

August 18, 2003

020000

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Assigning Priorities

If we are going to get the priorities pushed forward, we are going to have to have a champion for each one of them and periodic reporting.

Please take a look at the priorities sheet, see what you think and see me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081803-45

.....

Please respond by 9/12/03

18 AUG 03

U21644 /03

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outbox  
9/9

August 18, 2003

Singapore

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
CC: Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Singapore and Global Crossing

I am sure Lee Kwan Yu has called others besides me. He is concerned about the Global Crossing acquisition issue. He has a serious problem, and, as a result, I believe we have a serious problem.

Are you thinking about this, and do you have any suggestions? It seems to me there ought to be a creative way to solve it.

DHR:dh  
081803-44

*cc + D. F*

U21645 /03

18 AUG 03

11-L-0559/OSD/18978

August 18, 2003

020 PA

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Paula Unruh

Where do we stand on Paula Unruh? Here is a letter from her dated August 12 with your note on it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/12/03 Unruh ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
081803-46

.....

Please respond by 9/12/03

*9/8*  
*Tom O'Brien*  
*Let's discuss. Tom*

Larry Di Rita  
*9/9*

18 AUG 03

U21646 /03

(b)(6)

*Paula Wurub*

(b)(6)

August 12, 2003

*8/13  
Secret -  
I can speak with  
her if you like.  
D. Rite*

*Larry Di Rite  
8/13*

Dear Mr. Secretary - Don:

I have tried for months to secure an interview with someone at DOD or Presidential Personnel, with an express interest in working for you at DOD. After reading U. S. News & World Report last night, I decided to make one more effort - through you. If this idea has no merit, please have someone tell me.


With respect to Torie Clarke's departure as the Pentagon spokeswoman, I was intrigued to read that you don't want "an insider - someone beholden to the brass." If that is accurate, I will list some bullet points why I would like to interview for that position (followed by my resume):

1. I have never worked at DOD, nor have I been in the service - although I did join my husband in Germany when he served with the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division.
2. I served nine years on the National USO Board with many retired military people; this organization addresses the plight of the average NCO here and abroad. I was the spokesperson and chair of their long-term planning committee.
3. As Campaign Manager (12 years) for a Congressman, I was frequently a spokesperson.
4. As Campaign Manager for 2 gubernatorial races, I also served as spokesperson. Both these races were in Arkansas; we won the race in 1980, and won the primary in 1990.
5. Served as spokesperson for the Secretary of Energy as Director of Consumer Affairs
6. As a former Congressional candidate, I have faced the press many times.
7. Spoke (faced) the national press when I was Chairman of the Southern States Chairmen (RNC).

8. Conducted press interviews as one of the National Alumnae Achievement winners at the national convention of Kappa Kappa Gamma.
9. As Executive Vice-President/day-to-day manager of the Tulsa Global Trade Foundation, I handled all press releases/interviews/conferences.
10. As Republican State Chairman for the state of Oklahoma, I did multiple interviews all over the state.
11. When I was the Principal Deputy to the Director General of the U. S. & Foreign Commercial Service, International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce, I frequently met the press head on; while traveling to manage the 1,500 government employees, I often addressed the U. S. Chambers of Commerce worldwide. In the role of Deputy, I also dealt with organizations like the President's "E" Award for excellence in exporting, the National League of Cities, Three Mile Island and the World Conference of Mayors.

While I have never served as a press secretary nor been employed as a press person, I feel my life experiences have given me the ability to make intelligent remarks on behalf of those I represent. I bring to the table lots of gray matter - in a blond form. My allegiance and loyalty would be to you and to the President.



**PAULA UNRUH****Biographical Data Update**  
7-15-03

This resume was originally prepared for use by White House Personnel in considering Paula Unruh as an appointee to any department for which they deemed appropriate. Previous experiences involve the Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, and current interests involve the Department of Defense and Homeland Security.

Letters of recommendation were sent in early 2001 to the White House and several agencies; names of those who submitted letters will be listed at the end of this resume. Most of my efforts were concentrated through the Department of Defense, but after September 11, 2001, I stopped all communications, which I thought was appropriate. I know from experience that there are turnovers at the end of the first two years in any administration and feel it is time once again to pursue an opportunity to serve President Bush. Under Secretary Asa Hutchison, Ross Swimmer (Special Trustee for American Indians/Interior), and Secretary Rumsfeld are familiar with some of my activities, in addition to those listed elsewhere.

**Current:** Marketing for a lighting technology firm.

**Past:** Consultant to small and medium-sized companies wishing to develop International markets.

1994 – Congressional candidate, 1<sup>st</sup> District, Oklahoma.

1992 – Adjunct Professor- campaign management, Univ. of Tulsa.

1990 – Campaign Manager, Arkansas, Gubernatorial candidate Sheffield Nelson – winning the Republican Primary.

1988 – National Coordinator for delegates/alternates, Dole for President. Monitored the tracking system for delegate information.

- 1988 - Honored by Kappa Kappa Gamma at its national convention as one of its National Alumnae Achievement Award recipients.
- 1987 - Executive Vice-President, Tulsa Global Trade Foundation. A group of 100 business executives formed the Foundation to promote trade between the People's Republic of China and the central region of the United States. Responsible for day-to-day management and overall success of this year-long project.
- 1984-1986 - Appointed by President Reagan to serve as the Principal Deputy Director General of the U. S. & Foreign Commercial Service, International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce, Washington, D. C. First woman to serve in this high-level managerial role with the US&FCS, directing the programs, personnel and administrative functions of 1,300 government officials, foreign and domestic, in 200 locations throughout the world. Initiated and implemented the first national meeting of The District Export Councils. Created and implemented educational programs for Members of Congress, Governors, state economic development offices and national trade associations; led numerous trade missions, including two sponsored by the National Association of Women Business Owners; spoke to worldwide Chambers of Commerce.
- 1981-1983 Served Secretary Jim Edwards, Secretary of Energy, as Director of Consumer Affairs; directed outreach efforts for a nationwide energy program involving consumer groups, business, industry and labor leaders - opinions and recommendations forwarded to the Secretary and the White House.
- 1980 - At the request of the Republican National Committee, managed the Gubernatorial race for Frank White, Arkansas, defeating Governor Bill Clinton.
- 1979 - Campaign Manager in the state of Arkansas for Presidential candidate John Connally, securing his lone delegate (the \$12 million woman).
- 1978 - Candidate for Congress, 1<sup>st</sup> District, Oklahoma, running against a 12-year Democrat incumbent
- 1977 - Appointed by President Ford to the National USO Board of Directors for a 9-year term; served on the Board's Executive Committee, its Financial Development Committee, and chaired the Long-range Planning Committee, one of very few women serving on the Board.



- 1960-1988 - Numerous other managerial roles for state and national campaigns, including Governor/Senator Henry Bellmon (OK); President Richard Nixon, President Gerald Ford, President Ronald Reagan, Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld, and President George Bush .
- 1975-1977 - Republican State Chair (OK), first woman Chair of either political Party, surpassed previous fundraising goals, elected a new Congressman, initiated direct mail, member of RNC's Executive Committee, elected first woman Chair of the Southern State Chairmen, served as Chair of the Southern Republican Leadership Conference
- 1974 - Mayor Bob LaFortune appointed her to Co-Chair the Tulsa Performing Arts Center Bond Issue Campaign. It passed after having failed on three previous occasions.
- 1960-1970 Served as Campaign Manager for Congressman Page Belcher, 1<sup>st</sup> District, OK for 10 years. Those winning campaigns were supported by 125 uniformed women, their husbands and children.
- During this same period she served her community through Legal Aid, the Tulsa Philharmonic, Tulsa Opera, Junior Association of the Tulsa Boys Home, American Red Cross, Administrative Officer for the Bureau of the Census (1<sup>st</sup> District, OK), and was honored by Women in Communications as one of their "Women of the Year."
- 1948-1960 - Executive Secretary for the Assistant to the President, Carter Oil Company; Staff Assistant, D. C. for Congressman Page Belcher; Young Republican State Vice-Chair and National Committeewoman; Lived overseas as a military dependent when husband served with the 10<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, 35<sup>th</sup> Field Artillery, U. S. Army (Germany); University of Tulsa and University of Arkansas, Business and English major.

Letters of recommendation were sent in 2001 from:

Jim Barrett (former President of the USO)  
 Don Rumsfeld "put me into the process."  
 Charles Ablard - Washington, D. C. attorney  
 Senator/Governor Henry Bellmon (OK)  
 General Michael Davison (Ret) -former President of the USO)  
 Senator Chuck Hagel

Senator Jim Inhofe  
Senator Don Nickles  
Congressman J. C. Watts  
Major General, USAF (Ret.) Jeanne M. Holm  
George "Bud" Lawrence - former President, American Gas Assoc.  
Wales Madden, Jr. -(Texas); friend/supporter George Bush, et al  
Brigadier General Joseph W. Turner (Ret.)  
Edgar Welden, Alabama National Committeeman

cc: Reuben Jeffery  
Fred Smith  
Sarah Nogelmann  
August 18, 2003

~~Call~~ Tell

IRAD

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Ed De Latre

Did we ever send Ed De Latre to Baghdad for education activities? *Police*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081803-50

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*8/26/03*

*9/19*

*SD,*

I have been told he is

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

According to

(b)(6)

he

never wanted to go to Iraq but wanted to offer his assistance on building a police force.

I have asked Bernie Kirk, our Baghdad advisor on building the force, to call him. After Bernie speaks with him we will follow up to see if he would be helpful here.

18Aug03

August 18, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Meet w/David Chu

*Done  
TEN*

000.7150

I would like to see David Chu and have him explain the cutting of people's pay.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081803-49

.....  
Please respond by 9/12/03

U21648 /03

18 AUG 03

August 18, 2003

✓ 9/3

C 9/3  
cleared w/ SD  
on 9/3

240

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Imminent Danger Pay

Please make sure you get a clear explanation of what David Chu tried to background the press on the other day.

I just do not understand how the press carried this stuff about the Pentagon wanting to cut back on the pay of folks who serve in Afghanistan and Iraq. What led them to do it? What are the actual facts? It has to be in crystal clear language.

If we made a mistake, we ought to say so. But I just cannot imagine anyone doing that. What are the facts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081803-52

.....  
Please respond by 8/22/03

U21649 /03

18 AUG 03

**Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD**

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**From:** DoD Transcripts [dltranscripts\_sender@DTIC.MIL]  
**Sent:** Thursday, August 14, 2003 8:02 PM  
**To:** DODTRANSCRIPTS-L@DTIC.MIL  
**Subject:** Press Gaggle with Mr. Di Rita and Dr. Chu on Combat Pay Compensation

NEWS TRANSCRIPT from the United States Department of Defense

DoD News Briefing  
Lawrence Di Rita, Acting ASD(PA)  
Thursday, August 14, 2003 - 4:15 p.m. EDT

(Press gaggle. Participating were Lawrence Di Rita, acting assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, and David Chu, under secretary of defense for personnel and readiness.)

Di Rita: I appreciate you all coming over. We've prevailed upon Dr. David Chu to join us and provide a little bit of reality check to this it sounds like an immensely overheated story.

Q: First, do you know anything about the power outages?

Di Rita: What I'm seeing here. I know I was heading for Detroit tomorrow.

With that, I don't think there's any need for an opener from me. I'll just turn it over to David.

David, we'll be on the record except for those points when David may ask that we go no background.

Chu: Thank you for the chance to get together. I'd just like very quickly to put to rest what I understand has been a burgeoning rumor that somehow we are going to reduce compensation for those serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. That is not true. We are not going to reduce their compensation.

There is an open issue about how we're going to do that which depends on exactly how the conference report in the Congress comes out on some technical allowance issues, but the bottom line is we will at least maintain the compensation of those serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. We're not going to cut their pay or anything like that.

Q: The point was when this extra money provision expires in September, the report was that you were opposed to extending it.

Chu: That's a separate issue. The department has a variety of pay and allowance powers already with which it plans to maintain the compensation of those serving in Iraq and Afghanistan should the current allowance provisions expire. Whether they expire or not is a question which we don't have the answer to. But actually we would prefer, and I think that's how this rumor got started, we would prefer to use those other compensation powers as our way of ensuring that we target these compensation benefits on the troops serving in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Q: What are these other powers? What do you mean by those?

Chu: We have a variety of other pays. We have hardship duty pay, for example, we have some incentive pay with which we can compensate people in Iraq should these allowances fall back to levels prior to April of this year when Congress enacted new levels with which we can and will -- we haven't chosen which one yet -- maintain compensation in Iraq. Obviously exactly what we do depends on what Congress does also. If they pass some other allowance or extend the existing allowance it will change exactly what we do on this end. But there is no intention of allowing compensation for those serving in Iraq or Afghanistan to fall.

Di Rita: The premise that we would somehow disadvantage U.S. forces in a combat environment --

Chu: Is absolutely wrong.

Di Rita: It's absurd. It's not even wrong, it's absurd.

Chu: That's why I was so startled when this story arose. We are actually looking at the opposite issue. What should we be doing for our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan as appropriate for their circumstance, especially those who are serving long periods of time. We had discussions underway at this very moment of R&R type powers for the commander, some of which he already has but which we are looking at extending.

Q: So how do you explain the statement that says you hadn't budgeted for these increases and therefore you didn't want the increases?

Chu: What I think you're pointing to is one piece of a very thick technical appeal document that speaks to the question do we want to extend the language Congress used in the Family Separation Allowance and Imminent Danger Pay statutes. And no, we don't think we need to extend that language. That's a different statement from are we going to reduce compensation for those in Iraq and Afghanistan. As I emphasized --

Q: But nobody ever --

Chu: No one ever said we're going to reduce compensation in Iraq and Afghanistan. People have jumped to a conclusion based upon the fact that we have said --

Di Rita: People have said it today, but nobody in this department.

Q: It sounds like it amounts to the same thing. Unless you're going to --

Chu: No, no, no, no. I don't mean to be a technocrat here, but we have plenty of authority that we think is frankly better suited to the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan to maintain that compensation at the level it now stands without this power. And what we're saying in this document is we don't need this authority. What Congress really would do if they extend this is actually pay it to a lot of people who aren't in Iraq and Afghanistan.

So we said look, we're just fine, guys. We have plenty of authority. We have never said we're going to cut -- I couldn't believe this rumor getting started. We have never said we are. We haven't touched this issue. In fact the whole debate inside the department has been the other side. What do we need to do for the people serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially those there for long periods of time.

Q: So if that money goes away you would make up for it in some other way, is that what you're saying?

Chu: Well you're dealing here not with money. You're dealing here with authority. This is not an appropriation. This is the authorization bill. This gives us authority. In fact actually this mandates, this is a bit of entitlement kind of thing, this mandates pay. We're saying we've got plenty of authority. We'll use that authority. In fact we are busy debating how best to use that authority. We haven't come to our conclusion yet. All we're saying in this appeal document which actually is a much larger document, all sorts of issues in it, is we don't need this authority, guys. Don't muck it up.

Q: Mr. Chu, a couple of things. First of all is the continuation of these increased payments not budgeted for in the '04 budget? And does that create -- If the answer is yes does that create something of a problem that you're going to have to find a work-around for? And secondly, you've said repeatedly that the troops in Iraq and Afghanistan will not have their pay cut. Does that mean that you're looking at a situation where maybe people if you're at Prince Sultan, if you're in Diego Garcia, if you're loading planes in Germany for Liberia where you may be entitled to some of these benefits now -- imminent danger pay or something -- that you're looking at that and ways of tightening that up a bit?

Chu: Let me go to your first question. As our statement on the record indicated, the increase in these two specific allowances was voted by the Congress after the President's budget was formulated. So Congress said okay, let's up these allowances. Therefore by definition there isn't an explicit line in the President's budget for that increased amount.



Now a different issue is whether we're going to continue compensation at present levels in fiscal '04. What I'm saying on the record for Iraq and Afghanistan, absolutely yes, we are going to continue compensation for those folks.

The way the nation has financed many of the costs, the incremental costs associated with the war in Iraq and its aftermath and the war in Afghanistan and its aftermath has been through supplemental appropriations. So it's my -- depending -- It does kind of depend on what authority we use, but my anticipation is that whatever happened we were going to have to ask for supplemental appropriations. That's an issue no matter what happens.

Now it's quite conceivable, again the appropriations bill is still open. It's very conceivable Congress will fund whatever the authorization committed does; it's conceivable they'll fund something else. Who knows?

Di Rita: Also, let's keep the context in mind. For three years in a row we've provided gradual increases to the pay accounts, in many areas targeted those for the more distressed ratings and distressed pay grades. This Administration has an admirable record, together with Congress, of providing pay raises over the last three years to bring our military back to where they sort of lost ground in the late '90s.

That's the philosophy. That philosophy is unchanged.

Chu: If I may, I'd like to emphasize a point that Larry made that I think is very important here that's germane to the misunderstanding that has arisen.

Throughout the Administration, starting with the President's billion dollar target pay increase, he has emphasized targeting. That is, we want to put the available funds to the places of greatest need. Those are at the moment in terms of what's happening here, Iraq and Afghanistan. So we're trying to be careful not to underwrite broad-based changes that aren't targeted to these.

Q: Just to be clear, there was never any intention on the part of the Defense Department to even look at eliminating these increases. Is that correct?

Chu: I want to be careful about the reference to "these increases". The department's position is to maintain compensation in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now how we --

Q: At the same level?

Chu: At the same level. Total compensation. What counts is the bottom line. Remember the typical person -- E-5, E-6, E-7 in Iraq/Afghanistan is being paid \$4,000 or \$5,000 a month. So what's at issue here is around \$200 a month in these changed levels in these allowances.

We're going to try to maintain total compensation. Now we would prefer to do it with a different set of authorities than are at stake in this authorization issue. From that difference, unfortunately, this rumor has that we're going to cut compensation in Iraq and Afghanistan. No, we're not.

Q: Is there also a difference in criteria? In other words where you may be reducing combat danger pay but increasing something else?

Chu: It could be. We haven't decided which instrument to use. Obviously it's a bit contingent on what Congress does. So if they do something we have to be sure we're thoughtful in responding to that direction.

Q: A second question if I could from just a minute ago, one of the things that's been written about this sort of suggests that people may be working in Diego Garcia or ships at sea, although that was not one of the things specifically listed in the Persian Gulf. Are you looking at narrowing the range or the scope, the number of people that would be eligible for even a danger pay, for example, as part of this process?

Chu: Imminent danger pay boundaries are constantly reviewed because of course there was a different situation pre-September 11, 2001 than there was on September 12th; a different situation before hostilities in Iraq from post-hostilities Afghanistan; a different situation today; so we constantly review where the boundaries are for all these issues that are threat-specific. That goes on all the time.

Di Rita: And it frankly would not be satisfactory to start saying "and therefore in this area this might happen" because as David said, we review these all the time. Clearly the allegations are wrong that there will be some effect on Afghanistan and Iraq, and to get into whether this patch of ocean will get it and this patch won't is just speculation that we --

Chu: And let me emphasize. It is our desire to ensure those people who are facing real dangers and real hardship are compensated. So it goes up for some, depending upon that; and at some point in the future an area that was once thought to be a problem area will no longer be so. So it will change.

Q: You've got the 5th Fleet at sea in the Persian Gulf during wartime operations. I assume they're eligible at that point for imminent danger pay?

Chu: Your excellent point is that units at sea and the kind of threats they face and whether they're in these various zones or not will change depending on the threat situation. We don't do it every day, this is not continuous, but at finite points over time we look at are we being appropriate in the kinds of pays that we're offering.

Q: Why don't you want the current authorization?

Q: I have one more question, too.

Di Rita: But we're about done.

Chu: Why don't we do two more and then we're finished.

Q: Why don't you want the current authorization? Do you have problems with that?

Chu: It's too broad-based. It's like using a sledgehammer to hit a small nail.

Di Rita: And what we have seen in the past three years of the approach the President has taken which is to be smart about how we apply pay raises, we've seen the results in recruitment and retention that we desire, which is that recruitment and retention in those key areas remain at the levels they need to be.

Chu: We want to be sure we put the monies the taxpayers of America make available to us in the places of greatest need.

Q: And that doesn't let you do that?

Chu: That doesn't let us do that.

Di Rita: It may not let us do that.

Chu: It may not. Depending on the wording.

Di Rita: It's premature to say --

Q: So you're giving premium pay to people who are not in harm's way right now. Is that the idea?

Chu: There are two allowances at stake here. One is called family separation allowance, one is imminent danger pay. Family separation allowance under the words of the statute as they were enacted goes to anyone who is separated from his or her family for more than 30 days.

That means if I'm stationed in Newport, Rhode Island and I am detailed to Pearl Harbor, Honolulu for more than 30 days, I get family separation allowance. Is that where the taxpayers want us to put our money?

Q: On a pretty good trip, too.

Chu: If you like Hawaii. (Laughter.)

Q: Does your categorical statement that compensation as a whole will not be reduced for troops in Iraq and Afghanistan apply to troops in Kuwait or other --

Chu: I think I want to be where Larry is, and as your question indicated. We constantly review all areas. We're not out to --

Q: Some people will see some decrease then if this thing goes away.

Q: Right.

Chu: Obviously if it goes down there are some people who will get less, yes. But the point that I think we want to emphasize is the people that the Congress intended to help, and that was if you look back at the words of the Floor debate at the time that this was enacted, were the troops in danger? The troops now in Iraq, the troops in Afghanistan, we're not planning to cut their compensation.

Di Rita: To be fair, folks, let's all remember why we're here. Because somebody made the allegation that the Bush Administration's decision to cut the pay of our troops in Iraq is unconscionable. It's simply not going to happen.

Chu: No decision like that has been --

Di Rita: Nobody went to the Floor of the Senate and said the Bush Administration decision to cut the pay of our troops in Diego Garcia is unconscionable. We don't --

Q: Larry, that's a statement by a politician. That's not a news report --

Di Rita: So we're doing our best to educate you. But you can take this to the nth degree and it will be hard to decide --

Chu: Compensation allowance --

Di Rita: -- answer it.

Chu: -- base compensation around the globe shifts over time. I'll take a trivial example. Housing allowances. They vary based upon what housing costs are. No one's going to go to the Floor and say it's unconscionable that the housing allowance for Providence, Rhode Island has dropped by \$3.

Di Rita: Things fluctuate. But the philosophy is, target it where it's needed the most. It's clearly needed in Iraq and Afghanistan. There are other areas in that same region where it is needed and where it will be --

Chu: And we'll continue to pay it. We may even pay more in some cases.

Di Rita: How it shakes out over time, we'll do our best to make sure people stay well informed on that.

Q: Is that something you're looking at?

Di Rita: That's about all we have time for.

Chu: We are looking at --

Di Rita: Thank you, gentlemen, ladies.

[Web Version: <http://www.dod.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030814-0582.html>]

-- News Transcripts: <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/>  
-- DoD News: <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/dodnews.html>  
-- Subscribe/Unsubscribe: <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/dodnews.html#e-mail>  
-- Today in DoD: <http://www.defenselink.mil/today/>

August 18, 2003

005

TO: Mary Claire Murphy  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Gifts for Ministerial

A couple of the ministers of defense at the ministerial meeting in Colorado Springs are women. I wonder if we want to give them a somewhat different gift. Those bookends seem awfully massive and masculine. What do you think?

Please talk to Joyce about it and sort that out.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081803-33

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Mr. Secretary -*  
*Mary Claire is gone on vacation and*  
*will be back in the office on Tuesday, Aug. 26.*  
*Do you want her to call Mrs. Rumsfeld in*  
*Jass*  *YES*  
*NO - Wait until Mrs. Rumsfeld*  
*returns to Washington Sept. 8*

*8/18*

*MR,*  

|        |
|--------|
| (b)(6) |
|--------|

U21650 /03

18 AUG 03

August 18, 2003

350.001

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Speeches etc.

Please take a look at all the edits I did over the weekend on these speeches, toasts, and the like. Please look at all the times I marked and made a note that we should not use the construct that is used, and then instruct all the speechwriters not to use those things.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081803-34



Please respond by 8/22/03

18Aug03

U21651 /03

August 18, 2003

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Phonetic Pronunciation

Please remind the speechwriters to put in the phonetic pronunciation of foreign names. I shouldn't have to ask them; they should just do it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081803-36

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

350.00150

18 AUG 03

U21652 /03



Snowflake

August 18, 2003

030

*S. Bucci -  
Who do you think?  
D/R*

TO: Ray DuBois  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Interns

Please take a look at these interns from the various services and OSD. It doesn't say anything about the Joint Staff, which it probably should.

Look at how differently people are doing this—ought we to have a policy and encourage people to do certain things? It looks kind of strange to me.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/12/03 DuBois memo to SecDef re: Pentagon Interns

DHR:dh  
DF1203-37

*✓ 10/15*

Please respond by 9/12/03

*Response attached  
Forwarded 10/14  
vr/CDR Nosenzo*

U21653 /03

18 Aug 03



ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

002 001 - 1 10 17

INFO MEMO

October 01, 2003 5:30 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

*Ray DuBois* (10.1.03)

SUBJECT: Follow-up to Snowflake on Pentagon Interns

- In the subject Snowflake, you asked why the Joint Staff was not represented in the intern numbers we provided to you in our initial Snowflake response of August 12th (attached). You also noted the difference in intern numbers among the Components and asked if we should have a departmental policy regarding interns.
- The Joint Staff does not have any civilian interns at this time. However, OSD Presidential Management Interns occasionally rotate through the Joint Staff.
- The numbers provided on August 12th reflected only those interns serving in the Pentagon at the time, which is a relatively small subset of the total Intern population in the Department. The number of interns in the Department is as follows:

| Component                    | Presidential Management Interns | Other Post Graduate Interns | Short-term <sup>1</sup> Student Programs | Career <sup>2</sup> Program Interns | Total  |
|------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|--|-------------------------------------|--------|
| Air Force                    | 4                               | 30                          | 4,402                                    | 2,454                               | 6,890  |
| Army                         | 11                              | 8                           | 3,646                                    | 10,459                              | 14,124 |
| Navy                         | 35                              | 3                           | 3,521                                    | 940                                 | 4,499  |
| OSD/JCS/<br>Defense Agencies | 21                              | 5                           | 2,346                                    | 1,568                               | 3,940  |
| Total                        | 71                              | 46                          | 13,915                                   | 15,421                              | 29,453 |

<sup>1</sup> Students working and attending school concurrently.

<sup>2</sup> Functional intern programs designed and operated by the Components to help recruit, train and develop future staff (e.g., the Naval Acquisition Intern Program and the DeCA Commissary Management Intern Program).

- The Office of Personnel Management and the USD(P&R) provide guidance for the Department on intern and other student hiring programs. The Components believe that this guidance is adequate. The above numbers indicate that they are making robust use of the policies and authorities currently in place.

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by: Laura Devlin, (b)(6)

|                       |        |
|-----------------------|--------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA |        |
| SR MA CRADDOCK        |        |
| MA BUCCI              | 5/3/03 |
| EXECSEC HARRISON      | 10/3   |

11-L-0559/OSD/19001

U16280 /03



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1850 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

SECRET  
2003 AUG 13 11 3:51

*Ron D. B.*

INFO MEMO

August 12, 2003, 3:45 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *Howard G. Becker, Acting*  
Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Snowflake on Pentagon Interns

- In the snowflake, you had asked how many interns we have in the Pentagon and where they work.
- As of July 31, 2003, we had 353 civilian interns working in the Pentagon. Following is a breakout by Component and type of internship:

TYPES OF PENTAGON INTERNS AND WHERE THEY WORK

| <u>Component</u> | <u>Presidential Management Interns (PMIs)</u> | <u>Student Summer Interns</u> | <u>Other Student Interns (Various Programs)*</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|------------------|---|-------------------------------|--|--------------|
| OSD/WHS          | 8   | 42                            | 86   | 136          |
| Army             | 19  | 31                            | <del>8</del>                                     | 50           |
| Air Force        | <del>1</del>                                  | 60                            | 80   | 140          |
| Navy             | 7   | <del>12</del>                 | 12   | 19           |
| Marine Corps     | 7   | <del>10</del>                 | <del>10</del>                                    | 7            |
| DISA             | <del>0</del>                                  | <del>0</del>                  | 1  | 1            |
| <b>TOTAL</b>     | <b>41</b>                                     | <b>133</b>                    | <b>179</b>                                       | <b>353</b>   |

\* Includes unsalaried interns; student interns working part time during school year and full time during summers/breaks; and special intern programs for disabled, minority, and disadvantaged youth.

*P-2004*

Attachment  
As stated

Prepared by: Laura Devlin, WHS, (b)(6)

|                       |      |
|-----------------------|------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA | 8/10 |
| SR MA CRADDOCK        | 8/19 |
| MA BLUES              | 8/16 |
| EXECSEC MARIOTT       | 8/14 |

August 18, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Global Force Posture

*Done  
TEN*

*381*

Let's make sure we start scheduling some more meetings on Global Force Posture.  
That is going to take some time.

Let's do it in two or three sessions—one session for each of the remaining AORs.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081803-38

.....  
Please respond by 9/12/03

U21654 /03

*18 Aug 03*

August 18, 2003

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Help from the Hill

032

We probably ought to get two or three Senators and two or three House members who can defend the studies of new things and understand the privacy issues at DARPA that we have been getting battered on. If we had folks who could be helpful, I think it would be a good idea.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081803-40

.....

Please respond by 9/2/03

18 AUG 03

U21656 /03

August 18, 2003

000.7150

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Fran Townsend

Sometime I would like to have Fran Townsend over for lunch. She works on Condi's staff.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081803-41



Please respond by 9/12/03

U21657 /03

18 AUG 03

August 18, 2003

110.01

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: OMB Statement

Please let me see the language in the OMB statement on the Administration's position on the defense appropriations bill.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081803-42



Please respond by 8/21/03

✓ *MM* 9/3

U21658 /03

18 AUG 03

August 18, 2003

240

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Inaccurate Headlines

If the press carries an inaccurate article with an inaccurate headline, why does the *Early Bird* repeat it?

If you will notice here, on August 15, it says, "Pentagon Seeks Cut To Danger Pay In Iraq." We know that is not true. You said it was not true. But the paper printed it anyway.

Why would something we put out, the *Early Bird*, carry it that way? Why wouldn't we change the headline to the truth, namely, "Chu Rebutts Charge That Pentagon Seeks Cut In Pay." Why don't you fix that system?

Thanks.

Attach.  
August 15, 2003 *Early Bird* table of contents

DJR:dh  
081803-31



Please respond by 9/5/03

18 AUG 03

U21659 /03



Earl B. ...  
re: ...  
Ch. ...  
Hunt -

# CURRENT NEWS

## EARLY BIRD

August 15, 2003

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Story numbers indicate order of appearance only.

### TOP STORIES

1. **Blackout Causes Mass Disruption**

(Washington Post)...Barton Gellman and Dana Milbank

An enormous power failure this afternoon blacked out population centers from New York City to Cleveland, Detroit and Toronto, crippling transportation networks and trapping tens of thousands of people in subway cars, elevators and trains and on highways. Authorities quickly dismissed the possibility that terrorists were to blame for the outage, but the impact of the mechanical failures that began along the Canadian border was no less dramatic.

2. **Pentagon Seeks Cut In Danger Pay In Iraq**

(Washington Times)...Combined Dispatches

The Pentagon has urged Congress not to extend recent increases in "imminent danger pay" and "family separation allowances" to U.S. troops in war zones, citing the extra \$225 monthly for the two pay categories.

3. **With Hussein Out Of Picture, Painters Change The Subject**

(Wall Street Journal)...Farnaz Fassihi

...Once one of hundreds of Iraqi artists who crafted representations of Mr. Hussein for a living, Mr. Khazaali is now among dozens who have taken up painting Americans. Mr. Khazaali earns \$50 a portrait, the same price he used to get for large pictures of Mr. Hussein. He gets as many as 50 orders a week, he says, most of them through a gift shop at Baghdad's Rasheed Hotel, which is filled with U.S. military personnel. Working from snapshots he receives from the owner of the gift shop, he's never actually met an American soldier.

4. **Al Qaeda Figure Seized In Thailand**

(Washington Post)...Ellen Nakashima and Alan Sipress

U.S. officials announced Thursday that they had captured Hambali, the 39-year-old Indonesian they describe as al Qaeda's top strategist in Southeast Asia and a key figure in the bombings on the resort island of Bali last year that killed 202 people.

5. **Pride And Peril For US As Global Cop**

(Christian Science Monitor)...Peter Grier

This week the United States is being reminded of a truth about geopolitics: World police don't always get to control their agenda.

### IRAQ

6. **Military Apologizes In Flag Incident**


(Washington Post)...Theola Labbe

The U.S. military apologized today for knocking down a Shiite Muslim flag in a Baghdad neighborhood on Wednesday that sparked protests in which one Iraqi was killed and four were wounded. Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, commander of U.S. ground troops here, also acknowledged that poorly marked traffic checkpoints set up hastily by U.S. troops had led to civilian deaths and promised a review.

August 18, 2003

8/19/03  
✓ 9/10

240

TO: David Chu  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Combat Pay

We have to make sure we don't get ourselves positioned like we did this past week, looking like we are against pay for the people in Iraq and Afghanistan. I cannot imagine how we arrived there.

Please explain.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081803-5

.....  
Please respond by 8/29/03

U21660 /03

18 AUG 03



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

C9/3

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

INFO MEMO

September 2, 2003 – 2:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*

SUBJECT: How Did the Iraq/Afghanistan Pay Issues Arise—SNOWFLAKE

- In the April Supplemental process, Congress decided to show support for troops in Iraq and Afghanistan by a step above and beyond the Administration's actions. It increased Imminent Danger Pay (sometimes called "combat pay") from \$150 to \$225 per month, and the Family Separation Allowance (paid to married personnel separated 30 days or more from their families) from \$100 to \$250. Because the initiative rode on an Appropriations Bill, it expires on September 30.
- By definition, there was no proposal to increase either in the President's budget request. The Armed Services Committees took different approaches for FY 2004, with the Senate extending the increases (but funding only 40% of the cost in its Appropriations Bill to date), while the House would restrict them to the combat zones. (Under current law they're paid world-wide.)
- The House approach is clearly preferable, but still flawed, because 55% of the troops in Iraq and Afghanistan are single and not eligible for the bulk of the payment, which comes through an increased Family Separation Allowance. In our appeal, therefore, we asked that Congress sustain the status quo ante. (We were separately working on how to use existing authorities to reward properly those in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially those who will be in theater six months or more, but this was a matter not yet ready for a public announcement.) Hence the controversy: The Service Times' editorial denounced our appeal, and the issue was picked up by several seeking the Democratic nomination for President. The public assurance we provided that we would not cut compensation for those in Iraq and Afghanistan received balanced, thoughtful coverage in the Service Times, but not in all media outlets. We will need to continue to work to get the word out.



11-L-0559/OSD/19010

- In the meantime, OMB has charge of the Administration's position on the issue. Subject to your guidance, we will press OMB for an increase in the ceiling on Hardship Duty Pay so that we can indeed easily sustain compensation in Iraq and Afghanistan, regardless of how the Authorization Bill conference comes out.

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock, (b)(6)

# Most dangerous places = most money

White House wants to make sure special pays go to certain locations like Iraq and Afghanistan

By Vince Crawley  
Times Staff Writer

Bush administration officials are huddling during the next few weeks to discuss proposing their case in Congress for revamping deployment pays so troops in the most dangerous places — Iraq and Afghanistan — get the most money.

In a hastily arranged news conference meant to defuse growing criticism, David S.C. Chu, the Pentagon's personnel chief, promised Aug. 14 that no one in Iraq or Afghanistan would see a reduced paycheck under contemplated changes. But Chu left open the possibility that those serving elsewhere might see lower deployment pays.

The Pentagon's idea could provide pay increases for single troops in combat zones, but at the expense of married and single personnel serving in relatively less risky assignments.

Defense Department officials said it is premature to publicly

discuss the possible changes, but Chu told reporters that troops in combat zones might receive geographically targeted hikes in hardship-duty pay or the new assignment-incentive pay.

At issue are family separation allowance and imminent-danger pay. Currently eligible troops all over the world get temporarily higher levels of those deployment pays because of a law passed by Congress in April at the height of the Iraq war. Lawmakers increased monthly family separation allowances — which goes to those separated from their families at least 30 days — from \$100 to \$250, and boosted monthly imminent-danger pay — which goes to all who serve in designated danger zones — from \$150 to \$225. Lawmakers set the temporary increases to expire Sept. 30, but the slow progress of the Iraq campaign has meant troops likely will remain under fire long past that date.

The Pentagon in early July sent

a legislative appeal to the House and Senate Armed Services committees proposing that both pays be restored to prewar levels, in part because the temporary hikes would cost more than \$500 million per year.

The issue quickly caught the public's attention. Troops and families, citing Air Force Times stories and editorials, started to complain about possible pay cuts. Democratic presidential contenders began bashing the plan, which led to Chu's news conference.

Chu said no one in Iraq or Afghanistan would see a pay cut. Instead, the Pentagon wants to use alternatives to accurately target more pay only to those in the combat zone — the intent of Congress when it raised the pays in the first place, he said.

Family-separation allowance goes to tens of thousands of people worldwide who are spending a month or more away from home for training reasons or on noncom-



MASTER SGT. JAMES M. HOFFMAN, AIR FORCE

Paratroopers deployed to Baghdad International Airport participate in a hoist extraction exercise on an HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopter. The White House wants to revamp danger pays so that troops in Iraq and Afghanistan — the most dangerous combat areas — get the most money.

bat deployments. Danger pay also goes to many locations, such as Bosnia and Kosovo, where troops face a relatively low threat compared to those being attacked daily in and around Baghdad, Iraq.

So far, the Pentagon has done little to sell its proposal. Both the Senate and House have funded slightly different plans for continuing to pay higher rates of family-separation allowance and danger pay into the new fiscal year that begins Oct. 1.

"We've been hearing from ... the Defense Department that for some reason or another, they can't afford to keep the promises we made to these young men and women who are putting their lives on the line for freedom," said Rep. Jerry Lewis, R-Calif.

"As far as I'm concerned, we sure as hell can afford this, and we will," said Lewis, chairman of the House Appropriations defense subcommittee.

## A better way?

But in his meeting with Pentagon reporters, Chu argued the family and danger pays aren't necessarily the best way to compensate those in Iraq and Afghanistan.

"Too broad-based," he said. "It's like using a sledgehammer to hit a small nail."

Another official said closed-door discussions are taking place among Pentagon and White House officials on whether to make a strong pitch to Congress for changing the danger-pay plans now underway.

Currently, troops in the combat zones receive \$430 in deployment pays if they are single and \$680 if they have families. Of that, the

temporary increases in danger pay and family allowance total \$75 for single people and \$225 for married personnel.

Chu named hardship-duty pay and assignment-incentive pay as possible ways to add \$225 to monthly paychecks for those in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Currently, troops who receive danger pay in those areas also receive \$100 per month in hardship-duty pay. The special pay was created by the Defense Department in 2001 and is paid in three increments — \$50, \$100 and \$150.

Assignment-incentive pay was introduced just this year as a pilot program for the Navy. Under current policy, sailors bid on how much extra monthly pay they would be willing to accept for positions that the service finds particularly difficult to fill. Bids typically top out at \$400 to \$500 per month, and the pay is based on geography and actual duties to be performed at the duty location.

However, the law authorizing this special pay is so broadly written that it might be tailored to fit special circumstances — including, perhaps, paying \$225 to anyone in Iraq or Afghanistan.

In neither of these cases, single service members would end up getting more than they do under the plan making its way through Congress.

Unlike danger pay and family allowance, the two newer pays can be targeted to specific nations or even specific cities and bases within a nation. This would follow the practice of the State Department, which targets danger pays for its employees in certain countries and cities and offers a range of danger pays based on the level of risk. □

Coors salutes the men and women fighting to protect our country. We wish you a safe return.

August 18, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Col. Turner

*(Rums)*

There was fellow named Colonel Mike Turner on CNN this morning at 7:23 a.m. saying that the United States is against having multinational forces in Iraq. Someone ought to get a hold of him and straighten him out. What a knucklehead.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081803-4

.....  
Please respond by 8/29/03

U21661 /03

18 AUG 03

August 18, 2003

CENTCOM

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Gen. DeLong

When Mike DeLong departs, please be sure I see the letter we send him. I would like to edit it and make sure it is a good one.

Thanks.

DHR:ds  
081603-3

.....  
Please respond by 9/12/03

*OK*  
*DR*

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

*please do double space rough and to techy.*

*(Signature)*

Larry Di Rita  
8/29

*Trax*

*(Signature)*  
Larry Di Rita  
8/29

U21662 /03

18 AUG 03

Lieutenant General Michael P. DeLong, USMC  
Deputy Commander  
United States Central Command  
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 33621-5101

Dear General DeLong,

You are a star! You can leave the U.S. Marine Corps after these many years knowing that the nation is better because you have served. From your tours of duty in Vietnam to your leadership during Iraqi Freedom, you have answered the call of duty with great dedication.

I am pleased to have had the opportunity to work with you, and I have valued your wise counsel during your tour as Deputy Commander of the Central Command.

As you reflect on your long and exemplary career, consider the remarkable period during which you served. Our nation prevailed over a determined Soviet adversary through the Cold War, successfully embarked on a global war against terrorism and Al Qaeda, and played a vital role in liberating the people of Iraq from years of tyranny.



I extend my personal appreciation for all you have done for our country.  
You have served America with honor. You have my gratitude and the gratitude  
of our nation.

Joyce joins me in sending warmest best wishes to you and Kathy. Do stay  
in touch.

Sincerely,



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

Lieutenant General Michael P. DeLong, USMC  
Deputy Commander  
United States Central Command  
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 33621-5101

Dear General DeLong,

You are a star! You can leave the U.S. Marine Corps after these many years knowing that the nation is better because you have served. From your tours of duty in Vietnam to your leadership during Iraqi Freedom, you have answered the call of duty with great dedication.

I am pleased to have had the opportunity to work with you, and I have valued your wise counsel during your tour as Deputy Commander of the Central Command.

As you reflect on your long and exemplary career, consider the remarkable period during which you served. Our nation prevailed over a determined Soviet adversary through the Cold War, successfully embarked on a global war against terrorism and Al Qaeda, and played a vital role in liberating the people of Iraq from years of tyranny.

I extend my personal appreciation for all you have done for our country. You have served America with honor. You have my gratitude and the gratitude of our nation.

Joyce joins me in sending warmest best wishes to you and Kathy. Do stay in touch.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/19017

**WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES  
COMMUNICATIONS AND DIRECTIVES**

August 27, 2003

**MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY**

**Subject: General Officer Retirement Letter**

- Request the Secretary of Defense's signature/SoM on the general officer retirement letter at Tab A.
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has certified satisfactory service and approved the retirement of the general officer per the attached General Officer Retirement memorandum at Tab B.
- This retirement does not require a time-in-grade waiver and the Office of the Inspector General found no adverse information.
- Coordination sheet is at Tab C.
- Recommend you approve the Secretary's signature on the retirement letter at Tab A.

  
Larry Horner  
Communications & Directives

2 Attachments:  
As stated

Decision:  
Approved \_\_\_\_\_  
Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_  
Other \_\_\_\_\_

Nom No: W71313-03  
Rank/Name: LTGEN Michael P. DeLong, USMC  
Retirement Ceremony is scheduled for September 2, 2003.

