."

True leaders perform their best during the most difficult times. Secretary Rumsfeld is leading from the front with strength, honor, and candor. We continue to support him as he continues his job as our Secretary of Defense.

Thank you for your leadership and for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,



Mike D. Rogers  
Member of Congress



Duncan Hunter  
Member of Congress

11-L-0559/OSD/41905



J. Patton

Joe Wilson

Pic Lentz

"Duke" Langford

John Smith

Sam Johnson

Tony Ernst

Roy Hunt

Ed Whis.

Sam Cole

Domin Nunes

Case Dallenzer

Cardinal Miller

Bob Bump

Spencer Bolus

John Rife

John Rife

Paul Smith

John King

Tom Fennell

Ray Pidge

Jim Gibson

Steve King

Walter Kennedy

~~MLA~~

Frank Ann

Melvin Hart

Wally Hergen

~~Jack~~ Kingston

~~Robert~~

Todd Tichat

Mac Hays

John R Carter

~~Sam~~

Tim Murphy

John T. Drotz

Jim Ryan

[Signature]

Blayshaw

Melissa Hunt

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 JUN 11 AM 9:04

June 10, 2004 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake #060804-27

- You asked for a draft thank you letter (Tab 2) to send to each Member who signed the 13 May 04 letter to the President (Tab 4)
- You also asked to see the printed names of the Members (Tab 3)

335 SD

Attachments:

1. SECDEF Snowflake
2. Proposed Thank You Letter
3. List of Names
4. 13 May 04 Letter to the President

10 Jun 04 8 Jun 04

OSD 08785-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41910

TAB A

SECRET  
2004 MAY 19 9:35

May 20, 2004

777

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Jim Haynes  
Pete Geren  
Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Joint Doctrine on Detainees

There is an issue **arising** on doctrine on detainees. It seems to me that, given the fact of the nature of the war we are in, we need to **have** a Joint Doctrine on detainees.

Please come **up** with a **proposal** in the next seven days.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
052004-27

.....  
Please respond by 6/1/04

0 SD 08793-04

Tab A



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 JUN 11 AM 9:39

CM-1835-04  
10 June 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *JBM 6/10*

SUBJECT: Joint Doctrine on Detainees

- **Issue.** "There is an issue arising on doctrine on detainees. It seems to me that, given the fact of the nature of the war we are in, we need to have a Joint Doctrine on detainees. Please come up with a proposal in the next seven days." (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** The Joint Doctrine Development Community is aggressively working to establish doctrine for detainee and interrogation operations. Joint Publication 2-01.1, "Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations," introduces interrogation operations and should be approved this August. A first draft of a "stand alone" detainee operations joint publication will be developed immediately thereafter.
- **Discussion.** The attached (TAB B) provides information on development of joint doctrine for detainee and interrogation operations.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Brig Gen Jack Catton, USAF; Director, J-7: (b)(6)

OSD 08793-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41912

May 20, 2004

777

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Jim Haynes  
Pete Geren  
Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Joint Doctrine on Detainees

There is an issue arising on doctrine on detainees. It seems to me that, given the fact of the nature of the war we are in, we need to have a Joint Doctrine on detainees.

Please come up with a proposal in the next seven days.

Thanks

DHR:dh  
052004-27

.....  
Please respond by 6/1/04



INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: /SF-777/ Joint Doctrine on Detainees

1. Purpose. To provide information on doctrine for joint detainee and interrogation operations.

2. Key Points. The Joint Doctrine Development Community is currently establishing joint doctrine for detainee and interrogation operations.

- Detainee Operations

- The Air-Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center completed a manual on "Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (MTTP) on Detainee Operations in a Joint Theater." This manual, which is ready for signature, is on hold per an April 2004 request by the OSD General Counsel (pending Supreme Court decision on detainees).
- The Joint Staff intent is to convert the above MTTP publication into a "stand alone" unclassified joint publication. Notwithstanding the OSD GC hold, the existence of a mature MTTP draft suggests that the joint doctrine development timeline can be shortened; a first draft for Service and combatant command staffing could be developed by fall 2004. A final draft for CJCS signature would be ready by fall 2005.

- Interrogation Operations

- The revision of Joint Publication (JP) 2-01, "Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations" will introduce joint interrogation operations and should be approved in August 2004.
- The revision of JP 2-01.2, "Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Operations" is in the assessment stage. This classified revision will address human intelligence, counterintelligence and interrogation operations based on lessons learned from ongoing operations. The first draft should be out by August 2005, and the approved doctrine published by fall 2006.

JUN 14 2004

TO: RADM Michel Miller, WHMO

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Military Nominations

I have just reviewed the status of senior military nominations needing Senate confirmation. I am concerned by the number of nominations awaiting action at the White House, as well as in the Senate.

We have several key nominations in that queue at the White House that must get to the Senate for confirmation action this month. I would appreciate your personal efforts to get the nominations currently in the White House to the President for action.

I have attached a memo I sent to Andy Card on this subject, and a listing of nominations currently at the White House awaiting signature.

Thank you.

Attach.

**6/9/04** SecDef memo to Andy Card  
 Pending 3 & 4 Star Nominations as of Tuesday, June 8, 2004

DHR:dh  
 061004-1

210 (384)

14 Jun 04

OSD 08850-04

Copy

June 9, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Military Nominations

Andy—

We talked on the phone about our need to get the White House to sign off on our three- and four-star military nominations. Attached is the list of the nominations that are at the White House. I am told that the papers for some or all of them are physically with the President's party at Sea Island. It would be a big help if you could get them signed.

We need help! We have a war going on. The peacetime pace of 10 working days for White House processing gets multiplied when they go to the Senate. They are still operating on a peacetime schedule. The combination of the two means that we are consistently without a large number of senior military officers. Also, throughout the three-and-a-half-year period we have had 20 to 25 percent of the 48 Presidential appointees that require Senate confirmation vacant. It makes it tough to run this Department.

Thanks.

Attach.

Pending 3 & 4 Star Nominations as of Tuesday, June 8, 2004

DHR:dh  
060904-11

OSD 08728 04

11-L-0559/OSD/41916

## Pending 3 & 4 Star Nominations

as of

Tuesday, June 08, 2004

### NOMINATIONS AT WHITE HOUSE FOR POTUS SIGNATURE

Service	Name	Type of Nomination:	Arrival at White House
USMC	Cartwright	Cdr, US STRATCOM	5/21/2004
AF	Hester	Cdr, PACAF	5/21/2004
Navy	Keating	Cdr, NORTHCOM	5/21/2004
Navy	Morgan	Deputy Chief of Naval Operations	5/21/2004
Navy	Muntis	Cdr Submarine Force, US Atlantic Fleet and Cdr. Submarine Allied Cmd.	5/21/2004
Navy	Nathnian	Vice Chief of Naval Operations	5/21/2004
Army	Odiemo	Assistant to the CJCS	5/21/2004
USMC	Sattler	Cdr, I MEF	5/24/2004
Navy	Route	Inspector General, Department of the Navy	5/25/2004
AF	McNabb	0-9 to 0-9 Dir, Log. J-4, JS	5/27/2004
Army	Broadwater	Chief of Staff, US European Cmd	5/28/2004
Navy	LaFleur	Cdr, US Pacific Fleet	5/28/2004
Army	Casey	Cdr, Multi-National Forces-Iraq	6/2/2004
Army	Cody	Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army	6/2/2004
USMC	Conway	0-9 to 0-9 Dir of Ops, J-3, JS	6/2/2004
Army	Honore	CG, First US Army	6/3/2004
Army	Inge	Deputy Commander, U. S. Northern Command/Vice Commander, U. S. Element, North American Aerospace Defense Command	6/3/2004
AF	Schwartz	Director, Joint Staff	6/3/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/41917

720



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

SECRET  
2004 JUN 14 PM 1:35

HEALTH AFFAIRS

INFO MEMO

JUN 10 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*  
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Letter from Secretary Thompson on Afghanistan

- You asked me to respond to a recent letter you received from Health and Human Services Secretary Thompson regarding his experiences and observations about health issues in Afghanistan, and the on-going joint effort between Health and Human Services and Department of Defense to improve child and maternity health services (TAB A).
- Secretary Thompson referenced the Rabia Balkhi Hospital and a request from the Afghan Ministry of Health to have Health and Human Services take management of the hospital.
- As you recall, I have been facilitating regular meetings addressing maternal and child health issues in Afghanistan. These meetings bring together the relevant people on this issue from Health and Human Services, Department of Defense, Veterans Health Administration, and U.S. Agency for International Development. It also includes Dr. Peter Saleh, the senior advisor to the Afghan Ministry of Health, who works on the Afghanistan Reconstruction Group for Ambassador Khalilzad, and Marty Hoffman.
- The group met last week and addressed the issues raised by Secretary Thompson. Although preliminary, an innovative proposal emerged which may eventually involve an international foundation in responsibility for administration of the hospital.
- Progress is being made in facility refurbishment and clinical care, but all representatives agreed that effective management of Rabia Balkhi Hospital is a critical need. Dr. Saleh announced that the French have agreed to construct a new women's hospital in Kabul, which may eventually serve as a referral facility for Rabia Balkhi, Malalai, and Indira Ghandi Hospitals. Management of such a network of facilities will present even greater challenges.
- Representatives from Health and Human Services and the Veteran's Health Administration are putting together a proposal to address the need for effective hospital management. It will include cost estimates for a management program for

11-L-0559/OSD/41918

OSD 08841-04

0114741

Rabia Balkhi Hospital, and will be scalable to permit inclusion of Malalai and Indira Ghandi Hospitals in management improvements. Once completed and vetted with stakeholder agencies, Dr. Saleh will engage and brief the Minister of Health.

- Our inter-agency healthcare coordination group will meet again in six weeks to discuss the management improvement proposal and other progress in the Afghanistan healthcare sector reconstruction effort.
- It would be useful for you and Secretary Thompson to meet again in order to have you jointly place your support behind this solution. I would suggest the optimal time for your meeting to be after the proposal is completed, in six to eight weeks.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: CAPT Jack Smith, C&PP, (b)(6) PCDOCS 65790,661 12,66124

2:31 PM

TO: Bill Winkenwerder  
**CC:** Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: June 1, 2004  
SUBJECT: Attached,

Here is a **note** from Secretary Thompson. *Do you have any thoughts?*

*Thanks.*

DHR/szn  
060104.29

*Attach: 5/27/04 - Secy. Thompson ltr. to SD*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ *6 | 10 | 04*

11-L-0559/OSD/41920



THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20201

MAY 27 2004

*The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld*  
Secretary of Defense  
U.S. Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Last January, I provided you an update of the efforts and accomplishments of my Department of Health and Human Services in Afghanistan throughout last year. While in the past year we have made tremendous progress in improving the lives of Afghans, much still needs to be done. As you might know, I visited Afghanistan for the third time, and I would like to share with you some of my impressions from my trip.

Before that, I would like once again to express my appreciation to the Department of Defense for making my trip a possibility. Difficulties of air travel in the region made it impossible for me to fly by commercial air, and thus I relied on military transport provided by U.S. Central Command, for which I am very grateful. Throughout my travels, the pilots and ground personnel were of the highest caliber and true ambassadors of the American people.

The primary purpose of my visit was to follow up on letters from President George W. Bush to the heads of state of the six remaining countries that have endemic poliovirus transmission. We are nearing the end of a fifteen-year-long campaign to eradicate polio from the world, supported in large part by the U.S. Government, and I hope these last six countries can overcome the remaining obstacles and stamp out this disease that cripples and kills children primarily. In each of the countries I visited, I saw great enthusiasm and resolve to complete this task, from the highest levels of government on down. I also saw the power of the private sector, particularly Rotary International, with its hundreds of chapters around the world, in making this dream of global polio eradication a reality.

In Afghanistan, I had the opportunity to tour three different hospitals in Kabul, including Rabia Balkhi Women's Hospital, which has had the support of the Departments of Defense and Health and Human Services. In addition, I visited a maternity hospital supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development and a children's hospital supported by the Indian Government. While there are certainly limitations at these facilities in terms of infrastructure, staffing and supplies, they all are clearly providing a vital service to the people of Kabul.

As a result of my recent discussions with you, I am pleased to say we now have a new commitment from the Department of Defense to support some of the needed repairs at Rabia



Page 2- The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld

Balkhi Hospital. This is in addition to the several millions of dollars my Department will put into upgrading the training of the staff in modern women's health care.

Additionally, the Afghan Ministry of Public Health has asked my Department to consider taking on the management of Rabia Balkhi Hospital. If the Afghan health care sector is to achieve self-sufficiency, the country will need high-quality managerial talent. We are currently considering this request and have not yet responded formally to the Ministry, but my staff had fruitful discussions with the leadership of the Ministry during the World Health Assembly in Geneva this past week. Managing Rabia Balkhi would represent a substantial increase in our commitment to the facility and is outside the bounds of our limited resources. Nonetheless, we view this as an opportunity to cement some of the gains we have made by instituting a sustainable management at the hospital, indeed at all three maternity hospitals in Kabul, which can be replicated across the country. As you may know, we have had significant success in this particular area through our Indian Health Service, which has been able over the years to train Native American communities, many of whom live in very difficult conditions, to manage their own health care resources in a self-sufficient manner. We are fortunate in that the Native American community has expressed interest in contributing to our efforts in Afghanistan by assisting the Afghan people in this particular area. I am hoping to identify additional resources to make this initiative a reality.


We are making substantial progress in many needed areas of life in Afghanistan, but the ability of the Afghan people to perpetuate these improvements will depend on their ability to actively manage their scarce resources, whether financial or human, and to pass on and use knowledge and skills. This, in itself, will be a true test of our legacy in Afghanistan.

I look forward to a chance to discuss these developments further with you.

Sincerely,



Tommy G. Thompson



P.S. Thanks Don for  
all your help & support!  
Jimmy

Response to Health and Human Services Secretary Regarding Trip to Afghanistan

COORDINATION


**DASD, C&PP**

USD (P&R)

Dr. David Tornberg

Dr. David S.C. Chu

Concurred 6/6/04

  
David S.C. Chu  
11 June 04

2:31 PM

TO: Bill Winkenwerder

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 1, 2004

SUBJECT: Attached,

Here is a note from Secretary Thompson. Do you have any thoughts?

Thanks.

*Paul Butler*

*6/15*

*Afghanistan*

DHR/azn  
060104.39

Attach: 5/27/04 - Secy. Thompson ltr. to SD

Please respond by:

*6/10/04*

*DR 6/16*

*Sir,  
Response attached.  
w/CDR Nosenzo  
6/15*

*1 Jun 04*

*10 Jun 04*

05/28

THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20201

MAY 27 2004

Bill W

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
U.S. Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301

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(b)(6)

Page 2- The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld


Balkhi Hospital. This is in addition to the several millions of dollars my Department will put into upgrading the training of the staff in modern women's health care.


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We are making substantial progress in many needed areas of life in Afghanistan, but the ability of the Afghan people to perpetuate these improvements will depend on their ability to actively manage their scarce resources, whether financial or human, and to pass on and use knowledge and skills. This, in itself, will be a true test of our legacy in Afghanistan.

I look forward to a chance to discuss these developments further with you.

Sincerely,

  
Tommy G. Thompson





OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301

June 14, 2004 12:42 PM

Administration  
& Management

INFO MEMO

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: RAYMOND F. DuBOIS, DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT *Ray DuBois*

SUBJECT: Review of DoD Directives Status Report

- Of a total of 653 DoD Directives, **388** were identified for revision or cancellation. Tab A shows their current status.
- Of the 388 Directives, 43% either have been approved or are in formal staffing.
  - 167 have been submitted for cancellation or revision (123 for revision, 44 for cancellation).
  - Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz has approved 48 of the 167 directives submitted.
- The above numbers reflect *only* the Directives either complete or informal coordination.
  - For example, the attached status chart at Tab A indicates that USD(Policy) has only submitted two of its 51 Directives identified for revision. However, 19 additional Directives are drafted and in internal Policy coordination (Tab B). USD(AT&L) has submitted 29 of its 50 Directives for revision, with 16 of the remaining 21 currently in draft or internal coordination (Tab C). Progress also is evident in other components.
  - The same chart shows that DA&M has identified 45 Directives for revision, but 39 of these are Charter Directives, which require full and timely participation from Principal Staff Assistants and Components.
- Following the SecDef's February 13, 2004 memo expressing disappointment at the pace of this effort (Tab D), the weekly submission rate increased by over 60%.
- With regard to the OSD Review of Joint Staff Directives, a copy of Ryan Henry's April 8, 2004 memorandum to the Secretary is at Tab E.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: **Mr.** Dan Cragg, ES&CD,

(b)(6)

OSD 08856-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41927

**TAB**

**A**

**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES  
 PROGRESS REPORT  
 FOR WEEK ENDING  
6/4/04**

<b>COMPONENT</b>	<b>NUMBER OF DIRECTIVES</b>	<b>CERTIFIED CURRENT</b>	<b>REVISIONS</b>		<b>CANCELLATIONS</b>		<b>SIGNED</b>	
			Reported*	Submitted	Reported*	Submitted	Revisions	Cancellations
USD(AT&L)	113	38	50	29	25	22	10	5
USD(P)	64	11	51	2	2	0	0	0
USD(P&R)	193	103	79	41	11	5	13	3
USD(C)	15	9	6	5	0	0	0	0
USD(I)	58	8	45	8	5	3	0	2
ASD(NII)	40	19	12	5	9	8	1	3
ASD(PA)	14	11	3	3	0	0	0	0
ASD(LA)	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
DPA&E	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
IG, DoD	14	7	7	6	0	0	2	0
GC, DoD	36	19	16	9	1	0	4	0
DA&M	86	31	45**	7	10**	6	2	1
WHS/B&F	2	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
WHS/C&D	2	0	2	2	0	0	0	0
WHS/DPO	2	0	2	2	0	0	0	0
WHS/FOIA	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
WHS/FV	2	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
WHS/P&S	5	4	1	1	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTALS:</b>	<b>653</b>	<b>265</b>	<b>325</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>14</b>

\* Number identified by each Component in response to Mr. DuBois' memo of October 29,2003.

\*\* Of the 45 DA&M Directives identified for revision, 39 are charter Directives; 9 of the 10 cancellations are also charters. While DA&M is the agent for updating, coordinating, and maintaining these Directives, processing updates is a participatory endeavor and cannot be completed without full and timely input from the concerned PSAs and Component Heads.



**TAB**

**B**

**Proponent Responsibility: USD(P)**

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS	RESPONSE DATE	DATE RECEIVED IN D&RD	DATE OF NEW DIRECTIVE	NEXT REVIEW DATE
<b>SOLIC</b>											
U	2205.2	HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE (HCA) PROVIDED IN CONJUNCTION WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS	10/6/1994		X		SOLIC/HA&APL Policy estimated completion 6-8 wks, working w/DSCA. Per SOLIC about 60% completed, estimate 3 wks to finish revision and another 3-4 for final coordination. POC: Todd Harvey (b)(6)	11/21/2003			
	4500.51	DOD NON-TACTICAL ARMORED VEHICLE POLICY (U)	5/4/1987		X		SOLIC/AT Draft is 10% completed, working w/J34, estimated draft completion 15 Aug 04. Antiterrorism Standards (2000.16) must be completed before this directive can be updated. POC: COL Tension (b)(6)	11/21/2003			
U	5100.46	FOREIGN DISASTER RELIEF	12/4/1975		X		SOLIC/HA&APL Policy estimated completion 6-8 wks, working w/DSCA. Per SOLIC about 40% completed, estimate 4-5 wks to finish revision and another 3-4 wks for final coordination.	11/21/2003			

**PDUSD(P)**

U	2002.3	CLEARANCE OF RESEARCH AND STUDIES WITH FOREIGN AFFAIRS IMPLICATIONS	11/17/1997		X		PDUSDP/OM&S/MS&F (Ed Rader), Contacted Gwen Simpson @ State	11/21/2003			
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U	2040.2	INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS OF TECHNOLOGY, GOODS, SERVICES, AND MUNITIONS	7/5/1985		X		ISP/TSP&CP/D TSA per Chester under revision				
U	2060.2	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERPROLIFERATION (CP) IMPLEMENTATION	8/8/1972		X		ISP/TSP&CP under revision	11/21/2003			
U	3100.1	SPACE POLICY	7/9/1999		X		ISP/FP COL TROTTER on HOLD pending issuance of NSPD in 2005				
U	3230.3	DOD SUPPORT FOR COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH ACTIVITIES	3/7/1988		X		ISP/FP COL TROTTER on HOLD pending issuance of NSPD in 2005				
U	5230.20	VISITS, ASSIGNMENTS, AND EXCHANGES OF FOREIGN NATIONALS	11/18/1983		X		ISP/TSP&CP - Pete Batten (b)(6) under revision	11/21/2003			
U	6205.3	DOD IMMUNIZATION PROGRAM FOR BIOLOGICAL WARFARE DEFENSE			X		ISP/TSP&CPP under revision	11/21/2003			

U	3020.38	ASSIGNMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (NSEP) RESPONSIBILITIES TO DOD COMPONENTS	1/15/1993		X		ND- under revision, POC: Donna Reuss/Chuck Adams (b)(6)	11/21/2003			
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**Proponent Responsibility: USD(P)**

**Proponent Responsibility: USD(P)**

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT		CANCEL	REMARKS	RESPONSE DATE	DATE RECEIVED IN O&RD	DATE OF NEW DIRECTIVE	NEXT REVIEW DATE
U	3025.1	MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES (MSCA)	2/4/1994			X	Per Walter Washahaugh, directive will be incorporated into the new Defense Support of Civil Authorities directive.	11/21/2003			
U	3025.12	MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR CIVIL DISTURBANCES (MACDIS)	2/18/1997			X	Per Walter Washabaugh, directive will be included in the new Defense Support of Civil Authorities directive.	11/21/2003			
U	3025.15	MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES	7/9/1999			X	Per Walter Washabaugh, directive will be included in the new Defense Support of Civil Authorities directive.	11/21/2003			
U	5030.46	ASSISTANCE TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT IN COMBATING CRIME	4/13/1972			X	Per HD, will be included in the new Defense Support of Civil Authorities combatting crime directive.	11/21/2003			
U	5030.50	EMPLOYMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICES	12/4/1975			X	Per HD, will be included in the new Defense Support of Civil Authorities support of US Postal Services.	11/21/2003			
[REDACTED SECTION]											
U	2140.5	DEFENSE INSTITUTE OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT (DISAM)	6/2/1993			X	ISA/DSCA under revision 3d Qtr. POC: Freda Lodge (b)(6)	11/21/2003			
	2310.1	DOD PROGRAMS FOR ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR (POW) AND OTHER DETAINEES (SHORT TITLE, DOD ENEMY POW DETAINEE PROGRAM)	8/18/1994			X	ISA/DPMO POC: LTC Dan Shea (b)(6) under revision				
U	5410.17	INFORMATIONAL PROGRAM FOR FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINEES IN THE UNITED STATES	11/26/1993			X	ISA/DSCA - Forwarded to LTG Waiters to sign coordination sheet. Should be completed 3d Qtr 04 POC: Dawn Burke (b)(6)	11/21/2003			

**Proponent Responsibility: USD(P)**

11-L-0559/OSD/41932

**TAB**

**C**

**Proponent Responsibility:USD(AT&L)**

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS	RESPONSE DATE	DATE RECEIVED IN D&RD	DATE OF NEW DIRECTIVE	NEXT REVIEW DATE
U	1315.6	RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MILITARY TROOP CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE OVERSEAS	8/26/1978		X		FORMALLY COORDINATED	12/1/2003			
U	2010.5	DOD PARTICIPATION IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM	6/24/1992 6/24/1992		X		REDRAFTED	11/24/2003			
U	3201.1	MANAGEMENT OF DOD RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT LABORATORIES	3/9/1981 3/9/1981		X		REDRAFTED	12/1/2003			
U	3204.1	INDEPENDENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (IR&D) AND BID AND PROPOSAL (B&P) PROGRAM	5/10/1999		X		REDRAFTED	12/1/2003			
U	3222.4	ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) AND COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE (C2W) COUNTERMEASURES	1/28/1994		X		REDRAFTED	11/24/2003			
U	3224.3	PHYSICAL SECURITY EQUIPMENT (PSE); ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, EVALUATION, PRODUCTION, PROCUREMENT, DEPLOYMENT, AND SUPPORT	2/17/1988		X		REDRAFTED	12/1/2003			
U	4100.15	COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PROGRAM	3/10/1989		X		REDRAFTED	11/24/2003			
U	4120.1.1	STANDARDIZATION OF MOBILE ELECTRIC POWER (MEP) GENERATING SOURCES	7/9/1993		X		REDRAFTED	12/8/2003			
U	4120.15	DESIGNATING AND NAMING MILITARY AEROSPACE VEHICLES	3/2/1982 5/2/1985		X		REDRAFTED	12/8/2003			
U	4270.5	MILITARY CONSTRUCTION RESPONSIBILITIES	3/2/1982		X		REDRAFTED	11/24/2003			
U	4510.11	DOD TRANSPORTATION ENGINEERING	10/2/1995 10/2/1995		X		REDRAFTED	11/21/2003			
U	4525.6	SINGLE MANAGER FOR MILITARY POSTAL SERVICE	5/5/1980		X		INFORMALLY COORDINATED	11/21/2003			
U	4700.3	MINERAL EXPLORATION AND EXTRACTION ON DOD LANDS	9/28/1988		X		INFORMALLY COORDINATED	12/8/2003			
U	4715.1	ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY	2/24/1996		X		REDRAFTED	11/24/2003			

**Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)**

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS	RESPONSE DATE	DATE RECEIVED IN DERD	DATE OF NEW DIRECTIVE	NEXT REVIEW DATE
U	5000.52	DEFENSE ACQUISITION EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND CAREER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM	10/25/1991		X		REDRAFTED	11/24/2003			
U	5134.5	DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY BOARD (DTB)	10/28/1992		X		REDRAFTED	12/8/2003			

**Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)**

11-L-0559/OSD/41935

**TAB**

**D**



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

FEB 13 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

SUBJECT: Review of DoD Directives

More than two months ago the Director, Administration and Management responded to concerns I have about the currency of DoD Directives and asked each of you to review those under your purview. You identified 384 Directives that you intend to revise or cancel. I expect these actions to be completed by April 1, 2004. I understand that, to date very few revisions or cancellations have been prepared.

Our policy directives must be kept updated to reflect our approach to meeting the ever changing national security environment or they are simply of no use. Therefore, I expect you to personally review all of the directives you earmarked for revision or cancellation and ensure those proposed updates be coordinated expeditiously.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "R. M. ...".



OSD 01776-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41937



**TAB**

**E**

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~


## INFO MEMO

DepSecDef \_\_\_\_\_

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1-04/002818

EF-8656

FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy  APR 8 2004

SUBJECT: OSD Review of Joint Staff Directives

- This responds to your question about the desirability of an OSD review of Joint Staff Directives.
- The Chairman transmits policy, procedures and guidance through CJCS instructions, manuals, notices, guides, handbooks, and pamphlets. Although not currently required by DoD Directive, a recent Joint Staff data call indicated that about two-thirds of these documents were coordinated with OSD prior to publication.
- As the Chairman mentioned to you, there is an ongoing effort to update CJCS publications, analogous to the OSD endeavor. Along those lines, Joint Doctrine Publications are staffed with OSD at the action officer level during the update process.
- There is a broad effort underway to update JCS and OSD instructions to reflect the post-9/11 environment and the transformation vision as it applies to existing capabilities.
- CJCS publications that apply to the Services, combatant commands, and Defense agencies are required to be formally coordinated with those organizations during update/revision.
- I believe that the formal and informal staff coordination that occurs throughout the review process provides requisite OSD visibility and oversight over Joint Staff publications.

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Pam Mirelson, WHS/Executive Services and Directives, (b)(6)  
Steven Netishen, OPDUSD(P), (b)(6)~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Policy Info Memo Template

In reply refer to EF-8656 & 04/002818-ES

4:05 AM

**TO:** Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

**DATE** February 24, 2004

**SUBJECT:** Directives

**Attached** is a memo I sent to Dick Myers and his response.

I wonder if we ought to think about having OSD review the Joint Staff Directives.  
If so, who do you think ought to do it?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
0202404.01ts

*Attach: Info Memo from Gen. Myer to SD 2/23/04 Re: Directives*

**Please respond by:** \_\_\_\_\_ 3/5 \_\_\_\_\_

01-03-04 15:11 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/41940



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-0000

INFO MEMO

CH-1546-04  
23 February 2004

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers*

*OSD Review*

SUBJECT: Directives

- **Question.** "Where do we stand on getting all of the Joint Staff and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs' directives reviewed and updated to reflect where we are today?"
- **Answer.** From January through March 2003, the Joint Staff conducted a special review of all 263 CJCS instructions and manuals to address the impact of organizational and policy changes. A total of 179 directives were identified for revision or cancellation action. To date, 127 (71 percent) of these actions are complete. Actions on the remaining 52 (29 percent) are scheduled for completion by May 2004.
- **Analysis.** The special review encompassed all CJCS directives, including those already undergoing a regularly scheduled assessment at the time. My staff continues to manage this regular scheduling system to keep guidance current, while monitoring the remaining out-of-cycle updates.

COORDINATION NONE

Attachment  
As stated

Prepared By: MG Michael D. Maples, USA; Vice Director, Joint Staff; (b)(6)

3

OSD 02613-04

684 2/24

To: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
 cc: Ray Dibos  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 31, 2004

SUBJECT: Directives

Where do we stand on getting all of the joint staff and chairmen of the joint chiefs' directives reviewed and updated to reflect where we are today?

Thank you.

DIR/Sec  
 103104.13

Respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

2/12/04

300.8 1

*Handwritten notes:*  
 2/12/04  
 2/12/04  
 2/12/04

31 Jan 04  
 5 Feb 04

OSD 01776-04

4/7 1600

120

Paul Butler →  
6/9

TO: Sec Def

TO: Mira Ricardet  
2004 JUN 15 21 08 36

I-04/007531  
EF-9782

DATE: June 2, 2004

SUBJECT: Uzbekistan

Are you positive that the State Dept. is not going to certify Uzbekistan? If that is so, we've got to get to work on it. Get Paul Wolfowitz to talk to Hadley, and draft a memo from me to Secretary Powell and a memo to me for my POTUS file that I want to talk to the President about Uzbekistan.

Thanks.

DHR/asm  
060204.04a

Please respond by: 6/8

Sir,  
Response attached.  
VV/CDR Nosenzo  
6/9

OSD 08876-04

03-05-04 12:02 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/41943

June 14, 2004

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Moving Military Base at Babylon

*Ira 9*

Please get back to me and tell me what you are going to do in response to the CPA's request that the military base at Babylon be moved to avoid disturbing and damaging archeological sites.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
061404-17

.....

*Please respond by* 6/25/04

*14 Jun 04*

OSD 08878-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

SECRET

JUN 15 11 0: 29

CM-1842-04  
14 June 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 6/14*

SUBJECT: Standing Orders

- **Issue.** "I just read this Operation Deep Freeze memo. I wonder how many things like this exist that need to be reviewed in light of September 11. This was in July 2001, before September 11. Four hundred missions is a pile of missions. Let's get some review of things that preceded September 11 that need to be reviewed like that. Please give me a proposal." (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** All pre-September 11 orders were reviewed previously with negative results (TAB B). USTRANSCOM was additionally tasked with the further examination of Memorandums of Agreement (MOAs) to ensure their applicability during the War On Terrorism (WOT) and their adherence to the standard DOD orders process. USTRANSCOM completed the review and stated that all MOAs are both applicable during the WOT and in compliance with the standard orders process.
- **Discussion.** USTRANSCOM is the only command supporting active MOAs with other agencies. Operation DEEP FREEZE was the only MOA supported by an Execute Order dated prior to 11 September 2001 and is currently in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) for rewrite.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen Norton A. Schwartz, USAF; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

OSD 08883-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41945



TAB A

March 2, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Standing Orders

I just read this Operation Deep Freeze memo. I wonder how many things **like** this exist that need to be reviewed in light of September 11. This was in July 2001, before September 11. Four hundred missions is a pile of missions.

Let's get some review of things that preceded September 11 that need to be reviewed like that. Please give me a proposal.

Thanks.

Attach.

2/12/04 J-3 response to SecDef snowflake

1/27/04 SecDef memo to CJCS re: Antarctica (012704-17)

DHR:dh  
030204-14

.....  
Please respond by 3/19/04

11-L-0559/OSD/41946

OSD 03398-04  
Tab A

## ANTARCTIC OPERATION DEEP FREEZE

**Purpose.** To provide a response to SecDef Snow Flake - 674.

**Issue.** SF-674 stated, "In the meeting with the President, John Handy mentioned that there had been 400 missions to Antarctica. I don't remember signing any deployment orders for that."

### Bottom Line

- DOD support to Operation DEEP FREEZE is provided on a reimbursable basis from the National Science Foundation (NSF) under a DOD-NSF Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) at no cost to the Department of Defense.
- Operations are conducted under a standing SecDef EXORD that was issued 032310ZJul01.

### Background

- Department of Defense has supported Polar Programs since 1957.
- Operation DEEP FREEZE mission is designed to move people and cargo to, from and within Antarctica in support of the NSF.
- MOA of 1 Apr 99 outlines NSF and DOD responsibilities for Operation DEEP FREEZE.
  - The implementing party for NSF is the Office of Polar Programs.
  - The implementing parties for the Department of Defense are the **US Air Force**/Air National Guard and the **US Transportation Command** (USTRANSCOM).
  - **As the** DOD Executive Agent for the MOA, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) is required to **perform** a biennial review of the MOA.

- USTRANSCOM has operational control of all DOD common user transportation assets and personnel when they are supporting the Polar Programs.
- Operation DEEP FREEZE missions include:
  - Flying support missions between McMurdo (base camp in Antarctica) and Christchurch, New Zealand, by C-141 and C-17.
  - Intercontinental missions by LC-130 (ski equipped).
  - On-continent missions by LC-130.
  - **US Coast Guard** (USGC) and Military Sealift Command vessel operations (**USCG** icebreakers, one cargo vessel and one fuel tanker).

### Current Year/Season Support (As of 12 Feb 04)

- **46** of **56** C-141 and C-17 missions completed (only C-141 missions remain)
- 51 of **66** LC-130 intercontinental missions complete
- 401 LC-130 on-continent missions complete
  - LC-130 providing additional airlifting for cargo offloaded from AMERICAN TERN
- McMurdo Station to close on **24 Feb**
- DEEP **FREEZE** closes o/a **27 Feb**; all units return home

**Recommendation.** None. Provided for information only.

Prepared by: CDR Warren, USN, J-3 JOD-PAC, (b)(6)

01270419

2

Tab A

January 27, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*  
SUBJECT: Antarctica

In the meeting with the President, John Handy mentioned that there **had** been 400 missions to Antarctica. I don't remember signing any deployment orders for that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012704-17

.....  
Please respond by 2/4/04

Sir,  
The attached <sup>C311</sup> 5x8 previously  
routed, answers this snowflake.  
vr/cdr Nosmy  
3/1

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/41948

TAB B



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1668-04  
5 April 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY/3*

SUBJECT: Standing Orders

- **Issue.** "I just read **this** Operation Deep Freeze memo. I wonder how **many things** like **this** exist **that** need to be reviewed in light of September 11. **This** was in July 2001, before September 11. **Four hundred** missions **is a pile** of missions. Let's get some review of **things** that preceded September 11 that need to be reviewed like Operation Deep Freeze. Please **give me a proposal.**" (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** The Joint **Staff**, combatant command **and** Service staffs have examined all **standing execution** orders (EXORDs). Operation DEEP FREEZE (ODF) **is the only** EXORD **that** had not been cancelled, reviewed or modified since 11 September 2001. I anticipate that **a further** evaluation of **outstanding** memorandums of agreement (MOAs) **and understanding** with other agencies **may** highlight areas that do not have a direct bearing on **the War** on Terrorism. A review of these memorandums **will be forwarded by 30 April.**
- Discussion. **EXORDs** dating back to 1992 **were analyzed to determine if they had** undergone periodic review and approval since 11 September.
  - Before July 2001, **ODF was** executed under **an MOA** with the National Science Foundation. USTRANSCOM supports several such MOAs pre-dating September 2001 that are now under evaluation.
  - Combatant **commander and** Service **staffs** were encouraged to **continue their** review **of** all EXORDs that require **use** of DOD **assets in** light of their applicability to current operations.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments :  
As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen Norton A. Schwartz, USAF; Director (b)(6)

*OSD 03398-04*  
*etc 04-00529/07*

11-L-0559/OSD/41949

Tab B

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

USTRANSCOM

Gen Handy

26 April 2004

file

June 21, 2004

TO: **LTC** John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: General Officers in Iraq

Please take these lists of generals and tell me how many are Army, how many are Marine Corps, and how many are Coalition (non-US). **Also**, how many generals do we have per 5,000 Army troops and how many Marine generals do we have per 5,000 Marines?

Thanks.

Attach.

6/15/04 JCS memo to SD re: Locations [OSD 08923-041]

DHR:dh  
062104-8

.....  
Please respond by 7/2/04

*9/11*

*7/2*

*EM*

*(21 Jun 04)*

Sir,

There are 33 Army General, 8 Marine Corps General, and 10 Coalition General. There are also 2 AF generals.

The Ratios are: 0.727 Army GOs/5000 soldiers  
0.625 Marine Corps GOs/5000 Marines.

*COL TB*

*2 Jun 04*

TAB A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

8:39 AM

TO: Gen. Pete Pace

CC: Gen. Richard Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

CJCS HASSEEN

JUN 03 2004

DATE: June 2, 2004

SUBJECT: Locations

Please do get me the information on where all the generals and admirals are in Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060204.07

Please respond by: 6/10

'04 JUN 8 9:11:36

0 SD 08932-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/41952



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

SECRET

2004 JUN 15 PM 5:53

CM-1844-04  
15 June 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 6/15*

SUBJECT: Locations

- **Question.** "Please do get me the information on where all the generals and admirals are in Iraq." (TAB A)
- **Answer.** TAB B shows where the general and flag officers in Iraq are located.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: VADM T. J. Keating, USN; Director, Joint Staff; (b)(6)

OSD 08932-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41953



USCENTCOM G/FO LOCATION IN IRAQ

**Multi-National Force - Iraq**

Commander	9/10	USA	LTG Sanchez	Baghdad, Iraq	Replacement to arrive 30 Jun
DCG	9	Coalition	Coalition-LTG McColl	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCG (Embassy based position)	8	USA		Baghdad, Iraq	MG Stratman, USA arrives 30 Jun
DCG	8	Coalition	Coalition-AirCmdr Jones (UK)	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCG Detainee Ops	8	USA	MG Miller, G	Baghdad, Iraq	
Chief of Staff	8	USMC	MajGen Weber	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCS Intel	8	USA	MG Fast	Baghdad, Iraq	BG DeFritas, USA arrives Aug
Deputy Intel	7	Coalition	Coalition	Baghdad, Iraq	UK Fills
DCS Ops	8	USA	MG Miller, T.	Baghdad, Iraq	Replacement BG Fil arrival TBD
DCS Ops	8	Coalition	Coalition - MG Molan (Aus)	Baghdad, Iraq	
Deputy C3	7	Coalition	Coalition	Baghdad, Iraq	Italian fill (BG Isaszegi departed)
Dep Dir, Ops/CICB	7	USA	BG Kimmit	Baghdad, Iraq	Brig Gen Lessel, USAF arrives 1 Jul
DCS Strategy, Policy & Plans	8	USAF	MajGen(S) Sargeant	Baghdad, Iraq	
Deputy Pol/Mil	7	Coalition	Coalition	Baghdad, Iraq	
Coalition Ops	7	Coalition	Coalition	Baghdad, Iraq	
C4I	7	USAR	MG Detamore	Baghdad, Iraq	Replacement requested for 1 Aug
DCS Log	8	USA	BG West	Baghdad, Iraq	MG Minetti, ARG arrives 15 Jul
C7/DCG Eng	8	USA	MG Johnson	Baghdad, Iraq	BG Bostick arrives July
C9	7	USAR	BG Davidson	Baghdad, Iraq	
CDR, Air Cbt Contingency Element	7	USAF	Brig Gen Steel	Baghdad, Iraq	
MND-North Cdr	7	USA	BG Ham	Mosul, Iraq	TF Olympia
CG MNTF North. 88th Inf Div (Fwd)	7	USARG	BG Wriaht	Mosul, Iraa	
DCG/OST-I	9	USA	LTG Patraeus	Baghdad, Iraq	
CMATT	8	USA	MG Eaton	Baghdad, Iraq	BG Schwitters arrives 20 Jun
CPATT	8	Coalition	Coalition - BG MacKay	Baghdad, Iraq	
Ch, Iraq Survey Group	8	USA	MG Dayton	Baghdad, Iraq	BGen McMenamin, USMC arrives 15 Jun
Cdr, MNC-I	9	USA	LTG Metz	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCG	8	Coalition	Coalition - MG Graham (UK)	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCG	8	Canada	MG Natynczyk (Can)	Baghdad, Iraq	

**USCENTCOMG/FO LOCATION IN IRAQ**

Chief of Staff	7	USA	BG Troy	Baghdad, Iraq	
c3	7	USA		Baghdad, Iraq	Requirement TBD
C3 (Effects)	7	USA	BG Formica	Baghdad, Iraq	
c7	7	IUSA	BG Pollman	Baghdad, Iraq	

CG, 1st Armored Div	8	USA	MG Dempsey	Al Hillah, Iraq	
ADC, 1AD	7	USA	BG Hertling	Al Hillah, Iraq	
ADC, 1AD	7	USA	BG Scaparrotti	Al Hillah, Iraq	
CG, 1st Infantry Div	8	USA	MG Batiste	Tikrit, Iraq	
ADC, 1ID	7	USA	BG Mundt	Tikrit, Iraq	
ADC, 1ID	7	USA	BG Morgan	Tikrit, Iraq	
CG, 1st Cavalry Div	8	USA	MG Chiarelli	Baghdad, Iraq	
ADC, 1st Cav	7	USA	BG Hammond	Baghdad, Iraq	
ADC, 1st Cav	7	USA	BG Jones	Baghdad, Iraq	
CG, 13th COSCOM	7	USA	BG Chambers	LSA Anaconda, Iraq	
CG, 2d Med Bde	7	USAR	BG Reynolds	Baghdad, Iraq	
CG, I MEF	9	USMC	LtGen Conway	Al Asad, Iraq	
DCG I MEF	8	USMC	MGen Stadler	Al Asad, Iraq	
CG, I MarDiv	8	USMC	MGen Mattis	Ar Ramadi, Iraq	
ADC 1stMarDiv	7	USMC	BGen Kelly	Ar Ramadi, Iraq	
CG, 1st FSSG	7	USMC	BGen Kramlich	Al Taqaddum, Iraq	
CG, 3d MAW	8	USMC	MGen Amos	Al Fallujah, Iraq	

Spl Asst to LTG(Ret) Oster	7	USMC	BGen Usher	Baghdad, Iraq	Backfill not required
DCdr, Gulf Region Engr Div	7	USA	COL(P) Schrodell	Baghdad, Iraq	
US Dep to Dir, CPA Iraq	7	USA	BG Seay	Baghdad, Iraq	

TAB C

COORDINATION

USA	COL Bruno	8 June 2004
USAF	Capt McKaskill	4 June 2004
USMC	Maj Sylvester	4 June 2004
USCENTCOM	LtCol Moscovic	8 April 2004



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

JUN 21 2004

Rear Admiral (NS) Teo Chee Hean  
Minister for Defence  
Ministry of Defence  
303 Gombak Drive  
Singapore 669645

333 SD

Dear Minister Teo:

It was a pleasure to be with you at the **IISS** Asia Security Conference. The Conference provided an excellent opportunity to discuss issues of regional and global concern with our colleagues in a candid, open atmosphere.

I do also thank you for hosting such a delightful, informative luncheon.

I look forward to working with you to further strengthen our defense relationship.

Sincerely,

21 Jun 04 14 Jun 04

OSD 08950-04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

Rear Admiral (NS) Teo Chee Hean  
Minister for Defence  
Ministry of Defence  
303 Gombak Drive  
Singapore 669645

Dear Minister Teo:

*Handwritten signature*

It was a pleasure to meet with you at the IISS Asia Security Conference. The Conference provided an excellent opportunity to discuss issues of regional and global concern with our colleagues in a candid, open atmosphere.

I do also thank you for hosting such a delightful, informative luncheon.

I look forward to working with you to further strengthen our defense relationship.

Sincerely,

CSC

FIX PLEASE

11/6/18

June 16, 2004

TO: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Letter to Singapore MoD

If I have not written to the Defense Minister of Singapore since my trip, someone should draft up a nice note for me to send to him.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Incoming 6/14/04 ltrs from MoD Singapore

DHR:dh  
061604-5

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*To Sec Def*

*There is a letter that is in coordination. We'll drag it out and get it to you (Policy drafted it and its with our writing staff)*

*Paul*  
Paul Butler

*6/16*

*33350*

*163604 145604*

OSD 08950-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41959

*TN 6/18*

Received Event (Event Succeeded)

Date: 6/15/2004  
Pages: 3  
Sender: (b)(6)  
Fax Number:  
Tyt JUN-15-2004 16:09

Time: 4:12 PM  
Duration: 1 min 17 sec  
Company:  
Subject:

SINGAPORE EMB IN WRS DC

(b)(6) P.02/03



MINISTER FOR DEFENCE  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
SINGAPORE

14 June 2004

The Honourable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
United States of America

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

It was a pleasure to welcome you to Singapore earlier this month. I am glad that you were able to see for yourself the close cooperation between the Singapore Armed Forces and the United States Armed Forces. I trust that you found your visit to Changi Naval Base useful. There are ongoing discussions between our respective staffs and armed forces on how the cooperation may be extended to include US access to the new facilities coming up in the vicinity of Changi Naval Base - Changi Runway 3 and the Command and Control Centre - as well as other SAF facilities. We look forward to these new areas of cooperation when the Defence Cooperation Agreement is concluded.

I also hope that you found the Shangri-La Dialogue to be a useful forum to gather perspectives from this region on the pressing security issues of the day. Your participation and your keynote address were valuable contributions to the Dialogue.

Thank you once again for your presence at the Dialogue and at the lunch for the Ministers.

Yours sincerely;

Read-Admiral(NS) Teo Chee Hean

OSD 08950-04

11-L-0559/OSD/41960

January 15, 2004

381

TO: Les Brownlee  
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Headquarters' Layering

That was a good meeting we had yesterday on end strength. While I gave you some guidance on further questions to come back to me on, I am not sure my request that you look at how you might eliminate some headquarters' layering was clear.

My perception is that the Army has an excessive number of headquarters from the lowest tactical to the highest operational level. We are in the 21st century – how long has the current Army organizational construct been in place? With the technological advances in communications and shared situational awareness, I wonder if the Army is organized to leverage the gains.

Some things I want you to look at and get back to me are:

- Is the division the least common denominator for deployment? Can you deploy multiple units subordinate to a division – to possibly different locations – quickly – like the Marine Corps?
- What is the value-added at each level of headquarters? At what level is the least value added?

15 Jan 04

OSD 08968-04



- What is a theater army? What is its relevance today? Who else can do that mission?
- Can brigades work directly for corps? If they can, why aren't they? If they cannot, why not? I believe NATO has had plans for brigades working for corps-level headquarters, so I would like to know what you think about that.

Please get your heads into this.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
011504-14

.....  
Please respond by 7/23/04

720

Rec'd 1240  
115

January 2, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Economist Story

1/20 → Allison Barber  
Read: Act discuss.  
Iraq  
J. R.

Here is a note from Newt Minow, with an article from *The Economist*. Is this true?

Larry Di Rita  
1/20

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/20/03 Minow note, w/12/13/03 *Economist* article: "A Chance Missed," p. 42-43

DHR:dh  
010204-12

.....  
Please res

SENIOR MILITARY ASSISTANT  
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

.....

CC: DSD

DSD

SJAN

FILE COPY

SDE-

Would you like for CPA  
to draft a response to  
you?

yes pl. \_\_\_\_\_

NAR \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 08971-04

2 Jan 04

11-L-0559/OSD/41963

v/r - Bill  
(\* Attached Kenney Team email)

WITH COMPLIMENTS

to DON RUMSFELD

IF TRUE, THIS IS A VERY  
SERIOUS MISTAKE - AND  
NEEDS YOUR PERSONAL  
ATTENTION. ALL BEST

NEWTON N. MINOW *hand*

12/20/03

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only one in five has been disqualified.

Hitherto, the Americans have supported UN-sponsored war-crimes tribunals. But in Iraq, from the outset, they have promoted the idea of an all-Iraqi court with no UN involvement, arguing that the Iraqis themselves, as the main victims of Mr Hussein, were entitled to try their own persecutors. They have even offered \$75m to support the court. But many suspect that the Americans' opposition to an international tribunal for Iraq is part of their campaign against the UN's International Criminal Court, not because of a genuine change of opinion. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, they certainly took the opposite view, even threatening to cut loans to a reforming Serbian government if it did not hand over Slobodan Milosevic to the UN's war-crimes tribunal in The Hague.

Of the 7,000 or so people still being held by coalition forces in Iraq, only around 100 are classified as prisoners of war: that is, uniformed soldiers captured on the battlefield. Under international law, they must either be freed or brought before a military court when hostilities have officially ceased. Around 2,200 are "criminal detainees", looters and the like, who will eventually be handed over to the Iraqi authorities for trial in normal Iraqi courts. The remaining 4,800-odd are so-called "security internees": suspected insurgents, al-Qaeda terrorists, would-be suicide bombers, and anyone else deemed to pose a threat to the coalition's forces or to Iraqis in general. They include 101 "high-value detainees" suspected of the worst atrocities under Mr Hussein, including 38 of the most wanted 55 people (two of whom have been killed) in the Americans' "deck of cards".

Unlike America's 660 prisoners in Guantánamo Bay, all its security internees in Iraq are being held in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. Though they have not been charged and have no access to a lawyer, their cases must be—and are being—subject to regular review. If no longer considered a danger, they may be freed or, if suspected of a crime, switched to the criminal-detainee category to await trial in an ordinary court. But those still deemed a security threat can continue to be held by the "occupying power", namely the CPA, for as long as the occupation continues.

What will happen to the detainees come July 1st next year, when the Iraqis are supposed to take over? No one is sure. Most of the mass murderers and other gross violators of human rights will probably end up before the new special tribunal, which is expected to start operating next year. Others may be freed. But the Americans will probably ask to keep those thought likely to provide useful information for its war on terror. So they could then fall into the same legal limbo as the prisoners in Guantánamo Bay. ■

### Iraq's television

## A chance missed

BAGHDAD

America has failed to promote freedom of expression—or its own message

**T**HERE is no information available at this time," reads the message on the website of the Iraqi Media Network, the intended precursor of a hoped-for revamped state broadcasting service and the Americans' main purveyor of news in Arabic that, after 30 years of state lies, is meant to be true. "Please check back."

Iraqis have been checking for eight months, baffled by how a nation with the world's most vibrant media can leave them still yearning for something they actually want to watch. So dull is the present service that some Iraqis may even hanker for the days when Saddam Hussein's delinquent son Uday ran the television. As a result, far more Iraqis watch two Arab satellite channels, al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya, both of which seem to revel in America's local tribulations.

Part of the problem is that the Pentagon assigned Iraq's broadcasting to a defence contractor, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). So far, the firm has shown as much aptitude for delivering news as the BBC would if it had to deliver missiles. It charged the Pentagon \$100m in operating and infrastructure costs but paid its broadcasters \$30 a week. It hired the

### Judging the war in Iraq

## Could try harder

Was it fought legally?

**B**OMBS are only ever as smart as the people who drop them. During the campaign in Iraq, says a new report on the war by Human Rights Watch, a lobbying group, the intelligence upon which the coalition's bomb-droppers relied was not always very intelligent.

Before the war, Britain and America trumpeted the care they intended to take in selecting targets, and most of their weaponry did indeed prove precise, but, argues the report, the 50 or so opportunistic strikes on Iraqi leaders, intended to "decapitate" Saddam Hussein's regime, relied on shaky information and ended up killing only civilians.

The report's other main charge concerns the coalition's use of cluster munitions, especially those fired by land forces. Designed for use against broad or moving targets, cluster bombs can be

same performers who sang praises to Mr Hussein as "the servant of God" to sing odes to Iraq's new-found freedom. State TV is required to relay the statements of the ruling American-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its appointed Iraqi Governing Council, earning it a reputation as the Pentagon's Pravda. Freed from Saddam's ban on satellite dishes, a third of Iraqis have switched to other stations.

The failure to provide useful or interesting information is not just SAIC's; it is symptomatic of a more general speech impediment. Not only does the CPA not speak Iraq's language; it rarely deigns to speak at all. Gary Thatcher, Mr Bremer's communications adviser, does not communicate himself, and often bars CPA officials, bunkered behind their concrete bollards, from answering press inquiries directly. This fosters suspicion and rumour, making the CPA seem remote and prickly. Mr Bremer rarely invites Arab journalists to his press conferences. In such self-imposed solitude, the CPA is struggling to get its message across.