11-L-0559/OSD/19018

August 18, 2003

333

TO: LTG John Craddock

✓ TEN 9/3

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: CENTCOM Trip

I would like to see the plan for Afghanistan and Iraq, the trip early next month, so I can get my head into it and decide what I want.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081803-16

.....  
Please respond by 8/19/03

✓ TEN 9/3

U21663 /03

18 AUG 03

August 18, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: See Tom Franks

*Centcom*

If I am going to be in Tampa on Tuesday after I leave Taos, why don't I try to see Tom Franks, if he is there, and have a cup of coffee with him.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081803-18

.....  
Please respond by 8/22/03

*DR* ✓  
*9/3*

*18 AUG 03*

U21664 /03

August 18, 2003

060

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Town Hall Video

Here is the Town Hall videotape back. Repeatedly lately, the tapes I am being given to take home don't work. They are either jumping or they don't even work. This one doesn't even work.

Whoever is doing these is not doing them well, and they are not checking to see if they work, which isn't really very good work. Why don't you talk to them and see if you can't figure out a way to get people to do it better.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081803-19

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

✓  
8/18

Sir -  
PA is going to check each tape before they give it to you. I've also asked Joe Wassel's group to check & clean your VCRs at home, while you & JR are gone. Hopefully that will take care of the problem.

Mr.  
an

18 AUG 03

August 18, 2003

TO: Ken Krieg  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Metrics

108.5

I don't know what your definition of metrics is, but the response to my memo doesn't do it. You need to see weekly, monthly or yearly data that tracks something for metrics. Please let me see what you have.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/12/03 PA&E response to SecDef memo #080503-14

DHR:db  
081803-7

.....

Please respond by 9/5/03

U21666 /03

18 AUG 03

8/14

August 5, 2003

8/12

Sec Def -

We'll brief you.

D, Rite

Larry Di Rita  
8/4

TO: Ken Krieg  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Metrics

DR

Larry Di Rita  
8/4

I don't have any idea what metrics anyone thinks they are using around here.  
Could you please give me a piece of paper that shows me what we are using, what is being developed and why, and let me look at it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080503-14

.....  
Please respond by 8/15/03

✓ 8/18

TWO THINGS FOR YOU TO LOOK AT:

FIRST - A COUPLE OF SLIDES THAT OUTLINE THE "MEASURES" (A MIX OF SOLID OUTPUT MEASURES & ACTIVITIES) THAT WE HAVE BEEN DEVELOPING AROUND THE BALANCED RISK FRAMEWORK

SECOND - FROM LARRY DIRITA, YOU WILL RECEIVE A DRAFT OF THE ANNUAL DEFENSE REPORT WHICH WE HAVE STRUCTURED AROUND THIS FRAMEWORK (BALANCED RISK & SCORECARD).

AS A SIDE NOTE, I (AND A FEW OTHERS) HAVE BEEN MEETING REGULARLY WITH SOME OF THE AGENCIES AND SERVICES AROUND THEIR SCORECARD DEVELOPMENT. IT IS A MIXED BAG BUT SOME GOOD WORK IS BEING DONE. MUCH MORE IF YOU NEED IT. KEN KRIEG

11-L-0559/OSD/19023

KEN KRIEG



# The DoD Balanced Scorecard: Outcome Goals

## Force Management Goals

Ensure sustainable military tempo  
 Maintain workforce satisfaction  
 Shape the force of the future

Maintain quality workforce  
 Maintain reasonable force costs

## Operational Goals

Successful plan and strategy execution  
 Are forces currently ready?

Critical systems sustainment (by exc...)  
 Do we have the force available?

## DoD Framework



## Institutional Goals

Streamline the decision process, drive financial management, and acquisition excellence  
 Improve the readiness and quality of key facilities

Realign support to the Warfighter (including defense agencies)  
 Manage overhead and indirect costs

## Future Challenges

Drive Joint Operations (CONOPS experiments)  
 Define and develop transformation capabilities

Define human at competitive...  
 Develop more effective organization

**OS**

| FORCE MANAGEMENT RISK |
|-----------------------|
| Capability            |

- 1) Quality of Force**
  - AC & RC End strength at 2% of Authorized (QTR)
  - **Recruiting Goals Met**
    - Recruit Quality
    - Critical Skills Recruitment
  - **Retention Goals Met**
    - Numeric Goals
    - Attrition Ceiling
    - Manning levels of Critical Skills
    - Balance NCO Grade & Experience
- 2) Tempo**
  - PERSTEMPO standards met
  - PERSTEMPO across occupational groups
- 3a) Reasonable Cost**
  - MIL force costs
  - CIV force costs
  - Total cost of contractor support
  - Community QoL/capita cost
  - Health care indicators
    - Outpatient market share
    - Primary care provider productivity
    - Medical cost/enrollee
- 3b) Workforce Satisfaction**
  - QoL Commitment Index
  - QoL Social Compact Improvement Index
  - Satisfaction with Military Health Plan
  - Satisfaction with Access
  - Satisfaction with Appointment
- 4) Shape the Force of the Future**
  - Core/non-core divestiture on track (Y/N)?
  - **CIV workforce goals (on track (Y/N)?**
    - Civilian cycle time
    - President's Management Agenda
    - CHRS plan
    - CIV critical skill fill goals
  - **Meet MIL personnel requirements**
    - Transform DoD training
    - MHRS tasks completed
    - New RC management Identify future critical skills
    - Identify optimal officer career patterns

| OPERATIONAL RISK |
|------------------|
| Capability       |

- 1) Do We Have the Forces Available?**
  - Operational Availability Building Blocks
- 2) Are They Postured to Succeed?**
  - Global Basing Study
  - Operational Lessons-Learned
  - Security Cooperation Plans
- 3) Are They Currently Ready?**
  - Defense Readiness Reporting System
  - Current Force Assessment
  - Adaptive Planning
- 4) Are They Employed Consistent w/Strategy?**
  - Analytic Agenda
  - Alternative courses of action
  - Risk metrics for plans, events, etc.
  - Models and simulations and current data

| FUTURE CHALLENGES RISK |
|------------------------|
| Capability             |

- 1) Drive Innovative Operations**
  - Maintain balanced and focused S&T
  - Experiment w/new warfare concepts
- 2) Develop More Effective Organizations**
  - Standing joint force HQ
  - Global joint forces rotation policy
  - Enhance Homeland Defense and Consequence Management
- 3) Define & Develop Transformational Capabilities**
  - Training Transformation
    - Joint Knowledge Development & Distribution Capability
    - Joint National Training Capability
    - Joint Assessment & Enabling Capability
  - Joint Force Experimentation
  - Monitor Service Transformation Plans
  - Monitor the Status of Defense Technology Objectives
  - Exploit the US Intelligence Advantage
    - Make info available on a dependable network
    - Populate the network with dynamic info
    - Deny enemy advantages and exploit weakness
- 4) Define Human Capital Skills & Competencies**
  - Human Skill Sets for a Networked Environment
  - Define and Monitor Key National Capabilities

| INSTITUTIONAL RISK |
|--------------------|
| Capability         |

- 1) Streamline the Decision Process, Drive Financial & Acquisition Excellence**
  - Develop metrics to support Acquisition Excellence goals
  - Increase visibility of trade space in program review
  - Improve transparency of component submissions
  - Provide explicit budget guidance
- 2) Manage Overhead & Direct Costs**
  - Link defense resources to key performance goals
- 3) Improve the Readiness and Quality of Key Facilities**
  - Fund to a 67-year recapitalization rate by 2007
  - Eliminate inadequate family housing by 2007
  - Restore readiness of key facilities by 2010
  - BRAC in FY 2005 (on track Y?N)?
- 4) Realign Support to the Warfighter**
  - MDAP cycle time
  - MDAP acquisition cost growth
  - MDAP O&S cost growth
  - Customer wait time
  - Management reforms (MIDs)

GREEN - WE HAVE A GOOD MEASURE

YELLOW - WE ARE DEVELOPING

RED - WE ARE AT RESEARCH STAGE

08/18/03  
2/4

August 18, 2003

Singapore

SUBJECT: Singapore

I have to solve the problem Lee Kwan Yu raised with me on Singapore and  
Hutchinson.


DHR:dh  
081803-23

U21667 /03

18 AUG 03

11-L-0559/OSD/19026

August 18, 2003

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Security Policy

Here is the Democrat proposal. Is there anything we ought to do about it?

Thanks.

Attach.

"An American Security Policy: Challenge, Opportunity, Commitment" National Security  
Advisory Group, July 2003.

DHR:dh  
081803-25

.....  
*Please respond by* 9/12/03

381

18 Aug 03

U21668 /03

From Sec. Def

Distro: CJCS  
Dr. Wolfowitz  
Feith

# **AN AMERICAN SECURITY POLICY:**

---

## **Challenge, Opportunity, Commitment**

**National Security Advisory Group**  
**July 2003**

**William J. Perry, Chair**

**Madeleine K. Albright, Samuel R. Berger, Louis Caldera,  
Ashton B. Carter, Wesley K. Clark, Michèle A. Flournoy,  
Alfonso E. Lenhardt, John D. Podesta, John M. Shalikashvili,  
Elizabeth D. Sherwood-Randall**

11-L-0559/OSD/19028

August 18, 2003

TO: Pete Geren  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: GAO Authority

Here is an article on GAO having more authority than DoD does on the personnel.  
Please take a look at it. Can we use that?

Thanks.

Attach.

Thompson, Nicholas. "The Watchdog That's Off and Running," *Washington Post*, August 3, 2003, p. B04.

DHR:dh  
081803-26



Please respond by 9/12/03

*230*

*1*

*18 Aug 03*

U21669 /03

C 8/5  
✓ 8/18

P. M...

washingtonpost.com

## The Watchdog That's Off and Running

By Nicholas Thompson

Sunday, August 3, 2003; Page B04

It's no secret that the federal government has a terrible time recruiting young people. To Generations X and Y, Uncle Sam is an old fuddy-duddy who doesn't publicize, doesn't pay and doesn't promote. That's too bad, because this is a particularly bad time for America's youth to be disengaged from what's arguably the most important organization on earth. Within five years, half the current federal workforce will be eligible for retirement. Someone's going to have to fill those jobs, and the country should hope that Uncle Sam can bring in top talent. Because, as we learned on Sept. 11, 2001 -- which might have been prevented if there'd been more imagination at the FBI, the CIA or the INS -- bureaucrats matter.

Unfortunately, the stereotypes are true: Most agencies of the federal government are truly inept at recruiting, hiring and nurturing talented people. But there is one shining exception. Earlier this year, I worked on an investigative project on what the government needs to do to address its personnel and hiring woes. One surprising answer kept coming back with remarkable frequency from experts: The whole government, they said, should emulate the GAO.

That's right, the General Accounting Office. If you think of this as the place staffed by rows upon rows of guys in shirtsleeves wearing green eyeshades, think again. The GAO may possess the least inspiring name in the federal government. It may be housed in possibly the ugliest building in the city: a drab concrete slab originally designed for document storage. It may look and sound like the kind of place that would leach all aspiration out of ambitious young people. But the truth is that GAO is the federal government's happening agency, attracting young recruits with a new, updated message and offering opportunities to match the private sector's. For young management wannabes, it's the government version of top management consulting firm McKinsey.

"Bottom line, GAO offers the rest of the federal government a model of how to recruit right," says Max Stier, president of the Partnership for Public Service, a nonprofit organization that leads efforts to solve the civil service's people problem.

Technically, GAO's mandate is to serve as the investigative, auditing and evaluation arm of Congress; the uncharitable interpretation is that its job is running errands for the legislators on Capitol Hill. But the folks at GAO don't see it that way. A lot of them think of themselves as something of a cross between Upton Sinclair and Lara Croft -- rooting out waste and fraud while having a heck of a good time doing it. It's where people scour government programs such as Medicare and farm loans for waste and inefficiency, bust soldiers who use Pentagon credit cards to pay for lap dances, and even sue the likes of Vice President Dick Cheney over the records from his energy commission.

This derring-do-gooder image seems to have swept onto college campuses, where the most talented students used to wrestle each other in line at the consulting-company booths while frowning at government recruiters. "[GAO] is really creating a buzz," says Phyllis Brust, director of career services at the University of Chicago's Harris School of Public Policy. She said GAO has successfully recruited more people on her campus than any other private or public organization for three of the past four years.

"They do the best job by far," agrees Alexandra Bennett, the assistant career director at Syracuse's

Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, who says she talks to representatives from GAO 25 to 30 times a year. In comparison, her contacts with representatives from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), for instance, have only recently increased to "maybe two or three times" a year.

Last year, there were about 20 applicants for every entry-level analyst opening at GAO, a significantly better number than that for the many other federal agencies that simply post their job openings online and wait for applications to come in. Many other government organizations don't even recruit on campus, having lost any recruiting skills they might have had over nearly a decade of hiring freezes and a couple of decades' worth of presidents bragging more about the government jobs they've cut than the great government jobs people could get. So given Uncle Sam's dismal image as a potential employer, how does GAO do it?

Part of its success is admittedly due to a structural advantage. The agency's head, the comptroller general, serves a 15-year term. This means that the interns who come in with him have the potential to be his trusted advisers by the time he checks out. Most Cabinet heads, by contrast, are on the job two -- maybe four -- years; their low-level recruits stand little chance of becoming valued top-level assistants. Furthermore, in 1980, Congress exempted GAO from much of the government's civil service legislation, allowing it to offer bonuses to top performers and to hire without regard to many of the legal hindrances built into the several-thousand-page federal civil service code.

This is not an uncontroversial issue -- money spent to attract new workers means less money for pay raises, bonuses and cost of living adjustments for longtime workers. And civil service and its protections attract people to government service too. But I think the tradeoff is well worth it. People who come in because they want challenge and opportunities seem more likely to succeed than people who come, and stay, simply because they'll get a raise each year no matter what they do. Our government needs hires with an attitude like Jonathan Meyer, a new employee who joined GAO right after college. He says he always wanted to work for the government, but was attracted to GAO because it doesn't have to follow the lockstep system that mandates that government pay raises and promotions be tied almost exclusively to experience. "You get promoted faster if you do good work here," he says.

Such exemption from civil service rules -- some of which the new Department for Homeland Security shares and which other agencies, such as the Department of Defense, are battling to get -- has also allowed GAO to accelerate its hiring process, limiting the endless series of steps that slow down government hiring to a rate many applicants find intolerable. A June GAO report cites one human resources director of a different major federal agency as saying that processing applications took so long that only one in 20 of the selected candidates were still interested when the agency finally notified them. In contrast, in this fiscal year, more than 75 percent of those selected have taken the jobs GAO offered them.

But GAO's advantage isn't just due to its freedom from stifling and archaic rules. More importantly, the organization in the drab gray building at 441 G St. NW has a leadership team that seems acutely concerned about bringing in top talent -- and holding on to it. Formerly in charge of personnel policies at Arthur Andersen, Comptroller General David Walker comes from a world where recruiting really matters, and he quickly made it one of his top priorities upon assuming his post in 1998. "When you talk about transforming how government does business, you are talking about people strategy more than anything else," he told me.

The agency gets the recruiting details right. If you click on the link that says "careers at GAO" on the organization's Web page, you find questions such as "Why work at GAO?" with links to answers headlined "Our work takes us everywhere" and "When we talk, others listen." By contrast, if you go to



the jobs link on the home page of HUD, for example, you find a couple of tepid paragraphs on working for HUD and a link to another Web site called "USA Jobs," preceded by a weird disclaimer that warns against clicking to any external Web page.

GAO's promotional materials appeal to young people's idealism and patriotism. Its main brochure declares that by joining the agency, young people will work to "ensure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people." The Web site runs a video in which techno music accompanies clips of Dan Rather, Peter Jennings and Tom Brokaw reporting on GAO, various senators extolling it and a diverse array of sharp-looking GAO employees testifying before Congress. It even throws in a GAO-related clip from the TV show "The West Wing" and ends with Walker saying he wants his organization to be a "world-class professional services organization that just happens to be in the government." Such recruiting videos are extremely rare in the federal government, with the exception of the armed services. PPS's Stier calls GAO's a "standout example of how government work can be presented as exciting and important."

Another major factor in GAO's recruiting success is that, unlike most government agencies, it frequently pays back student loans. This means it can effectively increase initial salaries for important recruits, limiting the government's financial disadvantage vis-a-vis the private sector. In 2002, the federal government helped 609 employees pay back their student loans; 84 percent of them worked at either GAO or the State Department, which has also made strong recruiting effort under Colin Powell.

GAO makes sure that every new employee is assigned to at least three different projects in the first two years. This kind of variety and challenge is a particular enticement to Generation X. Polls show that people in their twenties identify "opportunity to develop skills" and "opportunity for promotion" as the top two things they look for in a job, far ahead of benefits or job security, two advantages that have traditionally drawn people into the civil service.

Not everybody, to be sure, is completely on board with GAO's new policies and proposals. Many longstanding employees throughout the federal government, as well as the major federal employee unions, view some of GAO's changes as threatening and counterproductive. Some GAO employees have criticized legislation Walker is seeking that would give GAO even more flexibility over pay. Most controversially, it would allow GAO to refuse any annual pay increases to employees who receive poor ratings from their superiors. But such moves, as Walker points out, would help make the organization more competitive with the private sector.

Nor has the agency fully escaped its roots in the 1950s, when its employees did indeed wear green eyeshades (some of which are now on display in a small museum at headquarters). It still puts out plenty of truly turgid material. One recent 3,200-word report I analyzed used the phrase "human capital" more frequently than the words "of" or "a."

Still, that's not the worst mantra to have in a government where promoting people only in lockstep with their experience seems to be the chief goal of most personnel offices. By bringing good people in at the ground floor, GAO is creating a positive feedback loop of exactly the sort that the federal government needs. Good people come in and do a good job, which makes the place more efficient and exciting, which leads to more good people coming in. That's a great lesson for other federal agencies to absorb as they stumble into what is becoming a very serious federal people problem.

*Author's e-mail:*

(b)(6)

*Nicholas Thompson is a fellow at New America Foundation and has written extensively on civil service reform for the Understanding Government Foundation.*

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August 18, 2003

IRAQ

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Barry Blechman's Suggestions

Please have someone take this Blechman memo and edit our accomplishments, initiatives and priorities to take into account his suggestions. I think they are good.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/13/03 Blechman ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
081803-10

.....

Please respond by 9/5/03

18AUG03

U21670 /03



DFI INTERNATIONAL

Barry M. Blechman  
CEO and President

August 13, 2003

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Room 3E880  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

Someone recently gave me a copy of a chart listing accomplishments and initiatives for the first 30 months and a separate listing of the top priorities for the next 18 months; both listings were attributed to you. If true, you are far too modest. From my vantage point, you've already "transformed" thinking within the Pentagon, bringing about a major shift in the "culture" that dominates the building, and have initiated far-reaching changes in planning, programming, and budgeting processes that will have major effects over time. And this, of course, says nothing of what's most important: your huge accomplishments in the war against terror and in bringing US security policy and military strategy in line with the needs of the world in which we live.

I thought you might be interested in a few comments on accomplishments and priorities to help fine-tune your thinking on them.

I see modernizing the UCP on the accomplishments list, and much has been accomplished, but it's not on the future priorities list and, in my view, the job isn't done yet. A particular difficulty is emerging in integrating homeland defenses (missile and others) with offensive capabilities. To my mind, one command should integrate Strat Com (including space), Northcom, and all homeland defense components, but lesser solutions are feasible *so long as* warning, defense operations, and offensive strike operations are part of an integrated command and control system and placed under the control of a single individual. As the government struggles with the issue, defenses, including missile defenses, so far have not been brought into the equation. (Then there's the long-standing question of the component service commands, but that task is probably best left to the second term.)

✓  
8/18

Donald H. Rumsfeld  
August 13, 2003  
Page 2

The Nuclear Posture Review is also rightfully on the accomplishments list but, again, more needs to be done. While I cannot be certain of this given my outsider's view, it looks to me like implementation is proceeding only slowly, with continuing struggles within the bureaucracy over various issues. One bright spot are the efforts being undertaken by Admiral Ellis at Stratcom to develop appropriate ConOps and to take seriously the Policies' stress on providing a range of options for precision non-nuclear strikes, as well as nuclear capabilities. Acquisition programs pertaining to strategic strike systems, on the other hand, seem to be proceeding with little attention to the major changes envisioned in the new policy.

One last accomplishment needing additional attention, at least as far as one can tell from publicly available information, is the active/reserve components balance. I know internal work is on-going but this is clearly an area screaming for far-reaching reforms. The active/reserve mix is inappropriate for the current and prospective international environment, different kinds of capabilities need to be shifted from one to the other, and means to make reservists more accessible and more closely integrated with active forces are also necessary. (Given the difficult politics of this issue, and the BRAC coming up next year, it too may be best implemented during a second term.)

On the new priorities list, number 5 is counter proliferation, but no detail is offered. Most important, in my view, is *reversing* the progress that North Korea has made toward a significant nuclear capability. As we discussed at the last DPB meeting, the danger here is far worse than the risk of the DPRK sharing weapons or materiel with terrorists or other enemies. A North Korea with significant nuclear weapons – and particularly with a capability to hit the US with them – will be a North Korea emboldened to aggressively pursue its core objective: *unifying the Korean Peninsula under the leadership of Kim Jong Il*. North Korea isn't seeking nuclear weapons to protect its security; it is pursuing them so that it can deter the US from preventing it from defeating the south. (I recently read a study on this subject prepared by Keith Payne's company for Andy Marshall. If you haven't already received a briefing on it, it's worth a ½ hour of your time. [contract # 1435-04-02-CT-85857])

Only China can compel North Korea to de-nuclearize. It can put pressure on the North in any number of ways – and need not ever state that it is doing so. The various negotiations now starting are good cover under which these measures can be taken quietly. While China already has no shortage of reasons to want North Korea de-nuclearized, additional incentive would be provided if it believed that those crazy Americans just might act militarily if the negotiations do not make progress. In this regard, I was dismayed to read Jim Hoagland's assertion in today's *Washington Post* that the administration had reached a consensus that there are no attractive military options in either Iran or Korea. If this claim is accurate, I'm guessing the reason is to reassure the South Koreans and Japanese. But they are the lesser players in this drama, and it would not be difficult to

Donald H. Rumsfeld  
August 13, 2003  
Page 3

make clear indirectly, but publicly, that good military options exist and are definitely a possibility.

I also note that Homeland Security is on the priorities list. One important area that needs attention is the interface between DoD and the various DHS agencies in monitoring the air, sea, and land approaches to the US. What's needed is an integrated system that can identify, monitor, interrogate (through tamper-proof devices) and, when necessary, intercept and inspect any type of penetrator. As usual, the bureaucracy is pursuing all kinds of initiatives but not, what's needed, an integrated comprehensive approach under a single leader who can ensure that resources are combined in an efficient and timely manner. It's an area that could benefit from your and DoD's leadership – particularly given the multiplicity of actors on the DHS side.

Finally, I see "New Concepts of Global Engagement" on the priorities list. Within this area, there is an urgent need for new ConOps for what I'll call stability operations – the kinds of activities now on-going in Iraq and Afghanistan. I believe JFCom has been assigned this responsibility. Current operations will no doubt provide many lessons, but there's a rich history already from interventions in the 1980s and 1990s, the problem has been the Army's reluctance to embrace the mission. Hopefully, General Schoomaker will now cause the Service to take it more seriously.

I hope you find these thoughts helpful. The main point is that your accomplishments have been amazing.

Sincerely,



August 18, 2003

000.3

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Prayer

Before we have to do a prayer another time, here is a good one that could be worked on.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/12/03 Prayer by Josephine Robertson

DHR:dh  
081803-6

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

U21671 /03

18 AUG 03

Sir,

From my quiet time this morning, a prayer for you, I thought:

"We thank thee for the courage of those who are called upon to lead and, in leading, to stand alone. Help us to appreciate the cost to the individual of those who renounce much to serve their fellow men, and may we, as we can, give them support. In the name of One who stood alone for all mankind."

Written by Josephine Robertson  
*Meditations on Garden Themes*

With great respect, and always in support,  
NP  
8/12/03



August 18, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DL  
SUBJECT: Democracy for Schools

Please see that Congressman Wolf has the information in the attached memo from Doug Feith.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/13/03 USD(P) memo to SecDef re: Info on Democracy for Schools

DHR:dh  
081403-22

.....  
Please respond by 8/29/03

U21672 /03

18Aug03

INFO MEMO

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

*FOR SANDY HODGKINSON*

SUBJECT: Info on Democracy for Schools

- You asked us to look at getting material on democracy into Iraqi schools.
- CPA reachback office in the Pentagon passed your request to the Senior Advisor for the Ministry of Education in Baghdad, Jim Nelson. He has examined the issue and is taking the following action:
  - Considering the model of democracy education developed by the Kurds for incorporation into the education system.
  - Met with Sandy Hodgkinson, CPA Director for Human Rights within the Office of Human Rights and Transitional Justice, to gather materials from that Office's democracy program. Considering a similar program to incorporate in school curriculum.
  - Developed a strategic plan for the Education Ministry that includes textbook revision, teacher training in tolerance and human rights, and the development of an educational reform agenda.
- Mr. Nelson and the Ministry of Education recognize that it will be necessary to change attitudes among teachers, retire many of those who represent old ways of thinking, and recruit new teachers in order to introduce new concepts, improve the quality of education, and lay the foundation for educational reform.
- The CPA is actively working these issues and will provide additional information after completing their review of available products.

DUSD (NESA)

*Chopped  
29 July 03*

11-L-0559/OSD/19041

CR8114

EX-5569  
I-03/067833

June 2, 2003 7:19 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
cc: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Info on Democracy for Schools

Frank Wolfe said that they need some material on democracy to put in the schools, that there is a vacuum. They need information. Let's get on that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
053003-5

.....

Please respond by 6/05/03

cc Terry Bremer

Sir,  
Response attached.  
V/COR Nosenzo  
B/H

06-03-03 17:29 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/19042

August 19, 2003

*routed to SP*

390

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: David Chu  
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Rotation Multiples

I found the discussion on rotation multiples interesting. I have never understood it. I understand it even less today.

If I am not mistaken, the Army and the Air Force currently have a four- or five-to-one rotation, depending on how one counts. The Navy and the Marines currently have a three-to-one rotation.

It seems to me that we ought to get a set of common definitions and some common counting rules, and then each Service ought to put down on a piece of paper very simply why it is they think they need those multiples, and what they think could be done to reach lower multiples.

Please assign that and get back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081403-20

.....


Please respond by 9/5/03

18 AUG 03

U21673 /03

August 14, 2003

012

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Library of Congress Opinion

We are going to have to get the information from the Library of Congress as to whether or not, from a tax standpoint, I can use my foundation to pay them for the digitization of all of those personal papers. I may want to try to do it this year, since I have to distribute a certain amount out of the foundation.

I would like to get closure on it. I don't want to wait until the last month of the year, so let's really press ahead on it. I feel like months have gone by since I met with those folks and said I wanted to get going. No one has gotten back to me. I have to get it done.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081403-4

.....

Please respond by 9/5/03

14 AUG 03

U21674 /03

August 14, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG Craddock  
CC: Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Calendar/Travel

*Advanced copy sent to Col. Bucci*

33350

Friday, August 15. I will plan to do my PDB at 9:00 a.m. for one hour at my house. I need a phone number I can call to cancel it, in the event I decide I cannot be there,

Thursday, August 21. We should depart DC in time to land in either Livingston or Bozeman by 4:00 pm or 4:30 p.m. We will stay in Livingston Thursday night, do some things all day Friday, August 22, and then leave in time to get to Taos by dusk—6:00 p.m. or something like that.

Weekend of September 12-13. I have a choice—I could either go to New York on Friday, September 12, and do an editorial board or a speech someplace, or just relax and go to dinner with Joyce; or I could go up on Saturday morning, September 13, do the event and come back that evening. I don't know what the schedule is for that day. Have we ever heard from those people?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081403-5

.....  
Please respond by 8/15/03


14 AUG 03

U21675 /03

August 14, 2003

Greece

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: E-mail to Ambassador Miller

Please e-mail Tom Miller:

*I am not going to be in Europe in August, but I might be passing through in the fall and will keep your thought about Souda Bay in mind.*

*Hope things are going well.*

DHR:dh  
081403-1

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

14 AUG 03

U21676 /03

Sir - Message for you from Amb Tom Miller RE: Your upcoming trip.

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

**From:** Ioannou, Madeleine B [IoannouMB@state.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, August 14, 2003 4:03 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@pentagon.mil  
**Cc:** 'Steven.bucci@osd.pentagon.smil.mil'  
**Subject:** Office of the Ambassador

The following message was dictated by Ambassador Thomas J. Miller, Embassy of the United States of America, Athens, Greece:

Dear (b)(6)

I heard through my grapevine that Secretary Rumsfeld is planning a trip to the Middle East in the near future. While I have no details as to timing (even if I did I would not want to discuss them in an unclassified message), if the timing fits I'd appreciate if you would suggest to him the possibility of stopping at our very important naval/air facility in Souda Bay on the southern Greek island of Crete. This facility was extremely important during Iraqi Freedom and I know a visit from SecDef would be deeply appreciated. I'd be pleased to fly down to meet him as well. I have to come back to the U.S. August 25-27 and then have some meetings in Germany August 28. I'd love to be there if he does stop in Souda, so if his travel is in this period, maybe we could just make it another time.

All the best,

Tom Miller

P.S.: You should know that Souda is often a refueling stop for military aircraft traveling to and from the Middle East.

This message was transmitted by:  
Madeleine Bennett Ioannou  
Personal Assistant to the Ambassador  
Embassy of the United States of America  
Athens, Greece  
Phone: (b)(6)  
E-mail: IoannouMB@state.gov



August 14, 2003

000.4

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Pentagon Memorial

Someone should keep me posted on how the fundraising is going for the memorial. I guess the deadline is September 11, so by September 5, I would like to know where they are.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081403-6

.....

Please respond by 9/5/03

U21677 /03

14 AUG 03

11-L-0559/OSD/19048

August 14, 2003

322

TO: Dov Zakheim  
 CC: Ken Krieg  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Funding for AOR Combatant Commands

*9/12*  
~~SECRET~~

In the future, I want to get involved in the allocation of funds for the combatant commands.

Next, I wonder why there isn't any funding for Joint Forces Command.

These allocations do not look right to me. On what basis are they made? Please advise.

Thanks.

Attach.  
 8/5/03 USD(C) memo to SecDef re: Money Allocated for AOR Combatant Commands (COCOMS)

DHR:db  
081403-8

.....

Please respond by 9/5/03

*9/4*  
response attached

U21678 103

14 AUG 03

7/8  
1330



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 SEP -8 AM 6:34

INFO MEMO

September 5, 2003, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Money Allocated for AOR Combatant Commands (COCOMs)

- You asked for the basis of the funding levels of the regional COCOMs that we provided to you previously.
- We have identified the major Operations and Maintenance (O&M) expenses in FY 2003 below for each COCOM as provided in the FY 2004 President's Budget submission. Each COCOM's O&M funding is allocated through their executive agent. O&M primarily funds administrative and logistics support of the headquarters, for example:
  - Central Command (\$102.0 million): Headquarters operations, communications including Joint Communications Support Element and headquarters communications; General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) activities.
  - European Command (\$192.4 million): Headquarters operations; intelligence and counter-intelligence activities.
  - Northern Command (\$90.0 million): Headquarters operations, security programs.
  - Pacific Command (\$116.4 million): Headquarters operations; GDIP activities.
  - Southern Command (\$107.7 million): Headquarters operations including State Partnership program, Unit/Individual Exchange program, Distinguished Visitor/Observers program, Antiterrorism/Force Protection training.

Comparable funding levels for the other COCOMS are:

(O&M Dollars in Millions)

| <u>Combatant Command (Executive Agent)</u> | <u>FY 2003</u> | <u>FY 2004</u> | <u>FY 2005</u> |
|--|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Joint Forces Command (Navy)                | 130.2          | 254.8          | 264.9          |
| Transportation Command (Air Force)         | 16.4           | 15.6           | 14.1           |
| Strategic Command (Air Force)              | 202.6          | 287.7          | 312.2          |

|                       |             |
|-----------------------|-------------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA |             |
| SR MA CRADDOCK        |             |
| MA BUCCI              |             |
| EXE/SEC WARRINT       | 0050<br>7/8 |

11

U14879 03

- The above cost estimates do **not** include:
  - Contingency funding from supplementals and the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund,
  - Military personnel assigned to work at the COCOM headquarters,
  - Procurement costs for joint communications systems or GDIP investments,
  - Additional funding that may be provided to the COCOMs throughout the year of execution.
  
- You also asked how you could get involved in the allocation of funds for the COCOMS. My staff, in coordination with the Joint Staff, will be reviewing and assessing the COCOM Budget Change Proposals (BCPs) which will be submitted through the Military Department Executive Agents during the upcoming review. This will allow you to provide direction or decisions on the most urgent COCOM requirements.
  
- In addition, U.S. Central Command requested a review of DoD Directive 5100.3 which defines the role of the Service Executive Agent. My staff is developing a response to this request, in consultation with the Joint Staff and PA&E, which would clarify procedures for addressing urgent COCOM resource needs during the execution year. New procedures would allow for your increased involvement in evaluating routine requirements for COCOM logistics and administrative support.

RECOMMENDATION: None. Provided for your information.

COORDINATION: Attached.

Prepared By: John Evans, (b)(6)

**COORDINATION PAGE**

The Joint Staff (J8)

RDML Daily

September 3, 2003

11-L-0559/OSD/19052

August 14, 2003

701

TO: LTG John Craddock  
 CC: Col. Bucci  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Medicare Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund

Please set a date for me to have Dov Zakheim or somebody brief me on this military retirement fund on page two of his memo.

Thanks.

Attach.  
 8/8/03 USD(C) memo to SecDef re: Weekly Report 8/8/03 [U13538/03]

DHR:dh  
 081403-11



Please respond by 9/12/03

14 AUG 03

U21679 /03



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 AUG - 6 PM 6:36

8/14

INFO MEMO

August 8, 2003, 5:00 PM

COMPTROLLER

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *DZ*

SUBJECT: Weekly Report 08/08/03

|                       |         |
|-----------------------|---------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA | 7/12    |
| SR MA CRADDOCK        | 8/12    |
| MA BUCCI              | 7/28/12 |
| EXECSEC MARRIOTT      | 8/11    |

- **CPA Requirements:** Ambassador Bremer continues to emphasize his 2004 reconstruction requirements. He has provided preliminary budget estimates of \$16 billion which we are beginning to review. In particular, we will require detailed justification to accompany the raw numbers. The key issue remains to determine how a request for this additional funding will fit into the congressional appropriation calendar. None of the FY 2004 appropriation bills have been completed, creating a significant challenge for both houses of Congress when they return. The Defense appropriation bill is scheduled to go to conference on 22-23 September. I will work with OMB to develop a strategy that best serves everyone's interests.

[I have told this to Jerry]

- **Iraq Donors' Conference:** The Core Group on Iraq Reconstruction (USG, UNDG, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, UAE, Japan, EC and Italy) agreed to convene a Donors' Conference on Iraq in Madrid, Spain on October 23/24. In preparation, the Core Group will hold a face-to-face meeting in Brussels on September 3. Depending on the level of other agency representation, either I or my deputy, David Norquist, will attend this preliminary meeting. I will send you a memo suggesting that either you or the Deputy attend the conference on October 24. Secretaries Powell and Snow plan to attend. Secretary General Kofi Annan is also being invited.

*Bad timing - same time as Korea/Japan trip*

- **Pakistani Stability Forces:** I am making an intense effort to get these troops in country, and am in contact with Pakistan's finance ministry.

- **Foreign Frozen Assets:** I am working with John Taylor (Treasury) to "un-freeze" assets in the Arab world.

• **CPA:**

- The seventh shipment of vested funds will depart Andrews AFB on Sunday. A total of \$238.9M will be flown directly to Baghdad. Most of these funds will be used to pay Iraqi civilian workers' salaries. Per the Department of Justice (DoJ), there is no impediment to transferring these funds from the vested assets account to fulfill the needs expressed by the CPA, despite ongoing legal proceedings involving former Gulf War POWs.

- DoJ expects the plaintiffs in the POWs' case to file a motion to expedite their hearing in the appellate court. If the court agrees, the case will likely be heard at the end of August. Separately, the case of the 9/11 victims in New York who won their suit against the Iraqi government for \$63 million should reach a final

11-L-0559/OSD/19054

U13538 / 03

decision in September. Until a final decision is made, \$63 million in vested funds must remain in the U.S.

- **International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB):** I sent representatives to Baghdad for negotiations with the World Bank, United Nations, International Monetary Fund and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development regarding the IAMB and its auditing role for the Development Fund for Iraq. My staff worked with OGC and CPA staff to keep the scope of the IAMB consistent with UNSCR 1483 and not allow its work to interfere with the CPA.
- **Auditable financial statements:** I met with Joe Schmitz to develop a strategy for achieving a favorable audit opinion on our financial statements by FY 2007. I am tasking the Military Departments and Defense Agencies to prepare their plans by October 31, 2003.
- **Military Retirement Fund:** I am evaluating our investment strategy for the Medicare Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund, based on a recent report by the DoD IG and a subsequent story in Bloomberg News. I am establishing an advisory committee of investment experts to oversee our approach in the investment of the \$217 billion in these funds.
- **Executive Agency:** CENTCOM proposes that the directive governing Executive Agency be rewritten to broaden Service responsibilities related to funding combatant command and non-contingency operations, to include theater engagement. I am working with PA&E and the Joint Staff to determine the appropriate vehicle for addressing CENTCOM's concerns in this year's PPBE process.
- **Iraq "Tin Cup":** I have attached my weekly report on contributions for Iraq.
- **DCAA: Mr. Bill Reed, Director of DCAA, reports:**
  - DCAA is conducting interviews of Subject Matter Experts throughout Iraq on the SAIC Iraq Reconstruction and Development Council (IRDC) contract. The Contracting Officer's Technical Representative is concerned SAIC IRDC personnel may not be qualified for assigned tasks, may not be working in their assigned ministry, and that terminations of IRDC personnel are not taking place in a timely manner. We anticipate completing our interviews within three weeks.
  - An issue raised in a DCAA audit report several years ago is nearing resolution. On July 21, 2003, United Technologies (UTC) appealed a unanimous appeals court decision that favored the U.S. Government. The decision supports the DCAA position that UTC was required to include costs of its collaboration partners in its overhead allocation bases. UTC's exclusion of these costs resulted in overcharging the Government by approximately \$772 million, with an additional \$30 million interest expense accruing annually.
  - DCAA recommended to the CPA General Counsel that DCAA assist in the review of the Oil for Food (OFF) Program. The OFF North (region) Transition Team (comprised of DCMA, DoDIG, and CPA/Ministry of Trade) will commence work next week.
- **DFAS:** Mr. Tom Bloom, Director of DFAS, reports that DFAS hosted the annual Navy military pay operations conference in Cleveland. The theme of the conference



was "Transformation of Navy Military Pay and Personnel". The event provided a forum to share strategies, initiatives, and tactics to improve financial and personnel support.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment: As stated.

Iraq Humanitarian Assistance and Reconstruction Assistance  
Contributions Update As of 8 August 2003

A. What was offered/confirmed in the past week:

| Country/Organization | Recent Pledges              | Offered/confirmed in the past week  |
|----------------------|-----------------------------|---|
| Czech Republic       | Dollar value not calculated | (U) The People in Need foundation, CR-based NGO, is proceeding with the reconstruction of the first five Public Health Centers. |

B. Offers of Assistance.

**Totals. As of July 30, total non-military assistance is \$2.8 billion.**

- The UN reports humanitarian assistance of \$2.341 billion of which:
  - \$1.3 billion is pledges and contributions from the international community, and
  - \$1.0 billion is funded through the UN's Oil for Food Programme\*.
- In addition, several nations have made public commitments of over \$0.5 billion in assistance in excess of those reported by the UN.

\* The UN official financial data is changed to detail the Oil for Food Programme amounts separate from the NGOs/International Organizations.

**Top Twelve.** The twelve largest offers/pledges of assistance to Iraq are:

|                          |         |
|--------------------------|---------|
| United States            | \$565.3 |
| United Kingdom *         | \$335.1 |
| Canada *                 | \$215.0 |
| Japan                    | \$101.8 |
| Australia                | \$60.6  |
| Germany *                | \$56.0  |
| Norway *                 | \$55.0  |
| Denmark *                | \$54.0  |
| Korea*                   | \$50.0  |
| United Arab Emirates * * | \$47.6  |
| Saudi Arabia             | \$36.6  |
| Spain                    | \$32.3  |

\* Government's publicly announced pledge, which is greater than UN reported number.

\*\* Information passed by UAE to DoD, which is greater than UN reported number.


### C. UN Appeal

- **Inside vs. Outside the UN Appeal.** Of the \$2.341 billion in total offers of assistance as of July 30, 2003, \$2 billion in humanitarian assistance has been offered/donated in response to the UN Appeals. On March 28, the UN Flash Appeal requested \$2.2 billion for urgent humanitarian requirements. The June 23<sup>rd</sup> UN Appeal requested an additional \$259 million for a total UN appeal amount of \$2.459 billion. The amount pledged equates to 81 percent of the \$2.459 billion requested in the UN Flash Appeals.
  
- **Sector Breakout of UN Appeal Response.** By sector, the \$2 billion pledged within the Flash appeal breaks out as follows:
  - Agriculture \$18.5 million, (Lead donor – UK, Oil for Food)
  - Coordination and Support Services \$70.5 million, (Lead Donors – U.S., U.K.)
  - Economic Recovery and Infrastructure \$20.7 million, (Lead Donors – U.K., Japan)
  - Education \$40.5 million, (Lead Donor – Japan, U.S.)
  - Food \$1,479.0 million, (Lead Donors – Oil-for-Food, U.S.)
  - Health \$58.0 million, (Lead donors – U.S., U.K.)
  - Mine Action \$18.7 million, (Lead donors – Germany, Canada, U.K.)
  - Multi-Sector \$257.7 million, (Lead donors – U.S., Japan, Australia)
  - Protection/Human Rights/Rule of Law \$5.7 million, (Private/NGO, Denmark)
  - Security \$1.9 million, (Lead donors – Canada, Netherlands)
  - Water and Sanitation \$28.8 million, (Lead donors – UK, US)

In addition, numerous countries have contributed to coalition military operations in Iraq with basing rights, over-flight rights, fuel, and other logistical support not included in the figures above. While the dollar value of some of those contributions has not yet been calculated, the assistance is enormously important.

August 14, 2003

032

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Legislative Strategy

I think we need to develop a legislative strategy with respect to the committee on privacy that works with Jim Haynes. Newt Minow is the chairman of it.

Please get with Jim, and let's figure out what we do. I think if they did some work on the Hill, we could manage to get through without more bumps. But if they don't do work on the Hill, we won't. We are behind the curve.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081403-13



Please respond by 9/5/03

U21680 /03

14Aug03

August 14, 2003

413.51

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Cyberspace Attacks

My understanding is that OMB is engaging the cyberspace attacks issue—there is a national security exemption—but they are reviewing it.

Are you knowledgeable about this?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081403-14

.....  
Please respond by 9/5/03

U21681 /03

14 AUG 03

TAB A

August 14, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Detainees

383.6

I just read this piece from the *London Daily Telegraph* on Guantanamo. I wonder if we have given any thought to going up and asking for legislation as to how we should treat the detainees, so we get off the hook legally.

Thanks.

Attach.