Too late for a remedy? SAIC's contract is up for renewal next month and has been put up for tender. The money on offer—\$98m a year for two years—at first attracted a welter of interested parties, including the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, the BBC and Britain's Independent Television News. The British apparently tried to persuade Mr Bremer that Iraq needs a public broadcaster, independent of the government and regulated by law, for its fledgling democracy.

It has yet to happen. Proposals to keep ▶▶

...tally haphazard when dropped in populated areas, as some were in Iraq. As in previous conflicts, some of the bomblets failed to explode and now lie around imperilling Iraqi lives. The report concludes that hundreds of civilian deaths could have been prevented; it also criticises some of the attacks on Iraq's infrastructure and the coalition's failure to secure dangerous Iraqi arms caches. The Saddamites, of course, violated the rules of war with abandon, disguising themselves as civilians and utilising mosques and hospitals. Those rules, however, oblige states to take "all feasible precautions" to avoid harming civilians. As military technology advances, it imposes a responsibility on America and its allies to take commensurately stricter precautions. In Iraq, that didn't always happen.

broadcasting out of the hands of the executive have collided with vested interests in Washington. If you give \$100m, you expect some say in how it is spent, they say. The BBC, among others, is shying away. Of 28 potential bidders, only three are primarily broadcasters. Others include specialists in engineering and arms, and the Rendon Group, a public-relations firm paid by the CIA to help the Iraqi National Congress and its leader, Ahmed Chalabi. Even SAIC may still be interested.

Most Iraqis are in the dark about all of this. The Governing Council gave warning that if the American administration let foreigners run Iraq's broadcasting service without consultation, the transitional government due to take office in July would sever the contract.

In its search for a voice, the council has sought editorial control and a say in appointing staff. But its own commitment to press freedom is iffy. Last month, it ordered al-Arabiya to shut its Baghdad office. ■

Zimbabwe and the Commonwealth

## Bye-bye Bob

ABUJA

Zimbabwe is isolated, Africa divided

**B**ETWEEN the ceremonial planting of trees, traditional dances and a speech by England's queen, two questions paralysed last week's meeting of leaders of the (formerly British) Commonwealth in Nigeria's capital, Abuja: what to do about Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe; and how to explain the continuing support for him by the one man who could sink him, South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki. After three days of talks, there was an answer to the first: the 51 leaders agreed to prolong Zimbabwe's suspension from the organisation, because of its government's oppressive ways.

Mr Mugabe, who had not been invited to the Abuja jamboree, will be banned from future meetings. He declared that he would, in any case, leave the Commonwealth and turn his back on the "unholy Anglo-Saxon" alliance which—he says—runs it. So Zimbabwe follows the example of apartheid-era South Africa, which quit the Commonwealth in 1961 rather than treat its people decently. (Three other countries—Fiji, Nigeria and Pakistan—have been suspended for mounting coups or hanging dissidents. Pakistan is still out.)

Zimbabwe flouts nearly every principle that the Commonwealth promotes. In September, for instance, club-wielding Zimbabwean police shut down the country's only independent daily paper. Last

## Terror, tourism and odd beliefs

**F**EW readers of *The Economist*, one would imagine, have seen a one-eyed dwarf with bat-like wings, pointed ears and sharpened talons. Even fewer are likely to have been sodomised by one. Many of the people of Zanzibar, however, sincerely believe in Popobawa, an incubus who supposedly rapes men who doubt his existence. Isolated sightings are reported every year. Locals say that Popobawa appears accompanied by a puff of smoke, usually on Pemba, the smaller of the spice islands that make up this semi-autonomous part of Tanzania. At times of stress, Popobawa seems to go on a rampage. So many people report seeing him that ordinary life in some villages stops. Men sleep arm-in-arm outside their houses, in the belief that not being in bed makes them less vulnerable. There were said to be numerous attacks before and after Zanzibar's president was assassinated in 1972, and again in 2000 and 2001, coinciding with a rigged and violent election.

Popobawa may be mythical, but reports of sightings give a useful insight into the Zanzibari mood. The incubus was seen in November, prompting a local spiritualist to predict that "bad men will do bad things here next year [and] people will die." It is possible. Tensions have been simmering in Zanzibar since the police killed 39 opposition supporters in early

week Mr Mugabe said it was time again to use "some measures of force" against his opponents. Members of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), Zimbabwe's opposition, were in Abuja showing grisly videos of what usually happens when Mr Mugabe makes such threats.

Mr Mugabe's economic incompetence



Spicy rumours in the spice islands  
2001. The island's mostly poor and Muslim population feels marginalised. Secessionist mutterings are growing louder. Tanzania's government has clamped down: last month it banned an independent newspaper, accusing it of fomenting tribal and religious divisions.

Economic woes may make unrest more likely. Too many young men lost their jobs after terrorists attacked Jewish targets in nearby Kenya a year ago. Tourist receipts in Zanzibar fell by 30% in the first three months of this year. Things have since improved, but America says the threat of an attack on Zanzibar remains high, pointing out that two al-Qaeda operatives were born there. Zanzibaris, most of whom are moderates, disagree. "Freddie Mercury was born in Zanzibar," said one. "It doesn't make us more likely to become pop stars."

causes even more misery. On December 3rd, the IMF finally decided to expel Zimbabwe, citing its government's unwillingness to do anything about an economy that has shrunk by 40% since 1999, inflation of 526% and a populace so impoverished that two-thirds of them depend on foreign food aid. The country's finance minister cheerily predicts that the economy will shrink by another 8.5% next year. The country has one of the world's highest rates of HIV: around 34% of adults are infected. Hundreds of thousands of Zimbabweans flee abroad every year.

Yet quite a few leading Africans, particularly South Africa's Mr Mbeki, still turn a blind eye to Mr Mugabe's shortcomings. The African Union and the Southern African Development Community have yet to criticise him in public. And Mr Mbeki is still campaigning to have him appeased.

Indeed, Mr Mbeki tried to oust Don McKinnon, the Commonwealth's secretary-general, who made no secret of wanting Zimbabwe to stay suspended. South

January 2, 2004

Germany

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Post-World War II Occupation of Germany

Please take a look at these three papers on the post-war occupation of Germany.  
They are really interesting.

Thanks.

Attach.

Bess, Demaree. "How We Botched the German Occupation," *Saturday Evening Post*, January 26, 1946.

Dos Passos, John. "Americans Are Losing the Victory in Europe"

Dulles, Allen W. "That Was Then: Allen W. Dulles on the Occupation of Germany," *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2003.

DHR:dh  
010204-15



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

2 Jan 04

OSD 08998-04

Saturday Evening Post  
January 26, 1946

(S)

How We Botched the German Occupation  
By Demaree Bess

Berlin

Everywhere I've traveled recently in Germany I've run into Americans, ranging from generals down to privates, who ask perplexedly, "What are we Americans supposed to be doing here? Are we going to take over this place and stay here forever?"

Judging by reports received here from the United States, this perplexity of Americans in Germany is matching by the perplexity of Americans at home. We have got into this German job without understanding what we were tackling or why. Imagine how incredulous we would have been if anybody had told us---even so recently as five years ago---that hundreds of thousands of Americans would be camped in the middle of Europe in 1946, completely responsible for the conduct and welfare of approximately 20,000,000 Germans?

How does it happen that even some of our topmost officials in Germany admit that they don't know what they are doing here? The answer can be expressed, I believe, in one word---secrecy. . . .

Mr. Stimson probably has had more experience in international affairs than any other American. Before being appointed to head the War Department for the second time, he had also served as Secretary of State and had been Governor General of the Philippines. Thus he was familiar with the military requirements, the political implications and the practical problems involved in administering an alien and distant territory under wartime conditions. Mr. Hull, appreciating the value of Mr. Stimson's experience in world affairs, was inclined to defer to his judgment in most of the matters under dispute. Mr. Morgenthau, on the other hand, gradually became the chief spokesman for the advocates of an American-imposed revolution in Germany.

His so-called Morgenthau plan, which has since been widely publicized, was not just the personal policy of the former Secretary of the Treasury. It combined the ideas of a sizable group of aggressive Americans which included some conservative big businessmen as well as left-wing theorists. The group supporting Mr. Morgenthau's ideas included Americans of all races, creeds and political beliefs. It is doubtful whether Mr. Morgenthau could recall today the source of some of the most explosive ideas which he gradually adopted.

However that may be, the Cabinet committee soon found itself in disagreement, with Secretaries Stimson and Hull on one side and Mr. Morgenthau on the other. Hints of this disagreement leaked out at the time and the issue was represented as a "hard peace" versus a "soft peace," but actually that was not the issue at all. In fact, the major disagreement then was over the question of procedure, and did not directly concern long-term economic and financial policies. The three Cabinet members were equally anxious to make sure that Germany should be deprived of the means for waging another war, but Secretaries Stimson and Hull were determined not to bite off more than we could chew at one time. They wanted to reduce the original occupation plans to the simplest possible form, with three primary objectives in mind: (1) agreement by all the Allies upon a joint occupation; (2) provision of some hope for the German people that they might develop a decent life for themselves once they became completely demilitarized; and (3) the obligation not to burden the American people with more commitments than they might later prove willing to accept.

While these discussions were proceeding, however, Mr. Morgenthau became convinced that we should go into Germany with a complete blueprint, worked out in exhaustive detail, providing for an economic and industrial revolution so drastic that it would affect not only Germany but almost every other country in Europe. He wanted us to adopt this blueprint for ourselves and to use every conceivable means to pressure upon our Allies to get them to accept it. Whenever he was outvoted in the Cabinet committee, he had the immense advantage---as an

intimate friend of Franklin D. Roosevelt---of being able to go through the side door of the White House and sell his ideas directly to the President. . . .

The French, unconvinced that the atomic bomb has opened an entirely new era, are insisting upon establishing buffer states between themselves and Germany. To this end, they're trying to make a friend of the Germans in their zone and to encourage them to organize separatist movements.

The British, conscious, of the broader aspects of Western Europe's economic situation, are devising schemes to revive German economic life in their zones, particularly in the Ruhr. In order to provide immediately for some of the things which Western Europeans so urgently require, they're trying to establish some kind of international combine to operate Ruhr industries and coal mines---a proposal which they compare to the Tennessee Valley Authority.

The Russians, grappling with the enormous tasks of reconstructing their own war-wracked homeland, are carrying off from their zone all the machines and tools and animals which they can use in Russia. While the Russians reduce the labor surplus in their zone by sending skilled German workers to Russia, they also encourage the remaining Germans to revive political and economic life with due attention to Russian models.

It is only in the American zone that the "pastoral economy" is emerging, which some Americans had visioned for the whole of Germany. Although the Potsdam Declaration technically superseded the American directive JCS 1067, in practice this directive never has been superseded, so far as Americans are concerned. We still are committed to apply in our zone a blue print which was designed for the whole of Germany, but which was never accepted by any of our Allies. This directive is chiefly concerned with tearing things down rather than building things up, and in the absence of any common policy for the whole of Germany, our particular zone is threatened with "planned chaos."

No wonder so many Americans are asking, "What are we doing in Germany?" They can see that the Russians and British and French are initiating projects which promise some direct benefits to them in their zones. But when they look at our zone they see only headaches. These peculiar problems of the American zone will be discussed in a subsequent article.



# AMERICANS ARE LOSING THE VICTORY IN EUROPE

DESTITUTE NATIONS FEEL THAT THE U. S. HAS FAILED THEM

by JOHN DOS PASSOS

*Novelist John Dos Passos spent three months in Europe as a correspondent for LIFE, which recently printed his report on the Nürnberg trials. Just back in the U. S., Author Dos Passos here sums up his impressions of the Continent.*



We are in a cabin deep down below decks on a Navy ship jam-packed with troops that's pitching and creaking its way across the Atlantic in a winter gale. There is a man in every bunk. There's a man wedged into every corner. There's a man in every chair. The air is dense with cigarette smoke and with the staleness of packed troops and sour wool.

"Don't think I'm sticking up for the Germans," puts in the lanky young captain in the upper berth, "but..."

"To hell with the Germans," says the broad-shouldered dark lieutenant. "It's what our boys have been doing that worries me."

The lieutenant has been talking about the traffic in Army property, the leaking of gasoline into the black market in France and Belgium even while the fighting was going on, the way the Army kicks the civilians around, the looting.

"Lust, liquor and loot are the soldier's pay," interrupts a red-faced major.

The lieutenant comes out with his conclusion: "Two wrongs don't make a right." You hear these two phrases again and again in about every bull session on the ship. "Two wrongs don't make a right" and "Don't think I'm sticking up for the Germans, but..."

The troops returning home are worried. "We've lost the peace," men tell you. "We can't make it stick."

A tour of the beaten-up cities of Europe six months after victory is a mighty sobering experience for anyone. Europeans. Friend and foe alike, look you accusingly in the face and tell you how bitterly they are disappointed in you as an American. They cite the evolution of the word "liberation." Before the Normandy landings it meant to be freed from the tyranny of the Nazis. Now it stands in the minds of the civilians for one thing, looting.

You try to explain to these Europeans that they expected too much. They answer that they had a right to, that after the last war America was the hope of the world. They talk about the Hoover relief, the work of the Quakers, the speeches of Woodrow Wilson. They don't blame us for the fading of that hope. But they blame us now.

Never has American prestige in Europe been lower. People never tire of telling you of the ignorance and rowdy-ism of American troops, of our misunderstanding of European conditions. They say that the theft and sale of Army supplies by our troops is the basis of their black market. They blame us for the corruption and disorganization of UNRRA. They blame us for the fumbling timidity of our negotiations with the Soviet Union. They tell us that our mechanical de-nazification policy in Germany is producing results opposite to those we planned. "Have you no statesmen in America?" they ask.

### **The skeptical French press**

Yet whenever we show a trace of positive leadership I found Europeans quite willing to follow our lead. The evening before Robert Jackson's opening of the case for the prosecution in the Nurnberg trial, I talked to some correspondents from the French newspapers. They were polite but skeptical. They were willing enough to take part in a highly publicized act of vengeance against the enemy, but when you talked about the usefulness of writing a prohibition of aggressive war into the law of nations they laughed in your face. The night after Jackson's nobly delivered and nobly worded speech I saw them all again. They were very much impressed. Their manner had even changed toward me personally as an American. Their sudden enthusiasm seemed to me typical of the almost neurotic craving for leadership of the European people struggling wearily for existence in the wintry ruins of their world.

The ruin this war has left in Europe can hardly be exaggerated. I can remember the years after the last war. Then, as soon as you got away from the military, all the little strands and pulleys that form the fabric of a society were still knitted together. Farmers took their crops to market. Money was a valid medium of exchange. Now the entire fabric of a million little routines has broken down. No one can think beyond food for today. Money is worthless. Cigarettes are used as a kind of lunatic travesty on a currency. If a man goes out to work he shops around to find the business that serves the best hot meal. The final pay-off is the situation reported from the Ruhr where the miners are fed at the pits so that they will not be able to take the food home to their families.

"Well, the Germans are to blame. Let them pay for it. It's their fault," you say. The trouble is that starving the Germans and throwing them out of their homes is only producing more areas of famine and collapse.


One section of the population of Europe looked to us for salvation and another looked to the Soviet Union. Wherever the people have endured either the American armies or the Russian armies both hopes have been bitterly disappointed. The British have won a slightly better reputation. The state of mind in Vienna is interesting because there the part of the population that was not actively Nazi was about equally divided. The wealthier classes looked to America, the workers to the Soviet Union.

The Russians came first. The Viennese tell you of the savagery of the Russian armies. They came like the ancient Mongol hordes out of the steppes, with the flimsiest supply. The people in the working-class districts had felt that when the Russians came that they at least would be spared. But not at all. In the working-class districts the troops were allowed to rape and murder and loot at will. When victims complained, the Russians answered, "You are too well off to be workers. You are bourgeoisie."

When Americans looted they took cameras and valuables but when the Russians looted they took everything. And they raped and killed. From the eastern frontiers a tide of refugees is seeping across Europe bringing a nightmare tale of helpless populations trampled underfoot. When the British and American came the Viennese felt that at last they were in the hands of civilized people. But instead of coming in with a bold plan of relief and reconstruction we came in full of evasions and apologies.

## U.S. administration a poor third

We know now the tragic results of the ineptitudes of the Peace of Versailles. The European system it set up was Utopia compared to the present tangle of snarling misery. The Russians at least are carrying out a logical plan for extending their system of control at whatever cost. The British show signs of recovering their good sense and their innate human decency. All we have brought to Europe so far is confusion backed up by a drumhead regime of military courts. **We have swept away Hitlerism, but a great many Europeans feel that the cure has been worse than the disease. [Emphasis mine]**



The taste of victory had gone sour in the mouth of every thoughtful American I met. Thoughtful men can't help remembering that this is a period in history when every *political crime* and every *frivolous* mistake in statesmanship has been paid for by the death of innocent people. The Germans built the Stalags; the Nazis are behind barbed wire now, but who will be next? Whenever you sit eating a good meal in the midst of a starving city in a handsome house requisitioned from some German, you find yourself wondering how it would feel to have a conqueror drinking out of your glasses. When you hear the tales of the brutalizing of women from the eastern frontier you think with a shudder of those you love and cherish at home.

That we are one world is unfortunately a brutal truth. Punishing the German people indiscriminately for the sins of their leader may be justice, but it is not helping to restore the rule of civilization. The terrible lesson of the events of this year of victory is that what is happening to the bulk of Europe today can happen to American tomorrow.

In America we are still rich, we are still free to move from place to place and to talk to our friends without fear of the secret police. The time has come, for our own future security, to give the best we have to the world instead of the worst. So far as Europe is concerned, American leadership up to now has been obsessed with a fear of our own virtues. Winston Churchill expressed this state of mind brilliantly in a speech to his own people which applies even more accurately to the people of the U.S. "You must be prepared," he warned them, "for further efforts of mind and body and further sacrifices to great causes, if you are not to fall back into the rut of inertia, the confusion of aim and the craven fear of being great."

# FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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## **That Was Then: Allen W. Dulles on the Occupation of Germany**

By Allen W. Dulles

From *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2003

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### A Note from the Editors:

In thinking about the reconstruction of Iraq, many have looked for insight to the American experiences in rebuilding Germany and Japan after World War II. Optimists point to similarities across the cases and argue that they bode well for the Bush administration's efforts today. Pessimists point to differences and draw the opposite conclusion. In truth, some aspects of the occupations look familiar and some do not. As the saying goes, history does not repeat itself, but it rhymes. What is most striking about the comparison is that in all three cases, several months into the postwar era the future of the country was still hanging in the balance.

Picking their way through the rubble, officials early in the Truman administration had as little clue about the eventual outcome of their experiments as their counterparts in Washington and Baghdad do today. They saw little choice but to grope forward as best they could, responding to immediate problems and fast-moving events while trying to keep their eyes steady on a grand long-term vision. Knowing how the story ended, it is difficult for us to escape the tyranny of hindsight and see those earlier cases as they appeared to contemporary observers -- in their full uncertainty, as history in the making rather than data to be mined for present-day polemics. *Foreign Affairs* is pleased, therefore, to be able to open a window directly onto occupied Germany seven months after V-E Day, taking readers back in media res.

During World War II, Allen W. Dulles served as the Bern station chief for the Office of Strategic Services. (He would later serve as the head of a successor organization, the Central Intelligence Agency, from 1953 to 1961.) Dulles was the main American liaison with the German resistance and a close observer of the early stages of the postwar occupation. After the OSS was disbanded in late September 1945, he decided to return to private life. On December 3, less than a week before leaving government service, he gave a frank and unvarnished update on the situation in Germany to an off-the-record meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations.

At the time the meeting was held, the United States and the Soviet Union were watching each other warily across the ruins of Europe but had not yet descended into what would become known as the Cold War. Germany was still one country, although divided into four occupation zones. George Kennan's "Long Telegram" and Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech were still months off, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and NATO still years in the future. Washington was trying to put Germany back on its feet while simultaneously demobilizing and turning to domestic matters. Few Americans had any inkling of just what their country's commitment to postwar Europe would eventually involve; most simply wanted the troops to come home.

According to the Council's archival policies, all substantive council records more than 25 years old are open for use, subject to permission being obtained from any living person for remarks attributed to them. Since the notes of that Dulles meeting are no longer protected, we are publishing them here for the first time, with only slight editing, as a contribution to public debate.

### THE PRESENT SITUATION IN GERMANY

Digest of a meeting with Allen W. Dulles at the Council on Foreign Relations, December 3, 1945

11-L-0559/OSD/41974

Germany today is a problem of extraordinary complexity. For two and one-half years the country has been a political and economic void in which discipline was well-maintained. There is no dangerous underground operating there now although some newspapers in the United States played up such a story. The German leaders, of course, could not admit defeat and today the attitude of the people is not so much a feeling of shame and guilt as one of having been let down by their leaders.

Economically and industrially, Germany has scraped the bottom of the barrel, and there are few shops with anything to sell. As soon as you attempt to get Germany to tick and to make arrangements for a government, the lack of men becomes apparent at once. Most men of the caliber required suffer a political taint. When we discover someone whose ability and politics are alike acceptable, we usually find as we did in one case that the man has been living abroad for the past ten years and is hopelessly out of touch with the local situation. We have already found out that you can't run railroads without taking in some Party members.

Labels are always arbitrary and sometimes they effectively mask what lies underneath. For example, citizens A, B, C, and D who didn't care about politics one way or the other were told they had to join the Nazi Party in order to make up the proper quota in the factory in which they worked. The consequences of refusal being what they were, they joined the Party. I know of one instance where two brothers tossed a coin to see which one would join the SS. I mention these things not because I think any substantial number of Germans were opposed to the Party but rather to point out how misleading and decisive a label can be. Furthermore we had altogether too many rules and regulations dealing with the Germans to make an adequate supply of men available to us. There were 126 categories of Germans excluded from any activity or from posts in German administration. Take, for example, the case of a man who owned zinc and coal mines in Upper Silesia. He was a bitter and proven anti-Nazi and a man of undoubted courage and integrity. I was not permitted to use him because he came under category 106, being classified as a war economy supervisor.

We tried hard to find financial advisers, but most of the bankers who had been in Germany in the Twenties and Thirties had by this time been liquidated. I found a banker in the prisoner's cage who had been arrested on an automatic charge because in the early part of the war he had been appointed custodian for the property of an alien, a post he later resigned. I am told that during the period of his responsibility he discharged his trust with scrupulous honesty. I had to bring his case before the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington before I was permitted to use him. Then there was Doctor Sauerbruch, one of the leading surgeons in Berlin. Him, also, I found in a cage. It took a cable to London from Washington to get his case straightened out and get him released for useful service, and this had no sooner been done when a few days later the British rearrested him because he came under some other category.

In our zone we arrested 70,000 people. There was no such thing as a habeas corpus and there was no forum to which one could apply for a hearing, although later on we did set up a tribunal of sorts. I do not blame our people too much for this state of affairs. After all, we could not examine each case individually in the early days when the chief task was to occupy Germany in the most effective manner.

The present political set-up in Germany is based on the agreements reached at Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam. Tehran was made when Churchill felt somewhat shaky. The arrangement did not include the French zone, which was added later. But regardless of its genesis, by and large the scheme is almost entirely unworkable. We have chopped up Baden, Württemberg, and Hesse into artificial zones. In the case of Saxony, the Russian zone cuts off the American and British zones from their counterparts there. It is difficult to see how the Allies could have done otherwise inasmuch as the Russians would not consent to British and American domination of Germany and the Americans and British likewise refused to consider letting Russia get an advantage. Even so, very little progress is being made toward the centralization of the various services. To complicate matters, the French have been saying that they could not set up an administration in the zone assigned to them until they knew what disposition was going to be made of the Rhine and the Ruhr.

In the zone under Russian control the application of Soviet doctrines is thus far confined largely to paper. The Russians are finding it a little difficult to mix collectivist doctrines, including the nationalization of banks, a new system of land tenure, and the creation of a small farmer class, with the set up as it existed under the Nazis and more broadly under a capitalist economy.

11-L-0559/OSD/41975

We, ourselves, have excellent men on the job. I have the highest regard for Clay, and Eisenhower is a genius as a diplomat and administrator.\* Yet I am inclined to think that the problems inherent in the situation are almost too much for us. Our people in Germany are unduly fearful of criticism in the United States. For example, the road between Frankfurt and Wiesbaden is so full of holes that it is almost impossible to drive over it, and one cannot cross the Main between those two places because all the bridges are down. But no repairs are made since the Army feels certain it would be criticized for "restoring the German war potential."

Industry in Germany is at its lowest ebb except for some coal mining in the Ruhr. The minute one considers what industries should be allowed to function and how best to prime the pump in order to set them going, some very real and serious difficulties appear.

So far as the treatment of industry in various zones is concerned, the Russian policy is particularly hard to fathom. It is hard to say whether the Russians really intend to tear down the zone for the purpose of building up Russia, but there is some evidence pointing that way. The Russians have torn up all the double tracks, they are keeping all able-bodied German prisoners, and they have taken East a great many industrialists, bankers, scientists, and the like.

Russian standing in their zone is low. Russian troops are living off the land, and have looted far more than anyone else. They have gone about Berlin looting workers' houses in very much the same way they did in Hungary. This seems to indicate that in both localities the Communist party is not very strong. At any rate, the Russians have seen the West and vice versa.

In the zone being turned over to Poland there is a good deal of buck passing. It is difficult to say what is going on, but in general the Russians are acting little better than thugs. They have wiped out all the liquid assets. No food cards are issued to Germans, who are forced to travel on foot into the Russian zone, often more dead than alive. An iron curtain has descended over the fate of these people and very likely conditions are truly terrible. The promises at Yalta to the contrary, probably 8 to 10 million people are being enslaved. Unquestionably Germany should be punished. In this instance, however, I think there will remain a legacy of bitterness which will not bode well for the future.

I have already said that the problem of Germany very nearly defies a successful solution. The question is: What can we do? The first step is to get together in dealing with what is at bottom a common problem. Next, we must find people we can use. We might use the churches which did not knuckle under to Hitler, although it is questionable in the minds of some people whether churches should get into politics. We might also consider the survivors of the affair of July 20\* and see what material the trade unions can furnish. Finally, we can screen the prisoners of war.

The women will not be much help to us, although in theory they could be. A saying now current in Germany is that today most of the able-bodied men are women. Hitler had an enormous hold over them and Eva Braun's existence appeared to be unknown to most of them. They are extremely bitter. Altogether the problem deserves very careful study.

I think it may well become necessary for us to change the form of our occupation. Thus far there has been very little disturbance or misbehavior on the part of our troops. I think we ought to use small, highly mechanized units and put our reliance on planes. These forces I would quarter outside of the cities, lest their presence create a talking point for German propaganda against the occupation.

Trying to arrive at figures in order to set up a standard of living in Germany is a difficult and almost hopeless problem, and one perhaps beyond the ingenuity of man. And yet we must somehow find a solution.

Germany ought to be put to work for the benefit of Europe and particularly for the benefit of those countries plundered by the Nazis. If we do not find some work for the Germans and if we do not solve the refugee problem,\* the Germans will have their revenge in one form or another though it takes a hundred years.

Q: Would you tell us something about the food situation?

11-L-0559/OSD/41976

A: In the American zone the standard is 1,500 calories daily; but this figure has not been realized. Both we and the British will have to import food if the Germans are to stay alive. Sixty percent of the population of Germany is in the French, British, and American zones which produce only about forty percent of the food. In the Russian zone some of the food there is being diverted by the Russians to their own uses. ...

Q: There is a groundswell in the United States in favor of letting American voluntary agencies help in the feeding and rehabilitation of Germany. What do you think of the idea?

A: This poses a great problem because of the multiplicity of agencies. I discussed this matter with Eisenhower and I think perhaps it can be worked out. I don't know how soon it will be possible to make individual remittances to Germany. ...

Q: What are the prospects for setting up a central administration in Germany?

A: Until the Russians get out -- and there is no indication that they intend to -- there can be no central administration. Hence I think it will be necessary to attempt to build up local government, not in the sense of trying to divide Germany but to provide some means of administration. ...

Q: When will there be civilian administration in the American zone?

A: The Army doesn't like the job and I don't blame them in the least. When we get civilian administration depends on what plans are being made in Washington. Thus far I have heard nothing to indicate that such plans exist.

\*Editors' note. An unsuccessful 1944 coup attempt by anti-Hitler elements in the German army and military intelligence.

\*Editors' note. At the time, Generals Lucius Clay and Dwight Eisenhower were the deputy military governor and military governor of Germany, respectively.

\*Editors' note. The country was then flooded with millions of ethnic Germans displaced from territories to the east.

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January 2, 2004

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: POTUS Speeches

Here are three speeches from the President. I have marked some sections I think are interesting. We might want to use some of that material.

Thanks.

Attach.

- 11/6/03 POTUS speech on Freedom in Iraq and Middle East
- 11/20/03 US/UK Declaration on Iraq by President Bush and PM Blair
- 11/19/03 POTUS Discusses Iraq Policy at Whitehall Palace in London

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Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

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OSD 08999-04



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Supporting freedom around the world

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Events >> 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy

For Immediate Release  
Office of the Press Secretary  
November 6, 2003

**Program:**

**Welcoming Remarks & Introductions**

Vin Weber  
Chairman, National  
Endowment for Democracy

**Congressional Remarks**

Senator Evan Bayh  
Senator Sam Brownback  
Rep. Chris Cox  
Rep. Tom Lantos

**Keynote Address**

George W. Bush  
President of the United  
States


**Closing Remarks**

Carl Gershman  
President, National  
Endowment for Democracy

**President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East  
Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for  
Democracy**

United States Chamber of Commerce  
Washington, D.C.

**THE PRESIDENT:** Thank you all very much. Please be seated. Thanks for the warm welcome, and thanks for inviting me to join you in this 20th anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy. The staff and directors of this organization have seen a lot of history over the last two decades, you've been a part of that history. By speaking for and standing for freedom, you've lifted the hopes of people around the world, and you've brought great credit to America.



I appreciate Vin for the short introduction. I'm a man who likes short introductions. And he didn't let me down. But more importantly, I appreciate the invitation. I appreciate the members of Congress who are here, senators from both political parties, members of the House of Representatives from both political parties. I appreciate the ambassadors who are here. I appreciate the guests who have come. I appreciate the bipartisan spirit, the nonpartisan spirit of the National Endowment for Democracy. I'm glad that Republicans and Democrats and independents are working together to advance human liberty.

The roots of our democracy can be traced to England, and to its Parliament -- and so can the roots of this organization. In June of 1982, President Ronald Reagan spoke at Westminster Palace and declared, the turning point had arrived in history. He argued that Soviet communism had failed, precisely because it did not respect its own people - their creativity, their genius and their rights.

President Reagan said that the day of Soviet tyranny was passing, that freedom had a momentum which would not be halted. He gave this organization its mandate: to add to the momentum of freedom across the world. Your mandate was important 20 years ago; it is equally important today. (Applause.)

A number of critics were dismissive of that speech by the President. According to one editorial of the time, "It seems hard to be a sophisticated European and also an admirer of Ronald Reagan." (Laughter.) Some observers on both sides of the Atlantic pronounced the speech simplistic and naive, and even dangerous. In fact, Ronald Reagan's words were courageous and optimistic and entirely correct. (Applause.)

The great democratic movement President Reagan described was already well underway. In the early 1970s, there were about 40 democracies in the world. By the middle of that decade, Portugal and Spain and Greece held free elections. Soon there

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*Speech available in Arabic*

11-L-0559/OSD/41979

were new democracies in Latin America, and free institutions were spreading in Korea, in Taiwan, and in East Asia. This very week in 1989, there were protests in East Berlin and in Leipzig. By the end of that year, every communist dictatorship in Central America\* had collapsed. Within another year, the South African government released Nelson Mandela. Four years later, he was elected president of his country -- ascending, like Walesa and Havel, from prisoner of state to head of state.

As the 20th century ended, there were around 120 democracies in the world -- and I can assure you more are on the way. (Applause.) Ronald Reagan would be pleased, and he would not be surprised.

We've witnessed, in little over a generation, the swiftest advance of freedom in the 2,500 year story of democracy. Historians in the future will offer their own explanations for why this happened. Yet we already know some of the reasons they will cite. It is no accident that the rise of so many democracies took place in a time when the world's most influential nation was itself a democracy.

The United States made military and moral commitments in Europe and Asia, which protected free nations from aggression, and created the conditions in which new democracies could flourish. As we provided security for whole nations, we also provided inspiration for oppressed peoples. In prison camps, in banned union meetings, in clandestine churches, men and women knew that the whole world was not sharing their own nightmare. They knew of at least one place -- a bright and hopeful land -- where freedom was valued and secure. And they prayed that America would not forget them, or forget the mission to promote liberty around the world.

Historians will note that in many nations, the advance of markets and free enterprise helped to create a middle class that was confident enough to demand their own rights. They will point to the role of technology in frustrating censorship and central control -- and marvel at the power of instant communications to spread the truth, the news, and courage across borders.

Historians in the future will reflect on an extraordinary, undeniable fact: Over time, free nations grow stronger and dictatorships grow weaker. In the middle of the 20th century, some imagined that the central planning and social regimentation were a shortcut to national strength. In fact, the prosperity, and social vitality and technological progress of a people are directly determined by extent of their liberty. Freedom honors and unleashes human creativity -- and creativity determines the strength and wealth of nations. Liberty is both the plan of Heaven for humanity, and the best hope for progress here on Earth.

The progress of liberty is a powerful trend. Yet, we also know that liberty, if not defended, can be lost. The success of freedom is not determined by some dialectic of history. By definition, the success of freedom rests upon the choices and the courage of free peoples, and upon their willingness to sacrifice. In the trenches of World War I, through a two-front war in the 1940s, the difficult battles of Korea and Vietnam, and in missions of rescue and liberation on nearly every continent, Americans have amply displayed our willingness to sacrifice for liberty.

The sacrifices of Americans have not always been recognized or appreciated, yet they have been worthwhile. Because we and our allies were steadfast, Germany and Japan are democratic nations that no longer threaten the world. A global nuclear standoff with the Soviet Union ended peacefully -- as did the Soviet Union. The nations of Europe are moving towards unity, not dividing into armed camps and descending into genocide. Every nation has learned, or should have learned, an important lesson: Freedom is worth fighting for, dying for, and standing for -- and the advance of freedom leads to peace. (Applause.)

And now we must apply that lesson in our own time. We've reached another great turning point -- and the resolve we show will shape the next stage of the world

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democratic movement.

Our commitment to democracy is tested in countries like Cuba and Burma and North Korea and Zimbabwe -- outposts of oppression in our world. The people in these nations live in captivity, and fear and silence. Yet, these regimes cannot hold back freedom forever -- and, one day, from prison camps and prison cells, and from exile, the leaders of new democracies will arrive. (Applause.) Communism, and militarism and rule by the capricious and corrupt are the relics of a passing era. And we will stand with these oppressed peoples until the day of their freedom finally arrives. (Applause.)

Our commitment to democracy is tested in China. That nation now has a sliver, a fragment of liberty. Yet, China's people will eventually want their liberty pure and whole. China has discovered that economic freedom leads to national wealth. China's leaders will also discover that freedom is indivisible -- that social and religious freedom is also essential to national greatness and national dignity. Eventually, men and women who are allowed to control their own wealth will insist on controlling their own lives and their own country.

Our commitment to democracy is also tested in the Middle East, which is my focus today, and must be a focus of American policy for decades to come. In many nations of the Middle East -- countries of great strategic importance -- democracy has not yet taken root. And the questions arise: Are the peoples of the Middle East somehow beyond the reach of liberty? Are millions of men and women and children condemned by history or culture to live in despotism? Are they alone never to know freedom, and never even to have a choice in the matter? I, for one, do not believe it. I believe every person has the ability and the right to be free. (Applause.)

Some skeptics of democracy assert that the traditions of Islam are inhospitable to the representative government. This "cultural condescension," as Ronald Reagan termed it, has a long history. After the Japanese surrender in 1945, a so-called Japan expert asserted that democracy in that former empire would "never work." Another observer declared the prospects for democracy in post-Hitler Germany are, and I quote, "most uncertain at best" -- he made that claim in 1957. Seventy-four years ago, The Sunday London Times declared nine-tenths of the population of India to be "illiterates not caring a fig for politics." Yet when Indian democracy was imperiled in the 1970s, the Indian people showed their commitment to liberty in a national referendum that saved their form of government.

Time after time, observers have questioned whether this country, or that people, or this group, are "ready" for democracy -- as if freedom were a prize you win for meeting our own Western standards of progress. In fact, the daily work of democracy itself is the path of progress. It teaches cooperation, the free exchange of ideas, and the peaceful resolution of differences. As men and women are showing, from Bangladesh to Botswana, to Mongolia, it is the practice of democracy that makes a nation ready for democracy, and every nation can start on this path.

It should be clear to all that Islam -- the faith of one-fifth of humanity -- is consistent with democratic rule. Democratic progress is found in many predominantly Muslim countries -- in Turkey and Indonesia, and Senegal and Albania, Niger and Sierra Leone. Muslim men and women are good citizens of India and South Africa, of the nations of Western Europe, and of the United States of America.

More than half of all the Muslims in the world live in freedom under democratically constituted governments. They succeed in democratic societies, not in spite of their faith, but because of it. A religion that demands individual moral accountability, and encourages the encounter of the individual with God, is fully compatible with the rights and responsibilities of self-government.

Yet there's a great challenge today in the Middle East. In the words of a recent report by Arab scholars, the global wave of democracy has -- and I quote -- "barely reached

the Arab states." They continue: "This freedom deficit undermines human development and is one of the most painful manifestations of lagging political development." The freedom deficit they describe has terrible consequences, of the people of the Middle East and for the world. In many Middle Eastern countries, poverty is deep and it is spreading, women lack rights and are denied schooling. Whole societies remain stagnant while the world moves ahead. These are not the failures of a culture or a religion. These are the failures of political and economic doctrines.

As the colonial era passed away, the Middle East saw the establishment of many military dictatorships. Some rulers adopted the dogmas of socialism, seized total control of political parties and the media and universities. They allied themselves with the Soviet bloc and with international terrorism. Dictators in Iraq and Syria promised the restoration of national honor, a return to ancient glories. They've left instead a legacy of torture, oppression, misery, and ruin.

Other men, and groups of men, have gained influence in the Middle East and beyond through an ideology of theocratic terror. Behind their language of religion is the ambition for absolute political power. Ruling cabals like the Taliban show their version of religious piety in public whippings of women, ruthless suppression of any difference or dissent, and support for terrorists who arm and train to murder the innocent. The Taliban promised religious purity and national pride. Instead, by systematically destroying a proud and working society, they left behind suffering and starvation.

Many Middle Eastern governments now understand that military dictatorship and theocratic rule are a straight, smooth highway to nowhere. But some governments still cling to the old habits of central control. There are governments that still fear and repress independent thought and creativity, and private enterprise -- the human qualities that make for a -- strong and successful societies. Even when these nations have vast natural resources, they do not respect or develop their greatest resources -- the talent and energy of men and women working and living in freedom.

Instead of dwelling on past wrongs and blaming others, governments in the Middle East need to confront real problems, and serve the true interests of their nations. The good and capable people of the Middle East all deserve responsible leadership. For too long, many people in that region have been victims and subjects -- they deserve to be active citizens.

Governments across the Middle East and North Africa are beginning to see the need for change. Morocco has a diverse new parliament; King Mohammed has urged it to extend the rights to women. Here is how His Majesty explained his reforms to parliament: "How can society achieve progress while women, who represent half the nation, see their rights violated and suffer as a result of injustice, violence, and marginalization, notwithstanding the dignity and justice granted to them by our glorious religion?" The King of Morocco is correct: The future of Muslim nations will be better for all with the full participation of women. (Applause.)

In Bahrain last year, citizens elected their own parliament for the first time in nearly three decades. Oman has extended the vote to all adult citizens; Qatar has a new constitution; Yemen has a multiparty political system; Kuwait has a directly elected national assembly; and Jordan held historic elections this summer. Recent surveys in Arab nations reveal broad support for political pluralism, the rule of law, and free speech. These are the stirrings of Middle Eastern democracy, and they carry the promise of greater change to come.

As changes come to the Middle Eastern region, those with power should ask themselves: Will they be remembered for resisting reform, or for leading it? In Iran, the demand for democracy is strong and broad, as we saw last month when thousands gathered to welcome home Shirin Ebadi, the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. The regime in Teheran must heed the democratic demands of the Iranian people, or lose its last claim to legitimacy. (Applause.)

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For the Palestinian people, the only path to independence and dignity and progress is the path of democracy. (Applause.) And the Palestinian leaders who block and undermine democratic reform, and feed hatred and encourage violence are not leaders at all. They're the main obstacles to peace, and to the success of the Palestinian people.

The Saudi government is taking first steps toward reform, including a plan for gradual introduction of elections. By giving the Saudi people a greater role in their own society, the Saudi government can demonstrate true leadership in the region.

The great and proud nation of Egypt has shown the way toward peace in the Middle East, and now should show the way toward democracy in the Middle East. (Applause.) Champions of democracy in the region understand that democracy is not perfect, it is not the path to utopia, but it's the only path to national success and dignity.

As we watch and encourage reforms in the region, we are mindful that modernization is not the same as Westernization. Representative governments in the Middle East will reflect their own cultures. They will not, and should not, look like us. Democratic nations may be constitutional monarchies, federal republics, or parliamentary systems. And working democracies always need time to develop -- as did our own. We've taken a 200-year journey toward inclusion and justice -- and this makes us patient and understanding as other nations are at different stages of this journey.

There are, however, essential principles common to every successful society, in every culture. Successful societies limit the power of the state and the power of the military -- so that governments respond to the will of the people, and not the will of an elite. Successful societies protect freedom with the consistent and impartial rule of law, instead of selectively applying -- selectively applying the law to punish political opponents. Successful societies allow room for healthy civic institutions -- for political parties and labor unions and independent newspapers and broadcast media. Successful societies guarantee religious liberty -- the right to serve and honor God without fear of persecution. Successful societies privatize their economies, and secure the rights of property. They prohibit and punish official corruption, and invest in the health and education of their people. They recognize the rights of women. And instead of directing hatred and resentment against others, successful societies appeal to the hopes of their own people. (Applause.)

These vital principles are being applied in the nations of Afghanistan and Iraq. With the steady leadership of President Karzai, the people of Afghanistan are building a modern and peaceful government. Next month, 500 delegates will convene a national assembly in Kabul to approve a new Afghan constitution. The proposed draft would establish a bicameral parliament, set national elections next year, and recognize Afghanistan's Muslim identity, while protecting the rights of all citizens. Afghanistan faces continuing economic and security challenges -- it will face those challenges as a free and stable democracy. (Applause.)

In Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council are also working together to build a democracy -- and after three decades of tyranny, this work is not easy. The former dictator ruled by terror and treachery, and left deeply ingrained habits of fear and distrust. Remnants of his regime, joined by foreign terrorists, continue their battle against order and against civilization. Our coalition is responding to recent attacks with precision raids, guided by intelligence provided by the Iraqis, themselves. And we're working closely with Iraqi citizens as they prepare a constitution, as they move toward free elections and take increasing responsibility for their own affairs. As in the defense of Greece in 1947, and later in the Berlin Airlift, the strength and will of free peoples are now being tested before a watching world. And we will meet this test. (Applause.)

Securing democracy in Iraq is the work of many hands. American and coalition forces

are sacrificing for the peace of Iraq and for the security of free nations. Aid workers from many countries are facing danger to help the Iraqi people. The National Endowment for Democracy is promoting women's rights, and training Iraqi journalists, and teaching the skills of political participation. Iraqis, themselves -- police and borders guards and local officials -- are joining in the work and they are sharing in the sacrifice.

This is a massive and difficult undertaking -- it is worth our effort, it is worth our sacrifice, because we know the stakes. The failure of Iraqi democracy would embolden terrorists around the world, increase dangers to the American people, and extinguish the hopes of millions in the region. Iraqi democracy will succeed -- and that success will send forth the news, from Damascus to Teheran -- that freedom can be the future of every nation. (Applause.) The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution. (Applause.)

Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe -- because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty. As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export. And with the spread of weapons that can bring catastrophic harm to our country and to our friends, it would be reckless to accept the status quo. (Applause.)

Therefore, the United States has adopted a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East. This strategy requires the same persistence and energy and idealism we have shown before. And it will yield the same results. As in Europe, as in Asia, as in every region of the world, the advance of freedom leads to peace. (Applause.)

The advance of freedom is the calling of our time; it is the calling of our country. From the Fourteen Points to the Four Freedoms, to the Speech at Westminster, America has put our power at the service of principle. We believe that liberty is the design of nature; we believe that liberty is the direction of history. We believe that human fulfillment and excellence come in the responsible exercise of liberty. And we believe that freedom -- the freedom we prize -- is not for us alone, it is the right and the capacity of all mankind. (Applause.)

Working for the spread of freedom can be hard. Yet, America has accomplished hard tasks before. Our nation is strong; we're strong of heart. And we're not alone. Freedom is finding allies in every country; freedom finds allies in every culture. And as we meet the terror and violence of the world, we can be certain the author of freedom is not indifferent to the fate of freedom.

With all the tests and all the challenges of our age, this is, above all, the age of liberty. Each of you at this Endowment is fully engaged in the great cause of liberty. And I thank you. May God bless your work. And may God continue to bless America. (Applause.)



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For Immediate Release  
Office of the Press Secretary  
November 20, 2003

## US/UK Declaration on Iraq

Declaration on Iraq by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair

For the first time in decades, the Iraqi people are enjoying the taste of freedom. Iraqis are starting to rebuild their country and can look to a brighter future. They are free of Saddam Hussein and his vicious regime; they can speak freely; practice their religion; and start to come to terms with the nightmare of the last 35 years, in which hundreds of thousands of Iraqis were murdered by their own government.

But Iraq is still threatened by followers of the former regime, and by outside terrorists who are helping them. The struggle is difficult. Yet we shall persevere to ensure that the people of Iraq will prevail, with the support of the new and strengthening Iraqi security forces: the police, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, the Facility Protection Service, the border police, and the New Iraqi Army. We salute the courage of those Iraqis and the coalition forces engaged in the struggle against reactionary elements in Iraq who want to turn back the clock to the dark days of Saddam's regime.

We reaffirm the resolve of our two countries, with many friends and allies, to complete the process of bringing freedom, security, and peace to Iraq.

We warmly welcome the Iraqi Governing Council's announcement of a timetable for the creation of a sovereign Iraqi Transitional Administration by the end of June 2004, and for a process leading to the adoption of a permanent constitution and national elections for a new Iraqi government by the end of 2005.

This announcement is consistent with our long-stated aim of handing over power to Iraqis as quickly as possible. It is right that Iraqis are making these decisions and for the first time in generations determining their own future. We welcome the Governing Council's commitment to ensuring the widest possible participation in the Transitional Assembly and constitutional process.

We reaffirm our long-term commitment to Iraq. The United States and United Kingdom stand ready to support the Transitional Administration in its task of building a new Iraq and its democratic institutions. Our military participation in the multinational force in Iraq will serve the Iraqi people until the Iraqis themselves are able to discharge full responsibility for their own security. At the same time, we hope that international partners will increasingly participate in the multinational force.

Our long-term political, moral, and financial commitment to the reconstruction of Iraq was underlined at the Madrid Donors Conference last month. Although the Coalition Provisional Authority will come to an end once the Transitional Administration is installed, the United States and United Kingdom will continue to provide assistance as part of the international support effort. In these tasks, we welcome the involvement of other nations, regardless of earlier differences; of the United Nations and the International Financial Institutions; and of the many non-governmental organizations who are able to make an important contribution.

Great challenges remain in Iraq. But the progress we have made this year has been enormous. Iraqis no longer live in fear of their own government, and Iraq's neighbors no long feel threatened. Our resolve to complete the task we set ourselves remains undiminished. Our partnership with the Iraqi people is for the long-term.

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11/24/2003





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MT

For Immediate Release  
Office of the Press Secretary  
November 19, 2003

## President Bush Discusses Iraq Policy at Whitehall Palace in London

Remarks by the President at Whitehall Palace  
Royal Banqueting House-Whitehall Palace  
London, England

1:24 P.M. (Local)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Secretary Straw and Secretary Hoon; Admiral Cobbald and Dr. Chipman; distinguished guests: I want to thank you for your very kind welcome that you've given to me and to Laura. I also thank the groups hosting this event -- The Royal United Services Institute, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. We're honored to be in the United Kingdom, and we bring the good wishes of the American people.

It was pointed out to me that the last noted American to visit London stayed in a glass box dangling over the Thames. (Laughter.) A few might have been happy to provide similar arrangements for me. (Laughter.) I thank Her Majesty the Queen for interceding. (Laughter.) We're honored to be staying at her house.

Americans traveling to England always observe more similarities to our country than differences. I've been here only a short time, but I've noticed that the tradition of free speech -- exercised with enthusiasm -- (laughter) -- is alive and well here in London. We have that at home, too. They now have that right in Baghdad, as well. (Applause.)

The people of Great Britain also might see some familiar traits in Americans. We're sometimes faulted for a naive faith that liberty can change the world. If that's an error it began with reading too much John Locke and Adam Smith. Americans have, on occasion, been called moralists who often speak in terms of right and wrong. That zeal has been inspired by examples on this island, by the tireless compassion of Lord Shaftesbury, the righteous courage of Wilberforce, and the firm determination of the Royal Navy over the decades to fight and end the trade in slaves.

It's rightly said that Americans are a religious people. That's, in part, because the "Good News" was translated by Tyndale, preached by Wesley, lived out in the example of William Booth. At times, Americans are even said to have a puritan streak -- where might that have come from? (Laughter.) Well, we can start with the Puritans.

To this fine heritage, Americans have added a few traits of our own: the good influence of our immigrants, the spirit of the frontier. Yet, there remains a bit of England in every American. So much of our national character comes from you, and we're glad for it.

The fellowship of generations is the cause of common beliefs. We believe in open societies ordered by moral conviction. We believe in private markets, humanized by compassionate government. We believe in economies that reward effort, communities that protect the weak, and the duty of nations to respect the dignity and the rights of all. And whether one learns these ideals in County Durham or in West Texas, they instill mutual respect and they inspire common purpose.

More than an alliance of security and commerce, the British and American peoples have an alliance of values. And, today, this old and tested alliance is very strong. (Applause.)

The deepest beliefs of our nations set the direction of our foreign policy. We value our own civil rights, so we stand for the human rights of others. We affirm the God-given dignity of every person, so we are moved to action by poverty and oppression and famine and disease. The United States and Great Britain share a mission in the

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world beyond the balance of power or the simple pursuit of interest. We seek the advance of freedom and the peace that freedom brings. Together our nations are standing and sacrificing for this high goal in a distant land at this very hour. And America honors the idealism and the bravery of the sons and daughters of Britain.

The last President to stay at Buckingham Palace was an idealist, without question. At a dinner hosted by King George V, in 1918, Woodrow Wilson made a pledge; with typical American understatement, he vowed that right and justice would become the predominant and controlling force in the world.

President Wilson had come to Europe with his 14 Points for Peace. Many complimented him on his vision; yet some were dubious. Take, for example, the Prime Minister of France. He complained that God, himself, had only 10 commandments. (Laughter.) Sounds familiar. (Laughter.)

At Wilson's high point of idealism, however, Europe was one short generation from Munich and Auschwitz and the Blitz. Looking back, we see the reasons why. The League of Nations, lacking both credibility and will, collapsed at the first challenge of the dictators. Free nations failed to recognize, much less confront, the aggressive evil in plain sight. And so dictators went about their business, feeding resentments and anti-Semitism, bringing death to innocent people in this city and across the world, and filling the last century with violence and genocide.

Through world war and cold war, we learned that idealism, if it is to do any good in this world, requires common purpose and national strength, moral courage and patience in difficult tasks. And now our generation has need of these qualities.

On September the 11th, 2001, terrorists left their mark of murder on my country, and took the lives of 67 British citizens. With the passing of months and years, it is the natural human desire to resume a quiet life and to put that day behind us, as if waking from a dark dream. The hope that danger has passed is comforting, is understanding, and it is false. The attacks that followed -- on Bali, Jakarta, Casablanca, Bombay, Mombassa, Najaf, Jerusalem, Riyadh, Baghdad, and Istanbul -- were not dreams. They're part of the global campaign by terrorist networks to intimidate and demoralize all who oppose them.

These terrorists target the innocent, and they kill by the thousands. And they would, if they gain the weapons they seek, kill by the millions and not be finished. The greatest threat of our age is nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons in the hands of terrorists, and the dictators who aid them. The evil is in plain sight. The danger only increases with denial. Great responsibilities fall once again to the great democracies. We will face these threats with open eyes, and we will defeat them. (Applause.)

The peace and security of free nations now rests on three pillars: First, international organizations must be equal to the challenges facing our world, from lifting up failing states to opposing proliferation.

Like 11 Presidents before me, I believe in the international institutions and alliances that America helped to form and helps to lead. The United States and Great Britain have labored hard to help make the United Nations what it is supposed to be -- an effective instrument of our collective security. In recent months, we've sought and gained three additional resolutions on Iraq -- Resolutions 1441, 1483 and 1511 -- precisely because the global danger of terror demands a global response. The United Nations has no more compelling advocate than your Prime Minister, who at every turn has championed its ideals and appealed to its authority. He understands, as well, that the credibility of the U.N. depends on a willingness to keep its word and to act when action is required.

America and Great Britain have done, and will do, all in their power to prevent the United Nations from solemnly choosing its own irrelevance and inviting the fate of the League of Nations. It's not enough to meet the dangers of the world with resolutions; we must meet those dangers with resolve.

In this century, as in the last, nations can accomplish more together than apart. For 54 years, America has stood with our partners in NATO, the most effective multilateral institution in history. We're committed to this great democratic alliance, and we believe it must have the will and the capacity to act beyond Europe where threats emerge.

My nation welcomes the growing unity of Europe, and the world needs America and the European Union to work in common purpose for the advance of security and justice. America is cooperating with four other nations to meet the dangers posed by North Korea. America believes the IAEA must be true to its purpose and hold Iran to its

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obligations.

Our first choice, and our constant practice, is to work with other responsible governments. We understand, as well, that the success of multilateralism is not measured by adherence to forms alone, the tidiness of the process, but by the results we achieve to keep our nations secure.

The second pillar of peace and security in our world is the willingness of free nations, when the last resort arrives, to retain\* {sic} aggression and evil by force. There are principled objections to the use of force in every generation, and I credit the good motives behind these views.

Those in authority, however, are not judged only by good motivations. The people have given us the duty to defend them. And that duty sometimes requires the violent restraint of violent men. In some cases, the measured use of force is all that protects us from a chaotic world ruled by force.

Most in the peaceful West have no living memory of that kind of world. Yet in some countries, the memories are recent: The victims of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, those who survived the rapists and the death squads, have few qualms when NATO applied force to help end those crimes. The women of Afghanistan, imprisoned in their homes and beaten in the streets and executed in public spectacles, did not reproach us for routing the Taliban. The inhabitants of Iraq's Baathist hell, with its lavish palaces and its torture chambers, with its massive statues and its mass graves, do not miss their fugitive dictator. They rejoiced at his fall.

In all these cases, military action was preceded by diplomatic initiatives and negotiations and ultimatums, and final chances until the final moment. In Iraq, year after year, the dictator was given the chance to account for his weapons programs, and end the nightmare for his people. Now the resolutions he defied have been enforced.

And who will say that Iraq was better off when Saddam Hussein was strutting and killing, or that the world was safer when he held power? Who doubts that Afghanistan is a more just society and less dangerous without Mullah Omar playing host to terrorists from around the world. And Europe, too, is plainly better off with Milosevic answering for his crimes, instead of committing more.

It's been said that those who live near a police station find it hard to believe in the triumph of violence, in the same way free peoples might be tempted to take for granted the orderly societies we have come to know. Europe's peaceful unity is one of the great achievements of the last half-century. And because European countries now resolve differences through negotiation and consensus, there's sometimes an assumption that the entire world functions in the same way. But let us never forget how Europe's unity was achieved -- by allied armies of liberation and NATO armies of defense. And let us never forget, beyond Europe's borders, in a world where oppression and violence are very real, liberation is still a moral goal, and freedom and security still need defenders. (Applause.)

The third pillar of security is our commitment to the global expansion of democracy, and the hope and progress it brings, as the alternative to instability and to hatred and terror. We cannot rely exclusively on military power to assure our long-term security. Lasting peace is gained as justice and democracy advance.

In democratic and successful societies, men and women do not swear allegiance to malcontents and murderers; they turn their hearts and labor to building better lives. And democratic governments do not shelter terrorist camps or attack their peaceful neighbors; they honor the aspirations and dignity of their own people. In our conflict with terror and tyranny, we have an unmatched advantage, a power that cannot be resisted, and that is the appeal of freedom to all mankind.

As global powers, both our nations serve the cause of freedom in many ways, in many places. By promoting development, and fighting famine and AIDS and other diseases, we're fulfilling our moral duties, as well as encouraging stability and building a firmer basis for democratic institutions. By working for justice in Burma, in the Sudan and in Zimbabwe, we give hope to suffering people and improve the chances for stability and progress. By extending the reach of trade we foster prosperity and the habits of liberty. And by advancing freedom in the greater Middle East, we help end a cycle of dictatorship and radicalism that brings millions of people to misery and brings danger to our own people.

The stakes in that region could not be higher. If the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish,

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it will remain a place of stagnation and anger and violence for export. And as we saw in the ruins of two towers, no distance on the map will protect our lives and way of life. If the greater Middle East joins the democratic revolution that has reached much of the world, the lives of millions in that region will be bettered, and a trend of conflict and fear will be ended at its source.

The movement of history will not come about quickly. Because of our own democratic development -- the fact that it was gradual and, at times, turbulent -- we must be patient with others. And the Middle East countries have some distance to travel.

Arab scholars speak of a freedom deficit that has separated whole nations from the progress of our time. The essentials of social and material progress -- limited government, equal justice under law, religious and economic liberty, political participation, free press, and respect for the rights of women -- have been scarce across the region. Yet that has begun to change. In an arc of reform from Morocco to Jordan to Qatar, we are seeing elections and new protections for women and the stirring of political pluralism. Many governments are realizing that theocracy and dictatorship do not lead to national greatness; they end in national ruin. They are finding, as others will find, that national progress and dignity are achieved when governments are just and people are free.

The democratic progress we've seen in the Middle East was not imposed from abroad, and neither will the greater progress we hope to see. Freedom, by definition, must be chosen, and defended by those who choose it. Our part, as free nations, is to ally ourselves with reform, wherever it occurs.

Perhaps the most helpful change we can make is to change in our own thinking. In the West, there's been a certain skepticism about the capacity or even the desire of Middle Eastern peoples for self-government. We're told that Islam is somehow inconsistent with a democratic culture. Yet more than half of the world's Muslims are today contributing citizens in democratic societies. It is suggested that the poor, in their daily struggles, care little for self-government. Yet the poor, especially, need the power of democracy to defend themselves against corrupt elites.

Peoples of the Middle East share a high civilization, a religion of personal responsibility, and a need for freedom as deep as our own. It is not realism to suppose that one-fifth of humanity is unsuited to liberty; it is pessimism and condescension, and we should have none of it. (Applause.)

We must shake off decades of failed policy in the Middle East. Your nation and mine, in the past, have been willing to make a bargain, to tolerate oppression for the sake of stability. Longstanding ties often led us to overlook the faults of local elites. Yet this bargain did not bring stability or make us safe. It merely bought time, while problems festered and ideologies of violence took hold.

As recent history has shown, we cannot turn a blind eye to oppression just because the oppression is not in our own backyard. No longer should we think tyranny is benign because it is temporarily convenient. Tyranny is never benign to its victims, and our great democracies should oppose tyranny wherever it is found. (Applause.)

Now we're pursuing a different course, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East. We will consistently challenge the enemies of reform and confront the allies of terror. We will expect a higher standard from our friends in the region, and we will meet our responsibilities in Afghanistan and in Iraq by finishing the work of democracy we have begun.

There were good-faith disagreements in your country and mine over the course and timing of military action in Iraq. Whatever has come before, we now have only two options: to keep our word, or to break our word. The failure of democracy in Iraq would throw its people back into misery and turn that country over to terrorists who wish to destroy us. Yet democracy will succeed in Iraq, because our will is firm, our word is good, and the Iraqi people will not surrender their freedom. (Applause.)

Since the liberation of Iraq, we have seen changes that could hardly have been imagined a year ago. A new Iraqi police force protects the people, instead of bullying them. More than 150 Iraqi newspapers are now in circulation, printing what they choose, not what they're ordered. Schools are open with textbooks free of propaganda. Hospitals are functioning and are well-supplied. Iraq has a new currency, the first battalion of a new army, representative local governments, and a Governing Council with an aggressive timetable for national sovereignty. This is substantial progress. And much of it has proceeded faster than similar efforts in Germany and Japan after

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World War II.

Yet the violence we are seeing in Iraq today is serious. And it comes from Baathist holdouts and Jihadists from other countries, and terrorists drawn to the prospect of innocent bloodshed. It is the nature of terrorism and the cruelty of a few to try to bring grief in the loss to many. The armed forces of both our countries have taken losses, felt deeply by our citizens. Some families now live with a burden of great sorrow. We cannot take the pain away. But these families can know they are not alone. We pray for their strength; we pray for their comfort; and we will never forget the courage of the ones they loved.

The terrorists have a purpose, a strategy to their cruelty. They view the rise of democracy in Iraq as a powerful threat to their ambitions. In this, they are correct. They believe their acts of terror against our coalition, against international aid workers and against innocent Iraqis, will make us recoil and retreat. In this, they are mistaken. (Applause.)

We did not charge hundreds of miles into the heart of Iraq and pay a bitter cost of casualties, and liberate 25 million people, only to retreat before a band of thugs and assassins. (Applause.) We will help the Iraqi people establish a peaceful and democratic country in the heart of the Middle East. And by doing so, we will defend our people from danger.

The forward strategy of freedom must also apply to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It's a difficult period in a part of the world that has known many. Yet, our commitment remains firm. We seek justice and dignity. We seek a viable, independent state for the Palestinian people, who have been betrayed by others for too long. (Applause.) We seek security and recognition for the state of Israel, which has lived in the shadow of random death for too long. (Applause.) These are worthy goals in themselves, and by reaching them we will also remove an occasion and excuse for hatred and violence in the broader Middle East.

Achieving peace in the Holy Land is not just a matter of the shape of a border. As we work on the details of peace, we must look to the heart of the matter, which is the need for a viable Palestinian democracy. Peace will not be achieved by Palestinian rulers who intimidate opposition, who tolerate and profit from corruption and maintain their ties to terrorist groups. These are the methods of the old elites, who time and again had put their own self-interest above the interest of the people they claim to serve. The long-suffering Palestinian people deserve better. They deserve true leaders, capable of creating and governing a Palestinian state.

Even after the setbacks and frustrations of recent months, goodwill and hard effort can bring about a Palestinian state and a secure Israel. Those who would lead a new Palestine should adopt peaceful means to achieve the rights of their people and create the reformed institutions of a stable democracy.

Israel should freeze settlement construction, dismantle unauthorized outposts, end the daily humiliation of the Palestinian people, and not prejudice final negotiations with the placements of walls and fences.

Arab states should end incitement in their own media, cut off public and private funding for terrorism, and establish normal relations with Israel.

Leaders in Europe should withdraw all favor and support from any Palestinian ruler who fails his people and betrays their cause. And Europe's leaders -- and all leaders -- should strongly oppose anti-Semitism, which poisons public debates over the future of the Middle East. (Applause.)

Ladies and gentlemen, we have great objectives before us that make our Atlantic alliance as vital as it has ever been. We will encourage the strength and effectiveness of international institutions. We will use force when necessary in the defense of freedom. And we will raise up an ideal of democracy in every part of the world. On these three pillars we will build the peace and security of all free nations in a time of danger.

So much good has come from our alliance of conviction and might. So much now depends on the strength of this alliance as we go forward. America has always found strong partners in London, leaders of good judgment and blunt counsel and backbone when times are tough. And I have found all those qualities in your current Prime Minister, who has my respect and my deepest thanks. (Applause.)

The ties between our nations, however, are deeper than the relationship between leaders. These ties endure because they are formed by the experience and responsibilities and adversity we have shared. And in the memory of our peoples, there will always be one experience, one central event when the seal was fixed on the friendship between Britain and the United States: The arrival in Great Britain of more than 1.5 million American soldiers and airmen in the 1940s was a turning point in the second world war. For many Britons, it was a first close look at Americans, other than in the movies. Some of you here today may still remember the "friendly invasion." Our lads, they took some getting used to. There was even a saying about what many of them were up to -- in addition to be "overpaid and over here." (Laughter.)

At a reunion in North London some years ago, an American pilot who had settled in England after his military service, said, "Well, I'm still over here, and probably overpaid. So two out of three isn't bad." (Laughter.)

In that time of war, the English people did get used to the Americans. They welcomed soldiers and fliers into their villages and homes, and took to calling them, "our boys." About 70,000 of those boys did their part to affirm our special relationship. They returned home with English brides.

Americans gained a certain image of Britain, as well. We saw an island threatened on every side, a leader who did not waver, and a country of the firmest character. And that has not changed. The British people are the sort of partners you want when serious work needs doing. The men and women of this Kingdom are kind and steadfast and generous and brave. And America is fortunate to call this country our closest friend in the world.

May God bless you all. (Applause.)

END 2:03 P.M. (Local)

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January 2, 2004

2330.02

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: John H. Thomas

Attached is a background sheet from a person who apparently served on the USS Iowa with me, back when I was a midshipman. He has a pretty good background.

We might want to see if there is some way a person like that could be helpful. I do not remember him, and I have seen him only once since then, when he visited the Pentagon.

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/28/03 Thomas ltr to SecDef  
draft SecDef ltr to Thomas

DHR:dh  
010204-9

.....  
Please respond by 1/31/04

*CG to  
Richard DeLamy*

2 Jan 04

OSD 09000-04

SecDef

Mr. John H. Thomas  
P.O. Box 1422  
Rancho Santa Fe, CA 92067

LASTY OF FILE

12/29

Dear John:

Thank you for your kind letter. I am pleased Barbara, Bill, and you enjoyed your visit to the Pentagon.

I appreciate the kind words, and your interest in serving. I passed your information to our General Counsel, Jim Haynes, to consider if there may be a way for you to get involved.

With best wishes for a joyous Holiday Season,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be the initials 'OK' or a similar stylized mark.



87 L  
703 000 10 11 23 2

November 28, 2003

Dear Don,

It was great to see you again. You and your staff were so gracious to me, Barbara, and Bill Whalen.

We really enjoyed your showing us through your office. What a strong feeling of history is present there. Many thanks from your Iowa shipmates.

Thank you, also, for the photos. I am proud to have them. You're my hero—the wisest and most dynamic SecDef.

America has gained much from your innovative, long, and distinguished service, especially during the last three years.

Barbara has included you on her daily "Prayer List," asking for your continued strength and good health in these stressful times. I believe it works.

I saw Tom Evans recently. He looks "fit as a fiddle." He asked me to give you his best wishes.

If all one knew were what he learned from the media, he would be depressed about how America is faring in the world. However, almost everyone I talk with supports you and your skillful efforts throughout the world. We feel we are winning, with each day that passes. The reasonable prospects for a better world are exciting.

Hope you bag the "Ace of Spades" soon. I think you will.

If I may assist you in any way, please let me know. On that subject, please see the enclosed.

Barbara, Bill Whalen, and I send our best wishes, strong support, and thanks to you.

Sincerely,



P.O. Box 1422  
Rancho Santa Fe, CA 92067

U20462"/03

**John H. Thomas  
Lawyer  
P.O. Box 1422  
Rancho Santa Fe, CA 92067**

(b)(6)

November 28, 2003

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I hereby offer my services in the war against terrorism.

**MY BACKGROUND:**

- NROTC Regular, Univ. of Virginia (ranked 1<sup>st</sup> in NROTC class).
- Phi Beta Kappa (Junior year); Fulbright Fellowship, France (Modern European History).
- Surface Navy (active duty) and Intelligence (Reserves).
- Univ. of Va. Law School; Order of the Coif.
- 35 years of law practice in California.
- Taught Constitutional law at a law school.

**WHAT I CAN ACCOMPLISH:**

- a). Perhaps of use in GTMO, Legal or intelligence skills; or
- b). In the U.S., as a lawyer used to counter the expected onslaught of ACLU, etc., actions, concerning GTMO prisoner and related matters.

**DETAILS:**

- I will work where needed.
- I seek no payment for my services.

Since our meeting in October, I have given a lot of thought to this; I am serious; I think I can be useful.

Sincerely yours,



John H. Thomas

11-L-0559/OSD/41995

January 2, 2004

000,5

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: War on Terror

Here is an interesting article by Bernard Lewis that you might make some use of.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Lewis, Bernard. "Democracy and the Enemies of Freedom," *Wall Street Journal*, December 22, 2003.

DHR:dh  
010204-19



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

cc: DSD

2 Jan 04

OSD 09002-04

# Democracy and the Enemies of Freedom

By Bernard Lewis

The American military intervention in Afghanistan and then in Iraq has had two declared objectives: the first and more immediate, to deter and defeat terrorism; the second, to bring freedom, sometimes called democracy, to the peoples of these countries and beyond.

The sponsors and organizers of terrorism are of two kinds, with very different purposes, even though they can and frequently do cooperate. One of the two is local or regional, and consists of survivors of the former Iraqi regime, encouraged and supported by the governments of other countries in the region that feel endangered by what might happen in Iraq. The aim of these groups is to protect—or, in the case of Iraq, restore—the tyrannies under which these countries have lived so long. If, as many urge, the Americans decide to abandon this costly and troublesome operation and simply go home, this might just possibly be enough to satisfy the local sponsors of terror. Some of them might even offer the resumption of what passes for friendly relations.

\* \* \*

But there are others who would see the eviction of the Americans from Afghanistan and Iraq not as the end but as the beginning—as a victory not in a war but in a battle; one step in a longer and wider war that must be pursued until the final and global victory.

The Americans too, have proclaimed a larger and longer purpose for their intervention; not just to defeat and end terrorism, but to give to the long-oppressed peoples of Afghanistan, Iraq and eventually other countries the opportunity to end the corrupt and oppressive regimes under which they have suffered for decades, and to restore or create a political order respected by and answerable to the people. This goal evokes strong support among many in the region. But, because of both past experience and current discourse, that support is understandably wary.

Certainly, the creation of a democracy in the Middle East will not be quick or easy, any more than it was in Europe or the Americas. There, too, it must come in gradual stages. Going too far, too fast would give an immediate advantage to those skilled in the arts of manipulation and of intimidation. As the example of Algeria demonstrates, it can even lead to a violent clash between the two.

The kind of dictatorship that exists in the Middle East today has to no small extent been the result of modernization, more specifically of European influence and example. This included the only European political model that really worked in the Middle East—that of the one-party state, either in the Nazi or the communist version, which did not differ greatly from one another. In these systems, the party is not, as in the West, an organization for attracting votes


and winning elections. It is part of the apparatus of government, particularly concerned with indoctrination and enforcement. The Baath Party has a double ancestry, both fascist and communist, and still represents both trends very well.

But beyond these there are older traditions, well represented in both the political literature and political experience of the Islamic Middle East: traditions of government under law, by consent, even by contract.

Changes in the spirit of these traditions

**Even after Saddam Hussein's arrest, the forces of tyranny remain very strong.**

would offer an opportunity to other versions of Islam besides the fanatical and intolerant creed of the terrorists. Though at present widely held and richly endowed, this version is far from representative of mainstream Islam through the centuries. The traditions of command and obedience are indeed deep-rooted, but there are other



elements in Islamic tradition that could contribute to a more open and freer form of government: the rejection by the traditional jurists of despotic and arbitrary rule in favor of contract in the formation and consensus in the conduct of government; and their insistence that the mightiest of rulers, no less than the humblest of his servants, is bound by the law.

Another element is the acceptance, indeed the requirement of tolerance, embodied in such dicta as the Quranic verse "there is no compulsion in religion," and the early tradition "diversity in my community is God's mercy." This is carried a step further in the Sufi ideal of dialogue between faiths in a common search for the fulfillment of shared aspirations.

The attempt to bring freedom to the Middle East evokes two fears: one in the U.S. and still

more in Europe, that it will fail; and the other, among many of the present rulers of the region, that it will succeed.

Certainly, policies of political liberalization in Afghanistan and in Iraq offer a mortal threat to regimes that can survive only by tyranny at home and terror abroad. The enemies of freedom are dangerous: unrestrained by any kind of scruple and unhampered by either compunction or compassion, even for their own people. They are willing to use not just individuals and families, but whole nations as suicide bombers to be sacrificed as required in order to defeat and eject the infidel enemy and establish their own supremacy.

The creation of a free society, as the history of existing democracies in the world makes clear, is no easy matter. The experience of the Turkish republic over the last half century and of some other Muslim countries more recently has demonstrated two things: first, that it is indeed very difficult to create a democracy in such a society, and second, that although difficult, it is not impossible.

The study of Islamic history and of the vast and rich Islamic political literature encourages the belief that it may well be possible to develop democratic institutions—not necessarily in our Western definition of that much misused term, but in one deriving from their own history and culture, and ensuring, in their way, limited government under law, consultation and openness, in a civilized and humane society. There is enough in the traditional culture of Islam on the one hand and the modern experience of the Muslim peoples on the other to provide the basis for an advance towards freedom in the true sense of that word.

\* \* \*

Even after the arrest of Saddam Hussein this week, the forces of tyranny and terror remain very strong and the outcome is still far from certain. But as the struggle rages and intensifies, certain things that were previously obscure are becoming clear. The war against terror and the quest for freedom are inextricably linked, and neither can succeed without the other. The struggle is no longer limited to one or two countries, as some Westerners still manage to believe. It has acquired first a regional and then a global dimension, with profound consequences for all of us.

If freedom fails and terror triumphs, the peoples of Islam will be the first and greatest victims. They will not be alone, and many others will suffer with them.

Mr. Lewis, professor emeritus of history at Princeton, is the author of "The Crisis of Islam" and "From Babel to Dragomans," out in the Spring from Random House Trade Paperback and the Oxford University Press, respectively.

By Vernon L. Smith

With the capture of Saddam Hussein, President Bush has a great symbolic victory against his critics. However, the unfinished Iraqi oil

dealers who value them most for production, development or exploration. The auction could begin by selling existing producing oil properties, refineries, pipelines, and gathering, separating and terminal facilities over the ne-

It is better, because spending for power

11-L-0559/OSD/41997

5/1

January 2, 2004

Philippines

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. Pete Pace  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Lessons from Philippines for Iraq

Attached is an interesting article on the Philippines.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Kaltman, Al. "Lessons for Iraq" undated, unsourced

DHR:dh  
010204-18

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

2 Jan 04

OSD 09003-04

By Al Kaltman

Harry Truman once remarked that the only thing new in this world is the history we haven't learned. One hundred years ago, an American army won a relatively bloodless war in the Philippines, and then learned the hard way that a war isn't over when major military operations end. Iraq is not the Philippines. In addition to the span of time between the two wars and the advances in weaponry and war fighting, there are important differences in geography and the customs and cultures of the Filipinos and Iraqis. However, Gen. Arthur MacArthur, who was the military governor of the Philippines from May 1900 until July 1901, faced challenges that more closely resemble the situation in Iraq today than any other U.S. military history experience. He was America's first viceroy, and his son, Douglas, used the lessons learned by his father to model his own successful stewardship of Japan at the end of World War II. Those lessons are still instructive today.

At the conclusion of the Spanish American War, President McKinley reluctantly decided that the United States had no choice but to purchase the Philippines from Spain. As he explained: "The truth is I didn't want the Philippines, and when they came to us as a gift from the gods, I did not know what to do with them. ... And, one night it came to me. We could not give them back to Spain — that would be cowardly and dishonorable; we could not turn them over to France or Germany — that would be bad business; we could not leave them to themselves — they were unfit for self-government and they would have anarchy and misrule. There was nothing left for us to do but to take them ... and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift ... them."

The treaty to end the Spanish American War was signed in December 1898. At that time the Army had 20,000 soldiers in Manila. They were surrounded by a 40,000 man Philippine army. In February, the Americans began offensive operations and defeated the Filipinos in a series of engagements over the

# Lessons for Iraq

## Gen. MacArthur provides a good strategy

course of the next 10 months. By mid-November 1899, large scale military operations had ended. The U.S. government declared that the war was over, and Gen. Elwell Otis, Gen. MacArthur's predecessor, was greeted as a conquering hero upon his return to the United States. However, the guerrilla, that is, the terrorist war, had only just begun.

From December 1899 to July 1901, American forces would engage the enemy 1,697 times,

**As terrorist attacks upon his soldiers mounted, Gen. MacArthur concluded that until the Filipino people stopped aiding and abetting those who were ambushing and laying booby traps for his men, the country could never be secure.**

and suffer 1,699 casualties. To secure the Philippines, the U.S. army would require 125,000 soldiers, more than 6 times the number that was needed to "win the war." The United States had paid \$20 million for the Philippines; it would spend over \$200 million to defeat the terrorists.

Wearing civilian clothing and working in the fields, the terrorists were indistinguishable from innocent civilians. One U.S. officer described how they would "slip away, go out into the bushes, get their guns, and waylay you. ... You rout them and scatter them; they hide their guns and take to their houses and claim to be amigos." The

terrorists targeted for assassination Filipinos who provided assistance to the U.S. forces or cooperated with the Americans. As a result, Filipinos who were supportive of the American efforts to bring peace were not only intimidated and afraid to identify terrorists or reveal their hideouts, but also felt compelled to assist them logistically and to provide intelligence on American troop movements.

As terrorist attacks upon his soldiers mounted, Gen. MacArthur concluded that until the Filipino people stopped aiding and abetting those who were ambushing and laying booby traps for his men, the country could never be secure. He reluctantly ordered the arrest and imprisonment of anyone suspected of harboring or helping the terrorists. Those arrested were to be detained until all terrorist attacks had ceased. Following Gen. MacArthur's orders, U.S. commanders interned large numbers of Filipinos.

Gen. MacArthur then ordered his army commanders to leave their 500 garrisons and sweep the countryside, cities, towns and villages in a relentless search for the enemy and his stores of weapons. At the same time, he instituted a program of prisoner releases in exchange for turning in terrorists and weapons.

His tactics met with considerable success; however, sporadic terrorist attacks continued. Gen. MacArthur believed that until the country was pacified, "military authority was paramount and exclusive." The Army did not turn over control of the Philippines to a civilian administration until 32 months after the "end of the war."

Gen. MacArthur understood that pacification could not be achieved "by force alone." He made it clear that Filipino culture and customs would be respected. Under Gen. MacArthur, Filipinos were accorded the same personal freedoms enjoyed by U.S. citizens.

As he explained, "American institutions are on trial."

He assigned officers to investigate the entire spectrum of issues involved in establishing a nation's infrastructure. Kenneth Ray Young, in his biography of the general, writes that under Gen. MacArthur's leadership, "new health and sanitation laws were implemented, legal codes were revised, schools and hospitals were built and a tariff system was developed."

Until the country was secure, Gen. MacArthur was unwilling to establish a Philippine army. He did not want to put weapons in the hands of men who, after dark, might change into civilian clothes and use their American supplied arms to kill U.S. soldiers. However, he did recruit and train a number of Filipinos who were attached to Army units. These men, who served as interpreters and scouts, would after pacification form the nucleus of a national army.

Gen. MacArthur did permit the creation of local police forces, but they were armed only with pistols and shotguns. He also allowed the creation of elected self-governing councils who were given the responsibility of carrying out the basic tasks of municipal governance such as collecting garbage and providing potable drinking water; however all of the actions taken by these councils were subject to the approval of the local Army garrison commander.

He permitted the Filipinos to exercise free speech, except that no one, and that included religious leaders and school teachers as well as intellectuals, journalists and politicians, was allowed to advocate violent resistance to the U.S. administration.

Gen. MacArthur understood that it was unrealistic to expect the Filipino population, all but a small number of whom were illiterate, to embrace Western ideals and democratic principles. They first had to be educated. Using U.S. soldiers as

teachers, he began a widespread English language education program that included instruction on the American political system, Constitution and Bill of Rights. The program he began was so effective that at the start of World War II the Philippines had the highest literacy rate in Asia with English as its de facto national language.

When military rule ended, William Howard Taft became the first U.S. civil governor of the Philippines. He believed the Filipinos "would need training for 50 or 100 years" before they would be ready to assume the responsibilities of self-rule under a U.S. styled constitution with democratically elected leaders. It was 1946 before the Philippines became independ-

**Gen. MacArthur understood that pacification could not be achieved 'by force alone.' He made it clear that Filipino culture and customs would be respected. As he explained, 'American institutions are on trial.'**

ent. Ferdinand Marcos, who ruled the Philippines as a dictator from 1972 to 1986, demonstrated that even after many years of nurturing and training in the principles of American government and individual liberty, democracy is still a very fragile and slow flowering plant in third world countries.

While Gen. MacArthur dealt with many of the same problems that Americans face today in Iraq, because the Philippines are an island archipelago, he did not have to deal with porous borders and the introduction of a seemingly unending stream of armed ter-

rorists from neighboring countries. We can only speculate as to the recommendations he would have made to prevent these incursions. Whatever he might have asked for, whether it was for more troops to patrol and try to seal the borders, permission to strike at terrorist training camps in neighboring countries, or something else altogether, it would have been with the understanding that the Iraqi people cannot begin their long march down the road to democracy until the terrorist threat has been eliminated, and that will be impossible as long as terrorists can continue to sneak into Iraq.

The Bush administration recognizes that the military occupation will be costly, and that full sovereignty cannot be restored to Iraq until the terrorists are defeated. However, for the peace and stability of the region, the other prerequisite to the restoration of sovereignty should be the widespread understanding and acceptance by the Iraqi people of the mechanisms and principles of secular democratic self-government. Of the lessons to be drawn from the U.S. experience in the Philippines, the most important, but one our government apparently has yet to learn, is that an extensive, long-term political education program will need to be successfully conducted if democratic institutions are to take root in Iraq.

Kofi Anan, Jacques Chirac and the others who are calling for an early U.S. withdrawal from Iraq are naive or disingenuous. The result would be to hand Iraq over to the radical Islamists. This would leave the country in a worse state than it was before we set out to effect regime change. American blood would have been spilled for a pyrrhic victory.

*Al Kaltman is a graduate of the University of the Philippines and has a Ph.D. in political science from the George Washington University. He is the author of "The Genius of Robert E. Lee, and Cigars, Whiskey and Winning: Leadership Lessons from General Ulysses S. Grant."*

9:14 AM

TO: David Chu  
Dov Zakheim  
Gen. Pete Pace

CC: Marc Thiessen  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 5, 2004

SUBJECT: **Increase in End Strength**

Please prepare a draft reply to the members of Congress on their End Strength letter. This is an important policy issue.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
10504.05

*Closed  
SMA/DJS  
1/8*

Please respond by: 1/15/04

*320.2*

*655*

*5 Jan 04*

OSD 09006-04

**SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL**

Print Date: 6/16/2004

6-22-04 *jlz*

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DOR **6/16/2004**

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SUBJECT **INCREASE IN END STRENGTH**

KEYWORDS **SNOW FLAKE, GEN PETE PACE**

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January 2, 2004

Iraq

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Oil-for-Food

Shouldn't we do some work on finding the extent to which the UN Oil-for-Food program was abused?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
010204-29

.....  
Please respond by 1/30/04

cc: Steve Cambone

Feith is working.  
V/r  
*Jaymie*

2 Jan 04

OSD 09007-04

120

5:26 PM

Via Facsimile

TO: Amb. Zalmay Khalizad

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*

DATE: January 5, 2004

SUBJECT:

Afghanistan

Congratulations on the successful work of Loya Jirga. I know your involvement made a big difference, and I thank you so much for your selfless contribution.

Please extend my warm congratulations to President Karzai on the successful role he played in moving his country forward. It is an impressive accomplishment. Also, please give him my very best wishes for the New Year.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
010504.19

00245-24

5 Jan 04

OSD 09021-04

5:26 PM

*Via Facsimile*

TO: Amb. Zalmay Khalizad

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: January 5, 2004

SUBJECT:

Congratulations on the successful work of Loya Jirga. I know your involvement made a big difference, and I thank you so much for your selfless contribution.

Please extend my warm congratulations to President Karzai on the successful role he played in moving his country forward. It is an impressive accomplishment. Also, please give him my very best wishes for the New Year.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
010504.19

OSD 00245-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42004

Afghanistan

5 Jan 04

10:30 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: January 6, 2004  
 SUBJECT: End of Year Summary

*Larry Di Rita*  
 1/13

020 DOD

Colin Powell had a good paper in at the end of the year. We ought to have thought about something like that around here; a year end summary. Even if we just did something internally on our accomplishments, our initiatives. An atta boy kind of thing. But doing it publicly was a good idea, I thought.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
 010604.12

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*✓*  
 2/2

*1/10*  
 → Sec Def -

*Good idea. Our accomplishments/  
 initiatives / priorities, properly done,  
 would be a good pamphlet. I  
 have some people working on a draft  
 in Public Affairs.*

*D. RL*

*ES:  
 Can you get  
 a copy? Thanks,  
 Jaymie*

*Tan 04*

*TEN  
 1/13*

TO: Larry Di Rita  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **DR**  
 DATE: January 7, 2004  
 SUBJECT: **Press Briefings**

000.7 SD

At the last press conference we had on Tuesday, go through it and find out how many times the questioner said the question the issue was rigged, or is accused of being political and where they put a negative cast into the question.

I want to see out of the total number of questions how many questions had that kind of a turn to them. I know Jaymie McIntyre did, and another did on BRAC, and a couple of others did. Let's catalog it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
 010704.01

Please respond by: ~~1/18/04~~ 1/11/04

7 Jan 04

OSD 09023-04

7:35 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: January 7, 2004  
SUBJECT: **Patricia Harrison**

See what Torie Clarke thinks of Pat Harrison.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
010704.06

*Attach: Bio on Patricia de Stacy Harrison*

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

~~1/18/04~~ 1/19/04

0910 STATE

OSD 09024-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42007

*January*



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# U.S. DEPARTMENT of STATE

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Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs

Home > Assistant Secretary Harrison

*1/6  
SecDef As Discussed,  
D, ltr*



## Patricia de Stacy Harrison

### Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs

Patricia (Pat) de Stacy Harrison was sworn in as the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs on October 2, 2001. As an entrepreneur, author and political leader, Ms. Harrison has over 20 years experience in communication strategy, coalition, and constituency building. A nationally known spokesperson prior to and during her term as Co-Chairman of the Republican Party, she was the first Co-Chairman of Italian heritage and the first Co-Chairman not previously a member of the Republican National Committee.

*[Handwritten signature]*  
*TLC*

As founder and President of the National Women's Economic Alliance, she worked to identify women and minorities for leadership roles in business and politics. Through The Decade for Democracy, a mentoring exchange program sponsored by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the U.S. Small Business Administration, Ms. Harrison worked with women entrepreneurs in emerging democracies, to help them achieve within their new free enterprise systems.

As a founding partner of E. Bruce Harrison Company, among the country's top ten owner-managed public affairs firms prior to its sale in 1996, she created and directed programs in the public interest comprising diverse stakeholder groups including the National Environmental Development Association, a partnership of labor, agriculture and industry working for better environmental solutions together.

Appointed by President Bush (1990) to the President's Export Council, U.S. Department of Commerce, she served on the Executive Committee and worked to strengthen export promotion programs on behalf of U.S. business. She also chaired the International Committee, Small Business Advisory Council, Small Business Administration and in 1992, was appointed to serve on the United States Trade Representative's Service Policy Advisory Council.

The author of *A Seat At The Table* and *America's New Women Entrepreneurs*, Ms. Harrison received an Honorary Doctorate from the American University of Rome, in 2002. In 2000, she served as a Visiting Fellow, Institute of Public Service, The Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania. In 1992 she was a Visiting Fellow at the John F. Kennedy School of Government.

Ms. Harrison is the recipient of many awards and honors, including the 1999 Global Women's Leadership Award; 1999 New York Black Republican Council's Woman of The Year Award; 1998 Hispanic Heritage Leadership

11-L-0559/OSD/42008

Award; 1988 Entrepreneur Of the Year/Arthur Young Company and Venture Magazine; 1989 Distinguished Woman Award, Northwood Institute; and 1997 Ladies Home Journal "50 Most Influential Women in Politics."

She is a former member of the Executive Committee, National Italian American Foundation; a former Thomas Colloquium Free Enterprise Chair Guest Lecturer at Youngstown State University, in Ohio; and a former Chairman of the Board, Guest Services, Inc.

Ms. Harrison is a graduate of American University. She is married and the mother of three children.


[Back to the top](#)

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7:48 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
DATE: January 7, 2004  
SUBJECT: **Press Briefings**

I would like to know after each press briefing or event which networks carry me live, so we can sort of keep track of it and know what kind of reach we are getting, and what works and what doesn't.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
010704.11

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

~~1/20/04~~

OSD 09025-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42010

600.75D

7 Jan 04

7:52 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *A*

DATE: January 7, 2004

SUBJECT:

Find out who this Col. Irwin is. We want to figure out why he was saying what he was saying.

Also find out who was running the Command Center on that domestic event that Cambone talked about yesterday. He sounded like he did a good job.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
010704.13

Please respond by:

~~1/30/04~~      1/11/04

**OB**  
**1/30**

*384*

OSD 09026-04

*7 Jan 04*

1/9  
SD:

9:52 AM

C/110

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: January 7, 2004  
SUBJECT: Attached Article

This is a good argument to stop calling Iraq the "Central Front" on Terrorism.

Read this Krauthammer article. It makes the point that nations understandably have different self-interests, and that, for a half century, anti-communism muted

erly

2b

more lethal as the years go on.

His point about the French foreign minister refusing a reporter's questions as to which side he wanted to win as between the U.S. and Iraq, is that it wasn't pique it was that ground zero was not Paris. The people of France have to know that Paris is ground zero, just as the rest of the world is, if we fail to deal effectively with the problems we face.

I think there is a thread in his article that's worth thinking about as rework sections of the one and four briefings,

OSD 09028-04

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
010804.01

Attach: "A Farewell to Allies" C. Krauthammer, Time Magazine, 1/12/04

Please respond by:

During the Cold War we had the central front as well as the Southern Flank & Northern Flank. For the most part the latter two were fakes (but we convinced ourselves the threat was real) Today, all fronts are real and the French are trying to convince themselves that there is only one front. 1/2 Daymie

Charles Krauthammer

# A Farewell to Allies

Now they are neutrals. America can stand tall without them

**W**ITHIN DAYS AFTER SADDAM'S CAPTURE, FRANCE, GERMANY and Russia announced their willingness to consider relieving Iraq's crushing debt burden. This was no burst of conscience about unrepayable billions lent Saddam to squander on grotesque palaces and grotesque weapons. This was the wind shifting America's way in Iraq—and the neutrals adjusting course accordingly.

But this is not the beginning of a great reconciliation. These countries were no help before the war, during the war or after the war. France tried to rally the world to stop the U.S. from deposing Saddam. Russia was sending night-vision goggles to Saddam. Not one lifted a finger to help the postwar reconstruction.

Some Americans are bitter about this, others merely confused. Democrats think it's our fault. They charge Bush with mishandling relations with the allies. There is an etymological problem. Events have overtaken vocabulary. These countries are not allies. It is sheer laziness now that counts France and Germany as old allies, sheer naiveté that counts Russia as a new one.

It should not surprise us. Countries have different interests. For a half-century, anticommunism papered over those differences, but communism is gone. Europe lives by Lord Palmerston's axiom: nations have no permanent allies, only permanent interests. Alliance with America is no longer a permanent interest. The postwar alliance that once structured and indeed defined our world is dead. It died in 2003.

To be sure, there are some countries that see their ultimate security as dependent upon the international order maintained by the U.S. These are not insignificant countries, and over time they may become the kernel of an entirely new alliance system. They include Anglo-Saxons (Britain, Australia) and a few Europeans (Italy, Spain, Poland, other newly liberated East European countries). They understand that the sinews of stability—free commerce, open sea lanes, regional balances of power, nonproliferation, deterrence—are provided overwhelmingly by the American colossus. They understand that without it, the world collapses into chaos and worse. They believe in the American umbrella and are committed to helping the umbrella holder.

As for the rest, they are content to leave America out there

twisting in the wind. They do not wish us destroyed—they are not crazy—but they are not unhappy to see us distracted, diminished and occasionally defeated.

When the Iraq war began, the French Foreign Minister refused a reporter's question as to which side he wanted to win. This was not a mere expression of pique. When the existential enemy was Nazism or communism, the world rallied to the American protector. But Arab-Islamic radicalism is different. Its hatreds are wide, but its strategic focus is America. Its monument is ground zero. Ground zero is not in Paris.

The neutrals know that perhaps in the long run they too will be threatened. For now, however, they are quite content to see the U.S. carry the fight against the new barbarians. The U.S. was attacked; it will carry the fight regardless.

For much of the world, the war on terrorism offers not just a free ride but a strategic bonus: American diminishment. France unabashedly declares that American dominance is intolerable and the world should by right be not unipolar but multipolar. Much of the rest of the world believes it but does not have France's nerve to say it.

The hard fact is that war on many fronts is consuming and containing American power. While America spends blood and treasure in faraway places like Baghdad, China builds the economic and military superpower of the future.

Europe knits itself into another continental colossus. And the rest of the world goes about its business. Meanwhile, the Americans take on the axis of evil one by one.

In the 1990s, containment of America took a different form. With the acquiescence of a Democratic Administration uncomfortable with American power, silk ropes were fashioned to tie down Gulliver: a myriad of treaties, protocols and prohibitions on everything from carbon emissions to land mines to nuclear testing. With the advent of the Bush Administration, contemptuous of these restraints, that would no longer work. Enter al-Qaeda.

The neutrals may wax poetic about America's sins, but they do not hate us. The problem is not emotion, but calculation. At root, it is a matter of interests. Interests diverge. No use wailing about it. The grand alliances are dead. With a few trusted friends, America must carry on alone. ■



ILLUSTRATION FOR TIME BY GEOFFREY DEAN

9:52 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: January 7, 2004  
SUBJECT: **Attached Article**

CC: DSJ  
Andy Marshall

Read this Krauthammer article. It makes the point that nations understandably have different self-interests, and that, for a half century, anti-communism muted those differences. Now communism is gone.

It could be that the new cause, anti-terrorism, if we fashion it right and properly present it, can be the thing that will mute the natural self-interests of nations.

The threat we face is no less lethal. It will be increasingly more dangerous and more lethal as the years go on.

His point about the French foreign minister refusing a reporter's questions as to which side he wanted to win as between the U.S. and Iraq, is that it wasn't pique – it was that ground zero was not Paris. The people of France have to know that Paris is ground zero, just as the rest of the world is, if we fail to deal effectively with the problems we face.

I think there is a thread in his article that's worth thinking about as rework sections of the one and four briefings.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
010804.01

Attach: "A Farewell to Allies" C. Krauthammer, Time Magazine, 1/12/04

*2/20*  
*will be incorporated*  
*in Battle of Ideas +*  
*GWOT Briefs.*  
*J.*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

11-L-0559/OSD/42014

Charles Krauthammer

# A Farewell to Allies

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twisting in the wind. They do not wish us destroyed—they are not crazy—but they are not unhappy to see us distracted, diminished and occasionally defeated.

When the Iraq war began, the French Foreign Minister refused a reporter's question as to which side he wanted to win. This was not a mere expression of pique. When the existential enemy was Nazism or communism, the world rallied to the American protector. But Arab-Islamic radicalism is different. Its hatreds are wide, but its strategic focus is America. Its monument is ground zero. Ground zero is not in Paris.

The neutrals that persist in the long run they are threatened. For now, however, they are quite content to see the U.S. carry the fight against the new barbarians. The U.S. was attacked; it will carry the fight regardless.

For much of the world, the war on terrorism offers not just a free ride but a strategic bonus: American diminishment. France unabashedly declares that American dominance is intolerable and the world should by right be not unipolar but multipolar. Much of the rest of the world believes it but does not have France's nerve to say it.

The hard fact is that war on many fronts is consuming and containing American power. While America spends blood and treasure in faraway places like Baghdad, China builds the economic and military superpower of the future.

Europe knits itself into another continental colossus. And the rest of the world goes about its business. Meanwhile, the Americans take on the axis of evil one by one.

In the 1990s, containment of America took a different form. With the acquiescence of a Democratic Administration uncomfortable with American power, silk ropes were fashioned to tie down Gulliver: a myriad of treaties, protocols and prohibitions on everything from carbon emissions to land mines to nuclear testing. With the advent of the Bush Administration, contemptuous of these restraints, that would no longer work. Enter al-Qaeda.

The neutrals may wax poetic about America's sins, but they do not hate us. The problem is not emotion, but calculation. At root, it is a matter of interests. Interests diverge. No use wailing about it. The grand alliances are dead. With a few trusted friends, America must carry on alone. ■



ILLUSTRATION FOR THIS DEPARTMENTS BY GARY



# HOW NOW, C

## Big Beef was doing fine until disease felled a heifer. Will consumer anxiety cripple the industry?

By CATHY BOOTH THOMAS DALLAS

**W**HEN FIONA SIGALLA CROSSED back into the U.S. from Canada a few days after Christmas, she expected the usual questions about firearms—routine in these times of terrorist threats. But the border cop in his bulletproof SWAT uniform took one look inside her car and immediately seized the contraband held by Sigalla's 8-year-old daughter: her lunch leftovers. "He looked slightly embarrassed, but he confiscated my McDonald's trash," Sigalla says with a chuckle. "Of course, you notice that I wasn't afraid to purchase a McDonald's hamburger, even in Canada."

For the U.S., could this be the year of mad cow? The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) banned Canadian beef in May after mad-cow disease, or bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), turned up in a single calf there. Now it is America's turn. More than 30 countries have banned U.S. beef imports since BSE was detected in a slaughtered 6-year-old dairy cow in Washington State on Dec. 23. Though officials say the cow entered from Canada in 2001, the USDA last week instituted a series of measures to reassure consumers that American beef is safe, including a ban on the slaughter of cattle too sick or injured to walk, called downers, for human food. The BSE-infected cow was one such downer. The

USDA also called for immediate implementation of a national animal-tracking system so the source of any diseased cattle could be more readily identified.

As the public copes with the news, the U.S.'s \$40 billion cattle business is bracing for trouble. The industry, led by the National Cattlemen's Beef Association in Denver, had originally fought the ban on downers as costly and unnecessary. But the losses caused by the BSE discovery in Washington State are likely to make those steps seem cheap by comparison. Big overseas customers like Japan and South Korea no longer want U.S. steaks, ships at sea packed with meat bound for Asia are turning back. Containers of frozen French fries cooked in beef tallow for the export market are idling in U.S. ports.

In short, America's \$4.3 billion beef-export business is pretty much dead meat, at least for now. "We still haven't felt the

8:04 AM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

CC: DSD / ANDY MARSHALL

DATE: January 8, 2004

SUBJECT: Attached

Take a look at this Friedman article. It's got some of the elements we talked about yesterday in terms of the old war of ideas.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
010804.07

Attach: "War of Ideas, Part I" Friedman

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

2/20  
will be  
incorporated in  
Battle of Ideas +  
GWOT Briefs  
JMO

0001

OSD 09029-04

E Jan 04



THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

## War of Ideas, Part 1

Airline flights into the U.S. are canceled from France, Mexico and London. Armed guards are put onto other flights coming to America. Westerners are warned to avoid Saudi Arabia, and synagogues are bombed in Turkey and France. A package left on the steps of the Metropolitan Museum of Art forces the evacuation of 5,000 museumgoers. (It turns out to contain a stuffed snowman.) National Guardsmen are posted at key bridges and tunnels.

Happy New Year.

What you are witnessing is why Sept. 11 amounts to World War III — the third great totalitarian challenge to open societies in the last 100 years. As the longtime Middle East analyst Abdullah Schleifer once put it to me: World War II was the Nazis, using the engine of Germany to try to impose the reign of the perfect race, the Aryan race. The cold war was the Marxists, using the engine of the Soviet Union to try to impose the reign of the perfect class, the working class. And 9/11 was about religious totalitarians, Islamists, using suicide bombing to try to impose the reign of the perfect faith, political Islam.

O.K., you say, but how can one possibly compare the Soviet Union, which had thousands of nukes, with Al Qaeda? Here's how: As dangerous as the Soviet Union was, it was always deterrable with a wall of containment and with nukes of our own. Because, at the end of the day, the Soviets loved life more than they hated us. Despite our differences, we agreed on certain bedrock rules of civilization.

With the Islamist militant groups, we face people who hate us more than they love life. When you have large numbers of people ready to commit suicide, and ready to do it by making themselves into human bombs, using the most normal instruments of daily life — an airplane, a car, a garage door opener, a cellphone, fertilizer, a tennis shoe — you create a weapon that is undeterrable, undetectable and inexhaustible. This poses a much more serious threat than the Soviet Red Army because these human bombs attack the most essential element of an open society: trust.

Trust is built into every aspect, every building and every interaction in our increasingly hyperconnected world. We trust that when we board a plane, the person next to us isn't going to blow up his shoes. Without trust, there's no open society because there aren't enough police to guard every opening in an open society.

Which is why suicidal Islamist militants have the potential to erode our

lifestyle. Because the only way to deter a suicidal enemy ready to use the instruments of daily life to kill us is by gradually taking away trust. We start by stripping airline passengers, then we go to fingerprinting all visitors, and we will end up removing cherished civil liberties.

So what to do? There are only

### What can deter terror? Shame.

three things we can do: (1) Improve our intelligence to deter and capture terrorists before they act. (2) Learn to live with more risk, while maintaining our open society. (3) Most important, find ways to get the societies where these Islamists come from to deter them first. Only they really know their own, and only they can really restrain their extremists.

As my friend Dov Seidman, whose company, LRN, teaches ethics to global corporations, put it: The cold war ended the way it did because at some bedrock level we and the Soviets "agreed on what is shameful." And shame, more than any laws or police, is how a village, a society or a culture expresses approval and disapproval and applies restraints.

But today, alas, there is no bedrock agreement on what is shameful, what is outside the boundary of a civilized world. Unlike the Soviet Union, the Islamist terrorists are neither a state subject to conventional deterrence or international rules, nor individuals deterred by the fear of death. And their home societies, in too many cases, have not stigmatized their acts as "shameful." In too many cases, their spiritual leaders have provided them with religious cover, and their local charities have provided them with money. That is why suicide bombing is spreading.

We cannot change other societies and cultures on our own. But we also can't just do nothing in the face of this mounting threat. What we can do is partner with the forces of moderation within these societies to help them fight the war of ideas. Because ultimately this is a struggle within the Arab-Muslim world, and we have to help our allies there, just as we did in World Wars I and II.

This column is the first in a five-part series on how we can do that. □

7:57 AM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
 Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 8, 2004

SUBJECT: **Force Rotation**

We need to take a look at force rotation over a couple of years in Iraq and worldwide and see what it adds up to.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
 010804.06

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

~~1/15/04~~ 1/15/04

3 20, 2

OSD 09030-04

8 Jan 04



11:00 AM

TO: Secretary Brownlee  
Gen. Schoomaker

CC: David Chu  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 8, 2004

SUBJECT: **Attached**

Attached is a memo from David Chu describing the Marine Corps approach to enhancing foreign language training prior to deploying to Iraq.

*091.4*

I think it is a good thing. Would it make sense for the **Army** to implement a similar program?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
010804.08

*Attach: Chu Memo re: Marine Corp. Foreign Language Support for OIF II*

\_\_\_\_\_  
| |

OSD 09031-04

*8 January*

TO: LTG John Craddock  
Powell Moore

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 8, 2004

SUBJECT: **Senator John Warner**

I think I probably ought to see John Warner every three or four weeks. I ought to try to alternate to go up there once in a while.

032

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
010804.11

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

cc: Cathy  
Durnan  
1/12

Powell: This is part of the overall outreach program.

*1/12*  
*Jaymie*  
*S. Jan 14*

7:45 AM

TO: David Chu  
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: January 9, 2004  
 SUBJECT: **SLRG**

The SLRG went well. I do need visibility into what is going on with the data on recruiting, retention, spouses' attitudes, etc. I don't feel like I am getting sufficient periodic reports - every month or six weeks. Please see that I do.

*334*

Second, when I do my congressional testimony, we need some good charts that show how we are doing in recruiting and retention.

We will also need good charts showing what kinds of numbers of percentages of reserves have been called up and the guard to show what a small fraction it actually is.

In addition, we are going to want to be able to show that half to one million dollars that people get after retirement in some way.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
010904.01

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ *1/14/04* \_\_\_\_\_ *1/16/04*

OSD 09033-04

*9 Jan 04*

7:09 AM

TO: Jim Haynes  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: January 9, 2004  
SUBJECT: **Detainees**

We are going to have to come up with a good rationale and body of support for our position that we could keep detainees during the global war on terrorism. Please come up with a plan, show me and then we will see how we go forward.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
010904.08

Please respond by: 1/15/04

**OR**  
**3/15**

*383.6*

*9 gandy*

OSD 09034-04

7:21 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: January 9, 2004  
SUBJECT: **Talking Points**

*Done*

Talking point papers should have the name of the person I am meeting with, the country, how he should be addressed, the time the meeting is supposed to start and the time the meeting is supposed to end.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
010904.09

*001.7155*

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*cc: Rachel B*  
*done - 1/12*  
*sc*

*copy pls*  
*DRK*  
*1/9*

OSD 09035-04

*Jan 09*

7:16 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: February 12, 2004  
SUBJECT: **Press Briefings**

Rather than send me a card like this, let's keep a running log of who carries the press briefings and each time let me look at it so we can figure it out.

Thanks.

000.7 SD

DHR/azn  
011204.02

Attach: Card accompanying SD Video on Press Briefings

Please respond by: 2/20

*Col Rumsfeld*  
2/20  
George -  
- J. ...  
D. ...  
Larry Di Rita  
2/23

Col | n  
Can you run  
with this for  
Larry?