"The Guantanamo Solution," *London Daily Telegraph*, August 13, 2003

DHR:dh  
081403-12

.....  
Please respond by 9/5/03

Copy of CTCs  
Response  
TEN  
11/6

14AUG03

Tab A

U21682 /03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999  
INFO MEMO

CM-1315-03  
31 October 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, USAF, CJCS *RBW/p/s*

SUBJECT: Legislation on Treatment of Detainees

- **Question (TAB A).** I wonder if we have given any thought to going up and asking legislation as to how we should treat the detainees, so we get off the hook legally.
- **Answer.** I agree in OGC's analysis (TAB B) that the advantages of seeking legislation regarding the treatment of detainees are outweighed by the disadvantages. There are a few additional amplifying points that I believe are important.
- **Analysis.**
  - Pursuant to DOD policies, several levels of review regarding detainee status and detention are already in place. While improvements can always be made, the current system is refined and mature enough to reduce arbitrariness in the treatment of detainees.
  - As the memo notes, legislation may unduly limit the President's authority to act regarding detainees. Similarly, legislation could severely hamper a commander's ability to conduct military missions since flexibility is required to appropriately respond to the changing battlespace he or she may encounter.
  - If Congress viewed treatment of detainees to be arbitrary, numerous programs and initiatives exist to "reach out" to modify that view. Examples include Congressional Delegation visits to Guantanamo Bay, briefings and information on detainees to various congressional personnel and committees, and the proposed "public diplomacy" initiative awaiting final implementation. Increasing our efforts in these areas would assist in reducing any perception of arbitrariness in the treatment of detainees.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Prepared By: CAPT Hal Dronberger, USN; OCJCS/LC; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/19062

London Daily Telegraph  
August 13, 2003

## The Guantanamo Solution

President Bush and Donald Rumsfeld, the US Defence Secretary, have been unfairly maligned in this country for their decision to put terrorist suspects on trial in Guantanamo Bay.

Paradoxically, their difficulties stem not so much from their alleged illiberalism as from a desire to maintain some measure of due process in a time of a new and horrific kind of asymmetric warfare.

The Bush Administration has been wrestling with the problem - not dissimilar to that faced by Whitehall during the early years of the Troubles in Northern Ireland - about whether to treat suspects as prisoners of war or common criminals. His dilemma was understandable. Had he called them PoWs, he would have been obliged by the Geneva Conventions to release them at the end of hostilities.

But when can a war against global terrorism be said to be at an end? With the fall of the Taliban? With the deposition of Saddam? Mr Bush had every reason to believe - he still has - that, if he were to release the prisoners in Camp Delta, a great many of them would return immediately to the war against the West, and plot a new atrocity like the destruction of the Twin Towers. That was something that no responsible leader could countenance.

But if he could not call his captives PoWs, nor could he treat them quite like common criminals. Under the US Constitution, criminal suspects have to be put on trial, and judged according to the rules of evidence. Any competent defence lawyer would make short work of testimony gathered from secret sources or from prisoners held for many months, in harsh conditions, without access to lawyers.

Mr Bush's liberal instincts told him that it was wrong to hold possibly innocent men for long periods without trial. But, equally, he knew that no ordinarily conducted criminal trial could be expected to result in a conviction, no matter how guilty the defendant might be.

So it was that the President hit upon the idea of treating them neither as PoWs nor as criminals, but as something in between. He decided to put them on trial by military tribunal, and instructed his Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, to draft special rules of evidence and procedure that would make convictions more likely than in a civilian court. In so doing, he landed himself in the worst of all possible worlds.

Mr Rumsfeld's rules, drafted on March 21, 2002, are not nearly as illiberal as his critics maintain. They include many safeguards of the rights of the defendant. But the fact is that they fall well short of the standards of justice required by civilian courts in both Britain and America.

By being as liberal and fair-minded as he dared, Mr Bush succeeded only in making himself look more authoritarian than he appeared before he suggested trials of any sort. The British Government, which has never wanted responsibility for British prisoners held in Camp Delta, has been forced into the hypocritical position of defending the rights of its citizens against Mr Bush.

Only a fool would dispute that Mr Bush was right to hold and interrogate prisoners while they might still have useful information about planned terrorist atrocities. But the longer their detention goes on, in this limbo between PoW and criminal status, the less justified it seems to many in this country.

Tab A



The answer, surely, lies not in subjecting the prisoners to military tribunals, but in regularising their status under the law. During the Second World War, many Germans and Italians were humanely interned in Britain, under a form of administrative detention that made no comment on their guilt or innocence of Nazi sympathies. The prisoners in Guantanamo Bay should be treated like that.

Tab A

TAB B



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

September 22, 2003, 5:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II *WJ Haynes*

SUBJECT: Legislation on Treatment of Detainees

- In light of the August 13, 2003 Daily Telegraph article entitled "The Guantanamo Solution" you asked whether we have thought about seeking legislation regarding how we should treat the detainees. Tab A.
- The disadvantages of seeking such legislation far outweigh the advantages of seeking such legislation. Nevertheless, more interaction with Congress and the public on this issue could help us and could be achieved through means other than seeking legislation.
- *Reasons to Seek Legislation.*
  - Seeking legislation offers the prospect of additional legitimacy for the continued detention and treatment of the individuals held at Guantanamo Bay (GTMO).
  - The President acts at the height of his power when he acts with congressional authorization.
  - Legislation could reduce arbitrariness and the appearance of arbitrariness in the detention and treatment of detainees.
- *Reasons Not to Seek Legislation.*
  - The President has the legal authority to detain those individuals currently being held at GTMO and to determine the course of their treatment without congressional authorization.
    - Determinations about the detention and treatment of enemies detained during an armed conflict are tactical determinations made in prosecuting a war. The Constitution vests in the President *alone* the ability to make such determinations.
  - Executive branch practice is an important factor in judicial determinations regarding the scope of presidential power. If the President seeks legislation

03 OCT 2003 7:11



Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/19065

when he does not need to do so, he may limit his legal authority as well as the legal authority of future Presidents to act in a similar manner absent congressional authorization.

- Moreover, the President is already acting at the height of his authority in the current context.
  - Congress has authorized the President to detain individuals held at GTMO through its authorization of the use of force, permitting him “to use all necessary and appropriate force” against those responsible for the September 11 attacks and to prevent future such attacks against the United States. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1541 Note (2001).
  - Even if Congress had not expressly authorized the President to detain such individuals, it has done so tacitly through similar authorizations and permitting unbroken executive practice of such detention. As a result, the President would still be acting at the height of his authority.
    - Through the Alien Enemies Act of 1789, 10 U.S.C. § 21, which remains in force today, Congress has authorized the detention and removal of enemy aliens.
    - There is an unbroken history of the President’s authority as Commander in Chief to detain enemy combatants.
- As a matter of policy, seeking legislation would also bear substantial risks.
  - There is no way to predict the rules that Congress would impose.
  - The legislation potentially could limit the President’s ability to react to new intelligence and his ability to gather intelligence from those detained at GTMO.
  - Seeking legislation from Congress regarding the detention of those at GTMO may also expose the military commission process to legislative efforts to dictate the rules and procedures to be used by the commissions.
- *Alternative to Seeking Legislation.* The reduction of arbitrariness and the appearance of arbitrariness can be accomplished through actions undertaken by the Department.
  - The Department could adopt a plan for the periodic review of the need for continued detention of those individuals detained at GTMO, which could reduce any arbitrariness present in the current system.
    - The appearance of arbitrariness could be reduced through making that plan public, to the maximum practicable.
    - As you may recall, I briefed you a few weeks ago on a concept for such a process. Tab B. We are currently seeking views within the

Department on that concept, which we revised based on comments received in the briefing. Tab C.

- Reaching out to Congress in ways other than seeking legislation may be helpful to us.
  - We need not seek legislation in order to reach out to Congress.
  - There is value in going to the Hill and inviting their informal participation, such as in seeking their comment on any long-term detention plan that we might wish to adopt.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared by: Jennifer L. Koester, DoD OGC, (b)(6)

TAB C


COORDINATION SHEET

| <b>AGENCY</b>       | <b>NAME</b> | <b>DATE</b>      |
|---------------------|-------------|------------------|
| US Southern Command | Col Stone   | October 23, 2003 |
| US Central Command  | Mr. Hammil  | October 22, 2003 |

Tab C

11-L-0559/OSD/19068

August 14, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Detainees


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Attach.  
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DHR:dh  
081403-12

.....  
Please respond by 9/5/03





GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

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    - Determinations about the detention and treatment of enemies detained during an armed conflict are tactical determinations made in prosecuting a war. The Constitution vests in the President *alone* the ability to make such determinations.
  - Executive branch practice is an important factor in judicial determinations regarding the scope of presidential power. If the President seeks legislation



11-L-0559/OSD/19070

when he does not need to do so, he may limit his legal authority as well as the legal authority of future Presidents to act in a similar manner absent congressional authorization.

- Moreover, the President is already acting at the height of his authority in the current context.
  - Congress has authorized the President to detain individuals held at GTMO through its authorization of the use of force, permitting him “to use all necessary and appropriate force” against those responsible for the September 11 attacks and to prevent future such attacks against the United States. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1541 Note (2001).
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COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared by: Jennifer L. Koester, DoD OGC, (b)(6)

**TAB**

**A**

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August 13, 2003

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But when can a war against global terrorism be said to be at an end? With the fall of the Taliban? With the deposition of Saddam? Mr Bush had every reason to believe - he still has - that, if he were to release the prisoners in Camp Delta, a great many of them would return immediately to the war against the West, and plot a new atrocity like the destruction of the Twin Towers. That was something that no responsible leader could countenance.

But if he could not call his captives PoWs, nor could he treat them quite like common criminals. Under the US Constitution, criminal suspects have to be put on trial, and judged according to the rules of evidence. Any competent defence lawyer would make short work of testimony gathered from secret sources or from prisoners held for many months, in harsh conditions, without access to lawyers.

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11-L-0559/OSD/19074

The answer, surely, lies not in subjecting the prisoners to military tribunals, but in regularising their status under the law. During the Second World War, many Germans and Italians were humanely interned in Britain, under a form of administrative detention that made no comment on their guilt or innocence of Nazi sympathies. The prisoners in Guantanamo Bay should be treated like that.

**TAB**

**B**

# **Long-Term Detention of High Threat Individuals in the Global War on Terrorism**

Briefing to GCs-JAGs

September 3, 2003

Prepared by: DoD OGC

9/5/2003 8:51 AM

For Official Use Only

1

11-L-0559/OSD/19077

# Overview

- The Likely Need for Long-Term Detention of High Threat Individuals
- Conditions of Confinement
- The Need for a New Review Process for Long-Term Detention
- Transparency
- Options for Long-Term Detention Review Process

# Assumptions

- There may be detainees whom we must consider continuing to detain, who are unlikely to be transferred or tried.
  - Pursuant to the laws of armed conflict, the United States can detain enemy combatants until the end of the conflict.
  - The current conflict may be lengthy.
- Few people are aware of the scrutiny applied in the decision to detain each individual.
  - There is substantial value in making public current and proposed processes.
  - There may be value in inviting external examination of current and proposed processes.



## Assumptions (cont.)

- Some are uneasy with the rigor with which the current processes have been used, which suggests a need for to reevaluate those processes.
- An examination of long-term detention *conditions* may be warranted.

# The Likely Need for Long-Term Detention

- The enemy is much more likely than in previous conflicts to rejoin the conflict upon release.
- The conflict is also more likely to be lengthy.
- We must seriously consider detaining some detainees for a lengthy period of time because they pose a high threat.
  - That detention serves to prevent those detainees from carrying out attacks against the United States.
  - It is not intended as punishment.
- We have the legal authority to detain these individuals until the end of the conflict.

# Long-Term Detention

- There is no generally accepted definition of long-term detention.
- The long-term detention addressed here is the detention of persons occurring beyond their ability to provide timely, actionable intelligence.
- Long-term detention may mean detention lasting several years or longer.

# Conditions of Long-Term Detention

- Long-Term Detention is *preventive* detention.
- Providing the same conditions for long-term detention as those provided for incarceration pursuant to a sentence imposed by a military commission will blur the lines between punishment and preventive detention.
- The conditions of long-term detention should therefore differ from the conditions of imprisonment in a way that demonstrates that the detention is not punishment.
- Absent a distinction, upon their eventual release long-term detainees may pose a greater threat to our national security.
- Thus, the conditions of long-term detention should be examined.

# The Practical Need for a New Review Process

- The current screening processes are not set up to review the long-term detention of detainees.
  - Those processes focus on Enemy Combatant (EC) status.
  - The continued detention of high threat individuals is solely a question of *dangerousness*, not EC status.
- The threat posed by an individual could change during his detention.
- Absent a mechanism indicating that release is a possibility, we may risk creating a detainee population that has nothing to lose, which may in turn create a risk to the security of our service personnel charged with guarding the population.

# The Institutional Need for a New Review Process

- Instituting a review process would ensure that we act consistent with American values by placing a check on arbitrariness and the potential for arbitrariness by the Executive Branch.
- Periodic reexamination is intrinsically valuable because it further legitimates continued detention.
  - It is more principle-based.
  - It is more demonstrably principle-based.

# Transparency

- Our current review processes have not been made public.
- If the review process selected is not made public:
  - no reduction in the appearance of arbitrariness will occur.
  - no legitimacy will be derived from periodic review.
- The review process selected thus must be made public.
- Consultation with outside experts on the processes for and the conditions of long-term detention may be worthwhile.
  - Such experts could include experts in terrorism, mental health, and prison management.

# **Options for a New Review Process**

Options for reviewing the long-term detention of high-threat detainees include:

- (1) An administrative review board established to review the need for continued detention; or
- (2) Combatant Commander modified to review the need for continued detention.



# **(1) Administrative Review Board**

- The administrative review board (the board) would:
  - serve as a finder-of-fact on one question: Does the detainee remain a threat to the United States?
  - recommend to the Secretary, in writing, whether detention should be continued.
- It would not determine whether to release a detainee. That determination would rest:
  - with the Secretary,
  - if the Secretary deems it appropriate, with an inter-agency review process, or
  - with the Secretary's delegate, who should be a senior civilian appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

# Board Hearings

- Hearings would be non-adversarial.
  - Investigators would present all available information without the presence of the detainee.
  - The board would provide the detainee with the information presented against him insofar as it was consistent with national security.
  - Detainee would present separately why he is not a threat.
  - Detainee would be assigned a JAG to offer him assistance in presenting his case.
    - The JAG would not be advocate for the detainee.
- The board could request additional fact-finding.

# Ombudsman

- An ombudsman would oversee the board process.
  - The ombudsman would have access to all materials presented to and prepared by the board.
  - The ombudsman would be permitted to attend all hearings.
- The ombudsman would be selected by:
  - the Secretary, or
  - the Secretary's delegate, who should be an senior civilian appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and has not part of the review process.
- The ombudsman would report to the Secretary or his delegate any inadequacies in the review process.

# Advantages of the Board

- May review detention more stringently than current process.
- Diminishes potential for and appearance of arbitrariness in the continued detention of individuals.
- Likely to achieve broader acceptance because:
  - it is analogous to procedures used for long-term detention internationally and
  - it is analogous to procedure used in the United States, both in wartime and peacetime.

# Disadvantages of the Board

- It will impose additional costs, including the cost of:
  - personnel (both as board members and in the implementation of the review),
  - periodic psychological assessments of detainees,
  - periodic investigations, and
  - additional investigations that the board requests.
- It will require the development and issuance of additional detailed guidance.

# Combatant Commander

- Advantages:
  - The system is already in place and running and would require minor modifications to use for reviewing long-term detention.
  - It may impose fewer additional costs than those imposed by adopting the review board system.
- Disadvantages:
  - Applying the current system to long-term detention will likely fail to abate criticisms that the system is arbitrary.
  - It may not have as stringent a review process that might be employed by the review board.
  - It will further burdens the Combatant Commander.

# Backup Slides

9/5/2003 8:51 AM

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18

11-L-0559/OSD/19094

# World War II Detention of Civilians

- President Roosevelt ordered the Attorney General (AG) to detain and intern “[a]lien enemies deemed dangerous to the public peace or safety of the United States.”
  - President Roosevelt did so consistent with the authority provided by the Alien Enemies Act (AEA), 50 U.S.C. § 21, which is still in force.
  - The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the AEA’s constitutionality.
- Pursuant to the President’s order, the AG appointed unpaid civilian hearing boards.
  - The boards held two-part hearings: (1) government presented its case for detention; (2) alien presented his case against detention.
  - Aliens could produce witnesses at the hearings.
  - The boards could advise aliens of the evidence against them insofar as it did not reveal confidential sources of information.



# Contemporary Examples of Detention

- Maribel Boatlift Detainees: INS annually reviews the status of detainees.
  - The review process includes:
    - INS interview of detainee
    - Detainee can present evidence to review panel
    - Detainee has no right to counsel
  - The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld a similar review process used for detaining permanent residents.
- Mental Illness: The U.S. Supreme Court has held constitutional the detention of mentally ill persons where those persons are found to be “specially dangerous.”

# International Practice

- Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
  - Detention of civilians who threaten security.
  - Upon request, detainees can have an administrative board review their cases.
  - The convention does not require the use of any specific procedures.
- Preventive detention of terrorists
  - UK: Hearing before a commissioner, with an appeal to a tribunal. Detainee excludable from tribunal hearing.
  - India: Advisory board reviews detainee's status and courts may review board's determination.
  - Israel: Detainee brought before President of District Court within 48 hours of detention; detention reviewed every 3 months.
  - Egypt: Detainee referred to military courts or regular state security courts. Detention can be indefinite.

# Human Rights Instruments

- Human rights instruments to which the U.S. is a party recognize that rights are not so unlimited as to preclude a nation from protecting its security both in times of war and other public emergencies.
  - U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Permits limits on rights in order to meet “the just requirements of . . . public order . . . .”
  - ICCPR: Permits derogation from its prohibition against arbitrary detention in times of public emergency.
    - ICCPR is not applicable to armed conflict.
- This limitation is likewise recognized in other treaties to which the U.S. is not a party, e.g., the European Convention on Human Rights, which permits derogation from bar on arbitrary detention in times of war or other public emergencies.

# Board Composition

- Three or more commissioned officers in the U.S. Armed Forces selected by the Secretary.
- The presiding officer should be a JAG.
- Board members should report directly to a senior civilian that is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

# Determination of Continued Detention

- After its hearing, the board recommends release or continued detention to the Secretary or his delegate.
  - The recommendation is based on the board's assessment of the threat that the detainee poses.
  - The recommendation includes the supporting information.
- The Secretary or his delegate has the records of the board's proceedings available to him.
- The Secretary or his delegate makes the ultimate decision whether to continue detain an individual.

**TAB**

**C**

# **Long-Term Detention of High Threat Individuals**

Briefing to the Secretary of Defense

August 09, 2003

Prepared by: DoD GC

For Official Use Only

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11-L-0559/OSD/19102

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# Overview

- The Likely Need for Long-Term Detention of High Threat Individuals
- The Need for a Reviewing Process for Long-Term Detainees
- Transparency
- Options for Long-Term Detention Review Process



# Assumptions

- There are likely to be detainees held by the U.S. who will not be released, transferred, or tried.
- Very few people are aware of the scrutiny applied to our detainees.
  - There is substantial value in making public the processes we currently employ and the processes that we might employ.
  - There may be value in inviting external examination of the current and proposed processes.
- Sr. leadership in the U.S. government and even DoD are uneasy with the rigor with which the current processes have been used suggesting that a reevaluation of those processes is necessary.

# **The Likely Need for Long-Term Detention**

- The enemy is much more likely than in previous conflicts to rejoin the conflict upon release.
- The conflict is also more likely to be lengthy.
- We must seriously consider detaining some detainees for a lengthy period of time because they pose a high threat.
  - Not every high threat detainee will be triable.
  - Thus, there is a need for long-term detention without trial.
- We have the legal authority to detain these individuals until the end of the conflict.

# The Practical Need for a Review Process

- The current screening processes are not set up to review the long-term detention of detainees.
  - Those processes focus on EC status.
  - The continued detention of high threat individuals is a question of dangerousness, not EC status.
- The threat-level assessment of an individual could change during long-term detention.
- Thus, periodic review of the *threat* the detainee poses is needed.

# **The Institutional Need for a Review Process**

- Instituting a review process would ensure that we act consistent with American values by acting as a check on arbitrariness and the potential for arbitrariness by the Executive Branch.
- Periodic reexamination is intrinsically valuable because it further legitimates continued and lengthy detention.

# Transparency

- Our current review processes have not been made public.
- If the review process selected is not made public:
  - no reduction in the appearance of arbitrariness will occur.
  - no legitimacy will be derived from periodic review.
- The review process selected thus must be made public.

# **Options for Long-Term Detention Review Process**

Options for reviewing the detention of GTMO detainees include:

- (1) An administrative review board established to review the status of detainees;
- (2) The Military Commissions modified to review the status of detainees; or
- (3) Combatant Commander modified to review the status of detainees.

# Administrative Review Board

- The administrative review board would:
  - serve as a finder-of-fact on one question: Does the detainee remain a threat to the United States?
  - recommend to the Secretary whether detention should be continued.
- It would not determine whether to release a detainee. That determination:
  - rests with the Secretary or
  - if the Secretary deems it appropriate, with an inter-agency review process.

# Board Hearings

- The hearing would be non-adversarial.
  - Investigators would present all available information without the presence of the detainee.
  - The Board would provide the detainee with the information presented against to the extent consistent with national security.
  - Detainee would present why he is not a threat.
  - Detainee would be assigned a JAG to offer assistance to him in presenting his case.
- The board could request additional fact-finding.



# Ombudsman

- The Secretary would select the ombudsman.
- The ombudsman would oversee the Review Board process.
  - The ombudsman would have access to all materials presented to and prepared by the board.
  - The ombudsman would be permitted to attend all hearings.
- The ombudsman would report to the Secretary any inadequacies in the review process.

# Advantages of the Board

- May review detention more stringently than current process.
- Diminishes potential for and appearance of arbitrariness in the continued detention of individuals at GTMO.
- Likely to achieve broader acceptance because it is analogous to procedures used for long-term detention:
  - in Geneva Convention IV,
  - by the U.S. in WW II, and
  - by India, the UK, and Israel.

# Disadvantages of the Board

- It will impose additional costs, including:
  - personnel,
  - periodic psychological assessments of detainees
  - periodic investigations, and
  - additional investigations ordered at the board's request.
- It will require the development and issuance of additional detailed guidance.

# Modified Military Commissions

- Military Commission Order No. 1 could be modified to:
  - empower the commissions to assess a detainee’s threat.
  - use a lower burden of proof, e.g., “reason to believe” or “probable cause.”
- The Order’s procedures would be retained:
  - an adversarial hearing,
  - counsel for the detainee, and
  - protections for national security information

# **Advantages of the Military Commissions**

- May reviews detention more stringently than current process.
- Diminishes potential for and appearance of arbitrariness by using adversarial procedure and providing detainee with counsel during hearings.
- Draws upon already established body and process, requiring only some modifications.

# **Disadvantages of Military Commissions**

- May require periodic psychological assessments of detainees and additional investigations.
- Blurs the lines between preventive detention and punishment by using the body established to mete out punishment to also determine the necessity of continued detention.
- May overburden the military commissions.
- Does not bear as great a potential for broad acceptance as the board does.

# Combatant Commander

- Advantages:
  - The system is already in place and running and would require only minor modification to use for the review of long-term detention.
  - It imposes no additional costs.
- Disadvantages:
  - Applying the current system to long-term detention fails to abate criticisms that the system is arbitrary.
  - It may not have as stringent a review process that might develop before the military commissions or a review board.

# Backup Slides

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11-L-0559/OSD/19119



# World War II Detention of Civilians

- President Roosevelt ordered the Attorney General to detain and intern “[a]lien enemies deemed dangerous to the public peace or safety of the United States.”
  - President Roosevelt did so consistent with the authority provided in the Alien Enemies Act, 50 U.S.C. § 21, which is still in force.
  - The U.S. Supreme Court held that the AEA was constitutional.
- AG appointed unpaid civilian hearing boards.
  - The boards held two-part hearings: (1) government presented its case for detention; (2) alien presented his case against detention.
  - Aliens could produce witnesses at the hearings.
  - The boards could advise aliens of the evidence against them insofar as it did not reveal confidential sources of information.

# Contemporary Detainee Examples

- Marinel Boatlift Detainees: INS annually reviews the status of detainees.
  - The process includes:
    - INS interview of detainee, detainee can present evidence to review panel
    - Detainee has no right to counsel
  - The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld a similar review process used for detaining permanent residents.
- Mental Illness: The U.S. Supreme Court upheld as constitutional detaining a mentally ill person where that person was found to be “specially dangerous.”

# International Practice

- Geneva Convention IV
  - Detention of civilians who threaten security.
  - Upon request, detainees can have an administrative board review their cases. Requires no specific procedures.
- Preventive detention of terrorists
  - UK: Hearing before a commissioner, with an appeal to a tribunal. Detainee excludable from tribunal hearing.
  - India: Advisory board reviews detainee's status and courts may review board determination.
  - Israel: Detainee brought before President of District Court within 48 hours of detention; reviewed every 3 months.
  - Egypt: Detainee referred to military courts or regular state security courts. Detention can be indefinite.

# Human Rights Instruments

- ICCPR: Permits derogation from bar on arbitrary detention in times of public emergency.
- U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Permits limits on rights in order to meet “the just requirements of . . . public order . . . .”
- European Convention on Human Rights: Permits derogation from bar on arbitrary detention in times of war other public emergencies.

# Board Composition

- Three or more commissioned officers in the U.S. Armed Forces that are selected by the Secretary.
- The presiding officer should be a JAG.
- The members of the review board should report directly to a senior civilian that is PAS.

# Determination of Continued Detention

- After its hearing, the board recommends release or continued detention to the Secretary.
  - The recommendation is based on the board's assessment of the threat that the detainee poses.
  - The recommendation includes the supporting information.
- The Secretary has the records of the board's proceedings available to him.
- The Secretary makes the ultimate decision whether to continue detain an individual.

August 13, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Feedback

2308

Please try to get some feedback on that meeting with those retired civilian and military leaders.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081303-4



Please respond by 8/22/03

U21683 /03

13 AUG 03

August 13, 2003

33350

TO: LTG Craddock  
 Larry Di Rita

CC: Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

SUBJECT: Foreign Travel

I would like to go to Sri Lanka sometime. I would also like to go to Diego Garcia and thank people.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081303-5

.....

Please respond by 9/12/03

U21684. /03

13 AUG 03



August 13, 2003

TO: General Doug Brown  
CC: General Richard Myers  
General Michael Hagee  
LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Interoperability and Integration

I just read this memo to me from General Holland and General Hagee. I don't have conviction that we are doing what we ought to be doing between the Marine Corps and Special Operations.

I would like to hear your thoughts when we meet next.

Thanks.

Attach.

7/16/03 Holland and Hagee memo to SecDef re: Status Update of USSOC AND USMC Interoperability and Integration Initiative

DHR:dh  
081303-6

.....

Please respond by 9/12/03

*SSOCM*

U21685 /03

*13 Aug 03*



**UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND**  
**OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER**  
7701 TAMPA POINT BOULEVARD  
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5323

✓  
4/1

**MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, 1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON,  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000**

**SUBJECT: Status Update of United States Special Operations Command - United  
States Marine Corps Interoperability and Integration Initiative**

1. Shortly after the events of 11 September 2001, you gave specific guidance to both the U. S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the Marine Corps to improve the interoperability and integration between our two organizations. Your direction has provided the foundation for our actions over the past two years. We believed it time to provide you with a brief update on the status of our efforts and the tremendous successes of our organization in meeting your goals. Pursuant to your goals, we signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in November 2001 re-establishing the USSOCOM/Marine Corps Board in order to provide a venue through which we developed and implemented more than 30 initiatives specifically designed to meet transformational and interoperability goals. Specifically, USSOCOM and the Marine Corps:

a. Provided highly effective and lethal mutual support during combat operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq that resulted in immediate synergism of areas that maximized the capabilities of each force such as in fire support; close air support; battlefield command, control and coordination; weapons techniques and development; psychological and information operations; and intelligence collaboration.

b. Provided Marine support in the Philippines to special operations forces (SOF) Joint Task Force 510 that included both infantry and US Marine Corps engineers. This force provided humanitarian engineering and construction support, as well as the Quick Reaction Force for Joint Task Force 510. The visible presence of Marine forces working in concert with special operators improved our ability to openly operate and improved the defense of our forces.

c. Instituted a broad-reaching, inclusive program to share acquisition and developmental information regarding weapons systems, munitions, armaments, and communications. Additionally, this collaboration included previously restricted special operations weapons and technology development programs. This will leverage the efforts of both USSOCOM and the Marine Corps highly efficient and innovative acquisitions processes and ensure more rapid interoperability.

11-L-0559/OSD/19129

**SUBJECT: Status Update of United States Special Operations Command - United States Marine Corps Interoperability and Integration Initiative**

d. Expanded mutual training through routine reciprocal fixed and rotary wing air support for assault support, static-line and free-fall parachute operations, and expanded participation in special operations and Joint Marine-Army SOF exercises training with the 26<sup>th</sup> Marine Expeditionary Unit and 4<sup>th</sup> Air & Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO). We also expanded opportunities for both Marines and special operators to attend the types of surgical warfighting training that already paid significant dividends on the battlefield.

e. Developed and are presently training the Marine Corps force contribution to USSOCOM deployment, which will act as a proof of concept for the future. This unit will be under the operational control of a deploying SEAL Squadron and will enhance the integration, coordination and interoperability capability of both units.

f. Developed and implemented a pilot program within the U.S. European Command through an MOA between the Theater Special Operations Command's Naval and Marine components to create a habitual Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (special operations capable)-Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR). This program established a relationship based on common understanding and shared knowledge of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP). The MOA compels the development of those TTP with the goal of improving the responsiveness and ability of forward-deployed/-based special operations and naval contingency forces to prosecute time-sensitive operations in support of the war on terrorism.

g. Developed and have agreed to co-chair a Joint Test and Experimentation program specifically designed to improve the ability of the Joint Commander to plan, execute, and leverage special operations in an interagency, coalition, and transnational environment by developing and ensuring integrated, interoperable, and collaborative TTP and systems. The Marine Co-chairman will be in place later this summer.

h. Took the first step in "transitioning" some SOF missions with the U.S. Marines' assumption of the Georgia Train and Equip mission from SOCEUR. There are currently 25 Marines conducting Foreign Internal Defense training to enhance the Georgian Ministry of Defense's capability to conduct counterinsurgency operations in support of the War on Terrorism. Specifically, the Marines are currently assisting in Phase III of that training which focuses on the tactical training of a 558-man light infantry organization. That support will continue through May of 2004.

i. Held Service-level "Warfighter" talks addressing myriad issues focused on maintaining momentum established through two USSOCOM/Marine Corps Board

SUBJECT: Status Update of United States Special Operations Command - United States Marine Corps Interoperability and Integration Initiative

meetings held in January and October of 2002. The "Warfighter" talks and the board meetings included discussion and decisions in the areas of Operations, Training and Education, Communications/C4, Information Operations and Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs, Intelligence, Aviation, Future Concepts, and Equipment/Technology.


j. Have agreed to further integrate the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) and the Marine Corps University (MCU) by exchanging permanent chairs. These permanent faculty members will provide subject matter expertise on the integration of their respective planning and employment methods within joint operations at the operational level of war.

2. While the initiatives above represent some of the ways we have aggressively pursued meeting our country's goals, they represent some of the most dramatic in terms of applying the natural synergy existing between our organizations to take the fight to our enemies. We thank you for your leadership in helping to transform our nation's ability to defend itself and look forward to discussing each of these initiatives with you in detail and the way ahead with you.



CHARLES R. HOLLAND  
General, U.S. Air Force  
Commander, U.S. Special  
Operations Command

Date: 16 July 2003



MICHAEL W. HAGEE  
General, U.S. Marine Corps  
Commandant of the Marine Corps

Date: 16 July 2003

Attachment:

1. Addendum page.

ADDENDUM PAGE TO MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

USSOCOM - Marine Corps Firsts:

Marine Corps General Officer assignment to USSOCOM. Brigadier General Hejlik reported to USSOCOM and assumed duties as the Chief of Staff in January 2003.

Marine Corps Colonel assignment to JSOC. Colonel Hummer will report to JSOC and assume duties as the Chief of Staff in 2003.

Marine Corps SOCOM Detachment One. Formally stood-up 20 June 2003. The total Marine structure for this is currently 86 personnel, with the potential to grow. Scheduled to chop OPCON to NSW on 1 Oct 2003.

ARG/MEU/ESG LNO to TSOCs. The Marine Corps is developing a plan to provide a liaison officer from deploying ARG/MEU/ESGs to the Theater Special Operations Commands upon arrival into theater.

USMC-SOCOM Co-sponsorship of the Joint Test and Experimentation Program. The Marine Corps will provide one LtCol to act as the Deputy Test director and one Major as an operations analyst.

Transition of prior SOF specific missions. 25 Marines currently conducting Foreign Internal Defense training in Georgia.

Service Level Warfighter conference. Hosted by USSOCOM in June 03. 30

Marine Corps/SOF General and Flag Officers participated.

MCU and JSOU exchange of permanent chairs. One permanent faculty member per University will provide their respective subject matter expertise.

Co-location of Marine Forces and Theater SOC Headquarters. Decision has been made to co-locate within the same bldg MARFORSOUTH/SOCSOUTH (within 10 months) and MARFOREUR/SOCEUR (summer 04).

Operational Support: Over the past year the Marine Corps has supported SOCOM operations in Somalia, Yemen, Philippines, Georgia, Kuwait, Qatar, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The following are specific examples of SOF/USMC joint missions:

-ARG/MEUs have provided heavy Lift Helicopter assets and Quick Reaction Forces in support of the JSOTF-CRE in the Horn of Africa.

-FAST platoon acted as follow on security for SOF elements executing Direct Action missions in the Northern Arabian Gulf.

-Task Force 58 provided sensitive Site Exploitation support, Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel Logistical support, Close Air Support, Assault Support, FOB/Safe House Security, Quick Reaction Force, MEDEVAC, and intelligence Sharing of SOF during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

-3<sup>rd</sup> Marine Division provided support in the Philippines to special operations forces (SOF) Joint Task Force 510 that included both infantry (135 Marine) and US Marine Corps engineers (144 Marines).

-COMSIXTHFLEET's FAST platoons deployed as follows to provide security for SOF executing MIO/VBSS in the Mediterranean.

Personnel support: At present there are approximately 105 Marines filling billets supporting Special Operation.

Program Integration: To date, the Marine Corps and SOCOM have collaborated on at least 11 programs including those for CV-22, Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Lightweight Counter-Mortar Radar, CBRNE equipment and C4I systems Engineering and Integration.

Training Integration: Marine Corps has provided more than 120 days of fixed and rotary wing air support to Army Special Operations Forces.

-The Special Operations Terminal Air Controller Courses, Level 1 and 2 (SOTACC) have been developed and are being taught to SF operators by USMC Forward Air Controllers. To date, 40 SF operators have completed at least one of these courses.

August 13, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: David Brooks

Have we ever looked at David Brooks to work in the Pentagon? Apparently he is very good. He may be at the *Wall Street Journal* now. He may have been at Heritage at one point and may have written for the *New York Times*.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081303-11

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Please respond by 8/22/03

*230.02*

*13 Aug 03*

U21686 /03

August 13, 2003

000.9150

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Pentagon Force Protection Agency

I am thinking about asking Chief Jester, head of the Pentagon Force Protection Agency, to come in so I can have a brief visit with him.

I called him in some time ago and told him I was unhappy with the way the guards conducted themselves at all the entrances. The improvement in this building in 2½ years is like night and day. Everywhere I go, the guards are smiling and happy, and they greet you pleasantly. I like it, and I want to tell him that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081303-3



Please respond by 8/22/03

13 Aug 03

U21687 /03

*RF: U4229-03*

OB  
AVP

August 13, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Intel Organization

350.09

Here is an interesting old chart on intel from back when I was Chief of Staff of the White House and Secretary of Defense.

Thanks.

Attach.  
1976 *CQ Almanac*, p. 301.

DHR:dh  
081303-16



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_


13 AUG 03

U21688 /03



ON 11 2003 3:32PM LORR 2

NATIONAL SECURITY



pecially when not available through public sources; also responsible for intelligence on the foreign aspects of terrorism and narcotics traffic.

Three parts of the charter appeared to expand the agency's sphere of action. The executive order permitted the CIA to carry out covert operations at the direction of the President or the National Security Council. The section of the National Security Act under which covert operations previously were carried out permitted such action "as the National Security Council may direct."

The order gave the CIA responsibility for foreign counterintelligence outside the United States and "in the United States in coordination with the FBI subject to the approval of the Attorney General." In the past, primary responsibility for domestic counterintelligence had rested with the FBI.

The CIA also would be allowed to enter into research contracts with universities "provided CIA sponsorship is known to the appropriate senior officials of the academic institutions and to senior project officials." In 1967 President Johnson had prohibited CIA contracts with domestic institutions.

**Department of Defense:** Authorized to gather foreign military intelligence and to conduct analysis of foreign communications (signals intelligence).

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was retained as the intelligence source for the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The House Select Intelligence Committee had recommended the DIA's abolition.

The order also continued the National Security Agency (NSA) as the organization for signals intelligence. The

House select committee had recommended that the NSA be established by law as an independent agency, apart from the Defense Department.

**Federal Bureau of Investigation:** Given responsibility for domestic collection of foreign intelligence and for domestic counterintelligence.

**Other Agencies:** Foreign intelligence responsibilities were specified for the Departments of State and Treasury and for the Energy Research and Development Agency.

**Restrictions on Activities**

The President placed no new restrictions on foreign covert operations. He reiterated his prohibition of political assassination and endorsed legislation to outlaw it.

The executive order prohibited a wide range of domestic activities by foreign intelligence agencies although several of the prohibitions allowed for exceptions as provided by law or by regulations of the Attorney General. According to the order, the list of restrictions authorized no activity not previously authorized and voided no restrictions which otherwise would be applicable. However, the President announced that he would seek legal authority for some activities which were illegal under existing law.

The restrictions did not apply to the FBI. The executive order required the Attorney General to issue guidelines for the foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the FBI.

Major restrictions included:

- Physical surveillance of U.S. persons—citizens or resident aliens—by federal intelligence agencies was prohibited

August 13, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iraq Survey Group Methodology

Please take a look at this memo from Bill Schneider that he sent you and me.  
What do you think we ought to do about it?

Thanks.

Attach.

8/11/03 Schneider memo to SecDef re: "Concern About the Methodology of the Iraq Survey Group"

DHR:dh  
081303-15

.....  
Please respond by 8/29/03

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
INTELLIGENCE  
AUG 13 2003

*The attached memo was sent to SecDef earlier today; believe it answered this snowflake.*  
*Col Sweatt*

*Sir,  
Forwarded (w/ snowflake)  
v/r  
CDR Nasuno  
8/14*



U21689 /03

13 AUG 03

8/13/2003 6:14 AM

**MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, JR.**

**FROM:** Stephen A. Cambone 

**SUBJECT: Concern About the Methodology of the Iraq Survey Group**

**I read your 11 August note to SecDef.**

**I believe Kay and Dayton are pursuing the hypotheses you suggest rather than confining themselves to "things" and "sites."**

**I'd be happy to fill you in on the approach of the ISG when you are next in the building.**

**cc:**  
**SecDef**

11-L-0559/OSD/19138



**William Schneider, Jr.**

August 11, 2003

**MEMORANDUM**

④

**TO:** Hon. Don Rumsfeld  
cc: Hon. Steve Cambone

**FROM:** William Schneider, Jr.

**SUBJECT:** Concern about the methodology of the Iraq Survey Group

I participated in the July meeting of the Defense Policy Board where I the Board received a classified briefing by a representative of the ISG. The presentation raised a concern about the methodology used by the ISG to accomplish its mission. The briefing presented four closely related "hypotheses" that were the underlying source of direction for the ISG effort.

These "hypotheses" struck me as very closely akin to our experience five years ago with the Intelligence Community's efforts to understand the North Korean "indigenous" ICBM program. The hypotheses used by the ISG are closer to assumptions than hypotheses since (in the confines of the briefing) no competing hypotheses appeared to be subject to testing.


For example, it is plausible to me that the focus of the Iraq WMD program is a "process" rather than a "thing" or a "site." It is plausible that the Iraqi chemical/biological WMD program is a "just-in-time" system where dual use facilities are designed to be covertly diverted to producing contraband WMD only when needed rather than for war reserve stocks or similar purposes that would produce a signature as an end item. In this case, uncovering evidence of this process will focus on the exploitation of documents and the scientists and engineers who manage the relevant industrial or research facilities.

I have no evidence to affirm or deny this "process hypothesis, but I am concerned that the methodology being employed by the ISG will make it difficult for alternative hypotheses to emerge or be tested. As a result, *in extremis* the ISG could so focus survey resources, that it will miss rather than capture Iraqi WMD developments.

cc: D. Pita

August 13, 2003

Iceland

TO: J.D. Crouch  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Iceland

Iceland is going to be done in the broader footprint context, so nothing is going to be happening immediately.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081303-26



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

U21690- /03

13AUG03

August 13, 2003

350.0015D

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Speeches

I have to see the speeches for the entire rest of this month before I get back and for the change of command on September 2. I have to see them this week.

I do not want to spend my whole vacation doing drafts of speeches for the American Legion, the change of command, California or any of these other things I am scheduled to do.

You must force those people to produce the things and get them in. You ought to go over them, and I have to go over them. I want to get it behind me. This just isn't working right.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081303-29



Please respond by 8/15/03

13 AUG 03

U21691 /03

August 13, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Air Bridge Denial

Colombia

I pushed Colin and Condi hard on the air bridge for Colombia. They said they all agreed with me, that we ought to get it out. Condi said she would push on it in the NSC.

Let's jog it a couple of times, so it is clearly going to be done by the time I go to Colombia.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/12/03 SecDef memo [081203-11]

DHR:dh  
081303-25

.....  
Please respond by 8/15/03 ✓ *TEN 9/3*

13 Aug 03

U21692 /03

BCC: Gen Pace

August 12, 2003

✓ 9/3

Snowflake

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
CC: Dr. Stephen Hadley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Colombia Air Bridge Denial

I just looked at this rollout program for the Colombia air bridge denial. It seems to me that this is not a good way to do it.

I am going to be down there August 19 and 20. We certainly ought to have the thing done before I go. It has been hanging around forever. There isn't any need to go through all this process.

We already know that the President of Colombia wants it. Why don't we just get it done?

Attach.  
8/12/03 memo to Gen. Pace

DHR:dh  
081203-11

*Copy to C/C file  
on desk to discuss  
in a.m.*

11-L-0559/OSD/19143



12 Aug 03

To: GEN Pace

Subj: Colombia Air Bridge Denial

✓ 9/3  
D  
C/R

1. The NSC Meeting on 11 Aug was between the NSC staff members, not the interagency.
2. DJ5 e-mail below lays out way ahead:

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Sharp, Walter L., LTG, JCS J5  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 12, 2003 10:06 AM  
**To:** Manaskie, George E., CAPT, JCS J5; Sullivan, William D, RADM, JCS J5  
**Subject:** FW: Colombian ABD update

Got this from the NSC AO working ABD:

Deputy Nat'l Security Advisor Hadley will be giving Dr Rice a draft memo today for release to be circulated to Principals involved in ABD (DOD, DoS, DOJ, DHLS, DOT, ONDCP) that will include: cover memo asking response by Friday 15 August, the proposed PD, proposed memo of justification for restarting ABD, and the program roll out plan. The memo will be asking for final confirmation that each department principal is comfortable with the program and ready to commence operations.

The rollout plan thumbnail is as follows:

12 August - Circulate memorandum package to 6 principals.

15 August - Responses due back to NSC

~~18-22 August~~ - SECDEF trip to SOAM, SECDEF discuss ABD program with President

Uribe to confirm GoC definitely desires ABD program.

22 August - POTUS signs PD

August 13, 2003

334N5C

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Absence from Washington

Condi Rice is going to be gone August 14 to 19, August 25, and August 28 to September 1.

Colin Powell is going to be gone from August 15 to August 26.

DHR:dh  
081303-24

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

✓  
PEN 9/3

U21693 /03

13Aug03

August 13, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Hispanics in DoD

Please take a look at this memo from Al Zapanta and tell me what you think we ought to do.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/7/03 Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
081303-21



Please respond by 8/29/03

*9/5*

*7/8*

*Sharon*

*I ought to see*

*Al Z. and David Chu.*

*Get a copy of this to done 9/14*

*Dr. Chu, The*

*2nd Equiv Report*

*13 Aug 03*

✓ 8/13



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD  
7300 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-7300

August 7, 2003

Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In one of our earlier discussions, you asked that I assist you in resolving the chronic DoD Hispanic under-representation. The current situation in DoD requires your personal intervention. While Hispanics comprise fully 14% of the U.S. population (40M people) and 11% of the Civilian Labor Force (CLF), they represent only 6% of the DoD civilian workforce and 9% of the active duty forces. DoD data also show that there are no Hispanic career SES 5 or 6's, and that Hispanics comprise only 1.7% of the GS 15 population. Presently, there is only one Hispanic 3-star (promoted June 2003) and no flag officers of 4-star rank on active duty. Hispanics comprise only 2.1% of the O-6 officers on active duty and 2.2% of the reserve forces. The data clearly show Hispanics are under-employed and under-promoted. Hispanics are the only large minority under-represented at DoD (Blacks and Asians are not), but Hispanics accounted for 20% of casualties in Iraq, so far, while only representing 9% of active duty forces.

Attached is a strategy that I believe will begin to address the DoD Hispanic under-representation issue. The strategy provides you with another example of what can be done to transform the DoD. This approach calls for you to issue a snowflake (also attached) which tasks me to lead a Hispanic Diversity Pilot Program to implement Guard and Reserves innovative practices DoD-wide. Through quarterly meetings with Service Secretaries, USD(P&R), CJCS, I can report to you progress on Hispanic employment statistics. On Wednesday, September 17, ASD(PA) and I will co-sponsor the OSD Hispanic Heritage Contributions observance. You have an opportunity to introduce this pilot program during that event. Next year you will be able to demonstrate, during the September 2004 Hispanic Heritage Contributions observance, the extent of this Administration's commitment to Hispanics by presenting the gains.

Resolving chronic and systemic under representation of Hispanics in DoD and Defense leadership is an issue whose time has come. I urge you to continue to personally champion this effort to ensure its success.

Sincerely,

Albert C. Zapanta  
Chairman

8/7 - A copy has been provided to LTG Craddock -

## **RESOLVE DOD HISPANIC UNDER-REPRESENTATION STRATEGY**

- **SECDEF issues snowflake**
- **Within 2 weeks Chairman, RFPB meets with SECNAV, SECARMY, SECAF, CJCS and USD(P&R) and their Personnel designees, e.g., ASN(M&RA), SAF/MR, ASA(M&RA), VCJCS, PDUSD(P&R)**
  - **Outlines details of Guard and Reserves Pilot Program**
  - **Develop consensus way-ahead**
- **SECDEF opens Hispanic Heritage Month ceremonies and announces Pilot Program**
  - **Theme: "To honor those that have paid the ultimate price I promise to improve the DoD by striving to achieve a balanced workforce with diversity in leadership."**
- **Chairman, RFPB to meet quarterly with Secretaries, CJCS, USD(P&R)**
- **Chairman, RFPB to also meet monthly with ASN(M&RA), SAF/MR, ASA(M&RA), VCJCS, PDUSD(P&R)**
  - **Working group to meet weekly or on as-needed basis**
- **Resources**
  - **Pilot Program housed in 3B737**
  - **Defense Advisory Council on Hispanic Issues (DACHI) report which addresses actions required to increase Hispanic representation**
  - **Pilot Program Lead, Dr. Elizabeth Rodriguez-Johnson, currently Co-Chair DACHI to immediately begin working Hispanic Heritage Month preparations with Pilot Program continuation. (Requires reassignment from OUSD(AT&L) to RFPB)**

**SNOWFLAKE**

**7 August 03**

**MEMORANDUM FOR SERVICE SECRETARIES  
CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL & READINESS)**

**Hispanics are our largest minority and are under-represented in the DoD. We must transform DoD's recruiting, retention and promotion practices to resolve the current chronic Hispanic under-representation, under-employment and under-promoted situation.**

**I have asked the Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Mr. Al Zapanta, to lead and chair a pilot program to expand upon Guard and Reserves Hispanic Diversity practices for DoD-wide benefit. Al will meet with you quarterly to discuss how DoD can implement innovative practices. I would like the first Hispanic Diversity Pilot Program meeting to occur within two weeks. Al will make sure I am cognizant of issues that need to be resolved expeditiously.**

**I will also be hosting periodic meetings at which I expect a one-page report on the status of Hispanic Diversity Progress within your organization and what is being done to achieve parity. I intend to have my first meeting in September to underscore our collective support for Hispanic Heritage Month.**

August 12, 2003

EF-6518  
03/011473-ES

IRAQ

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iraq's Debt

*RESA*

What is your reaction to this issue of writing off the debt for Iraq?

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/11/03 Brock e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh  
081203-4

.....  
Please respond by 9/11/03

**Policy ExecSec's Note**

October 31, 2003

COL Bucci/CDR Nosenzo,

- USDP Feith is working this issue.
- Please see the attached memo, *Iraq Debt Relief*, from Benjamin Zycher and Charles Wolf of RAND.

Colonel C. L. O'Connor, USMC  
Director, Policy Executive Secretariat

POC: BEN

124903

U21695 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/19150

MEMORANDUM FOR GARY EDSON  
BOB BLACKWILL  
REUBEN JEFFERY

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

*DJF by LA  
10/30/05*

SUBJECT: Iraqi Debt

See attached from Ben Zycher (Rand) on Iraqi debt.



# RAND

Note for Dr. Benjamin Runkle, Office of the Secretary of Defense

By fax:

(b)(6)

From: *BZ* Benjamin Zycher and Charles Wolf  
Subject: Iraqi Debt Relief  
Date: September 29, 2003

Cc: Mr. Douglas J. Feith  
Col. Kathy Pivarsky  
(By fax: (b)(6))

Summary

- A repudiation of Iraqi debt under the odious debt doctrine is fully consistent with that doctrine.
- That the debts were incurred so as to circumvent UN sanctions is one important condition (among several) that distinguishes the Iraqi debt from those of other nations.
- An odious debt repudiation of Iraqi debt would serve a number of important U.S. goals in both economic and policy dimensions.
- Those goals would be hampered by the preservation of the Iraqi debt burden; and a debt rescheduling and other such approaches would fail to provide incentives for international lenders to avoid dealings with odious regimes.
- Preservation of the Iraqi debt is likely to entangle the central Iraqi government with future mandates and other constraints imposed by the IMF and/or World Bank.
- The purported damage to the future Iraqi credit standing attendant upon an odious debt repudiation has been overstated substantially.
- Much of the current debt in reality was "protection" payments made by several creditors to the Baathist regime; the *ex ante* expectation of repayment must have been low.
- The adverse precedent effect of a failure to repudiate the Iraqi debt as odious is more important than the purported precedent effect of an odious debt repudiation.
- A useful *quid pro quo* program for bilateral forgiveness in terms of "credits" for contributions to future Iraqi reconstruction programs could be developed.

1700 Main Street, PO Box 2138  
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/19152

# RAND

- The argument that the current Governing Council is less legitimate than the Baathist regime is highly questionable.
- We would be happy to come to Washington to discuss these issues if that would prove useful.

## Introduction

This note responds to your request for a brief overview analysis of alternative approaches for the problem of Iraqi debt relief. It is our view that a full (or substantial) debt repudiation under the odious debt doctrine is entirely appropriate in the Iraqi context on both economic and policy grounds. The creator of the odious debt doctrine, Alexander Nahum Sack, noted in 1927 that notwithstanding the general obligation of successor states to honor the debts of the *territory* rather than of a *specific governmental structure*, debts not created in the interests of the state ("dettes odieuses") should not be bound to this general rule:

If a despotic power incurs a debt not for the needs or in the interest of the State, but to strengthen its despotic regime, to repress the population that fights against it, etc., this debt is odious for the population of all the State.<sup>1</sup>

Sack argued as well that for creditors to expect any protection in their loans to foreign states, their loans must be utilized for the needs and interests of the State. If that condition is not satisfied, the loans are the responsibility of the regime that incurred them, and thus are (or were) debts of the regime ("dettes de regime"). Because the doctrine of odious debt clearly is vulnerable to abuse by debtors, Sack proposed that a new government be required to prove that the debt damaged rather than served the public interest and that the creditors were aware of that. Given that proof, the burden then falls upon the creditors to show that the funds in fact were used for the benefit of the territory, in the absence of which proof the debt would be unenforceable.

The Iraqi debts incontrovertibly satisfy this set of criteria. Moreover, there can be no dispute that the principal creditors, including Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Russia, France, etc., have known the character of the Baathist regime for many years, and indeed have acknowledged it explicitly; their loans indisputably provided Saddam Hussein with fungible resources with which to acquire weaponry and palaces rather than infrastructure and the like, and to fund a (ghastly) repression apparatus.

We begin with our view of the central appropriate goals of U.S. policy relevant in the context of Iraqi debt, economic growth, and democratization; and then offer thoughts

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<sup>1</sup> Quoted in Patricia Adams, *Odious Debts: Loose Lending, Corruption, and the Third World's Environmental Legacy*. Toronto: Energy Probe Research, 1991.

# RAND

on the basic alternative approaches and on your thoughts as presented in your email notes of September 19 and September 22.

## Goals of U.S. Policy

It is fair to say that the overriding goal of U.S. policy in Iraq can be summarized as the evolution of democratic political processes and a market economic system, in pursuit of an political/economic institutional framework providing a bulwark against terrorism and regional instability, while providing a model for a moderate Islamic society and multiethnic cooperation. In the context of Iraqi debt relief—as well as from the ancillary perspective of providing useful incentives to other central parties in the international capital market—it is useful to delineate the policy goals likely to be affected by decisions on Iraqi debt relief. We believe that it is fair to summarize the relevant U.S. policy goals as follows:

- Low tax rates and restrained public sector consumption of economic resources.
- Iraqi “federalism,” that is, devolution of policymaking authority to regional and local entities.
- Expansion of the Iraqi private sector and the growth of the Iraqi capital stock, that is, attraction of both domestic and foreign direct and indirect investment, and thus a long-term growth in real wages.
- Future attractiveness of Iraqi public sector debt issuance on international capital markets.
- Avoidance of the adverse precedent effect of a failure to invoke the odious debt doctrine in the case of Iraqi debt.
- Reduction of Iraqi central bank incentives to inflate.
- Provision of appropriate future political incentives to international lenders.
- Insulation of the Iraqi economy and policymaking from possible future edicts of such international lending institutions as the IMF and the World Bank.

## Discussion

The pursuit of each of the goals noted above would be hampered by the preservation of the large existing Iraqi debt burden on the part of the central government. The central public sector budget necessarily would be larger than otherwise would be the case—and the regional budgets and the private sector correspondingly smaller—given the need to service substantial debt. Marginal tax rates are likely to be forced up from the current plan for maximum 15 percent rates on both personal and business income; alternatively, debt service will reduce the resources available for other pressing public sector needs. There are good reasons to believe that Iraqi infrastructure investment would suffer disproportionately, unless increased aid is forthcoming from the U.S. and/or others, itself a problematic blessing from the standpoint of future Iraqi political independence.

# RAND

The requirement for repayment of debts incurred by the Baathist regime will not reduce other demands upon the public sector, and will yield little or no additional revenue on the margin, since the debts, based upon the information publicly available, largely do not represent productive assets yielding greater economic (or social) wealth and a larger tax base. This need for additional revenue at the level of the central government will hamper the devolution of authority to regional and local entities because the perceived need to raise tax rates would be facilitated by centralization of public sector activity, but hindered by the prospective tax competition inherent in decentralization. Apart from the adverse economic consequences of political centralization, the political effects are unlikely to prove salutary in the Iraqi context.

Higher taxes and greater centralization to some degree will reduce the growth of the Iraqi private sector, and in particular would be likely to hamper capital investment by both domestic and foreign investors. The longer-term outcome would be a smaller stock of productive capital, and thus lower wages for Iraqi workers. Substitution of public sector investment in place of reduced private sector efforts, even apart from the obvious disadvantages of the former, would be constrained in that the greater public sector resource demands present in the context of a need to service past debts would be likely to increase the interest rates at which such borrowing could be pursued.

The higher public sector spending demands attendant upon a large debt-service obligation would increase incentives for the Iraqi central bank authorities to inflate. This is true even if the debts are denominated in dollars or euros, in that inflation, even if fully anticipated, is a tax that transfers real resources to the government without an explicit tax increase. Moreover, preservation of Iraqi debt obligations would do little to discipline international lenders in terms of incentives to do business with totalitarian regimes. Finally, the preservation of the debt obligation is likely to entangle the Iraqi government with IMF and World Bank mandates over the foreseeable future; such mandates, which loosely can be categorized under the heading "austerity," are unlikely to yield stronger economic growth.

A Paris Club-style rescheduling with little or no repudiation does little to solve the fundamental problems summarized above; it would simply delay the adverse effects, and perhaps reduce the present value of the debt burden unless interest continued to accrue. The damage to Iraq's credit standing attendant upon an odious debt repudiation is far less obvious than often alleged: The credit standing of the Iraqi private sector would be affected little if at all, and, indeed, might be enhanced. And even for the government, the sharp break with the Baathist regime ought to be obvious to the international capital market. Indeed, future debts incurred by the new government ought to be viewed quite favorably because of the strong incentives of the new government to pay its bills; earmarking of some portion of oil revenues or other assets toward that end would yield even greater confidence. Similarly, the distaste for repudiation on the part of the major

# RAND

current creditors is likely to be overstated, particularly in the case of Gulf States; their past "lending" to the Baathist regime clearly constituted protection payments (to use a rather crude term) for the most part, so that the *ex ante* prospect of actual repayment must have been low.

The precedent issue is not to be taken lightly; other states might be tempted to use the same rationale. Examples are the Congo post-Mobutu, some remnants of the former Soviet empire, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Pakistan. Such repudiations clearly would present diplomatic problems—and problems for the creditors as well!—but have potential salutary effects also. International lenders would have to take into account the nature of the regimes and economic systems with which they deal, with reduced prospects for bailouts from the IMF and World Bank. Moreover, the Iraqi case is different qualitatively from the others: The Baathist regime inordinately was more brutal, vicious, and the most odious of the odious. Its resource use clearly was more injurious to the population writ large than was the case for the other regimes. Moreover, the Iraqi debts provided a means of circumventing the UN sanctions, a condition not applicable to the other governments.

More generally, if the odious debt framework does not apply in the case of Baathist Iraq, under what conditions would it apply? In order to have a prospective effect in terms of penalizing odious regimes, the doctrine must be used. If not now, when? If not Iraq, where? The usual precedent arguments now being heard in opposition to an odious repudiation of Iraqi debt fail to recognize that the precedent problem is two-sided: A failure to invoke the odious debt doctrine in this case will make it difficult ever to do so; after all, if the Baathist debts do not qualify, what does. As noted above, one policy goal is the provision of incentives to international lenders not to deal with particularly corrupt, odious regimes. If the odious debt doctrine is not invoked in the Iraqi case, that incentive is likely to assume negligible weight. This problem of adverse incentives attendant upon a failure to invoke the odious debt doctrine in the Iraqi case is the central—and important—analytic distinction between voluntary forgiveness and repudiation. A failure to invoke the odious debt doctrine will preserve the future credit standing of odious regimes.

Unilateral U.S. forgiveness might be useful, but in terms of setting an example for other creditors in terms of bilateral negotiations, less can be expected because respective *quid pro quos* inevitably will be demanded, some of which may be inconsistent with U.S. objectives. Such *quid pro quos* are likely to involve favored business arrangements and other sorts of deals inconsistent with an efficient Iraqi central government and the other goals summarized above. Debt forgiveness through the heavily Indebted Poor Country process might be an avenue through which debt reduction could be achieved; but Iraq is very different from many of the African debtors. Moreover, this approach would do little in terms of imposing discipline upon the international lenders. The existing debts—the past lending—truly were "odious," and policy ought not lose sight of that central truth.

# RAND

6

One more fruitful approach for the *quid pro quo* problem might be as follows: Unilateral debt forgiveness on the part of an individual lender might be credited toward that lender's future obligations under future Iraqi reconstruction efforts and programs. This can be done on a dollar-for-dollar basis or on a percentage basis, in which the percentage would be that part of the individual debt unilaterally forgiven.

A limited repudiation of debt under an *ad hoc* arrangement would provide limited economic benefits to the Iraqi government, by definition, and would do little in terms of other important U.S. objectives. That the G7 recently endorsed the Paris Club approach is not a particularly powerful argument; in part, the view seems to be that Iraq is "wealthy," so that an odious debt repudiation is unnecessary. Whether Iraq is "wealthy" in some sense says little about the U.S. policy goals discussed above. The mechanics of an odious debt repudiation, in terms of the legitimacy of the Governing Council, is primarily a question of international law, about which we are not expert. At the same time, we view the implicit premise—that the Governing Council is less legitimate than was the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein—as preposterous.

We hope that these observations prove of interest, and we would like to continue this discussion of so important a problem. To that end, we would be happy to come to Washington if that would be useful.

August 12, 2003

3317000

TO: Honorable Newt Gingrich  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: JROC

I talked to Ed about serving as a member of JROC. It struck me he has so much work to do, it would be a pain in the neck for him to have to travel up for every meeting.

He tells me he is perfectly happy having his deputy represent him. I think that is probably a good solution.

Thanks again.

DHR:dh  
081203-10

U21696 /03

12AUG03

August 12, 2003

EF-6519

03/01148-ES

381

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Phase IV Capability

Should the Department of Defense try to fashion a Phase IV or post-combat capability of some sort? If so, what would you propose?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081203-13

.....

Please respond by 9/5/03

U21697 103 V/R, COLB 8/27

Interim Response

11-L-0559/OSD/19159

A193-2

12 AUG 03



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

USD/P



INFO MEMO

EF-6519

I-03/011435-ES

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and  
Low Intensity Conflict *OC 8/25/03*

SUBJECT: Phase IV Capability – Interim Response

You asked the following question of USD/P recently: "Should the Department of Defense try to fashion a Phase IV or post-combat capability of some sort? If so, what would you propose?"

- SO/LIC is informally staffing a thought piece on tailoring units for Stability Operations.
- Training is another issue. A review of CJCS and Combatant-Commander-directed exercises for FY 2004 shows that only 13 of 167 exercises sponsored at those levels will have significant Phase IV or post-combat components. More practice may well be in order.
- We will report back to you by September 5<sup>th</sup> on comments from the Joint Staff and Army Staff on our thought-piece, and on discussions with the OSD Strategy office and Joint Staff J7 about the CJCS and Combatant Commander exercise programs.

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by: COL Dallas Brown, SO/LIC Stability Operations, (b)(6)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

11-L-0559/OSD/19160

*A193-3*

In reply refer to EF-6504  
and I - 03/011352

August 11, 2003

EGYPT

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Follow-up with Egypt

We probably ought to get a letter to MoD Tatawi following up on my call where we ended up canceling the exercise.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081103-2

.....  
Please respond by 8/15/03

See ed in 2  
Sent

Sir,  
Mr. Rodman recommends signing the attached letter.  
/ CDR Nosenzo  
8/21

11-01-03 08:33

U21698 /03 Ale 2

11 AUG 03



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

Field Marshall Hussein Tantawi  
Minister of Defense  
Arab Republic of Egypt  
Ministry of Defense  
Cairo, Egypt


Dear Minister Tantawi:

Thank you for understanding <sup>the</sup> ~~our~~ decision <sup>with respect to</sup> ~~not to participate in~~  
Exercise Bright Star this year. It was a difficult decision that was driven  
by our global commitments.

~~Egypt and the United States are partners committed to bringing~~  
~~stability and peace to the region.~~ I look forward to working with you.

Sincerely,

*on other matters  
in the Middle East.*



*AK  
3*

August 11, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Daily Meeting on Liberia

*Advance copy sent*

*Liberia*

We probably ought to start scheduling a meeting on Liberia every day this week, first thing in the morning.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081103-3

.....  
Please respond by 8/12/03

U21699 /03

*11Aug03*

August 11, 2003

200

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Non-Military Essential Jobs

I have your memo of July 23 on Senator Levin's question.

I don't quite understand your third bulleted paragraph about the Services designating 332,000 out of 380,000 as exempt from civilianization. I need to know more about this, and I need some advice from you as to how we get that problem fixed.

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/23/03 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Senator Levin's Question

DHR:dh  
081103-10



Please respond by 8/29/03

U217007/03

11Aug03

8/4



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

003 AUG - 1 AM 9:21



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

INFO MEMO

July 23, 2003 11:03 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)

SUBJECT: SecDef Snowflake--Senator Levin's Question

- You asked about our response to Senator Levin.
- TAB is our answer. The 320,000 estimate that was briefed to you by Arnold Punaro was extracted from a 1997 QDR study guided by the ASD(FMP). It was based on a review of military occupational specialties.
- Shortly after that study was completed, the Department began collecting personnel data for the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) inventory that relates to A-76 reviews. These data provide more depth, telling how many people are doing seemingly non-military essential jobs, but also why they are doing them. The latest inventory substantiates that there are over 380,000 jobs being done by active military that appear to be civilian in nature. However, the Services have designated approximately 332,000 of these as "exempt" from civilianization. We are now debating with the Services regarding the merits of the "exempted" population.
- On July 11, members of my staff briefed SASC minority staff on the origin of 320,000 and the ongoing review of the 332,000. The initial feedback was they expected to see exactly which 320,000 jobs would be converted—stating they were under the impression that those jobs had already been identified. We pointed out that no determination has yet been made. The staffers asked for additional data on the functions being reviewed. We have heard nothing further, but anticipate that any future hearings related to the conversions will include questions on details on the conversions (how many, what jobs and when).

ATTACHMENT(S):

As stated

PREPARED BY: A. Gallant, OUSD(P&R)PI, (b)(6)

|                       |     |
|-----------------------|-----|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA |     |
| SR MA CRADDOCK        |     |
| MA BUCCI              |     |
| EXECSEC MARRIOTT      | 8/1 |



Senator Levin. My question, though, is does the inventory you referred to total 320,000?

**Response:** The 320,000 military jobs that could be converted to DoD civilian or private sector were first identified in a 1997 study for Deputy Secretary Hamre that was conducted under the auspices of the Honorable Frederick F.Y. Pang, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy. The study was a review of "Headquarters and Cross-Service Occupational Specialties." It concluded that there were approximately 320,900 military in occupational specialties that were "commercial" in nature. Those occupations are attached. They ranged from General Administration to Recruiting/Counseling, Weather and Information Technology. While these data accurately depicted what military personnel were doing, there was no supporting "requirements" information that illustrated why they were doing it. Subsequent to that 1997 study, the Department began compiling the annual Inventory of Commercial and Inherently Governmental Activities (commonly referred to as the IGCA Inventory). This inventory is based on a set of criteria that categorize military authorizations into: 1) inherently governmental, 2) commercial but exempt from private sector performance, and 3) subject to review for divestiture or private sector performance. The criteria used for this inventory is very explicit, and gives greater visibility into the reasons military manpower is being used in fields other than combat operations.

The latest IGCA inventory (Fiscal Year 2002) is currently being analyzed for accuracy, but initial indications are that there are over 330,000 Active military in commercial activities that DoD Components have identified as exempt from DoD civilian or private sector performance. This group is now under scrutiny by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for possible conversion to either DoD civilian or private sector performance. This evaluation is part of a larger review of the entire workforce that was initiated last year in support of the President's Management Agenda for competitive sourcing. The larger review will eventually cover the entire range of functions performed in support activities in the Department's infrastructure, and will eventually be expanded to address manpower in the operating forces. In addition to the 330,000, three of the Services have identified nearly 50,000 Active military in activities that could be converted to DoD civilian, private sector performance or to the Ready Reserve. However, while we explore, encourage and debate conversion of additional military manpower, we also must consider the changing worldwide military stationing strategies and potential transformation of our force structure, which will affect the outcome. That outcome may also be constrained by federal law, treaty, International Agreement, or other similar requirement.

**MILITARY MANPOWER IN SPECIALTIES  
THAT COULD BE CONSIDERED NON-MILITARY ESSENTIAL  
Task Force on Defense Reform Report, June 1997**

|   | <u>Army</u>  | <u>Air Force</u> | <u>Navy</u>  | <u>All Services</u> |
|---|--------------|------------------|--------------|---------------------|
| <b>Officers</b>                               |              |                  |              |                     |
| Adjutant General/Information Management       | 596          | 1,465            |              | 2,061               |
| Aerospace Engrg/Maintenance                   |              |                  | 542          | 542                 |
| Civil Engineer                                |              | 1,571            | 1,174        | 2,745               |
| Communications/Data Automation                | 641          | 4,655            |              | 5,296               |
| Comptroller                                   | 170          | 1,066            |              | 1,236               |
| Contracting                                   | 370          |                  |              | 370                 |
| Foreign Area Officer                          | 570          |                  |              | 570                 |
| Manpower                                      |              | 261              |              | 261                 |
| Morale, Welfare & Recreation                  |              | 333              |              | 333                 |
| Nuclear Research & Operations                 | 90           |                  |              | 90                  |
| Oceanography                                  |              |                  | 322          | 322                 |
| Operations Support, Plans & Training          | 841          | 1,109            |              | 1,950               |
| Operations Research                           | 212          |                  |              | 212                 |
| Ordnance                                      | 200          |                  |              | 200                 |
| Personnel                                     | 236          | 1,131            |              | 1,367               |
| Psychological Operations/Civil Affairs        | 51           |                  |              | 51                  |
| Public Affairs                                | 133          | 375              | 184          | 692                 |
| Quartermaster/Supply/Transportation/Logistics | 717          | 1,114            | 3,211        | 5,042               |
| Research, Development & Acquisition           | 955          | 2,545            | 825          | 4,325               |
| Security Police                               |              | 1,013            |              | 1,013               |
| Special Duty                                  |              | 1,366            |              | 1,366               |
| Weather                                       |              | 709              |              | 709                 |
| <b>Subtotal</b>                               | <b>5,782</b> | <b>18,713</b>    | <b>6,258</b> | <b>30,753</b>       |
| <b>Enlisted</b>                               |              |                  |              |                     |
| Administration                                |              |                  |              | 39,769              |
| Auditing & Accounting                         |              |                  |              | 3,117               |
| Computer Operations & Analysis                |              |                  |              | 13,539              |
| Construction Equipment                        |              |                  |              | 4,457               |
| Electricians                                  |              |                  |              | 3,645               |
| Electronic Instruments                        |              |                  |              | 14,428              |
| Fire Fighting                                 |              |                  |              | 5,579               |
| Food Service                                  |              |                  |              | 17,672              |
| Information & Education                       |              |                  |              | 3,580               |
| Law Enforcement                               |              |                  |              | 26,811              |
| Mechanical & Electrical                       |              |                  |              | 2,957               |
| Medical Admin & Logistics                     |              |                  |              | 8,172               |
| Motor Vehicle Operators                       |              |                  |              | 14,052              |
| Personnel                                     |              |                  |              | 26,751              |
| Recruiting & Counseling                       |              |                  |              | 6,088               |
| Security Guards                               |              |                  |              | 17,044              |
| Supply  |              |                  |              | 56,707              |
| Transportation                                |              |                  |              | 9,603               |
| Utilities                                     |              |                  |              | 10,390              |
| Warehousing & Eqpt Handling                   |              |                  |              | 5,851               |
| <b>Subtotal</b>                               |              |                  |              | <b>290,212</b>      |
| <b>GRAND TOTAL</b>                            |              |                  |              | <b>320,965</b>      |





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# Briefing for the Senate Armed Services Committee

**July 2003**

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11-L-0559/OSD/19168



# TOPICS

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- Review of 320,000 Active military for conversion to civilian or private sector performance
- Funding for the conversions
- Operation Iraqi Freedom contractor support



# BACKGROUND

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- 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)  
Study on Management Headquarters
- 1998 Defense Reform Initiative Directive  
(DRID) 20 Inventory
- 1999 Inherently Governmental and  
Commercial Activities (IGCA) Inventory
- 2002 Briefing to Secretary of Defense
- 2003 Hearings and Speeches



## BACKGROUND – 1997 QDR

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### Secretary Pang guided a special study of *Headquarters and Cross-Service Occupational Specialties*

- Data indicated approximately 320,900 Active military in occupational specialties that were “commercial” in nature
- Data accurately portrayed military personnel occupations – but not the reason the jobs were being performed

### Inventory of Commercial and Inherently Governmental Activities (IGCA Inventory) identifies:

- Type of work performed
- Rationale for activities considered military or civilian essential versus private sector performance



# 1997 PANG REPORT-SPECIAL

|   | <u>Army</u>  | <u>Air Force</u> | <u>Navy</u>  |
|---|--------------|------------------|--------------|
| <b><u>Officers</u></b>                        |              |                  |              |
| Adjutant General/Information Management       | 596          | 1,465            |              |
| Aerospace Engrg/Maintenance                   |              |                  | 542          |
| Civil Engineer                                |              | 1,571            | 1,174        |
| Communications/Data Automation                | 641          | 4,655            |              |
| Comptroller                                   | 170          | 1,066            |              |
| Contracting                                   | 370          |                  |              |
| Foreign Area Officer                          | 570          |                  |              |
| Manpower                                      |              | 261              |              |
| Morale, Welfare & Recreation                  |              | 333              |              |
| Nuclear Research & Operations                 | 90           |                  |              |
| Oceanography                                  |              |                  | 322          |
| Operations Support, Plans & Training          | 841          | 1,109            |              |
| Operations Research                           | 212          |                  |              |
| Ordnance                                      | 200          |                  |              |
| Personnel                                     | 236          | 1,131            |              |
| Psychological Operations/Civil Affairs        | 51           |                  |              |
| Public Affairs                                | 133          | 375              | 184          |
| Quartermaster/Supply/Transportation/Logistics | 717          | 1,114            | 3,211        |
| Research, Development & Acquisition           | 955          | 2,545            | 825          |
| Security Police                               |              | 1,013            |              |
| Special Duty                                  |              | 1,366            |              |
| Weather                                       |              | 709              |              |
| <b>Subtotal</b>                               | <b>5,782</b> | <b>18,713</b>    | <b>6,258</b> |

11-L-0559/OSD/19172



# 1997 PANG REPORT-SPECIALTIES

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## Enlisted

|                                |                |
|--------------------------------|----------------|
| Administration                 | 39,769         |
| Auditing & Accounting          | 3,117          |
| Computer Operations & Analysis | 13,539         |
| Construction Equipment         | 4,457          |
| Electricians                   | 3,645          |
| Electronic Instruments         | 14,428         |
| Fire Fighting                  | 5,579          |
| Food Service                   | 17,672         |
| Information & Education        | 3,580          |
| Law Enforcement                | 26,811         |
| Mechanical & Electrical        | 2,957          |
| Medical Admin & Logistics      | 8,172          |
| Motor Vehicle Operators        | 14,052         |
| Personnel                      | 26,751         |
| Recruiting & Counseling        | 6,088          |
| Security Guards                | 17,044         |
| Supply                         | 56,707         |
| Transportation                 | 9,603          |
| Utilities                      | 10,390         |
| Warehousing & Eqpt Handling    | 5,851          |
| <b>Subtotal</b>                | <b>290,212</b> |

**Grand total**

**320,965**

---

1120 Snowflake

08/9

July 18, 2003

TO: David Chu  
Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: Senator Levin's Question

Larry Di Rita  
9/4

Did we ever answer Levin's question as to the 320,000 people who were military people doing civilian jobs. I would like to see the answer, please.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071503-2

.....

Please respond by 7/25/03

C9/2

August 11, 2003

002

TO: Powell Moore

CC: Larry Di Rita  
LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Senator Reed

*LARRY DI RITA  
9/2*

Please find out if Senator Reed of Rhode Island has any military people serving on his staff. If so, I think I want to pull them back.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081103-8

Please respond by 8/22/03

*Donald Moore*

*Larry -  
see me - 7.*

*done - 10/14*  
Larry Di Rita

11 Aug 03

U21701 /03





LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

August 15, 2003 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs, 697-6210

SUBJECT: Military on Senator Reed's Staff – Response to Snowflake  
#081103-8

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Powell Moore", written over a horizontal line.

- One of the 26 legislative fellows assigned to the Hill is serving in Senator Jack Reed's (D-RI) office. Army Major Thomas Heibert is an infantry officer whose tour ends in November.
- As you know, Senator Reed has close ties to the Army. He is a 1971 West Point graduate who served in the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division.

**Attachment:** Snowflake #081103-8.

Prepared by: CDR Taylor Skardon, Director (Senate Affairs), (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/19176

August 11, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*  
SUBJECT: Protecting Embassies in Iraq

*outbox  
9/19*

Please look at the attached article about embassies in Iraq.

For one thing, I am beside myself that we don't have control over all the Iraqi embassies all over the world.

I am also concerned we are not getting recognized by the UN.

With respect to foreign embassies inside Iraq, it seems to me that our rule ought to be that they have to provide for their own protection, or else we don't recognize them to come in and don't accept them, because we do not have the forces to protect 180 embassies.

Please respond.

Thanks.

Attach.

Hendren, John and Farley, Maggie. "Views Differ Over Responsibility for Embassies in Iraq," *Los Angeles Times*, August 8, 2003.

DHR:dh  
081103-12

.....  
Please respond by 8/22/03

11 AUG 03

U21702 /03

Los Angeles Times  
August 8, 2003

## Views Differ Over Responsibility For Embassies In Iraq

*U.S. defense officials say it is up to local police to protect the missions. But U.N. and legal experts contend that it is the job of the occupying forces.*

By John Hendren and Maggie Farley, Times Staff Writers

WASHINGTON — Although the Pentagon insisted Thursday that it is not responsible for securing foreign embassies in Baghdad, U.N. officials and several legal experts said that under international law, the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority is responsible for the safety of diplomatic missions in Iraq.

"Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, the occupying power has responsibility for law and order and security," said Fred Eckhard, a spokesman for U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, after an attack on the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad on Thursday that left at least 12 people dead.

U.S. defense officials said the job of protecting the embassies has been left to the newly reconstituted Iraqi police force. "The way to address the problem [is] internal security provided in Iraq by Iraqis," Lt. Gen. Norton Schwartz, director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said at the Pentagon. "It is far more likely that Iraqis will guard embassies of other nations in Baghdad."

Pentagon officials said that they did not yet know who bombed the embassy or whether the attack marked a shift in tactics by guerrillas who have carried out hundreds of assaults with rifles, grenades and small explosives since President Bush declared major combat over May 1. What is clear, analysts say, is that the gap between the security that Iraqi police are capable of providing and the security that coalition forces are willing to provide leaves attackers wide berth to operate.

In Baghdad, U.S. civil administrator L. Paul Bremer III did not comment on the bombing.

Several analysts say that as the leader of the occupying force, the United States bears ultimate responsibility.

Laurence E. Rothenberg, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a specialist in international law, said that under the Hague Regulations of 1907, the United States, as an occupying power, was responsible for "taking all measures in its power to ensure public order and safety."

At some point, he said, the occupier can transfer that responsibility to the new Iraqi Governing Council and local police, but until an independent Iraqi government is established, "I'd say the United States is still responsible for public order and safety."

Wherever the legal responsibility lies, many Iraqis insist that the moral onus rests firmly with the Americans.

Although five Iraqi police officers were in the Jordanian Embassy when the deadly attack occurred, Iraqi police have only recently begun to have a presence on the streets and are just beginning to learn Western approaches to investigating crime and arresting suspects. They have had some successes when working in joint patrols with American military police, but security in Baghdad remains extremely volatile.

Schwartz insisted that the U.S. military's best course was to leave the Iraqi police force to guard diplomatic buildings, freeing American soldiers to track anti-coalition guerrillas.

"I would say you really don't defend against it," Pentagon spokesman Lawrence Di Rita added. "You stay on offense."

By targeting Jordan, one of the United States' most consistent allies in the Arab world, the attack appeared to send a signal that to be a friend of the Americans was to be a potential target.

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell expressed regret over the attack in a call to the Jordanian foreign minister and said the Coalition Provisional Authority would "do what it can to secure the site" of the bombed-out embassy, according to a senior State Department official.

The initial U.S. reading was that the attack was aimed at undercutting support for the Iraqi Governing Council, the official said.

Theories of potential suspects included loyalists of deposed President Saddam Hussein who were angered by Jordan's role in helping Americans in the war, Hussein opponents angry that Jordan gave asylum to the ex-dictator's daughters last week, and Al Qaeda-style militants who harbor strong anti-American feelings but find easier targets among U.S. allies.

*Hendren reported from Washington and Farley from the United Nations. Times staff writers Alissa J. Rubin in Baghdad and Bob Drogin, Paul Richter and Robin Wright in Washington contributed to this report.*

August 12, 2003

337

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Outreach

Please give me a list of the people who are on Jim Haynes's committee with respect to the commissions and also on the committee with respect to the Terrorism Information Awareness/Poindexter group. I would like to think about inviting them to a function of some kind.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081203-1

.....  
Please respond by 8/22/03

U21703 /03

12 AUG 03

August 4, 2003

020PA

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Interview Process

I need to get a read on all these Public Affairs people from each of the people who have interviewed them. I never get any feedback.

Do you have a system where they write down what they think and how they rank them? Let's get a grid.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080603-22



Please respond by 8/15/03

U21704 /03

9 AUG 03

August 6 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Susan Molinari

Please check Susan Molinari out with Newt Gingrich for me and tell me what he thinks.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080603-21

.....

Please respond by 8/8/03

*230.02*

*9 Aug 03*

U21705 /03

OB  
9-20

August 6, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Analysis of Those Arrested

Please find out who does the interrogation of the people we arrest for attacking us and whether or not there is some analytical work being done about who they are.

Are they criminals? Are they people being paid to do it? Are they jihadists who came in from other countries? Are they Iraqi jihadists? Are they Fedayeen Saddam? Are they Sunnis?

There must be some analysis. We have arrested hundreds of these people. We must be talking to them.

Please find out as soon as possible who is doing it and what the analysis is.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080603-23

.....

Please respond by 8/15/03

*IRAKI*

*9 Aug 03*

U21706 /03



August <sup>9</sup>~~6~~, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Add Susan Molinari to Outreach

We should add Susan Molinari to that outreach group of lobbyists and political people that comes in once in a while.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080603-19



Please respond by 8/22/03

337

0217074/03

9 Aug 03

August 9, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Speeches

*ADVANCE  
COPY SENT*

*350.0015D*

Next week I need to see all my speeches that I need to give between now and September 15, so I can get them done this week and not have to work while I am supposedly on vacation.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080903-2



Please respond by 8/15/03

*9AUG03*

U21708 /03

8/13

August 9, 2003  
EF-6487  
03/011297-ES

TURKEY

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM:  
SUBJECT: Turkey

If we end up having Turkish troops and have to make some concessions to them as to how they do it, and have to work with the Kurds to achieve it, we sure better get more than 2,000 that they are currently talking about.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080903-5



Please respond by 8/22/03

AUG 12 2003  
0910 RECEIVED IN ISF

✓ 8/14

AUG 13 2003

SecDef:

Agreed. We are working toward a multiple brigade size commitment.

J.D

U21709 /03

9 AUG 03

August 7, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Ed De Latra

I would like you to bore in on Ed De Latra. He really knows the police situation and can help in Baghdad. He is eager to get into it.

Please make sure he gets involved in Baghdad.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080703-1

.....  
Please respond by 8/15/03

U21710 /03

AUG03

11-L-0559/OSD/19187

August 7, 2003

IRAQ

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Info for Mrs. (b)(6)

You can contact (b)(6) at (b)(6). Please send her the names of the countries currently in Iraq and the names of the countries currently committed to it that we can give her on an unclassified basis.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080703-3

.....  
Please respond by 8/15/03

U21711 /03

1 AUG 03

August 7, 2003

IRAQ

TO: (b)(6)  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Soccer Balls

The United States sent a bunch of soccer balls over to Iraq. We have told Senator Mark Dayton about it. I would like to know the details and so would Joyce. Please send them to each of us.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
080703-4

.....  
Please respond by 8/22/03

*Claude Chafer -  
Please do nothing  
until we discuss.  
D. Chafer*

Larry Di Rita  
8/14

U21712 /03

11 AUG 03

816

August 7, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Editorial about Duncan Hunter

I just read this August 5 editorial in the *San Diego Union-Tribune*. It seems to me we ought to get a letter off to them fast, today.

032

We ought to tell them the truth: Rumsfeld is not furious; Rumsfeld works closely with Duncan Hunter, respects him and, indeed, admires him as a talented, dedicated American patriot; we are working together to try to figure out a way to deal with the issues that inevitably result between the executive and legislative branches; and the article was just flat wrong.

Thanks.

Attach.  
"Protectionist Rule," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, August 5, 2003.

DHR:dh  
080703-8

.....  
Please respond by 8/8/03

*Sec draft attached*

*Sir,  
This has been sent, but  
you never saw the response.*

*v/r  
CDR Nosewo*

*7 Aug 03*

*B17*

Your article from August 5, 2003 alleging that Congressman Hunter is alienating the Defense Department is absurd conjecture and flat wrong. This spring, Congressman Hunter masterfully navigated through the House of Representatives a bold program of defense transformation that the President proposed earlier in the year. If the full Congress passes what the House passed under Duncan Hunter's leadership, some of the most significant defense reforms in a generation will become law.

The specific "domestic content" proposal discussed in your article is a separate matter that I have discussed on several occasions with Congressman Hunter. The Department of Defense experts on the issue, together with experts from other departments and agencies that may be affected, are working closely with him and other members of Congress to better understand the full potential impact of the proposal. That is quite a different matter from the manner in which you attempted -- and failed -- to characterize my views.



embellishment worthy of the New York Times was the article by Jon Ward, "War casualties overflow Walter Reed hospital" (Page 1, Monday).

I have stayed in the Mologne House. This is not an outpatient facility. The Mologne House is an on-post hotel, period. The hotel is within walking distance of Walter Reed Hospital. Like any other hotel, it has a restaurant, maid service, etc. The hotel is frequently booked up, not because of the war, but because of its close proximity to the hospital and its proximity to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology. The hotel is usually full of medical personnel who are on temporary duty at Walter Reed or the Institute of Pathology. The need to farm out personnel for lodging at other hotels in the area is nothing new and is frequently done on other posts, bases, etc. when the need arises. When I was there earlier this year, before the war, I often saw people arriving at the front desk and being referred for lodging elsewhere (at government expense).

While the need to give priority to outpatients from Walter Reed is not lost on this reader, what the author suggests between the lines is also not lost. Once again, the need to make things read worse than they really are has taken precedence. The hospital is not overflowing with war casualties. That it is not is testament to the efficiency, professionalism and dedication of our ground forces in Iraq (and the military medical personnel between Iraq and the United States). If the author of the piece desires a comparison to the current patient flow, I would suggest that he contact personnel that worked at Army or Air Force medical facilities in Hawaii, or the West Coast in the late '60s or early '70s. I believe they could provide some perspective on what 'overflowing' with war casualties is really like.