12 Feb 04

Thanks  
*Jaym...*

OSD 09037-04



DoD Press Briefing  
10 February 2004

Pentagon Channel	1339 - 1424
C-SPAN 1	1339 - 1359
CNN	1339 - 1422
Fox News Channel	1340 - 1422
MSNBC	1342 - 1349 - 1402 - 1414

3:35 PM

TO: Dan Dell'Orto  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: February 12, 2004  
SUBJECT: **E-Mails**

When are you going to get back to me on those McCain e-mails with some proposals as to what you think I ought to do about them all?

Thanks.

032

DHR/azn  
011204.09

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 09038-04

12 July 04



January 12, 2004

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: POTUS Remarks

I want you to see the film of the President delivering his remarks at Constitution Hall. It was elevating. I think you ought to think about feeding some of that type of thing into the remarks we make, particularly at town halls.

*090*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
011204-26

.....  
Please respond by *1/16/04*

OSD 09039-04

*12 Jan 04*

January 12, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: 9/11 Commission Meeting Dates

I notice on my calendar that there is no indication of the dates for the 9/11 Commission. Both dates should be put on my calendar—the informal and the formal, even if it is still a guess and is not firmed up.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
011204-31

.....  
Please respond by 1/16/04

*OB*  
*1/30*

CC: LTG CRADDOCK  
CATHY

(b)(6)

*Coxe-1/13*

*OSD SD*

OSD 09040-04

*12 Jan 04*

January 12, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

cc: Doug Feith *done: '03*  
SUBJECT: FRL

We should talk at the Staff Meeting and the Combatant Commanders' Conference about discontinuing the use of the phrase "former regime loyalists."

33

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
011204-39



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

12 Jan 04

OSD 09041-04

January 13, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Brief for DPB

I think the Defense Policy Board ought to get briefed on the Giambastiani Red Team brief.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
011304-1



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*OB*  
*1/20*

*frag*


OSD 09063-04

*13 Jan 04*

January 13, 2004

TO: David Chu

c c : Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Recruiting System

It appears we are entering into an age of selective information with a 20<sup>th</sup> century system of recruiting.

In specialized areas, such as language capability or ethnic background and understanding, possibly we ought to think about developing a national recruiting model, with intermediaries in the language or cultural skills we are seeking and with rewards for finding us the people we need in the numbers we need them. DoD can probably do it better than a single Service.

Why don't you think that through, use Arabic speakers as an example, and get back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
011304-6

.....  
Please respond by 2/13/04

OSD 09064-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42032

340

13 Jan 04

January 14, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Brief POTUS

Sometime I want to brief the President on the Giambastiani brief on lessons learned from the Iraqi perspective.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
011404-9



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Greg*

OSD 09065-04

*14 Jan 04*



TO: Steve Cambone  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: January 31, 2004  
SUBJECT: **Old Europe**

Take a look at this report on people who have benefited from Saddam's oil and look into it and tell me if it is even partly true.

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
103104.17

*Attach: ABC report from T. Dolan on Old Europe*

Respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*2/6/04*

OSD 09066-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42034

*hang*

*31 Jan 04*

C1/31

1/30  
1420

Jan. 29, 2003

MEMO

*done*  
*1/30*

To: Secretary Rumsfeld  
Fr: Anthony R. Dolan  
Re: ABC report. Old Europe.

1. Here is the ABC report we discussed.
2. The statistics about European opinion are fascinating and explain much of the problem.

cc: DSD  
*done 1/30*  
*SC*

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abcNEWS.com **INVESTIGATION**



Watch this video

A document obtained by ABCNEWS provides insight into how Saddam Hussein did business with friends and supporters. (ABCNEWS.com)

### Saddam's Gifts

Document: Saddam Supporters Received Lucrative Oil Contracts

By Brian Ross  
abcNEWS

Jan. 29 — ABCNEWS has obtained an extraordinary list that contains the names of prominent people around the world who supported Saddam Hussein's regime and were given oil contracts as a result.

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  - Stalled Your U
  - Can Be Cell Ph



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All of the contracts were awarded from late 1997 until the U.S.-led war in March 2003. They were conducted under the aegis of the United Nations' oil-for-food program, which was designed to allow Iraq to sell oil in exchange for humanitarian goods.

The document was discovered several weeks ago in the files of the Iraqi Oil Ministry in

11-L-0559/OSD/42036

Baghdad.

According to a copy obtained by ABCNEWS, some 270 prominent individuals, political parties or corporations in 47 countries were on a list of those given Iraq oil contracts instantly worth millions of dollars.

Today, the U.S. Treasury Department said that any American citizens found to be illegally involved could face prosecution.

"You are looking at a political slush fund that was buying political support for the regime of Saddam Hussein for the last six or seven years," said financial investigator John Fawcett.

Investigators say none of the people involved would have actually taken possession of oil, but rather just the right to buy the oil at a discounted price, which could be resold to a legitimate broker or oil company, at an average profit of about 50 cents a barrel.

#### List Includes Prominent Names

Among those named: Indonesia President Megawati Sukarnoputri, an outspoken opponent of U.S.-Iraq policy, who received a contract for 10 million barrels of oil — about a \$5 million profit.

The son of the Syrian defense minister received 6 million barrels, according to the document, worth about \$3 million.

George Galloway, a British member of Parliament, was also on the list to receive 19 million barrels of oil, a \$9.5 million profit. A vocal critic of the Iraq war, Galloway denied any involvement to ABCNEWS earlier this year.

"I've never seen a bottle of oil, owned one or bought one," Galloway said in a previous interview with ABCNEWS.

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**Document: Saddam Supporters Received Lucrative Oil Contracts** Continued ↘

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According to the document, France was the second-largest beneficiary, with tens of millions of barrels awarded to Patrick Maugein, a close political associate and financial backer of French President Jacques Chirac.

Maugein, individually and through companies connected to him, received contracts for some 36 million barrels. Chirac's office said it was unaware of Maugein's deals, which Maugein told ABCNEWS are perfectly legal.

The single biggest set of contracts were given to the Russian government and Russian political figures, more than 1.3 billion barrels in all — including 92 million barrels to individual officials in the office of President Vladimir Putin.

Another 1 million barrels were contracted to the Russian ambassador to Baghdad, 137 million barrels of oil were given to the Russian Communist Party, and 5 million barrels were contracted to the Russian Orthodox Church.

Also on the list are the names of prominent journalists, two Iraqi-Americans, and a French priest who organized a meeting between the pope and Tariq Aziz, Saddam's deputy

11-L-0559/OSD/42038

prime minister.

The following are the names of some of those who, according to the document, received Iraqi oil contracts (amounts are in millions of barrels of oil):

#### **Russia**

The Companies of the Russian Communist Party: 137 million

The Companies of the Liberal Democratic Party: 79.8 million

The Russian Committee for Solidarity with Iraq: 6.5 million and 12.5 million (2 separate contracts)

Head of the Russian Presidential Cabinet: 90 million

The Russian Orthodox Church: 5 million

#### **France**

Charles Pasqua, former minister of interior: 12 million

Trafigura (Patrick Maugein), businessman: 25 million

Ibex: 47.2 million

Bernard Merimee, former French ambassador to the United Nations: 3 million

Michel Grimard, founder of the French-Iraqi Export Club: 17.1 million

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- Syria**  
Firas Mostafa Tlass, son of Syria's defense minister: 6 million
- Turkey**  
Zeynel Abidin Erdem: more than 27 million  
Lotfy Doghan: more than 11 million
- Indonesia**  
Megawati Sukarnoputri: 11 million
- Spain**  
Ali Ballout, Lebanese journalist: 8.8 million
- Yugoslavia**  
The Socialist Party: 22 million  
Kostunica's Party: 6 million

11-L-0559/OSD/42040

**Canada**

Arthur Millholland, president and CEO of Oilexco: 9.5 million

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January 30, 2004




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Page 4 of 4

**Saddam's Gifts**  
**Document: Saddam Supporters Received Lucrative Oil Contracts** Continued ↗

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**Italy**  
 Father Benjamin, a French Catholic priest who arranged a meeting between the pope and Tariq Aziz: 4.5 million  
 Roberto Frimigoni: 24.5 million

**United States**  
 Samir Vincent: 7 million  
 Shakir Alkhalaji: 10.5 million

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The son of President Lahoud: 5.5 million

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Khaled Abdel Nasser: 16.5 million  
Emad Al Galda, businessman and Parliament member: 14 million

**Palestinian Territories**  
The Palestinian Liberation Organization: 4 million  
Abu Al Abbas: 11.5 million

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Hamad bin Ali Al Thany: 14 million

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Prime Minister Shukri Ghanem: 1 million

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The October 8th Movement: 4.5 million

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The minister of the Forests of Myanmar: 5 million

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The Social Democratic Party: 8.5 million  
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11-L-0559/OSD/42043

# Differences in American and European Worldviews

Russell A. Berman is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and a Walter H. Wood Professor in the Humanities at Stanford University.

**R**ather than viewing European anti-Americanism solely in terms of current policy disputes, we must look at our deep-seated cultural differences. According to *Views of a Changing World*, a study conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, **Americans and West Europeans advocate very distinct philosophical stances, especially regarding matters of individual responsibility and the role of the state.**

Asked to evaluate the statement "Success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside our control," 32 percent of the Americans polled agreed, in contrast to 48 percent in England, 54 percent in France, 66 percent in Italy, and 68 percent in Germany. Less than a third of Americans view their lives as defined by external forces, implying that the majority see the world in terms of individual responsibility. Meanwhile, Europeans minimize individual responsibility and attribute much greater importance to outside forces. Whereas Europeans tend toward a deterministic worldview, Americans focus on individual freedom.

The survey also measured how public opinion chooses between two competing values: the value of the freedom of individuals to pursue goals without state interference and the value of a state guarantee that no one be in need. Fifty-eight percent of Americans, a significant majority, chose freedom from state interference as the most important goal. This result stands in stark contrast to Europe, where freedom earns support at dramatically lower rates: only 39 percent in Germany, 36 percent in France, 33 percent in England, and a paltry 24 percent in Italy. Whereas Americans are predisposed to understand their lives in terms of individual responsibility and reject greater state regulation,

Europeans, by and large, take the opposite position: They view their lives in terms of larger social forces and expect the state to protect them from need—even at the price of a restriction of their freedom. No wonder current domestic politics in most European countries involves the difficult task of reforming firmly entrenched welfare-state systems.

Not surprisingly, **the cultural difference between Americans and Europeans has significant foreign policy ramifications.** The American worldview of individual responsibility underpins an insistence on national sovereignty. In contrast, Europeans—especially the French and the Germans—tend to support restraints on the power of individual states. The lesson they take away from the two world wars is that curbs should be placed on individual states to prevent them from pursuing selfish interests. As a result, European states are gradually ceding elements of their sovereignty to the superstate of the European Union. In contrast, the United States has repeatedly demonstrated its reluctance to cede such authority to international bodies.

This is the cultural basis for the debate over multilateralism and unilateralism. In practice, the difference is, of course, hardly absolute. Although European politicians insist on international cooperation, they typically continue to pursue national interests. Whereas the American leadership insists on the right to act independently, it has appealed repeatedly to the United Nations for support. Nonetheless, the significant differences in American and European worldviews are likely to cause political rifts long after the current battles, such as Iraq and Kyoto, have faded.

—Russell A. Berman

11-L-0559/OSD/42044

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MEMORANDUM  
January 31, 2004

Important cost-cutting activities that will change the face of how this department functions.

1. Complete revamping of the DAT system worldwide.
2. New security cooperation.
3. Massive review of regular international and bilateral meetings to increase the ones that should be increased and decrease the ones that should be decreased.
4. Force posture.
5. Complete review of DoD directives.
6. Complete revamping of contingency plans.
7. Other.

DHR/azn  
013104.15

OSD 09067-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42045

090 DoD

31 January

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock  
Jaymie Durnan  
Steve Cambone  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Ken Kries  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: January 31, 2004  
SUBJECT: Attached

Attached is a list of some major cost-cutting efforts. Why don't you add some others to this list and let's refine it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
103104.16

*Attach: List of Cost Cutting Activities*

*Respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*2/7/04*

OSD 09068-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42046

*020 DED*

*31 Jan 04*

MEMORANDUM  
January 31, 2004

Important cost-cutting activities that will change the face of how this department functions.

1. Complete revamping of the DAT system worldwide.
2. New security cooperation.
3. Massive review of regular international and bilateral meetings to increase the ones that should be increased and decrease the ones that should be decreased.
4. Force posture.
5. Complete review of DoD directives.
6. Complete revamping of contingency plans.
7. Other.

DHR/azn  
013104.15

OSD 09067-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42047

72

February 2, 2004

334 NSC

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Brief to PC

This Iraqi Transition Strategic Assessment Teams Weekly Update is good. We want to have an updated version of it, so the day we brief the PC on the Security Assessment Team's briefing, we can precede that brief with this one. We can also give any other brief that is available.

Thanks.

Attach.

24-30 January 2004 DoD Iraqi Transition Strategic Assessment Teams' Weekly Update

DHR:dh  
013004-11

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_


*Dme*  
*@ 2/2*

2 Feb 04

OSD 09070-04

~~February 2~~  
January 30, 2004

293

TO: Marc Thiessen  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Condolence Letters

I would like to have you give me three or four draft letters to people whose sons or daughters have been killed, so I can look at them and edit them.

I would also like you to consider whether we want to include a copy of the statement I made at Arlington on the first anniversary.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
013004-2



Please respond by 2/13/04

2 FEB 6 04

OSD 09071-04



January 29, 2004

TO: Marc Thiessen  
CC: **DIA/IA**  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Op-ed Pieces on WMD

*Iraq*

These two pieces on WMD are worth your looking at.

I need a one-pager to respond to the question when I am before the committee next week.

Thanks.

Attach.

"So Where's the WMD?" *The Wall Street Journal*, January 28, 2004.

Feaver, Peter D. "The Fog of WMD," *Washington Post*, January 28, 2004, p. A21.

DHR:dh  
012904-2

.....  
Please respond by

*2/2/04*

OSD 09072-04

*29 Jan 04*

11-L-0559/OSD/42050

America's friendship with Russia, and with the Russian people, will not abate. Leaders will come and go over the years, but our hand will be outstretched, our hearts will be open. As Russia is constructing a new political and social life, so we together are constructing the U.S.-Russian partnership.

We hope that Russia's path to mature democracy and prosperity is cleared soon of all obstacles. We both have a large stake in that journey, and we trust in its eventual completion. It will take time. But after all, we know what a difference 30 years can make.

*This essay by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell originally appeared in the Russian newspaper Izvestia.*

Wall Street Journal  
January 28, 2004

## 42. So Where's The WMD?

Iraq weapons inspector David Kay speaks to the Senate today, and our (probably forlorn) hope is that his remarks will get wide and detailed coverage. What we've been hearing from him in snippets so far explains the mystery of whatever happened to Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction.

His answers, we should make clear, are a long way from the "Bush and Blair lied" paradigm currently animating the Democratic primaries and newspapers. John Kerry of all people now claims that, because Mr. Kay's Iraq Study Group has not found stockpiles of WMD or a mature nuclear program, President Bush somehow "misled" the country. "I think there's been an enormous amount of exaggeration, stretching, deception," he said on "Fox News Sunday." This is the same Senator who voted for the war after having access to the intelligence and has himself said previously that he believed Saddam had such weapons.

The reason Mr. Kerry believed this is because

everybody else did too. That Saddam had WMD was the consensus of the U.S. intelligence community for years, going back well into the Clinton Administration. The CIA's near east and counterterrorism bureaus disagreed on the links between al Qaeda and Saddam -- which is one reason the Bush Administration failed to push that theme. But the CIA and its intelligence brethren were united in their belief that Saddam had WMD, as the agency made clear in numerous briefings to Congress.

And not just the CIA. Believers included the U.N., whose inspectors were tossed out of Iraq after they had recorded huge stockpiles after the Gulf War. No less than French President Jacques Chirac warned as late as last February about "the probable possession of weapons of mass destruction by an uncontrollable country, Iraq" and declared that the "international community is right ... in having decided Iraq should be disarmed."

All of this was enshrined in U.N. Resolution 1441, which ordered Saddam to come completely clean about his weapons. If he really had already destroyed all of his WMD, Saddam had every incentive to give U.N. inspectors free rein, put everything on the table and live to deceive another day. That he didn't may go down as Saddam's last and greatest miscalculation.

But Mr. Kay's Study Group has also discovered plenty to suggest that Saddam couldn't come clean because he knew he wasn't. In his interim report last year, Mr. Kay disclosed a previously unknown Iraq program for long-range missiles; this was a direct violation of U.N. resolutions.

Mr. Kay has also speculated that Saddam may have thought he had WMD because his own generals and scientists lied to him. "The

scientists were able to fake programs," the chief inspector says. This is entirely plausible, because aides who didn't tell Saddam what he wanted to hear were often tortured and killed. We know from post-invasion interrogations that Saddam's own generals believed that Iraq had WMD. If they thought so, it's hard to fault the CIA for believing it too.

Mr. Kay has also made clear that, stockpiles or no, Saddam's regime retained active programs that could have been reconstituted at any time. Saddam tried to restart his nuclear program as recently as 2001. There is also evidence, Mr. Kay has told the London Telegraph, that some components of Saddam's WMD program "went to Syria before the war." Precisely what and how much "is a major issue that needs to be resolved." The most logical conclusion is that Saddam hoped to do just enough to satisfy U.N. inspectors and then restart his WMD production once sanctions were lifted and the international heat was off.

By all means let Congress explore why the CIA overestimated Saddam's WMD stockpiles this time around. But let's do so while recalling that the CIA had underestimated the progress of his nuclear, chemical and biological programs before the first Gulf War. We are also now learning that the CIA has long underestimated the extent and progress of nuclear programs in both Libya and Iran. Why aren't Democrats and liberals just as alarmed about those intelligence failures?

Intelligence is as much art and judgment as it is science, and it is inherently uncertain. We elect Presidents and legislators to consider the evidence and then make difficult policy judgments that the voters can later hold them responsible for. Mr. Kay told National Public Radio that,

based on the evidence he has seen from Iraq, "I think it was reasonable to reach the conclusion that Iraq posed an imminent threat." He added that "I must say I actually think what we learned during the inspection made Iraq a more dangerous place potentially, than in fact we thought it was even before the war."

As intelligence failures go, we'd prefer one that worried too much about a threat than one that worried too little. The latter got us September 11.

Los Angeles Times  
January 28, 2004

## 43. Pakistan And Proliferation

*Musharraf has to ensure that rogue states are not given nuclear know-how.*

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf likes to portray himself as a key U.S. ally in the war on terror, shoulder-to-shoulder in battling the Taliban and Al Qaeda. So it must have been hard for him to admit that Pakistan probably dabbled in spreading nuclear weaponry to rogue states. When faced with overwhelming evidence from international inspectors, Musharraf grudgingly acknowledged that Pakistani scientists appear to have sent nuclear designs and perhaps technology to countries trying to clandestinely develop atomic weapons.

In Libya, U.S., European and International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors scouring the country after Moammar Kadafi's decision to give up his nuclear weapons program found technology for enriching uranium that appears to have come from Pakistan. Pakistan is also believed to have exchanged know-how with North Korea.

Musharraf said last week that top Pakistani scientists seem to have sold nuclear designs "for personal financial gain," but he denied that any government or military officials were involved. That is

washingtonpost.com

Mar 5  
pg A21

# The Fog of WMD

By Peter D. Feaver

Wednesday, January 28, 2004; Page A21

David Kay's surprising exit interview confirms that the old conventional wisdom -- that Iraq had an advanced and growing WMD program -- has given way to a new conventional wisdom: that the Iraqi program was to a remarkable extent smoke and mirrors. It is increasingly unlikely that new discoveries will change this assessment, so it makes sense to take stock of what the new conventional wisdom tells us about the old, and vice versa.

We should begin by discarding the self-serving rush to judgment of partisans. Democrats have gleefully claimed that since the Iraqi WMD program was (apparently) not as advanced as the Bush administration claimed it to be, the neoconservatives in the Bush administration must have deliberately lied. Despite its popularity on the campaign primary trail, this conspiracy theory is so nutty that Bush defenders have just as gleefully avoided tougher questions and contented themselves with knocking it down: How could even the all-powerful neocons have manipulated the intelligence estimates of the Clinton administration, French intelligence, British intelligence, German intelligence and all the other "co-conspirators" who concurred on the fundamentals of the Bush assessment?

But focusing on that extreme charge distracts us from recognizing some less obvious lessons that are clearer now with hindsight. Here are four:

- The alternatives confronting the Security Council in March 2003 were not viable. If eight months of largely unfettered investigations could not provide a smoking gun to prove the existence or nonexistence of a stockpile, certainly Hans Blix would fail as well. The alternatives some advocated -- I thought six more weeks of Blix inspections would have been a good compromise in March 2003 -- would have left us just as uncertain. Even giving Blix another year would have left us groping in the dark. Remember that the new conventional wisdom is built on the absence of discovery (something that Blix could have provided easily) and on the corroborating testimony of people who no longer have reason to fear Saddam Hussein (something that Blix could never have provided).
- Intelligence failure was inevitable given the nature of the Iraqi regime. The new conventional wisdom is that Hussein wanted us to think he had a more advanced WMD program than he thought he had, and that Hussein himself thought he had a more advanced WMD program than he really had. If Hussein could be deceived in a country where he had absolute power, where he regularly punished betrayers by slipping them through human shredders or having their wives raped in front of them, then any external intelligence service was going to be deceived as well. The intelligence community accurately reported that Hussein was hiding things, that he was pursuing WMD programs, that senior members of the Iraqi military-industrial complex were convinced Iraq was pursuing WMD. Given Iraq's record, it would have been heroic to connect those dots into the picture we now think we see, namely, that it was mostly Iraqi actors deceiving each other and everyone else.

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- Intelligence failures beget intelligence failures. The intelligence community has a sorry record of assessing just how advanced an incipient WMD program really is. In fact, there is a striking pattern. In each of these cases, new evidence turned out to rebut the established consensus of the intelligence community: the Soviet Union in 1949, China in 1964, India in 1974, Iraq in 1991, North Korea in 1994, Iraq in 1995, India in 1998, Pakistan in 1998, North Korea in 2002, Iran in 2003 and Libya in 2003. In each of these cases, the WMD program turned out to be more advanced than the intelligence community thought. Iraq in 2003 may be the only exception (though there is reason to believe that North Korea is, like Iraq, exaggerating its nuclear progress).

- Intelligence cannot substitute for political judgment. Coercive diplomacy, the alternative to war, requires political judgment under conditions of uncertainty, a fact lost in the increasingly rancorous partisan debate. The critics who are bashing President Bush for pushing a hard line on Iraq are also bashing President Bush for not pushing a hard enough line on North Korea. Ironically, the president is doing everything in North Korea that he was accused of not doing in Iraq: building an international coalition to support pressure on North Korea; not taking North Korean claims at face value; weighing carefully the costs of military action; and so on. The bottom line is that the hard cases -- North Korea, Iran and, yes, Iraq -- are hard cases precisely because the easy options have been tried and proved wanting.

If the current Kay exit interview had been available in March 2003, it's unlikely that the administration would have pressed for war. But since the war case rested on multiple pillars -- dealing with a problem now before it became an unmanageable problem later, recognizing that Hussein could not be trusted in the long run, recognizing that the war on terrorists involved getting tough on the causes of terrorism (stunted political development in the Middle East), recognizing that the status quo policy on Iraq was responsible for creating the conditions that gave rise to al Qaeda in the first place -- it is possible that reasonable people would have still advocated war.

So by all means, let us have a full investigation into the intelligence failure (though let us not expect one during a presidential campaign). But let us not think that much better intelligence would have been achievable or conclusive in helping us decide how to deal with Hussein.

*The writer is a professor of political science and public policy at Duke University.*

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January 28, 2004

334

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Personnel Working on Frank Miller Committee

I want to talk to you about Benkert and Bergner, who serve on the Frank Miller committee, and whether they are the right people. Condi may have a point. This is going to be big between now and July.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012804-11

..... 2/20

Please respond by 2/4/04

*r-  
let* said Benkert  
and Bergner are  
the right people.  
Reuben doesn't have  
time + Benkert is  
the best

28 Jan 04

OSD 09073-04

*J/R*  
*Jaymie*

11-L-0559/OSD/42054

January 28, 2004

110,91

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Dov Zakheim  
Les Brownlee  
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Budget Proposal for Army

*Advance  
copy sent  
1/28 1330*

We are going to have to get our arms around this Army budget question fast. I don't want to leave the seeming lack of clarity or lack of agreement lying there very long.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012804-10

.....  
Please respond by 1/30/04

OSD 09074-04

28 Jan 04

January 28, 2004

TO: Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Proposal for Army

As I indicated to you, we need to find ways to explain what you are proposing to do that will be clear to the layman. I mentioned that to you before we went to see the President. The President also mentioned it to you. He is right.

I know it seems clear to you. But, for the general public, the words "brigade," "division," "battalion," and "company" do not have real meaning. There need to be some illustrations and anecdotes that will explain it better.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012804-9



Please respond by 2/13/04

320.2

28 Jan 03

OSD 09075-04

January 28, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: NATO Secretary-General

When I go to Wehrkunde I want to talk to the NATO Secretary-General about pushing for NATO to do the Iraq, Polish and possibly UK sectors soon.

If he is going to be in Washington between now and then, I ought to raise it with him here.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012804-2

*HONOR COLLEGE  
AND MEETING  
TOMORROW (THU)  
5-5:30 PM*

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 09079:04

11-L-0559/OSD/42057

*ILMP*

*28 Jan 04*



7201  
Binder - FILE COPY

EF-8564  
I-04/002401  
January 28, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *R*  
SUBJECT: Assumptions

I don't know if you were there, but we simply do have to fashion assumptions for the kind of world we are going to be living in for the next two or three years.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012804-4

.....  
Please respond by 5 MAR 04

100-54

**Policy ExecSec's Note**

April 21, 2004

CAPT Marriott:

PDUSDP Ryan Henry said the assumptions proposal was discussed in detail during a SLRG on March 25<sup>th</sup>.

Policy is incorporating SecDef's guidance into the next iteration of that package and into ongoing deliberations on the Defense Strategy.

Please close this action.

*C. L. O'Connor*

Colonel C. L. O'Connor, USMC  
Director, Policy Executive Secretariat

COMPLETED  
MAR 25 2004

*M*

OSD 09080-04

28  
100-54

23-02-04 16:35

January 28, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Technology for Joint Warfighting

Vern Clark I think talked about getting technology for joint warfighting. Someone ought to be assigned to do that. It came **up** in the CINC conference yesterday.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012804-6

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*


381

OSD 09081-04

*Dr Rumsfeld*

720

January 28, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Intelligence Tasking and Prioritizing

I have the feeling from the CINC conference that we are still not doing the intelligence tasking and prioritizing to undergird and enable war plans. The result is that the plans are not very good—not realistic—because we don't have intelligence to do the things we think we are capable of doing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012804-8



*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

350.09

28 January

OSD 09082-04

720  
January 27, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Brief for POTUS

We do have to schedule the brief for the President on lessons learned from the Iraqi point of view.

I would prefer to do it before August. We just have to schedule it, tell them it is an hour and get it done someplace where he and just a very small group can hear it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012704-16

.....  
Please respond by 3/12/04

OSD 09083-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42061

*DR*

*27 Jan 04*

January 27, 2004

671

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

c c : Paul Wolfowitz  
Larry Di Rita  
David Chu  
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Legislation on Numbers

320.2

At the first day of the CINC conference, there was the discussion about end strength and the need for greater flexibility.

Let's get a proposal fashioned to recommend to the Congress to relieve us of the burden of having to be at a certain number—not above, not below—once each year.

Thanks.

DIR:dh  
012704-11

.....  
Please respond by 2/27/04

*Closed per SMA  
3/26/04*

*27 David*

OSD 09084-04



January 27, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Personnel as Better Sensors

One of the things Pete Schoomaker said at the CINC conference that was interesting was that we need to do a better job of making all US military people better sensors.

Please have some folks think about that and get back to us.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012704-15

.....  
Please respond by 2/27/04

*350.09*

*27 January*

OSD 09085-04

ACTION COMPLETE.  
STATE DEPT.  
TRANSLATION  
ATTACHED BEHIND  
ARTICLE.

26  
January 23, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Article on Belgian Minister of Defense

Here is this article Colin Powell sent over. Please see what language it was written in and if it was not written in English, then please get our own translation of it very fast. Make sure it is absolutely accurate and get the full text of the interview. Then get it back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012304-11

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

File Copy  
Action Completed

*[Handwritten flourish]*

OSD 09087:04

11-L-0559/OSD/42064

*BEI DRUM*

*26 Jan 04*

"Democratic Winner Kerry Hasn't Reached the Shore Yet" - conservative Christian-Democrat *Het Belang van Limburg* (1/20)(circ.102,000)

"Vietnam Veteran Kerry: Surprising Victory" - conservative *Het Laatste Nieuws* (1/20)(circ.301,000)

1/23  
See Def  
to discuss  
Dijk

## II. Quotes

### Defense Minister Andre Flahaut

In an interview with leftist TV weekly *Humo* (1/20)(circ.242,000) Defense Minister Andre Flahaut is quoted as saying: "I am particularly irritated by the fact that we continue to admire the U.S. armed forces without any criticism. In my opinion, they are everything but an ideal. Compared to our forces, they are a completely stagnant entity – with all the possible consequences.... The Americans spend so much money on their armed forces that they simply cannot act efficiently. When they have to move 15 men from point A to point B, they will use three aircraft to make certain that they succeed. We will use only one airplane or – even better – we will try to find out whether we can fly with an ally who is going the same direction. The U.S. will never do that. We will both make it to point B, but which method is the most efficient? The U.S. defense budget has simply exploded.

"In Europe, we have other military objectives than the United States. By the way, did that much better equipped American army perform that well in Iraq? Every day they had major problems with provisioning their troops. No matter what the media say, the U.S. army must never be our ideal....

"Belgium lies in the center of Europe. NATO's headquarters is established here. We receive international recognition for our invaluable political and military experience in Africa. (Supreme Allied Commander) Jones told me that Bush himself believes that we are dealing with the issues in Congo in the right manner. Because we are a small country we do not have a hidden agenda – which means that others accept us more easily. By the way, why shouldn't I have the right to be critical of the United States? Belgium is an independent country. It is not a blind obeying disciple who lines up when the Americans yell.



"And, with my criticism on the war on terror I am not far from the truth either, am I? After the invasion of Iraq the Americans have become stuck in quicksand - militarily and politically. Their Middle East peace plan has not been realized. Their main mistake is that they wanted to keep the UN out of the game. We want a new resolution before we participate in the reconstruction of Iraq.

"Undeniably, there is a difference between the ideal and the real world. The United States exerted so much pressure to make us change the law of universal competence that we could only give in. But, that does not mean that we have to keep our mouth shut for the rest of our days. As a matter of fact, the United States is changing, too. Its blunt language about the 'old Europe' in 2002 (sic) is disappearing. At NATO meetings today the Americans speak a totally different language. They begin to take seriously what the rest of the international community thinks about their actions because they understand that they cannot take care of the job alone.

"The main problem is that the United States is unwilling to understand that a strong European defense - the kind Belgium is pleading for - will strengthen NATO. Our main goal is to tune our armies to each other, to prevent them from doing the same things, and to enable each country to develop its own areas of military expertise. That is certainly not a threat for the United States because we do not have those large budgets and enormous manpower. The Americans have nothing to fear from us because we want to cooperate with them. However, they want tough competition (between the U.S. and the EU) to prevail because that stimulates their economy. Well anyway, perhaps there will be a turnabout after the presidential elections at the end of this year. It would be ethically indelicate for a Belgian Minister to comment on the American elections. I leave that to the American voters. However, if I were an American I would vote for a Democrat."



### *III. Editorials and Commentaries*

#### **State of the Union Address**

Under a New York dateline and under the heading "A Domestic War," Alain Campiotti in left-of-center *Le Soir* (1/21)(circ. 103,500) comments: "The incumbent President has an advantage on the other Presidential candidates: his State of the Union address, which he delivered to Congress yesterday night. Last year and in 2002, this annual harangue was about war. This year, it could not but be an electoral speech.

Partial Translation of Interview with Andre Flahaut

Humo 20 Jan 04

[passage on domestic Belgian issues omitted]

[Lippens] The government agreement requires you to downsize the military to 35,000 people. There are that many soldiers on one American military base. What is the use of such a militarily insignificant army?

[Flahaut] The downsizing to 35,000 persons is the goal for the year 2015 and I myself am an advocate of that. A small army can still be very useful militarily. Why do you think that the international community asks us for operations in Kosovo, the Congo, or Afghanistan? I would even venture to say that our C130 planes are indispensable for some missions of the United Nations.

The armed forces are now unified. Previously we had an army, air force, navy, and medical service - a top-heavy structure which I have transformed into a flexible organization without duplication and complicated command structures. We are now quite complementary with the other European armies, and that is the future of our Defense.

[Lippens] All these international operations are constantly being carried out by the same five thousand military personnel. Why do we need the other thirty thousand people?

[Flahaut] That is being changed: we are evolving toward an army which is completely available. In the land army, only 40 percent of the personnel have been available for operations up to now. We are raising that to 68 percent.

When we first came out with the new army structure, namely one central command, people thought it was strange. Well, meanwhile the Dutch are busy with a similar reform. This morning I spoke with the Saceur (Supreme Allied Commander Europe), and General James Jones told me that our plan is the direction all NATO armies must go. We are on the right path.

## Poor Americans

[Lippens] How operational is an army with personnel who average 40 years in age? The average American soldier is 28 - you are hardly finding any new, young recruits.

[Flahaut] The average age has now dropped to 38, and the recruiting of young people is going well. We just cannot find enough soldiers in the northern part of Belgium. (Editor's note: According to an unwritten rule, the army is supposed to consist of 60 percent Dutch speakers and 40 percent French speakers). What can you do? A youth from Antwerp or Kortrijk, where there is little unemployment, will not be quick to join the army. Thus we also need more women and more immigrants. Since 1 January we have also been able to recruit European youths, and I want to make extra efforts to recruit young Belgians of North African origin.

The military career has basically changed. No one signs up for life, five to ten years are pretty much the maximum. Nor can you attract young people if you cannot offer them anything other than standing guard in front of a barracks. I think we can find motivated persons if we can offer them adventurous foreign missions - with humanitarian or social dimensions.

But what especially irritates me is that we are still staring blindly at the American army. For me that is by no means a model. In comparison with ours, it is a completely compartmentalized organization with all the disadvantages which come from that. The US army is perhaps effective but certainly not efficient.

[Lippens] Please explain!

[Flahaut] The Americans throw so much money at their army that it just cannot be efficient. If they need to get fifteen people from point A to point B, they would use three airplanes to make sure that they succeed. We would send just one airplane, or better yet: first check whether we can fly with an ally who is going the same direction. The US never does that! We would both arrive at point B,

but what is the most efficient way? The US defense budget has simply exploded.

[Lippens] But do not you and your generally constantly want to invest in new, expensive, and modern materiel? You do not want to keep flying around with C130s that are thirty years old and with F16s from 1975?

[Flahaut] Our F16s are perhaps old, but they are perfectly compatible with the American planes. We proved that in Kosovo. Our materiel is technologically up-to-date and our C130s are better equipped than those of other countries. You do not always have to believe professors from military academies. Let them stick to their courses, the politicians will decide what, when, and how much will be purchased.

We in Europe have quite different goals than the United States. Besides: did the US military with its superior equipment perform so well in Iraq? Every day they had gigantic problems to supply their soldiers. No matter what the press says, the American army cannot be our great model.

[Lippens] Reputable foreign newspapers such as *NRC Handelsblad* and *The Wall Street Journal* do find fault with the Belgian army. And General Herteleer, the former chief of staff, even said that our troops are unmotivated and thus unsuited for any operation.

[Flahaut] Hopefully you are more honest than your colleague from *NRC Handelsblad*, who spoke two hours with me and then published an article which they had already composed and which hardly used a word from our conversation.

General Herteleer once told me that after three months' retirement, even the best military person was hopelessly behind in the latest developments and thus should not issue commentaries. Well, in this case I would like to remind the retired general of his own, wise words. I invite every genuinely interested journalist to come and see all that we are doing, and with what materiel. Why do you not go more often on our operations? I can guarantee you that the

army, from top to bottom, is quite tired of reading the same slanted stories of a couple of dissatisfied people. Come see for yourself, instead of looking at our army through an American lens.

[Lippens] Does the Belgian press look through an American lens too often?

[Flahaut] Yes, I can refute item-by-item all the spectacular stories about our army by using arguments and facts, but you must take the trouble to come and check them out on site. My door is wide open.

### Salvation Army

[Lippens] If everything is going so well, why did General August Van Daele, the successor to Herteleer, complain in a note about abuses in foreign operations? He spoke of sexual misconduct, drug and alcohol abuse, and impermissible deals by military personnel.

[Flahaut] Do you know an company with 40,000 personnel which never has problems with harassment and alcohol misuse?

[Lippens] Cannot a bit more discipline be expected from military personnel?

[Flahaut] Look, high moral norms are expected of the clergy, and nevertheless pedophile priests have been discovered. If a military person does something wrong, it is widely reported in the press and it is always carefully noted that it was Sergeant X or Adjutant Y, even if it were a soldier from the Salvation Army, the press would report his rank! But if a factory worker does something wrong, is the name of his company mentioned? No! Evidently perfection is always and everywhere expected of the army, but since the existence of original sin, that does not exist any more. (laughs) See, I do have Catholic roots.

But be at ease: if there are problems, they will be tackled, and anyone who does something wrong will be punished.

[Lippens] During the Iraq war, you were highly critical of Bush. Can you, as the defense minister of a military dwarf, permit yourself such statements?

[Flahaut] Belgium is in the center of Europe, the NATO headquarters are located here, and we are getting international recognition because of our priceless political and military experience in Africa. I have heard from General Jones that Bush himself thinks that we are approaching things the right way in the Congo. Because we are a small country, we have no hidden agenda, and so we are also received better. Besides: why should I not be able to criticize the US? Belgium is an independent country and not a blind follower who snaps to attention whenever the Americans say something.

And was my criticism of the "war on terrorism" really that far off? After invading Afghanistan, the Americans failed to capture Osama Bin Ladin, they are in military and political quicksand in Iraq, and their peace plan for the Middle East is not being realized. Their great mistake was that they did not involve the United Nations. We want a new UN resolution before we will help with the rebuilding of Iraq.

[Lippens] Until the US should threaten to take NATO headquarters out of Belgium.

[Flahaut] There is a difference between the ideal world and reality. The US put so much pressure on us to modify our genocide law that we had to yield. But that does not mean that we are going to keep quiet for the rest of our days. After all, the United States is changing too. The tough talk of the year 2002 about "old Europe" has already been greatly toned down. They are now using a quite different tone at NATO meetings. They are beginning to take into account what the rest of the international community thinks about their behavior because they realize that they cannot do it alone.

The biggest problem at this moment is that United States refuses to understand that a strong European defense, as advocated by Belgium, will also strengthen NATO. The aim is especially to coordinate our armies better, to eliminate

duplication, and to allow each country to develop its own military specialties. It is by no means a threat to the United States, because we do not have the huge budgets or the big numbers. Americans have nothing to fear from us, because our defense is based on cooperation, with them as well. But they simply want tough competition among each other, because that makes their economy go. Oh well, maybe there will be some momentum after the presidential elections in the United States late this year.

[Lippens] You hope that Bush will lose the elections?

[Flahaut] It would be morally quite indiscreet for a Belgian minister to comment on the American elections. I am glad to leave that to the American voters. (Grins) But if I were an American, I would vote for a Democrat.

[passage on Belgian domestic affairs omitted]

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2/20  
January 20, 2004 SD:

Will Be included  
Battle of Ideas  
+  
GWOT Briefs  
J

Iraq

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iraq—the Debate

Attached are articles written by Lind and Dempsey that Pete Schoomaker sent me. You ought to take a look at them and think about it in the battle for ideas paper we are working on. I think it is worth considering.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Lind, William S. "Understanding Fourth Generation Warfare" (undated)  
BG Dempsey's Response to 4<sup>th</sup> Generation Warfare Article (undated)

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Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

20 Jan 04

OSD 09088-04



## Understanding Fourth Generation Warfare

William S. Lind

Rather than commenting on the specifics of the war with Iraq, I thought it might be a good time to lay out a framework for understanding that and other conflicts. The framework is the Four Generations of Modern War.

I developed the framework of the first three generations ("generation" is shorthand for dialectically qualitative shift) in the 1980s, when I was laboring to introduce maneuver warfare to the Marine Corps. Marines kept asking, "What will the Fourth Generation be like?", and I began to think about that. The result was the article I co-authored for the Marine Corps Gazette in 1989, "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation." Our troops found copies of it in the caves at Tora Bora, the al Qaeda hideout in Afghanistan.

The Four Generations began with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the treaty that ended the Thirty Years' War. With the Treaty of Westphalia, the state established a monopoly on war. Previously, many different entities had fought wars - families, tribes, religions, cities, business enterprises - using many different means, not just armies and navies (two of those means, bribery and assassination, are again in vogue). Now, state militaries find it difficult to imagine war in any way other than fighting state armed forces similar to themselves.

The First Generation of Modern War runs roughly from 1648 to 1860. This was war of line and column tactics, where battles were formal and the battlefield was orderly. The relevance of the First Generation springs from the fact that the battlefield of order created a military culture of order. Most of the things that distinguish "military" from "civilian" - uniforms, saluting, careful gradations or rank - were products of the First Generation and are intended to reinforce the culture of order.

The problem is that, around the middle of the 19th century, the battlefield of order began to break down. Mass armies, soldiers who actually wanted to fight (an 18th century's soldier's main objective was to desert), rifled muskets, then breech loaders and machine guns, made the old line and column tactics first obsolete, then suicidal.

The problem ever since has been a growing contradiction between the military culture and the increasing disorderliness of the battlefield. The culture of order that was once consistent with the environment in which it operated has become more and more at odds with it.

Second Generation warfare was one answer to this contradiction. Developed by the French Army during and after World War I, it sought a solution in mass firepower, most of which was indirect artillery fire. The goal was attrition, and the doctrine was summed up by the French as, "The artillery conquers, the infantry occupies." Centrally-controlled firepower was carefully synchronized, using detailed, specific plans and orders, for the infantry, tanks, and artillery, in a "conducted battle" where the commander was in effect the conductor of an orchestra.

Second Generation warfare came as a great relief to soldiers (or at least their officers) because it preserved the culture of order. The focus was inward on rules, processes and procedures. Obedience was more important than initiative (in fact, initiative was not wanted, because it endangered synchronization), and discipline was top-down and imposed.

Second Generation warfare is relevant to us today because the United States Army and Marine Corps learned Second Generation warfare from the French during and after World War I. It remains the American way of war, as we are seeing in Afghanistan and Iraq: to Americans, war means "putting steel on target." Aviation has replaced artillery as the source of most firepower, but otherwise, (and despite the Marine's formal doctrine, which is Third Generation maneuver warfare) the American military today is as French as white wine and brie. At the Marine Corps' desert warfare training center at 29 Palms, California, the only thing missing is the tricolor and a picture of General Gamelin in the headquarters. The same is true at the Army's Armor School at Fort Knox, where one instructor recently began his class by saying, "I don't know why I have to teach you all this old French crap, but I do."

Third Generation warfare, like Second, was a product of World War I. It was developed by the German Army, and is commonly known as Blitzkrieg or maneuver warfare.

Third Generation warfare is based not on firepower and attrition but speed, surprise, and mental as well as physical dislocation. Tactically, in the attack a Third Generation military seeks to get into the enemy's rear and collapse him from the rear forward: instead of "close with and destroy," the motto is "bypass and collapse." In the defense, it attempts to draw the enemy in, then cut him off. War ceases to be a shoving contest, where forces attempt to hold or advance a "line;" Third Generation warfare is non-linear.

Not only do tactics change in the Third Generation, so does the military culture. A Third Generation military focuses outward, on the situation, the enemy, and the result the situation requires, not inward on process and method (in war games in the 19th Century, German junior officers were routinely given problems that could only be solved by disobeying orders). Orders themselves specify the result to be achieved, but never the method ("Auftragstaktik").

Initiative is more important than obedience (mistakes are tolerated, so long as they come from too much initiative rather than too little), and it all depends on self-discipline, not imposed discipline. The Kaiserheer and the Wehrmacht could put on great parades, but in reality they had broken with the culture of order.

Characteristics such as decentralization and initiative carry over from the Third to the Fourth Generation, but in other respects the Fourth Generation marks the most radical change since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. In Fourth Generation war, the state loses its monopoly on war. All over the world, state militaries find themselves fighting non-state opponents such as al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the FARC. Almost everywhere, the state is losing.

Fourth Generation war is also marked by a return to a world of cultures, not merely states, in conflict. We now find ourselves facing the Christian West's oldest and most steadfast opponent, Islam. After about three centuries on the strategic defensive, following the failure of the second Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683, Islam has resumed the strategic offensive, expanding outward in every direction. In Third Generation war, invasion by immigration can be at least as dangerous as invasion by a state army.

Nor is Fourth Generation warfare merely something we import, as we did on 9/11. At its core lies a universal crisis of legitimacy of the state, and that crisis means many countries will evolve Fourth Generation war on their soil. America, with a closed political system (regardless of which party wins, the Establishment remains in power and nothing really changes) and a poisonous ideology of "multiculturalism," is a prime candidate for the home-grown variety of Fourth Generation war - which is by far the most dangerous kind.

Where does the war in Iraq fit in this framework?

I suggest that the war we have seen thus far is merely a powder train leading to the magazine. The magazine is Fourth Generation war by a wide variety of Islamic non-state actors, directed at America and Americans (and local governments friendly to America) everywhere. The longer America occupies Iraq, the greater the chance that the magazine will explode. If it does, God help us all.

For almost two years, a small seminar has been meeting at my house to work on the question of how to fight Fourth Generation war. It is made up mostly of Marines, lieutenant through lieutenant colonel, with one Army officer, one National Guard tanker captain and one foreign officer. We figured somebody ought to be working on the most difficult question facing the U.S. armed forces, and nobody else seems to be.

The seminar recently decided it was time to go public with a few of the ideas it has come up with, and use this column to that end. We have no magic solutions to offer, only some thoughts. We recognized from the outset that the whole task may be hopeless; state militaries may not be able to come to grips with Fourth Generation enemies no matter what they do.

But for what they are worth, here are our thoughts to date:

If America had some Third Generation ground forces, capable of maneuver warfare, we might be able to fight battles of encirclement. The inability to fight battles of encirclement is what led to the failure of Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, where al Qaeda stood, fought us, and got away with few casualties. To fight such battles we need some true light infantry, infantry that can move farther and faster on its feet than the enemy, has a full tactical repertoire (not just bumping into the enemy and calling for fire) and can fight with its own weapons instead of depending on supporting arms. We estimate that U.S. Marine infantry today has a sustained march rate of only 10-15 kilometers per day; German World War II line, not light, infantry could sustain 40 kilometers.

Fourth Generation opponents will not sign up to the Geneva Conventions, but might some be open to a chivalric code governing how our war with them would be fought? It's worth exploring.

How U.S. forces conduct themselves after the battle may be as important in 4GW as how they fight the battle.

What the Marine Corps calls "cultural intelligence" is of vital importance in 4GW, and it must go down to the lowest rank. In Iraq, the Marines seemed to grasp this much better than the U.S. Army.

What kind of people do we need in Special Operations Forces? The seminar thought minds were more important than muscles, but it is not clear all U.S. SOF understand this.

One key to success is integrating our troops as much as possible with the local people.

Unfortunately, the American doctrine of "force protection" works against integration and generally hurts us badly. Here's a quote from the minutes of the seminar:

There are two ways to deal with the issue of force protection. One way is the way we are currently doing it, which is to separate ourselves from the population and to intimidate them with our firepower. A more viable alternative might be to take the opposite approach and integrate

with the community. That way you find out more of what is going on and the population protects you. The British approach of getting the helmets off as soon as possible may actually be saving lives.

What "wins" at the tactical and physical levels may lose at the operational, strategic, mental and moral levels, where 4GW is decided. Martin van Creveld argues that one reason the British have not lost in Northern Ireland is that the British Army has taken more casualties than it has inflicted. This is something the Second Generation American military has great trouble grasping, because it defines success in terms of comparative attrition rates.

We must recognize that in 4GW situations, we are the weaker, not the stronger party, despite all our firepower and technology.

What can the U.S. military learn from cops? Our reserve and National Guard units include lots of cops; are we taking advantage of what they know?

One key to success in 4GW may be "losing to win." Part of the reason the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are not succeeding is that our initial invasion destroyed the state, creating a happy hunting ground for Fourth Generation forces. In a world where the state is in decline, if you destroy a state, it is very difficult to recreate it. Here's another quote from the minutes of the seminar:

"The discussion concluded that while war against another state may be necessary one should seek to preserve that state even as one defeats it. Grant the opposing armies the 'honors of war,' tell them what a fine job they did, make their defeat 'civilized' so they can survive the war institutionally intact and then work for your side. This would be similar to 18th century notions of civilized war and contribute greatly to propping up a fragile state. Humiliating the defeated enemy troops, especially in front of their own population, is always a serious mistake but one that Americans are prone to make. This is because the 'football mentality' we have developed since World War II works against us."

In many ways, the 21st century will offer a war between the forces of 4GW and Brave New World. The 4GW forces understand this, while the international elites that seek BNW do not. Another quote from the minutes:

"Osama bin Ladin, though reportedly very wealthy, lives in a cave. Yes, it is for security but it is also leadership by example. It may make it harder to separate (physically or psychologically) the 4GW leaders from their troops. It also makes it harder to discredit those leaders with their

followers. This contrasts dramatically with the BNW elites who are physically and psychologically separated (by a huge gap) from their followers (even the generals in most conventional armies are to a great extent separated from their men). The BNW elites are in many respects occupying the moral low ground but don't know it."

In the Axis occupation of the Balkans during World War II, the Italians in many ways were more effective than the Germans. The key to their success is that they did not want to fight. On Cyprus, the U.N. commander rated the Argentine battalion as more effective than the British or the Austrians because the Argentines did not want to fight. What lessons can U.S. forces draw from this?

How would the Mafia do an occupation?

When we have a coalition, what if we let each country do what it does best, e.g., the Russians handle operational art, the U.S. firepower and logistics, maybe the Italians the occupation?

How could the Defense Department's concept of "Transformation" be redefined so as to come to grips with 4GW? If you read the current "Transformation Planning Guidance" put out by DOD, you find nothing in it on 4GW, indeed nothing that relates at all to either of the two wars we are now fighting. It is all oriented toward fighting other state armed forces that fight us symmetrically.

The seminar intends to continue working on this question of redefining "Transformation" (die Verwandlung?) so as to make it relevant to 4GW. However, for our December meeting, we have posed the following problem: It is Spring, 2004. The U.S. Marines are to relieve the Army in the occupation of Fallujah, perhaps Iraq's hottest hot spot (and one where the 82nd Airborne's tactics have been pouring gasoline on the fire). You are the commander of the Marine force taking over Fallujah. What do you do?

I'll let you know what we come up with.

Will Saddam's capture mark a turning point in the war in Iraq? Don't count on it. Few resistance fighters have been fighting for Saddam personally. Saddam's capture may lead to a fractioning of the Baath Party, which would move us further toward a Fourth Generation situation where no one can recreate the state. It may also tell the Shiites that they no longer need America to protect them from Saddam, giving them more options in their struggle for free elections.

If the U.S. Army used the capture of Saddam to announce the end of tactics that enrage ordinary Iraqis and drive them toward active resistance, it might buy us a bit of de-escalation. But I don't think we'll that be smart. When it comes to Fourth Generation war, it seems nobody in the American military gets it.

Recently, a faculty member at the National Defense University wrote to Marine Corps General Mattis, commander of I MAR DIV, to ask his views on the importance of reading military history. Mattis responded with an eloquent defense of taking time to read history, one that should go up on the wall at all of our military schools. "Thanks to my reading, I have never been caught flat-footed by any situation," Mattis said. "It doesn't give me all the answers, but it lights what is often a dark path ahead."

Still, even such a capable and well-read commander as General Mattis seems to miss the point about Fourth Generation warfare. He said in his missive, "Ultimately, a real understanding of history means that we face NOTHING new under the sun. For all the '4th Generation of War' intellectuals running around today saying that the nature of war has fundamentally changed, the tactics are wholly new, etc., I must respectfully say, 'Not really.'"

Well, that isn't quite what we Fourth Generation intellectuals are saying. On the contrary, we have pointed out over and over that the 4th Generation is not novel, but a return, specifically a return to the way war worked before the rise of the state. Now, as then, many different entities, not just governments of states, will wage war. They will wage war for many different reasons, not just "the extension of politics by other means." And they will use many different tools to fight war, not restricting themselves to what we recognize as military forces. When I am asked to recommend a good book describing what a Fourth Generation world will be like, I usually suggest Barbara Tuchman's *A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous Fourteenth Century*.

Nor are we saying that Fourth Generation tactics are new. On the contrary, many of the tactics Fourth Generation opponents use are standard guerilla tactics. Others, including much of what we call "terrorism," are classic Arab light cavalry warfare carried out with modern technology at the operational and strategic, not just tactical, levels.