**Lt. Col. Thomas M. Seay, M.D., USAF, San Antonio, Texas**

**Editor's Note:** The article referred to appeared in the Current News Early Bird, August 4, 2003.

San Diego Union-Tribune  
August 5, 2003

#### **47. Protectionist Rule**

*Rep. Hunter alienates Defense Department*

No lawmaker has been more supportive of the military than House Armed Services Committee Chairman Duncan Hunter, a former Army Ranger who served in Vietnam. Yet the 12-term congressman is crossways with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld over a "buy American" requirement that Hunter folded into the Defense Department's 2004 spending authorization bill.

Hunter's protectionist measure would boost the current domestic content requirement in military hardware from 50 percent to 65 percent. It also would specify certain items, such as machine tools, that only American companies could supply.

Rumsfeld is so furious at this frontal attack on the Pentagon's procurement system that he's threatening to recommend that President Bush veto the Defense Department's entire \$400 billion budget if it includes Hunter's proposal.

The White House is rightly standing by Rumsfeld, calling Hunter's proposal "burdensome, counterproductive and (having) the potential to degrade U.S. military capabilities." Hunter is standing his ground, maintaining that hard-working, taxpaying Americans should "participate fully in the manufacture of military goods."

This classic confrontation impacts military contractors, many of whom have contributed to Hunter's re-election campaigns. They

are none too happy with his protectionist crusade, which would prevent them from buying from less expensive foreign suppliers.

Foreign governments are complaining as well, particularly the British, who feel slighted for their steadfast support of the Bush administration's campaign to liberate Iraq.

But such complaints don't count for much with Hunter.

Last year Hunter tried to block funding for the continued destruction of Russia's huge stockpile of nuclear weapons, a sensible bipartisan program that began under former President George Bush. Two years ago, he mortified Pentagon officials by supporting legislation to prevent the U.S. Army from having berets made in China.

Hunter butted heads with Rumsfeld earlier this year by trying to undermine the next round of base closings, which would free up money that could be far better spent to modernize the armed forces. The congressman's stance is all the more puzzling given his rock-solid commitment to military readiness. In a March commentary for *The Wall Street Journal*, Hunter complained about aging equipment and called for a \$20 billion boost in modernization funds. Much of that money could be gained by closing obsolete military bases.

Hunter contends his domestic content proviso is needed to prevent the Pentagon from becoming too dependent on foreign suppliers, particularly when some of them object to U.S. policies. This fuzzy logic flows from the congressman's opposition to free trade. When Congress reconvenes after Labor Day, the House-Senate conference committee considering the defense authorization bill should remove Hunter's domestic content provision.

August 7, 2003

UK

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: UK Media

Someone suggested we think about doing something with David Frost on television. We could do it here in the United States or possibly over there.

We also may want to think about giving a speech in London sometime.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080703-10

.....  
Please respond by 8/22/03

U21714 /03

1 AUG 03

August 7, 2003

040 JUSTICE

TO: Jim Haynes

CC: Larry Di Rita  
 LTG Craddock  
 Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Brothers to the Rescue

I am going to have to deal with the Brothers to the Rescue issue with John Ashcroft on Monday or Tuesday. I need to get ready by Saturday.

Colin Powell and I are going to both try to work the problem together, so our General Counsel's shop should work with the State Department to get us both ready.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080703-9



Please respond by 8/9/03

7 AUG 03

U21715 /03

EF-6470  
03/01184  
August 7, 2003 8/22

TURKEY

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Follow-Up w/Bremer


Please make sure you let Jerry Bremer know that both of these items in this memo I sent on Peshmerga and Turkey are being taken care of, according to what you said.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/4/03 SecDef memo to Bremer re: Peshmerga and Turkey [080403-26]

DHR:dh  
080703-12

.....  
Please respond by 8/15/03



TO: SECDEF  
FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *for Sec Def 22 Aug 2003*  
SUBJECT: Follow-Up w/ Bremer

Sir:

We informed Colonel Scott Norwood in Amb. Bremer's office in Baghdad that the issues you raised in the attached memo have been addressed.

1 AUG 03

11-L-0559/OSD/19195 U21716 /03

August 4, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer  
Gen. Abizaid

CC: Gen. Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld (RM)

SUBJECT: Peshmerga and Turkey

*Alvarez Exp by Am.*  
*Alvarez Exp by Am.*

Attached is a note from Jay Garner, which discussed two important points.

1. We ought to consider what to do about the Peshmerga, since we are paying the Iraqi troops.
2. The possible Turkish logistics tail in the north in the event that they come into the central or southern areas.

I agree with him that those are problems. I hope you are both focusing on it. If I can be helpful, please let me know.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/1/03 Garner note to SecDef

DHR:dh  
080403-26

.....

Please respond by 8/15/03

11-L-0559/OSD/19196

✓  
8/4

Mr. Secretary,

Hope this finds you in good spirits. I have concerns on two issues dealing with Northern Iraq. I'm sure that you have already solved them; however, in case they are still active I want to bring them up to you. First, I understand that we are now paying stipends to the Iraqi military, which I strongly agree with. However, we are not paying the Peshmerga, who were our allies during the war and could still have great utility in specified security roles; e.g., border guards, static security, etc. Second, I have been told that we will use the Turks as part of the coalition stability force and that they will be used in the south rather than the north. I agree with this and think that this is extremely important that we have Muslims as part of our stability force. The problem I foresee is that the Turks will establish a huge logistics tail from their position in the south through the northern provinces and especially Kurdistan. I don't know how we control this, but unless we are prepared for it - it will cause significant issues with the Kurds. As you know, there are continual problems between the Kurds and the Turks in and around Kirkuk. If we don't control the Turkish access from north to south the problems will be exponentially worse. As I said I'm sure you have already solved these, but I just needed to get that burr from under my saddle.

Connie and I look forward to your BBQ on the 16<sup>th</sup>. Have a good weeker d.

Jay

August 6, 2003

INDONESIA

TO: Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: (b)(6)

*Handwritten notes:*  
172/1000  
1/21/03

Would you please return a call to Mr. (b)(6) at (b)(6) He says he knows something about the Indonesian bombing.

I don't know who he is, but he called on the government phone at my house and told Joyce he knows me. I just don't remember him, if I do know him. But you might find out who he is and what he is up to, what he has in mind.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080603-3

*Response Attached*  
*Page 13*  
....

*Handwritten notes:*  
192/1000  
1/21/03  
Speaker about ...

(b)(6)

*Large handwritten mark:* 7  
*Vertical text:* INDONESIA

*Vertical text:* MR. ...

*Vertical text:* 6 AUG 03

U21717 /03

6 August 2003

Memorandum for Secretary of Defense

Subject: Call from Mr. (b)(6)

Sir,

I spoke with Mr. (b)(6). I do not think he is a legitimate caller. He was very agitated, and when I asked him to explain his previous association with you, he said he had been a close associate during the Reagan administration. He said he was with protective services and was a national security advisor (I was quite suspicious at this point). As I continued to question him he got more agitated and said he had been conversing with you regularly reference UBL and Saddam. He then demanded to have an extensive meeting with you reference the bombing. When I told him that would probably not happen, he said he would then be forced to report your lack of mental stability to the Armed Services Committee. I asked him to please not call the number again, and I will give a copy of this packet to (b)(6).

Very Respectfully,

COL B

*I have never heard of him - ✓ 8/6*

*\$*

11-L-0559/OSD/19199



August 6, 2003

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Senator Collins

If Susan Collins is key, we better figure out what we do about it. Please come up with a plan; talk to anyone you need to talk to.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080603-4



Please respond by 8/22/03

*CBSD  
TRM  
8/12*

*032*

*6 Aug 03*

U21718 /03

August 6, 2003

300.2

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *A*  
SUBJECT: Schoomaker Quote

Please give me the precise quote of what Schoomaker said on end strength at the hearing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080603-6

.....  
Please respond by 8/8/03

✓ 8/14

Sec Def — 8/6

Yellow tabs - Questions on Endstrength

Red tab - of interest

U21719 / 03

8/6  
10 AUG 03

WARNER: Agreed. But, you indicated that you would make, at the earliest possibility, a trip into theater, both Afghanistan and <Iraq>. Thank you. Senator Levin?

LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A critically important part of your background, General Schoomaker, is the fact that you received a master's degree at Central Michigan University. I should have noted that earlier, and I just remembered it.

SCHOOMAKER: Sir, I had to have something to do at night. I did that on my own dime.

LEVIN: General, the United States has almost 150,000 troops deployed to <Iraq>, and we're going to have a significant presence at or near that level apparently for some time. A lot of the troops there don't know when they're coming home. General Franks said he thought that something like current troop levels are going to be required for the foreseeable future.

I'm just wondering how long do you believe that we could maintain a significant troop presence in <Iraq>, given the authorized level of 480,000 troops in the active Army? At what point might we have to raise the force levels to make this situation sustainable in the long- term?

SCHOOMAKER: Sir, that's, again, a difficult question, and I'd like to have some time to really assess the specifics of it. As we discussed in the office call, I think that this isn't just an issue of end strength; it's an issue of fundamental organization.

And the fact of the matter is we will be in <Iraq> a long time creating the environment there for it to be able to transition to the peace and the kind of stable nation that's able to operate within the kind of values we'd like to see it operate. And it's going to require presence there, and that presence, I think as you've seen, is going to start transitioning to other friends that will help us do that.

But fundamentally, I think this is an issue of what capability we have to have there. We could have a lot of people there in the wrong capability and not be very effective. And that, I think, is my fundamental challenge, is to do an assessment of how we're organized, do we have the capability packaged properly and can we establish a rotation base before we make a decision on whether or not we need more people, because I think we could take a lot more people and put them in the wrong places and end up with the same problem. And I'd sure hate to go down that road.

LEVIN: As the chairman indicated, the stress on our active duty service members and their families has been immense. The problem with our Reserve and National Guard personnel, who have really been called up for longer periods of time than they had reason to expect are major problems. And you've indicated you want some time to reach some recommendations on these issues, and that's fair enough, but I do hope that you would keep in close touch with this committee on those issues, because this is a major issue out in our states and for the nation as to how much stress we can place on our active duty forces.

Sergeant McCoy is a veteran of B Company, 2nd Battalion, 504th Infantry, and in 1976 I commanded that company. He is living proof that the paratroopers are better, they're taller.  
(LAUGHTER)

(UNKNOWN)  
Smarter?

REED: Smarter, and we are still very proud of him.

So thank you, Sergeant McCoy.

General Schoomaker, it's no secret that there was a certain degree of tension between General Shinseki and the secretary of defense. And you are going into a position which you will require not only the confidence of the secretary of defense, as I'm sure you have, but also that the confidence of everyone within the Army, which I assume and expect you will get too.

But there certainly is a different perception today about the relationship between the Army and civilian leaders of the Department of Defense.

Can you comment on that and your perspectives going forward as to what you -- how do you see you're going to dispel any lingering rumors?

SCHOOMAKER: Well, sir, first of all, I can't speak to the specifics of what's gone on in the past that I wasn't witness to.

But like you, as a private citizen, I observed -- you know, I know what the perceptions are and I saw the things that the media reported. And when I was asked to consider returning to active duty and take on this job, that was one of the things that was on my mind.

And since the secretary of defense is the one that asked me to do this, that was one of the first things we discussed. And I'm convinced through our discussions and our subsequent dealings that we have an open and candid dialogue, and that we have come to an arrangement where we can agree to disagree and at the same time understand what the chain of command is. And I'm very comfortable that he's going to hold to his word, and I know I'll hold to mine.

REED: Thank you, sir.

I think that's an important point to begin your service.

One of the innovations that began several years ago was the Stryker brigades and they are poised now to begin their first operational deployment.

Can you comment upon that and also additional changes that you anticipate, for example, less reliance upon division headquarters as organizing elements and more on separate brigades?

SCHOOMAKER: Sir, the Stryker brigade falls, in my view, in that area I was talking about, the

REED: Thank you very much.

WARNER: Thank you, Senator Reed. Senator Talent?

TALENT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Schoomaker, I have first of all what I think is a very important question I need to ask you if we're going to have a strong relationship in the future.

How do you pronounce your name?  
(LAUGHTER)

Because I've heard senators pronounce it Schoomaker and staff Schoomaker. And normally, I would assume the staff knew better than the senators. But I'm...

SCHOO MAKER:

First of all, the only one that cares is my father. All right?

TALENT: How would he pronounce it?

SCHOO MAKER: It's Schoomaker.

TALENT: Schoomaker.

SCHOO MAKER: (inaudible) S-K-O-O.

TALENT: Well, good, that's easier, because that's how it's spelled.

**Just one subject I want to go into with you. It's one of the reasons I wanted to be certain to be here and to be able to ask you questions.**

**And I have some history on the whole issue of in-strength, because I went in the House in 1992 and went on the HASC at that point. And even as a freshman, knowing as little as I knew then, I could see that that was an issue, because we had drawn down the force in active Army from 780,000-plus troops to 480,000-plus. And at the same time, OPTEMPO was going up.**

**And it seemed to me, even as a freshman, that this was creating a disequilibrium that would have a danger of breaking the force and perhaps threatening the national security. And obviously, OPTEMPO is even higher than it was then.**

**And I complained about it. I made a lot of points about it. And in the last administration -- I've been doing the same in this.**

**Now, I'm also a believer in transformation. But I want to make certain that transformation is a way of accomplishing the national military strategy, not an excuse by which we console ourselves while we're not accomplishing it.**

**And I want to know your thoughts on the whole subject of in- strength. Senator Reed mentioned it's no secret there was tension between General Shinseki and Secretary Rumsfeld, and I think there's no secret that part of the tension was a disagreement on that issue.**

**What do you think of General Shinseki's evaluation that we needed 20,000 to 40,000 more people in the active Army at least to round out some of the specialties, like MPs, civil affairs? Are you at a point where you can make an assessment? How great a priority is it for you to be able to make that assessment?**

**SCHOOMAKER: First of all, I do need to have time to formally assess this.**

**But I'm going to take a little risk here and I'm going to tell you that, intuitively, I think we need more people. I mean, it's just that simple.**

**But the problem is that we haven't taken a hard look yet at whether or not we should -- how we can rebalance the AC/RC, the active component/Reserve component mix.**

**Much of this has got to do with availability. There are many things that we know that we have to have readily available in a contingent kind of environment. For instance, port opening units, which are all in the Reserves, need to be more available to us. So some of that needs to come across in trade.**

**And my point earlier is is that before we just add a very expensive component on top of our current construct, I think we need to take a look at rebalancing and make sure we know where we want to put additional people if we need them.**

**In the Army, the figures I looked at planning figures-wise is something like \$60,000 a face for an active enlisted soldier. That's an important price. And it's one the Army cannot absorb from within its TOA and it would have to come with the monies attached.**

**So I think this is an important enough thing that we need to take a good look at. It's one of the things that, clearly, if I'm confirmed we're going to have to look at immediately.**

**And it's got to be done within a context that says what is a relevant Army? How should it be organized? How does it fit the joint doctrine? What do we need immediately available? How should it be packaged?**

**And we shouldn't be trapped in our old construct. If the old constructs work for us, fine. If they don't, we need to modify them and then make a decision about whether the Army is big enough on the thing.**

August 6, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Division of Labor

I talked to Paul Wolfowitz about developing a division of labor, so I don't have to work so hard and late and seven days a week. He sits in all my meetings doing everything I am doing. He said he thought that might be a good idea.

Please come up with a list of things you think we might divide on. I think it would be helpful if we arranged a list of things he could then work and report to me on, but not simply end any decision on—for example, David Chu's work, Mike Wynne's work, and we ought to think of other things.

*DR*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080603-7

.....  
Please respond by 8/15/03

U21720 /03

*6 Aug 03*

August 6, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Firebombs

In the Early Bird item #13, it talks about firebombs being dropped in Iraq. Please have someone look into that and tell me what that is about.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Crawley, James W. "Officials Confirm Dropping Firebombs on Iraqi Troops," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, August 5, 2003, p. 1.

DHR:dh  
080603-11

.....  
Please respond by 8/15/03

*From "out box"  
after Round Table*

U21721 /03

6 AUG 03

11-L-0559/OSD/19207



San Diego Union-Tribune  
August 5, 2003  
Pg. 1

## Officials Confirm Dropping Firebombs On Iraqi Troops

*Results are 'remarkably similar' to using napalm*

By James W. Crawley, Staff Writer

American jets killed Iraqi troops with firebombs – similar to the controversial napalm used in the Vietnam War – in March and April as Marines battled toward Baghdad.

Marine Corps fighter pilots and commanders who have returned from the war zone have confirmed dropping dozens of incendiary bombs near bridges over the Saddam Canal and the Tigris River. The explosions created massive fireballs.

"We napalmed both those (bridge) approaches," said Col. Randolph Alles in a recent interview. He commanded Marine Air Group 11, based at Miramar Marine Corps Air Station, during the war. "Unfortunately, there were people there because you could see them in the (cockpit) video.

"They were Iraqi soldiers there. It's no great way to die," he added. How many Iraqis died, the military couldn't say. No accurate count has been made of Iraqi war casualties.

The bombing campaign helped clear the path for the Marines' race to Baghdad.

During the war, Pentagon spokesmen disputed reports that napalm was being used, saying the Pentagon's stockpile had been destroyed two years ago.

Apparently the spokesmen were drawing a distinction between the terms "firebomb" and "napalm." If reporters had asked about firebombs, officials said yesterday they would have confirmed their use.

What the Marines dropped, the spokesmen said yesterday, were "Mark 77 firebombs." They acknowledged those are incendiary devices with a function "remarkably similar" to napalm weapons.

Rather than using gasoline and benzene as the fuel, the firebombs use kerosene-based jet fuel, which has a smaller concentration of benzene.

Hundreds of partially loaded Mark 77 firebombs were stored on pre-positioned ammunition ships overseas, Marine Corps officials said. Those ships were unloaded in Kuwait during the weeks preceding the war.

"You can call it something other than napalm, but it's napalm," said John Pike, defense analyst with GlobalSecurity.org, a nonpartisan research group in Alexandria, Va.

Although many human rights groups consider incendiary bombs to be inhumane, international law does not prohibit their use against military forces. The United States has not agreed to a ban against possible civilian targets.

"Incendiaries create burns that are difficult to treat," said Robert Musil, executive director of Physicians for Social Responsibility, a Washington group that opposes the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Musil described the Pentagon's distinction between napalm and Mark 77 firebombs as "pretty outrageous."

"That's clearly Orwellian," he added.

Developed during World War II and dropped on troops and Japanese cities, incendiary bombs have been used by American forces in nearly every conflict since. Their use became controversial during the Vietnam War when U.S. and South Vietnamese aircraft dropped millions of pounds of napalm. Its effects were shown in a Pulitzer Prize-winning photograph of Vietnamese children running from their burned village.

Before March, the last time U.S. forces had used napalm in combat was the Persian Gulf War, again by Marines.

During a recent interview about the bombing campaign in Iraq, Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Jim Amos confirmed aircraft dropped what he and other Marines continue to call napalm on Iraqi troops on several occasions. He commanded Marine jet and helicopter units involved in the Iraq war and leads the Miramar-based 3rd Marine Air Wing.

Miramar pilots familiar with the bombing missions pointed to at least two locations where firebombs were dropped.

Before the Marines crossed the Saddam Canal in central Iraq, jets dropped several firebombs on enemy positions near a bridge that would become the Marines' main crossing point on the road toward Numaniyah, a key town 40 miles from Baghdad.

Next, the bombs were used against Iraqis near a key Tigris River bridge, north of Numaniyah, in early April.

There were reports of another attack on the first day of the war.

Two embedded journalists reported what they described as napalm being dropped on an Iraqi observation post at Safwan Hill overlooking the Kuwait border.

Reporters for CNN and the Sydney (Australia) Morning Herald were told by unnamed Marine officers that aircraft dropped napalm on the Iraqi position, which was adjacent to one of the Marines' main invasion routes.

Their reports were disputed by several Pentagon spokesmen who said no such bombs were used nor did the United States have any napalm weapons.

The Pentagon destroyed its stockpile of napalm canisters, which had been stored near Camp Pendleton at the Fallbrook Naval Weapons Station, in April 2001.

Yesterday military spokesmen described what they see as the distinction between the two types of incendiary bombs. They said mixture used in modern firebombs is a less harmful mixture than Vietnam War-era napalm.

"This additive has significantly less of an impact on the environment," wrote Marine spokesman Col. Michael Daily, in an e-mailed information sheet provided by the Pentagon.

He added, "many folks (out of habit) refer to the Mark 77 as 'napalm' because its effect upon the target is remarkably similar."

In the e-mail, Daily also acknowledged that firebombs were dropped near Safwan Hill.

Alles, who oversaw the Safwan bombing raid, said 18 one-ton satellite-guided bombs, but no incendiary bombs, were dropped on the site.

Military experts say incendiary bombs can be an effective weapon in certain situations.

Firebombs are useful against dug-in troops and light vehicles, said GlobalSecurity's Pike.

"I used it routinely in Vietnam," said retired Marine Lt. Gen. Bernard Trainor, now a prominent defense analyst. "I have no moral compunction against using it. It's just another weapon."

And, the distinctive fireball and smell have a psychological impact on troops, experts said.

"The generals love napalm," said Alles, who has transferred to Washington. "It has a big psychological effect."

August 6, 2003

004

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: Sirius and Global Crossing

*Advance  
copy sent*

I have to get back to John Snow on this Sirius and Global Crossing issue. He is going to make a recommendation to the President.

John wants me to call him back and tell him who has the real story on the DoD position, so he will know precisely what we believe. You said there was a memo. If there is, I need to see it fast if we want to affect the decision.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080603-17

.....  
Please respond by 8/7/03

6 AUG 03

U21722 /03

August 6, 2003

TO: Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeldy *DR*

SUBJECT: Phone Calls

*Advances  
copy given  
to [unclear] / [unclear]*

I need phone calls with Stephen Hadley, ADM Giambastiani, David Chu, Pete Aldridge and Powell Moore, and I want to talk to J.D. Crouch about Hawaii. I could do that when I see him Friday.

*020 SD*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080603-15

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

*6 Aug 03*

U21723 /03

August 6, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Material to Greenspan

*Advance work not*

*Larry Di Rita*  
*8/6*

Alan Greenspan said he never received that material on the Poindexter project you said was sent over to him.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
080603-20

Please respond by 8/8/03

*4/13.51*  
*8/12*

*8/11*  
*Secret*  
*→ I'll get it back over to him.*  
*D. Rita*

Larry Di Rita  
*8/11*

U21724 /03

*Coarjos*

August <sup>6</sup>~~4~~, 2003

010

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Law Change

Let's go ahead forward and get the law changed, so we can keep the four-star at CIA and have the possibility of two three-stars that are exempted because of the importance of the relationship.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080403-57



Please respond by 8/22/03

6 AUG 03

U21725 /03

August <sup>6</sup> 4, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: J.D. Crouch

Please talk to Crouch, and see if he has any interest in that Hawaii post.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080403-58



Please respond by 8/8/03

*2003 235.02*

U21726 /03

*6Aug03*



August <sup>6</sup>/~~4~~, 2003

*Classified  
Copy sent*

TO: Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Calls to VP, Crouch

Please set me up to talk to the Vice President on the secure line preferably today,  
or sometime before the NSC tomorrow.

And set me up to talk to J.D. Crouch on the phone sometime.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080403-59

*020517*

.....

Please respond by 8/5/03

*6 Aug 03*

U21727 /03

6  
August 4, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: USAFA Legal Entities

I am told there are three separate legal entities at the Air Force Academy. Could you look into it, tell me how many lawyers are out there and why we don't get that streamlined. That sounds excessive to me.

*DR*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080403-53

.....  
Please respond by 8/22/03

*✓*  
*10/3*

*C 10/2*

*SIR,*  
*Response attached*  
*vr / CDR Nosenzo*  
*10-2*

*6 Aug 03*

U21728 /03



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

✓  
10/3

October 1, 2003, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *William J. Haynes II*

SUBJECT: Air Force Academy Legal Entities

- You asked about the Air Force Academy's legal entities and the number of lawyers assigned to them.
- There are, as you noted, three separate legal entities at the United States Air Force Academy, in addition to the Air Force Academy Legal Department whose primary mission is teaching.
- My view is that the three legal entities and the lawyers assigned to them are appropriate considering their different missions and responsibilities at the Academy:
  - Air Force Academy Legal Office
    - Currently staffed with eight attorneys, although authorized 11 military and civilian attorneys.
    - Principal legal support to the Superintendent (the General Court-Martial Convening Authority), Vice Superintendent, Athletic Director, President of the Academy Board, the Commander, 34<sup>th</sup> Training Wing, and the Dean of Faculty on military justice and disciplinary issues. Legal advisor to the Commander, 10<sup>th</sup> Air Base Wing (the Special Court-Martial Convening Authority), and all subordinate commanders and Wing agencies on military justice, claims, civilian personnel actions, environmental law issues and administrative matters involving cadets, active duty, and civilian personnel assigned to the Academy.
  - Area Defense Counsel Office
    - Two military attorneys authorized and assigned.
    - Separate legal office dedicated to providing independent defense counsel services to over 7,600 cadets and military personnel assigned.



11-L-0559/OSD/19218

- Legal Advisor to the 34<sup>th</sup> Training Wing
  - One military attorney authorized and assigned.
  - The Secretary of the Air Force recently established this position to serve as principal legal liaison to cadet sexual assault victims on all investigative and criminal justice legal matters, to serve as legal advisor to the Vice Commandant of Cadets, the Academy Response Team.
- In May 2003, the Secretary of the Air Force directed consolidation of the 10<sup>th</sup> Air Base Wing Legal Office and the United States Air Force Academy Legal Office into what is now the Air Force Academy Legal Office.
- The Air Force Academy's Legal Department currently has 19 military and civilian attorneys of the 20 authorized to provide cadet leadership and academic development through a broad liberal arts undergraduate program in Legal Studies. The Legal Studies program emphasizes critical thinking and problem-solving skills in addition to in-depth knowledge of the American legal system. Instructors teach one core law course to all 4,000 cadets, and 11 elective law courses and four interdisciplinary courses to smaller cadet classes. The faculty provides scholarly research and writing, as well as serves as officer representatives for Academy clubs and athletic teams.
- A more detailed summary of each legal entity's manning and mission is at Tab A.
- Both the Air Force General Counsel and Judge Advocate General reviewed the number of assigned attorneys to perform their respective missions and concluded that none of the entities is overstaffed with attorneys. The Air Force General Counsel's analysis and coordination are at Tab B.

COORDINATION: SAF/GC.

Attachment:  
As stated.

Prepared By: Robert E. Reed, ODGC (P&HP) (b)(6)

### Air Force Academy Legal Entities

- Air Force Academy Legal Office. Recently reorganized to combine what had been divided into two legal offices as part of the Air Force Chief of Staff's Model Wing Program in 1994.
- Manning. Authorized eight judge advocates and three civilian attorneys, but is currently staffed with six judge advocates and two civilian attorneys.
- Unit Mission. Provides legal counsel to the Superintendent, who is Commander, General Court-Martial Convening Authority, and President of the Academy Board. Provides legal advice to the Commander, 34<sup>th</sup> Training Wing and Dean of Faculty on military justice issues. Legal advisor to the Vice Superintendent, Athletic Director, and Commander, 10<sup>th</sup> Air Base Wing and all subordinate commanders and Wing agencies. Advises commanders and staff on courts-martial, nonjudicial punishment, civilian personnel actions, government claims, civil law matters, and compliance with federal and state environmental laws. Legal advisor for all disciplinary and administrative matters involving cadets, active duty, and civilian personnel assigned to the Academy. Legal advisor to the Military Review Committee and Cadet Honor Code Division; manages the Cadet Disenrollment program encompassing academic, conduct, athletic, honor, and training deficiencies involving over 300 cadets annually.
- Area Defense Counsel Office.
  - Manning. Authorized and assigned two judge advocates.
  - Unit Mission. Assigned to the Air Force Legal Services Agency, provides independent defense counsel services to over 4,000 cadets and 3,600 military personnel assigned. Defense services include representation during law enforcement interrogations, pretrial confinement hearings, all courts-martial (summary, special, and general courts-martial), and post-trial clemency proceedings. Provides defense services in administrative separation and demotion cases, nonjudicial punishments, flying and physical evaluation boards, medical credential hearings, and all personnel actions in which defense counsel representation is authorized or required.

- Legal Advisor to the 34<sup>th</sup> Training Wing.
  - Manning. One judge advocate authorized and assigned.
  - Mission. The Secretary of the Air Force directed this position be separately established as principal legal liaison to cadet sexual assault victims on all investigative and criminal justice legal matters, to serve as legal advisor to the Vice Commandant of Cadets, the Academy Response Team, and the 34<sup>th</sup> Training Wing on all matters associated with sexual assault investigations, victim support, and cadet discipline. Provides guidance on sexual assault education and training programs. Responsible for legal issues related to Congressional inquiries related to sexual assault cases and cadet discipline.

#### **Air Force Academy Legal Department**

- Manning. Authorized 15 judge advocates and four civilian attorneys, but is currently staffed with 14 judge advocates and four civilian attorneys.
- Unit Mission. Provides cadet leadership and academic development by administering a broad liberal arts undergraduate program in Legal Studies. The Legal Studies program emphasizes critical thinking and problem-solving skills in addition to in-depth knowledge of the American legal system. Instructors teach one core law course to all 4,000 cadets, and 11 elective law courses and four interdisciplinary courses to smaller cadet classes. Provides scholarly research and writing on a wide variety of legal issues, and support to other legal offices in specialized areas such as military justice, copyright, ethics, and estate planning. Provides support to the Cadet Wing for the investigation and hearing of alleged Honor Code violations. Faculty participates as Associate Air Officers Commanding (AOC), Associate AOC for Academics, and officer representatives for Academy clubs and athletic teams.



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON, DC

Office Of The General Counsel

SEP 1 0 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR DOD/GC

FROM: SAF/GC

SUBJECT: Appropriate Composition of the Air Force Academy's Current Legal Entities

In response to your request for my assessment of the appropriateness of the current configuration of the Air Force Academy legal entities and the number of attorneys assigned to them, my view is that the current structure is proper and the number of attorneys assigned is definitely not excessive. While I am always open to finding ways to provide legal services more efficiently, I believe attorney staff reductions at the Academy at this time would be counter-productive.

As you know, the Working Group Report on Sexual Assaults at the Academy recommended a consolidation of legal offices. That has been accomplished. The number of attorneys assigned to the recently reorganized Air Force Academy Legal Office is based on the manpower standard used to staff all Air Force wing legal offices that serve General Court-Martial Convening Authorities. Based on my staff's interaction with this office and comments we have received from the Air Force Academy Superintendent and Commandant of Cadets, I believe that office may be in need of more attorneys or attorneys with more seniority given the current demands. I am currently working this issue.


The Legal Advisor to the 34<sup>th</sup> Training Wing was created this year at the direction of the Secretary of the Air Force in furtherance of the Agenda of Change and supports the new "first responder team" interfacing with victims of sexual assault. While the need for this advisor is viewed as temporary, it is believed needed by our Secretary as we work through the controversial issues currently facing the Air Force and the Academy.

The Dean of the Faculty's Department of Law, which is not a legal office because of its mission, is manned based on a formula provided by the Department of Mathematical Sciences. This formula is applied to all academic departments and primarily considers such things as the current student population and the number of core and elective courses taught. The number of authorized law faculty position was increased by one in the mid 1990s because of the support the law instructors provide to the honor system. The law faculty supports the cadet honor system as Case Legal Advisors, who advise cadets investigating honor allegations, and Board Legal Advisors, who observe and advise the honor boards. From June 2002 to June 2003, the Case Legal Advisors were involved in 153 cases and the Board Legal Advisors served with 90 honor boards. Given the primary teaching mission and the honor workload, I view the current number of attorneys assigned to the faculty as appropriate.

11-L-0559/OSD/19222

The Area Defense Counsel Office is different from the typical Academy-size installation with the second attorney assigned to handle cadet-specific issues. Given the unique aspects and number of cases involving the cadet disciplinary and honor systems, the second attorney is believed warranted.

Please let me know if I can provide any further information.




MARY L. WALKER  
General Counsel



**COORDINATION**

SUBJECT: INFO MEMO on Air Force Academy Legal Entities, September 22, 2003

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
General Counsel of the Department of the Air Force

11-L-0559/OSD/19224

August <sup>6</sup> 2003  
OS  
9.20

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Follow Up on Sen. Warner

032

Please give me a report back after you talk to Warner about the Barbara Barrett thing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080403-52



Please respond by 8/8/03

1 Aug 03

U21729 /03

August 6, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Quote

*Larry Di Rita*  
*8/4*

Please get me the exact quote from James Wolfensohn, head of the World Bank, where he said they couldn't give assistance to the Iraqis because the Iraqi Governing Council wasn't elected—yet they helped Iraq when the dictator was never elected, either. It is outrageous.

*Iraq*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080603-1

.....  
Please respond by 8/8/03

*Attached*

Larry Di Rita  
*DL*

*6 Aug 03*

U21730 /03

 Email this document

Source: Agence France-Presse (AFP)  
Date: 31 Jul 2003

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## Iraq welcomes returning refugees, first Governing Council president

**BAGHDAD, July 31 (AFP)** - Aspiring to end the anarchy of the post-war, Iraq's Governing Council named its first president Wednesday as a group of Iraqi refugees who languished 12 years in a Saudi camp returned home.

But hopes for the future were mitigated by the release of another audiotape the CIA believes carries Saddam Hussein's voice taunting US troops as insurgents carried out fresh attacks.

The instability has tried the patience of Iraqis, who expect the US to deliver on promises of a better life. Under Saddam they endured three wars and over a decade of crippling international trade sanctions.

But World Bank president James Wolfensohn, on a one-day tour of Baghdad, said aid might be a year away.

"At some point that (aid) will, I'm sure, happen but as you know, there is a need first to have a constitution, to have a government, to re-establish Iraq as the Iraqi people would like to have it," he told reporters. | !!

"We need to determine a recognized government to whom we can lend," Wolfensohn added after meeting the US overseer in Iraq, Paul Bremer, and members of the Governing Council.

Still, betting on a brighter future, more than 240 Iraqi refugees returned Wednesday to their native soil after 12 years living in the squalid Rafha refugee camp in the barren desert plains of northern Saudi Arabia.

The 244 refugees reached the port of Umm Qasr and then headed up to the southern city of Basra in buses.

One of them, Taher Shahrur Taher, could not hide his joy upon coming back to Iraq.

"If they had mass graves in Iraq, in Rafha the whole camp was a tomb for the living," Tahar said.

Rafha camp, 10 kilometers (six miles) from the Iraqi border, was built 12 years ago and once sheltered 33,000 refugees, many of whom fled following the 1991 Gulf War and a Shiite-led uprising in the south brutally suppressed by Saddam's army.

The US-sponsored interim Governing Council meanwhile cleared a hurdle as it named Ibrahim Jafari, from the Shiite fundamentalist Dawa party, as its first

president in a nine-man monthly rotation.

Jafari was chosen as the council's debut president because his name comes first in alphabetical order, said Patriotic Union of Kurdistan official Barham Saleh.

He will be succeeded by two fellow Shiites, who count a 60 percent majority in Iraq: the Pentagon-backed Ahmed Chalabi and Iyad Allawi, a former Baathist and longtime member of the exiled opposition.

The rotation includes five Shiite Muslims, two Sunni and two Kurdish members of the 25-strong council, a microcosm of Iraq's rich diversity.

The decision was a delicate one with members not wishing to aggravate the country's ethnic and religious fault lines.

However, in a sobering development, the Dubai-based Al-Arabiya satellite channel aired late Tuesday the fifth purported message from Saddam since he was deposed in April.

CIA analysts concluded there is a "high likelihood" that the voice was Saddam's.

"We thank God for honoring us with their martyrdom" after a "valiant battle with the enemy lasting six hours," the voice said, referring to the killing of Saddam's sons Uday and Qusay in Mosul, northern Iraq on July 22.

In Washington, a senior US military official said tips were now flooding in about the whereabouts of Saddam, who has a 25-million-dollar price on his head. US commanders believe "that he relocates repeatedly during the day, and during the night," said Air Force Lieutenant General Norton Schwartz, operations director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In a sign efforts to track down Saddam and his loyalists were running full throttle, the US military announced it had arrested 559 people in 51 raids and 1,977 patrols during a 24-hour period ending Wednesday.

However, US President George W. Bush sounded less sure.

"I don't know how close we are to getting Saddam Hussein. Closer than we were yesterday, I guess," Bush said at a White House press conference Wednesday.

"All I know is: We're on the hunt."

Bush also accepted the blame for his specious claim that Iraq had attempted to purchase uranium.

"I take personal responsibility for everything I say, of course. Absolutely," Bush said, quickly changing the subject.

"I analysed a thorough body of intelligence -- good, solid, sound intelligence -- that led me to come to the conclusion that it was necessary to remove Saddam Hussein

from power."

Meanwhile, three soldiers were wounded in two rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) attacks Tuesday and Wednesday in Samarra, 100 kilometers (60 miles) north of Baghdad, a military spokesman said, while witnesses said a US tank was hit by an RPG outside the town of Fallujah, causing little damage.

bur-kd/aln AFP 310158 GMT 07 03

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509

August 5, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Op-Ed on North Korea

You might want to send this op-ed piece by Woolsey and McInerney on North Korea to Leon LaPorte.

Report (North)

Thanks.

Attach.

Woolsey, R. James and McInerney, Thomas G. "The Next Korean War," *The Wall Street Journal*, August 3, 2003, p. A8.

DHR:dh  
080503-1

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

5 Aug 03

U21731 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/19230

Wall Street Journal  
August 4, 2003

## The Next Korean War

By R. James Woolsey and Thomas G. McInerney

The White House had a shape-of-the-table announcement last week: North Korea would participate in six-sided talks with the U.S., China, Russia, South Korea and Japan. This was welcome but it changes nothing fundamental. Kim Jong Il has clearly demonstrated his capacity for falsehood in multilateral as well as bilateral forums. The bigger, and much worse, news is the overall course of events this summer.

In early July, krypton 85 was detected in locations that suggested that this gas, produced when spent nuclear fuel is reprocessed into plutonium for nuclear weapons, may have emanated from a site other than North Korea's known reprocessing facility at Yongbyon.

There would be nothing surprising about a hidden reprocessing plant -- North Korea has thousands of underground facilities. But if the reprocessing of the 8,000 spent fuel rods that the North Koreans took out of storage at Yongbyon last January -- when it ousted international inspectors and walked away from the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- has been completed clandestinely, then Kim Jong Il may already have enough material for several more weapons to go with the one or two he is thought to have from previous reprocessing.

### Several Additional Bombs

But even if the krypton was emanating from Yongbyon, this still means that several additional bombs' worth of plutonium could be available a few months from now. Add this to Pyongyang's breach of the 1994 Agreed Framework by its secret uranium-enrichment program, and its boast in April that it would sell weapons-grade plutonium to whomever it pleased (rogue states? terrorist groups?), and it is apparent that the world has weeks to months, at most, to deal with this issue, not months to years.

Interdiction of shipments out of North Korea will not stop the export of such fissionable material. Even if current efforts for nations to intercept North Korean shipping are successful, this would be completely inadequate to the purpose. The North Koreans' principal exports today are ballistic missiles and illegal drugs, both clandestine. As former Secretary of Defense William Perry recently noted, the amount of plutonium needed for a bomb is about the size of a soccer ball.

There is no reason the North Koreans would refrain from using air shipments, including those protected by diplomatic immunity, to smuggle and sell such material.

In the midst of the just announced six-way talks, one fact stands out: The only chance for a peaceful resolution of this crisis before North Korea moves clearly into the ranks of nuclear powers is for China to move decisively. Indeed we see no alternative but for China to use its substantial economic leverage, derived from North Korea's dependence on it for fuel and food, to press, hard and immediately, for a change in regime. Kim Jong Il's regime has shown that agreements signed with it, by anyone, mean nothing.

What could induce China to follow such an uncharacteristically decisive course? North Korea's escalating nuclear aspirations run the risk of creating not one but four new nuclear powers in Asia. South Korea, Japan and probably Taiwan will find it very difficult to refrain from moving toward nuclear



capability as North Korea becomes more threatening. Also, China must be clearly told that North Korea's long-range ballistic missile program and the prospect of its sale of fissionable material to terrorists make this a direct matter of U.S. security. Presidents Bush and Roh declared in May that they will "not tolerate nuclear weapons in North Korea."

Unfortunately, the reflexive rejection in the public debate of the use of force against North Korea has begun to undermine U.S. ability both to influence China to act and to take the preparatory steps necessary for effectiveness if force should be needed. The U.S. and South Korea must instead come together and begin to assess realistically what it would take to conduct a successful military operation to change the North Korean regime.

It is not reasonable to limit the use of force to a surgical strike destroying Yongbyon. Although the facility would need to be destroyed, the possible existence of another plutonium reprocessing plant or of uranium-enrichment facilities, or of plutonium hidden elsewhere, makes it infeasible to limit the use of force to such a single objective. Moreover, military action against North Korea must protect South Korea from certain attack (particularly from artillery just north of the DMZ that can reach Seoul). In short, we must be prepared to win a war, not execute a strike.

U.S. and South Korean forces have spent nearly half a century preparing to fight and win such a war. We should not be intimidated by North Korea's much-discussed artillery. Around half of North Korea's 11,000-plus artillery pieces, some of them in caves, are in position to fire on Seoul. But all are vulnerable to stealth and precision weapons -- e.g., caves can be sealed by accurate munitions.

Massive air power is the key to being able both to destroy Yongbyon and to protect South Korea from attack by missile or artillery. There is a significant number of hardened air bases available in South Korea and the South Koreans have an excellent air force of approximately 550 modern tactical aircraft. The U.S. should begin planning immediately to deploy the Patriot tactical ballistic missile defense system plus Aegis ships to South Korea and Japan, and also to reinforce our tactical air forces by moving in several air wings and aircraft carrier battle groups, together with the all-important surveillance aircraft and drones.

The goal of the planning should be to be prepared on short notice both to destroy the nuclear capabilities at Yongbyon and other key North Korean facilities and to protect South Korea against attack by destroying North Korean artillery and missile sites. Our stealth aircraft, equipped with precision bombs, and cruise missiles will be crucial -- these weapons can be tailored to incinerate the WMD and minimize radiation leakage.

The key point is that the base infrastructure available in the region and the accessibility of North Korea from the sea should make it possible to generate around 4,000 sorties a day compared to the 800 a day that were so effective in Iraq. When one contemplates that the vast majority of these sorties would use precision munitions, and that surveillance aircraft would permit immediate targeting of artillery pieces and ballistic missile launch sites, we believe the use of air power in such a war would be swifter and more devastating than it was in Iraq. North Korea's geriatric air defenses -- both fighter aircraft and missiles -- would not last long. As the Iraqis understood when facing our air power, if you fly, you die.

Marine forces deployed off both coasts of North Korea could put both Pyongyang and Wonson at risk of rapid seizure, particularly given the fact that most of North Korea's armed forces are situated along the DMZ. With over 20 of the Army's 33 combat brigades now committed it would be necessary to call up additional Reserve and National Guard units. However, the U.S. forces that would have the greatest immediate effect are Expeditionary Air Forces and Carrier Battle Groups, most of which have now been

removed from the Iraqi theater.

### **An Assured Victory**

The South Korean Army is well equipped to handle a counteroffensive into North Korea with help from perhaps two additional U.S. Army divisions, together with the above-mentioned Marine Expeditionary Force and dominant air power. We judge that the U.S. and South Korea could defeat North Korea decisively in 30 to 60 days with such a strategy. Importantly, there is "no doubt on the outcome" as the chairman of the JCS, Gen. Meyers, said at his reconfirmation hearing on July 26 to the Senate.

We are not eager to see force used on the Korean peninsula. It is better to resolve this crisis without war. However, unless China succeeds in ending North Korea's nuclear weapons development -- and we believe this will require a change in regime -- Americans will be left with the threat to our existence described by Secretary Perry when he recently said that the North Korean nuclear program "poses an imminent danger of nuclear weapons being detonated in American cities."

We can hate it that we are forced now to confront this choice. But we should not take refuge in denial.

*Mr. Woolsey was CIA director from 1993-95. Gen. McInerney, a retired three-star Air Force lieutenant general and former assistant vice chief of staff, is a Fox News military analyst.*

August 5, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock

CC: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Schedule for Strategic Overview and CENTCOM/CPA SVTC

Yesterday we only got halfway through, and we still ran over on our first briefing in the ESC. We better fix the time so we have time to do what we need to do.

In addition, instead of leaving five or ten minutes or no time between meetings, please start leaving 20 minutes. I simply have to have a moment to make a phone call, go to the bathroom or dictate at the conclusion of a meeting. After every meeting someone in the group always wants to stay back and talk, and that takes at least five minutes.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080503-3

.....  
Please respond by 8/6/03

*Handwritten notes:*  
DHR  
08/05/03  
to Bucci  
C 8/11

CENTCOM

5AUG03

U21732 /03

August 5, 2003

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Soccer Balls for Iraq

Please get back to Senator Mark Dayton with a letter from me to tell him we have already done the soccer ball effort.

Find out from Larry Di Rita precisely what was done, when it was done, how it was done, where it was done, how many of them, etc., and then get it to Dayton. You may recall he had that idea in the hearing.

*DR*

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/4/03 SecDef memo re: Soccer Balls

DHR:dh  
080503-4

.....  
Please respond by 8/15/03 *8/4*

*Powell -  
Claude Chafin  
can brief him. He  
was uninvolved.  
DR*

*5 Aug 03*

U21733 103 Done/SD  
11-L-0559/OSD/19235 TEN 8/11

August 4, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Soccer Balls

*Advance copy sent*

Someone—I think it was Senator Dayton in the meeting in the intelligence room with the Senators—recommended that we ought to think about giving a whole lot of soccer balls to Iraq. The schools are out, and all the kids are looking for something to do. Rather than stealing or shooting, we could get them playing soccer.

We would really have to go fast on this. It could be a superb PR opportunity. If there is no money, I would be happy to buy 10,000 or 50,000 soccer balls—whatever. We have planes going over there all the time, and a company would undoubtedly give them to them or fly them over. I could get somebody from the outside to call a company.

Please see if you can get someone really working that. You might talk to Torie Clarke.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080103-16

*(\*)*

*V 8/5*

*D. R.*

.....  
Please respond by 8/8/03


*SecDef-*

*This is such a good idea, we did it about 3 months ago (I was still in*

*fact, we did it better this way, if my*  
11-L-0559/OSD 19236

August 5, 2003

Netherlands

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Dutch FM

I ought to probably meet the Dutch foreign minister when he comes to the United States in September, since he is a possibility as NATO Secretary General.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080503-5

.....  
Please respond by 8/22/03

U21734 /03

SAUG03

11-L-0559/OSD/19237

August 5, 2003

NIE (F50)

TO: Powell Moore

CC: Doug Feith  
Dov Zakheim  
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Nunn-Lugar/Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, FY 2004 Bill

Attached are papers Senator Lugar gave me this morning at breakfast. He is hopeful that we will be able to keep our bill as it was, and not have the House knock out the \$50 million.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Nunn-Lugar/Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, FY 2004 Bill

DHR:dh  
080503-8



Please respond by 8/22/03

5 Aug 03

U21735 /03

# NUNN-LUGAR/COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

## FY 2004 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL

### SENATE MARK:

The Senate Armed Services Committee provided the program full funding and added no new conditions. They provide authority to expand Nunn-Lugar outside the former Soviet Union and give a one-year waiver for work at Shchuchye. They are silent on the program-wide waiver authority citing two years remaining on the existing 3-year waiver authority

### HOUSE MARK:

The House Armed Services Committee provided full funding for the program but there are five items that could prove extremely damaging to the program:

#### 1. SHCHUCHYE:

- The President is provided with a one-year waiver;
- \$28.8 million is cut from Shchuchye and added to Offensive Strategic Arms Elimination (missiles, subs, etc.);
- Of the \$161.6 million that remains for Shchuchye: \$71.5 million is permitted to be spent but the remaining \$90 million is only available on a matching basis (two dollars can be spent for every one dollar contributed by the international community or Russia)

#### 2. NUNN-LUGAR EXPANSION:

- The House mark does not permit Nunn-Lugar to go outside the former Soviet Union. Instead it permits \$50 million to be transferred to the State Department to be used in the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund.
- This is bizarre, they are so intent on stopping Nunn-Lugar from going outside the former Soviet Union that they are willing to transfer funds to the State Department.

#### 3. VOTKINSK:

- In response to overcoming local and regional opposition and acquiring needed permits and licenses with regard to the construction of a solid rocket motor disposition facility, the House mark restricts Nunn-Lugar from obligating more than 35% of a project's total until the Secretary can certify that all of the necessary licenses and permits have been acquired.
- The Administration will argue that this is micro-management and is best addressed by the semi-annual review in place to ensure that problems such as Votkinsk and Krasnoyarsk do not occur in the future.



- This provision would have the effect of burying the program in paper.

#### **4. HEPTYL:**

- In response to the Russian failure to notify the U.S. of their utilization of rocket fuel (heptyl) in their space launch program thus negating the need for a \$100 million facility to destroy the materials, the House mark requires that any project worth more than \$25 million must have an on-site manager who will ensure that not only does the project stay on target cost-wise but also that the project's stated purpose remains unfulfilled.
- They point out that on large projects they would have such an individual anyway.
- The costs associated with doing this with every projects over the threshold will be in the tens of millions.

#### **5. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS:**

- Nunn-Lugar can't spend money at a biological weapons facility unless the Secretary of Defense determines that the facility is secure, we have full access, and nothing bad is going on there.
- This would be a killer, there is no way to determine/certify that nothing "bad" is going on. The facilities are way too big to guarantee that someone, somewhere, isn't doing something.

August 5, 2003

TO: Honorable John Hamre

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

Thanks for your letter about the Iraqi constitution process. It is helpful. I shared it with Jerry Bremer.

Keep them coming!

DHR:dh  
080503-11

*Jerry*

U21736 /03

*5 Aug 03*

11-L-0559/OSD/19241

August 5, 2003

TO: Gen. Pace  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Briefing Papers

337

In the future, please ask people to mark the pages that have been changed when they change pages in a briefing paper, so I don't have to go through every one if I have notes on the other draft.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080503-10



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

5 Aug 03

Done 8/7

U21737 /03

August 5, 2003

310.1

TO: Ken Krieg

8/12  
Sec Def -

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DR

Will brief you.

SUBJECT: Metrics

D, Lt

LARRY DI RITA

8/4

LARRY DI RITA  
8/4

I don't have any idea what metrics anyone thinks they are using around here.

Could you please give me a piece of paper that shows me what we are using, what is being developed and why, and let me look at it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080503-14

.....  
Please respond by 8/15/03

U21739.2/03

TWO THINGS FOR YOU TO LOOK AT:

FIRST - A COUPLE OF SLIDES THAT OUTLINE THE "MEASURES" (A MIX OF SOLID OUTPUT MEASURES & ACTIVITIES) THAT WE HAVE BEEN DEVELOPING AROUND THE BALANCED RISK FRAMEWORK

SECOND - FROM LARRY DIRITA, YOU WILL RECEIVE A DRAFT OF THE ANNUAL DEFENSE REPORT WHICH WE HAVE STRUCTURED AROUND THIS FRAMEWORK (BALANCED RISK & SCORECARD).

AS A SIDE NOTE, I (AND A FEW OTHERS) HAVE BEEN MEETING REGULARLY WITH SOME OF THE AGENCIES AND SERVICES AROUND THEIR SCORECARD DEVELOPMENT. IT IS A MIXED BAG BUT SOME GOOD WORK IS BEING DONE. MUCH MORE IF YOU NEED IT. Ken Krieg

5 Aug 03


# The DoD Balanced Scorecard: Outcome Goals

## Force Management Goals

|                                   |                                 |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Ensure sustainable military tempo | Maintain quality workforce      |
| Maintain workforce satisfaction   | Maintain reasonable force costs |
| Shape the force of the future     |                                 |

## Operational Goals

|  |  |
|--|--|
| Successful plan and strategy execution | Critical systems sustainm<br>Infrastr<br>(by exc |
| Are forces currently ready?            | D<br>we h<br>the fo<br>availa                    |



## Institutional Goals

|   |  |
|---|--|
| Streamline the decision process, drive financial management, and acquisition excellence | Realign support to the Warfighter (including defense agencies) |
| Improve the readiness and quality of key facilities                                     | Manage overhead and indirect costs                             |

## Future Challenges

|  |                             |
|--|-----------------------------|
| Drive Joint Operations (CONOPS experiments)    | Define human as<br>compe    |
| Define and develop transformation capabilities | Dev<br>me<br>effe<br>organi |

**OS**

| FORCE MANAGEMENT RISK   | OPERATIONAL RISK  | FUTURE CHALLENGES RISK  | INSTITUTIONAL RISK  |
|---|---|---|---|
| Capability  | Capability  | Capability  | Capability  |
| <p><b>1) Quality of Force</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-AC &amp; RC End strength at 2% of Authorized (QTR)</li> <li>• <b>Recruiting Goals Met</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Recruit Quality</li> <li>-Critical Skills Recruitment</li> </ul> </li> <li>• <b>Retention Goals Met</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Numeric Goals</li> <li>-Attrition Ceiling</li> <li>-Manning levels of Critical Skills</li> <li>-Balance NCO Grade &amp; Experience</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><b>2) Tempo</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PERSTEMPO standards met</li> <li>• PERSTEMPO across occupational groups</li> </ul> <p><b>3a) Reasonable Cost</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MIL force costs</li> <li>• CIV force costs</li> <li>• Total cost of contractor support</li> <li>• Community QoL/capita cost</li> <li>• Health care indicators <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Outpatient market share</li> <li>-Primary care provider productivity</li> <li>-Medical cost/enrollee</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><b>3b) Workforce Satisfaction</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• QoL Commitment Index</li> <li>• QoL Social Compact Improvement Index</li> <li>• Satisfaction with Military Health Plan</li> <li>• Satisfaction with Access</li> <li>• Satisfaction with Appointment</li> </ul> <p><b>4) Shape the Force of the Future</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Core/non-core divestiture on track (Y/N)?</li> <li>• <b>CIV workforce goals (on track (Y/N)?</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Civilian cycle time</li> <li>-President's Management Agenda</li> <li>-CHRS plan</li> <li>-CIV critical skill fill goals</li> </ul> </li> <li>• <b>Meet MIL personnel requirements</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Transform DoD training</li> <li>-MHRs tasks completed</li> <li>-New RC management</li> <li>-Identify future critical skills</li> <li>-Identify optimal officer career patterns</li> </ul> </li> </ul> | <p><b>1) Do We Have the Forces Available?</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Operational Availability Building Blocks</li> </ul> <p><b>2) Are They Postured to Succeed?</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Global Basing Study</li> <li>• Operational Lessons-Learned</li> <li>• Security Cooperation Plans</li> </ul> <p><b>3) Are They Currently Ready?</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Defense Readiness Reporting System</li> <li>• Current Force Assessment</li> <li>• Adaptive Planning</li> </ul> <p><b>4) Are They Employed Consistent w/Strategy?</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analytic Agenda</li> <li>• Alternative courses of action</li> <li>• Risk metrics for plans, events, etc.</li> <li>• Models and simulations and current data</li> </ul> | <p><b>1) Drive Innovative Operations</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Maintain balanced and focused S&amp;T</li> <li>• Experiment w/new warfare concepts</li> </ul> <p><b>2) Develop More Effective Organizations</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Standing joint force HQ</li> <li>• Global joint forces rotation policy</li> <li>• Enhance Homeland Defense and Consequence Management</li> </ul> <p><b>3) Define &amp; Develop Transformational Capabilities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training Transformation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Joint Knowledge Development &amp; Distribution Capability</li> <li>-Joint National Training Capability</li> <li>-Joint Assessment &amp; Enabling Capability</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Joint Force Experimentation</li> <li>• Monitor Service Transformation Plans</li> <li>• Monitor the Status of Defense Technology Objectives</li> <li>• Exploit the US Intelligence Advantage <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Make info available on a dependable network</li> <li>-Populate the network with dynamic info</li> <li>-Deny enemy advantages and exploit weakness</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><b>4) Define Human Capital Skills &amp; Competencies</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Human Skill Sets for a Networked Environment</li> <li>• Define and Monitor Key National Capabilities</li> </ul> | <p><b>1) Streamline the Decision Process, Drive Financial &amp; Acquisition Excellence</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop metrics to support Acquisition Excellence goals</li> <li>• Increase visibility of trade space in program review</li> <li>• Improve transparency of component submissions</li> <li>• Provide explicit budget guidance</li> </ul> <p><b>2) Manage Overhead &amp; Direct Costs</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Link defense resources to key performance goals</li> </ul> <p><b>3) Improve the Readiness and Quality of Key Facilities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fund to a 67-year recapitalization rate by 2007</li> <li>• Eliminate inadequate family housing by 2007</li> <li>• Restore readiness of key facilities by 2010</li> <li>• BRAC in FY 2005 (on track Y?N)?</li> </ul> <p><b>4) Realign Support to the Warfighter</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MDAP cycle time</li> <li>• MDAP acquisition cost growth</li> <li>• MDAP O&amp;S cost growth</li> <li>• Customer wait time</li> <li>• Management reforms (MIDs)</li> </ul> |

GREEN - WE HAVE A GOOD MESSAGE  
YELLOW - WE ARE DEVELOPING  
RED - WE ARE AT RESEARCH STAGES

August 5, 2003

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Emphasis

I think we ought to do more to make sure that we talk about the importance of what the soldiers and sailors are doing. The work they are doing is important, and I think we need to say so.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080503-15

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*2003-08-05*

*5 Aug 03*

U21740 /03

August 5, 2003

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: India

*India*

At today's press briefing, Gen. Myers said that India will soon have the largest population in the world. Is that true?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080503-16

.....  
*Please respond by* 8/15/03

*5 Aug 03*

U21741 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/19247



August 5, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Press Avail Coordination

*Larry Di Rita*  
*8/6*

*050.7*

Gen. Myers' opening statement was awfully long, given my opening statement, and it felt like it hadn't been coordinated with mine. He was saying basically what I was saying.

We ought to get a system so he coordinate his remarks with ours, and his remarks are 2 1/2 minutes maximum and mine are 3 maximum. That is plenty.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080503-17

.....  
Please respond by 8/15/03

*8/5* *✓* *8/6*

*Okay. We usually do coordinate.*

*(On the message of "progress in Iraq" generally, though, a little repetition is needed.)*

*5 AUG 03*

U21742 /03  
11-L-0559/OSD/19248

*Di Rita*  
*Larry Di Rita* *8/6*

August 5, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG Craddock  
CC: Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Walter Reed Visit

*Advance copy sent to Col. Bucci*

*333 SD*

Please don't schedule me to go to Walter Reed on August 10, because I am going to be out there on August 11 getting an examination. I will do just go out an hour or an hour and ten minutes early, see some of the wounded soldiers, then do my procedure and leave.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080503-18

.....

Please respond by 8/8/03

*8 Aug 03*

U21743 /03

*Done 8/7*

August 5, 2003

STRATCOM

TO: Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: STRATCOM on Secure Phone

For some reason I cannot find a button for STRATCOM on my secure phone. If it is not there, and I don't think it is, please have someone put it on one of the empty buttons.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080503-19

.....  
Please respond by 8/6/03

*✓ 8/6*

*Sir,*

There is now a button for ADMET, 1113  
3d column at the bottom. IT has been  
tested.

*V/R, COLTB*

*8/8 5:50am*

SAUG03

U21744 /03

August 4, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Liberia

I take it that later this afternoon you are going to come back to me and tell me where we stand on the questions Condi posed to us, including:

- When we ought to send our liaison unit in—that is to say, when the ECOWAS headquarters is such that having our team with them makes sense.
- How the U.S. can facilitate the entry of the ECOWAS forces faster—such as accelerating APCs, lift and the like.

If Condi is right—that the question the President is going to be focused on is how we can help others relieve the humanitarian disaster—we ought to have a sense of how ECOWAS would do that. Do they know what they are going to do? How are they going to facilitate the entry for humanitarian workers?

I take it that all they are going to do to get a ceasefire is by their presence at the port and the airport. The question then comes, who is going to get the ceasefire? Is there someone negotiating it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080403-55

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

U21745 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/19251

LIBERIA

17 Aug 03

August 4, 2003

Qatar

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: *60 Minutes* on Qatar

Someone ought to look at the program that was on *60 Minutes* Sunday night on Qatar, and see if it is something that ought to be broadcast in English and Arabic on the Iraq television station we run.

*J*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080403-44

.....  
Please respond by 8/15/03

*9/15*

→

*Col Rhynedance -*

*Can you get the  
out to senior in Baghdad?*

*Thanks. We ought  
to get a copy of the  
tape to make Hussein  
on him.*

*4 AUG 03*

*[Signature]*

U21746 /03

Larry Di Rita

11-L-0559/OSD/19252

*9/15*

August 4, 2003

314.7

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Materials from Library of Congress

Where is the material from the Library of Congress and the historian? I have been waiting for a long time for that. It hasn't come. There must be some reason.

Let's see if we can get them stirred up.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080403-48



Please respond by 8/15/03

U21747 /03

4 AUG 03

August 4, 2003

110.01

TO: Larry Di Rita  
 LTG Craddock

CC: Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meeting Today on Supplemental

I need a meeting with Paul Wolfowitz, Doug Feith and Dov Zakheim today on Bremer's request for a supplemental.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
 080403-50

.....

Please respond by 8/4/03

*1400  
 closed  
 TEN*

4 AUG 03

U21748 /03

August 4, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Media Outreach

Let's think about getting five or six of the anchors in to give them a two-hour briefing on what actually is going on in Iraq, and then I would meet with them.

Talk to me about it—who you would invite and how we would do it—before you do it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080103-28

.....  
Please respond by 8 / 8 / 03

U21749 /03

4AUG03



August 4, 2003

330

TO: Larry Di Rita  
 LTG Craddock

CC: Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Schedule Issues

*Advance copy sent to Col Bucci*

Next week I simply have to have time with Craddock and Di Rita. Every time we put it in, it gets cancelled because there isn't time to do the things that weren't allowed for.

I also have to have an hour on Round Table next week. This file just gets thicker and thicker.

I also have to have at least three meetings on personnel. I don't care if I am all alone. I have to get some work done on this.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080103-29



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

4 AUG 03

U21750 /03

*Closed/SD  
JEN 8/11*

August 4, 2003

HDRrea

TO: Gen. Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: DMZ

Would someone please refresh me on what Leon LaPorte has in mind in terms of the unit near the DMZ? Are we going to leave anyone up there in that guard area, in the square area up there, as a symbol?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080403-1

.....  
Please respond by 8/15/03

*Closed @ round table  
8/15/03*

4A4B03

U21751 /03

August 4, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Secretary Principi

Did we ever do anything about getting Tony Principi out to Iraq and Afghanistan?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080403-8

.....  
Please respond by 8/8/03

3/4

✓  
8/5

→ to def-

I spoke with  
his Chief of Staff and  
said we'd like to  
get something going. She  
concurred, said she would  
get back to me, but  
has not as yet.

*D. h.*

4 AUG 03

U21752 /03

August 4, 2003

Mexico

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld <sup>DA</sup>  
SUBJECT: New Law

Would either you or Peter Rodman please talk to Henry Kissinger about the new law in Mexico that is as bad as the Belgian law.

Please see if you can figure out what we should do about it, and come see me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080403-10

.....  
Please respond by 8/22/03

Y

9  
29 →

U21753 /03

4AUG03

August 4, 2003

IRAQ

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Garner to Iraq/Afghanistan

When I go to Iraq and Afghanistan on that trip, I may want to take Jay Garner with me. He has a good set of eyes. I would want to make sure Jerry wouldn't be bothered by that, and I don't think he would.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080403-15


.....  
Please respond by 8/15/03

U21754 /03

4Aug03

11-L-0559/OSD/19262

August 4, 2003

TO: Jay Garner  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: C-SPAN

I saw the C-SPAN show on your *Newsweek* meeting. It was first-rate. You and General Bates did a wonderful job.

Regards,

DHR:dh  
080403-17

000.77

U21755 /03

4 Aug 03

Done 8/6

August 4, 2003

000.75D

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DL  
SUBJECT: Press Avail on Garner

What do you think about pulling together a press briefing and just list all the things that happened while Garner was there in those early weeks. It is really impressive. I saw that C-SPAN program. They did an awful lot.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080403-18



Please respond by 8/8/03

4 AUG 03

U21756 /03

August 4, 2003

33350

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Press on Trip

We ought to think about who from the press I want to take on the trip. Do we want to break Torie's rule, like Paul did? I am a little uncomfortable with that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080403-20



Please respond by 8/15/03

4 AUG 03


U21757 /03



August 4, 2003

000.7

TO: Pam Hess

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

I read your piece on Najaf. It was excellent. Good for you!

DHR:dh  
080403-23

4Aug03

U21758 /03

August 4, 2003

337

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meetings

Please give me the updated version of all my press contacts, all my Congressional contact sheets and also the updated one on meetings with the Chiefs.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080403-21

.....  
Please respond by 8/15/03

U21759 /03


4 AUG 03

11-L-0559/OSD/19267

DOA SMA  
B/H

August 4, 2003

TURKEY

TO: Jay Garner  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: August 1 Note

Thanks so much for your note of August 1. I will look into the matter of paying Pehsmerga. I haven't focused on it, but we'll see what the folks here think.

I share your concern about the logistics train if the Turks come into the western part of the country, and I will see that our folks are attentive to it.

Thanks so much. I look forward to seeing you later this month.

Regards,

DHR:dh  
080403-25

U21760 /03

Done 8/6

4AUG03

11-L-0559/OSD/19268

August 4, 2003

840021A

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: CIA Lessons Learned

I would like to get briefed on the lessons learned from the CIA team. I don't feel I have gotten any visibility into what they think they have learned about what we knew and didn't know that relates to the October memo I sent.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080403-30

.....

Please respond by 8/22/03

U21761 /03

4 AUG 03

8/4/03 ✓

August 4, 2003

000.015D

Larry Di Rita  
9/2

TO: David Chu  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Senator Alexander

We met with the Senators the other day, and Senator Lamar Alexander of Tennessee said there are a number of ideas that don't cost an awful lot that involve the forces.

I hope you will go up and see him for me. Please tell him you are there because I asked you to go and talk to him about the ideas he has. He is a fine man, and I know he wants to be helpful.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080103-14

.....  
Please respond by 8/22/03

U21762 /03

4 AUG 03



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECRET

2003 AUG 16 11 06 15

INFO MEMO

August 15, 2003 – 5:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu 15 Aug 03*  
SUBJECT: Appointment with Senator Alexander—SNOWFLAKE

- Senator Alexander is on a trip to Africa, but his office will work on an appointment for me to see him and hear his ideas in early September.

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock, (b)(6)

*Di Rita*

|                       |      |
|-----------------------|------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DIR-RTA | 9/2  |
| SR MA CRADDOCK        | 9/2  |
| MA BUCCI              |      |
| EXECSEC MARRIOTT      | 8/18 |

U13922 03



August 4, 2003

IRAQ

Advanced copy sent

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Soccer Balls

Someone—I think it was Senator Dayton in the meeting in the intelligence room with the Senators—recommended that we ought to think about giving a whole lot of soccer balls to Iraq. The schools are out, and all the kids are looking for something to do. Rather than stealing or shooting, we could get them playing soccer.

We would really have to go fast on this. It could be a superb PR opportunity. If there is no money, I would be happy to buy 10,000 or 50,000 soccer balls—whatever. We have planes going over there all the time, and a company would undoubtedly give them to them or fly them over. I could get somebody from the outside to call a company.

(\*)

Please see if you can get someone really working that. You might talk to Torie Clarke.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080103-16

*Di Rita*

.....  
Please respond by 8/8/03

*SecDef-*

*This is such a good idea, we did it about 3 months ago (I was still in fact, we did it pretty much this way, if my memory is right)*

HAUG03

U21763 103

11-L-0559/OSD

8/4/03

August 4, 2003

TO: David Chu  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Redstone Arsenal

001.1

As you know, you may be invited to go to Redstone Arsenal with Senator Stevens and Senator Susan Collins. It would be a good idea if you could do it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080103-17

.....  
Please respond by 8/22/03

✓  
8/19

Sir,  
Response attached.  
w/CDR Nosenzo  
8/18

U21764 /03

4AUG03





PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECRET

✓  
8/19

2003 AUG 15 11:11:10

INFO MEMO

August 15, 2003 – 5:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

*David S. C. Chu 15 Aug 03*

SUBJECT: Redstone Arsenal Visit—SNOWFLAKE

- Senator Stevens' Redstone Arsenal trip is planned for 8 or 15 September. I will join if Senator Collins accepts his invitation to go.

Attachment – snowflake

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock, (b)(6)

|                       |      |
|-----------------------|------|
| SPL ASSISTANT OF RITA | X    |
| SR MA CRADDOCK        | 8/18 |
| MA BUCCI              | 8/18 |
| EXECSEC MARRIOTT      | 8/18 |

U13949 03



August 4, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Emphasis

We need to constantly say that what our forces are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan is important. It is important for the United States. It is important for those countries. It is important for the region. It is important for the world.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080103-19

.....


Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

U21765 /03

4 AUG 03

August 4, 2003

0200CPA

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Kimsey Letter

We got a letter that Jim Kimsey sent to Colin Powell, and it had a lot of suggestions that related to us. We should get it to Bremer.

Please let me see a copy, and I will dictate a note to Bremer.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080103-20



Please respond by 8/8/03

4 AUG 03

U21766 /03

Snowflake

Have you seen?  
Gael

August 4, 2003

334

TO: Ken Krieg  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Defense Business Fellows

I would like to push ahead with this Defense Business Fellows Program, so we can do it in the earlier timeframe—'04 instead of '05.

Please tell someone what needs to be done to have that happen.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Defense Business Fellows Program Timeline

DHR:dh  
080103-21

.....  
Please respond by 8/22/03

✓  
10/17

U21767 /03

4 AUG 03

1 copy to [unclear]  
10/16

10/5  
of over



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

✓  
M17

733 OCT 14 AM 11:13

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

September 22, 2003, 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)

SUBJECT: Defense Business Fellows Program - Implementation

*David S. C. Chu 10/14/03*

- This responds to your inquiry regarding timeliness for the Defense Business Program Fellows (DBF) (Tab A).
- The Defense Business Practice Implementation Board recommended the creating of the program using a DoD-specific Executive Order (EO), which would involve a lengthy process involving OMB, OPM and other agencies.
- We will begin immediately using existing authorities to appoint interns at the GS-9 level, and simultaneously request OPM concurrence for a plan to appoint at the GS-11 and GS-12 levels. (If NSPS passage includes waiver of the Title 50 hiring provisions, we would not need OPM approval).

*Slow way*  
*Better way*

|                       |              |
|-----------------------|--------------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA |              |
| SR MA CRADDOCK        | <i>C1016</i> |
| MA BUCCI              |              |
| EXECSEC MARRIOTT      | <i>10/14</i> |

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: Jeanne N. Raymos, ODUSD(CPP), (b)(6)

U16926 03



11-L-0559/OSD/19278

August 4, 2003

230

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Interns

In the future I would like to meet with our interns, every group that comes in.

Apparently these folks are only there every six weeks. Are there more coming in the next cycle? It seems to me it is important that I at least take 20 or 30 minutes with them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080103-22



Please respond by 8/22/03

U21768 /03

4Aug04

CLOSED/SD  
TEN 8/11

August 4, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Personnel for Iraq

You asked me about some 200-plus State Department people who have volunteered but have been held up for a month and a half—as I recall, that is what you said.

Here is the response I received.

Please sort through it, let me know what you think the facts are, and we'll see if we can figure out why there is such an enormous difference in what you heard and what I am being told.

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/31/03 Smith memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
080103-25

4 AUG 03

U21769 /03


11-L-0559/OSD/19280

File

✓  
8/1

July 31, 2003

TO: Secretary of Defense

THROUGH: Jaymie Durnan 

FROM: Fred Smith, Office of the CPA Representative

CC: Deputy Secretary of Defense  
Ambassador Bremer  
Ambassador Kennedy  
Larry DiRita

SUBJECT: Department of State Personnel for Iraq

I understand that Secretary Powell raised the issue of 200+ State personnel ready to go to Iraq, but there is a problem with DoD. The CPA has only 33 State billets identified, and we, working closely with State, have identified 27 of the 33 people needed in Baghdad.

The facts of this situation are:

Several weeks ago State canvassed all its personnel asking who would be interested in serving in Iraq for a temporary assignment. State received approximately 230 responses (according to State, it turns out that some of these people are not truly interested, not available until next year, or not cleared for medical reasons). State is working off that list to find people to fill 33 positions identified by the CPA. Twenty-seven people, to date, have been identified by name by State to fill those positions. Several of those people are already in Baghdad, many are en route, and the rest are being processed (several people are not available to deploy until September, October, or November). We are working closely with State every day/every hour to process all the people. Pat Kennedy, Jerry Bremer's Chief of Staff and a Foreign Service Officer, spent a full day at State last week working on this issue.

Talking points you may wish to sue in a conversation with Secretary Powell:

- Defense (Fred Smith) is working closely with State (NEA, Kathleen Austin-Ferguson) on this issue.
- The CPA has validated a requirement for 33 State people to work in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Governance.

11-L-0559/OSD/19281



- We have already moved, or are processing, 27 people to fill those positions.
- One limiting factor in Baghdad is living space to put these people—there's a waiting list of 300 people for the Al Rasheed Hotel; 200 people are sleeping on cots in the hotel ballroom. We are working to resolve this problem.
- We greatly appreciate State's support. In fact, we will try to use as many State people as possible to fill positions identified in other ministries.

August 4, 2003

320.2

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DT*  
SUBJECT: Remarks on End Strength

I think I am going to have to give a talk on end strength—what we are doing, why we believe the current end strength is working and other things we need to do first before adding those costs.

I have been talking about it a lot. You must have a good deal of that already. I will try to dictate something additional this weekend, but we do need to get started on it. I am going to have to do it next week somewhere.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080103-26



Please respond by 8/8/03

*outbox  
8/7*

U21770 /03

4 Aug 03

In reply refer to : EF -6412  
and I - 03/010927

August 4, 2003

EF-6412  
I-03/010927

Liberia

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Liberia

Why don't you push back on Liberia and find out who is going to do the humanitarian work—what government of what country and what international organizations are going to come in there and provide the food, the water, the medicine, etc.

Unless someone has that lined up, they are going to expect the United States to do it, and I just don't think the U.S. is prepared to do that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080103-3

.....  
Please respond by 8/8/03

✓ 8/16

eds

Sir,  
Response attached. This same information was provided to the Secretary by Mr Feith during the Liberia Pre-Brief this morning.

ulr  
CDR Nosenzo

4AUG03

U21771 /03

INFO MEMO

USDP \_\_\_\_\_

I-03/010927-ES

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6))

SUBJECT: (U) Who will provide humanitarian aid in Liberia?

- In response to your question (TAB A), various United Nations (UN), International Organizations (IO) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have Liberian operations; some remain active while others are suspended for this crisis.
- The international staffs for the majority of these organizations have been evacuated, leaving only the national staffs in place. All are preparing now to return expatriate staff and recall national staff. (TAB B).
- Most organizations have reported significant loss of food, medical supplies, and equipment due to looting. Their ability to respond to the humanitarian crisis will depend on the restoration of supply lines.
- Some organizations have continued delivery of supplies by air; and more are prepared for sea delivery.
- The UN Office of Humanitarian Coordination is planning an August 6 emergency appeal for \$37 million, and UN specialized agencies, e.g., UNICEF and UNHCR, have appealed for Liberia. USAID is providing \$10M to the UN and some NGOs.
- In addition to Monrovia-based operations, the UN and International Red Cross are considering cross-border operations – from Guinea, Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone – to reach people in need in remote areas of Liberia.

COORDINATION: SO/LIC

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: LTC Timothy A. Rainey (b)(6)

DASD/AFR \_\_\_\_\_

PDASD/ISA \_\_\_\_\_

11-L-0559/OSD/19285

## **LIBERIA CRISIS HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE CAPABILITY**

### **UN Organizations**

- Humanitarian Affairs coordination team prepared to deploy aboard ship off Monrovia when permissive environment exists.
- UN High Commission for Refugees – prepared to deploy staff off shore when permissive conditions exist.
- UN Children's' Fund – some national staff still present; prepared to deploy ashore with supplies as soon as permissive environment exists.
- World Food Program – prepared to deliver 16,000 MT in a week, which will feed 250,000 for 3 months.

### **European Commission**

- Prepared to send 10 trucks and chlorination supplies for 1,500 wells.

### **International Committee of the Red Cross**

- Eleven expatriate medical staff in Monrovia; 300 locals pinned down.
- Continuing daily air delivery of medical and other non-food supplies
- Staff remains in four counties; six more standing by to go to eastern counties when permissive environment exists.

### **Non-Governmental Organizations**

- Catholic Relief Services – 50 national staff ready to resume work; 5 expatriates will return; supplies remain safe until now.
- Doctors without borders – 6 expatriate doctors in country.
- Save the Children (UK) – local staff still functioning when possible to deliver food; ten expatriates standing by to return; air shipment of non-food supplies continues daily.

**US Agency for International Development - Emergency support team in US Embassy Monrovia; has available/already committed \$10M for aid.**

August 4, 2003

337

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Dr*  
SUBJECT: Round Table

*Admission card  
copy  
given to Col. Bucci*

It seems to me at the Round Table we ought to have:

*DEPUTY*

1. Someone from Intel—either Cambone or Boykin
2. Someone from Policy—one, two or three
3. Both of you
4. Either the Chairman or the Vice
5. The Director
6. General Counsel or number two
7. Public Affairs or number two
8. Legislative Affairs or number two.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080103-4



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*8/4*

*Sec Def -*

*Jerry Bremer suggests*

*Reuben Jeffery, when he  
returns full-time to be  
Bremer's Washington Rep.*

*4 AUG 04*

*U21772 / 103*

*FILE 0559/OSD/1928Z/SD  
TEN 8/11*

*D. Rita*

August 4, 2003

020 DOD

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: DoD

You cited a bunch of numbers I have never heard before when we were meeting with Ted Stevens. Please give me a paper that shows me the total number of people connected with DoD—active, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, reserve, guard, civilians of all those four or five types you talked about, contractors, whatever. I would like to see the full list.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080103-8



Please respond by 8/15/03

4 AUG 03

U21773 /03

August 4, 2003

000715B

TO: LTG Craddock  
Larry Di Rita  
CC: Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: Jim Schlesinger

Jim Schlesinger said he needs to see me next week for 15 minutes. Why don't I have him in if I have a free lunch someday.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080103-11

.....  
Please respond by 8/8/03

U21774 /03

Closed/SD  
JEN 8/11

4AUG03



August 4, 2003

334

TO: Larry Di Rita  
 LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*

SUBJECT: Time w/Formers, Policy Board

It bothers me that I don't know who is being invited to the Formers meetings, and I am not being given enough time with them. It is like the Policy Board.

When those folks come in, I want to have time with them. They are smart people.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080103-12



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

U21775 /03

CLOSED/SD  
TEN 8/11

11-L-0559/OSD/19290

4 AUG 03

August 4, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Corrected Transcripts

*Advance copy sent*

032

I would like to see the transcript we are correcting on the Pryor issue and the Ted Kennedy issue. I need to see what we are submitting, so please dig it out before it goes up there. I have to get it fixed, and I have to see that it is fixed right. This is very important to me.

Further, I need the retouched text of my letter to Ted Kennedy. The time is passing. I have to get that fixed fast, and if you cannot get it out of Jim Jones, please get it out of somebody else. If you need help from me, ask me, but we have to get it fixed.

*- DONE; GIVEN TO FEDEF 8/1*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080103-1

.....  
Please respond by 8/4/03

U21776 /03

4 Aug 03

CLOSED/SD  
TEN 8/11

August 1, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Dates

*Advance copy sent*

**DONE**

*Iraq*

Today someone needs to give me the date the war started in Iraq, the date the President announced major combat operations ended and the time periods from the war and then since the war. I need to have them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080103-27

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

*1 Aug 03*

U21777 /03

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: July 28, 2003

SUBJECT:

DB  
10-20

032

We need to fashion a way to get some GOP Congressmen and Senators, a team of them, to help acting on information in ways that can be helpful. I don't think they all have to be Republican. They can be either party.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
082803.8

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

8/1/03

U21778 /03

28 Jul 03

7:37 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 1, 2003  
SUBJECT: **Weekly Report**

020050

Here's a weekly report from Zakheim. I think it ought to be made available to people.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
090103.09

***Attach: Weekly Report 8/15/03 - Zakheim***

***Please respond by:*** \_\_\_\_\_ 9/10/03 \_\_\_\_\_

U21779 /03

15EP03

11-L-0559/OSD/19294

C8/18



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

COMPTROLLER

INFO MEMO

August 15, 2003, 1:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *DZ*

SUBJECT: Weekly Report 08/15/03

- **CPA:** The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has provided preliminary information on resource requirements for the remainder of this year and next year. My staff is working with the CPA staff to review the numbers. There are a number of issues about the nature of the identified requirements and the quality of the cost estimates that need to be sorted out. As yet, there is no indication from the OMB on the timing of a potential supplemental. The CPA staff intends to submit more details to us within the next 2 weeks. My goal is to have the numbers solidified as soon as possible so that we are ready to go once a decision is made on the timing.
- **Afghanistan:** I am also working on the authority and funding issues associated with the Afghanistan initiative. It now appears that there is less money left in last year's Defense Emergency Response Fund than originally thought (approximately \$450 million rather than \$600 million). There are authority limitations that restrict the use of this year's supplemental (the Iraq Freedom Fund). I am working with the General Counsel and OMB to address these issues in order to free up as much money as possible. The intent is still to use approximately \$1 billion in available DoD funds to accelerate efforts in Afghanistan.
- **Iraq "Tin Cup":**
  - My staff met with Mr. Yamada, from the Grant Aid Division of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They discussed the importance of the upcoming Iraq and Afghanistan donor conference. Japan has been one of the largest international donors and expressed its strong support for both events. Japan is working on its pledge for these events, but expressed concern about the competing demands of the two conferences, the President's AIDS initiative and potential requirements in Liberia.
  - I have attached my weekly report on contributions for Iraq.
- **Quarterly Financial Statements:** I have submitted the DoD FY2003 3rd quarter financial statements to OMB. For the first time, we reported an estimate for military property plant and equipment of the net booked value of \$323.4 billion. I continue to see improvement in the quality of information disclosed in the footnotes.

11-L-0559/OSD/19295

013891 03

- **Tanker Lease:** DUSD Wayne Schroeder and Nancy Spruill of AT&L participated in a question and answer session with Inspector General's staff on Wednesday, August 13. The session was a part of the IG's ongoing evaluation of the DoD decision process concerning the Boeing 767 tanker aircraft lease.
- **DCAA:** Mr. Bill Reed, Director of DCAA, reports that on August 9, DCAA representatives from the Iraq Branch Office briefed the in-theater Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) for the U.S. Army Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) III contract. The DCAA is currently performing in-theater audits of Kellogg Brown & Root's (KBR) accounting, timekeeping, subcontracting, and purchasing systems in Kuwait and Iraq. The ACO was very complimentary of our current and planned level of oversight for KBR.

**COORDINATION:** None

**Attachment:** As stated

**Iraq Humanitarian Assistance and Reconstruction Assistance  
Contributions Update as of 15 August 2003**

A. What was offered/confirmed in the past week:

| Country/Organization | Recent Pledges              | Offered/confirmed in the past week   |
|----------------------|-----------------------------|--|
| Philippines          | Dollar value not calculated | (U) A 96-member team, comprised of soldiers, police and doctors is en route to Iraq as part of the Polish led coalition          |
| UAE                  | Dollar value not calculated | (U) UAE completed airlift of Bulgarian battalion on 13 August. Sealift expected to arrive in port on 16 August.                  |
| Norway               | Dollar value not calculated | (U) Norwegian Church Aid is now working as an implementing partner for UNICEF on major water/sanitation project in Southern Iraq |

B. Offers of Assistance.

Note: Until now the "offers of assistance" data was generally gathered from the United Nations (UN) Financial Management System. That system, however, focuses on the UN humanitarian appeal. We have been working with the State Department and our embassies to collect more complete and up to date information from each host country and that data will now be used as the basis for this report.

|  |             |
|--|-------------|
| Pledges and contributions from the international community | 1.4 Billion |
| United States (Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund)        | 2.5 Billion |
| UN's Oil for Food Program                                  | 1.1 Billion |

**Top Twelve.** The top twelve largest offers/pledges of assistance to Iraq are:

|                      | (Dollars in Millions) |
|----------------------|-----------------------|
| United States        | \$2,475.0             |
| United Kingdom       | \$426.4               |
| Canada               | \$224.0               |
| Japan                | \$101.8               |
| Kuwait               | \$90.0                |
| Australia            | \$65.8                |
| Germany              | \$57.5                |
| Denmark              | \$53.1                |
| Korea                | \$50.0                |
| United Arab Emirates | \$47.6                |
| Saudi Arabia         | \$44.5                |
| Spain                | \$32.3                |

11-L-0559/OSD/19297



- In addition, numerous countries have contributed to coalition military operations in Iraq with basing rights, over-flight rights, fuel, and other logistical support not included in the figures above. While the dollar value of some of those contributions has not yet been calculated, the assistance is enormously important.

7:16 PM

TO: Secretary Jim Roche

CC: David Chu  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: September 1, 2003

SUBJECT: **Recommendations for Implementation of Space Commission Initiative**

421.96

Attached is a note from my friend, Dr. Bill Graham. Please take a look at it and tell me where you think we stand on the concerns he's expressed.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
090103.14

*Attach: Memo to SD from William Graham 8/25/03 Re: Recommendations*

Please respond by: 9/10

1 Sep 03

U21780 /03

STB  
8/28



TO: The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld

FROM: William R. Graham *Dill*

DATE: 25 August, 2003

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Implementation of Space Commission Initiative

Among the five matters of key importance we identified in our 2000 Space Commission Report was the importance that fostering a cadre of space professionals (skilled in science, engineering and systems operations), and the need for action by the leadership of the DOD. We concluded that space leadership in the military will require highly trained and experienced personnel throughout all echelons of command, including very senior levels. We specifically noted that the Air Force did not have a history of developing the space cadre the nation needs, and recommended action. I have been watching the progression of space officers - particularly in the general officer members of the Air Force - since our report, and the results to date are not encouraging.

One of the tendencies we saw at the time of the Commission's examination was that military leaders with little or no previous space experience or expertise in space technology or operations were often given the command of space organizations as their first space assignments. A corollary of this tendency is for space officers to fare poorly in the promotion process. For example, less than 10% of the Air Force officers promoted to Major General on the last list had spent at least half of their assignments in space-related activities (which do not include ICBM operations). This same 10% figure was in place throughout the Air Force general officer ranks at the time of our Commission in 2000.

I recommend that you encourage the Air Force to promote qualified space officers if the U.S. is to build the space cadre we need. As you may know, the Air Force Chief of Staff and often the Air Force Secretary will develop guidance for the promotion board to follow in discharging its responsibilities. The guidance generally includes the type of people that the Air Force needs at that grade. This is done so that the board can be responsive to the staffing needs of the Air Force. The CSAF and SECAF should be willing to consider your requirements, representing a broader view of overall need and direction of the DOD and the U.S.