As I have said before in this column, most of what we are facing in Iraq today is not yet Fourth Generation warfare, but a War of National Liberation, fought by people whose goal is to restore a Baathist state. But as that goal fades and those forces splinter, Fourth Generation war will come more and more to the fore. What will characterize it is not vast changes in how the enemy fights, but rather in who fights and what they fight for. The change in who fights makes it difficult for us to tell friend from foe. A good example is the advent of female suicide bombers; do

U.S. troops now start frisking every Moslem woman they encounter? The change in what our enemies fight for makes impossible the political compromises that are necessary to ending any war. We find that when it comes to making peace, we have no one to talk to and nothing to talk about. And the end of a war like that in Iraq becomes inevitable: the local state we attacked vanishes, leaving behind either a stateless region (Somalia) or a façade of a state (Afghanistan) within which more non-state elements rise and fight.

General Mattis is correct that none of this is new. It is only new to state armed forces that were designed to fight other state armed forces. The fact that no state military has recently succeeded in defeating a non-state enemy reminds us that Clio has a sense of humor: history also teaches us that not all problems have solutions.



## BG Dempsey's Response to 4<sup>th</sup> Generation Warfare Article

It's probably not possible for me to respond to this without sounding defensive. However, since it's important that we capture the right lessons from our experience in OIF-1, I'll give it a shot.

I completely agree that it is necessary we be prepared to fight both state and non-state actors. Whether this is some generational evolution or simply a variety of enemies using whatever they have at their disposal against us is a matter best left to academia.

Beyond that one point of agreement, I've got to push back on several of the other ideas in the essay:

1. "One key to success is integrating our troops as much as possible with the local people." I assume that the idea here is that once they get to know us, they'll trust us. That is a significant oversimplification of a very complex issue. We meet with "the local people" constantly and at every level. We've learned that Arabs are very friendly but very private. The ones who are already inclined to support us will befriend us to a point, but they will want to keep us at arms length. Furthermore, no amount of "integration" will change the opinion of those who think ill of us for what we represent. HUMINT follows success not friendship. Prove that you can take the bad guys off the street, and HUMINT goes up. No question that cultural awareness is good and that we should avoid being seen as excessively provocative. Also no question, in my mind at least, that they expect us to be who and what we are--the best fighting force in the world. For now, and until their own security forces are fully functioning, they're looking to us for security not friendship. Finally, Arabs are not put off by our basing and force protection. They can be critical if we inconvenience them in their daily lives by impeding traffic and denying them access to parts of the city. Having Armies live on well-protected bases outside of cities makes perfect sense to them. Having Armies living inside their cities does not. We're accounting for that by setting up the enduring base camps on the periphery of the city.

2. "We must recognize that in 4GW situations, we are the weaker, not the stronger party, despite all our firepower and technology." This is simply nonsense. As I've told our soldiers over here, they--not our weapons--are what terrifies the terrorist. We are visible proof that men and women, blacks and whites, Christians, Muslims, and Jews can work together toward a common goal. We fight for positive ideas like individual rights, diversity, and freedom. Our enemies fight for negative ideas like personal gain, exclusion, and oppression. We only become the "weaker party" when we forget that.

3. "Part of the reason the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are not succeeding is that our initial invasion destroyed the state, thereby creating a happy hunting ground for Fourth Generational forces." First of all, from our perspective the war in Iraq is succeeding. The rogue regime of Sadaam Hussein is gone. We are on the offensive against terrorism. We don't know what shape the future Iraq will take, but there is every reason to be hopeful that it will be better than the old Iraq. Time and money will influence the outcome in a way that was impossible when the Baath Party was in power. Second, the initial invasion didn't destroy the state. Sadaam Hussein destroyed the state through 25 years of nepotism, favoritism, corruption, and neglect. We have made and continue to make herculean efforts to improve the quality of life for Iraq's people, and they know it. From their perspective, admitting that we've improved their lives would incur a psychological debt, a debt they are unwilling to incur. So, they will continue to be openly critical of our efforts.

4. "When it comes to Fourth Generation War, it seems nobody in the American military gets it." An incredible statement. We have made frequent adaptations in very nearly every system and function of the Division, and I know every US Army Division has done the same. We have learned never to believe we are as good as we can be, and we remain aware that pride of "authorship" is probably the most dangerous enemy we face in this environment.

The forces that follow us will probably not find the Iraq they think they will find. It will either be better or it will be worse. As we have, they will have to adjust. If under Mr. Lind's influence they arrive with well-established and pre-conceived notions about how to operate, they will probably be wrong.

As I write, we're fighting three different "kinds" of enemy in Iraq: the former regime, terrorism, and organized crime. We're also fighting against the emergence of religious extremism--mostly radical Sunni religious extremism--that in the long run may be the most dangerous influence the new Iraq will face. Overarching all of this, we are in competition for the popular support of the Iraqi people. For now, we have it, but that popular support has a shelf life, and we are working hard to "buy time" so that we can reduce the enemy forces to a level where the new Iraqi security forces can handle them.

Finally, I appreciate all you are doing to get us thinking about our profession and how we operate.

V/R BG Marty Dempsey

720

January 20, 2004

000,5

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. Pete Pace  
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Statements

Attached is an interesting piece on Wes Clark and Sandy Berger.

Thanks.

Attach.  
1/13/04 RNC Research Briefing: "Careless Clark"

DHR:dh  
012004-21



*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

20 Jan 04

OSD 09089-04

9/11  
1.

Sherline, Stephanie, CIV, OSD

From: RNCResearch@rnchq.org  
Sent: Tuesday, January 13, 2004 1:15 PM  
To: (b)(6)  
Subject: Careless Clark



RNCResearch@rnchq.org  
January 13, 2004



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# CARELESS CLARK

*Unprepared, Unprincipled  
Or Both?*

## CLARK SAYS CLINTON GAVE BUSH ADMINISTRATION WAR PLAN TO DISMANTLE AL QAEDA?

**January 12, 2004:** "After the bombings at American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and the attack on the USS Cole . . . the Clinton team spent months devising a detailed special operations plan to dismantle Al Qaeda that was in place in 2000. 'They built a plan and turned it over to the Bush administration.' said Clark, who said the plan was ignored. 'This administration failed to do its duty to protect the United States of America before 9/11.'" (Raja Mishra and Joanna Weiss, "Iraq Was Distraction, Clark Says," *The Boston Globe*, 1/13/04)

## CLINTON NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SANDY BERGER SAYS CLARK IS INCORRECT

**September 19, 2002:** "[T]here was no war plan [to fight terrorism and Al Qaida] that we turned over to the Bush administration during the transition. And the reports of that are just incorrect." (Samuel R. Berger, U.S. House Of Representatives And U.S. Senate, Select Committees On Intelligence, *Joint Hearing*, 9/19/02)

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21  
January 16, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Internet Article

335 SD

You might want to see the attached *Current Viewpoint's* person of the year.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/26/03 Internet article

DHR:dh  
011604-5

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

21 Jan 04

OSD 09090704

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### Our Person of the Year

Uploaded : *Friday 26th Dec 2003 at 16:41*

Contributed by : *Carol Gould*

Last year our Person of the Year was Daniel Pearl. Kidnapped by Islamic terrorists and beheaded on video after reciting 'I am a Jew' for the murderers' camera, we felt Danny represented the best in journalism. Danny was fascinated by Islamic and Arab culture and wanted to know what made shoe-bomber Richard Reid's friends tick. He ventured into Pakistan and trusted his contacts in the field. His courage and instinctively inquisitive nature -- essential in any reporter worth his salt -- proved fatal.

To the anguish of his family, friends and colleagues at The Wall Street Journal, his disappearance, and then the news of his death in captivity, dramatised the gap between the rest of the world and the mind of the terrorist.

This year we have chosen a man who has come under fire from every corner and has suffered the slings and arrows of Generals; world-renowned Editors; award-winning cartoonists and satirists not to mention Democratic candidates and liberal pressure groups. The photograph of him shaking hands with Saddam Hussein in December 1983 has been plastered all over the world. Like Franklin Roosevelt, Yitzhak Rabin, Moshe Dayan, Golda Meir and Bill Clinton, millions will see him as imperfect.

However, at Current Viewpoint we value leaders who see good in their Jewish citizens and in the people of Israel. We are based in the UK and live each day dreading the perpetual barrage of Israel-bashing on British radio, British television, newspapers, magazines and books and even on children's programming. We dread attending friends' dinner parties, as Jews in the past three years are invariably set upon by dinner guests as if we come from a freak race of murderous masters of 'genocide' and 'apartheid' who 'use the Holocaust' to justify 'stealing Palestine from the rightful inhabitants'. British MPs feel free to accuse the Bush Administration and Tony Blair of being bullied by a 'cabal of Zionists' and a mainstream magazine, 'The New Statesman,' feels no constraint about having on its cover a giant Star of David impaling a Union Jack with the caption 'A Kosher Conspiracy?' British columnists think nothing of telling their readers that they do not bother to open mail from people with 'Jewish sounding names' and 'The Evening Standard' and 'Guardian' are happy to run articles entitled 'Israel Simply Has no Right to Exist' and in which writers suggest the Jewish State should be dismantled.

Our Person of the Year has the courage to defend Israel with intelligent answers and represents the many positive attributes of the American people: he is a tireless worker (the British papers did laud his workaholic schedule when our Defence Minister, Geoff Hoon went on holiday during a crucial period this year); when the hijacked aircraft hit the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 he did not escape to a bunker but helped carry burning victims from their offices to safety.. He cares about the destiny of his people. He knows who he is.

He is Donald H Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defence of the United States and head of the Pentagon. Rumsfeld first came to the world's attention on September 11, 2001 when he held a press conference with Senators John Warner and Carl Levin in the Pentagon Briefing Room that afternoon as the building smouldered. It is notable that in the days before 9/11, New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani was, in the words of Jimmy Breslin, regarded as 'a bum' and was in the

11-L-0559/OSD/42088

doghouse from all directions. After 9/11 he was lionised. In the lead-up to the events of that appalling day, Washington pundits were already naming a successor to Rumsfeld, their slings and arrows accusing him of alienating Pentagon brass in his efforts to transform the cumbersome, costly defence department.

After 9/11 the articulate, witty and well-informed Defence chief became a national hero; what we see as his secret formula was his ability to project his total love for his nation and commitment to its safety and survival. One felt comforted the minute he opened his mouth. That sort of personal magnetism and self-assurance cannot be bottled.

Before readers groan that Rummy has few admirers these days, it is important to note that some of the world's most distinguished journalists and historians, including Sir John Keegan, Stephen Pollard, Mark Steyn and Michael Gove have supported his continued reign as Defence chief throughout the darkest days of post-war Iraq and the controversies over Halliburton and Lt Gen Boykin. It is reported this week that when TIME was trying to select this year's Person of the Year and had shortlisted Rumsfeld, it was he who suggested they pick the American soldier as Person of the Year, which they went on to do.

At a Pentagon Town Hall meeting in August 2002, when asked about Israel he said :

'If you have a country that's a sliver and you can see three sides of it from a high hotel building, you've got to be careful what you give away and to whom you give it. ..Barak made a proposal that was as forthcoming as anyone in the world could ever imagine, and Arafat turned it down.....there was a war. Israel urged neighbouring countries not to get involved ...,they all jumped in, and they lost a lot of real estate to Israel because Israel prevailed in that conflict. In the intervening period, they've made some settlements in various parts of the so-called occupied area, which was the result of a war, which they won.!' [Quote from Department of Defence transcript]

At Current Viewpoint we have never met Secretary Rumsfeld and have no personal view on him. We have watched him in hours and hours of Pentagon briefings as well as on his visits to Europe, the Gulf and the Far East and feel he is an eminent emissary of the free world. Whom do we have in Great Britain who can field questions from the world's press with the thoroughness and depth with which Rumsfeld handles his inquisitors on his world travels? This year we saw Joschka Fischer publicly berating Rumsfeld at the Munich Security Conference and millions of demonstrators across the globe carrying effigies and posters declaring him a war criminal and Nazi. Would Joschka's world be better off with Saddam still in power and a nerd in charge of the Pentagon?

Frankly, those of us who have lived in Israel and who have lived in nations plagued by terror feel a sense of reassurance when the people in charge value our survival; one of the aspects of Rumsfeld's rhetoric this year that endeared him to us was his genuine incredulity and public outrage when he learned that a group of nations that included Libya, Iran and Syria was being given authority and committee chairmanships by the United Nations on issues of arms control and human rights.

The problems of post-war Iraq are manifold and are blamed by many on Rumsfeld, but it would be nice to wake up one morning and hear that a group of Arab and African nations had got together to help in reconstruction, so that Iraq could look like Israel -- a democratic nation littered with symphony orchestras, art galleries and research institutions funded by world Jewish philanthropy. Articles are appearing this very week about the visit he made to Saddam in 1983 on behalf of the Reagan Administration and, according to some sources, again in 1984 to reassure the Iraqi dictator that America supported his campaign against Iran. We cannot be sure how this controversy will eventually affect Rumsfeld's legacy. However, even our greatest heroes, whom we enumerated at the beginning of this article, have carried out deeds in the line of duty at various points in history in the context of the times in which they were facing crises.

That Yasser Arafat, whom I saw cry on the Yahrzeit of Yitzhak Rabin, was a Nobel Peace Prize winner and is now a prisoner of the Israeli authorities demonstrates the explosive nature of the politics of that region.



Donald Rumsfeld's success story is a role-model for young people. A Princeton graduate and champion wrestler, he was a gifted Navy pilot and settled into married life as a family-oriented young man. He launched himself into a career of public service and had a good record on civil rights at a time when Republicans were not championing these issues. He was a tough businessman and his style may not be everyone's cup of tea. However if one takes his attributes and puts them into a pot they make a finer soup than the activities of the enemies of the United States and Israel. His management of the Afghanistan and Iraqi campaigns has been criticised by many but one wonders if anyone else could have handled this staggering crisis in America's security --- the post 9/11 world -- any better.

Rumsfeld's assessment of the arrangement of modern-day Europe into 'Old' and 'New' Europe is astute; the outrage throughout the world at these observations brought to mind 'Methinks the lady doth protest too much.' The anger lasted for months, but few journalists around the globe stopped to reflect on the fact that ex-Soviet bloc nations understand oppression just as much as, if not more than countries who have not known Soviet-style tyranny. Yes, Germany and those occupied endured Hitler for twelve years, but the recent collective memory of the Eastern bloc puts 'New Europe' into the basket of *peoples* who can empathise with **Jraqis**.

The Defence Secretary's frequent trips abroad have made him one of the most travelled of Pentagon chiefs. A weekly magazine criticised him for being ensconced in his office and suggested he 'travel out of Washington;' unless it is a double popping up in Afghanistan, Iraq, Japan, Old and New Europe and Great Britain in 2003, that criticism of Rumsfeld reveals a frightening lack of knowledge about America's leaders, not any shortcoming of the man in question. We feel that an individual who has made a continuing impact on world events and who has shown dedication to the work placed before him is worthy of being selected Person of the Year.

We hope that Don Rumsfeld's gift to the world in 2004 will be the capture of bin laden and al Zawahiri. His gift to the American people has been his devotion to the nation's survival. We pray that the deaths of American troops will end and that he will be instrumental in making this happen in 2004.

If a Democrat is elected in 2004 we pray that a Pentagon chief as accomplished and eloquent as Rumsfeld (notwithstanding the ridiculous and insulting British 'Foot in Mouth' award to him this year) will serve in coming years in defense of the rapidly-shrinking free world.

\*\*\*\*\*

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Photograph of United States Defence Secretary Donald H Rumsfeld by Tech Sgt Andy Dunaway ; Department of Defence.

Website:

<http://www.defenselink.mil/>

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VIA FAX

January 20, 2004

333

TO: Ambassador Van Galbraith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

Van--

I hope you have a good trip to Iraq. It sounds like a good idea to me.

Regards,

DHR:dh  
012004-20

20 Jan 04

OSD 09092-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42091

January 20, 2004

TO: Mary Claire Murphy

CC: Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock  
(b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Hosting Functions

We will pay for the spouses' function. However, often in these events there is a good deal of leftover food. I noticed from my Christmas party, which cost me a fortune, that all the leftover food disappeared — the shrimp and everything else, as though it belonged to the USC. I may wish to take some of it home.

They ought to manage the costs in a way that is appropriate, both when I am paying and when the government is paying.

Thanks.

Attach.  
1/16/04 Protocol memo to SecDef re: Combatant Commanders' Spouses Luncheon

DHR:dh  
012004-6

.....  
Please respond by 1/23/04

1-10

OSD 09103-04

January 16, 2004

*File - 7  
From - 1 -*

*✓  
1/20*

Memorandum To: The Secretary of Defense

From: Mary Claire Murphy *Mary Claire Murphy*

Re: Combatant Commander's Spouses Luncheon  
Monday, January 26, 2004

Sir,

As you know, Joyce will be hosting the CINC spouses and the Service Chief Spouses for a luncheon on Monday, January 26, 2004, here in the SecDef dining room.

It has come to my attention that for this conference, the CINC Spouses are on "Travel Only" orders - meaning that they can fly with their spouses, but no meals, etc. are covered during their stay here. They must pay for all non-hosted meals out of their own pockets.

The spouses will receive a bill for all meals that the JCS provides, but it was my thought that you may prefer to host them and pay for the luncheon personally?

The cost would be approximately \$45.00 per person or \$765.00 for 17 guests.

Approve       Disapprove

cc: Larry Di Rita

(b)(6)

January 20, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Kennedy Rebuttal

We probably ought to get a written rebuttal of Kennedy's op-ed piece. I don't know if we want to use it, but we certainly ought to have it in our files.

*prop*

Please do it and show me.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Kennedy, Edward M. "A Dishonest War," *Washington Post*, January 18, 2004, p. B7.

DHR:dh  
012004-7

.....  
Please respond by 1/23/04

OSD 09104-04

*in process*

washingtonpost.com

# A Dishonest War

By Edward M. Kennedy

Sunday, January 18, 2004; Page B07

Of the many issues competing for attention in this new and defining year, one is of a unique order of magnitude: President Bush's decision to go to war in Iraq. The facts demonstrate how dishonest that decision was. As former Treasury secretary Paul H. O'Neill recently confirmed, the debate over military action began as soon as President Bush took office. Some felt Saddam Hussein could be contained without war. A month after the inauguration, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said: "We have kept him contained, kept him in his box." The next day, he said tellingly that Hussein "has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction."

The events of Sept. 11, 2001, gave advocates of war the opening they needed. They tried immediately to tie Hussein to al Qaeda and the terrorist attacks. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld created an Office of Special Plans in the Pentagon to analyze the intelligence for war and bypass the traditional screening process. Vice President Cheney relied on intelligence from Iraqi exiles and put pressure on intelligence agencies to produce the desired result.

The war in Afghanistan began in October with overwhelming support in Congress and the country. But the focus on Iraq continued behind the scenes, and President Bush went along. In the Rose Garden on Nov. 26, he said: "Afghanistan is still just the beginning."

Three days later, Cheney publicly began to send signals about attacking Iraq. On Nov. 29 he said: "I don't think it takes a genius to figure out that this guy [Hussein] is clearly . . . a significant potential problem for the region, for the United States, for everybody with interests in the area." On Dec. 12 he raised the temperature: "If I were Saddam Hussein, I'd be thinking very carefully about the future, and I'd be looking very closely to see what happened to the Taliban in Afghanistan."

Next, Karl Rove, in a rare public stumble, made his own role clear, telling the Republican National Committee on Jan. 19, 2002, that the war on terrorism could be used politically. Republicans could "go to the country on this issue," he said.

Ten days later, in his State of the Union address, President Bush invoked the "axis of evil" -- Iraq, Iran and North Korea -- and we lost our clear focus on al Qaeda. The address contained 12 paragraphs on Afghanistan and 29 on the war on terrorism, but only one fleeting mention of al Qaeda. It said nothing about the Taliban or Osama bin Laden.

In the following months, although bin Laden was still at large, the drumbeat on Iraq gradually drowned out those who felt Hussein was no imminent threat. On Sept. 12 the president told the United Nations: "Iraq likely maintains stockpiles of VX, mustard and other chemical agents and has made several

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attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon." He said Iraq could build a nuclear weapon "within a year" if Hussein obtained such material.

War on Iraq was clearly coming, but why make this statement in September? As White House Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card Jr. said, "From a marketing point of view, you don't introduce new products in August." The 2002 election campaigns were then entering the home stretch. Election politics prevailed over foreign policy and national security. The administration insisted on a vote in Congress to authorize the war before Congress adjourned for the elections. Why? Because the debate would distract attention from the troubled economy and the failed effort to capture bin Laden. The shift in focus to Iraq could help Republicans and divide Democrats.

The tactic worked. Republicans voted almost unanimously for war and kept control of the House in the elections. Democrats were deeply divided and lost their majority in the Senate. The White House could use its control of Congress to get its way on key domestic priorities.

The final step in the march to war was a feint to the United Nations. But Cheney, Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz had convinced the president that war would be a cakewalk, with or without the United Nations, and that our forces would be welcomed as liberators. In March the war began.

Hussein's brutal regime was not an adequate justification for war, and the administration did not seriously try to make it one until long after the war began and all the false justifications began to fall apart. There was no imminent threat. Hussein had no nuclear weapons, no arsenals of chemical or biological weapons, no connection to Sept. 11 and no plausible link to al Qaeda. We never should have gone to war for ideological reasons driven by politics and based on manipulated intelligence.

Vast resources have been spent on the war that should have been spent on priorities at home. Our forces are stretched thin. Precious lives have been lost. The war has made America more hated in the world and made the war on terrorism harder to win. As Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge said in announcing the latest higher alert: "Al Qaeda's continued desire to carry out attacks against our homeland is perhaps greater now than at any point since September 11th."

The most fundamental decision a president ever makes is the decision to go to war. President Bush violated the trust that must exist between government and the people. If Congress and the American people had known the truth, America would never have gone to war in Iraq. No president who does that to our country deserves to be reelected.

*The writer is a Democratic senator from Massachusetts.*

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January 20, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Poland

Please take a look at this note from Newt and tell me what you think we ought to do.

Thanks.

Attach.  
1/18/04 Gingrich e-mail re: Help for Poland

DHR:dh  
012004-12

.....  
Please respond by

2/6/04

*DR*

Ryan,  
sent it back  
to ISP for redo  
because it is  
not ready  
will get Newt.  
ASAP.

11-L-0559/OSD/42097 OSD 09105-04

*J*



**Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD**

---

**From:** Thirdwave2@aol.com  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 18, 2004 10:31 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;  
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6) jack.patterson@osd.mil  
**Subject:** Fwd: OUR FORGOTTEN ALLIES

for secdef,depsecdef  
from newt 1/18/04

### Help for Poland

the column by Peters makes a pretty compelling case that we ought to have some sense of proportionality in helping Poland versus Pakistan, Egypt and Turkey.

I do not know how close to the numbers his final section is but giving the Egyptians 200 times as much as the Poles does seem a bit disproportionate

if we want to grow support in Europe we need to be seen as rewarding those who take the risk of helping us

**Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD**

---

**From:** Rick Tyler - Gingrich Communications (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, December 22, 2003 2:57 PM  
**To:** Newt Gingrich  
**Subject:** OUR FORGOTTEN ALLIES

<http://www.nypost.com/postopinion/opedcolumnists/14094.htm>  
OUR FORGOTTEN ALLIES

By RALPH PETERS

December 22, 2003 -- THE decisive turning point in the West's long struggle against Islamic conquerors came on the afternoon of Sept. 12, 1683, during the last Turkish siege of Vienna. Severely outnumbered Polish hussars - the finest cavalry Europe ever produced - charged into the massed Ottoman ranks with lowered lances and a wild battle cry. Led by the valiant King Jan Sobieski, the Poles had marched to save Vienna while other Europeans looked away. The French - surprise! - had cut a deal with the sultan. (To Louis XIV, humbling the rival Habsburgs trumped the fate of Western civilization.) The odds were grim. Many of King Jan's nobles feared disaster. But Sobieski risked his kingdom - actually a rough-and-tumble democracy - to save a continent. On that fateful afternoon, the Polish cavalry struck the Turkish lines with such force that 2,000 lances shattered. The charge stunned the Ottoman army. A hundred thousand Turks ran for the Danube. No army from the Islamic world ever posed such a threat to the West again. Poland's thanks for its courage? In the next century, the country was sliced up like a pie by the ungrateful Habsburgs, along with the Romanovs of Russia and the Prussian Hohenzollerns. It was the most cynical action in European history until the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which divided Poland again in 1939. But the Poles never gave up their belief in their country - or in freedom. During our own revolution, our first allies were Polish freedom fighters such as Casimir Pulaski and Tadeusz Kosciuszko. (Paris only joined the fight when it looked like we might win. And France intervened to spite Britain, not to help us.) Throughout the 19th century, Poles fought for freedom wherever the struggle raged, in Latin America, Greece and Italy, and on the Union side in our Civil War. Although their country had been raped by the great powers of Europe, Poles kept her cause alive. Again and again, Poles rose against their occupiers, only to be savagely put down, with their finest young men slaughtered or marched to Siberian prisons. Then, at the end of the Great War, Poland suddenly reappeared on the maps. What did the Poles do? They immediately saved Western civilization yet again. In the now-forgotten "Miracle on the Vistula," a patched-together Polish army turned back the Red hordes headed for Berlin. One of history's most brilliant campaigns, it saved defeated Germany from a communist takeover. Poland's thanks? The slaughter of World War II. Then the Soviet occupation. But the Poles never gave up. Their language, their faith - and their martial traditions - were maintained with rigor and pride. Of all the countries that gained their freedom as the Soviet Union collapsed, none had struggled for liberty as relentlessly as Poland. Now the Poles are defending freedom again. In Iraq. While the establishment media agonize over the fickle moods of Paris and Berlin, there's little mention in the press of the superb contribution made by our Polish allies - at great cost to their own country. In the words of an American officer who works closely with them, "Poland has taken to the Iraq mission for idealistic and principled purposes: Its leadership and military truly believe that freedom and justice are universal values worth fighting for." To how many other nations would those words apply? Poland has deployed 2,500 of its best soldiers to Iraq. It sent \$64 million worth of its newest equipment - which operations in Iraq will ruin. Warsaw selected its finest officers to command and staff the Multinational Division Center South. A Polish major general commands a total of 12,000 troops from 22 nations with responsibility for a sector previously held by twice as many U.S. Marines. The Polish performance has been flawless. Their reward? Surely America must recognize such a great contribution from an economically struggling ally - at a time when Polish troops also support peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan and the Balkans? Sorry. Turkey, which stabbed us as deeply in the back as it could on the eve of Operation Iraqi Freedom, will receive a minimum of \$2 billion from Washington - and the same elements in the Rumsfeld cabal who failed to plan for the occupation of Iraq hope to increase our aid to Ankara to \$5 billion. Pakistan, which refuses to press home the fight against al Qaeda, will get billions from Washington. The repressive Egyptian regime will get a few billion, too, as it does every year. Even Yemen will get a welfare check from Uncle Sugar. And Poland? Like the Czech Republic, which sent a few medics to the Persian

11-L-0559/OSD/42099

Gulf then withdrew them in panic, Poland will get a standard package of \$12 million for NATO-related programs. Other than some logistical support in Iraq, that's it. Strategic peanuts for our most enthusiastic ally on the European continent. Poland did have one request - a humble one, in the great scheme of things. Warsaw asked for \$47 million to modernize six used, American-built C-130 transport aircraft and to purchase American-built HMMWV all-terrain vehicles so elite Polish units could better integrate operations with American forces. Much of the money would go right back to U.S. factories and workers. Our response? We stiffed them. For once, the Pentagon and the State Department agree: No can do. Impossible. Our pockets are empty. Got to FedEx every penny to our favorite dictators. It's a mistake to over-idealize any nation. But if there's a land of heroes anywhere between the English Channel and the coast of California, it's Poland. Our Polish allies have taken a brave, costly, principled stand for freedom and democracy in Iraq. They desperately want to be seen by Washington as reliable friends in this treacherous world. The least we could do is to treat them with respect. Ralph Peters is a retired Army officer and the author of "Beyond Baghdad"

Best regards,  
Rick Tyler  
Director of Media Relations  
Gingrich Communications  
(b)(6)

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014  
1402

EF-8188  
3/8  
3/8

In reply refer to EF-8188 and I# 04/000837

January 20, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz

ATTY DI FILE  
3/8

Sec Def  
SUBJECT: Poland

Please take a look at this note from Newt and tell me what you think we ought to do.

Thanks.

Attach.  
1/18/04 Gingrich e-mail re: Help for Poland

DHR:dh  
012004-12

.....  
Please respond by 2/2/04

23-02-04 09:00 LB

21-01-04 10:00 LB

OSD 09105-04

✓  
319

EF-8188  
I-04/000837-ES

USDP *[Signature]* 3/3/04

INFO MEMO

FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mira R. Rigardel, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (Acting) *[Signature]* MAR 1 2004

SUBJECT: Help for Poland

- In response to an e-mail by Newt Gingrich, you asked of ways to further help Poland. New US initiatives announced during President Kwasniewski's visit include:
  - Increased FMF to Poland (\$66M will be requested this year) to acquire C-130 military transport aircraft,
  - Send experts to provide information on the Iraq reconstruction process and procurement opportunities to Polish firms,
  - Establish in Warsaw a program to pre-screen visitors traveling from Poland to the United States.
  
- We have concluded a round of consultations on the Defense Transformation Initiative (DTI) which is aimed at enhancing our priority relationship with Poland. DTI priorities include:
  - Ground Forces partnerships between US Army Europe and Polish Land Forces units and staffs. After a hiatus in 2003, due to OIF, these partnerships will be accelerated in 2004.
  - Missile Defense consultations.
  - Air Force unit-to-unit partnerships now that Poland will soon receive F-16s.
  - NCO training to help the Poles grow a new NCO corps.
  - Training to help Poles develop an open and transparent acquisition system.
  
- Additionally, we are assisting the Poles to implement a state-of-art training center to support our future force posture needs in Europe.
  
- I will be traveling to Warsaw in March to attend a missile defense conference and meet with senior Polish officials. My staff meets routinely with Polish defense officials to identify new initiatives and best ways of supporting the Polish military.

**Coordination**

Dir EUR

CAPT Jay Wilkins

PD for EUR/NATO

Jim Townsend

*DASO NATO/cun*

*IAW Brzezinski*

*Jak for  
GHW for*

*Jew*

**Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD**

---

**From:** Thirdwave2@aol.com

**Sent:** Sunday, January 18, 2004 10:31 AM

**To:** (b)(6) Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;  
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6) jack.patterson@osd.mil

**Subject:** Fwd: OUR FORGOTTEN ALLIES

for secdef,depsecdef  
from newt 1/18/04

Help for Poland

the column by Peters makes a pretty compelling case that we ought to have some sense of proportionality in helping Poland versus Pakistan, Egypt and Turkey.

I do not know how close to the numbers his final section is but giving the Egyptians 200 times as much as the Poles does seem a bit disproportionate

if we want to grow support in Europe we need to be seen as rewarding those who take the risk of helping us

## **Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD**

**From:** Rick Tyler - Gingrich Communications (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, December 22, 2003 2:57 PM  
**To:** Newt Gingrich  
**Subject:** OUR FORGOTTEN ALLIES

<http://www.nypost.com/postopinion/opedcolumnists/14094.htm>  
OUR FORGOTTEN ALLIES

By RALPH PETERS

December 22, 2003 -- THE decisive turning point in the West's long struggle against Islamic conquerors came on the afternoon of Sept. 12, 1683, during the last Turkish siege of Vienna. Severely outnumbered Polish hussars - the finest cavalry Europe ever produced - charged into the massed Ottoman ranks with lowered lances and a wild battle cry. Led by the valiant King Jan Sobieski, the Poles had marched to save Vienna while other Europeans looked away. The French - surprise! - had cut a deal with the sultan. (To Louis XIV, humbling the rival Habsburgs trumped the fate of Western civilization.) The odds were grim. Many of King Jan's nobles feared disaster. But Sobieski risked his kingdom - actually a rough-and-tumble democracy - to save a continent. On that fateful afternoon, the Polish cavalry struck the Turkish lines with such force that 2,000 lances shattered. The charge stunned the Ottoman army. A hundred thousand Turks ran for the Danube. No army from the Islamic world ever posed such a threat to the West again. Poland's thanks for its courage? In the next century, the country was sliced up like a pie by the ungrateful Habsburgs, along with the Romanovs of Russia and the Prussian Hohenzollerns. It was the most cynical action in European history until the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which divided Poland again in 1939. But the Poles never gave up their belief in their country - or in freedom. During our own revolution, our first allies were Polish freedom fighters such as Casimir Pulaski and Tadeusz Kosciuszko. (Paris only joined the fight when it looked like we might win. And France intervened to spite Britain, not to help us.) Throughout the 19th century, Poles fought for freedom wherever the struggle raged, in Latin America, Greece and Italy, and on the Union side in our Civil War. Although their country had been raped by the great powers of Europe, Poles kept her cause alive. Again and again, Poles rose against their occupiers, only to be savagely put down, with their finest young men slaughtered or marched to Siberian prisons. Then, at the end of the Great War, Poland suddenly reappeared on the maps. What did the Poles do? They immediately saved Western civilization yet again. In the now-forgotten "Miracle on the Vistula," a patched-together Polish army turned back the Red hordes headed for Berlin. One of history's most brilliant campaigns, it saved defeated Germany from a communist takeover. Poland's thanks? The slaughter of World War II. Then the Soviet occupation. But the Poles never gave up. Their language, their faith - and their martial traditions - were maintained with rigor and pride. Of all the countries that gained their freedom as the Soviet Union collapsed, none had struggled for liberty as relentlessly as Poland. Now the Poles are defending freedom again. In Iraq. While the establishment media agonize over the fickle moods of Paris and Berlin, there's little mention in the press of the superb contribution made by our Polish allies - at great cost to their own country. In the words of an American officer who works closely with them, "Poland has taken to the Iraq mission for idealistic and principled purposes: Its leadership and military truly believe that freedom and justice are universal values worth fighting for." To how many other nations would those words apply? Poland has deployed 2,500 of its best soldiers to Iraq. It sent \$64 million worth of its newest equipment - which operations in Iraq will ruin. Warsaw selected its finest officers to command and staff the Multinational Division Center South. A Polish major general commands a total of 12,300 troops from 22 nations with responsibility for a sector previously held by twice as many U.S. Marines. The Polish performance has been flawless. Their reward? Surely America must recognize such a great contribution from an economically struggling ally - at a time when Polish troops also support peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan and the Balkans? Sorry. Turkey, which stabbed us as deeply in the back as it could on the eve of Operation Iraqi Freedom, will receive a minimum of \$2 billion from Washington - and the same elements in the Rumsfeld cabal who failed to plan for the occupation of Iraq hope to increase our aid to Ankara to \$5 billion. Pakistan, which refuses to press home the fight against al Qaeda, will get billions from Washington. The repressive Egyptian regime will get a few billion, too, as it does every year. Even Yemen will get a welfare check from Uncle Sugar. And Poland? Like the Czech Republic, which sent a few medics to the Persian



Gulf then withdrew them in panic, Poland will get a standard package of \$12 million for NATO-related programs. Other than some logistical support in Iraq, that's it. Strategic peanuts for our most enthusiastic ally on the European continent. Poland did have one request - a humble one, in the great scheme of things. Warsaw asked for \$47 million to modernize six used, American-built C-130 transport aircraft and to purchase American-built HMMWV all-terrain vehicles so elite Polish units could better integrate operations with American forces. Much of the money would go right back to U.S. factories and workers. Our response? We scuffed them. For once, the Pentagon and the State Department agree: No can do. Impossible. Our pocket are empty. Got to FedEx every penny to our favorite dictators. It's a mistake to over-idealize any nation. But if there's a land of heroes anywhere between the English Channel and the coast of California, it's Poland. Our Polish allies have taken a brave, costly, principled stand for freedom and democracy in Iraq. They desperately want to be seen by Washington as reliable friends in this treacherous world. The least we could do is to treat them with respect. Ralph Peters is a retired Army officer and the author of "Beyond Baghdad

Best regards,  
Rick Tyler  
Director of Media Relations  
Girgich Communications

(b)(6)

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January 20, 2004

TO: David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Senator Coleman and Troop Reimbursement

Please let me know what is going on after you talk to Norm Coleman in connection with this letter he sent.

Thanks.

Attach.  
1/16/04 Coleman ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
012004-13

.....  
Please respond by 1/30/04

*Light*

*30 Jan 04*

OSD 09106-04

✓  
1/20

NORM COLEMAN  
MINNESOTA

United States Senate  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-2307

COMMITTEE ON  
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS  
CHAIRMAN  
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS  
COMMITTEE ON  
FOREIGN RELATIONS  
CHAIRMAN  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
WESTERN HEMISPHERE, PEACE CORPS, AND NARCOTICS AFFAIRS  
COMMITTEE ON  
AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY  
COMMITTEE ON  
SMALL BUSINESS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP

January 16, 2004

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary  
U.S. Department of Defense  
1300 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301

lex left

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am writing to express my deep disappointment over the manner in which my amendment to the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill intended by Congress to provide reimbursement to our troops on rest and recuperation leave from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom is being implemented by the Department of Defense.

Specifically, I understand that reimbursement is not available to our troops for travel preceding December 19, 2003, the date on which the amendment was implemented by the Department of Defense notwithstanding the clear intent of the Congress to provide such reimbursement for any air travel that is commenced during fiscal year 2003 or fiscal year 2004 and is completed during either such fiscal year while the member is on rest and recuperation leave from deployment overseas in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.

My amendment, which enjoyed the cosponsorship of 17 Senators, including the underlying bill's floor managers, the Chairman and Ranking Democrat of the Appropriations Committee, passed the United States Senate unanimously because we firmly believe that the men and women of the Armed Forces who have served our country so faithfully and with such courage deserve this small gesture of thanks from a very grateful nation.

Mr. Secretary, I strongly urge you to personally review this matter immediately and make the revisions to the program necessary to ensure its implementation is consistent with the law and the will of Congress.

Thank you for your prompt attention to this very important matter.

Sincerely,

Norm Coleman  
United States Senate

I have passed Sen. 1/17  
Coleman's concern to  
David Chu and the Legis.  
Affairs shop.

Chu is to call the  
Senator today.

C

January 20, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: **Army** End Strength

What do we need to do to get closure on the Army end strength issue? I think they owe me another report, and we ought to do it fast.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012004-17

.....  
Please respond by 1/30/04

OSD 09107-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42109

*1.06.04*

*in volume*

720

January 20, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rurnsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Idea for a Press Avail

I think we ought to do a press avail where we show two pictures of barrels with spigots, one with a spigot too high and brackish water down below. We can show on the side of that barrel the total number of men and women in uniform, the Reserve, the Guard and the Individual Ready Reserve. We can emphasize how many we are actually getting at and talk about the brackish water. It is a good idea.

326

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012004-18

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

20 January

OSD 09108-04

January 20, 2004

TO: Jaymie Duman

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

*Duman  
1/22*

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Safety, Health and Return-to-Employment (SHARE) Initiative

Let's make sure we implement this Elaine Chao memo.

Thanks.

Attach.  
1/15/04 Chao memo to SecDef re: SHARE Initiative

DHR:dh  
012004-22

.....  
Please respond by 1/31/04

*1/22*  
*David Chao* 1/22

SD:  
RAY DuBois is working this.  
We will keep you informed.  
✓ 1/23

*Jaymie Duman*  
1/22

CC: Es *(circled)*

OSD 09109-04

759  
606

60 Jan 04

(b)(6)

1/20  
1/16

~~For Your Information~~

SECRETARY OF LABOR  
WASHINGTON

JAN 15 2004

②

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

FROM ELAINE L. CHAO

*E.L. Chao*

SUBJECT: Safety, Health and Return-to-Employment (SHARE) Initiative

To demonstrate his Administration's commitment to worker safety and health, and to reduce *the* personal and financial cast of accidents in our Federal workplaces, the President has directed the Department of Labor to lead a major new initiative, SHARE, to promote Safety, Health and Return-to-Employment of Federal workers injured on the job.

SHARE is a new, more forward-looking initiative to replace "Federal Worker 2000," an initiative which began in 1999. The critical target areas of SHARE are similar to the goals of Federal Worker 2000. SHARE builds on the successes of the old, and reinforces this Administration's interest in safe and healthful workplaces and *costs savings to* taxpayers.

The cost of federal workplace injuries, when measured by workers' compensation losses, exceeds two billion dollars annually. In Fiscal Year 2003, the nearly 2.7 million federal employees filed more than 168,000 new workers' compensation claims, which resulted in over two million days lost from work. Even these striking numbers do not include the pain and inconveniences suffered by injured workers, and in many cases, the profound disruption of their lives. Nor do they count the losses in productivity, diminished responsiveness, and quality of service to the taxpayer because of diverted resources and lost workdays.

The President has directed all Executive Branch departments and agencies to participate in SHARE for three years, beginning with FY 2004. The Department will measure and report agencies' progress in four critical areas against their performance in the baseline year FY 2003, and will assist agencies in meeting their annual goals in each area.

The President asks that **we** set goals in the following areas:

- % Reduction in total case rates for injuries and illnesses
- % Reduction in case rates for lost ~~time~~ injuries and illnesses
- % Improvement of the timeliness of filing notices of injury and illness
- % Reduction in the rates of ~~lost~~ production days due to injuries and illnesses.

**We believe that it is reasonable for the government as a whole to accomplish at least the following: reduce total injury case rates and lost time case rates by 3% each per year; increase the timely filing of claims by 5% per year; and reduce the rate of lost production days due to injury by 1% each year.**

We know that some agencies **have** set more **challenging** goals for themselves, and indeed, many agencies can make greater **strides** in accomplishing **these objectives**. To accommodate these variations, the President has **asked** that each agency work with the Department of Labor to set for **itself** **challenging** annual targets for the three years of the initiative. By January 30, 2004, each agency should notify John L. Henshaw, Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health (202-693-2000) of its annual **targets for the three years of the initiative in each of the four measures**. Department of Labor staff in **our** Occupational Safety and Health Administration and Office of **Workers' Compensation Programs** will provide baseline performance data, assist **in** goal-setting, and **work** with **you** and your staffs during the year as **you evaluate your status, adopt strategies to meet your targets, and check your progress.**

**As Federal agencies organize and function to ensure our security at home and abroad, we must maintain our focus on improving worker safety and health, reducing the costs of workplace injuries and illnesses and enhancing workforce productivity.** As the President stated, many if not all, workplace injuries and illnesses **can be avoided.**

**We at the Department are inspired and energized by the President's commitment to improve workplace safety and health beginning with our own establishments. I am completely committed to improving the Federal workplace by achieving the goals of SHARE, and I look forward to working with each of you to achieve these critical results.**



TO: Jaymie Durnan

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 25, 2004

SUBJECT: Joint Logistics and Support

I just read this piece from Mike Wynne in response to my snowflake. I have no idea what to do with it? What do you recommend? Recommend a specific action or proposal.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
022504.a.03

Attach: Wynne Memo to SD 2/20/04

Please respond by: 2/27

OSD 09111-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42114

ANN

25 FEB 04

20 JAN 04

January 20, 2004

TO: Mike Wynne  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Joint Logistics and Support

How ought we to move towards joint logistics and support? Why shouldn't the drivers of all the Services be capable of dealing with all the appropriate equipment, rather than a single Service? Why shouldn't chaplains be capable of functioning with all the Services and the like?

Please get back to me with a proposal as to how we can integrate logistics on a joint basis.

Thanks.

012004-39

(DHR:dh)  
012004 39

.....  
Please respond by 1/20/04

322

20 Jan 04

OSD 09111-04



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

# THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

February 20, 2004, 1100

## RESPONSE TO SNOWFLAKE FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

### MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: Mr. Michael W. Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,  
Technology and Logistics) *M. Wynne*

- In your recent note you asked for a proposal on how to “integrate logistics on a joint basis.” You also asked why drivers and chaplains should not be capable of functioning with all the Services.
- Joint use of the Services’ personnel in common support specialties, such as cargo truck drivers, already exists. All drivers, regardless of Service, attend a common training program. This training qualifies them to operate typical military cargo vehicles. The Air Force and the Navy deployed 523 and 278 cargo truck drivers, respectively, to augment Army transportation units in the OIF II force. This joint support model is our planned approach for future operations.
- Similar joint augmentation is occurring in communications and engineering.
- Chaplains presently perform in a variety of joint-Service roles, and are among the staffs of Combatant Commanders and most Joint Task Forces. But as with other officers, their principal training and experience is with their parent Service.
- One way we are accelerating “jointness” in theater logistics is through our Distribution Process Owner (DPO). The DPO, Commander CENTCOM, DLA, and all logistics providers have teamed to create the CENTCOM Deployment/Distribution Operations Center to jointly oversee all AOR logistics operations.
- Whether through process owners or command roles, we must be *knowledge enabled* to become truly joint. Through the Business Management Modernization Program, we are building our Logistics architecture to enable interoperability and visibility of information in a joint environment. This is the key to joint logistics.

322

20 Feb 04

20 Jan 04


COORDINATION: USD(P&R) Signed 2/24/04

Prepared by CAPT Joe D. Clements, DUSD(L&MR), (b)(6)

OSD 09111-04



January 21, 2004

TO: David Chu  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Troops in OIF

Attached is a paper from Charles Moskos, which is interesting.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/14/03 Moskos paper: "Preliminary Report on Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)"

DHR:dh  
012104-3



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Iraq*

OSD 09112-04

*hand 10*



Judd A. and Marjorie Weinberg  
College of Arts and Sciences  
Northwestern University

Department of Sociology  
1613 Chicago Avenue, 1st Floor  
Evanston, Illinois 60201-1320

soci@northwestern.edu  
Phone 847-491-5415  
Fax 847-491-9937  
www.northwestern.edu/soc/chggp/



NORTHWESTERN  
UNIVERSITY

*Good paper!*

*C/1/20*

*Panel  
Copy*

*1/6 pp.*

January 15, 2004

General Peter J. Schoomaker  
Chief of Staff, US Army

Dear General Schoomaker:

The enclosed FYI regarding our troops in OIF. Memo based on my recent trip there. Our soldiers are performing very well. Would be glad to share observations with you in person if you so wish.

Yours sincerely,

*Charles Moskos*

Charles Moskos  
E-4 retired  
Professor of Sociology  
c-moskos@northwestern.edu



Judd A. and Marjorie Weinberg  
College of Arts and Sciences  
Northwestern University

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Phone: 847-481-5335  
Fax: (b)(6)  
www.northwestern.edu/sociology/



NORTHWESTERN  
UNIVERSITY

14 Dec. 2003

Memorandum: Hon. Les Brownlee  
Acting Secretary of Army

Subject: Preliminary Report on Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)

From: Charles Moskos  
c-moskos@northwestern.edu

Introduction. This report on Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is based on field research conducted in Kuwait, Qatar, and Iraq, 29 November to 7 December, 2003. The report is based on a variety of methods: field observations, casual conversations, in-depth interviews, and a survey of approximately 500 soldiers. This preliminary report is based on the field observations, conversations and interviews. Statistical data of the surveys is now being tabulated and will be ready in several weeks.

The basic findings are derived from troops who were deployed in Iraq, those en route for two weeks R&R in CONUS (or Germany), and those on short-term R&R in Qatar. In addition to general social and morale attitudes, a special focus of attention was on the role of the chaplaincy in OIF. At all times, the large majority of troops indicated an eagerness to talk with the researchers as well as complete the surveys.

Overview. The first and most important finding is that the active-duty soldiers displayed a higher level of morale than was anticipated. In broad terms, the mission was seen as most demanding in the so-called Sunni triangle and Mosul, less so in the Kurdish north, and middling in the Shiite south. Soldiers of OIF, of course, had complaints, but the overall tone was one of performing an important, if not always appreciated at home, mission. The research trip was completed before the capture of Saddam Hussein which undoubtedly has been a great morale booster.





OIF soldiers achieve exceptional levels of performance under very demanding conditions. They bring great credit to themselves, their commanders, and their country. Their accomplishments are especially noteworthy inasmuch

as OIF represents a most strenuous and dangerous mission. With such performance in evidence, I have no recommendation for major changes with regard to overall command policies affecting soldiers. Some specific recommendations pertaining to personnel issues will be covered in the conclusion of the report.

With regard to danger, that general attitude was more fatalistic than fearful. The mission goal was seen as ridding the country of the Saddam Hussein regime and bringing about a more stable and democratic Iraq. There was not much talk about weapons of mass destruction or terrorist linkages with 9/11 events. Some illustrative quotes follow:

- a. "Sure there lots of extremists, but the people like us generally. Especially the kids."
- b. "Iraqis are like little children. We may have to spank them so they will grow up to be good adults."
- c. "People back home can't get the big picture. There are good things as well bad things happening here."

Reservists. In contrast to the generally good morale of the active-duty soldiers, that of the reserve components – again in general terms – was markedly lower. Reservists is used here to include both Army Reserve and National Guard soldiers. The complaint that reservists were "second-class citizens" in OIF was frequently heard. Or as one put it, "on a scale of one to ten, I'm a 12." Issues raised by reservists include the following:

1. Reservists frequently serve longer in theater than do active-duty soldiers and are less likely to know the end date of their OIF deployment. 
2. Stop-loss affects reservists more than active-duty soldiers. 
3. Promotions for reservists often get stalled because their home unit cannot promote them while they are activated for OIF and they cannot be promoted in OIF because they are reservists.
4. Advanced schooling that would be available if they were still in their home unit is delayed and not likely to be properly available when they return to their home unit. 
5. KBR guards received three times more compensation for the same guard duty as do reservists. Civilian contractors often had better BDUs and boots than reservists. 

6. Career reservists should be allowed to acquire retirement pay earlier even if prorated lower.

It should be noted that the above morale description of reservists contrasts with the generally higher morale – compared to active-duty soldiers – of reservists in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo.

The Chaplaincy. The current mission of OIF is one that has yet to be conceptualized properly in Army thought. It has elements of combat, guerrilla war, asymmetrical war, liberation, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, occupation, constabulary, to name a few. With such an ambiguous mission, the role of the chaplaincy becomes more central than ever.

1. In combat operations, the chaplains' role is typically seen more in conventional religious, even denominational, terms. In OIF, the chaplain's role is seen more in spiritual and counseling terms.

2. The chaplain, even if a stranger, is regarded as one who gives honest advice without any hidden agenda.

3. From a soldier's viewpoint, seeing a chaplain about a personal problem carries much less stigma than seeing a mental health counselor. As one soldier put it, seeing a mental health counselor means "You're a nut job in the file."

4. Chaplains need to make special efforts to circulate among the troops rather than be constrained by administrative jobs in headquarters areas.

#### General Observations.

1. The local Iraqis are referred to as hajjis (also spelled hadjis). It seems to have no special negative meaning. This contrasts with "ragheads" used to describe locals in the first Gulf War or with "gooks" and "slopes" of the Vietnam era. (Hajji, of course, originally derives from those who have made pilgrimages to Mecca.) One theory is that the G.I. term originated from a character in the cartoon television show Johnny Quest

2. E-mail is widely used by troops in OIF. Thus, regular communication with home is the rule rather than the exception.

3. A new technological innovation is the use of DVDs with a laptop computer to watch current movies in the field.

4. The absence of a good field manual on Iraq was noted by many. Soldiers also report that the prep program for OIF seemed to portray an Iraq that was more fundamentalist Islamic than the more secular society they actually encountered. Likewise for Kuwait and Qatar.

TRADOC



5. The two week R&R in CONUS is widely appreciated. The shorter – usually four days – R&R tours in Qatar are also welcome respites. A common complaint in Qatar, however, is that individuals are not routinely assigned to take R&R troops into town, without whom they must remain on base.

6. There is a perception, rightly or wrongly, that some units are overmanned and doing little, while others are undermanned and over stretched.

7. Race relations problems appear minimal. There was some undercurrent among black troops that Jessica Lynch was the object of overplayed propaganda compared to the similar experiences of Shoshana Johnson.

8. It may seem far fetched, but an unobtrusive measure of morale could be a content analysis of the graffiti in the portable toilets.

Recommendations:

1. Consider a video/DVD along the lines of the famous "Why We Fight" movies directed by Frank Capra during WWII. Themes to be developed could include serving a just cause, the evils of the Hussein regime, stepping into history, the new greatest generation, etc. OIF is a shaping experience that they will look back upon with pride for the rest of their lives.

See <http://history/acusd.edu/gen/filmnotes/whywefight.html>

2. Short-Term FAOs. The issue of Arab interpreters is central. Consider a short-term warrant-officer program for Arab-speaking soldiers and recruits as kind of temporary FAOs, civil affairs assistants, etc. Or reconstitute the old specialist ranks for linguistically qualified soldiers. This would apply to recruiting from current U.S. citizens/American residents. Such recruitment might focus on Arab students in American universities. Consideration might also be given to recruiting Arab speakers from other English-speaking countries.

3. Have incoming NCOs and junior officers take a quick – say, 3-week – course on Arab culture and learn a few Arab expressions. This could be akin to the 3-week German course for incoming company commanders in the USAREUR of old.

4. Military Police should be given a combat medal equivalent to the combat medal given to medics in hostile fire zones.

5. Iraq CAP. This would be along the lines of the Marine Combined Action Program (CAP) where rifle squads joined local platoons in Vietnam. But in OIF

STRATCOM?

TRADOC  
G1

TRADOC

SMA/G1

offer the local recruited Iraqis extraordinary inducements, e.g. high pay, guaranteed pension, perhaps even American citizenship.

6. Consider allowing alcohol usage on a limited basis in Iraq. Limited official drinking, as is now allowed in Qatar, would reduce illicit drinking.

7. Those activated from the IRR rather than a regular reserve unit are typically used as fillers. In these case the families of the IRR activate do not have a local soldier support system. Some system should be developed where IRR families could come under the purview of the nearest military base.

8. Explore use of short-term active-duty enlistments to perform duties currently conducted by reservists. Ref. memo to Hon. L. Brownlee, 15-Month Enlistment Option, dated 14 Oct 2003.

Acknowledgments. Special thanks goes to Gen. John P. Abizaid, CENTCOM, who initiated this trip for our research team. I am indebted to Dr. Laura Miller of RAND as my research associate and to Chaplain (LTC) Franklin Wester who made the initial arrangements possible. Both Dr. Miller's and Chaplain Wester's collegiality and insights were invaluable. I also wish to thank Chaplain (LTC) Barry Presley who served as our escort officer and made possible the interviews and surveys in the various locales in theater

It was an honor to be part of OIF, even if only for a short time. The openness of the soldiers to a visiting team was uplifting. We also believe that our visit served as a morale booster for the troops with whom we were privileged to spend time. Still, we understand that such research trips require a tremendous amount of time and energy on the part of our hosts. We are extremely appreciative of the extraordinary assistance given us.

Support from the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) is gratefully acknowledged. The mode and presentation of the data collection are the sole responsibility of the principal investigator and do not necessarily reflect the views of ARI or the U.S. military.

26  
January 22, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Response to Bill Brock

Bill Brock is a long-time friend of mine. We served in Congress together. Please have someone draft a personal note from me to him on this subject.

Thanks.

**Attach.**  
12/22/03 Brock ltr to SecDef [OSD 00882-04]

DHR:dh  
012204-3

.....  
Please respond by 1/27/04

*352 Dep SecDef*

OSD 09113-04

*26 January*

WILLIAM E. BROCK

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 JAN 21 PM 2: 13

Secretary of Defense



SA0032625

December 22, 2003

Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary  
United States Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Rm. 3E - 880  
Washington, DC 20008

P&R HAS BEEN  
TASKED TO  
RESPOND

(b)(6)

Dear Don,

It's been forty one years since we were sworn in together in the House, and those forty one years have proven to be quite a ride for both of us. Never have I been more proud of you than I am today, and I just wanted to thank you for your continued extraordinary service to this country.

There is one concern about a recent news item. The *Post* Friday carried a story that the Pentagon was once again considering closing a great many of the schools on our military bases. I really and truly respect the challenges you face in managing your expenditures in a time of fiscal restraint, but I can think of very few areas where a cut would prove to be more counterproductive. Those schools are the glue that encourages families to stay in the military far beyond what they would do otherwise. I have no economic interest in the argument, but I am profoundly concerned that depriving our military families of this enormously valued support would result in a huge erosion of military retention.

I have had a great many conversations in my many different efforts at educational reform about how unique and wonderful these schools are. Parental involvement exceeds anything I've ever seen in any community in the United States, and is one of the primary reasons for their success. The parents are involved because they know what education means to their children. They are involved because it is a part of the community in which they live. Given the number of times we move these families around, taking this special sense of community away from them would be devastating for, spouses and children alike.

I won't go on. The issue is important and I am confident you will make the right decision.

Sandy and I were distressed that we had scheduled our own Christmas party the same night that you and Joyce had yours. Please tell her how much we missed being with you and how much we appreciated the invitation. Good luck and God bless.

Very truly yours,

William E. Brock

Enclosure  
WEB/ch

OSD 00882-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42125

49 Old Solomons Island Road, Suite 206, Annapolis, Maryland 21401

# Quantico Awaits Word on Schools'

## Closure Would Add to Crowding in Pr. William Classes

By CHRISTINA A. SAMUELS  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Department of Defense is studying whether to save money by closing some or all of the 58 schools it runs on military bases across the country, including four at Quantico Marine Corps Base in Prince William County.

The department operates 69 domestic base schools that educate about 33,000 students at a cost of almost \$363 million. Eleven of the schools are in Puerto Rico and Guam, and they are not being considered for closure.

Quantico's four schools—three elementary schools and a combination middle school and high school—enroll about 800 children, and that number is projected to rise to 1,500 within three years, as new base housing becomes available. That is 1,500 students who could be added to the county's enrollment, at a cost of about \$7,550 a year for each.

The Defense Department has studied closing base schools before. The difference this time, according to department officials, is that the options will include closing only some of a base's schools while leaving others open. Previous studies considered closing all or none of the schools at each base.

"It would be a death of a thousand cuts," said Lt. Col. Eric Peterson, who has three children in Quantico schools.

In many cases, military families said they choose to live in old, cramped base housing so their children can take advantage of base schools. Parents said the atmosphere is tailor-made for military kids who may hopscotch across the country and the world, with no cliques that exclude new students. Classes are small, sometimes fewer than a dozen children,

so students who might get swallowed up in a bigger school are encouraged to be active, parents said.

In addition, Quantico schools offer some perks that Prince William schools do not, including all-day kindergarten.

Military families "can accept the hardships and the deployments when they know their family is taken care of," said Lt. Col. Karen Dowling, who spends her lunch hour volunteering at Ashurst Elementary, where she has a child in third grade and another in first.

In addition, the timing of a study that could send children to school "outside the gate" could not be worse, some parents said, especially to a military stretched by the demands of war in Iraq and Afghanistan.

"We make a lot of sacrifices," said Darcy Smith, a teacher's aide at Russell Elementary and mother of two students there. "It's nice to have these certain privileges. Our children did not ask to be born into the military."

The \$1.6 million study began in fall 2002. It included an analysis of the physical condition of each school and the cost of bringing each facility up to local standards.

Defense officials also have sought community input. Parents, including many high-ranking officers, traveled to Georgia to speak overwhelmingly in support of the departmental school system, said Superintendent Lawanna Mangleburg, who oversees the Quantico schools as well as the 800-student system in West Point, N.Y., and the 200-student Dahlgren School in Virginia's Northern Neck.

"I just wish that every single parent could have been there to hear the emotion that was attached to these comments," Mangleburg said. "This has caused all

of us to think about how important all the schools are."

Col. James Lowe, base commander at Quantico, was among the officers who made the trip.

"The schools are a part of this community," Lowe said. "There was just a huge, huge concern that this is yet another facet of the quality of life that's being taken away from them."

If Quantico schools were to close, the students who live on the sprawling base would be added to Prince William's system, which has 63,000 students this year, about 1,700 more than anticipated last year. County officials said their schools would be hard pressed to accept the youngsters.

"We do not have space for 900 kids right now," said Lucy S. Beauchamp (At Large), chairman of the Prince William County School Board. The growth would be especially hard to handle in the southern end of the county, where schools are crowded.

In the past several years, Defense officials have studied other services, such as base housing and commissaries, for possible cost-cutting. Recommendations from the schools study are scheduled to be presented to the Pentagon in the spring, said Charles Hoff, spokesman for U.S. Department of Defense Education Activity. Lowe, the base commander, said no schools would close before 2005.

The hopes of military parents are clear. Maj. Christopher "Joey" Wales, who lives 400 yards from Ashurst Elementary, often eats lunch at school with his three children, as he did yesterday. He said he has never felt as much a part of a school community as he does at Quantico.

"Why would anyone want to meddle with a system that works?" Wales said. "I can't say enough good things about this."

12/19/03

720

26  
January 23, 2004

TO: Gen. Pete Schoomaker  
CC: Gen. George Casey  
Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Article on Army Supply Issues

400

I am dumbfounded by this article that quotes Gen. Kern.

I have asked Dick Myers to reconstruct what took place, so we can put out the truth.

I think the facts will not be pleasant for the complainers and, when looking where to assign blame, those folks may have to look in the mirror.

Attach.

Wood, David. "Military Acknowledges Massive Supply Problems in Iraq War,"  
*Newhouse.com*, January 22, 2004.

DHR:db  
012304-4

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*✓ 1/28*

*C 1/28*

*Sir,  
Response attached.  
Original attachment  
included behind.  
vr/CDR Nosmy  
1/28*

26 JAN 04

OSD 09116-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42127

Newhouse.com  
January 22,2004

## **Military Acknowledges Massive Supply Problems In Iraq War**

By David Wood, Newhouse News Service

WASHINGTON -- The U.S. military juggernaut that swept into Iraq last March was plagued by shortages of ammunition, spare parts and fuel, an epic logistics mess for which the old military term "snafu" might have been invented.

Battalions of tanks and armored vehicles, dashing forward under grueling conditions, got no repair parts for three weeks. Broken-down vehicles had to be stripped of usable parts and left behind. Some units ran dangerously low on ammunition and couldn't get resupplied; others in desperate need of M-16 and machine gun rounds got unneeded tank shells instead, according to logistics officers. Some troops had virtually no water while receiving truckloads of stuff they didn't need and couldn't carry.

"We weren't as effective as we could be," the Army's logistics chief, Lt. Gen. Claude V. Christianson, acknowledged in an interview.

In a devastating self-critique, Christianson and his staff have produced an analysis that concludes, in essence, that the Army's logisticians can't see what is needed on the battlefield, can't respond rapidly when they do find out what's needed, and can't distribute what they have when it's needed.

Christianson, who ran the war's logistics operation from Kuwait before he was brought back to the Pentagon to fix the mess, confirmed that these problems will require scarce money and sustained attention to fix.

But the supply problems were exacerbated, officers said, by the decision of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to deploy mostly combat units in the weeks before the invasion, and to hold back Army and Marine Corps logistics and support units until weeks or months later -- gambling that the war would be over quickly enough that sustained resupply wouldn't be needed.

According to combat units' after-action reports, that shaved it too close.

Even now, nine months after the fall of Baghdad, it takes the Army 34 to 38 days to move a requested spare part from a depot in the United States to the soldier in Iraq who needs it.

During the war, it was worse.

Days into combat, with tank and mechanized infantry units streaking across empty desert toward Baghdad and then fighting into the city, the Army struggled to send forward ammo and water in huge truck convoys that quickly came under fire on unguarded two-lane highways. Soon, the 400 miles between Kuwait and Baghdad were nearly impassable with stalled traffic.

That meant combat units couldn't evacuate their wounded by road, the 3rd Infantry Division reported, and had to compete for scarce helicopter space instead.

Combat engineers struggled to build fortified supply depots along the way but lacked critical equipment

11-L-0559/OSD/42128

and supplies, which "extended the time troops were operating while exposed to enemy fires," according to an after-combat report by the U.S. Army Engineer School at Fort Leonard Wood, Mo.

With some combat units like the 3rd Infantry Division desperately short of water, ammo, spare parts and food, crates and pallets of supplies piled up at depots and ports in Kuwait. At least \$1.2 billion worth of supplies got lost, according to an audit by the General Accounting Office.

Then the Army ran out of trucks.

American forces managed to prevail only because of the "creative ability of individual soldiers to pull the pieces together," Gen. Paul Kern, who oversees Army supplies and maintenance, said in an interview. "They are heroes."

Until the problems are fixed, U.S. military operations are subject to the same snafus that threatened the campaign to topple Saddam Hussein:

-- When troops are on the move on distant battlefields, the Army doesn't know which supplies are running low because there are no reliable, fast communications between front-line units and the rear. As a result, Army logisticians ship a mix of fuel, tires, ammunition and food according to what planners working years ago imagined units might need.

The fix: a new satellite communications system dedicated to logistics, and data links tracking supplies from depot to user.

-- Once the Army figures out what soldiers actually need, it can't get the materiel to the battlefield, and can't distribute it to individual units when it arrives. There is no military equivalent of FedEx or United Parcel Service on the battlefield.

The fix: Create one, reorganizing transportation units and equipping them with more data-linked trucks. The cost, Christianson said, will be \$500 million a year -- for the next 20 years.

-- When the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines work side by side in the same region, as they did in Iraq, the combined supply system is a clashing mismatch of different cultures, incompatible communications systems, different stock numbers for similar items, even different vocabularies. Keeping track of a spare Marine Corps tank transmission as it moves from a Marine Corps depot to an Air Force cargo plane to an Army truck, for instance, "is one of our biggest challenges," Christianson said.

The fix: The U.S. Transportation Command, a multiservice agency, has been put in overall charge. The services and other agencies will have to adapt. "It's a cultural issue, not a technology issue," Christianson said.

The next hurdle is getting the Pentagon and Congress to invest more money than traditionally is spent on logistics.

"This isn't a terribly sexy business," Kern said. "It's hard to get people interested in it until you run out of something."



INFO MEMO

January 27, 2004

✓  
1/28

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THRU: ACTING SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

*Beane*

400

FROM: General George W. Casey, Jr., Vice Chief of Staff of the Army *W. Casey*

SUBJECT: Newhouse News Story on Army Logistics During OIF (22 Jan 04)

- Below is my assessment of reporter David Wood's recent interviews with LTG Christianson and GEN Kern for his piece headlined "Military Acknowledges Massive Supply Problems in Iraq War."
  - o David Wood embedded with Army forces in Iraq from June - July 2003. He spent time with both civil affairs and logistics units to gain a better perspective of how support Soldiers performed their vital mission. Since returning to the United States, Mr. Wood requested interviews with senior logisticians to address his observations. LTG Christianson and GEN Kern agreed to be interviewed on the broad topic of actions the Army was taking to correct deficiencies identified during OIF.
  - o This is another case of editorial "bait and switch." Senior leaders are quoted in an article and, as a result, associated with comments made by unnamed "officers" and other information in the article.
  - o Both general officers stayed in their respective lanes during the interviews. Neither was asked questions or commented on the force deployment timeline. They commented broadly on our actions to correct supply problems identified during the War.

27 JAN 04

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: George W. Casey, Jr., General, USA, Vice Chief of Staff,

(b)(6)

26 JAN 04

January <sup>26</sup> 23, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Answer for General Vaught

*12A Q*

Please let General Vaught know that we brought this subject up with the CIA, and no one at the Agency can figure out what the dickens it is about.

Thanks.

Attach.  
1/22/04 Vaught ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
012304-17

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*05*  
*2/27*

OSD 09118-04

*26 JAN 04*

(b)(6)

For LTG B. Craddock. OSD

Planned page 1/22  
to Sec. Def.  
Shabe 1/23

LT. GENERAL JAMES B. VAUGHT  
(U.S. ARMY RETIRED)


(b)(6)

January 22, 2004

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

Preamble The news clip next under highlights a circumstance, which could deteriorate into an American "Dunkirk". A policy shift/clarification is urgently needed to assure the Iraqi majority (Shites and Kurds) that the coalition wants to help them and that we plan to stay in Iraq and the region until, with maximum Iraqi help, the Insurgents are eliminated and a constitutionally enabled democracy is in place and functioning. Announcing that the coalition plans to turn things over to an undetermined authority by June has caused the Shiites and Kurds to conclude that they will be abandoned once again. They recall that our early exit in 1990 let Saddam murder millions (?) of Shites and Kurds, violate U.N. resolutions, "buy" the left-over Russian Cold War conventional arsenal and with French, German and other help build weapons of mass destruction.

What needs to be done 1. Quickly find ways to constructively engage Shiite and Kurd leaders. 2. Assure them we plan to stay in Iraq as long as they need us there to help them get rid of the Insurgents while they stand up a democratically elected constitutionally enabled government. 3. Get the self discredited U.N. more involved on the ground in Iraq. 4. Keep the world informed about our goals. "Slog on!" Jim Vaught



Deck - FTI

11-L-0559/OSD/42133

**NATION & WORLD**

THE SUN NEWS, MYRTLE BEACH, S.C. | THURSDAY, JANUARY 22, 2004  
WWW.MYRTLEBEACHSUN.COM

# CIA: Iraq on way to civil war

Alert contradicts Bush's positive analysis of future

By WARREN P. STROBEL  
and JONATHAN S. LUNDY  
Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON | CIA officers in Iraq are warning that the country may be on a path to civil war, current and former U.S. officials said Wednesday, starkly contradicting the upbeat assessment that President Bush gave in his State of the Union address.

The CIA officers' bleak assessment was delivered to Washington this week, said the officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The warning echoed growing fears that Iraq's Shiite majority, which has until now grudgingly accepted the U.S. occupation, could turn to violence if its demands for direct elections are spurned.

Meanwhile, Iraq's Kurdish minority is pressing its demand for autonomy and shares of oil revenue.

"Both the Shiites and the Kurds think that now's their time," said one intelligence officer. "They think that if they don't get what they want now, they'll probably never get it. Both of them feel they've been betrayed by the United States before."

These dire scenarios were discussed at meetings this week by Iraqi, his top national security aides and the chief U.S. administrator in Iraq, L. Paul Bremer III, said a senior administration official, who requested anonymity.

Another senior official said concerns over a possible civil war weren't confined to the CIA but are "broadly held within the government," including by regional experts at the State Department and National Security Council.

Top officials are scrambling to save the U.S. exit strategy after concluding that Iraq's most powerful Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Husseini al-Sistani, is unlikely to drop his demand for elections for an interim assembly that would choose an interim government by June 30. Bremer would then hand over power to the interim



By GERALD HERBERT, The Associated Press

The next of kin of five servicemen who were killed Nov. 23 in Afghanistan mourn at their graveside after they were presented flags Wednesday at their joint funeral at Arlington National Cemetery in Arlington, Va. From left to right are Air Force Staff Sgt. Carlissa Walkup, wife of Staff Sgt. Thomas A. Walkup Jr., 25, of Millville, N.J.; Melissa Walters, wife of Tech. Sgt. Howard A. Walters, 33, of Port Huron, Mich.; and Kara Kerwood, wife of Tech. Sgt. William Kerwood, 37, of Houston, Mo. Also buried with them were Air Force Maj. Steven Plumbhoff, 33, of Hoshanic Station, N.J., and Army Sgt. Maj. Phillip R. Albert, 44, of Terryville, Conn. They were killed when their helicopter went down in support of America's military campaign in response to the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Operation Enduring Freedom. Their remains were buried together.

## War in Iraq

► **Military funeral** | Five servicemen who died together when their helicopter crashed in Afghanistan were buried together Wednesday at Arlington National Cemetery. An honor guard preceded a horse-drawn caisson containing a single flag-draped coffin with the remains of the five servicemen.

► **Explosion injures 10** | Ten people, including three American soldiers, were injured when a roadside bomb exploded near a U.S. convoy west of Mosul, Iraq, officials and witnesses said. None of the injuries was thought to be serious.

Source: The Associated Press

government.

However, Iraq's top Shiite Muslim cleric and coalition officials signaled flexibility on holding early elections, with both sides suggesting they'll follow any U.N. recommendation on whether a direct vote is feasible, Iraqi and Western officials said Wednesday.

A Shiite official who spoke to al-Sistani said Wednesday that if a proposed team of U.N. experts tells the cleric it isn't possible to organize direct elections by July 1, he would accept the verdict.

The CIA hasn't yet put its officers' warnings about a

potential Iraqi civil war in writing, but the senior official said he expected a formal report "momentarily."

"In the discussion with Bremer in the last few days, several very bad possibilities have been outlined," he said.

Bush, in his State of the Union address Tuesday, insisted that an insurgency against the U.S. occupation, conducted primarily by minority Sunni Muslims who enjoyed power under Saddam Hussein, "will fail, and the Iraqi people will live in freedom."

Bush didn't directly address the crisis over the Shiites' politi-

cal demands.

In an interview with Knight Ridder on Wednesday, a top cleric in the Shiite holy city of Najaf appeared to confirm the fears of potential civil war.

"Everything has its own time, but we are saying that we don't accept the occupiers getting involved with the Iraqis' affairs," said Sheikh Ali Najafi, whose father, Grand Ayatollah Basbir al-Najafi, is -- along with Sistani -- one of the four most senior clerics. "I don't trust the Americans -- not even for one blink."

The Associated Press contributed to this report.

January <sup>27</sup>~~24~~, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Belgian MoD

BELGIUM

Please take a look at this Belgian MoD memo from Colin Powell. I think we ought to get the US military people in Brussels working on the Belgian military.

Thanks.

Attach.  
1/23/04 Powell memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
012404-2



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*OB*  
*8/4*

OSD 09119-04

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

C 1/23  
23/1

To Don RUMSFELD  
Cond. Rice

FYI on MOJ FLAHAUT

CF

**Coleman, Kia J**

---

**From:** Jones, Beth (EUR)  
**Sent:** Friday, January 23, 2004 4:05 PM  
**To:** Karagiannis, Alexander; Bradtke, Robert A; Fitzpatrick, Michael J(Brussels); Ries, Charles P; Mennuti, Deborah; 'Fried, Daniel - NSC'  
**Cc:** Brink, Bridget A(P); Hogan, Dereck J(S); Coleman, Kia J(S); Kelly, Craig(S)  
**Subject:** Flahaut's nonsense

S talked this morning with Louis Michel to express his shock over F's statements. Just when he and LM had had such a good meeting in Br and just when things between Be and the US were getting back on track, Flahaut says these kinds of things. LM said he was personally embarrassed, this did not reflect the views of the government.

I then talked with the Amb and used all the points with him. I noted that S had just talked to LM as well. The Amb said he had talked with the office of the PM and the office of the FM last night, knowing that Flahaut's outburst was a serious problem. (The Amb said he had the full text, including in the original Flemish.) He said he took full note of all my points and would pursue this matter in Brussels. I added that I was also calling to convey the fact that the Secretary hoped to follow up with LM on the good meeting in Brussels with a meeting in Washington. I told him that S has no particular dates in mind, he would always prefer to take into account when the FM might wish to travel to the US. I said we would want to work closely to develop a mutually convenient date. The Amb was very/very pleased by the latter and said he would work with Alex once he heard back on dates from LM.

The Amb called me back less than an hour later to report he had talked with LMichel, who told him about his call from S. LM said he was very embarrassed, had apologized to S and had then called the PM. The PM agreed he had to do something. He called Flahaut, but couldn't reach him as the latter was in a plane over Africa. The PM is now drafting what the Amb described a letter of reprimand, which the PM/Amb will share with us on Monday or so. The Amb will call Alex, who can get it to us on the road.

11-L-0559/OSD/42136





28  
January 26, 2004

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Air Force End Strength

Does this letter from the Air Force on their end strength fit your understanding of the situation?

Thanks.

Attach.  
1/22/04 SecAF ltr to SecDef re: USAF Endstrength

DHR:dh  
012604-15

.....  
Please respond by 2/6/04

OSD 09124-0

11-L-0559/OSD/42138



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON

✓  
1/26

JAN 22 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: USAF ENDSTRENGTH

Last week you asked, "why is the AF over their authorized endstrength by 16K?" We believe this is a temporary situation fueled by the Global War on Terrorism, and it is our desire and very clear goal to return to our authorized endstrength of ~359K. I'll quickly lay out how we got to this point, then briefly discuss our plan for getting back within our authorized strength.

Let me begin with Stop Loss. This measure obviously froze people in place and was not lifted until late June of 2003. Furthermore, some individuals were allowed to stay until as late as December 2003. We are just now able to understand the reactions of our people to the lifting of Stop Loss. What we know now is that some who intended to leave have decided to stay.

Other policies, associated with the GWOT, also influenced our endstrength. We implemented programs to bring prior-service members back to active duty to fill known critical skill shortages (e.g. pilots). Although relatively small in number (~500), ARC volunteers on active duty beyond 179 days in lieu of mobilization also swelled the force. Perhaps most significant is our retention. For instance, our goal for first term enlisted is 55%. Our first term retention at the end of FY03 was 61%. Across the board our retention is up, and for good reason! The tax and pay incentives, some implemented for GWOT, *really work*. Imminent Danger Pay, Hardship Duty Pay, Combat Zone Tax Exclusion, Family Separation Allowance and a host of others, plus bonuses we pay to ensure we can retain critical skills, all add up to a very attractive compensation package that turns the tide toward staying in uniform, especially when faced with a still-uncertain economy. Now....returning to the larger **issue**, we are meeting our programmed recruiting goal of 37K for FY04. Typically, we would expect to have about the same number of people exit every year. But because of all the above, and perhaps other factors, they are staying with us.

AIR  
RESERVE  
COMMAND

That's how we got here.....now what's the way ahead? We have the challenge of getting down to strength, while simultaneously correcting some skills imbalances that persist from the late 90's, and accounting for a

whole new mission--NOBLE EAGLE. Starting with recruiting...we realized in an earlier programming exercise that we could begin to ratchet down somewhat and still retain the skills mix we need. We will reduce from 37K in FY04 to 35.6K in FY05 and 34.6K in FY04. And...we're looking at the possibility of reducing the 37K in FY04. We have several other policy levers available to reduce endstrength and to get the right skills in the right places. These include restricting reenlistment in overage career fields, transferring (voluntarily) active duty members to the **ARC**, shortening service commitments, limiting officer continuation for those deferred for promotion, commissioning ROTC cadets direct to the **ARC**, limiting reclassification of technical school eliminees, rolling back separation dates, officer/enlisted retraining, etc.

We believe living within our 359K authorized strength is the right thing to do, and we believe this a prudent approach to get there. What we would like to avoid is taking extreme measures (e.g., selective early retirement boards, reductions in force, excessive reductions in accessions, etc) that wreak havoc with morale, break faith, and can leave us with "bathtub" year groups from which recovery is long and painful. It is our goal to reduce to authorized by FY05, but depending on external variables (e.g, the economy), we may need relief until the end of FY06 to accomplish a measured drawdown, realign our forces to support stressed skills and avoid the aforementioned extremes. **We'll** know a lot more at the end of FY04.

215 2/17

720

28  
January 27, 2004

668

Durman  
2/17

TO: ~~Gen. Dick Myers~~ Pavel Moore  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Reserve Aircraft

Another Reserve aircraft diverted and went to Libya with a Congressional delegation. I want to find out how we stop Reserve aircraft from doing those things if they have not been authorized by the White House or by the DoD.

\*

453

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012704-3

.....  
Please respond by 2/6/04

✓  
2/19

Sir,  
Response attached. *2/19*  
vr/CDR Nosung  
2/19

28 Jan 04

OSD 09126-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42141

25  
132

✓  
2/19



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

February 5, 2004 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake # 012704-3 regarding Reserve Aircraft

- CODEL Weldon traveled to Libya on 25-26 Jan aboard a Navy C-40 (Ft Worth Reserve unit). CODEL itinerary also included stops in Tunisia, Kuwait, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Germany.
- OSD Legislative Affairs arranged DoD support for the CODEL, but declined Weldon's request to support a stop in Libya.
- We reversed this position after we were advised by NSC Legislative Affairs that Congressman Weldon had intervened with Andrew Card and Steve Hadley and obtained their approval.
- **FYI: CODEL Boehlert has requested DoD support to visit Libya, Kuwait and Iraq 12-18 Feb. At the suggestion of State and NSC, CODEL Stevens has requested DoD support to visit Iran, Kuwait and Iraq 13-21 Mar.**

Attachments:

SECDEF Snowflake

CODEL Weldon Manifest

CODEL Weldon Manifest

Rep Curt Weldon

Rep Solomon Ortiz

Rep Steve Israel

Rep Candace Miller

Rep Rodney Alexander

Rep Elton Gallegly (Libya only)

Rep Mark Souder

Rep Darrell Issa (Libya only)

Mr. Doug Roach

Mr. J.J. Gertler

Mr. Harald Stavenas

Mr. Marc Wheat

Mr. Richard Mero (Libya only)

LTC Craig Collier

LTC Gregg Blanchard

Sgt Thai Kov

Sgt Hugh Griffin

January 27, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Ray DuBois  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: DoD Historical Advisory Committee

Please move forward smartly on the proposals to revamp the DoD Historical Advisory Committee. I like the idea.

Thanks.

Attach.  
1/24/04 DepSecDef memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
012704-8

.....  
Please respond by 2/27/04

OSD 09127-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42144

1606  
12/1  
JTC

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: November 29, 2003  
SUBJECT: **DoD Historical Advisory Cmte**

What do you think about having a single DoD Historical Advisory Committee rather than several.

We could combine all the existing ones and then tone it down over time and see that the services get to recommend people.

Thanks.

*Let me know what you think!*

DHR/azn  
113003.03a

*Attach: Info Memo to SD from DuBois 11/19/03 DoD Historical AC*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ 12/10

*Sir, ✓ 1/27  
C 1/26  
Response attached.  
Original attachment  
included behind.  
vr / CDR N  
1/26*

U22533 / 103



✓  
1/27

**MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld**

**DATE: January 24, 2004**

**FROM: Paul Wolfowitz**

**SUBJECT: DOD Historical Advisory Committee**

Don,

In order to respond to your snowflake on this subject, I asked Eliot Cohen to give me his private views. The attached paper comes from him although we should not circulate it with his name on it without his permission.

I think Eliot's recommendation makes a lot of sense. If you agree, as a next step I would ask Eliot and two or three distinguished historians to undertake a review of how we organize our historical advisory committees, to come up with more detailed recommendations along the lines of what Eliot has here.

I believe this could be done relatively quickly, and it would give us a good basis for moving forward.

*Paul W.*

**SUBJECT: DOD Historical Advisory Committee**

1. Our current system has the following disadvantages:

a. It is service-based, where the reality of warfare is joint and combined operations;

b. Nominally, we ask the advisory committees to cover a great deal of ground, from advising on declassification, to commenting on commemoration and museum design, to quality control of long term studies. In actual fact, they accomplish little. In particular, I suspect they do us very little good in the area DOD can use history most – timely operational history and analysis in support of professional military education and decision-making;

c. Like most advisory committees, they spend too much time in plenary session, not enough in well-defined projects;

d. The personnel currently assigned to various committees is, to put it mildly, uneven. With some notable exceptions, they are heavily weighted to insiders, friends of the services, and undistinguished academics.

2. Military history is the foundation of military education, and has been recognized as such for centuries; no profession rests so heavily on history as does that of warfare. The health of our official military history programs is not, therefore, a matter merely of fulfilling a bureaucratic requirement, but rather of insuring the intellectual health of our armed forces.

3. The golden age of American military history was in the 1950's and early 1960's when some of the country's leading historians – Kent Roberts Greenfield, R. R. Palmer, Samuel Eliot Morison, Frank Craven, and many others – participated in the preparation of the official histories of World War II. These superb works, which have stood the test of time, were produced swiftly, and in time to contribute to professional military education and policy-making. Particularly in the Army's case, this was possible because of support at the very highest level, from Generals George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower. We cannot imitate that experience exactly, but the lessons are that quality and high level attention matter.

4. DOD should, therefore, create a high profile and energetic DOD Historical Advisory Committee. Its key features should be:

a. A very strong, compact executive committee of half a dozen, and a much larger pool of members (say, forty or more) who would participate in ad hoc task forces and subcommittee.

b. The executive committee, to include a chairman and vice chairman, should have some staff support, to include travel funds, and should develop an annual statement of work, to be approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense;

c. Examples of some of the projects that might be undertaken immediately would include assessments of:

i. current operational history efforts;

ii. the way in which DOD writes joint and combined history;

iii. the uses of recent military history in professional military education

iv. the desirable mix of in-house and contract history writing.

d. Those recruited for the advisory committee should be some of the best military historians in the United States. More than half of the committee's membership (and certainly more than half of the members of the executive committee) should come from outside DOD institutions.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

NOV 20 01 3 45



ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

INFO MEMO

November 19, 2003

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director of Administration and Management

SUBJECT: DoD Historical Advisory Committee

LAITY EX 11/24

- This responds to your question regarding the DoD Historical Advisory Committee, which was established in 1993.
- The purpose of the Committee is to provide advice to the Secretary of Defense and the secretaries of military departments regarding the professional standards, historical methodology, program priorities, liaison with professional groups and institutions, and adequacy of resources connected with the various historical programs and associated activities of the Department of Defense. These include: historical, archival, commemorative, museum, library, art, curatorial, and related programs.
- The committee consists of three subcommittees: the Department of the Army Historical Advisory Committee; the Department of the Navy Historical Advisory Committee; and the DoD Historical Records Declassification Panel (HRDAP). The first two subcommittees report to their Service Secretaries and the third formally reports to you.
- A listing of subcommittee members is attached.
- Administrative oversight of the subcommittees is the responsibility of the OSD Historian, who is also the chairman of the HRDAP.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments: As stated

Prepared By: Jennifer Spaeth (b)(6)

SPI ASSISTANT DI RITA	11/24
SR MA CHANDROCK	11/24
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	11/24

Secretary of *the* Navy's  
Advisory Subcommittee on Naval History  
October 2003

Rear Admiral Thomas **A.** Brooks, USN (Ret.) - Joint Military Intelligence College

Vice Admiral George **W.** Emery, USN (Ret.) - Naval Historical Foundation

**Dr.** John B. Hattendorf - North American Society for Oceanic History

Rear **Admiral** John T. Kavanaugh, SC, USN (Ret.) - USS Wisconsin Foundation

Rear **Admiral** John M. Kerish, USN (Ret.) - American Operations Corporation

**Lox** (Burt) Logan - **USS** Constitution Museum

Dr. James R. Reckner - Texas **Tech**

Virginia S. Wood - Boston University

Members of Department of the **Army**  
Historical Advisory Committee  
October 2003

Dr. Eric Bergerud - Department of General Education Lincoln University

**Mr. Mark Bowden** - Lincoln University

BG James T. Hirai - U.S. Army Command and General ~~Staff~~ College

Dr. **James T. Stensvaag** - Chief Historian, **A my**

COL Robert **A. Doughty** - U.S. Military Academy

Ms. Sandra **Stroud** - Department of the **Army**

Professor Adrian R. Lewis - University of North Texas

Professor **Brian M. Linn** - Texas A&M University

**Mr. Howard Lowell** - National Archives

COL Craig Madden - **U.S.** Army War College

Dr. John H. Morrow, Jr. - LeConte Halj The University of Georgia

Professor Reina Pennington - Norwich University

Professor Ronald H. Spector - George Washington University

-> Dr. Jon T. **Sumida** - University of Maryland (Chairman)

Professor Russell F. Weigley - Temple University

Members of DoD Historical Records  
Declassification Advisory Panel  
October 2003

Dr. John W. Chambers – Rutgers University

Dr. Ronald Hoffman – William and Mary

Dr. Irving B. Holley, Jr. – Duke University

Dr. Lorraine M. Lees – Old Dominion University

Dr. Brian Vandemark – U.S. Naval Academy

Dr. James Hershberg – George Washington University

Dr. Alfred Goldberg – OSD Historian (Chairman)

Dr. David Armstrong – Chief, Joint History Office

Dr. Jeffrey Clarke – Chief Historian, Army

Dr. William Dudley – Chief Historian, Navy

Dr. William Heimdahl – Deputy Chief Historian, Air Force

Mr. Fed Graboske – Archivist, US. Marine Corps Historical Center

2/19/04

no

reply refer to EF-8279 and # 04/001118-ES

January 27, 2004

*Summary*  
*2/19*  
*TO: SecDef*

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Iraqi Ministry of Defense

What is the status on the Iraqi Ministry of Defense? Are they going to be ready to take over responsibility for security at some point?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012704-10

.....  
Please respond by 2/6/04

2/19/04

S.F.  
Response attached

*vlp*  
(b)(6)

OSD 09129-04

*WFL*  
*27*



## MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Luti *WJL 2/17/04*

SUBJECT: Iraqi Ministry of Defense

- You asked for a status report on the new Iraqi Ministry of Defense, and if they will be able to take responsibility of security at some point.

**CPA Milestones for Transition (see attachment)**

- New Minister of Defense slated to be in office by 1 April.
- CPA order establishing the MoD to be signed approximately 1 March.
  - Order will probably place Iraq Civil Defense Corps under MOD.
- CPA Senior Advisor for Security Affairs, David Gompert, is taking the following steps:
  - Locating, vetting and training approximately 50 Iraqi civilians to form the core of a civil service cadre for the new MoD.
  - Sending Iraqis to the regional training program at NDU (4 in class now, approximately 30 more to arrive at NDU on 23 Feb).
  - Conducting twice-weekly consultations with the GC's Security Committee, chaired by Iyad Alawi.
    - Incorporating key principles (i.e., civilian control of the military, ban on private militias, etc.) into the Transitional Administrative Law.
  - Working with British counterparts to place approximately six Coalition advisors alongside critical Iraqi decision-makers within the new MoD.

**Remaining Issues**

- Loyalty, commitment and retention of Iraqi security personnel.
- Iraqi Armed Forces require unit training and must be further integrated into the internal security structures to help combat the current insurgency.
- Current Iraqi Armed Forces training program may not be optimum use of training resources; need to ramp up Iraq Civil Defense Corps and Police.


**Bottom Line:** CPA believes that the Iraqi MoD will be able to take responsibility for key aspects of the security situation in Iraq by the transition date. That said, Coalition forces will be required to conduct major operations (counter-terrorist, counter-WMD, border integrity, etc.) for some period after the transition date.

### Update on New Ministry of Defense


- **First Hires.** The first 21 defense advisors were hired and signed contracts on 28 January. They were selected from a pool of about 100 applicants. They will begin a period of training and orientation on 31 January 04 including attending a specially developed 3-week program organized by NDU.
- **Minister of Defense.** Selecting a Minister will be a particularly tricky task and will require political finesse.
  - Senior Advisor Gompert broached the subject informally with Allawi and they've agreed to work collaboratively on finding the right candidate. Gompert will ask members of the Security Committee to provide suggestions to CPA.
  - After interviewing candidates, CPA would reduce the list to one person and then get Security Committee support for that person. CPA will also seek recommendations from other sources in addition to the Security Committee.
  - CPA's target is to have a Minister named by April 1.
- **CPA Order.** A draft CPA Order establishing an MoD is being circulated around CPA Baghdad for comments. It will soon be sent to Washington for coordination with a goal of having Amb. Bremer sign it around March 1.
- **Training.** Three future Iraqi MOD employees are in Washington to participate in training at NDU. In mid-February, approximately 30 people (20 civilians and 10 military) will arrive in Washington for a three-week course and orientation tour (Allawi and Gompert may be in Washington at that time). There will be two more of these three-week courses in the spring for people we hire subsequently.
  - Administrative requirements for visas, etc. and logistics to send these groups to the States are extremely cumbersome.
  - UK is designing a mentoring program and is actively recruiting personnel in London for it. We are also looking for American mentors, as well as one or two from other countries such as Poland and Australia.
- **New MoD Headquarters.** Renovations are underway on a former elementary school that will be temporary quarters for the MoD staff. It will be ready for occupancy on March 15<sup>th</sup> when the staff returns from the Washington training. Contracts for work on the main building (the former Vice Presidential Palace) are being bid; that building will be ready in mid-May.
- **Public Affairs.** Seeking to have Iraqis as spokesmen on the Iraqi Armed Forces and new ministry. Allawi fully agrees. CPA is in further discussions with the Security Committee. A CPA working group is putting together a public affairs plan for the next several months and beyond.

**Key Dates:**

January-February:	Recruit and hire critical mass of people
February 23-March 12:	Training in Washington D.C. (additional training in March and June)
March 1:	Establish new Ministry of Defense (promulgate CPA order)
March-April:	Select senior civil servants and military officers
April 1:	Appoint new Minister of Defense
April-December:	Training continues
Mid-May:	Open MOD Building
July 1:	Transition to sovereign Iraq



## MoD Organisation Chart



Prepared by:  
Peter Velz/Security Affairs/CPA Washington  
Derived from various CPA Baghdad memos/briefings

(b)(6)

29 January 2004

72

EF-8280  
04/001120-ES

January 28, 2004

**TO:** Doug Feith  
**CC:** Paul Wolfowitz

**SUBJECT:** Intel Speech

Please get to work on that intel speech. I think it is important **for** me to have some material before **I go** to the Hill next week, and I would like to read it **by** this Friday.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012804-12

.....  
Please respond by 1/30/04

FILE DA 4/19

Policy ExecSec's Note

January 30, 2004

CDR Nosenzo,

The attached was handed to LTG Craddock this morning.

*C. L. O'Connor*

Colonel C. L. O'Connor, USMC  
Director, Policy Executive Secretariat

27

350.09

28 Jan 04

OSD 09131-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42158

04/19

**Iraq and WMD: The Intelligence Challenge**  
**SecDef Talking Points**  
**(NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION)**

- Stopping WMD proliferation is one of our central strategic necessities in this period, given the possible link with terrorists and state sponsors of terrorism.
- Getting good intelligence on WMD is therefore a priority challenge of our era. This is about more than just Iraq.

The Intelligence Challenge

- Intelligence is an art, not a science. It does not always produce “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” that would convict in a court of law.
  - Even good information may be uneven in quality, or sketchy.
  - Many things will be unknowable: e.g., a leader’s intentions.
  - In closed societies, regimes set up elaborate systems to conceal, deceive, and frustrate outside observers (whether intel or inspectors).
- Sometimes our intelligence has underestimated the danger. E.g.,
  - After the Gulf War, we discovered Saddam’s nuclear and other WMD programs were further advanced than we had thought. **Also:**
  - Iran’s nuclear program;
  - 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests.
- Roberta Wohlstetter’s insight: Clues that make perfect sense after the fact are usually overwhelmed -- at the time -- by the cloud of irrelevant or misleading “chaff” that surrounds them.
  - This is compounded by an opponent’s systematic denial and deception.
- The statesman’s dilemma (per Henry Kissinger):

- When the opportunity for a leader to act is at hand, he inevitably has only incomplete information. When all the information is available, the moment to shape events will have passed.
- There will often be majority and minority assessments of intelligence information. But a President must make decisions.
- In an age of catastrophic terrorism, inaction can be the most dangerous course. After 9/11, are we to sit back?

### Lessons of Iraq

- A glaring feature of the present debate is that we are accused simultaneously of two contradictory sins:
  - In the 9/11 investigation, we are criticized for not “connecting the dots”. Bits of information here or there, which now stand out as forewarnings, were obscure or ambiguous at the time (Wohlstetter’s point).
  - In Iraq, the President is criticized precisely for acting on the basis of a large number of dots that formed a distinct pattern: Saddam’s 12 years of deception and frustration of UN inspectors; his defiance of 17 UNSCRs; his **use** of chemical weapons; the large quantities of CW and BW that UN inspectors said were unaccounted for; the long record of Iraqi links with terrorism; the multitude of intel reports from multiple sources (disclosed by SecState to UNSC on 2/5/03) -- all pointing to Iraqi possession and/or active pursuit of WMD and to the danger of allowing him to continue.
  - The burden of proof, under post-Gulf War UNSCRs, was on **Saddam** to prove he was disarming.
  - The world community shared this assessment, as demonstrated by UNSCR 1441 (Nov. 2002).
- It should be clear by now that regime change in Iraq was a precondition for finding out the truth. And regime change was a prerequisite for stopping whatever Saddam was doing:
  - Recall his elaborate organization dedicated to denial and deception.
  - Some Iraqi scientists still gloat about concealing nuclear activities from UNMOVIC (Barton Gellman, **Wash. Post**, 1/7/04).

Another year or two of UN inspections would have done little to restrain Saddam's activities and yet might have led to the erosion of sanctions -- which would have brought us **closer** to a point of imminent danger.

- President Bush never said the danger of Saddam's WMD was imminent in March 2003. The issue was whether the world community could safely wait, doing nothing decisive to **prevent** that kind of imminent danger from arising.
- "Imminence" is not a workable standard. If something is about to happen, it may be too late to stop it.
- By ridding Iraq of Saddam's tyranny, the President and his Coalition partners eliminated the danger that Saddam posed. The world is now a safer place.

### Conclusion

- The USG should certainly review how to improve our intelligence on dangerous WMD programs -- examining where we have underestimated the problem as well as where we may have overestimated it.

Prepared by: ASD/ISA Peter W. Rodman

(b)(6)



## **Intelligence and Iraq:**

### **Critics's argument:**

- You went to war for WMD and found none. The war was unjustified. You skewed the evidence and misled the public.

### **Reality:**

- We knew, everyone knew, Saddam Hussein had lots of WMD for a long stretch of time.
- He used WMD.
- The UN inspectors in the 1990s found he had loads of WMD.
- He forced the UN inspectors out in 1998.
- He refused to show what had happened to his WMD and programs.
- The UN Security Council and the US gave him repeated opportunities to come clean and get UN sanctions lifted.
- He played games with Blix's UNMOVIC; his deceptions continued.
  - He couldn't just assert he had no wmd or programs; he had to prove it.
  - That's what the Security Council resolutions required.
- When we face a wrongdoer behaving this way, taking action against him is the prudent thing to do.
  - After 9/11, you don't take chances.

**On Not Finding WMD Stockpiles:**

- True, we did not.
- The possibilities are that Saddam may have:
  - Destroyed them.
  - Transferred them.
  - Been deceived by his people.
  - Deceived his people.
- We do not know the answers yet.
- But when we face a wrongdoer refusing to do the simple thing and meet the clear requirements of Security Resolutions, it is prudent to act.

**Saddam bore the burden to show what happened to his proven WMD, not us:**

- He was obligated under a decade of Security Council resolutions to prove their destruction unambiguously.
- He refused to do so.
- Only he could do what was necessary, not us.

7201

Rec'd  
5 Feb

January 28, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Quotes on WMD

I want to get some of the quotes about WMD made by Bill Cohen, Madeleine Albright, Sandy Berger, Bill Clinton and Al Gore. I also want to get some of the statements on WMD by Carl Levin and other prominent people.

Let's gather all that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012804-20

.....  
Please respond by 2/9/04 11:30 07

*1/30*  
*George R. ...*  
*Mr. Duman 9 Feb*  
*[Redacted]*  
*SecDel*  
*carried to the*  
*Hill yesterday.*  
*G.R.*  
*410*

*cc: ES [unclear] 2/10*

OSD 09132-04

*hand 88*

January 28, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Quotes on WMD

I want to get some of the quotes about WMD made by Bill Cohen, Madeleine Albright, Sandy Berger, Bill Clinton and Al Gore. I also want to get some of the statements on WMD by Carl Levin and other prominent people.

Let's gather all that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012804-20

.....  
Please respond by 2/4/04

*2/3*  
*1/30* *C*

George,  
Can we get these  
today to use for  
SD testimony on  
T + W next week?

Thanks,

OSD 09132-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42165

## Recent Quotes by Former National Security Officials about WMD

### Madeline Albright

#### **Excerpt from (AP) "Interview-Albright concerned about anti-Semitism in Europe, still backs U.S. invasion of Iraq" (1/29/04)**

On Iraq, Albright said the resignation of David Kay, who led the CIA's search for weapons of mass destruction, had not changed her views on the U.S.-led action to oust Saddam Hussein. She said she maintained her earlier position that she agreed that the step was necessary, but had doubts about its timing.

**"I did believe that there were weapons of mass destruction by deduction, because in 1998 when the inspectors left there were still weapons unaccounted for," Albright said, adding that she did not believe these weapons had posed an immediate threat to either the region or the United States. "In many ways I find it a mystery as to where these weapons are."**

### Sandy Berger

#### **Excerpt from a HASC Hearing Transcript (11/19/03)**

Today, the failure to locate weapons of mass destruction in Iraq points out how elusive indisputable intelligence can be. It brings to mind Will Rogers remark that it's not what we don't know that hurts, it's what we know that ain't so. America cannot afford to be perceived as pursuing a policy of shoot now, ask questions later. Our credibility and authority will be completely destroyed.

I do believe Saddam Hussein represented a threat to the region, based upon his history and the capabilities we believe that he had and his intentions, which I think were to dominate the region. So I have supported regime change as an appropriate objective of American policy, really since the inspectors were thrown out in '98.

And I supported the president in the buildup to the invasion. And although I'm not running for president, I would have voted yes on the resolution, even though I don't have a vote. Having said all that, I think that this was not such an imminent threat, of the kind that the chairman is talking about, that we could not have taken the time to do this right.

And I don't think we did. I don't think we took the time to build a coalition, the true coalition. We had four countries on the ground. We had countries many of whom gave us air space and didn't shoot our planes down when we went over their air space. But the lack of that coalition was not terribly important in the war because we own the game when it's military. We don't own the game now that it's trying to make a peace. And I think it's unforgivable that we didn't have a plan for the day after. Unforgivable, in my judgment. So I was for Iraq, but I was for doing it right. I don't think we've done it right.

Excerpt from (AP) - "Albright, Cohen Seek Support in Ohio (2/18/98)

"The lesson of the 20th century is, and we've learned through harsh experience, the only answer to aggression and outlaw behavior is firmness," Berger said. "He will use those weapons of mass destruction again, as he has 10 times since 1983," Berger said.

### Bill Clinton

Excerpt from M2 Presswire "Remarks by the President on Iraq to Pentagon personnel" (2/19/98)

If Saddam rejects peace and we have to use force, our purpose is clear: We want to seriously diminish the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program. We want to seriously reduce his capacity to threaten his neighbors. I am quite confident from the briefing I have just received from our military leaders that we can achieve the objectives and secure our vital strategic interests.

Let me be clear: A military operation cannot destroy all the weapons of mass destruction capacity. But it can, and will, leave him significantly worse off than he is now in terms of the ability to threaten the world with these weapons, or to attack his neighbors. And he will know that the international community continues to have the will to act if and when he threatens again.

Following any strike, we will carefully monitor Iraq's activities with all the means at our disposal. If he seeks to rebuild his weapons of mass destruction we will be prepared to strike him again. The economic sanctions will remain in place until Saddam complies fully with all U.N. resolutions.

### William Cohen

Excerpt from CNN's "Daybreak" (1/30/04)

O'BRIEN: In his testimony, David Kay said that intelligence failures date as far back as the Clinton administration. When we were talking to Congressman Porter Goss yesterday, he said that insufficiencies in the intelligence community go back to the early 1990s. You were the defense secretary at this time. Do you think it's the intelligence that's to blame or the administration's use of that intelligence that's to blame?

COHEN: Well, I think we can go back and look at the fact that we had insufficient information from human intelligence. We have great technical capability to see and hear things, but we don't have very many agents on the ground or spies on the ground so to speak. And so, there has always been a deficiency that we have recognized. But if we go back and look at this, we based the assumption that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction, No. 1, because he did. He used them against the Kurds and the Iranians in the past.

Also, we found after Desert Storm that he had -- was well on his way to developing a

nuclear capability. And then, by his own declaration, he submitted documentation to the United Nations and the Security Council indicating he had vast amounts of VX, anthrax, mustard gas, missiles to deliver them. And so, by his own declaration, he indicated that he had these.

So, this assumption was -- and this is, again, an assumption -- that by throwing the inspectors out and refusing to allow them to come back in that he still had them, was continuing his program.

So, go back and look at what was the process and what was the substance of our intelligence analysis, and come to a conclusion then.

### Al Gore

#### **Excerpt from Federal News Service Transcript of "Remarks By Former Vice President Al Gore At The Commonwealth Club, San Francisco" (9/23/02)**

Moreover, if we quickly succeed in a war against the weakened and depleted fourth rate military of Iraq and then quickly abandon that nation as President Bush has abandoned Afghanistan after quickly defeating a fifth rate military there, the resulting chaos could easily pose a far greater danger to the United States than we presently face from **Saddam. We know that he has stored secret supplies of biological and chemical weapons throughout his country.**

### Carl Levin

#### **Excerpt from a Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing: Transcript (9/19/02)**

**We begin with the common belief that Saddam Hussein is a tyrant and a threat to the peace and stability of the region. He has ignored the mandates of the United Nations, is building weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them.** Last week, in his speech to the United Nations, President Bush rightfully declared that the Iraqi threat is, quote, "exactly the kind of aggressive threat that the United Nations was born to confront." The president reminded the world that Iraqi aggression was stopped after the invasion of Kuwait -- in his words, "by the might of the coalition force and the will of the United Nations." And the president called upon the United Nations to act again, stating, "My nation will work with the U.N. Security Council to meet our common challenge. If Iraq defies us again, the world must move deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq to account. We will work with the U.N. Security Council for the necessary resolutions."

We in Congress applauded the president's efforts to galvanize the world community through the United Nations to deal with the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, and our actions now in Congress should be devoted to presenting a broad, bipartisan consensus in that critical effort. This does not mean giving a veto to the U.N. over U.S. foreign policy. No one is going to do that. It is an acknowledgment that Saddam is a world problem and should be addressed in the world arena, and that we are in a stronger position to disarm

Iraq, and even possibly avoid war, if Saddam sees the world at the other end of the barrel, not just the United States.

**Nancy Pelosi**

Excerpt from a Press Stakeout Transcript by Federal News Service (10/3/03)

This morning, I had the opportunity to get a briefing from Dr. Kay on the interim report of his inspection team. I want to commend Dr. Kay and the inspection team for their hard work, for their diligence, for their service to our country. From the unclassified report that you have and the interim report -- which is an interim report -- it is clear to me that there was no imminence of a threat of weapons -- from weapons of mass destruction by Iraq. Because of the lack of imminence of a threat, it is clear that there was time for more diplomatic efforts to be made before we went to war. I want to make one distinction, and that is the distinction between having a weapon and having a weapons program. I mean, weapon program is an aspiration to want to get a weapon. It's a big difference between that and actually achieving one. And I think what we're seeing in Iraq -- there's a big difference between the aspirations and the capability to achieve that. In any event, it all comes down to in this interim report, the lack of imminence of a threat. I said at the time of the vote last fall that the -- as the ranking Democrat on the Intelligence Committee, that the intelligence did not support the threat that was being described. This interim report confirms that observation for me.