Now is the time for inputs to be made with the Air Force. Acting now will ensure that 1) the rankings of the four-star promotion recommendations place the appropriate people in the competitive range and 2) the guidance to the Promotion Board accommodates the input. Guidance for the Major General and other Promotion Boards could, for example, be modeled after the following:

"The Department of Defense requires general officer selectees for the current promotion cycle with comprehensive space (vice missile) backgrounds. Backgrounds should include the following: 1) space operations experience at the crew, squadron, wing and unified command levels, and 2) experience in successful completion of space R&D or systems development programs and 3) advanced degrees in technical disciplines related to space."

#####

7:09 PM

1700  
9/2

UN

TO: Gen. Pete Pace  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: September 1, 2003

SUBJECT:

It seems to me the critical question is, what number of UN Coalition Forces can we get as a result of a UN Resolution, and what do we give up for it?

We need to know the numbers of forces, the countries they would come from, their competence, and how long they would stay and whether they would be rotated and backfilled until the job was done. We can't know what we are willing to give up until we know what we are going to get.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
090103.09

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

9/8

✓  
1/3

1 Sep 03

U21781 /03

C1917  
✓  
9/3

**MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld**

**DATE: September 3, 2003**

**FROM: Paul Wolfowitz** PW

**SUBJECT: UN Security Council Resolution**

Don,

You're absolutely right that we can't know what we might be willing to give up until we know what we would get for it. However, in this case:

1. In its present form, we don't feel that the Security Council Resolution forces us to give up anything on the military side. On the political side, it asks for movement toward greater Iraqi sovereignty, which is something we're more than willing to do. The question could become more difficult to answer if the French press for more than what we are currently prepared to offer.
2. It's hard to know how a UN Resolution will affect a country's contributions. We do know that the three from whom we're hoping we might get division-size forces, Pakistan, India and Turkey, would all find it easier with a UN mandate. However, each of them needs more than just that, and it's not going to be clear how much a UN Resolution will actually help until we have one. (Korea is the one other country with a division-size capability. A UN Resolution would certainly help there, but the other difficulties are very large.)

5:54 PM

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: September 3, 2003  
SUBJECT: **Third Quarter FY 03 Safety Report**

729

I've got to push on this safety issue. Here's the Navy's view of their situation.

Why don't you pull together the entire Department for us and let us look at the metrics. Then draft letters from me to the people that are doing well, encouraging them to do better, and draft letters for me to send to the folks that are not doing well, telling them I'm going to be watching, and I'm concerned about it and I want to see improvement.

Thanks.

DHR:azn  
090303.10

Attached: *Third Quarter FY 03 Safety Report from H. Johnson 8/26/03*

Respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ 9/20/03

3 Sep 03

U21782 /03



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
1000 NAVY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-1000

INFO MEMO

August 26, 2003, 1600

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Hansford T. Johnson, Acting Secretary of the Navy *HT Johnson*

*8/27/03*

SUBJECT: Third Quarter FY 03 Safety Report

Given current trends, FY03 will be the best year ever for Navy Class A operational motor vehicle mishaps and Navy off-duty shore and recreational fatalities.

- Marine Corps aviation and Navy operational Class A mishap rates have decreased over last year. We have also seen a reduction in private motor vehicle fatalities, and civilian lost time case rates (TAB A).
- Navy aviation and Marine Corps operational Class A mishap rates increased slightly over last year (TAB A).
- Marine Corps continues to lower their lost workday rate for civilian employees. They achieved a nine percent reduction over the past year, cutting lost workdays from 82 to 75 per 100 employees per year. (TAB B).
- DON reduced 2002 annual workers' compensation costs by 1.1 %, saving over two million dollars in 2003. DoD as a whole rose 1.3%.
- Per the recommendations of a DON Safety Task Force, I recently approved the following enhancements to the Naval Safety Center:
  - o Elevate the Commander billet from O-7 to O-8 effective 19 Aug 03,
  - o Commander reports to SECNAV as additional duty, and
  - o Establish a Marine Corps deputy position to ensure equity.

COORDINATION: Commander, Naval Safety Center, and Director of Safety, Headquarters, US Marine Corps (TAB C).

Attachments:  
as stated


Prepared by: Connie K. DeWitte, (b)(6)

|                       |      |
|-----------------------|------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA | 8/25 |
| SR MA CRADDOCK        | 8/25 |
| MA BUCCI              | 8/25 |
| EXECSEC MARRIOTT      | 8/28 |

U14540 /03

[Return to Index](#) | [12-Month Trends](#) | [Yearly Trends](#) | [Mishap Summaries](#)

*Navy and Marine Corps  
Class A Flight Mishap Rates  
As of 08 Jul 03*



Rates reflect mishaps per 100,000 flight hours.


ASN(JAE)

Contact the [Webmaster](#) at (757) 444-3520 x7305 (DSN 564)  
This US Government system is subject to monitoring.



[Return to Index](#) | [12-Month Trends](#)

**Navy and Marine Corps  
Total Class A Operational Mishap Rates  
As of 08 Jul 03**




Rates reflect mishaps per 100,000 personnel per year.

ASN(I&E)

Contact the Webmaster at (757) 444-3520 x7305 (DSN 584)  
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[Return to Index](#) | 12-Month Trends

### Navy and Marine Corps PMV Fatality Rates As of 08 Jul 03




Rates reflect military fatalities per 100,000 personnel per year.

ASN(L&F)

Contact the [Webmaster](#) at (757) 444-3520 x7305 (DSN 564)  
This US Government system is subject to monitoring.

[Back to Index](#)

*Navy and Marine Corps  
Federal Civilian Lost Time Case Rates  
As of 30 Apr 03*



Civilian lost time case rates - total number of worker's compensation cases involving lost time injuries per 100 workers per year.

ASN(1&E)


Contact the [Webmaster](#) at (757) 444-3520 x7305 (DSN 564)

This US Government system is subject to monitoring.



# Personnel Safety Metrics

## All Marine Corps Civilian -- Lost Day Rate



Note: The trend chart above displays a monthly average of the Total Lost Day rate by grouping pay periods paid in that month.

To view the historical data this agency click on the # button next to the title.

| Current Pay Period (12 JUL 2003) |                |               |               |                |                     | Last 26 Pay Periods |               |                |                     |
|----------------------------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------|----------------|---------------------|
| Agency                           | Prorated Hours | Incident Rate | COP Days Lost | LWOP Days Lost | Total Lost Day Rate | Incident Rate       | COP Days Lost | LWOP Days Lost | Total Lost Day Rate |
| # Marine Corps                   | 1,085,434      | 10.50         | 105           | 240            | 63.50               | 11.38               | 3,167         | 7,417          | 75.02               |

Major Component

Agency

Period

Source: Civilian payroll records

[Link For Definitions](#)

Coordination Sheet

|  |                            |             |
|--|----------------------------|-------------|
| Director of Safety, Headquarters, USMC | Col Henry "Buck" Dewcy III | 07 Aug 2003 |
| Commander, Naval Safety Center         | RADM Turcotte              | 12 Aug 2003 |

Cy No Snowflake  
NP 9/8

5:54 PM

TO: J. D. Crouch

CC: Jim Haynes

DATE: September 3, 2003

SUBJECT: War Crimes Cases in Belgium

Belgium

I read this memo on the war crime cases in Belgium, but what about the other cases that you don't mention?

Thanks.

090301 06

Attached: Info Memo to SD from JD Crouch 8/28/03

Respond by: 9/8/03

✓ 9/15

9/15

Other cases  
Jun 03  
Sec Det / Dep Sec

Sir,  
Response attached.  
Yr CDR Nosenzo  
9/14

3 Sep 03

U21783 /03

[Redacted]



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2600

INFO MEMO



9/15

USDP *[Handwritten initials]*  
I-03/012370-EPES  
EF-6740

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: DR. J.D. CROUCH II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY SEP 12 2003  
SUBJECT: Disposition of Existing War Crimes Cases in Belgium

- You asked about the disposition of the other war crimes cases filed in Belgium that were not mentioned in the last update memo.
- Three other complaints were filed with the Belgian Federal Prosecutor's office between April and June of 2003:
  - One case named President Bush (43), Prime Minister Blair, Secretary Powell, Secretary Rumsfeld, and General Franks as co-defendants
  - Another case named President Bush (43), Secretary Rumsfeld, Attorney General Ashcroft, Dr. Rice, and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz as co-defendants.
  - Another case named only Secretary Powell.
- According to the Deputy Chief of Mission at the Belgian Embassy in Washington, Jan Luykx, these three cases have been closed since June.
- Under provisions of the first change to the Belgian law (April 2003), all three cases were effectively dismissed by referring them to the defendants' own countries on June 19, 2003.
- No appeal to the referrals has been filed in Belgian courts.
- The other case not mentioned in the previous update was that of LtCol McCoy. LtCol McCoy is a co-defendant in the case against General Franks outlined in the previous update as "The Franks case."

DASD EUR/NATO *[Signature]*  
Derived from: Multiple Sources  
Declassify on: X6

DIR, EUR *[Signature]*  
Prepared By: MAJ James Hogle, ISP/EUR  
(b)(6) 09 Sep 2003





ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2600

INFO MEMO

EF-6663



USDP *[Signature]*

1-03/012028-EP

INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY POLICY

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. J.D. CROUCH II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

AUG 28 2003

SUBJECT: Disposition of Existing War Crimes Cases in Belgium

- On Monday, 25 August, Ambassador Van Daele of Belgium updated DASD Brzezinski on the disposition of Existing War Crimes Cases against US officials in Belgium. All cases should be completely dismissed by the 2<sup>nd</sup> week of October.
- The Bush/Cheney/Powell/Schwartzkopf cases will be sent to the Court of Cassation (the Belgian Supreme Court) in the 1st week of September for dismissal. *[C]*
  - In the worst case lawyers for the plaintiffs could choose to argue the case in the Court of Cassation delaying dismissal until the 2<sup>nd</sup> week of October.
  - The Ambassador expects this to be an "open and shut" case with no opportunity for appeal beyond the Court of Cassation.
- The Franks case has already been dropped by the Belgian government, but lawyers for the plaintiffs intend to take advantage of a technicality to pursue it further. *[C]*
  - A hearing is scheduled for the 9<sup>th</sup> of September in the 'Chamber of Indictment' to consider an indictment. There is no need for General Franks to be represented.
  - According to the Ambassador, the Chamber has no choice under the new law but to state that no case exists since General Franks is not subject to Belgian jurisdiction.
  - If, for some reason, the Chamber should agree with the plaintiff's lawyers, the Belgian federal prosecutor would immediately refer the case to the Court of Cassation for disposition under the same process as the Bush/Cheney/Powell/Schwartzkopf cases.

DASD EUR/NATS  
Derived from: Multiple Sources  
Declassify on: X6

SEP 2 2:01 PM



|                        |  |
|------------------------|--|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA  |  |
| SR MA CRADDOCK         |  |
| MA BUCCI               |  |
| EXECSEC MARRIOTTI, EUR |  |

Prepared By: MACT *[Signature]* ISP/EUR  
(b)(6) 28 August 2003

U14664 / 03



TO: Larry Di Rita  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
 DATE: September 3, 2003  
 SUBJECT: ~~Aghan~~ Maternal Health Care Clinic

*Larry Di Rita*  
*9/9*

*Afghanistan*

Should I go by and see the Rabia Balkhi Women's Hospital in Kabul that DoD and HHS worked on? Or has it been so heavily visited that there is no need for me to do it.

Thanks.

*9/8*  
*Yes, plus there would have been no time.*

*9/9*

DHR/azn  
 090303.11

*L. Di Rita*  
 Larry Di Rita  
*9/9*

Respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ *9/3/03*

*Sir,*  
*Forwarded.*  
*v/r CHR Nosenzo*

*3 Sep 03*

U21784 /03

SECRET  
2003 AUG 10 11 2 29

EF 6482

USD/P *[Signature]*  
9/19

INFO MEMO

I-03/011067-SO  
AUG 8 2003

*Lainy De Rita*  
9/2

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC)

*[Signature]*  
8/8/03

SUBJECT: Update on the DoD/HHS-Sponsored Afghan Maternal Health Care Clinic

In October 2002, you and Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) Tommy Thompson agreed to joint-sponsorship of a maternal/child health care teaching clinic within the Rabia Balkhi Women's Hospital (RBH) in Kabul. A series of four regional clinics will follow.

- The hospital in Kabul was visited by Mary Jo Myer, Chairman Myer's wife, on July 30, 2003. The Deputy Secretary of Defense had previously visited the hospital in January 2003.
- CJTF-180 soldiers are working with HHS staff to install over \$100,000 worth of excess DoD medical equipment provided through the Humanitarian Assistance Excess Property Program.
- HHS is providing six instructors, on a rotating basis, at the hospital to train attending physicians and midwives. Two expatriate Afghan-American doctors have returned to Afghanistan to teach at the hospital.
- Recent photos taken at RBH are attached.

HHS has requested, and Congress is considering, \$5M in the FY04 budget for maternal/child health care in Afghanistan.

- This funding will be used to expand the training at the Kabul hospital and open follow-on teaching clinics in the provinces. The other locations for HHS training are being discussed with the Afghan Ministry of Health and DoD staff.
- In September 2003, HHS and SO/LIC staff will visit the Afghan Ministry of Health and conduct site surveys of four additional clinic locations.
- The current focus in Kabul is on refresher training for the Rabia Balki staff physicians. In March 2004, HHS expects to refocus training on approximately forty resident physicians in delivery and child care at the Kabul facility.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:  
As stated

|                       |          |
|-----------------------|----------|
| SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA | 6/23     |
| SR MA GRADDOCK        | 7/10     |
| MA BUCCI              | 9/2 3/15 |
| EXECUTIVE MARIOTT     | 8/18     |

Prepared by: COL SAM Jones, SO/LIC Stability Ops., (b)(6)

U13993 /03



11-L-0559/OSD/19316



11-L-0559/OSD/19317



11-L-0559/OSD/19318



11-L-0559/OSD/19319



11-L-0559/OSD/19320

"0"

C 10/21  
closed

352  
NDU

TO: Doug Feith

DATE: September 8, 2003

EF-6746

I-03/012394-ES

SUBJECT: Regional Centers

I want to see the people who apply for these two jobs at Asia Pacific and the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, and I don't want anyone getting too far out thinking that they know who is going to go do those because I'm going to be involved in it.

Sir,  
Forwarded.  
v/cdr Nosenzo  
10-21

Thanks.

DHR/vcn  
090803.21a

Attach: Regional Centers Memo 9/4/03

Please respond by: 9/20

**Policy ExecSec's Note**

October 21, 2003

COL Bucci/CDR Nosenzo

- Mr. Feith and Mr. Sven Kraemer (Policy Advisory Group) briefed SecDef on the status of the selection process for each of the Regional Centers on Thursday, 16 Oct 03.
- Mr. Feith assured SecDef of the integrity of the of selection process and explained the roles of both DepSecDef and SecDef in the process.

*C. L. O'Connor*

Colonel C. L. O'Connor, USMC  
Director, Policy Executive Secretariat

8 Sep 03

U21785 /03



SEP - 4 2003

EF-6705

9/5 C9/5

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: Regional Centers

Of the five Regional Centers (Africa, Asia Pacific, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, the Marshall Center and Near East-South Asia), the following are now advertising for new Directors:

- Asia Pacific; and
- Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies.

The submission deadline for both centers is September 12, 2003. If you know of anyone who should apply, it is important that they be encouraged.

cc: DSD  
CJCS  
VCJCS



TO: Honorable Colin Powell (*hand delivery*)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: September 8, 2003

SUBJECT: *The Washington Post*

Attached is an article from *The Washington Post* about someone who they say is a consultant to the Department of State.

DHR/azn  
090803.18a

*Attached:* *Washington Post*, "Ex-Envoy Criticizes Bush's Postwar Policy," Ricks  
9/5/03

*Iraq*

*8 Sep 03*

U21786 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/19323

the United Nations.

The Pentagon estimates that the military occupation has been costing nearly \$4 billion a month.

This week, international experts enlisted by the American-led occupation authorities estimated that the loss of oil revenues and cost of operating a civilian government in Iraq is projected at \$20 billion for 2004.

That figure was given to diplomats from potential donor nations in Brussels this week, and by all accounts they were stunned.

"Think of it this way," said an official familiar with the Brussels session. "You'd be putting more than a third of the world's development assistance in 2004 into a country with the second largest oil reserves in the world. Imagine what that does to the rest of the poor countries in the world. All of Africa doesn't get that much money."

This official said the United States would have to "dramatically trim" its requests and put up a huge sum to goad other nations into donating.

But a senior administration official said: "We expect billions of dollars out of the rest of the world. Billions."

American officials recognize that in order to secure anything like those amounts, L. Paul Bremer III, the chief American administrator in Iraq, might either have to step aside or at least have to share his task of running Iraq with a successor to Sergio Vicira de Mello, the special envoy who was killed in the bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad on Aug. 19.

While the Iraq situation has unfolded, the administration has also made a big adjustment on North Korea.

China and to a lesser extent South Korea — and to an even lesser extent Japan — advocate a policy of some actions if North Korea seems headed toward the goal of

giving up its nuclear arms and programs.

"Everybody is realistic enough to know that you can't have a negotiation where one side does everything before the other side does anything," a senior official said. "I've never seen a negotiation like that. Even with the Japanese surrender after World War II, we said immediately that the emperor could stay."

Aerospace Daily  
September 5, 2003

### 31. Bush Nominates Wynne For ATL Undersecretary Post

President Bush has nominated Michael W. Wynne to be undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics (ATL), the White House said Sept. 3. If confirmed by the Senate, Wynne would replace former undersecretary E.C. "Pete" Aldridge Jr., who retired in May. Wynne has served as the principal undersecretary for ATL and has been acting secretary since Aldridge's retirement.

Washington Times  
September 5, 2003  
Pg. 15

### 32. U.S., 10 Allies Plan Series Of Exercises To Stop Illegal Arms

By David R. Sands, The Washington Times

The United States and 10 allies yesterday announced plans for a series of land, air and sea exercises over the next six months to put teeth into an accord to halt the shipping of weapons of mass destruction by North Korea and other rogue nations.

U.S. officials said two days of talks that ended yesterday in Paris also produced a set of principles for intercepting illegal arms shipments on the high seas and for sharing intelligence and other information to halt weapons flows.

The first of 10 planned exercises, dubbed "Pacific Protector," will be held beginning next week in the Coral Sea off Australia's northeast coast and will include vessels from the United States, France, Australia and Japan. Exercises in the coming months will be held in the Mediterranean and Arabian Sea, among other locales, officials said.

President Bush proposed the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in Krakow, Poland, in May, and Washington has led the drive to enlist more countries in the cooperative effort to shut down illegal weapons sales.

Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John R. Bolton told reporters in Paris that the agreement to hold a series of training exercises was "a very clear demonstration that what we're involved in here is not a diplomatic exercise."

Other nations involved in the PSI include Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Britain. The Bush administration is attempting to recruit more nations.

U.S. officials say the PSI is not targeted at any one nation, but Mr. Bolton, in a statement to the Paris conference yesterday, noted that North Korea and Iran have already been designated as states of "particular proliferation concern."

Taiwanese officials, acting on a tip from U.S. intelligence, seized 158 barrels of dual-use chemicals from a North Korean ship, and Australian forces earlier this year boarded another North Korean ship found to be carrying a huge cache of heroin.

But China, a neighbor of North Korea and host of last week's six-party talks on the Korean Peninsula nuclear standoff, yesterday voiced strong doubts about the PSI effort.

"We understand the concerns of some countries

about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction," said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan in a Beijing press briefing. "But many countries still question the efficiency and legitimacy of adopting this kind of measure."

China reportedly tried unsuccessfully to get the United States and its allies to postpone the Australian exercise as its North Korean diplomacy proceeded.

Mr. Bolton yesterday dismissed fears expressed by some that the PSI interdiction moves could violate international law, which sharply curtails the rights of individual nations to board ships in international waters.

In a celebrated case, Spanish naval forces — again acting on U.S. information — boarded an unflagged vessel last year in the Indian Ocean found to be carrying a shipment of North Korean Scud missiles bound for Yemen. Although such sales are a prime source of funds for the North Korean regime, U.S. officials concluded they had no legal grounds for halting the sale.

"What we intend to do is consistent with national and international authorities," Mr. Bolton said. "Where we think we may have gaps in that authority, we are willing to consider seeking additional authorization."

Washington Post  
September 5, 2003  
Pg. 16

### 33. Ex-Envoy Criticizes Bush's Postwar Policy

By Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post Staff Writer

A former U.S. commander for the Middle East who still consults for the State Department yesterday blasted the Bush administration's handling of postwar Iraq, saying it lacked a coherent strategy, a serious plan and sufficient resources.

"There is no strategy or

mechanism for putting the pieces together," said retired Marine Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, and so, he said, "we're in danger of failing."

In an impassioned speech to several hundred Marine and Navy officers and others, Zinni invoked the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War in the 1960s and '70s. "My contemporaries, our feelings and sensitivities were forged on the battlefields of Vietnam, where we heard the garbage and the lies, and we saw the sacrifice," said Zinni, who was severely wounded while serving as an infantry officer in that conflict. "I ask you, is it happening again?"

Zinni's comments were especially striking because he endorsed President Bush in the 2000 campaign, shortly after retiring from active duty, and serves as an adviser to the State Department on anti-terror initiatives in Indonesia and the Philippines. He preceded Army Gen. Tommy R. Franks as chief of the U.S. Central Command, the headquarters for U.S. military operations in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East.

This was not the first time he has broken with the administration. He was publicly skeptical last winter of the decision to attack Iraq.

Underscoring how much his views have changed since 2000, he implied that the Bush administration is now damaging the U.S. military in the way that Bush and Vice President Cheney during that campaign charged that the Clinton administration had done. "We can't go on breaking our military and doing things like we're doing now," he said.

He also questioned the Bush administration's decision in January to have the Pentagon oversee postwar efforts in Iraq. "Why the hell would the Department of Defense be the organization in our government that deals with the reconstruction of Iraq?" he asked. "Doesn't make sense."

In addition, he criticized

the administration for not working earlier and harder to win a U.N. resolution that several nations have indicated is a prerequisite to their contributing peacekeeping troops to help in Iraq. "We certainly blew past the U.N.," he said. "Why, I don't know. Now we're going back hat in hand."

Zinni's comments to the joint meeting in Arlington of the U.S. Naval Institute and the Marine Corps Association, two professional groups for officers, were greeted warmly by his audience, with prolonged applause at the end. Some officers bought tapes and compact discs of the speech to give to others.

USA Today  
September 5, 2003  
Pg. 11  
**34. Bush To Lead 9/11 Moment Of Silence**

President Bush will mark the second anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in a low-key fashion.

A year ago, Bush shuttled to three televised, emotional ceremonies at the Pentagon, Ground Zero in New York City and the crash site of United Flight 93 in Shanksville, Pa.

This year, Bush will stay in Washington. He'll start the day at an early-morning prayer service at St. John's Episcopal Church near the White House. Then he'll join others on the South Lawn of the White House for a moment of silence at 8:46 a.m. ET, the time the first hijacked plane slammed into the World Trade Center in New York.

Bush will proclaim a national day of prayer and remembrance. He'll ask all Americans to participate in appropriate observances and to fly their flags at half-staff.

In the afternoon, Bush will go to Walter Reed Army Hospital in Washington to visit U.S. troops wounded in the war on terror.

Other observances:  
\*Vice President Cheney

will attend a memorial service at Ground Zero.

\*Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld will participate in observances at Arlington National Cemetery and the Pentagon, where a stained-glass window honoring the 184 people killed there will be dedicated.

\*Interior Secretary Gale Norton will go to Shanksville for services honoring victims there.

By Richard Benedetto

Washington Post  
September 5, 2003  
Pg. 4

**35. Alternative To Boeing Tanker Deal Proposed**

Senate Panel Delays Vote on Air Force Plan, Suggests Leasing Only 25 Planes  
By Renae Merle, Washington Post Staff Writer

Committee Chairman Sen. John W. Warner (R-Va.) will ask Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld to study a proposal to lease up to 25 of the refueling tankers and purchase the remainder through the normal procurement process, said a committee spokesman. The committee will not make a decision on the Air Force's lease proposal until a review of the alternative is completed, the spokesman said.

The Air Force had proposed leasing all 100 planes and purchasing them as the leases expired. "I am concerned that if this matter is approved as submitted ... it will establish a precedent and we can see a reoccurrence of this type of end run -- I call it a Hail Mary pass -- around the budget process," said Warner.

Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), the chief critic of the lease-buy strategy, yesterday called Warner's alternative proposal "a concept that I think we ought to pursue."

But Air Force officials said yesterday that a combination of leases and purchases would delay delivery

of the planes, which refuel fighter jets in flight and are intended to replace an aging fleet suffering from corrosion problems. Speedy delivery was one of the chief objectives of the lease proposal.

The current plan also includes price breaks tied to the number of planes leased, which could not be achieved with only 25 planes, said Marvin R. Sambur, the Air Force's chief weapons buyer. "If they reduce quantity, prices go up," he said.

The delay was a victory for critics of the plan, who had expected the Armed Services Committee to approve the proposal quickly in an executive meeting yesterday. Yesterday's action comes at a time when Boeing's core business -- commercial jets -- continues to suffer with the airline industry's slump.

"I think Boeing was really counting on getting congressional commitment on 100 tankers this year. If that doesn't happen it's going to be a big disappointment on top of the meltdown in commercial airliner demand and festering problems the company has on military space," said Loren Thompson, a defense analyst with the Lexington Institute.

Three of four committees with jurisdiction over the issue have already approved the tanker lease, leaving the Armed Services Committee as the lone holdout.

Among the questions that senators lobbed at Secretary of the Air Force James G. Roche and Michael Wynne, the Pentagon's chief weapons buyer, was why there was no formal analysis of alternatives to the tanker proposal. Committee members also questioned a \$5 billion contract that Boeing was awarded to maintain the planes. The contract was issued without competition or a study of what a fair price might be, one senator said.

During the hearing, the Office of Management and Budget acknowledged its

TO: Rubin Jeffrey  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 8, 2003

*Iraq*

Attached is a paper I received from Secretary George Shultz on Provisional Laws for Iraq. You may already have a copy of it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
090803.36b

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*8 Sep 03*

U21787 /03

PROVISIONAL BASIC LAWS FOR IRAQ  
(ADS 18 AUG 03)

②

Preparing a Constitution for Iraq is complicated and will require a considerable time to complete and implement. Meantime, the CPA and Governing Council could consider adopting Provisional Basic Laws covering a number of important areas of governance in order to regularize and facilitate reconstruction and development. These laws would be subject to revision by a new constitution, when it takes effect, or by the permanent Iraqi Government, once it takes control.

The model of adopting Basic Laws, pending or instead of adoption of a constitution, is well established. Several countries have legislated in this manner. Usually, a Basic Law is like any other law, except that it is subject to revision by a greater legislative majority than is normally required to adopt a law, so it is treated as more fundamental in nature. In the case of Iraq, this premise is inapposite, since the new constitution and government should not be limited in their power to alter the laws adopted during this period. Therefore, the Basic Laws approach proposed for Iraq should be characterized as Provisional, signifying that, while the Basic Laws will deal with fundamental matters and establish important principles for the current situation, the Basic Laws adopted by the Governing Council with CPA approval will be subject to change by the new constitution and/or government.

Provisional Basic Laws should be adopted to deal with subjects in which basic principles of conduct and authority need to be established, without undue controversy regarding issues that may properly be left for later resolution. The subjects covered in the attached drafts are: Government Structure and Authority; Economic Relations; Judicial Authority; and Rule of Law.

①

Provisional Basic Law:

Government Structure and Authority

The permanent government structure and authority of Iraq will be determined by the Iraqi people, in accordance with measures proposed by the Governing Council. Until the permanent government is formed, governmental authority shall be exercised in accordance with this Provisional Basic Law.

A. The National Government.

The principal body for the interim administration of Iraq consists temporarily of the Governing Council, which together with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) exercises authority in the State of Iraq, as recognized by United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 1483 (2003). The Governing Council represents the interests of the Iraqi people to the CPA, and is an essential step for effectuating a transition to an internationally recognized, representative government. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1500 (2003).

Section 1. Governing Law. The Governing Council, in cooperation with the CPA, hereby adopts this Provisional Basic Law regarding Government Structure and Authority. This law, and all other laws adopted by the Governing Council in cooperation with the CPA, shall be implemented and adhered to by all national, regional, and local ministries and officials.

Section 2. Ministries. The Governing Council shall name interim ministers for all ministries, and shall have the authority to dismiss ministers in whom they lose confidence. The ministries heretofore recognized or established by the Governing

②

Council and the CPA shall be authorized to conduct the affairs they have been assigned. Ministries are empowered to issue rules and regulations concerning the areas of their responsibility, and their own procedures. Such rules may be given immediate effect on a temporary basis, but shall be published for comment by interested persons and entities, and shall be revised, as the ministries consider appropriate. Ministry rules and determinations shall be subject to judicial review on the ground that they are inconsistent with ministry rules, fundamentally unfair, or arbitrary and capricious.

Section 3. Contracts. The Governing Council and the ministries may enter into contracts for goods and/or services in accordance with their budgets and authorities. All such contracts shall be published for competitive bid and awarded to the lowest, acceptable bidder. All contracts for services shall require the use of Iraqi nationals or residents as employees to the extent practicable.

Section 4. Language. The official language of the State of Iraq shall be Arabic. All decisions of the Governing Council, and of the ministries, shall during the period of transition to a permanent government be published in Arabic and English.

Section 5. Foreign Affairs. The Governing Council, in addition to naming Iraq's interim minister of foreign affairs, shall arrange for the international representation of Iraq through Iraqi nationals whom it shall appoint, and shall receive representatives from other countries.

Section 6. Budget. The Governing Council will play a full role in the drawing up of the national budget for 2004 and subsequent years until a permanent government is established, together with the CPA and relevant international agencies and donors.

3



B. Provincial Governments.

Iraq is a federal state consisting of the 18 provinces of Al Anbar, Al Basrah, Al Muthanna, Al Qadisiyah, An Najaf, Arbil, As Sulaymaniyah, At Ta'min, Babil, Baghdad, Dahuk, Dhi Qar, Diyala, Karbala', Maysan, Ninawa, Salah ad Din, and Wasit. The provinces shall function within their recognized borders. Provinces shall have the authority to exercise jointly through Regional Councils any power they have individually. Provincial Councils shall be established pursuant to procedures and elections established by the Governing Council and the CPA. Provincial governments shall consist of a Provincial Governor and Council, and shall exercise such powers as they are assigned by the Governing Council and the CPA.

C. Local Governments.

Iraq's local governmental entities, including its cities, towns, communes (including tribes) and villages, shall have continued legitimacy. They shall have such powers and exercise such functions as they are assigned by the Governing Council and the CPA, by Provincial Councils, or by Regional Councils.

4

**Provisional Basic Law:**

**Economic Rights and Relations**

This Provisional Basic Law shall govern economic rights and relations among nationals and residents of the State of Iraq, and between such persons and nationals and residents of other States.

Section 1. Right to Property. All nationals or residents of the State of Iraq shall have the right to own and use property. Privately owned property may be taken by the government only for public purposes, pursuant to due process, upon payment of prompt, effective and adequate compensation.

Section 2. Freedom of Occupation. All nationals or residents of the State of Iraq shall have the right to engage in any occupation, profession, or trade, subject only to limitations based on public health, safety, and morals, applied without improper discrimination.

Section 3. Safety Net. The Governing Council will fund to the extent available resources allow, with the cooperation of the CPA and donor states and institutions, a safety net for Iraqis through job creation, pension payments, food programs, and emergency payments to ensure their minimum health and welfare.

Section 4. Education. The proper and useful education of Iraqi nationals and residents is a matter of central importance to the economy of the State of Iraq and is a fundamental opportunity that should be provided to all Iraqis without discrimination, and to the fullest extent practicable.

(5)

Section 5. Travel. Nationals or residents of the State of Iraq shall be free to travel within Iraq, or between Iraq and other countries, subject only to reasonable restrictions imposed for the control of immigration and public safety.

Section 6. Foreign Exchange. Nationals or residents of the State of Iraq shall be free to own, possess, and use foreign exchange, to establish accounts in banks within Iraq and elsewhere containing foreign exchange, and to transfer foreign exchange into and out of Iraq in all otherwise lawful transactions. RCC Decree No. 98 of 1999, and all other laws inconsistent with this provision, are invalid and unenforceable. The Board of Supreme Audit shall establish such regulations related to audit and control of foreign exchange, as it considers necessary, that are consistent with this law.

Section 7. Stock and Property Exchanges. Nationals or residents of the State of Iraq are entitled to form and operate exchanges for the sale and transfer of stocks, options, and other interests in tangible or intangible property, subject to such regulations and controls as the relevant national ministries adopt in the public interest.

Section 8. Trade. Nationals or residents of the State of Iraq are entitled to trade freely with all persons and entities of other states, through imports and exports, except to the extent the Ministry of Trade otherwise determines are necessary in the public interest, and subject to such rules and regulations as the ministry may adopt. The Governing Council approves CPA Order Number 20 creating a Trade Bank of Iraq, and authorizes establishment of an effective Trade Financing Facility, through the assistance of the CPA and international agencies, to replace the UN's Oil-for-Food Program.

Section 9. Banking Policies. The Governing Council will appoint a Governor of Banking and Currency, who will have all necessary powers to determine in cooperation

(6)

with the CPA the amounts of currency to issue and other related matters to maintain a stable and growing economy. The Governor shall be appointed for a term of two years, and shall be subject to removal by the Governing Council only for improper conduct. The banking system of Iraq shall be open to private ownership, subject to reasonable and nondiscriminatory regulation.

Section 10. Natural Resources. The natural resources within the State of Iraq shall be owned by the people of Iraq and shall be developed on their behalf. The ministries in charge of such resources may retain the services by contract or lease of Iraqi or foreign individuals or companies, but shall not convey ownership of any such resources. Income from the development of such resources will be used exclusively for the benefit of the Iraqi people.

Section 11. Foreign Investment. The Governing Council finds that foreign investment will benefit the Iraqi economy and people, and should be encouraged without limitation based on type of property or amount or proportion of ownership, subject only to limitation on the ownership of natural resources. Laws requiring the appointment of Iraqi agents or other representatives by foreigners seeking to invest in Iraq are hereby invalidated. Foreign investments shall be subject to reasonable regulation and taxation.

Section 12. Debt and Reparations. The Governing Council calls upon the UN and all States and international bodies, including the Club de Paris, to cooperate and assist in eliminating, reducing, or restructuring, as appropriate, all claimed debts or obligations caused or undertaken by the prior government of Iraq. The Foreign Ministry and the CPA shall implement this policy to the extent possible for the benefit of the Iraqi people and in the interests of justice.

(1)

**Provisional Basic Law:**

**The Judiciary and Laws of Iraq**

This Provisional Basic Law confirms the authority of the judiciary and courts of the State of Iraq, and sets forth their responsibilities and powers. It also authorizes the recognition and enforcement of national or international arbitral awards.

Section 1. The Courts. The judicial system of Iraq shall consist of the following civil courts, in addition to other courts that may be assigned judicial power by the Governing Council: (1) the Court of Cassation; (2) the Courts of Appeal; (3) the Courts of First Instance; (4) the Courts of Personal Status; and (5) any religious courts with respect to disputes among parties who voluntarily submit to the authority of such courts. These courts shall continue to exercise the powers assigned to them by Iraqi laws, and shall operate in the manner they have previously functioned, except to the extent otherwise specified by laws or rules adopted by the Governing Council.

Section 2. Judges. Judges of the civil and criminal courts of the State of Iraq (the "national courts") shall be selected in accordance with criteria established by the Governing Council, and after due consultation with experts on the law, including Iraqi bar associations. Judges of religious courts shall be selected by the religious authorities responsible for such courts. Judges of national courts shall be sworn to decide all cases in accordance with Iraqi law confirmed or established by the Governing Council, and shall act independently of any non-judicial authority, including the Ministry of Justice. No judge of a national court may be removed from office, except upon resignation, retirement, at the end of the judge's term of office, or by impeachment or other

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punishment as specified by the Governing Council. Judges of national courts may not engage in other occupations.

Section 3. Jurisdiction. All courts shall have jurisdiction over such cases as specified by prior law, or by the Governing Council. Decisions of lower courts shall be appealable as of right to higher courts to the extent allowed by prior law.

Section 4. Public Proceedings. All judicial proceedings shall be open to the public, except where otherwise required by law.

Section 5. Applicable Law. All criminal proceedings in the State of Iraq shall be governed by the Penal Code of 1969, and the Criminal Procedure Code of 1971, except to the extent the Governing Council provides otherwise. All criminal laws and laws related to criminal procedure adopted during the government of Saddam Hussein are hereby deemed null and void. The law applicable to civil disputes shall be the Civil Code, Law No. 40 of 1951, effective 1953, as amended by the Companies Law No. 21 of 1997, as well as the Code of Civil Procedure of 1969, Law No. 83, including all international treaties to which Iraq is a party. These and other commercial laws (including but not limited to the laws concerning trademarks, patents, and copyright) shall apply to the extent they are consistent with the rules and principles adopted by the Governing Council in Provisional Basic Laws and in other decisions or decrees.

Section 6. Arbitration. Citizens or residents of the State of Iraq are authorized to resolve their civil disputes with each other, or with citizens or residents of other States, through arbitration, in accordance with legal and/or procedural rules on which they agree. Decisions of arbitration tribunals that meet international standards established in conventions to which Iraq is a party, shall be recognized by and enforced in the courts of

(9)

Iraq, subject only to internationally recognized exceptions based on procedural regularity and public policy.

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**Provisional Basic Law:**

**The Rule of Law**

Section 1. The State. The State of Iraq is subject to the rule of law. No government or official shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without proper authority and in accordance with due process. No official may engage in a search or seizure of a person or residence, or other breach of the privacy of correspondence or communication, except as may be allowed in accordance with and in the manner prescribed by law. No official may interfere with the freedom of expression of opinion, the liberty of publication, or of association, except as may be permitted by law.

Section 2. Non-Discrimination.

The laws of the State of Iraq shall be applied and enforced without discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion, sex, or language. Iraqis shall be equal in status as regards the enjoyment of their rights, including government employment and services, and the discharge of their obligations. Government appointments shall be bestowed upon Iraqis alone, without discrimination, and in accordance with capacity and fitness.

Section 3. Punishment.

No government or official of the State of Iraq may punish any person except in accordance with and to the extent permitted by law. The torture, deportation, or any cruel and unusual punishment of any person in Iraq is forbidden. Prisoners shall be treated humanely, in accordance with international standards.

Section 4. Crimes Against the People.

Officials charged with committing crimes against persons within Iraq shall be tried as promptly as possible in the criminal courts and if found guilty shall be punished in accordance with law. Officials found responsible





for crimes shall be liable to pay compensation to their victims based on principles of restitution.

Section 5. Special Court on Crimes Against the Iraqi People. A Special Court for the trial of persons charged with crimes against the Iraqi people is hereby created. The Governing Council shall designate a Chief Prosecutor for the Special Court, and with the cooperation of the CPA shall provide a staff sufficient to investigate and prosecute crimes against the Iraqi people committed by officials of the regime of Saddam Hussein during the period 1980 to 2003. The CPA shall cooperate with the Special Court by providing access to persons charged with such crimes and to witnesses and evidence. The Governing Council shall appoint Iraqi nationals as Judges to the Special Court, after consultation with bar associations and interested groups. The judges of the Special Court shall be familiar with applicable principles of national and international law, and shall have played no part in the government under investigation. The Special Court shall enforce the crimes and apply the procedures established for and by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, except to the extent modified by unanimous decision of the Judges of the Special Court, or of the Governing Council.

Section 6. Emergency. No emergency may be invoked to suspend or diminish the limitations imposed by this Provisional Basic Law on the powers of the State or its officials.

(12)

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 8, 2003

*Afghanistan*

When I was in Afghanistan we were told the people who train Afghan army people cannot then go out with them on operations because it falls under Title 22 to train, that when they deploy, it is some different law. They say that every time they propose it to CENTCOM and the Joint Staff, it gets stopped by the lawyers.

Would you please figure out what is going on and let me know what you think we ought to do about it?

DHR/azn  
090803.32b

*OB  
10-16*

*9/18*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*8 Sep 03*

U21788 /03

TO: Merin Strmecki  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: September 8, 2003

Afghanistan

I was told in Afghanistan that they lost 200 Afghan police. I had never heard that. Would you get me some information on how it happened, when it happened, over what period of time.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
090803.30b

9/18

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

8 Sep 03

U21789 /03

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 8, 2003

*Iraq*

Gen. Abizaid owes me a note on possibly putting PRTs in Iraq. When the civil affairs people rotate out, we don't have enough additional to add in so we ~~may~~ *may* have to go with civilians.

DHR/bzn  
090803.25b

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*9/15*

U21790 /03

*8 Sep 03*

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Gen. Pete Pace  
Andy Marshall  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 8, 2003

OB  
9/12

092

Attached is an interesting article from *The Atlantic Monthly* on Rand's look into the future that I thought you might find of interest.

DHR/azu  
090803 02h

*Attach. The Atlantic Monthly, pgs 84-90*

8 Sep 03

U21795<sup>th</sup> /03

11-L-0559/OSD/19342

# HEADLINES OVER THE HORIZON

*Analysts at the RAND Corporation lay out ten international-security developments that aren't getting the attention they deserve*

## THE WALL

Whenever hopes for peace between Israelis and Palestinians rise, a new surge of bloodshed extinguishes them. Palestinian suicide bombings provoke Israeli military attacks, which provoke more suicide bombings, which provoke more military attacks. Now the Israelis are trying to stop the violence by building a 225-mile wall—variously consisting of concrete, barbed wire, electronic fencing, motion detectors, and trenches—that will separate the Jewish state from the West Bank. It will be completed this year and will profoundly change the geographical and political landscape of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The wall is the most ambitious attempt by Israelis to reclaim the relative quiet they enjoyed before the second intifada, which began in September of 2000 and has since subjected Israel to a relentless wave of suicide terrorism. The logic behind the wall is unassailable. Israel's other borders (with Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Gaza) are fairly well protected; none has the security problems with terrorist infiltrators that exist on the frontier with the West Bank. The Gaza Strip, for example, was a major departure point for Palestinian terrorist strikes into Israel before it was fenced off, in 1994. Since the current intifada began, no Palestinian suicide bomber has entered Israel from Gaza.

Polls show that at least 70 percent of Israelis support physical separation from the West Bank. However, many of the 200,000 Jewish settlers who live there oppose the wall, for a simple reason: once it is finished, the Israeli army will no longer provide the level of protection settlers currently enjoy. Few settlers are likely to want to remain outside the wall, given their increased vulnerability to attack; most will probably move back to Israel. Thus the wall could spell the

death of the attempt to settle Greater Israel, which encompasses the biblical lands of Judea and Samaria and includes the West Bank. It will also create a de facto international border.

The idea of the wall also makes many Palestinians unhappy, because it will not exactly follow the Green Line—Israel's pre-1967 border with the West Bank. Instead it will reach into the West Bank to embrace some nearby Jewish settlements. Palestinians consider this a land grab. In addition, the wall will further weaken the already severely damaged Palestinian economy in the short run, since entry into Israel will be more difficult. As Palestinians are forced to turn elsewhere for jobs and income, however, the impetus for a more self-reliant and robust Palestinian economy could emerge.