Text of a Press Release from Representative Pelosi (12/16/98)

Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi Statement on U.S. Led Military Strike Against Iraq As a member of the House Intelligence Committee, I am keenly aware that the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons is an issue of grave importance to all nations. Saddam Hussein has been engaged in the development of weapons of mass destruction technology which is a threat to countries in the region and he has made a mockery of the weapons inspection process. The responsibility of the United States in this conflict is to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, to minimize the danger to our troops and to diminish the suffering of the Iraqi people. The citizens of Iraq have suffered the most for Saddam Hussein's activities; sadly, those same citizens now stand to suffer more. I have supported efforts to ease the humanitarian situation in Iraq and my thoughts and prayers are with the innocent Iraqi civilians, as well as with the families of U.S. troops participating in the current action. I believe in negotiated solutions to international conflict. This is, unfortunately, not going to be the case in this situation where Saddam Hussein has been a repeat offender, ignoring the international community's requirement that he come clean with his weapons program. While I support the President, I hope and pray that this conflict can be resolved quickly and that the international community can find a lasting solution through diplomatic means.



January 29, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 9

SUBJECT: SLRG Meetings

The seating for the expanded SLRG was not good. All the military were together and all the civilians were at the head of the table, separate from them. We ought to intersperse people. Further, there were too many people in the room. We ought to tighten it up next time.

I want to personally have control over SLRGs and expanded SLRGs. It is an important institution. I cannot turn it over to people who don't understand that. I will do it myself, all aspects—the time, the agenda, the seating, who is invited, and who is going to present.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Seating chart

DHR:dh  
012904-7

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

OS5 09133-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42170

337

29 Jan 04

Red

Gen Brown

Gen LaPorte

Adm Giambastiani

Gen Abizaid

Adm Fargo

Lt Gen Sharp

VADM Szemborski

Gen Hill

Gen Handy

LtGen Cartwright

VADM Keating

Adm Ellis

Gen Jones

VADM Cebrowski

Mr. DuBois

Gen Eberhart

Gen Hagee

Mr. Geren

Mr. Di Rita

Gen Schoomake

Adm Clark

Mr. Moore

Mr. Stenbit

Gen Jumper

Dr. Cambone

Mr. Henry

Mr. Haynes

Gen Pace

Dr. Zakheim

Dr. Chu

Mr. Wynne

Mr. Feith

Dr. Roche

(b)(6)

Mr. Brownlee

SecDef

DepSec

Mr. England

Mr. Thiessen

11-L-0559/OSD/42171

Caldwell

Mr. Hoehn

January 29, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Joint Military Intelligence College

I had never heard of the Joint Military Intelligence College. Please take a look at it, and tell me how you think it is doing and anything we ought to do to strengthen it

Thanks.

Attach.  
1/28/04USD(I) memo to SecDef re: JMIC Annual Report FY03

DHR:dh  
012904-11

.....  
Please respond by 2/18/04

OSD 09134-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42172

352

2960001



INTELLIGENCE

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

JAN 28 2004

c/1/29  
✓  
1/29

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: Stephen A. Cambone *SC*

SUBJECT: Joint Military Intelligence College Annual Report – FY03

The Executive Summary from the subject report is forwarded for your information.

The directive (DoD Directive 3305.1) that requires this report to be sent to you is being amended to conform to the new organization.

cc: Director, DIA



11-L-0559/OSD/42173

## Executive Summary

Academic Year 2003 was one of progress and promise for the Joint Military Intelligence College. The mission of the College is to educate military and civilian intelligence professionals who are able to satisfy intelligence requirements as full partners in safeguarding and advancing the nation's interests and to conduct and disseminate relevant intelligence research. In both areas, education and research, the College experienced continued success through AY 2003. The College is the center of excellence for the education of intelligence professionals. Opportunities provided by the College allow students to pursue education and research directly relevant to their careers, and personal and professional advancement.

The year began on October 1, 2002 with the opening of the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. The success of the center, the fellows, and the research and writing they have completed, exceeded even the College's expectations for its first year of operation.

College faculty and staff have worked hard to keep the curricula on the cutting edge of the intelligence profession. Following 11 September 2001, the need for education in the areas of terrorism, information operations, denial and deception, and asymmetric warfare became critical. Changes in the curriculum have addressed all of these requirements.

In August 2003, the College signed a Memorandum of Agreement with the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) to establish a Graduate Center at NIMA. At the same time, the federal law enforcement community increased the priority they attach to educating their employees at the Joint Military Intelligence College. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Administration enrolled students in the in-residence MSSSI program, and discussions were begun to consider establishing a College graduate center for FBI and DEA at Quantico, Virginia. Additionally, the Drug Enforcement Administration assigned an adjunct faculty member to the College to teach a course on counternarcotics.

In 2003 the number of candidates for the Bachelor of Science in Intelligence (BSI) degree was 32 compared with 19 in the Class of 2002, underscoring the growing contribution of this program to the Services and the Community.

At the August 2003 graduation exercise, 151 MSSSI degrees were awarded. Honorary doctorates were awarded to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management, The Honorable Joan A. Dempsey, and to Ms. Ann Caracristi, former Deputy Director of NSA and Member of the College's Board of Visitors.

In the Spring of 2002, the College accepted the papers and memorabilia of the late Lieutenant General Vernon A. (Dick) Walters, USA. His collection is now on display in the Vernon A. Walters Room of the College.

The International Intelligence Fellows Program completed its second iteration in March 2003 with military officers from the Asia-Pacific Region participating with American colleagues.

The College's Annual Conference in June 2003 drew over three hundred participants to consider the evolutionary role of reserve intelligence and its contribution to the defense and intelligence missions.

In 2003, as the College moved forward to advance its education and research programs, the Director DIA endorsed the College's request for \$3.5 million additional funds to enable it to continue to increase the scope of its education and research programs. This request has been submitted as part of the FY2005-2009 budget.



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

ACTION MEMO

June 17, 2004, 9:00 AM

GENERAL COUNSEL

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJH*

SUBJECT: Addressing Sergeant Provance's "Cover-Up" Complaint

- The attached ABCNEWS article, "Definitely a Cover-up" reports that Sergeant Samuel Provance, a member of the 302<sup>nd</sup> Military Intelligence Battalion at Abu Ghraib in September 2003, asserts that Major General George R. Fay's ongoing investigation of Military Intelligence at Abu Ghraib is a "cover-up," in that during MG Fay's interview of him, MG Fay:
  - Actually focused on Military Police officer actions, rather than the actions of Military Intelligence officers;
  - Seemed to discourage SGT Provance from testifying;
  - Threatened to take action against SGT Provance for failing to report sooner;
  - Made SGT Provance feel as if it is he who is being punished and that he will be ostracized for speaking out.
- Additional media attention is anticipated.

OPTIONS:

1. Take no action pending review and assessment of MG Fay's soon-to-be-completed investigation report. If necessary, direct that the investigation be re-opened.
2. Direct that the investigation's appointing authority specifically evaluate SGT Provance's complaints and further direct or request an investigation of the complaints, as appropriate.
3. Refer SGT Provance's complaints to the Inspector General of the Department of Defense for appropriate action.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that you select Option 1 and take no action until you have had the opportunity to review and assess MG Fay's completed report of investigation.

COORDINATION: VDJS, VADM Church

Attachment:  
As stated.

*NOTE: I have no doubt that these allegations will continue to attract attention; they will not fall through the cracks.  
WJH*

*OS 6/17*

*383.6*

*17 Jun 04  
JL May 04*



SECDEF DECISION:

Approved  the Sec to Peter Geren

Disapproved JUN 18 2004

Other \_\_\_\_\_

cc: VADM Church  
MG Maples

Prepared By: Robert E. Reed, ODGC (P&HP), (b)(6)



May 21, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes  
cc: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Pete Geren  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Complaint

*383.6*

What do you propose we do about this complaint by Sergeant Provance about General Fay?

Thanks.

Attach.  
ABC News story: "Definitely a Cover-up," May 18, 2004.

DHR:dh  
052104-3

.....  
Please respond by 6/4/04

*DR 6/18*

*SIR,  
RESPONSE ATTACHED.  
vr/CDR Nosenzo  
6/18*

*21 May 04*

OSD 09201-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42178

## 'Definitely a Cover-Up'

### Former Abu Ghraib Intel Staffer Says Army Concealed Involvement in Abuse Scandal

By Brian Ross and Alexandra Salomon



**May 18, 2004** — Dozens of soldiers — other than the seven military police reservists who have been charged — were involved in the abuse at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison, and there is an effort under way in the Army to hide it, a key witness in the investigation told ABCNEWS.

"There's definitely a cover-up," the witness, Sgt. Samuel Provance, said. "People are either telling themselves or being told to be quiet."

Provance, 30, was part of the 302nd Military Intelligence Battalion stationed at Abu Ghraib last September. He spoke to ABCNEWS despite orders from his commanders not to.

"What I was surprised at was the silence," said Provance. "The collective silence by so many people that had to be involved, that had to have seen something or heard something."

Provance, now stationed in Germany, ran the top secret computer network used by military intelligence at the prison.

He said that while he did not see the actual abuse take place, the interrogators with whom he worked freely admitted they directed the MPs' rough treatment of prisoners.

"Anything [the MPs] were to do legally or otherwise, they were to take those commands from the interrogators," he said.

Top military officials have claimed the abuse seen in the photos at Abu Ghraib was limited to a few MPs, but Provance says the sexual humiliation of prisoners began as a technique ordered by the interrogators from military intelligence.

"One interrogator told me about how commonly the detainees were stripped naked, and in some occasions, wearing women's underwear," Provance said. "If it's your job to strip people naked, yell at them, scream at them, humiliate them, it's not going to be too hard to move from that to another level."

According to Provance, some of the physical abuse that took place at Abu Ghraib included **U.S.** soldiers "striking [prisoners] on the neck area somewhere and the person being knocked out. Then [the soldier] would go to the next detainee, who would be very fearful and voicing their fear, and the MP would calm him down and say, 'We're not going to do that. It's OK. Everything's fine,' and then do the exact same thing to him."

Provance also described an incident when two drunken interrogators took a female Iraqi prisoner from her cell in the middle of the night and stripped her naked to the waist. The men were later restrained by another MP.

## **Pentagon Sanctions Investigation**

Maj. Gen. George Fay, the Army's deputy chief of staff for intelligence, was assigned by the Pentagon to investigate the role of military intelligence in the abuse at the Iraq prison.

Fay started his probe on April 23, but Provance said when Fay interviewed him, the general seemed interested only in the military police, not the interrogators, and seemed to discourage him from testifying.

Provance said Fay threatened to take action against him for failing to report what he saw sooner, and the sergeant fears he will be ostracized for speaking out.

"I feel like I'm being punished for being honest," Provance told ABCNEWS. "You know, it was almost as if I actually felt if all my statements were shredded and I said, like most everybody else, 'I didn't hear anything, I didn't see anything. I don't know what you're talking about,' then my life would be just fine right now."

In response, Army officials said it is "routine procedure to advise military personnel under investigative review" not to comment.

The officials said, however, that Fay and the military were committed to an honest, in-depth investigation of what happened at the prison.

But Provance believes many involved may not be as forthcoming with information.

"I would say many people are probably hiding and wishing to God that this storm passes without them having to be investigated [or] personally looked at."



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 JUN 18 PM 5:23

INFO MEMO

June 17, 2004 5:00 p.m.

ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Pentagon Memorial Fundraising Status

- This responds to the attached snowflake which requests information on the status of fundraising for the Pentagon 9/11 Memorial.
- The total construction requirement will be nearly \$17.5 million.
- The tally of funds raised to date is **\$2.2 million**. This includes \$1.1 million already collected by DoD/WHS and the Pentagon Memorial Fund, Inc. (PMF, Inc.) as well as \$1.1 million pledged to the PMF, Inc., but not yet received.
- While the early results were notable, the pace of fundraising is now slower than anticipated, and we will need to put construction activities on hold pending receipts.
- The family group is still very committed to taking the long view and doing this right. However, to build momentum, Lynda Webster has expressed a need for public endorsements and hands-on assistance from influential, high visibility individuals, such as former Secretaries of Defense, politicians, corporate leaders, and other notable figures. Jim Laychak, Chairman of the PMF, Inc., has spoken with Secretary Laird, with whom he served on the design jury. Norm Augustine has told me that he will make some personal calls to potential donors.
- Attached at Tab A is the current listing of the Executive Committee and Advisory Committee members for PMF, Inc.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Brett Eaton,


(b)(6)

0 SD 09202-04



11-L-0559/OSD/42181

3E 792

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
DATE: June 6, 2004  
SUBJECT

How are we doing on the DoD Memorial Fund Raising?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060604.08ts

Please respond by: 6/21

6/9  
Ray Outbois -  
Please provide.  
Trx.  
D. Rita

# TAB

# A

**Pentagon Memorial Fund, Inc.**

**Executive Committee** (Confirmed Members as of June 3,2004)

**Norman R. Augustine**

Chairman, Executive Committee, Lockheed Martin Corporation

**Edward A. Brennan**

Executive Chairman, AMR and American Airlines

**Dr. Kurt Campbell**

Senior Vice President and Director of International Security, Center for Strategic and International Studies

**Lynda Carter**

Actress and Washington Community Leader

**Thomas E. Donilon**

Executive Vice President, Law and Policy and Secretary to the Board of Directors, Fannie Mae

**John W. Douglass**

President and CEO, Aerospace Industries Association; Former Assistant Secretary of the Navy

**John Fahey**

President and CEO, National Geographic

**Kenneth Fisher**

Partner, Fisher Brothers

**Joseph Kampf**

President and CEO, Anteon International Corporation

**General John Keane**

Former Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army

**John W. Madigan**

Retired Chairman and CEO, Tribune Company  
Chairman, McCormick Tribune Foundation

**Mrs. Donald Rumsfeld (Joyce)**

Founding Chair of Chicago Foundation for Education

**Paul Stern**

Partner and Co-Founder, Arlington Capital Partners  
Partner and Co-Founder, Thayer Capital Partners

**Catherine Stevens**

Attorney, Wife of Senior Alaska Senator Ted Stevens

**Patrick T. Stokes**

President and CEO, Anheuser-Busch

**Advisory Committee**

**Ms. Barbara Barrett**

President, Triple Creek Lodge

**The Honorable and Mrs. William Brock**

Chairman, Intellectual Development Systems, Inc.  
Former Senator of Tennessee  
Community Leaders

**Sandy Brock**

President, SMD Design Consulting Firm  
Advisory Board Member, The National Air & Space Administration  
Advisory Board Member, Center for Strategic and International Studies

**Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.**

Counselor for Center for Strategic and International Studies  
Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Former Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board  
Former United States Ambassador to the United Kingdom

**The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger**

Former Secretary of State  
Former National Security Advisor

**Alma Powell**

Co-Chair, America's Promise

**General Brent Scowcroft**

President and Founder, Scowcroft Group  
President and Founder, The Forum for International Policy



**Jack Valenti**

Chairman and CEO, Motion Picture Association of America

**The Honorable William H. Webster**

Senior Partner, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy

Former Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Central Intelligence Agency


**The Honorable Togo D. West**

Former Secretary of Veterans Affairs

Former Secretary of the Army

June 18, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Global War on Terror

Attached is a paper I have written on the subject of the global war on terror, which raises some questions about what we call it. I do believe that how we characterize it, how we set it up, directly affects what we do about it and what our coalition does about it.

0005

After you have had a chance to read this, I would like to visit with you, possibly when we get together on Monday. I think it is an important issue.

Respectfully,

Attach.

6/18/04 SecDef paper: "What Are We Fighting? Is It a Global War on Terror?"

DHR:dh  
061804-8

18 Jun 04

OSD 09210-04

June 18,2004

SUBJECT: What Are We Fighting? Is It a Global War on Terror?

Are we fighting a “Global War on Terror”?

- Or are we witnessing a “global civil war within the Muslim religion,” where a relatively small minority of radicals and extremists are trying to hijack the religion from the large majority of moderates?
- Or are we engaged in a “global insurgency” against us by a minority of radical Muslims in the name of a fanatical ideology?
- Or is it a combination of the two?

How we describe and set up the problem determines how we will deal with it – what priorities we establish and, in short, what we and our allies do to deal with the problem.

Since September 11,2001, the US has moved from addressing terrorism as a “law enforcement,” where we must find and arrest the terrorists, casting it as a “war” against terrorism, where we need to use our military might against the terrorist networks and their safe havens. That was an important and useful advance, freeing us and our coalition to use more vigorous responses.

The question now, however, is should we refine the problem further? What we may be facing is not only simply a law enforcement problem, it is also not a global war against generic terrorists, but rather a war by a radical extremist strain of Islam, a minority of that religion, first against the moderates in that religion, but also against much of the rest of the civilized world. The extremists’ grand objective seems to be to reshape the world – to cripple the US, to drive us out of the Middle East, to overthrow all moderate pro-Western governments in the Arab and Muslim worlds, and, in their dreams, to restore a “Caliphate” over large portions of the globe and reestablish an Islamic superpower.

The important point is that what we face is an ideologically-based challenge. Radical Islamists may be centered in the Middle East, but their reach is worldwide and their goals are global. They are currently making inroads in different ways in Europe, Central and Southeast Asia, and Africa, as well as the Western Hemisphere, including the United States.

Europe, it seems, does not understand the problem. Some Europeans seem to think they can make a “separate peace” (the “Spanish syndrome”). The UN Secretariat does not seem to get it either. For us to be successful – for the world to be successful – the US, the UN and the Europeans must have a reasonably common perception of what is happening – of what the threat is. The UN was the second target of the 1993 World Trade Center bombers. Yet the UN in Baghdad declared itself “unprotected” because they fancied themselves as “innocents.” But they were again attacked by extremists, very likely because the UN stands, in a general way, for the existing international system. To top it off, radical Islamists have recently put a price on Kofi Annan’s head. The reward is in gold to show the extremists do not depend on nation states.

It is likely that, over time, Europeans will be even more threatened than the US given their demographics. Israel, of course, represents the ultimate target in the Middle East – and is seen as an outpost of democracy, progress and Western values. It seems reasonable to conclude that the radicals’ goal is an ideological goal, and that terrorism is simply their weapon of choice.

We should test the proposition as to whether it might be accurate and useful to define our problem a new way – to declare it as “a civil war within Islam” and/or a “global ideological insurgency” – and find ways to test what the analytical results would be depending on how we set up the problem.

A number of things follow from this analysis.

If it is an ideological challenge, our task is not simply to defend, but to preempt, to go on the offensive, and to keep the radicals off balance. We learned this lesson in the Soviet Union cold war case.

For one thing, we will need to show the moderates in the religion that they have support. We will need to find ways to help them. But they must take up the battle and defend their religion against those who would hijack it. Only if moderate Muslims actively and effectively oppose the global insurgency will the extremists be defeated.

Moderate Muslim leadership needs to create opportunities for their people. We can help. Their attitude with respect to women results in a population explosion and denies their nations one-half of the energy, brainpower and creativity that other nations benefit from. It is a formula for certain failure. Moreover, championing women’s rights has a strategic importance: education of women in developing countries correlates closely with shrinking families, “middle class” values, economic progress and likely erosion of the more extreme forms of religious orthodoxy.

We must encourage oil-producing Muslim states to diversity their economies and not use oil as a crutch. Oil equals wealth, but that they happen to be sitting on sand over oil detaches them from the reality that effort and investment lead to wealth for all of the rest of the world that does not happen to be sitting on sand over oil. Too often, oil-rich Muslims are against physical labor, so they bring in Koreans and Pakistanis to do the labor, while their young people remain idle. An idle population is vulnerable to radicalism, particularly when they conclude it is prudent to pay off the extremists so they can maintain their preferred positions.

It is desirable, if not a necessity, for Middle Eastern nations to reform and institute representative systems that are respectful of all their people, including women. The President's initiative is not "do-goodism," but wise calculation: It is advice to moderate states that political reform is a way to strengthen themselves – to co-opt middle classes against the extremists.

Finally, ideologies can be defeated. The Soviet collapse teaches us this. If Islamism's goal is the fantasy of a new "Caliphate," we can deflate it by, over time, demonstrating its certain futility. Simply by not giving in to terrorist blackmail – by not being driven out of the Middle East – we will demonstrate over time that the extremists' ideology cannot deliver. At some point, its futility will become clear and the present enthusiasm will wane. Right now they are on a high, but what if 5 to 10 years from now they have achieved none of their goals (as Arafat has failed)? This is in our own hands.

The failure of the Iranian regime would also be a blow to the ideology, discrediting that ideology in the way that the collapse of the USSR discredited Marxist-Leninist parties most everywhere, except North Korea and Cuba. This, too, should be a strategic goal of ours in the struggle.

So if what is occurring is not a war against terrorism, we need to consider changing how we describe it and seek to get others to see the problem in a new way, because it will affect their attitudes and how they and we approach the critical problem of this decade.

DHR:dh  
Current MFRs/GWOT

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'D. M. Arafat', written in a cursive style.

JUN 21 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Army Paper

Attached is a paper that the United States Army is putting out. Pete Schoomaker's focus on the "Warrior Ethos" is taking hold.

I think you will enjoy skimming through it.

Respectfully,

Attach.

"Serving a Nation at War"

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UNITED STATES ARMY

# SERVING a NATION at WAR

A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities



U.S. ARMY

U.S. ARMY: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities

# FOREWORD

President Bush told us that this war would be unlike any other in our Nation's history. He was right. After our initial expeditionary responses and successful major combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, those operations have become protracted campaigns where we are providing the conditions of security needed to wage a conflict—a war of ideas. This is not simply a fight against terror—terror is a tactic. This is not simply a fight against Al Qaeda, its affiliates and adherents—they are foot soldiers. This is not simply a fight to bring democracy to the Middle East—that is a strategic objective. This is a fight for the very ideas at the foundation of our society, the way of life those ideas enable, and the freedoms we enjoy.

The single most significant component of our new strategic reality is that because of the centrality of the ideas in conflict, this war will be a protracted one. Whereas for most of our lives the default condition has been peace, now our default expectation must be conflict. This new strategic context is the logic for reshaping the Army to be an Army of campaign quality with joint and expeditionary capabilities. The lessons learned in two-and-a-half years of war have already propelled a wide series of changes in the Army and across the Joint team.

This learning process must not stop. Although this paper outlines the strategic context for the series of changes underway in our Army, its purpose is not to convince you or even to inform you. Its purpose is to cause you to reflect on and *think* about this new strategic context and what it portends for our future and for the Nation. All great changes in our Army have been accompanied by earnest dialogue and active debate at all levels—both within the Army and with those who care about the Army. As this paper states, “The best way to anticipate the future is to create it.” Your thoughtful participation in this dialogue is key to creating that future.



Peter J. Schoomaker  
General, United States Army  
Chief of Staff



R. L. Brownlee  
Acting Secretary of the Army

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




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## STRATEGIC CONTEXT

America is a Nation at war. *To* win this war, we must meld all elements of our national power in a determined and relentless campaign to defeat enemies who challenge our way of life. This is not a “contingency,” nor is it a “crisis.” It is a new reality that Soldiers understand all too well: since 9/11, they have witnessed more than a battalion’s worth of their comrades killed in action, more than a brigade’s worth severely wounded. Their sacrifice has liberated more than 46 million people. As these words are written, the Army is completing the largest rotation of forces in its history, and all 18 of its divisions have seen action in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, or Iraq. We have activated more than 244,000 Soldiers of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve in the last two years, and more than a division’s worth of Soldiers support homeland security missions. Over 300,000 Soldiers are forward-deployed. Like our Nation, we are an Army at war.




For any war, as Clausewitz pointed out, it is essential to understand “the kind of war on which [we] are embarking.” Although the fundamental nature of war is constant, its methods and techniques constantly change to reflect the strategic context and operational capabilities at hand. The United States is driving a rapid evolution in the methods and techniques of war. Our overwhelming success in this endeavor, however, has driven many adversaries to seek their own adaptive advantages through asymmetric means and methods.

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Some enemies, indeed, are almost perfectly asymmetric. Non-state actors, in particular, project no mirror image of the nation-state model that has dominated global relationships for the last few centuries. They are asymmetric in means. They are asymmetric in motivation: they don't value what we value; they don't fear what we fear. Whereas our government is necessarily hierarchical, these enemies are a network. Whereas we develop rules of engagement to limit tactical collateral damage, they feel morally

world, political pluralism, economic competition, unfettered trade, and tolerance of diversity have produced the greatest individual freedom and material abundance in human history. Other parts of the world remain mired in economic deprivation, political failure, and social resentment. Many remain irreconcilably opposed to religious freedom, secular pluralism, and modernization. Although not all have taken up arms in this war of ideas, such irreconcilables comprise dozens of potential combatants.



Meanwhile, not all former strategic threats have vanished. In the Far East, North Korea's nuclearization risks intensifying more than 50 years of unremitting hostility, and many others pursue weapons of mass destruction. We confront the growing danger that such weapons will find their way into the hands of non-state groups or individuals. Armed with such weapons and with

unconstrained in their efforts to deliver strategic effects. Highly adaptive, they are self-organizing on the basis of ideas alone, exposing very little of targetable value in terms of infrastructure or institutions. To better understand such a war, we must examine the broader context of conflict, the competition of ideas.

no infrastructure of their own at risk, such "super-empowered individuals" could be anxious to apply them to our homeland.

A cursory examination of the ideas in competition may forecast the depth and duration of this conflict. The United States, its economy dependent on overseas markets and trade, has contributed to a wave of globalization both in markets and in ideas. Throughout much of the

On the international landscape the significance of American dominance in world affairs has not been lost on other states. Many are envious, some are fearful, and others believe that the "sole superpower" must be curbed. This presents fertile soil for competitive coalitions and alliances between states and non-state actors aimed at curtailing U.S. strengths and influence. Such strategic challenges have the potential to become strategic threats at some point in the future.



At the same time, in a globalizing world, military-capable technology is increasingly fungible, and thus potential adversaries may have the means to achieve parity or even superiority in niche



technologies tailored to their military ambitions. For us and for them, those technologies facilitate increasingly rapid, simultaneous, and non-contiguous military operations. Such operations increasingly characterize today's conflicts, and portend daunting future operational challenges.

We must prepare for the future, then, even as we relentlessly pursue those who seek the destruction of our way of life, and while waging a prolonged war of ideas to alter the conditions that motivate our enemies. Some might equate these challenges to the Cold War, but there are critical distinctions:

- Our non-state adversaries are not satisfied with a "cold" standoff, but instead seek at every turn to make it "hot."
- Our own forces cannot focus solely on future overseas contingencies, but also must defend bases and facilities both at home and abroad.
- Because some of our adversaries are not easily deterred, our national strategy is not "defensive" but "preventive."

- Above all, because at least some current adversaries consider "peaceful coexistence" with the United States unacceptable, we must either alter the conditions and convictions prompting their hostility—or destroy them outright by war.

That is not the strategic context for which we designed today's United States Army. Hence, our Army today confronts the supreme test of all armies: *to adapt rapidly to circumstances that it could not foresee.*

## CHANGE IN A TIME OF WAR

The Army always has changed and always will. But an army at war must change the way it changes. In peacetime, armies change slowly and deliberately. Modern warfare is immensely complex. The vast array of capabilities, skills, techniques, and organizations of war is a recipe for chaos without thoughtful planning to assure interoperability, synchronization, and synergy. Second- and third-order effects of a change in any part of this intricate mechanism are difficult to forecast, and the consequences of misjudgment can be immense.



Peacetime also tends to subordinate effectiveness to economy, and joint collaboration to the inevitable competition for budgets and programs. Institutional energies tend to focus on preserving force structure and budgetary programs of record. Resource risk is spread across budget years and programs,

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Today, that measured approach to change will not suffice. Our current force is engaged, and in ways we could not perfectly forecast. Our immediate demands are urgent, and fielding capabilities in the near term may outweigh protection of the program of record. We will shift resource risk away from fighting Soldiers.

To be sure, this urgency does not excuse us from the obligation to prepare for the future, for the prolongation of this conflict as well as the possible outbreak of others we cannot predict. But it does significantly blur the usual dichotomy between the Current and Future Force. We must ensure that we apply lessons learned from today's fight to those Future Force programs, even if that means adjusting their direction and timing. In short, change in a time of war must deal simultaneously with both current and future needs.

Army at home. Such adaptation already is under way in the expansion and retailoring of our combat training centers, the establishment of a Futures Center in Training and Doctrine Command, reformulation of the Army Campaign Plan, and a wide range of consolidation and reorganization initiatives in Army major commands.

Fundamental to this adaptation will be our rapid evolution to a campaign quality Army with joint and expeditionary capabilities.

### **AN EXPEDITIONARY MINDSET**

The Army is no stranger to expeditionary operations. World War I saw deployment of the American Expeditionary Forces, and World War II the Allied Expeditionary Force. Throughout its history the Army has executed a wide array of



It must also pervade our entire institution. The Army cannot restrict change solely to its operating forces. The same Soldiers and leaders who adapt, learn, and innovate on our battlefields also drive our success on the battlefield with successful adaptation of the

deployments. But many today no longer perceive the United States Army to be expeditionary. Some might argue that the primary distinction of an expeditionary operation is its short duration, nor calls for expeditionary forces capable of sustained

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
operations—confirms such a definition. Others view expeditionary as speed of responsiveness, but this perception, too, is not complete. In the Cold War, the United States was committed to reinforce Europe with ten divisions within ten days, but no one perceived that responsiveness as expeditionary. The reason for this is significant: in the Cold War we knew where we would fight and we met this requirement through prepositioning of units or unit sets in a very developed theater. The uncertainty as to where we must deploy, the probability of a very austere operational environment, and the requirement to fight on arrival throughout the battlespace pose an entirely different challenge—and the fundamental distinction of expeditionary operations.

This challenge is above all one of mindset, because decades of planning and preparation against set-piece enemies predisposed American Soldiers to seek certainty and synchronization in the application of force. We have engaged repeatedly in conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity, to be sure, but always viewing such operations as the exception rather than the rule. That can no longer be the case. In this globalized world, our enemies shift resources and activities to those areas least accessible to us. As elusive and adaptive enemies seek refuge in the far corners of the earth, the norm will be short-notice operations, extremely austere theaters of operation, and incomplete information—indeed, the requirement to fight *for* information, rather than fight *with* information. Soldiers with a joint and expeditionary mindset will be confident that they are organized, trained, and equipped to go anywhere in *the* world, at any time, in any environment, against any adversary, to accomplish the assigned mission.

## A JOINT MINDSET

The touchstone of **America's** way of war is **the** **ability** **of** **our** **armed**

services excels in **combining** a wide array of technologies and tools in each dimension—land, air, sea, and space—to generate a synergy of effects that creates overwhelming dilemmas for our opponents. Today, that same emphasis on combinations extends beyond each service to joint operations. No longer satisfied merely to deconflict the activities of the several services, we now seek joint *interdependence*.



Interdependence is more than just interoperability, the assurance that service capabilities can work together smoothly. It is even more than integration to improve their collective efficiency and effectiveness. Joint interdependence purposefully combines service capabilities to maximize their **total** complementary and reinforcing effects, while minimizing their relative vulnerabilities. There are several compelling reasons for doing so:

- First, modern technology has extended the reach of weapons far beyond their “dimensions of origin.” For example, land-based cruise missiles threaten slips at sea, and land-based air defenses pose challenges to air-, sea-, and even space-based capabilities. Merely defeating the mirror-image threat within a service’s **primary** dimension of interest *can* no longer suffice.
- Second, in addition to achieving daunting supremacy within the air, maritime, and

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
space dimensions, our sister services are developing increasingly powerful capabilities that can influence land combat directly.

- Finally, the nature of expeditionary operations argues for leveraging every potential tool of speed, operational reach, and precision. By projecting coordinated combinations of force unhindered by distance and generally independent of terrain, we can achieve maximum effect for the Joint Force Commander without regard to the service of origin.

At the strategic level, interdependence has long pervaded the Army's thinking. Lacking organic strategic lift, we can neither deploy nor sustain ourselves without the support of the other services. But our commitment to interdependence has not always extended to the tactical level. Constrained by the tyranny of terrain, ground forces operate in a world of friction and position. Command

and control are fragile, the risk of surprise is omnipresent, and our mobility advantage is relatively limited vis-a-vis our adversaries. Once committed, we must prevail. The decisive nature of land combat underscores a preference for organizational autonomy and redundancy, and tends to prejudice Soldiers against relying on others for essential ingredients of tactical survival and success. In the past, moreover, that prejudice too often has prompted interservice rivalries reflecting concerns far removed from the practical imperatives of the battlefield.

A nation at war cannot afford that indulgence. War relentlessly exposes theories built upon prejudice rather than proof, and Iraq and Afghanistan have been no different. The air-, sea-, or land-power debates are over. Our collective future is irrefutably joint. To meet the challenges of expeditionary operations, the Army can and must embrace the capabilities of its sister services right down to the tactical level. In turn, that will require us to



develop operational concepts, Capabilities, and training programs that are joint from the outset, not merely as an afterthought.

The prerequisites of a commitment to interdependence are broad understanding of the differing strengths and limitations of each service's capabilities, clear agreement about how those capabilities will be integrated in any given operational setting, and absolute mutual trust that, once committed, they will be employed as agreed. At the same time, the Army requires a similar commitment from its sister services. The ultimate test of interdependence is at the very tip of the spear, where the rifleman carries the greatest burden of risk with the least intrinsic technological advantage. No concept of interdependence will suffice that does not enable the frontline Soldier and Marine.

The same logic and spirit that informs joint interdependence also underscores the role of interagency and multinational operations. In a sustained conflict that is a war of ideas, all interagency elements of our national power must work in concert with allies and coalition partners to alter the conditions that motivate our adversaries.

## **A CAMPAIGN QUALITY ARMY**

While our recent combat employments in Afghanistan and Iraq were models of rapid and effective offensive operations, they also demonstrate that neither the duration nor the character of even the most successful military campaign is readily predictable. Especially in wars intended to liberate rather than subjugate, victory entails winning a competition of ideas, and thereby fundamentally changing the conditions that prompted the conflict. Long after the defeat

of Taliban and Iraqi military forces, we continue to wage just such campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq.



The campaign quality of an Army thus is not only its ability to win decisive combat operations, but also its ability to sustain those operations for as long as necessary, adapting them as required to unpredictable and often profound changes in the context and character of the conflict. The Army's preeminent challenge is to reconcile expeditionary agility and responsiveness with the staying power, durability, and adaptability to carry a conflict to a victorious conclusion no matter what form it eventually takes.

## **“ARE YOU WEARING YOUR DOG TAGS?”**



Does that question surprise you? It might if you view peace as our default condition, and war the exception. But our new reality is very different:

- A conflict of irreconcilable ideas.
- A disparate pool of potential combatants.
- Adaptive adversaries seeking our destruction by any means possible.





- Evolving asymmetric threats that will relentlessly seek shelter in those environments and methods for which we are least prepared.
- A foreseeable future of extended conflict in which we can expect to fight every day, and in which real peace will be the anomaly.



in a time of profound change, the American Soldier will remain the center of our formations. In a conflict of daunting complexity and diversity, the Soldier is the ultimate platform. "Delinkable" from everything other than his values, the Soldier remains the irreplaceable base of the dynamic array of combinations that America can generate to defeat our enemies in any expeditionary environment. As the ultimate combination of sensor and shooter, the American Soldier is irrefutable proof that people are more important than hardware and quality more important than quantity.

This new reality drives the transformation under way in the Army. It is the lens that shapes our perception and interpretation of the future, and governs our responses to its challenges. It is the logic for a campaign quality Army with joint and expeditionary capabilities. Are you wearing your dog tags?



## CHANGING FOR CONFLICT

### THE CENTER OF OUR FORMATIONS

Our core competencies remain: to train and equip Soldiers and grow leaders; and to provide relevant and ready landpower to the Combatant Commander and the joint team. Therefore even

Making that Soldier more effective and survivable is the first requirement of adaptation to a joint and expeditionary environment. However much the tools of war may improve, only Soldiers willing and able to endure war's hardships can exploit them. Their skills will change as the specialization characteristic of industrial-age




warfare gives way to the information-age need for greater flexibility and versatility. What will not change is their warrior ethos.

That ethos reflects the spirit of the pioneers who built America, of whom it rightly was said, ‘The cowards never started. The brave arrived. Only the tough survived.’ It is a subtle, offensive spirit based on quiet competence. It is an ethos that recognizes that closing with an enemy is not just a matter of killing, but rather is the ultimate responsibility reserved for the most responsible and the most disciplined. Only the true warrior ethos can moderate war’s inevitable brutality.

Just as the post-9/11 operational environment has fundamentally changed, so too should the expectations of the Americans entering Army service. We will seek individuals ready and willing for warrior service. Bound to each other by integrity and trust, the young Americans we welcome to our ranks will learn that in the Army, every Soldier is a leader, responsible for what happens in his or her presence regardless of rank. They will value learning and adaptability at every level, particularly as it contributes to initiative: creating situations for an adversary, rather than reacting to them. They will learn that the Army’s culture is one of selfless service, a warrior culture rather than a corporate one. As such, it is not important who gets the credit, either within the



Army or within the joint team; what’s important is that the Nation is served.



## ORGANIZING FOR CONFLICT


Confronting an adaptive adversary, no single solution will succeed, no matter how elegant, synchronized, or advanced. Its very “perfection” will ensure its irrelevance, for an adaptive enemy will relentlessly eliminate the vulnerabilities that solution seeks to exploit and avoid the conditions necessary for its success. Instead, the foundations of Army Transformation must be diversity and adaptability. The Army must retain a wide range of capabilities while significantly improving their agility and versatility. Building a joint and expeditionary Army with campaign qualities will require versatile forces that can mount smaller, shorter duration operations routinely—without penalty to the Army’s capability for larger, more protracted campaigns.

**Modular Units.** A key prerequisite to achieving that capability is developing more modular tactical organizations. The Army’s force design has incorporated tailoring and task organization for decades, but primarily in the context of a large conventional war in which all echelons from platoon to Army Service Component Command were deployed. This presumption of



infrequent large-scale deployment encouraged the Army to centralize certain functions at higher echelons of command, and implicitly assumed that deployment would largely be complete before significant employment began. Moreover,

operations renders an ad hoc deployed force and a nondeployed residue of partially disassembled units, diminishing the effectiveness of both. The premium now is on employed combined-arms effectiveness at lower levels vice efficiency at



presuming peace to be the default condition, the Army garrisoned the bulk of its tactical units to optimize economic efficiency and management convenience rather than combined-arms training and rapid deployability. Above all, the Army designed its capabilities to satisfy every tactical requirement autonomously, viewing sister service capabilities as supplementary.

These presumptions no longer apply. Near-simultaneous employment and deployment increasingly characterize Army operations, and those operations are increasingly diverse in both purpose and *scope*. Tailoring and task-organizing our current force structure for such

macro levels. Peace will be the exception, and both tactical organizations and garrison configurations must support expeditionary deployment, not simply improvise it. Force design must catch up with strategic reality.

That strategic reality is the immediate need for versatile, cohesive units—and more of them. Increasingly, ownership of capabilities by echelons and even by services matters less than how those capabilities are allocated to missions. Although divisions have long been the nominal measure of the Army's fighting strength, the Army also has a long history of deployment and employment of multifunctional brigade combat



teams. In addition, the Army has a broad array of reinforcing capabilities—both units and headquarters—but we can significantly improve their modularity. In the future, by shifting to such brigade combat teams as our basic units of action, enabling them routinely with adequate combat, combat support, and sustainment capabilities, and assuring them connectivity to headquarters and joint assets, we can significantly improve the tailorability, scalability, and “fightability” of the Army’s contribution to the overall joint fight. At the same time, the inherent robustness and self-sufficiency of brigade combat teams will enhance their ability to deploy rapidly and fight on arrival.

Being expeditionary is far less about deployability than about operational and tactical agility, including the ability to reach routinely beyond organic capabilities for required effects. If in the process the Army can leverage our sister services’ mobility, reach, and lethality to satisfy some of those mission requirements, all the better. To achieve that, we must expand our view of Army force design to encompass the entire range of available joint capabilities. At the end of the day, squads and platoons will continue to win our engagements, but no one can reliably predict—particularly in the emerging operational environment—which squads or platoons will carry the decisive burden of the fight. In an expeditionary army, small units must be so well networked that whichever makes contact can leverage all joint capabilities to fight and win.

Such joint interdependence is not unidirectional. The more modular the Army’s capabilities, the better we will be able to support our sister services, whether by the air defense protection of an advanced sea base, compelling an enemy ground force to mass and thereby furnish targets for air attack, or exploiting the transitory effects

of precision fires with the more permanent effects of ground maneuver.

**Modular Headquarters.** The transformation of our headquarters will be even more dramatic than that of our units, for we will sever the routine association between headquarters and the units they control. At division level and higher, headquarters will surrender organic subordinate formations, becoming themselves streamlined modular organizations capable of commanding and controlling any combination of capabilities—Army, joint, or coalition. For that purpose, the headquarters themselves will be more robust, staffed to minimize the requirement for augmentation. They will



employ separable, deployable command posts for rapid response and entry; link to Home Station Operation Centers to minimize forward footprints; and be network-enabled organizations capable of commanding or supporting joint and multinational as well as Army forces.

Trained, cohesive staffs are key to combat effectiveness. Today, because our tactical headquarters elements lack the necessary joint interfaces, we have to improvise these when operations begin. That must change. Major tactical




headquarters must be capable of conducting Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC) operations. Major operational headquarters must have enough permanent sister-service staff positions to receive and employ a Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) plug, enabling them with equal effectiveness to serve as an Army Service Component Command, joint Task Force, or JFLCC headquarters.

**Stabilizing the force.** Paradoxically, an Army that seeks maximum flexibility through modularity must simultaneously maximize unit cohesion where it counts, within our companies, battalions, and brigades. Again, our altered strategic context is the driver. In the past, our approach to unit manning reflected the industrial age in which our forces were developed. Processes treated people as interchangeable parts, and valued their administrative availability more highly than their individual and team proficiency. At the unit level, manning and equipping reflected a "first-to-last" strategic deployment system. Peace was the default condition, allowing late-deploying units to fill out over time, typically by individual replacements, during the expected prolonged transition from peace to war.



At a time when protracted conflict has become the norm, during which we will repeatedly deploy and employ major portions of our Army, such an approach to manning will not

work. Instead, units will need to achieve and sustain a level of readiness far exceeding the ability of any individual manning system. The effects we seek are broad: continuity in training, stability of leadership, unit cohesion, enhanced unit effectiveness, and greater deployment predictability for Soldiers and their families.



To achieve these effects we are undertaking the most significant revision in manning policy in our Army's history. It entails four key changes:

- First, we will shift the logic of our force structure from a scenario basis to a capability basis. We will need an adequate level of capability not only for employment, but also rotation for training, refitting, and rest. This does not preclude the requirement or the capability to surge for crisis response, but sustained commitment and rotation will be the expected requirement.



- Second, we must abandon tiering unit readiness by “early” and “late” deployers. There will be no “late deployers,” merely “future deployers” who are at different stages of their rotation cycle.
- Third, we must synchronize our Soldiers’ tours with their unit’s rotation cycles. While accidents and casualties will preclude eliminating all individual replacements, we must minimize routine attrition of deployed units.
- Finally, we must stabilize the assignment of Soldiers and their families at home stations and communities across recurring rotations.

As any personnel manager would tell you, “This changes everything.” And so it should. Today’s individual Soldier and leader development programs, for example, do not accommodate force stabilization. They **will** change. Current command tour policies do not accommodate force stabilization. They **will** change. There have been many previous attempts to experiment with force stabilization, but those attempts always focused narrowly on only a **few** portions of **the** Army and invariably failed as a result. The Army **will** undertake a comprehensive policy redesign to stabilize the force.

## ADJUSTING THE TOTAL FORCE MIX

Changes in our Reserve Component organizations will match those in the Active component. Reserve Component forces are a vital part of the Army’s deployable combat power. The National Guard will continue to provide **strategic** and operational depth and flexibility; the Army Reserve **will still** reinforce the Army with **skill-rich** capabilities across the spectrum of operations. But with Reserve Component forces constituting an

indispensable portion of **our deployed landpower** in this protracted conflict, an **industrial-age** approach to mobilization no longer **will** suffice. The model will shift from “alert-mobilize-train-deploy” to “wain-alert-deploy.” Reserve Component mobilization must take less time and allow maximum mission time and more flexibility in managing individual and unit readiness, mobilization and demobilization, deployment and redeployment, and post-deployment recovery.



We **will** adjust the Active/Reserve mix so that Active component forces can execute the first 30 days of any deployment. For that purpose, some high-demand, low-density capabilities currently found only in the Reserve Components must be reincorporated in the active force. At the same time, while we **will** not expect Reserve Component units to deploy in the first 30 days, they **will** employ forces *within hours* for security operations within our homeland. As with the active forces, **the** need to build predictability into Reserve Component deployments will require increasing the proportion of high-demand, low-density units in the Reserve Components. Finally, the shift to rotation-based unit manning rather than individual replacement will apply **to** the Reserve Components also. As with the active forces, **therefore**, we must find a way to account for unit mobilization, training, and deployment with a **realistic personnel overhead account**.




## TRAINING AND EDUCATION

To change the mindset of an Army, few tools are as important as its programs of training and education. The U.S. Army has long set the standard across the world in its commitment to Soldier and leader development. This strong legacy is our fulcrum on which to leverage change. We train for certainty while educating for uncertainty. Today's conflict presents both.


**Individual Training.** The certainty confronting today's Soldiers is overseas deployment and probable combat. Some will enter combat within weeks or months of their basic and advanced individual training. Thrust into a conflict in which adversaries far outnumber their comrades, our Soldiers must believe and demonstrate that quality is more important than quantity, and that people are more important than hardware. On the battlefields we face, there are no front lines and no rear areas; there are no secure garrisons or convoys. Soldiers are warriors first, specialists second.

Therefore Soldier training will be stressful, beyond the comfort zone. We will adapt our

training programs to generate the stress necessary to change behavior and increase learning. Training will accurately represent the rigors and risks of combat. It will last longer than in the past and will put teams and Soldiers through the exhausting, challenging, and dangerous tasks of fighting. Soldiers will fight in body armor and will wear it in training. The safe handling of loaded firearms must be second nature, live-fire training routine. For a conflict of daunting ambiguity and complexity, training must imbue Soldiers with a fundamental joint and expeditionary mindset;



an attitude of multifunctionality rather than specialization, curiosity rather than complacency, and initiative rather than compliance. Above all, training must build the confidence that our Soldiers will prevail against any foe.



**It's in**  
Our Combat Training Centers (CTCs) drive the tactical culture of the Army. They are the lifeblood of our success over the past two decades. **It's in** that





every Army employment presumes a joint context, we will reinforce this key condition throughout our collective **training**.



Therefore we have begun introducing joint, interagency, and multinational components into our key training experiences at both the CTCs and our Battle Command Training Program for division and corps headquarters. We also support establishment of the Joint National Training Capability and have begun routinely incorporating joint effects in our home-station training. All these efforts will make Soldiers expert in the application of joint capabilities at every organizational level. At the same time, at both CTCs and home stations,

we have transformed training environments to reflect the more complex and ambiguous threats confronting our deployed forces. The ability to develop and disseminate actionable intelligence must be a key training focus.

Integrated with force stabilization cycles, CTC rotations will be the capstone experience for forces preparing to deploy. But the heart of the Army's training remains the training conducted at home stations by junior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). To empower them, we must shake a legacy of planning-centric rather than execution-centric training. We need battle drills rather than "rock drills," free play rather than scripted exercises, and Soldiers and units conditioned to seek out actionable intelligence rather than waiting passively to receive it.

**Professional Education.** Just as training must reflect the hard certainties of the conflict before us, individual Soldier and leader education must address its uncertainties. George C. Marshall once said that an Army at peace must go to school. Our **challenge** is to go to school while at war. The need to teach Soldiers and leaders *how to think* rather than *what to think* has never been clearer. To defeat adaptive enemies, we must **out-think them in order to out-fight them.**





Technology can enhance human capabilities, but at the end of the day, war remains more art than science, and its successful prosecution will require battle command more than battle management. We can have "perfect" knowledge with very "imperfect" understanding. Appreciation of context transforms knowledge to understanding, and only education can make that context accessible to us. Only education informed by experience will encourage Soldiers and leaders to meet the irreducible uncertainties of war with confidence, and to act decisively even when events fail to conform to planning assumptions and expectations.

As we improve leaders' skill and knowledge, we can rely more heavily on their artful application of leader knowledge and intuition. Planning will be iterative and collaborative rather than sequential and linear, more a framework for learning and action than a rigid template. Adapting our military decision making process will allow us to capitalize on the American Soldier's inherent versatility, our growing ability to acquire and process information, and the increased rapidity with which we can disseminate, coordinate, and transform planning adjustments into effective action.

To that end, the Army will continue to refocus institutional learning, shifting Center for Army Lessons Learned collection assets from the CTCs to deployed units. Similarly, recognizing that a learning organization cannot afford a culture of information ownership, we must streamline the flow of combat information to assure broader and faster dissemination of actionable intelligence.

At the individual level, finally, there is no substitute for experiential learning, and today's Army is the most operationally experienced Army in our history. There are tremendous opportunities to leverage experience through our



well-developed culture of After Action Reviews, Lessons Learned, the great experience of the serving officers and NCOs, and the links from joint and Army operational analyses to formal learning—distributed and in the classroom. At the same time, some of the best battlefield lessons result from tragic but honest mistakes. We cannot allow a zero-defects mentality to write off those who make such mistakes, and we will review our leader evaluation systems to ensure they are leader development tools and not mere management sorting tools.

**Leader Development.** The Army has always prized leader development, and in peacetime has been willing to accept some personnel turbulence to broaden career experience. That is not acceptable for an army at war. Effective collective training requires the participation of the entire team, and units are not merely training aids for commanders. If we are serious about developing more versatile junior leaders, we must avoid too rapid a turnover of those leaders in the name of career development.

The problem is somewhat less acute for middle- and senior-grade officers, whose fewer numbers in any case make greater assignment mobility unavoidable. Even in their case, however, the growing complexity and political sensitivity of joint and expeditionary operations urges leaders to seek assignments that inherently involve interpreting complex requirements and

implementing sophisticated solutions. Our legacy system of leader development will certainly evolve, with the alteration of some current career roadmaps or the accreditation of a greater variety of substitute experiences.



Just as we subordinate individual leader development to mission requirements, so too must we subordinate institutional leader development to joint requirements. Army training and education should produce imaginative staffs and commanders who understand how to interact with other service leaders and how to get the most out of the full set of joint capabilities. To produce leaders who reach instinctively beyond their own service for solutions to tactical and operational problems, Army leader development must routinely incorporate joint education and experience. In the end, we seek a bench of leaders able to think creatively at every level of war, and



able to operate with equal comfort in Army, joint, interagency, and multinational environments. And if achieving that requires submitting our internal educational institutions to joint oversight, we should not shrink from it.

## DOCTRINE, MATERIEL, AND SUSTAINMENT


**Doctrine.** The Army rightfully views itself as "doctrine-based." In the 1970s and 1980s, doctrine was the engine that transformed the post-Vietnam Army into the victor of our post-Cold War engagements. That doctrine, however, reflected the strategic environment dominated by a singular adversary, and an opposing army in symmetric contrast to our own. Although the challenge of developing doctrine for a joint and expeditionary environment is different, it is no less essential.

In any era, doctrine links theory, history, experimentation, and practice. It encapsulates a much larger body of knowledge and experience, providing an authoritative statement about how military forces do business and a common lexicon with which to describe it. As it has evolved since the Cold War, Army doctrine portrays military operations as a seamless and dynamic combination of offense, defense, stability, and support. Now we must extend it to address enemies who deliberately eschew predictable operating patterns.

To deal with such asymmetric opponents, doctrine must reflect the associated uncertainties. Uncertainty is in some measure inseparable from the nature of warfare. Asymmetry merely increases it. Doctrine cannot predict the precise nature and form of asymmetric engagements, but it can forecast the kinds of knowledge and organizational qualities necessary to cope with them.

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Such a doctrine, however, cannot simply prescribe solutions. Rather, it must furnish the intellectual tools with which to diagnose unexpected requirements, and a menu of practical options founded in experience from which leaders can create their own solutions quickly and effectively. Its objective must be to foster initiative and creative thinking. Such a doctrine is more playbook than textbook, and like any playbook, it is merely a gateway to decision, not a roadmap.



The U.S. military enjoys an immense array of capabilities that are useless if we overlook their prerequisites and limitations. Doctrine can help frame those capabilities in context, while not prescribing their rigid application in any given case. A doctrine intended for our emerging strategic context must underwrite flexible thought and action, and thereby assure the most creative

exploitation of our own asymmetric advantages. It must also account for the inherently joint character of all Army operations.