But the wall could also deepen Palestinian rage and enmity, of course, prompting escalated mortar and ground-to-ground missile attacks against targets inside Israel. Hamas has already launched such attacks from the Gaza Strip, and it may now do so from the West Bank. The wall could also prompt further attacks on Israelis overseas, like the suicide bombing last November of a Mombasa hotel filled with Israeli tourists and the accompanying attempt to shoot down an Israeli chartered plane. —BRUCE HOFFMAN

## A SHRINKING RUSSIA

The population of Russia is getting smaller and older. In 1992 the country's population was estimated at 148 million; today the number is 145 million. That's an absolute decline greater than that in any other nation during the past decade—and some analysts predict that the number of people in Russia will drop below 100 million by 2050. The number of Russians aged fifteen to twenty-four, though temporarily growing because of high birth

rates in the 1980s, may shrink by nearly half over the next fifteen years, because of low birth rates in the 1990s. This will greatly strain a country that is already struggling to cope with a daunting array of security challenges, including controlling the world's longest borders and largest land mass, maintaining the world's largest nuclear arsenal, and reining in one of the world's most serious weapons-proliferation problems.

The security implications of this demographic change become clear when one examines its effect on Russia's military, police, border guards, and other security forces, which in coming years won't be able to fill their ranks. And more is at issue than a simple decline in numbers. Young Russian men, the population from which the military and other security agencies draw most of their personnel, are today plagued with health problems, among them alcoholism (a long-standing problem), tuberculosis (a returning scourge), and HIV/AIDS (a rapidly emerging new epidemic). The mortality rate among Russian men aged fifteen to twenty-four nearly doubled in the 1990s and is now almost three times that among American men of the same age. The rate of death from suicide, one of the leading killers of young Russian men today, is more than three times that for young American men. And many young Russians who are fit for (ostensibly compulsory) military service bribe their way out of it, leaving a force even less healthy than the military-age population as a whole.

Unlike many European states that also have shrinking populations of young people, Russia isn't currently in a position to compensate for a loss of manpower by putting more money or technology into its military and other security organs, because the country's economy and scientific sectors have suffered considerably during the past

decade. And as the country's population ages, burgeoning pension obligations will drain away resources that could otherwise have been devoted to security. Although immigration might mitigate some of the population loss and help to fill the ranks, the trend is not encouraging: immigration has plummeted from more than 1.2 million in 1994 to fewer than 185,000 in 2002. Russia could try to expand its military ranks, at least, by relying more on women soldiers, but the military's attitude toward women is hostile in many ways, and cultural adjustments simply will not come quickly.

Without enough manpower to police its extensive borders and to respond effectively to internal and external security problems, Russia could well lose its battles against smuggling, terrorism, and weapons proliferation—all threats that pose dangers far beyond Russia's borders. —*JULIE DAVANZO, OLGA OLIKER, & CLIFFORD GRAMMICH*

#### THE HINDU-MUSLIM DIVIDE

A defining element of Indian politics since independence has been a commitment to secularism. That commitment is now at risk from an aggressive brand of Hindu nationalism that equates Indian national identity with Hindu religious identity. The country's radical nationalists view the secular political system as a threat to Hindu identity, largely because of the power it offers India's 140 million Muslims. Weakening, or even abolishing, the secular state has therefore become part of the radical-nationalist agenda. This may force Indian Muslims—traditionally moderate and supportive of the secular state, even on the sensitive matter of Kashmir—to shift their allegiance from the state to some sort of larger international Islamic movement, as many Muslims have done in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Such a radicalization of religious identities is a matter of serious concern in a nation of a billion people that possesses the world's seventh largest nuclear arsenal and has had troubled relations with its populous and nuclear-armed Muslim neighbor, Pakistan.

Radical Hindu nationalism is already a dominant force in mainstream

Indian politics. A Hindu nationalist party, the BJP, has led the country's coalition government for five years, and extremist Hindu organizations with explicitly anti-Muslim sentiments have heavily influenced the party's agenda. Strife between Hindus and Muslims has been the predictable result. Last year a group of Muslims burned a train full of nationalist Hindus in the state of Gujarat; the attack killed fifty-eight people and led to Hindu reprisals that killed about 2,000 Muslims. An Indian tribunal investigating the massacres found that Hindu nationalist groups had methodically targeted Muslim homes and shops. It even charged that one important group, the VHP, had recruited and trained militants for the violence, and had provided them with computer printouts of names and addresses. Local and national security forces failed to respond adequately to the crisis as it unfolded: initially the state police did not intervene, and the central government only belatedly sent troops to Gujarat to restore order. Although thousands of extremist Hindus were involved in the violence, few were arrested. On the whole, the Gujarat episode has left Indian Muslims feeling neglected by the government.

The radicalization of India's Hindus and Muslims poses obvious domestic-security challenges. According to recent reports, Muslim militants based in Kashmir have been working with Pakistani groups to target the VHP and other groups in retaliation for the massacre in Gujarat. Militant Hindu groups have vowed to destroy Muslim mosques throughout India, and to build temples in their place. —*ROLLIE LAL*

#### AIDS AND AFRICAN ARMIES

The devastating impact of the AIDS pandemic in Africa is well known. According to the United Nations, some 28 million people in sub-Saharan Africa now live with HIV/AIDS, and in some countries the rate of HIV infection approaches 40 percent of the adult population. AIDS claimed more than 900,000 lives in southern Africa during 2001, and has left more than three million children without one or both parents. The strain on Africa's social

fabric is hard to overestimate, and the problem is finally getting widespread attention—beyond just the medical community. In January of 2000 the U.S. National Intelligence Council issued its first-ever national intelligence estimate on the global impact of infectious diseases, in which the HIV/AIDS pandemic was identified as a serious threat to U.S. national security.

One little-noted aspect of this threat will become increasingly clear in the decades ahead: AIDS is decimating the ranks of African armed forces. A 2000 survey by the Civil-Military Alliance to Combat HIV and AIDS noted that by the mid-1990s several African defense ministries were reporting significant rates of HIV infection among their armed forces. Today the militaries hardest hit by HIV/AIDS infections include those of Zimbabwe (with a 50 percent infection rate), Angola (40 to 60 percent), Tanzania (15 to 30 percent), Congo-Brazzaville (10 to 25 percent), Côte d'Ivoire (10 to 20 percent), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (40 to 60 percent), Eritrea (10 percent), and Nigeria (10 to 20 percent). In South Africa the pandemic has reached biblical proportions, with HIV-infection rates in some units of the South African National Defence Force—which happens to be the biggest peacekeeping-capable military in southern Africa—reaching as high as 90 percent. The rate of HIV infection, like the rates of infection for other sexually transmitted diseases, is two to five times as prevalent in African armies as in corresponding civilian populations. And the soldiers themselves—often prone to sexual promiscuity and illicit drug use—are a major factor in the spread of the virus, both domestically and internationally. Many of the African countries with the greatest prevalence of HIV infection are engaged in conflict of one kind or another, and rape is often a tactic or a byproduct of war.

As the pandemic claims more lives, African militaries will lose the manpower they need to carry out their missions. It will deplete many armies' officer corps, leading to a loss of command capacity, and will drain defense budgets, as unprecedented resources are channeled

to the care of infected service members. The effects of the pandemic on African armed forces are already profound. In 1999, for example, when members of numerous southern African militaries came together for a peacekeeping exercise known as Operation Blue Crane, more than 30 percent of the South African participants turned out to be medically unfit for deployment, primarily because of HIV infection.

African armies are often seen as problems, not as forces for good, but in many cases only they have been able to ensure national and regional stability. Many countries, with their armies dramatically weakened by AIDS, are likely to lose control over national security, territorial integrity, and public order. —*KEVIN A. O'BRIEN*

### THE TEHRAN-NEW DELHI AXIS

Iran, with its Islamic regime, seems a strange ally of India, a predominantly Hindu democracy. But the two nations have been overcoming past antagonisms and developing closer ties that will affect not just Southwest Asia and the Middle East but also the United States. Their new relationship could powerfully influence such important matters as the flow of energy resources, regional and worldwide efforts to combat terrorism, and political developments in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other states in Central Asia. The consequences will not always suit U.S. interests.

Before the Islamic revolution, in 1979, Iran's ties with the West greatly vexed India, which had championed the non-aligned movement. Those concerns disappeared after the revolution, of course, but were soon replaced by concerns about Iran's support of Kashmiri aspirations and its efforts to spread Islamic revolution to other Persian Gulf states. Nevertheless, after the Cold War ended, Iran and India discovered that they shared a stake in checking U.S. global power, opposing the Taliban in Afghanistan, fighting narcotics trafficking in Asia, and developing mutually beneficial energy options.

More recently New Delhi and Tehran have found common ground in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and in the preservation of Pakistan as a

functioning state (because its collapse would pose even more of a threat to India than its survival). The two have also recognized that closer ties would help each nation meet important needs of its own: for Iran, India could be a source of technical expertise, industrial goods, and foreign investment; for India, Iran could be a much needed additional source of energy and could serve as a gateway to Central Asia (which India seeks in order to develop new markets) and as a new military flank against Pakistan. In the realm of domestic politics, too, India has strong reasons for wanting improved relations with Iran. As India witnesses a surge in Hindu nationalist politics and sentiment, it needs to signal to its increasingly marginalized and disaffected Muslim population (the second largest in the world) that it has Muslim interests in mind.

The most important milestone in the development of Indo-Iranian ties came this past January, when Iran's President Mohammad Khatami visited New Delhi as the chief guest for the Indian Republic Day parade—an honor reserved for the closest friends of India. During the visit Khatami and India's Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee signed an accord that focuses on economic, scientific, and technological ties between the two countries and that also provides a framework within which to explore a defense relationship. This new relationship began to take shape in March, in a small-scale naval exercise that Indian diplomats refer to as a "port call." Meanwhile, Iran seeks to buy arms and spare parts from India, which is steadily acquiring the capacity to manufacture a wide array of Russian military hardware, and India sees Iran as a major buyer that could help to defray the costs of this manufacturing program. —*C. CHRISTINE FAIR*

### ANTI-SATELLITE ATTACK

Within the next five years not only Russia and China but also Pakistan, North Korea, and even Iran may acquire the ability to carry out a nuclear attack against satellites. Launching such an attack would be much simpler technically than launching a nuclear attack against a distant city; only a primitive nuclear

program and basic missile technology are required. And as the importance of satellites grows, so will the destructive potential of such an attack, adding a significant new dimension to the politics of preventing nuclear war.

An anti-satellite attack could be mounted in a variety of ways, but a high-altitude nuclear detonation would create by far the most extensive effects. It would destroy satellites near the detonation point, of course; but, more significant, it would also expand and intensify the power of the Van Allen radiation belts, clouds of high-energy particles that encircle Earth. Satellites passing through the region after a nuclear attack—among them hundreds of low-orbiting communications, weather, imaging, and scientific satellites, including the International Space Station and the Hubble space telescope—would be subjected to greatly increased levels of radiation, against which civil and commercial systems are not protected. (The satellites of the Global Positioning System are not nuclear-hardened either—but they operate in higher, less vulnerable orbits.) Such radiation would progressively degrade the satellites' solar panels and onboard electronic systems, and within months, or even weeks, after a nuclear explosion every satellite orbiting at the affected altitudes—aside from a few military systems that are protected against nuclear attack—could be disabled. It would take many months for the excess radiation trapped in the Van Allen belts to dissipate.

A nuclear anti-satellite attack would do the most harm to the United States, which owns most of the more than 250 satellites that might be affected, and which depends more than any other country on space systems. Such an attack would substantially damage the U.S. and world economies (replacing the ruined satellites could cost tens of billions of dollars, in addition to the costs of losing their services) and would seriously inconvenience the U.S. military, which relies heavily on civil and commercial satellites for functions such as communications and weather forecasting. Although no nation is likely to attack satellites as a short-term military strategy (the full effects would take too




long to accumulate), someone might well consider using the tactic as a deterrent, as a coercive threat, or to strike a painful blow against the United States and its allies without the difficulties or obvious risks of attacking a target on American soil. —KARL P. MUELLER & ELWYN D. HARRIS

## DEFENSE-INDUSTRY GOLIATHS

In recent decades so many U.S. defense contractors have merged or been taken over that a few giant companies now dominate the industry. Initially companies chose to combine forces, to cope with the increasing complexity of new technologies and weapons systems; but the trend intensified significantly after the end of the Cold War, when Washington curtailed defense procurement and formally endorsed consolidation as a way to cut costs. The Pentagon today deals with a dramatically limited number of firms to research and develop new systems for defense, and it is almost certainly not giving those firms enough work to sustain their teams of engineers and managers. The consolidation of the defense industry has been so drastic, in fact, that the U.S. military—which must now be able not only to prevail in battle but also to do so quickly and with minimum loss of life—could see its vast technological superiority erode.

Virtually all major classes of defense equipment, including surface ships, armored vehicles, and helicopters, are threatened by consolidation. But nowhere is the threat more apparent than in the case of tactical aircraft systems. In the 1950s at least eleven firms had the engineering know-how and experience to design military aircraft for the Navy and the Air Force. More than forty different designs reached the flight-test stage during that decade—an average of roughly four per company. Keen intercompany competition provided the military with a rich menu of choices and the defense industry with a wealth of design and engineering experience. Today only three American companies—Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman—are capable of leading the design of a manned military



aircraft, and major contracts for which they can compete will emerge only once every other decade or so. For perhaps the first time the U.S. military is relying on only one prime contractor to design and build its new tactical fighters: Lockheed Martin, an amalgamation of more than a dozen former major aerospace companies, is developing the F-22 and the F-35. If either program runs into trouble (and few programs of comparable ambition and complexity escape it), the Pentagon's fallback options will be scarce. —MICHAEL RICH, JOHN BIRKLER, & MARK LORELL

## THE CARRIER SHORTAGE

As the recent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated, the United States relies more than ever on aircraft carriers to meet its military and foreign-policy objectives. The advantages of aircraft carriers are obvious: they can quickly move large air forces and their support to distant theaters of war; they can respond rapidly with tremendous firepower to changing tactical situations; they can support several missions at once, with a great number of flights per day; and deploying them in international waters requires no negotia-

SOURCES: INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES; RAND-MPT THROUGH INCIDENT DATABASE; CRAIG AND DOBRYN; CHEN

tions with other nations. But the United States has no plans to expand its fleet of aircraft carriers, which numbers twelve, four of them dating back to the 1960s. (Current plans call for one carrier to be replaced about every four or five years during the coming several decades.) And even if the U.S. government decided tomorrow to add three carriers to the fleet, as the Navy has argued it should, more than a decade would pass before they would all be in service.

The United States has by far the largest fleet of aircraft carriers in the world; the United Kingdom operates

three carriers, and Brazil, France, India, Italy, Russia, Spain, and Thailand each operate one. But the numbers are somewhat misleading, because a carrier spends less than a third of its life in actual deployment; crew training, maintenance, and overhaul take up the rest. During the recent Iraq war only eight of the twelve U.S. carriers were deployable; five played important roles in the conflict, leaving only three available for action elsewhere. Simply keeping even those eight carriers deployable required that maintenance and crew-rotation plans be deferred—something

that can't be done indefinitely. If a nuclear standoff with North Korea had escalated to war, or if Israel, Japan, or Taiwan had required U.S. military assistance, or even if the United States had simply needed to project power into the Indian Ocean or the Philippine Sea, taking adequate action would have been difficult.

Can the United States afford a fifteen-carrier fleet? The price would be impressive: each carrier would cost around \$6 billion to build; operation and support for each one could be expected to cost several hundred million



dollars a year. But considering the international military and security challenges that the United States is likely to face in the years and decades ahead, twelve carriers may simply not be enough. —JOHN BIRKLER & JOHN SCHANK

### THE INDUS WATER FIGHT

India and Pakistan have a long history of conflict: they have fought three limited territorial wars (in 1947, 1965, and 1999); a larger war (in 1971); and a protracted proxy war (since 1989) over the disputed Kashmir region. Now they are embroiled in a high-stakes dispute over water, an issue on which they had managed to cooperate for years. If it is not resolved, it could become a serious new source of conflict.

The dispute has its roots in the 1947 partition that split Pakistan from India. Pakistan received most of the western Punjab region, which was irrigated by canals that used water from the Indus River system. (The Indus River originates in western Tibet, flows through China and the Indian-held portion of Kashmir, and then turns south into Pakistan.) At the time of partition Sikh and Hindu farmers living in predominantly Muslim areas fled to the Indian-controlled eastern Punjab, which was relatively dry and had few canals; to address their water needs India began, in 1950, to build a canal system that diverted some of the flow from Pakistan. Eventually the World Bank and the United States brokered the Indus Water Treaty of 1960, which stipulated that India would control the eastern rivers of the Indus River system, with the remaining waters going to Pakistan. Both sides were satisfied with the treaty, possibly because it required little interaction, but it has come under increasing strain. Aquifers are being depleted, water tables are falling, waterways are severely polluted, and soils are becoming acutely saline from the overuse of underground water supplies. Yet both countries must not only maintain a supply of food and potable water for their populations but also develop the hydroelectric potential of the river system that runs through the borderlands.

In December of 2001, following the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament

(which precipitated an extensive Indian military buildup along the Pakistani border), India openly raised the possibility of revoking the treaty, as part of a strategy of coercive diplomacy with Pakistan. The Indian Cabinet Committee on Security identified the cutting of a major water supply as a threat to use against Pakistan. For its part, Pakistan began to argue that India had already effectively suspended the treaty that same month, when the Indian commissioner for the treaty severed all contact with his Pakistani counterpart and canceled a visit by Pakistani engineers.

Allowed to fester, the dispute over the Indus Water Treaty could fundamentally transform the Kashmir conflict, already one of the major threats to regional stability. Pakistani militants now operate in Kashmir; India has taken aggressive action against them; and demands are growing within India for a war against Pakistan to stop the proxy war. The Indus dispute may end up being the crisis that finally makes that pressure too much to contain. —C. CHRISTINE FAIR

### URBAN WARFARE

Future adversaries of the United States will not want to fight battles on open terrain, where their forces and equipment will be relatively easy for American forces to find and destroy. The world's population is increasingly migrating toward ever larger cities, and finding and fighting a determined enemy in these new urban environments—characterized by dense civilian populations, complex indoor spaces, “canyons” between buildings, and subterranean mazes of sewers and other infrastructure—will be very difficult. Urban warfare is not new, of course: often it has been the hinge point of a conflict (consider Stalingrad in World War II and Mogadishu in 1993). It has always been challenging and costly. Yet we will certainly be seeing more of it.

Defense planners are now addressing this challenge, researching and developing new technologies, systems, and concepts that will render the urban battlefield as transparent as possible. One example is micro-air vehicles. Six inches wide or less, these could be carried in a soldier's backpack and

would provide real-time video information about a situation by flying over it or “perching and staring” at it; the vehicles would be controlled by hand-held devices that would also receive and display the images being sent back. Researchers are also working on inexpensive micro-robot scouts that could one day carry visual, auditory, chemical, and other sensors from building to building.

Another possibility is “smart dust”—tiny, cheap electromechanical sensors that could be spread through an enemy area to collect raw data on motion, sound, heat, and magnetic fields. Such devices would use lasers, micro-mirrors, and other methods to feed a hand-held device that soldiers could consult to monitor the battlefield from afar. Under consideration, too, are robotic insects that could use flapping-wing flight to carry similar sensors into, or even collect samples from, hostile areas both indoors and out. Researchers are also looking into how information might be collected from real-life insect populations and used to map threats from chemical and biological agents. Bees, whose bodies collect airborne bacterial spores during flight, naturally search wide areas and can be examined for dangerous spores on return to their hive. Indigenous insects can also be lured and trapped to identify local environmental pathogens.

Successfully developing such systems will take years or even decades, but many have already been shown to be feasible. —EUGENE C. GRITTON & PHILIP S. ANTÓN

*The authors are all employed by the RAND Corporation. PHILIP S. ANTÓN is a senior information scientist. JOHN BIRKLER is a senior policy analyst. JULIE DAVANZO is the director of the Population Matters project. C. CHRISTINE FAIR is an associate political scientist. CLIFFORD GRAMMICH is a member of the Research Communications Group. EUGENE C. GRITTON is the director of the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center at RAND's National Defense Research Institute. ELWYN D. HARRIS is a senior policy researcher. BRUCE HOFFMAN is the director of the Washington, D.C., office. ROLLIE LAL is an associate political scientist. MARK LORELL is a senior political scientist. KARL P. MUELLER is an associate political scientist. KEVIN A. O'BRIEN is a senior policy analyst with RAND Europe. OLGA OLSKER is an associate political scientist. MICHAEL RICH is the executive vice-president. JOHN SCHANK is a senior operations research analyst.*

TO: Jerry Bremer  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 8, 2003  
SUBJECT:

*OB*  
*10/17*

*Iraq*

On the way home, I was thinking about the issue of the property settlement up north. It is a complicated one. I agree with you that it has got to be done right. On the other hand, in life sometimes an 80% solution now is better than 100% solution years from now.

Both Gen. Petraeus and Gen. O'Dierno seem to feel they know how to do it and they've got the people who can do it. Why don't you review their idea and see if that might not make sense, and let me know what you think.

Thanks very much.

DHR/azn  
090803.25a

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*8 Sep 03*

**U21791 /03**

11-L-0559/OSD/19349

TO: Gen. Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 8, 2003  
SUBJECT: Blue Force Tracker

320.2

Why would there be a major BFT Interoperability problem between the Army and the Marine Corps? Isn't that something that JROC is supposed to work through?  
See the attached.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
090803.22

*Attached: BFT Info Memo from CJCS to SD - 9/2/03*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_


9/21

8 Sep 03

U21792 /03

TO: Secretary Colin Powell

CC: Vice President Dick Cheney  
Honorable Andy Card  
Honorable George Tenet  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: September 8, 2003

SUBJECT: U.N. Resolution

UN

Having been in Iraq and Afghanistan, I don't have recent visibility as to what is taking place with respect to the U.N. negotiations on the possible U.N. Resolution on Iraq.

I understand that all agree that there is no way we can compromise with respect to the military chain of command. I would appreciate being able to see any language that touches on that issue before it is agreed.

In addition, Amb. Bremer is very concerned, and has communicated his concerns to both State and DoD, that any non-military responsibilities assigned to a U.N. representative be described as "in coordination with" or, "in cooperation with" the Coalition Provisional Authority.

Given the existence of the Governing Council and the new Cabinet that has been appointed, if there is any ambiguity as to authority or if there is divided authority on the political side, members of the Governing Council will play the Coalition Provisional Authority off against the U.N. and it will lead to damaging divisions.

For these reasons I would ask that we have an opportunity to discuss any language on this subject before it is agreed.

DHR/azn  
090703.05

8 Sep 03

U21794 /03

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 8, 2003  
SUBJECT: Attached

000.71 SD

Do you know Sandy Charles? Schlesinger mentions her here. My instinct is to go ahead and meet her unless you have a reason not to. Please set it up.

Also, set me up with a meeting with Bing West. I would like to see what he has to say.

Thanks.

*9/10*  
→ *Seidel -*  
*It may be better if I met with her first I did so once before she went to Iraq. I would not have suggested she meet with you then, and can make a determination*

DHR/azn  
090803.07a

Please respond by: 9/10

*now*  
*Dr Rita*  
*Army Di Rita*  
*Is this 9/10*  
*Sharon - Is this person I met with sometime back?*  
*8 Sep 03*  
*DR Rita*

TO: Staser Holcomb  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 8, 2003  
SUBJECT: Marine Corp

Seems to me that the next important position for the Marines is who is the Assistant Commandant with Gen. Hagee. Would you please tell me where we stand on that and what Spyder's end day is.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
090803.06

*9/13/03*  
Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

210 Marines

85 SEP 03

U21797 /03



TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*

DATE: September 8, 2003

SUBJECT:

Let's set up a meeting with Gen. Myers and the Director of the Joint Staff, LTG

Casey, Andy Hoehn, Feith, Wolfowitz on the subject of the forces in Europe.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
090803.15a

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*9/20*

Europe

8 SEP 03

U21798 /03

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: September 8, 2003

EF-6747  
I-03/012396-ES

Afghanistan

On the accelerating the ANA for Afghanistan, what's the issue; has Dov Zakheim found the money for the barracks?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
090803.10b

9/15

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

Signature: Sep. 12

83Sep03

09-09-03 11:59 AM

U21799 /03



COMPTROLLER


UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100



INFO MEMO

September 12, 2003, 1:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Afghan National Army (ANA) Funding

- In a note dated September 8, 2003 (Tab A), you asked Doug Feith "On the accelerating the ANA for Afghanistan, what's the issue; has Dov Zakheim found the money for the barracks?" The short answer is "yes."
- I worked closely with the Office of Management and Budget and the State Department, and together we identified funding sources for all fiscal year (FY) 2004 ANA requirements.
- The total FY 2004 ANA requirement, including the \$155 million acceleration, is \$584 million.
- We plan to resource this requirement as follows:

(Dollars in Millions)

|   |              |
|---|--------------|
| FY 2004 State Department FMF:             | \$150        |
| Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Drawdown: | 135          |
| Defense Emergency Response Fund:          | 77           |
| Supplemental (State Department FMF):      | <u>222</u>   |
| Total:                                    | <u>\$584</u> |

COORDINATION: Tab B

Prepared by: Frank Murphy, (b)(6)

SEP 15 8:11AM



11-L-0559/OSD/19356

# TAB A

# TAB B

**COORDINATION SHEET**

**SUBJECT: Afghan National Army Funding**

**USD(Policy)**

**Doug Feith**

**September 11, 2003**

**General Counsel**

**Dan J. Dell'Orto  
Principal Deputy**

**September 11, 2003**

**11-L-0559/OSD/19359**

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 8, 2003  
RE: PRGs

*IRAQ*

Are we accelerating the rest of the PRGs to 10/30/03?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
090803.09b

*9/15*  
**Please respond by:** \_\_\_\_\_

*85 SEP 03*

**U218002/03**

C9/12

EF-6744  
I03/012390/ES

TO: ~~Doug Feith~~

DATE: September 8, 2003

SUBJECT: Milestones

Please have somebody promptly, that is to say within five working days, get back to me with a piece of paper that shows ten or twelve key indicators, such as Jerry Bremer's put on the left side of his paper, and then show how long it took to achieve them in Germany, in Japan, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Afghanistan and in Iraq. It is important that this get done accurately and promptly.

Thanks.

Sir,  
Response attached.  
vr/CDR Nosenzo  
9/12

DHR/asm  
090803.09

Attach: Milestones

Please respond by: 9/15/03

IRAQ

85E103

U21801 /03



INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *AJ 7/12/03*

SUBJECT: Milestones in Afghanistan, Iraq, Germany, Bosnia, and Kosovo

- You asked for a table comparing milestones in the reconstruction of Germany, Japan, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Attached is our initial response.
- The matrix summarizes the milestones with three caveats:
  - Japan was excluded from the comparison because General MacArthur held near-absolute authority and kept the entire Japanese government and bureaucracy in place. Thus, Japan was not considered comparable to the other cases.
  - Endnotes explain subjective decisions and missing entries.
  - We will continue to research and refine the data.

## Iraq and Afghanistan Compared with Historical Reconstruction Efforts

*(The data within refers to the length of time from cessation of major combat operations)*

|                                 | Afghanistan          | Iraq       | Germany                 | Bosnia                 | Kosovo                 |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|------------|-------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Training of new military begins | 8 months             | 3 months   | 10 years                | --- <sup>1</sup>       | --- <sup>2</sup>       |
| Local police patrols begin      | 1 month <sup>3</sup> | 2 months   | 14 months               | In place <sup>4</sup>  | 5 months               |
| Local governance established    | 1 month <sup>5</sup> | 2 months   | 8 months <sup>6</sup>   | In place               | 16 months              |
| National elections              | Pending              | Pending    | 4 yrs                   | 10 months <sup>7</sup> | 2.5 years              |
| New constitution                | Pending              | Pending    | 4 yrs                   | 6 yrs                  | 12 months <sup>8</sup> |
| Cabinet seated                  | 1 month <sup>9</sup> | 4 months   | 13 months <sup>10</sup> | --- <sup>11</sup>      | 1 months <sup>12</sup> |
| Independent central bank        | In place             | 2 months   | 3 years                 | 21 months              | 5 months               |
| New currency                    | 11 months            | 2.5 months | 3 years                 | 3 years                | 2 months               |

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Separate militias in place within Muslim-Croat Federation and Republika Sprska when Dayton Accords concluded. IFOR/SFOR mandate did not include establishing a unified military force.

<sup>2</sup> Kosovo is formally an autonomous province of Serbia, and thus it is not entitled to a separate national military.

<sup>3</sup> Local militia-based forces began performing some police functions almost immediately after the Taliban was displaced. The impartiality and effectiveness of these forces were highly questionable.

<sup>4</sup> Local, ethnically-based, police resumed patrolling immediately after the Dayton Peace Accords. However, the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) charged with reforming the Bosnian police was still struggling to influence local police forces after more than four years in operation.

<sup>5</sup> Village Elders selected groups of electors, who met in late May and early June 2002 on a regional basis to choose district representatives for the *loya jirga*.

<sup>6</sup> Elections for communities of less than 20,000 occurred in January 1946, with elections for larger communities occurring over the next few months. In French and British zones local elections occurred more slowly, but active local political life had resumed by late 1946.

<sup>7</sup> Early nation-wide elections in Bosnia resulted in the return to office of ethnic separatists responsible for the 1992-1995 war, and thus were widely perceived as a failure.

<sup>8</sup> As an autonomous province of Serbia, Kosovo does not have a separate constitution. However, by the end of 2000, Kosovo had its own commercial code, and a criminal and civil code different from those of Serbia.

<sup>9</sup> The Bonn Agreement in December 2001 created an Afghani Government.

<sup>10</sup> The Office of the Military Government of the United States (OMGUS) set up a Council of Ministers-President (*Länderrat*) in November 1945, which did not begin to perform substantial executive functions until June 1946.

<sup>11</sup> Bosnia remains two separate ethnically derived entities, each with its own government and military, with few joint institutions.

<sup>12</sup> The KLA quickly installed its own chosen ministers, mayors, and other officials throughout Kosovo. These individuals were gradually, and with difficulty, replaced by UN-appointed successors.

OB  
9-20

IRAQ

TO: Honorable George Tenet

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: September 8, 2003

We need more and better human intelligence in Iraq.

What do we do about it?

DHR/azn  
090803.11b

85Sep03

U21802 /03

1 CDR

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 8, 2003

000.5

One of those generals up north, I think, said that since mid-May, they've captured 2,408, they've killed plus or minus 5,000 (or 125 a month), that there are 796 completed projects and that there are \$140,000 invested in education, public works, public health, etc. Is there some way to aggregate all that as I asked?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
090803.396

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

9/17

U21803 /03

8 SEP 03

9:59 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Gen. Myers  
Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: September 5, 2003

SUBJECT: *Wall Street Journal 8/21/03*

*08/9/02*

*IRAQ*

Attached is an interesting piece by Abraham Sofaer.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
090603.01

**Attach:** "Arab Nationalism Self-Destructs" *Wall Street Journal 8.21.03.*

**Please respond by:** \_\_\_\_\_

U21804 /03

*05/03*

# Arab Nationalism Self-Destructs

By Abraham D. Sofaer

With Arab militants pouring into Iraq to help carry out attacks like the U.N. bombing this week, it's worth traveling back in time a bit to examine just how we got here. Soon after joining Secretary of State George P. Shultz as his legal adviser in 1985, I was invited by Ambassador Richard Fairbanks (former Middle East negotiator) to a dinner in honor of Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. The dinner was hosted by Hassib Sabbagh, a prominent and successful Palestinian businessman. Among the many distinguished guests were Donald Rumsfeld, at that point the former Secretary of Defense, some high-level U.S. officials and former officials, and several successful Arab Americans.

Aziz was friendly, confident, and urbane. Iraq had relatively good relations with the U.S. at the time. It was at war with Iran, the fundamentalist Islamic Republic that had held American diplomats hostage for over a year. By contrast, Iraq was a secular regime, actively advancing itself diplomatically as the antidote for the kind of government Iran represented. Aziz was dressed in a suit and tie, looking slightly ruffled and professorial, but distinctly Western.

After everyone had feasted on the delicious Middle Eastern buffet, with alcohol freely available, Aziz spoke. He started out brilliantly, explaining why Iraq and the U.S. had mutual interests, including the need to prevent the Gulf from being overrun by religious militants. At the same time, he stressed, the West must allow Arabs to achieve economic and social progress, and the self-respect that comes from such achievement. The Islamic regimes that were friendly with the U.S. were no less anathema to the Arab future than Iran's government, he suggested. They were backward, discriminatory, and wasted their nations' resources in decadent indulgences. Arabs needed to feel proud to succeed. A successful future for Arabs depended on their being trained to modernize their societies, and on being disciplined not degenerate.

It was a successful pitch. Not just because Americans longed to believe that Arabs could be modern and rational, but also because Aziz was correct about the Gulf potentates, and because his aspirations for Arabs were legitimate and admirable.

Then, like a fighter pilot on a kamikaze mission, he veered off into the jingoistic aspects of the Arab nationalist line. To succeed and gain honor Arabs need solidarity. The "Arab nation" must work together and not permit artificial borders, drawn by the Western powers, to condemn them to be divided. Through solidarity, Arabs could reclaim their glory as a civilization, and all that was rightfully theirs, including of course Israel. Some of those present supported Aziz in these myopic views; others had heard this Arab nationalist line often enough not to get upset by its excesses. Not so Donald Rumsfeld, who rose to speak after Aziz had concluded.

Mr. Rumsfeld expressed his admiration for the foreign minister's ability, and for the aim of modernizing the Arab world. He shared and supported the idea that Arabs should live with pride and comfort, rather than being ruled by princes and tyrants. His good will toward Iraq had recently been demonstrated by his success as Middle East negotiator in restoring diplomatic relations between Iraq and the U.S. Aziz beamed with pleasure. But then Mr. Rumsfeld asked Aziz directly: "Do you really think the way to achieve what you are attempting is through ethnic solidarity? Are you convinced that you have more in common with all Arabs than with others who are non-Arab but share a vision of hope and decency for all peoples? Is it possible that the quest for Arab solidarity is driving the Arab world to seek alliances that are artificial, or based on self-defeating and costly hatreds?"

Aziz was flabbergasted. For what seemed a long time, he said nothing. The room fell into awkward silence. "Arab solidarity is a necessity," Aziz in substance persisted. "We are as entitled to seek our national and ethnic destiny as any other group. The problem is that most Arab leaders do not understand this, and are pursuing their own personal aggrandizement, rather than the best interests of their people. We, in Iraq, set an example of the commitment necessary to achieve self-respect, economic well being, and the power to end exploitation by outsiders."

Mr. Rumsfeld might as well have been speaking to a robot. He had offered an ethical, rather than ethnic, solidarity, suggesting: "Tariq, my friend, don't you think you have more in common with me, and with many of the people in

## Dinner memories of Tariq Aziz—a flavor of oppression.

this room, than with many if not most of the Arabs in the world? The values that ensure political and economic progress are universal, not ethnic." But Aziz could not accept this offer. He had become a committed Baathist, determined to attempt to achieve progress through a combination of nationalism, socialism, and racism.

Some 15 years later, Tariq Aziz is a prisoner, in Donald Rumsfeld's custody. As shocking as this result seems in the light of that memorable evening, it is a just outcome. However intelligent and refined he seemed, Aziz committed himself to the dark side. Like all other ideologies based on tyrannical rule, Iraq's Nazis did far more harm than good. His boss, Saddam Hussein, was a butcher. The economic development and self-respect Saddam's regime was able to

generate through a national-socialist agenda, guided by capable, committed men like Aziz, was overwhelmingly outweighed by fear, evil deeds and corruption. It was ultimately destroyed by insanely ambitious military adventures that killed or injured hundreds of thousands of Arabs, and equal numbers of Iranian Muslims. Aziz must answer for his part in these crimes.


At the same time, this turn of events is sad beyond words, and the outcome remains in doubt. Along with the Saddam regime, U.S. and coalition forces have potentially swept away the sense of achievement and self-respect that Iraqi Arabs felt despite all their suffering. Mr. Rumsfeld has, on behalf of the president and the people of the U.S., renewed the offer he made to Aziz that night.

He should continue to insist, without embarrassment, on Iraq's adherence to values enshrined in the U.N. Charter and other treaties to which Iraq is a party, including the right to vote, religious liberty, sexual equality, due process of law, and private property. But he must also reaffirm equally firmly and concretely his commitment to Arab progress and self-respect.

No amount of American power and will can assure that the Iraqi people will accept what Tariq Aziz could not. Our soldiers are being killed in significant numbers, and the U.S. is being told to go home and leave Iraqis to govern themselves as they see fit. Ironically, the very jihadis that Saddam's regime attempted to stamp out are fighting and dying on Iraqi soil. The task ahead is not merely to persist against adversity, but to convey to Iraqis a message likely to convince them of our goodwill and support of their own aspirations. We can do this only by ensuring that the credit for Iraq's progress will belong to the Iraqi people.

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer has moved decisively in the right direction by creating and empowering the new Governing Council of Iraqi leaders. He should encourage their leadership in every area of the Council's activity, making clear the lines the alliance insists must not be crossed. He should also accept requests by local officials to assume control of their own cities as swiftly as that can safely be accomplished. As a general rule, in fact, the U.S. and its allies should deliberately fashion (or refashion) every program, function, investment, and project undertaken in Iraq with the objective of making Iraqis a real part of each success, so they can achieve the self-respect and national fulfillment now truly within their grasp.

Mr. Sofaer, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, was legal adviser to the State Department from 1985-90.



TARIQ AZIZ

EF-6741  
I-03/012404

TO: Doug Feith

DATE: September 8, 2003

RE: PRGs<sup>T</sup>

Are we accelerating the rest of the PRGs<sup>T</sup> to 10/30/03?

Thanks,

DHR/azn  
090803.09b

Please respond by:

9/15

✓  
10/16

Response forwarded 10/19  
vr / CDR Nosurzu

U21805 /03

Afghanistan

85ep03



UNCLASSIFIED

I-03/012404  
EF-6741

✓  
10/16

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith  OCT 4 2003

SUBJECT: PRTs

- You asked whether we are accelerating the rest of the PRTs to October 30, 2003.
- We are not. CENTCOM's schedule for establishment of PRTs is as follows:
  - Early November: Kandahar, Herat.
  - December 1: Jalalabad, Parwan.
- All of these PRTs will be manned by U.S. personnel and so the constraints are internal to the USG.
- CENTCOM has said that fielding personnel for the PRTs and building the requisite PRT facilities are two constraints to a more accelerated PRT timetable.

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/19370

TO: ~~Doug Peith~~  
CC: Rubin Jeffreys

EF-6745  
I-03/012392-ES

334

DATE: September 8, 2003

SUBJECT:

I think it is a good idea to have selected Cabinet members visit Iraq and Afghanistan. For one thing, we need more of their employees working to help the ministries in both countries. We know that Dept. of Justice and Dept. of Energy are needed in greater numbers. Let's think through which departments make the most sense to go and then draft a letter from me to them so that we can get them interested in going over to those two countries so that they can be more helpful.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
090803.16a

Please respond by:

9/20

U218067/03

8 Sep 03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

SEP 22 2003

The Honorable Ann M. Veneman  
Secretary of Agriculture  
1400 Independence Avenue, SW  
Room 200A  
Washington, D.C. 20250

Dear Ann,

I recently returned from Iraq and Afghanistan, where I met with the Coalition military forces and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq. The CPA is staffed by professionals from many of your Departments and is working with Coalition forces and the Iraqi Governing Council to improve conditions and pave the way for a transition to Iraqi self-government.

They have made solid progress in Iraq: 23 million Iraqis have been liberated. Hospitals, universities and secondary schools are open. Crime is down, and more than 56,000 Iraqis have been trained and are engaged in security—police, army, border patrol, site protection and the like. Some 5,000 small businesses have opened since liberation. The Iraqi Central Bank has been put in place and a new currency introduced in just a few months—something that took years to achieve in post-war Germany. Roads and bridges have been restored, and rail lines are running. Iraq has returned to the world oil market.

This progress is due to the work of a great many, including some of your staff members serving in the CPA in Iraq. Unfortunately, the American people don't know much about the progress being made—because the media has focused on the difficulty and challenges, not the successes.

U15599-03

11-L-0559/OSD/19372

This letter is to encourage you to consider visiting Iraq and also Afghanistan in the period ahead. By bringing along your press corps, you could help shine a spotlight on the progress being made in your areas. Enclosed is a paper with some initial thoughts on a program for your visit. The Defense Department would be pleased to work with your staff to develop a program that would make the best use of your time.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be the letter 'D' with a stylized flourish.

Enclosure



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

SEP 22 2003

The Honorable Donald L. Evans  
Secretary of Commerce  
14<sup>th</sup> and Constitution Avenue, NW  
Room 5852  
Washington, DC 20230

Dear Don,

I recently returned from Iraq and Afghanistan, where I met with the Coalition military forces and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq. The CPA is staffed by professionals from many of your Departments and is working with Coalition forces and the Iraqi Governing Council to improve conditions and pave the way for a transition to Iraqi self-government.

They have made solid progress in Iraq: 23 million Iraqis have been liberated. Hospitals, universities and secondary schools are open. Crime is down, and more than 56,000 Iraqis have been trained and are engaged in security—police, army, border patrol, site protection and the like. Some 5,000 small businesses have opened since liberation. The Iraqi Central Bank has been put in place and a new currency introduced in just a few months—something that took years to achieve in post-war Germany. Roads and bridges have been restored, and rail lines are running. Iraq has returned to the world oil market.

This progress is due to the work of a great many, including some of your staff members serving in the CPA in Iraq. Unfortunately, the American people don't know much about the progress being made—because the media has focused on the difficulty and challenges, not the successes.

U15599-03

11-L-0559/OSD/19374

This letter is to encourage you to consider visiting Iraq and also Afghanistan in the period ahead. By bringing along your press corps, you could help shine a spotlight on the progress being made in your areas. Enclosed is a paper with some initial thoughts on a program for your visit. The Defense Department would be pleased to work with your staff to develop a program that would make the best use of your time.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be a stylized 'D' or 'R'.

Enclosure



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

SEP 22 2003

The Honorable Roderick Paige  
Secretary of Education  
Room 4181, Federal Office Building 6  
400 Maryland Avenue, SW  
Washington, DC 20202

Dear Rod,

I recently returned from Iraq and Afghanistan, where I met with the Coalition military forces and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq. The CPA is staffed by professionals from many of your Departments and is working with Coalition forces and the Iraqi Governing Council to improve conditions and pave the way for a transition to Iraqi self-government.

They have made solid progress in Iraq: 23 million Iraqis have been liberated. Hospitals, universities and secondary schools are open. Crime is down, and more than 56,000 Iraqis have been trained and are engaged in security—police, army, border patrol, site protection and the like. Some 5,000 small businesses have opened since liberation. The Iraqi Central Bank has been put in place and a new currency introduced in just a few months—something that took years to achieve in post-war Germany. Roads and bridges have been restored, and rail lines are running. Iraq has returned to the world oil market.

This progress is due to the work of a great many, including some of your staff members serving in the CPA in Iraq. Unfortunately, the American people don't know much about the progress being made—because the media has focused on the difficulty and challenges, not the successes.

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This letter is to encourage you to consider visiting Iraq and also Afghanistan in the period ahead. By bringing along your press corps, you could help shine a spotlight on the progress being made in your areas. Enclosed is a paper with some initial thoughts on a program for your visit. The Defense Department would be pleased to work with your staff to develop a program that would make the best use of your time.

Sincerely,

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be the letter 'D' with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Enclosure