Most important in today's environment, doctrine must acknowledge the adaptive nature of a thinking, willful opponent and avoid both prediction and prescription. It is not the role of doctrine to predict how an adversary will behave. Rather, its function is to enable us to recognize that behavior, understand its vulnerabilities and our own, and suggest ways of exploiting the former and diminishing the latter. It will be useful only to the extent that experience confirms it, and its continuous review and timely amendment therefore is essential.



**Materiel.** Materiel development is a special challenge for an army at war, because we must not only anticipate and address future needs, we must meet pressing current demands. There is, however, a constant first priority: equipping the individual Soldier. In the past, the Army reserved the best individual equipment for units most likely to fight; in an expeditionary army, one cannot forecast such units. Every deployed Soldier needs the best individual equipment available. In an expeditionary environment, moreover, we can no longer continue to treat equipment as permanently owned by the units to which it is assigned. In a rotation-based force,



equipment ownership **will** be the exception. We will increasingly separate Soldiers from their carriers and equipment, tailoring the materiel **mix** for **the** mission at hand.

**Being** most amenable to adaptability, speed, and flexibility, aviation assets will be key to an expeditionary force. The lessons learned after two-and-a-half years of war have provided our Army the opportunity to reassess near-term aviation requirements. We will fundamentally restructure our aviation program to ensure the entire Army



aviation fleet remains a key tool of maneuver, with better command-and-control connectivity, manned-unmanned teaming, extended operational reach, and all-weather capability.

Equally vital is the continued development of more rapidly deployable **fighting** platforms. The Future Combat System (FCS) remains the materiel centerpiece of the Army's commitment to become more expeditionary, and will go far to reconciling deployability with sustainable combat power. We will remain a hybrid force for the foreseeable future, and we will seek ways to improve the deployability of the platforms we already own.

Meanwhile, neither current platforms nor the FCS will satisfy expeditionary requirements without significant improvement in the ability to develop actionable intelligence and increase communications bandwidth at corps level and below. The Army, together with the joint community, must relentlessly address the architectures, protocols, and systems of a redundant, nonterrestrial network capable of providing the focused bandwidth necessary to support mobile Battle Command and joint Blue Force tracking. Lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom continue to highlight the successes and potential of network-enabled operations. The operational advantages of shared situational awareness, enhanced speed of command, and the ability of forces to self-synchronize are powerful. In this light, we must change the paradigm in which we talk and think about the network; we must fight rather than manage the network, and operators must see themselves as engaged at all times, ensuring the health and operation of **this** critical weapons system.

logistical structure for operations in developed



theaters with access to an extensive host-nation infrastructure. Expeditionary operations promise neither. Simultaneity and complexity compound the eternal constraints of decreased time, vast distances, and limited resources, creating a pressing demand for a logistics system that capitalizes on service interdependencies. We must operationally link logistics support to maneuver in order to produce desired operational outcomes. We will only realize such “effects-based logistics capability” when all services fully embrace joint logistics, eliminate gaps in logistics functions, and reduce overlapping support. We require a distribution-based sustainment system that provides end-to-end visibility of and control over force-support operations; one that incorporates by design the versatility to shift logistical support smoothly among multiple lines of operation and rapidly changing support requirements.

At the tactical level, that means eliminating today’s layered support structure, instead bridging the distance from theater or regional support commands to brigade combat teams with modular, distribution-based capabilities packages. We intend to use the resources from current-day corps and division support commands (COSCOMs and DISCOMs) to create joint-capable Army Deployment and Sustainment Commands (ADSCs). These ADSCs will be capable of serving as the foundation for a joint logistics command and control element at the Joint Task Force (JTF), and capable also of simultaneously executing the full range of complex operations—from theater port opening to employment and sustainment—required in the emerging operational environment.

Finally, it is clear that the physical security traditionally associated with the rearward location of logistical facilities no longer can be assumed. On today’s battlefields and tomorrow’s, we must make explicit provision

for the protection of logistical installations and the lines of communication joining them to combat formations. And the Soldiers conducting sustainment operations must be armed, trained, and psychologically prepared to fight as well as support.

**Installations.** Installations are an integral part of the deployed force from home station to the foxhole. Operational deployments and rotational assignments across the globe mean installation capabilities will transcend more traditional expeditionary support requirements associated with mobilizing, deploying, and sustaining the force. More than a jump point for projecting forces, installations serve a fundamental role in minimizing their footprint through robust connectivity and capacity to fully support reach-back operations.

Installation facilities must readily adapt to changing mission support needs, spiraling technology, and rapid equipment fielding. Installation connectivity must also support en route mission planning and situational awareness. Education and family support will use the same installation mission support connectivity to sustain the morale and emotional needs of our Soldiers and their families.

## **BUILDING INTERDEPENDENCE**

Earlier we noted that our future is irrevocably joint. Interdependence is central to both the expeditionary mindset and campaign quality we seek. Achieving it is first a *conceptual* challenge, for all capabilities—not **only** materiel capabilities—spring from operational concepts. Joint operational concepts are emerging, and the Army has participated actively with its sister services in their creation, articulation, wargaming, and experimentation. This effort identifies five key joint and expeditionary interdependencies:



**Joint Battle Command.** Making the flexible supported-to-supporting relationships first attempted in Operation Iraqi Freedom routine will demand interoperable command-and-control mechanisms supported by comprehensive and redundant information networks. Effective joint intelligence, joint fires, blue force tracking, and logistical support all require agreement on the data definition, protocols and standards informing the design of those networks. Army contributions to Joint Forces Command's Joint Battle Management Command and Control (JBMC2) Transformation Roadmap will be essential to assure the Army's LandWarNet, the Air Force's C2 Constellation, and the Navy's ForceNet reflect those common standards.

**Joint Fires and Effects.** Interdependence of joint fires will be vital to mitigating risk and reducing reliance on organic fires in a joint expeditionary environment. Linked through an



effective joint command and control system, the American Soldier will have the entire target acquisition and engagement resources of the theater at his fingertips. All of our modular solutions depend on enabling even our smallest






combat formations to leverage joint fires through mechanisms such as “universal observers” or “joint effects control teams.” To facilitate more effective employment of close air support in a non-contiguous battlespace, we need universal standards for observation, designation and target acquisition. The Air Force has demonstrated increasing responsiveness in recent operations and has committed to a general officer-led Joint Force Air Component Command element at every Army corps exercise. Both the Army and the Air Force still have concerns, the Army for responsiveness and reliability, the Air Force for control and training demands. Their resolution will require cooperative adjustments by both services.

**Joint Force Projection.** The Army's dependence on its sister services is nowhere more obvious than in the area of mobility, both strategic and operational. We cannot wish away the laws of physics, but neither must we surrender to them. The solution of the Army's mobility challenges will require action by both the Army and its partners. For its part, the Army must continue to improve its inherent deployability. This remains the focus of major development programs such as Stryker, the Future Combat System, and numerous complementary systems, all of which are being designed to satisfy the space and weight limitations of our major tactical intra-theater lift capabilities. It also is a major objective of our tactical unit redesign.

For their part, the Navy and Air Force must resource strategic and operational lift as critical service competencies. Intra-theater lift will be especially crucial in a future conflict in which enemies may be able to obstruct or deny altogether the use of fixed entry points such as airfields and seaports. To overcome that challenge, we will need the ability through vertical envelopment to bypass those entry points with forces of operational significance, forces with the mobility,





lethality, and survivability that can maneuver to and defeat these integrated point defenses.

Current intra-theater lift assets do not have the range, payload, or operational profiles to support that requirement. Future lift assets will need all of them. We also share the Marine Corps' interest in the feasibility of deploying from a Sea Base. The Army supports the development of a joint Sea Base capability and looks forward to a cooperative effort to address the intra-theater lift challenge.

**Joint Air and Missile Defense.** The increasing range and speed of air and missile threats, and their potential ability to deliver weapons of mass destruction, place a high premium on the integration of service air and missile defenses. The ultimate objective is a joint system of complementary air defense kill mechanisms able to defeat mixed threats of varying complexity — the right amount and combination of effects at the right time and place without regard for their domain of origin.

This arena already enjoys considerable integration of service programs, most recently the merger

of Army and Marine Corps programs to defend against cruise missiles. Other collaborations already underway include Joint Airspace Control Procedures, Joint Identification Procedures, Joint Engagement Authority Procedures, and others. Common operational architectures will be key.

**Joint Sustainment.** All the services have key interdependencies in the logistics arena and will experience even more in an expeditionary environment. There is a pressing demand for a joint end-to-end logistics structure that permits reliable support of distributed operations in which deployment, employment, and sustainment are simultaneous.

At the theater level, in cases where the Army is the predominant service component, we are willing to transform our current Theater Support Commands into regional joint logistics commands subordinate to the regional combatant commander. If another service is the predominant component, that service's logistics organization could serve as the basis for a regional joint support command, with the Army contributing in its normal Title X/WEAR (wartime Executive Agency Requirement) role.

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## MOVING OUT


The changes ahead are significant. But they are neither reckless nor revolutionary. On the contrary, they reflect years of Army study, experimentation, and experience. We have delayed this transformation repeatedly, fearing that we could not afford such change in a time of turbulence and reduced resources. Now we realize that what we cannot afford is more delay. The 3rd Infantry Division is reorganizing today to a prototype redesign that converts its combat structure from three brigades to four brigade teams. Other divisions will soon follow.



The best way to anticipate the future is to create it. The Army is moving out and this is merely the beginning. Our incentive is not change for change's sake. Our incentive is effectiveness in this current conflict. If necessary to defeat an adaptive enemy, the changes described here are a mere low payment on changes that will follow.

Our challenge is to move forward, not against others, but against our own potential. It is not enough that we are *changing*. The real question is, "Are we changing enough?" Our

brave Soldiers and adaptive leaders constitute the best Army in the world, but we can be even better. It is inside of us and it is what the Nation expects. The future as we know it—our lives, the lives of our families, this country, everything we love and cherish—all depend on our success in meeting this challenge. *Are you wearing your dog tags?*





# ***The Army Combat Uniform***

On June 14, 2004, the Army announced the selection of the new Army Combat Uniform (ACU).

The ACU is the culmination of many months of research and development, developed by Soldiers for Soldiers, and is the uniform of choice by the overwhelming majority of the Army's leaders and Soldiers.

The ACU consists of a jacket, trousers, patrol cap, moisture wicking t-shirt and improved hot weather and temperate weather desert boots, in a new Universal Camouflage pattern.

The ACU enhances Soldier performance by providing a uniform that is tailorable to the individual mission; provides enhanced functionality and ergonomics over the existing Battle Dress Uniform (BDU); and does away with requirements to procure uniforms focused on specific environments—the ACU is worldwide deployable.

The uniform will replace multiple versions of the current woodland pattern BDU and will be easy to maintain, thereby decreasing the out-of-pocket costs to our Soldiers.

The uniform will be fielded to deploying units starting in April 2005, and fielding to the entire Army is expected to be completed by December 2007.

The Army Black Beret will remain authorized for wear with the new ACU; no decision has been made concerning whether the ACU will replace any uniform other than the BDU.

The ACU, including component materials, will be manufactured in the United States using the same industrial base that produces the current BDU.

The ACU is part of the Army's continuing effort to equip the Army's Current Force today with Future Force capabilities and to provide America's Most Deployed Combat System, our Soldiers, the best, state-of-the-art equipment.

If you have any questions, please contact Lieutenant Colonel Craig Collier, Army Legislative Liaison, (703) 697-4418.

11-L-0559/OSD/42219

# The Soldier's Creed

I am an American Soldier.

I am a Warrior and a member of a team. I serve the people of the United States and live the Army Values.

**I WILL ALWAYS PLACE THE MISSION FIRST.**

**I WILL NEVER ACCEPT DEFEAT.**

**I WILL NEVER QUIT.**

**I WILL NEVER LEAVE A FALLEN COMRADE.**

I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my Warrior tasks and drills. I always maintain my arms, my equipment and myself.

I am an expert and I am a professional.

I stand ready to deploy, engage and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat.

I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life

I am an American Soldier.

Army Strategic Communications  
Room 3B548, Pentagon  
Washington, D.C.  
703-693-5962  
[www.army.mil](http://www.army.mil)



U.S. ARMY

JUN 21 2004

TO: Honorable Colin Powell  
CC: Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*  
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan

Attached is a report from Freedom House that gives Uzbekistan decent marks for some things they are doing.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Freedom House report

DHR:dh  
061804-5

UZBEKISTAN

21 Jun 04

OSD 09220-04

Tashkent, Uzbekistan  
June 1, 2004

Report by Amb. Vic  
Jackovich (ret.) for  
Freedom House

**THE SHELKOVENKO CASE IN UZBEKISTAN:  
Mission Accomplished -- Lessons Learned**

*Introduction and Summary*

I was part of a three-person group invited by the non-governmental organization (NGO) Freedom House to travel urgently to Tashkent, Uzbekistan in order to look into the case of an Uzbek detainee, Andrey Yur'yevich Shelkovenko, who had died on May 19, 2004, while in Uzbek police custody. The others in the group were Dr. Michael Pollanen, Forensic Pathologist in the Office of the Chief Coroner of the Province of Ontario, Canada, and Mr. James Gannon, Deputy Chief of the Cold Case Unit in the Office of the Prosecutor in Morristown, New Jersey.

Our group's mission was to serve as international observers while the Uzbek government conducted what turned out to be a rather thorough and systematic review of the case. Two NGOs, Freedom House and Human Rights Watch, had been asked by the Uzbek government to participate in the observational mission. By Presidential decree, the government also established its own review commission, comprised of six Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Justice officials. Uzbek authorities in effect re-opened this case and their full investigation is still ongoing.

Dr. Pollanen and I arrived in Tashkent in the early morning and Mr. Gannon later in the evening of Thursday, May 27.

In the end, we determined that all the available evidence indicated that Shelkovenko had committed suicide by hanging and that the Uzbek authorities detaining him were not guilty of maltreatment, abuse, or torture. We determined further that early reports of torture-related injuries were understandable misinterpretations of changes that occur in bodies after death, such as decomposition.

Beyond this, we discovered that the Shelkovenko case presented an opportunity to develop a check-list of "lessons learned" and recommendations for all involved – Uzbek and international entities– and for various levels – technical and political.

## *Autopsy Review*

Early in the morning of May 27, Pollanen and I sat with representatives of both NGOs, Freedom House and Human Rights Watch, and surveyed computerized photos taken by HRW. We listened to HRW staffers relate how they had first been called by the deceased's family members to look at the body and how they had offered them solace. HRW's initial work provided invaluable first-hand reporting of details. Upon reviewing the photos, Pollanen made a tentative preliminary judgment that the deceased had probably hanged himself and had not been abused by the police.

Later that morning, the body was visited at the city morgue by a delegation consisting of Dr. Pollanen and myself, as well as Uzbek government commission members, Uzbek medical experts, representatives of both NGOs and the immediate family (mother, sister and wife). After the body was positively identified by the sister, it was transported to another part of the city, where a second autopsy was performed by Uzbek specialists and observed directly by Dr. Pollanen.

At the second site, officials from the General Prosecutor's office did not immediately accede to getting started. The entire procedure had been arranged in advance through Uzbek government agencies, and the requisite documents obtained by the two NGOs from the government and the family of the deceased. Nevertheless, the General Prosecutor's representatives now wanted to be shown an additional letter from the mother detailing what new questions the second autopsy should investigate. Through on-the-spot negotiation, this demand was rescinded. (This could also have been a misunderstanding. In Uzbek tradition, if not law, autopsies are commissioned by relevant authorities with a list of questions the autopsy is expected to answer.)

The second autopsy was very thorough and lasted several hours. From the international side, only Dr. Pollanen attended. This was arranged by design in order to limit this event to a strictly specialist level, thus permitting free technical discussion among professionals. Pollanen was initially told he could not photograph the body, but this disinclination was reversed when he offered to share all his information and photo disks with the Uzbeks. The Uzbeks themselves did extensive still photography and video taping of the U.S. delegation visit to the second autopsy site.

Two findings were made during the second autopsy. First, all the available evidence indicated that this was suicide by hanging. Second, there was no physical evidence of mistreatment, abuse, or torture. Pollanen determined further that early reports of torture-related injuries were understandable misinterpretations of changes that occur in bodies after death, such as decomposition.

The first autopsy had apparently set out to prove suicide by hanging, but not to disprove other possibilities. Consequently, some routine steps had been omitted, an oversight readily recognized and acknowledged by higher-ranking Uzbek medical specialists at the second autopsy. In contrast, the second autopsy performed a full range of forensic procedures, essentially filling in the previous blanks.

At the conclusion of the second autopsy, our group, U.S. Embassy staffers, Uzbek commission members and Uzbek medical specialists (minus the Human Rights Watch NGO and the family, who had not proceeded beyond the morgue) met and discussed next steps. It was agreed that the hanging ligature would be brought to the site for analysis and that the members of our group would then retire to confer among ourselves. (The head Uzbek medical specialist wanted to announce joint findings already at this juncture, but this was aborted when it was explained that this would be premature.)

Arrangements were made for the family to retrieve the body of the deceased from the second autopsy site and to transport it to the deceased's domicile for internment.

### *Investigative Review/Press Conference*

The following morning, Friday, May 28, the three members of the group met to review developments and outline future strategy. (Gannon had arrived the previous evening, so this was the first time the entire three-person group had met together.) Gannon and Pollanen spent most of this day about one hour's drive from downtown Tashkent at the Gazalkent prison facility, where Shelkovenko had died. There Gannon observed Uzbek authorities conducting a review of criminal investigative and detention aspects of the case.

In his inspections and interviews, Gannon determined that the jail cell and its environs were compatible with the proposition of suicide by hanging. He had access to all relevant evidence at the crime scene, though some related materials were not immediately available and were promised at a later date.

The police recounted testimony of Shelkovenko's cell-mates, whom they cited as saying the deceased had been anxious because he had implicated accomplices in the murder case for which he was charged and because he feared reprisals from these accomplices. The police also provided Gannon a "booking photo" of Shelkovenko, which they said had been taken on May 18, one day before his death. The photo is the head shot of a middle-aged man with a seemingly normal visage and no signs of bruises or injuries. Shelkovenko had reportedly been shuttled back and forth between a temporary lock-up and a more permanent cell because of ongoing investigations into other crimes (thefts) for which he was being investigated.

In general, Gannon found his investigator counterparts to be friendly and cooperative. The Tashkent and Gazalkent Chiefs of Police themselves also attended. In consulting later with our group, Gannon stressed that he was observing Uzbek procedures and that he was evaluating evidentiary material and testimony provided by the Uzbek police, since it was not in the group's mandate to conduct an independent investigation. Through a Freedom House intermediary, the group dispatched a list of additional documents and evidentiary materials requested for observation. (These were made available the next day, as recounted below.)

During this day (May 28), I stayed behind in Tashkent in order to provide a detailed report of proceedings thus far to the U.S. Ambassador and to participate in a press conference at Freedom House. Though the press event was organized around a different human rights subject, journalists were expected to bring up the Shelkovenko case. When this indeed happened, I was introduced from the periphery to give a preliminary presentation.

At the press conference, I described the make-up and mission of our group and stressed we were observing reviews being conducted by Uzbek authorities and not undertaking an independent investigation. I said it was premature as yet to announce even preliminary observations. I expressed the group's gratitude to the Uzbek government, to the family of the deceased (to whom I also conveyed our deepest condolences) and to Freedom House. Finally, I commended the Uzbek government for its openness and cooperation during this process and expressed the hope that this would lead to greater cooperation in the future between the Uzbek government and the international community on issues of mutual concern, like human rights.

#### *Further Investigation/Meeting with Family*

On Saturday, May 29, the group met with the deceased's mother and sister, who had been brought to Freedom House offices in Tashkent. It was clear from the outset that the family members had expected to hear a conclusion that would confirm their suspicions of maltreatment and torture.

But Dr. Pollanen explained that all of the body features he had seen were consistent with natural post-mortem changes in the corpse. He said that the deceased had, from all available evidence, died by hanging and that there were no indications of maltreatment prior to that. He also provided a comprehensive survey of all the details of the second autopsy he had monitored.

The family members were grateful for the detailed explanation, but remained skeptical on certain points, such as place and circumstances of death. The mother especially found suicide a difficult scenario to accept and wondered whether her son had been forced to hang himself. Pollanen noted that there were no forensic signs that Shelkovenko had struggled against the hanging.

Later that evening, the group was invited to the General Prosecutor's office in Tashkent. There the set of additional documents – that had been requested earlier as a result of the first examination of the jail cell and environs in Gazalkent – were reviewed by the group, especially by Gannon in his capacity as a criminal investigator.

The additional documents conformed with the scenario of the arrest and detention of Shelkovenko, and his later death by hanging at the Gazalkent jail. Reports of the jailers, depositions from cellmates, ambulance logs and medical reports were all perused by the group.



### *Uzbek Commission/Final Press Conference*

On May 31, after a brief perusal of documentation concerning the mother's complaints against the police and the official responses to these complaints, the group held a final meeting with the Uzbek commission named to conduct the review of the Shelkovenko case.

During the final meeting between our group and the Uzbek commission, we provided a summary of our observations, as well as our confirmation of Uzbek contentions that Shelkovenko had hanged himself and not been abused or tortured. Pollanen and Gannon gave detailed reports of forensic and investigative observations, while I provided a check-list of "lessons learned" and recommendations.

Freedom House Tashkent Director Mjusa Sever expressed her satisfaction that a new level of cooperation had apparently been achieved. But she told the Deputy General Prosecutor that his office should be more open to international queries and promised him that there would be more such cases in the future. Sever said she was concerned that the Shelkovenko family not become the target of officially inspired pressure or intimidation.

The commission chairman, the Uzbek Deputy General Prosecutor, said that respect for human rights was a priority for his office and pledged to take our recommendations under serious consideration. He cautioned that Uzbekistan was a new state and that democratization was still an ongoing process. He acknowledged that Uzbek legislation was gradually developing toward greater protection of individual citizens' rights.

At a final Freedom House press conference at the Hotel Radisson in Tashkent, our group was introduced to an audience of about 50 journalists, foreign representatives and others. We then announced summaries of our final observations. Copies of those summaries were distributed at the event to all attendees.

At the press conference, some journalists and foreign representatives took the opportunity to pose questions and seek clarifications. They were especially keen to discover details about the forensic finding of suicide by hanging and lack of physical evidence of torture. Very quickly, the questioning turned from this particular case to the general human rights situation in Uzbekistan. Though this broader scope did not fall within the mandate of our mission, I did note that there were legitimate concerns in the international community about this and that there was recognition by the Uzbek government of the need for improvement and for implementing new procedures. News from the press conference was carried extensively by domestic Uzbek media and to some extent by international media.

## *The Role of Human Rights Watch*

In my pre-departure briefing at Freedom House headquarters in Washington, I was told that a fellow NGO, Human Rights Watch, was a partner in this mission. It was HRW that reportedly had had first contact with the Shelkovenko family and had assisted the family in making early assessments of the body's condition, photographing it and even moving it from place to place to ensure it was preserved and not interned. Both HRW and Freedom House had been invited by the Uzbek government to observe the Uzbek re-investigation of the case.

HRW staffers provided our group its first in-depth briefing on the case and showed digital photographs they had taken. But as soon as they learned that our preliminary observation assessed that this was probably a hanging and that torture was not involved, they expressed surprise and effectively withdrew from the mission. I had the impression that HRW had prejudged the outcome. That was reinforced by a press statement issued by HRW's Asia Bureau in London already May 21, in which HRW had declared – prematurely and inaccurately, as it turned out – that this was a case of Uzbek government-sponsored torture. This press statement pointedly linked the Shelkovenko case to the issue of whether U.S. government aid should be continued to Uzbekistan.

On May 28 and 29, I had two phone calls with the HRW chief in Tashkent in which I urged her organization to maintain a presence in our activities, and recalled that I had been told they were partners in this mission. HRW staffers had accompanied the family to the morgue the morning of May 27 for identification of the corpse, but were not seen again until the May 31 Commission meeting and press conference. At these two events, they did not participate, but only attended.

It was difficult to escape the impression that HRW lost interest in the Shelkovenko case as soon as it became clear that our mission's observations would not demonstrate Uzbek government culpability for human rights violations. Certainly, its instantaneous dissociation from Freedom House and from this mission was unannounced and unexpected.

At the May 31 press conference, I publicly recommended – without naming HRW – that organizations that had issued premature erroneous statements on this case demonstrate their seriousness and professionalism by issuing retractions or corrections.

On June 1, HRW posted a correction on its Internet website alongside the May 21 statement.

## *Lessons Learned and Recommendations*

During the course of observing this case, the three members of our group assessed that there are numerous “lessons learned” and recommendations that could be deduced from the experience.

In effect, the Shelkovenko tragedy seemed to present a wealth of opportunities that could, if exploited, enhance human rights standards in the country, assist in deepening domestic reforms and strengthen relations and confidence between Uzbekistan and the international community.

While numerous international missions have offered recommendations on this general subject, we do not believe our check-list substantially diverges from those of others and it might even provide useful additional dimensions. Recommendations intended for Uzbek authorities are offered in the spirit of mutual cooperation and full respect for the Uzbek government and the sovereignty of the state. In the end, it is for Uzbek authorities to determine whether these recommendations correspond to their interests and can be implemented.

The following is a list of the primary “lessons learned” and recommendations from this mission, for both Uzbek and international entities (governments and NGOs). While the first several “lessons” are aimed at the “quick fix” technical level, several others are intended for the longer-term policy level. And, while many of the “lessons” and recommendations are intended for the Uzbek government, some others pertain to the international community.

- *Preserving physical evidence.* Authorities need to move quickly and expeditiously to identify, seize and preserve all possible items of physical evidence. In this case, this would have included the ligature used for hanging (which, in fact, was quickly secured), as well as the detainee’s clothing and belongings, incidental objects and all other physical items in the vicinity.
- *Maintaining separation between examination and autopsy.* It is apparently common practice in Uzbekistan for the same medical specialist to perform a routine medical examination during life and an autopsy on the same body after death. In order to avoid the appearance of irregularity, Uzbek authorities can consider the utility of dividing these functions.
- *Integrating efforts.* The professional integrity of the forensic autopsy should stand alone, as should the contribution of investigative and other efforts. That said, an integrated final approach, rather than a compartmentalized one, would call for multi-disciplinary information sharing and would likely lead to more productive results.
- *Protocol on ‘death in custody.’* In Uzbek law, there is as yet no special protocol, or regulated procedure, for investigating the death of someone in police custody. Instead, such a death is given the same treatment as any homicide. Given the special circumstances and sensitivities involved, Uzbek authorities might consider introducing a new protocol on ‘death in custody.’

- *Creating a record.* Authorities need to create a thorough and immediate documentary record of a crime scene, including a log of events, interviews with relevant people involved and a full photographic record. In the Shelkovenko case, many interviews were conducted several days after the death, possibly in reaction to public attention to the incident.
- *Demonstrating full transparency.* In general, authorities need to conduct procedures that demonstrate full transparency vis-à-vis the public, other agencies of government, the media and the international community. This is above all a matter of instilling confidence in the people that government agencies are conducting themselves in a straightforward, professional and efficient manner.
- *Conducting a complete autopsy.* Forensic medical experts should ensure that complete postmortem examinations are performed on all deaths in police custody, including dissection of the neck. It is also important to perform supplementary dissections to effectively demonstrate the absence of significant findings, such as lack of injuries associated with torture.
- *Ensuring complete reviews.* In general, it is important that authorities conduct thorough and professional reviews, and to do so with an eye toward the public character of many of their actions, vis-à-vis both domestic and international public opinions. In the Shelkovenko case, Uzbek investigating authorities sought to prove a suicide by hanging, but did not find it necessary in their view to disprove public or on-the-street suspicions about maltreatment or torture. Shaping activities in a way that facilitates the government's communicating with the people would seem to be an important priority.
- *Inviting outside observers.* Authorities can often enhance the credibility of and confidence in its own findings by inviting professional international participation or observation at an early stage. The Shelkovenko case presents the international community with a rare opportunity to support the thrust of the Uzbek government's original findings, thus providing a basis for enhanced public support for reform-oriented government actions.
- *Accepting the citizen's right to question.* Authorities can demonstrate maturity by accepting that individual citizens, families and public associations have an inherent right to discuss decisions by a government. For this reason, government authorities should refrain from reprisals against those who first questioned these decisions.
- *Accepting the government's right to govern.* Citizens, families and associations bringing government decisions to the attention of the international community can demonstrate corresponding maturity by understanding the need for closure through final decisions by their own governments. Though they may not agree with the government's action, and may have even suffered property or other loss because of it, any society will sense a need for closure and movement forward. (Again, on the government side, this tension can be alleviated through pro-active public information mechanisms, respect for citizens' rights and mechanisms designed to demonstrate government responsiveness to citizens' interests.)
- *Enhancing inter-agency coordination.* Better inter-agency coordination among government agencies can lead to a more cohesive approach and more productive result. In the Shelkovenko case, while high-level Uzbek officials probably sensed

that a de facto exoneration of their government was in the offing, lower-level officials were likely not made aware of this and sometimes assumed defensive even stone-walling postures.

- *Communicating with the public.* Both Uzbek authorities and the international community need to ensure that public information is provided objectively and expeditiously, both to media outlets and to the general public. This can be accomplished through various means, including timely press conferences, public statements, special briefings, etc. Above all, perhaps, the Shelkovenko case once again points up the need for a pro-active Uzbek government public information program, including training of government agency spokespersons.
- *Gathering the facts first.* As a "lesson learned" for NGOs and the international community, public statements should be handled with seriousness and professionalism. At the least, relevant information and facts should be gathered and analyzed prior to the issuance of public statements. In this case, Human Rights Watch, one of the two NGOs originally engaged, prematurely (and inaccurately, as it turned out) declared this to be an example of torture by Uzbek authorities. After the results of our mission were announced, HRW posted a correction on its Internet website alongside the erroneous declaration.
- *Correcting misstatements.* Of course, any corrective actions taken by the international community should be brought to the attention of the host government, thus serving to ensure the government of the best intentions of the international community, and demonstrating objectivity and transparency in its own actions. The U.S. Embassy (Press Office) can assist, if not through a public statement of its own, then by informally contacting media outlets to help set the record straight. On the part of the major media and wire services, this presumes their willingness to acknowledge and publish corrections.
- *Following through with objectivity and transparency.* International organizations, once having launched inquiries into events in the country, need to see their actions through to the end, regardless of the consequences. In this case, Human Rights Watch was one of two prime NGO movers behind the international inquiry into the Shelkovenko case. But, as soon as HRW learned that its early presumption (and public declaration) of Uzbek official culpability was incorrect, it effectively withdrew participation in the case. This withdrawal has not only impacted on HRW's credibility in Uzbekistan and worldwide, but on the credibility of the international community in Uzbekistan. It also tends to reinforce the darkest suspicions of some Uzbek officials that the international community is arrayed against them and is not interested in giving them an objective opportunity.
- *Helping the citizenry.* NGOs with a publicly declared interest in assisting the citizens of foreign countries in which they operate should recognize responsibility for results of actions taken. In this case, given the post-mortem condition of the body, the Shelkovenko family could not have been faulted for believing initially that their son's death was irregular. Because of the final outcome of this case and because of the family's alliance with foreign NGOs in the country, however, the family is arguably now in a very difficult position vis-à-vis the Uzbek government and Uzbek society. The NGOs involved with this family will have to decide for themselves to what extent they are responsible for the family's ongoing welfare.

In the future, greater sensitivity needs to be shown by NGOs toward the Uzbek citizenry, especially in understanding their vulnerabilities and long-term interests.

- *Setting up a human rights group.* The Uzbek government and international entities should consider using the experience of the Shelkovenko case to institutionalize a human rights monitoring group that would consist of a small group of representatives from Uzbek government agencies, local NGOs and embassies. The group could routinely review selected cases with an eye to applying a cohesive approach to instances such as the Shelkovenko case. In the end, such a group could greatly enhance mutual confidence-building, strengthen the reform process in government and enhance human rights standards. (Alternatively, the Uzbek government could consider expanding the mandate of the special commission established for the Shelkovenko case.)
- *Providing in-depth special briefings.* Given the notoriety of the case, our group offered to make itself available for in-depth special briefings to selected audiences in Uzbekistan and elsewhere, including Uzbek institutions, institutions of other governments (especially the U.S. government) and international organizations. In this connection, we have offered through Freedom House to provide a series of briefings in Washington, including to the Department of State, institutions dealing with Central Asian affairs, human rights activists and U.S. Congress. This would provide opportunities for discussion of details not appropriate in public settings. The group could provide objective information on recent developments in Uzbekistan to Washington policymakers. The "lessons learned" check-list – or parts of it, depending on the audience – could also be included in the briefings.
- *Introducing forensic and investigative primers for USG officials.* Both the forensic pathologist and the criminal investigator offered to hold training sessions at the U.S. Embassy for local U.S. officials interested in gaining a quick primer to help with future human rights cases. In this connection, both also offered to hold similar sessions with non-U.S. international representatives in Uzbekistan. Finally, the group recommends to the Department of State's Foreign Service Institute (FSI) that a course be introduced there for U.S. foreign service personnel assigned to human rights portfolios in embassies abroad.
- *Increasing training and exchanges.* In the opinion of the group, the Shelkovenko case provides the Uzbek government and the international community with an additional stimulus for training programs and professional exchanges on various levels. Through U.S. government-sponsored and other international programs, the opportunity is presented for further professional interchange among government policymakers, forensic pathologists, criminal investigators, police officials and human rights activists.

~~[Detailed technical reports will be submitted separately by Pollanen and Gannon.]~~

~~[Recommended that the U.S. Ambassador transmit letters of commendation on behalf of both Pollanen and Gannon.]~~

Victor Jackovich  
Ambassador (ret.)  
President, Jackovich International, LLC  
Vice President Ervin Technical Associates - ETA  
(b)(6) (Washington office)  
(U.S. mobile)  
(b)(6) (European mobile)

Special Asst. \_\_\_\_\_

Bearsky \_\_\_\_\_

# CB-FILE COPY

EF-8373

February 2  
January 30, 2004

I-04/001270

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT TSG and Terrorism and Battle of Ideas

Do we have the theater security cooperation group focusing on terrorism and the battle of ideas?

Thanks.

DHR.db  
013004-1

.....  
Please respond by 2/4/04

**COMPLETED**

FEB 11 2004

OSD 09227-04

000

Flacey



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000



INFO MEMO

February 10, 2004  
1-04/001270  
EF-7566

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary Of Defense for Policy

*Handwritten signature of Douglas J. Feith*  
DOUSA

SUBJECT: DoD Security Cooperation and Battle of Ideas (U)

- (U) The DoD Security Cooperation Guidance is under review. Combatting Terrorism remains the most important theme, with particular emphasis placed on using Security Cooperation activities to support waging the battle of ideas.
- (U) We anticipate providing you a coordinated draft of the Security Cooperation Guidance within a month.

Prepared by: Andy Hoehn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy)

(b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



11-L-0559/OSD/42234

720  
CLOSE HOLD

January 30, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Les Brownlee  
Gen. Pete Schoomaker  
Dov Zakheim

CC: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Financing Army Force Levels

As I indicated to Pete Schoomaker before he met with the President and before he met with the House Armed Services Committee, it is important that all of us are precise in what we say about all aspects of the Army force level and transformation proposals.

Specifically, people should avoid talking about financing the Army plan in any way that appears certain, because we do not have certainty yet. We need to achieve certainty. We need to bring to closure an understanding with Josh Bolten as soon as possible.

My clear, current understanding with Les Brownlee, Pete Schoomaker, Andy Card and the President is as follows:

- DoD believes the FY04 Supplemental will enable us to pay for the costs of this program to be incurred by the Army for FY04.
- DoD will recommend to OMB and the President that we finance the Army's costs for this program for FY05 through an '05 Supplemental, which we anticipate will be introduced in January or February 2005.
- The question about FY06 and FY07 funding is open. It will depend on the President and Congress determining what aspects of the modernization and transformation of the force that we will be undertaking can be characterized as "resetting" or "reconstituting the force" in the wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom. DoD's view is that all of it, or a very large portion of it, should be so considered, as was the case for two or three years after Desert Storm. It takes that long to reset.

CLOSE HOLD

OSD 09223-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42235

381

30 Jan 04

CLOSE HOLD

- With respect to any costs that go beyond that period, and/or which are not approved in a supplemental, DoD may have to use any funds that we decide should be so allocated out of the inflation-plus \$10 billion we are scheduled to receive each year for the FYDP. Unfortunately, we can probably anticipate that the plus \$10 billion could only be \$4 or 5 billion if the Congress continues to add still more benefits and entitlements that are not requested.
- To the extent none of the above succeeds, the funding obviously will have to come from the Army through savings in other areas, which would be very painful to their procurement account.
- Finally, the other agreement I have with the Army and the President is that, at this time, we have agreed to increase from 33 to only **43** brigades — not to 48 brigades — and to delay a decision on the **5** additional brigades until we are close to the agreed-upon off ramp. So, this is a two-part plan. First, ramp up to 43 transformed brigades. Second, at the appropriate time, decide whether or not to continue to build from 43 to 48 brigades.
- We must all be careful to not create inaccurate impressions on the Hill or with the Press. We need to make sure we speak with precision and clarity and all say the same things in the same way.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012904-14

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_



January 30, 2004

TO: Josh Bolten  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Financing Army Force Levels

Josh—

Attached is a memo I have just sent out to our folks. I think it conforms to our brief discussion on the subject and the discussion I had with the President.

Please let me know if you are comfortable with it. If not, I will fix it.

Regards,

**Attach.**  
1/30/04 SecDef memo re: Financing Army Force Levels

DHR:dh  
013004-6

185

OSD 09229-04

CLOSE HOLD

January 30, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Les Brownlee  
Gen. Pete Schoomaker  
Dov Zakheim

cc: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Financing Army Force Levels

As I indicated to Pete Schoomaker before he met with the President and before he met with the House Armed Services Committee, it is important that all of us are precise in what we say about all aspects of the Army force level **and** transformation proposals.

Specifically, people should avoid talking about financing the Army plan in any way that appears certain, because we do not have certainty yet. We need to achieve certainty. We need to bring to closure an understanding with Josh Bolten as soon as possible.

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- The question about FY06 and FY07 funding is open. It will depend on the President and Congress determining what aspects of the modernization and transformation of the force that we will be undertaking can be characterized as "resetting" or "reconstituting the force" in the wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom. DoD's view is that all of it, or a very large portion of it, should be so considered, as was the case for two or three years after Desert Storm. It takes that long to reset.

CLOSE HOLD

OSD 09228-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42238

CLOSE HOLD

- With respect to any costs that go beyond that period, and/or which are not approved in a supplemental, DoD may have to use any funds that we decide should be so allocated out of the inflation-plus \$10 billion we are scheduled to receive each year for the FYDP. Unfortunately, we can probably anticipate that the plus \$10 billion could only be \$4 or \$5 billion if the Congress continues to add still more benefits and entitlements that are not requested.
- To the extent none of the above succeeds, the funding obviously will have to come from the Army through savings in other areas, which would be very painful to their procurement account.
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- We must all be careful to not create inaccurate impressions on the Hill or with the Press. We need to make sure we speak with precision and clarity and all say the same things in the same way.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012904-14

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

February 2, 2004

TO: Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Note from Mel Laird

326

Here is a note from Mel Laird on the subject that he would like to talk to you about.

Thanks.

Attach.  
24-30 January 2004 DoD Iraqi Transition Strategic Assessment Teams' Weekly Update

DHR:dh  
013004-12



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

cc: Cathy Jones-2/2  
SC

OSD 09230-04

2 Feb 04



To Sec. Rumsfeld 703-693-0100  
From Mel Laird — 1 of 3 pages —

I don't have study  
I referred to this afternoon  
here in Florida. I'll see  
it gets over when I return  
to Washington Tuesday.  
The note to Jack R Vessey  
I mentioned is forwarded  
as promised.

Wanted to talk to  
you !!

Regards  
Mel



FROM : LAIRD  
JAN 7 2004 17:43 FROM: KATHY WEAVER

PHONE NO. : (b)(6)  
(b)(6)

TO : (b)(6) Jan. 30 2004 06:53PM P2  
P.1

293

Melvin R. Laird  
1730 Rhode Island Avenue, NW  
Suite 212  
Washington, D.C. 20036

January 8, 2004

Dear Jack:

Carole and I appreciated receiving the Christmas card and note from Avis and you. The note of praise and support for our troops in 2004 is something I'd like to talk with you privately about at the time of the Alfalfa Club dinner later this month.

The All-Volunteer Service will work well in connection with our Total Force Concept, *only if* the commitment of Regular Forces around the world is properly planned. *With our* country's commitment of Regular Forces, as of January 1, 2004, another 175,000 in Army personnel is needed to ensure proper rotation if we continue present deployments around the world. We can count on using Reserve and Guard Forces on the planning basis of eight months active duty when called for regular duty in each two-year period. We will have no problems recruiting either Regular, Reserve, or Guard Forces if we remember the "quality of life" we must maintain for our service personnel and for their families. Most Americans have no idea of the commitments made by the Guard and Reserve in our present deployment. We *still* have not gotten our service personnel up to the pay scales of policemen, firemen, and many others, which *are* falling behind even with *the* most recent pay increases. Pay is still important, but other considerations must also be taken into account. I recently served on Secretary Rumsfeld's Commission to select the proper tribute to the men and women we lost in the September 11 attack on the Pentagon. When we compare the million dollar award to some of the families who suffered in the attacks in Washington and New York, with the losses of the families of our men and women on active duty every day, it does cause some of these families (if not our troops) to wonder. All these losses are truly mourned.

The Army has to speak out on this manpower problem if we are to meet all requests around the globe. Some in civilian leadership have the opinion that manpower commitments around the world can be filled by our Total Forces with no respect to the number of men and women in the Regular Forces.

11-L-0559/OSD/42242

FROM : LAIRD

PHONE NO. (b)(6)  
(b)(6)

Jan. 30 2004 06:54PM P3  
TO: (b)(6) P.2

3 of 3

General John W. Vessey, Jr. (USA, Ret.)  
January 8, 2004  
Page Two

I have argued this point with Rummy, but he still insists no more manpower end strength is needed. I'll talk with him again next week. I am proud of our All-Volunteer Force and the Total Force Concept, which I initiated, but we just can't take it for granted.

With best wishes and kindest personal regards, I am

Sincerely,



Melvin R. Laird

General John W. Vessey, Jr. (USA, Ret.)

(b)(6)

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 31, 2004

SUBJECT: **Follow Up From Our 9/11 Commission's Meeting on 1/30/04**

1. Haynes will get the quotes from the Woodward book and the other book where Shelton was quoted.
2. Haynes is supposed to get the veto letter.
3. Cambone will send them the Cohen list – show it to me before it goes.
4. Larry will find the “Major Directions” paper.
5. You will give me three pieces of paper showing precisely:
  - What we did on terrorism and Homeland Security pre-9/11;
  - What I did on 9/11; and
  - What we have done on terrorism and Homeland Security post-9/11.

*000.5*

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
013104.05

Respond by:           2/13/04          

OSD 09231-04

*31 Jan 04*

TO: LTG John Craddock  
Larry Di Rita

cc: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 31, 2004

SUBJECT: **Calendar**

I need an appointment with Dan Dell'Orto and I want to see physically what shows up on the federal register and how we can get it right. This is confusing and I don't know the answer.

OSD

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
103104.10

Respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ *2/10/04* *DB*  
*315*

*Cathy:*  
*Schedule week he comes back from*  
*TRIP.*  
*J.*

122  
1803



OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600

21 PM 2:18



INFO MEMO

October 20, 2003, 10 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dan Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

SUBJECT: SecDef Gifts

- This responds to your note to me of October 15, 2003, regarding whether gifts that you accept are published. (Tab A) You also asked to see what such publications look like.
- Gifts of more than minimal value that federal employees accept from foreign governments are itemized and published annually in the Federal Register through the Department of State in accordance with the Foreign Gifts Act. Other gifts are not published. Minimal value is currently set by regulation at \$285.00.
- At Tab B is the latest notice published in the Federal Register for applicable foreign gifts accepted in 2002. The section showing gifts that you and others in DoD accepted is flagged for you starting at page 37260.
- Gifts are reported to GSA and normally retained by DoD in a **vault** or on official display until the recipient prepares to depart his office. At that time, the recipient would decide which gifts he wishes to purchase, and the rest would be physically transferred to **GSA**. In the published report, "Reported to GSA for purchase" means that the recipient has expressed an interest in purchasing the gift.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Bill Brazis,

(b)(6)

<sup>10/23</sup>  
Dan Dell'Orto -  
Please let's discuss  
D. Dell'Orto


SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	10/22

10/2

10



U17491 / 03

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
DATE: November 29, 2003  
SUBJECT: **SecDef Gifts**

Set a meeting with Dan Dell'Orto for me to go over this SecDef Gifts paper. I just don't understand it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
113003.03a

*Attach: Info Memo to SD from Dell'Orto re: SD Gifts 10/20/03*

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ 12/15 \_\_\_\_\_

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

JUN 21 2004

The Honorable George P. Shultz

(b)(6)

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Dear George,

Here are some papers that, if I have not already sent to you, I think you will find interesting. You will note that some of your thoughts have found a home here!

Thanks again for your wonderful hospitality. Joyce and I enjoyed the evening thoroughly. Please tell Charlotte thanks so much, and that the spurs and handkerchiefs arrived

Regards,

Enclosures

- Torture, 6/17/04
- Global War on Terror, 6/18/04
- Thoughts on Iraq, 6/7/04

21 Jun 04

OSD 09234-04

June 17,2004

SUBJECT: Torture

Seeing the headlines in the press and the raft of articles and TV shows on the subject of "torture," over recent days I have been thinking about the issue.

When the word torture is used, most people think of physical torture. For myself, I think of the videos that we have all had an opportunity to see of Saddam Hussein's people cutting off prisoners' hands or pulling their tongues out with pliers and then slicing off their tongues.

But the impression one gets from reading the many editorials, op-ed pieces and news stories is that the United States Government has ordered, authorized, permitted, or tolerated physical torture.

Before I make an assertion, I have to say that we still have a number of investigations going, and, understandably, we are learning more as we go along. Also, I have to avoid saying anything that could later be characterized in a court martial as "command influence," where the result could be that a guilty defendant might be released.

However, at this point, I can say with high confidence that I have not seen anything that suggests a senior military or civilian official of the US Government ordered, authorized, permitted, or tolerated torture or any other act inconsistent with the Geneva Conventions, other laws of the United States or the values of the American people. There have been some illegal acts, to be sure, some of which have already been punished and others that will be.

11-L-0559/OSD/42249



So it is important for those commenting on this subject to consider what the effects of their acts are, just as those of us in government have to consider the effects of our acts.

- First, consider the effects on members of the US military when they read these articles, leaving them with the incorrect impression that physical torture has been ordered, authorized, or tolerated by their government. They may begin to believe that that is true, which, to my knowledge, it is not.
- Consider the Iraqi people and the people of the countries in that region whose help we need to succeed. As they get the impression that the US orders torture, which it does not, it makes our task there vastly more difficult.
- Finally, consider the reaction of those who may capture or hold prisoner US military or civilian personnel. They will contend that their acts of torture are justified by what they can point to as press reports of US torture, as inaccurate as they may be.

It is past time for those discussing this subject to do it in a more responsible way that does not overstate or misstate the facts.

We are in a war. Let there be no doubt, the American people's lives **are** at risk. Those of us in Government feel a responsibility to strive every day to protect the lives of the American people, military and civilians.

I don't get up every morning and say, "What might some critics say about a decision I may make?" I get up every morning and say, "Within the laws of the United States, including our treaty obligations and the values of the American people, what can I do to help protect our people from more attacks?" We of

course check proposals and decisions with the lawyers before making such decisions .

As of today, I can say that I have high confidence that the decisions we have made at the senior levels of the Department have been consistent with US treaty obligations, other laws of the United States and the values of the American people. And, further, I believe they have been in the best interests of our country.

DHR:dh  
Current MFRs/torture

June 18,2004

SUBJECT: What Are We Fighting? Is It a Global War on Terror?

Are we fighting a “Global War on Terror”?

- Or are we witnessing a “global civil war within the Muslim religion,” where a relatively small minority of radicals and extremists are trying to hijack the religion from the large majority of moderates?
- Or are we engaged in a “global insurgency” against us by a minority of radical Muslims in the name of a fanatical ideology?
- Or is it a combination of the two?

How we describe and set up the problem determines how we will deal with it – what priorities we establish and, in short, what we and our allies do to deal with the problem.

Since September 11,2001, the US has moved from addressing terrorism as a “law enforcement,” where we must find and arrest the terrorists, casting it as a “war” against terrorism, where we need to use our military might against the terrorist networks and their safe havens. That was an important and useful advance, freeing us and our coalition to use more vigorous responses.

The question now, however, is should we refine the problem further? What we may be facing is not only simply a law enforcement problem, it is also not a global war against generic terrorists, but rather a war by a radical extremist strain of Islam, a minority of that religion, first against the moderates in that religion, but also against much of the rest of the civilized world. The extremists’ grand objective seems to be to reshape the world – to cripple the US, to drive us out of the Middle East, to overthrow all moderate pro-Western governments in the Arab and Muslim worlds, and, in their dreams, to restore a “Caliphate” over large portions of the globe and reestablish an Islamic superpower.

The important point is that what we face is an ideologically-based challenge. Radical Islamists may be centered in the Middle East, but their reach is worldwide and their goals are global. They are currently making inroads in different ways in Europe, Central and Southeast Asia, and Africa, as well as the Western Hemisphere, including the United States.

11-L-0559/OSD/42252

Europe, it seems, does not understand the problem. Some Europeans seem to think they can make a “separate peace” (the “Spanish syndrome”). The UN Secretariat does not seem to get it either. For us to be successful – for the world to be successful – the US, the UN and the Europeans must have a reasonably common perception of what is happening – of what the threat is. The UN was the second target of the 1993 World Trade Center bombers. Yet the UN in Baghdad declared itself “unprotected” because they fancied themselves as “innocents.” But they were again attacked by extremists, very likely because the UN stands, in a general way, for the existing international system. To top it off, radical Islamists have recently put a price on Kofi Annan’s head. The reward is in gold to show the extremists do not depend on nation states.

It is likely that, over time, Europeans will be even more threatened than the US given their demographics. Israel, of course, represents the ultimate target in the Middle East – and is seen as an outpost of democracy, progress and Western values. It seems reasonable to conclude that the radicals’ goal is an ideological goal, and that terrorism is simply their weapon of choice.

We should test the proposition as to whether it might be accurate and useful to define our problem a new way – to declare it as “a civil war within Islam” and/or a “global ideological insurgency” – and find ways to test what the analytical results would be depending on how we set up the problem.

A number of things follow from this analysis.

If it is an ideological challenge, our task is not simply to defend, but to preempt, to go on the offensive, and to keep the radicals off balance. We learned this lesson in the Soviet Union cold war case.

For one thing, we will need to show the moderates in the religion that they have support. We will need to find ways to help them. But they must take up the battle and defend their religion against those who would hijack it. Only if moderate Muslims actively and effectively oppose the global insurgency will the extremists be defeated.

Moderate Muslim leadership needs to create opportunities for their people. We can help. Their attitude with respect to women results in a population explosion and denies their nations one-half of the energy, brainpower and creativity that other nations benefit from. It is a formula for certain failure. Moreover, championing women’s rights has a strategic importance: education of women in developing countries correlates closely with shrinking families, “middle class” values, economic progress and likely erosion of the more extreme forms of religious orthodoxy.

We must encourage oil-producing Muslim states to diversify their economies and not use oil as a crutch. Oil equals wealth, but that they happen to be sitting on sand over oil detaches them from the reality that effort and investment lead to wealth for all of the rest of the world that does not happen to be sitting on sand over oil. Too often, oil-rich Muslims are against physical labor, so they bring in Koreans and Pakistanis to do the labor, while their young people remain idle. An idle population is vulnerable to radicalism, particularly when they conclude it is prudent to pay off the extremists so they can maintain their preferred positions.

It is desirable, if not a necessity, for Middle Eastern nations to reform and institute representative systems that are respectful of all their people, including women. The President's initiative is not "do-goodism," but wise calculation: It is advice to moderate states that political reform is a way to strengthen themselves – to co-opt middle classes against the extremists.

Finally, ideologies can be defeated. The Soviet collapse teaches us this. If Islamism's goal is the fantasy of a new "Caliphate," we can deflate it by, over time, demonstrating its certain futility. Simply by not giving in to terrorist blackmail – by not being driven out of the Middle East – we will demonstrate over time that the extremists' ideology cannot deliver. At some point, its futility will become clear and the present enthusiasm will wane. Right now they are on a high, but what if 5 to 10 years from now they have achieved none of their goals (as Arafat has failed)? This is in our own hands.

The failure of the Iranian regime would also be a blow to the ideology, discrediting that ideology in the way that the collapse of the USSR discredited Marxist-Leninist parties most everywhere, except North Korea and Cuba. This, too, should be a strategic goal of ours in the struggle.

So if what is occurring is not a war against terrorism, we need to consider changing how we describe it and seek to get others to see the problem in a new way, because it will affect their attitudes and how they and we approach the critical problem of this decade.

DHR:dh  
Current MFRs/GWOT