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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Case No. M-2018-01031

Mr. John Greenewald  
27305 W. Live Oak Rd.  
Suite 1203  
Castaic, CA 91384

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

I refer to your letter dated February 07, 2018, requesting mandatory review and release of four Department of State documents under Executive Order 13526.

We have determined that three of the documents may be released in full. All released material is enclosed. A decision on the remaining document requires interagency coordination: it has been referred to another government office for further review to assist us in making a final determination.

Regarding the document still awaiting interagency coordination, we will let you know when a final determination has been made. If you have any questions, you may write to the Office of Information Programs and Services, SA-2, Department of State, Washington, DC 20522-8100, or telephone us at (202) 261-8484. Please be sure to refer to the case number shown above in all correspondence about this case.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Eric F. Stein".

Eric F. Stein, Director  
Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosures:  
As stated.

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RELEASE IN FULL

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APPROVED BY: EUR:RLRIDGWAY

EUR/SOV:LDSELL

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INFORM CONSULS

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P ' '

SUBJECT: COUNTERING SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON SOCIAL AND  
- ECONOMIC ISSUES

1. (C) THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE CONTAINING SUGGESTIONS  
FOR COUNTERING SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC  
ISSUES.

2. (C) OVER THE YEARS THE SOVIET UNION HAS ATTEMPTED TO  
PORTRAY ITS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM AS SUPERIOR TO THE  
PLURALIST, MIXED-MARKET SYSTEMS FOUND IN THE WEST.  
SOVIET PROPAGANDA TYPICALLY CRITICIZES THE WEST, AND  
PARTICULARLY THE UNITED STATES, FOR UNEMPLOYMENT, CRIME,  
AND RACISM WHILE EMPHASIZING SOVIET GUARANTEES OF JOBS,

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FREE MEDICAL CARE, AND SUBSIDIZED HOUSING. THIS  
PROPAGANDA LINE HAS ENJOYED SOME SUCCESS IN THE THIRD WORLD  
AND ELSEWHERE, AND HAS HELPED THE SOVIETS TO DEFLECT  
WESTERN CRITICISMS OF THE SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD.

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hare, Senior  
Reviewer

3. (C) RECENTLY, THE DEPARTMENT HAS BEGUN TO CONSIDER WAYS TO BETTER COUNTER SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES. WE PREPARED MATERIALS FOR USE AT THE OTTAWA CSCE HUMAN RIGHTS EXPERTS MEETING IN MAY THAT REBUT SOVIET CLAIMS OF SUPERIORITY ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC

ISSUES. THESE MATERIALS COMPARE THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ON A VARIETY OF QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS, INCLUDING PER CAPITA LIVING STANDARDS, HOUSING, AGRICULTURE AND MEDICAL CARE. OTHER AREAS COVERED INCLUDED SYSTEMIC SOVIET ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, CHRONIC CONSUMER SHORTAGES, THE BLACK MARKET, WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION, CRIME, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN, EPIDEMIC ALCOHOL ABUSE, INCREASING DEATH RATES AND HIGH INFANT MORTALITY, AND THE SOVIET PRIVILEGED CLASS, THE NOMENKLATURA. THESE MATERIALS FORMED THE CORE OF A REBUTTAL STATEMENT DELIVERED BY U.S. HEAD OF DELEGATION AMBASSADOR RICHARD SCHIFTER AT OTTAWA ON MAY 22. A DECIDEDLY WEAK AND FLUSTERED SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE STATEMENT CONFIRMED ITS EFFECTIVENESS.

4. (C) REPRINTED BELOW, AS TALKING POINTS, ARE THE MATERIALS PREPARED FOR USE AT OTTAWA. THEY INCLUDE POINTS, ON SOVIET CRIME AND OTHER SUBJECTS, NOT USED AT OTTAWA. POSTS ARE ENCOURAGED TO DRAW ON THEM AS APPROPRIATE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH HOST COUNTRY OFFICIALS, JOURNALISTS, ACADEMICS, MEMBERS OF THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY AND OTHER HOST COUNTRY OPINION MAKERS.

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5. (C) AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER'S OTTAWA STATEMENT, ENTITLED "U.S.-SOVIET QUALITY OF LIFE: A COMPARISON", HAS ITSELF BEEN PUBLISHED AS NO. 713 IN THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIR'S CURRENT POLICY SERIES. POSTS MAY WISH TO PROVIDE SELECTED HOST COUNTRY CONTACTS WITH COPIES OF THE STATEMENT. ADDITIONAL COPIES CAN BE ORDERED FROM PA/OAP. POSTS ARE ENCOURAGED TO CONTACT THE DEPARTMENT WITH ANY SUGGESTIONS OR QUESTIONS REGARDING THE APPROPRIATE USE OF THESE MATERIALS. REPORTING CABLES ARE ALSO WELCOME. CURRENT PLANS ARE TO UPDATE THESE MATERIALS ON A REGULAR BASIS AND MAKE THEM AVAILABLE TO POSTS.

6. (U) BEGIN TALKING POINTS: CONSUMPTION AND OVERALL STANDARD OF LIVING

-- IN THE EARLY 1960'S, SOVIET LEADER KHRUSHCHEV BOASTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD SURPASS THE UNITED STATES IN LIVING STANDARDS BY 1980.

-- TODAY, 55 YEARS AFTER KHRUSHCHEV SPOKE AND 67 YEARS AFTER THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION, THE SOVIET STANDARD OF LIVING, MEASURED IN TERMS OF PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION, REMAINS BARELY ONE THIRD OF THE U.S. LEVEL. INDEED, SOVIET LIVING STANDARDS ARE MUCH LOWER THAN IN ANY DEVELOPED WESTERN COUNTRY.

-- A RECENT STUDY DONE FOR THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH INDICATES THAT THE AVERAGE SOVIET CITIZEN LIVES CONSIDERABLY BELOW THE U.S. POVERTY LINE.

-- EQUALLY DRAMATIC COMPARISONS CAN BE MADE BETWEEN THE AVERAGE SOVIET CITIZEN AND THE AVERAGE UNEMPLOYED WORKER IN THE UNITED STATES. IN THE RECESSION YEAR OF 1982, FOR EXAMPLE-THE WORST SINCE WORLD WAR II-THE MEDIAN PER  
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CAPITA INCOME FOR UNEMPLOYED WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES WAS 5000 DOLLARS. THE AVERAGE INCOME OF A FAMILY WITH AN UNEMPLOYED WORKER WAS 20,000 DOLLARS. WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT SUCH AN INCOME IN MANY CASES REPRESENTED A SUBSTANTIAL DECLINE IN LIVING STANDARDS, IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT A SOVIET FAMILY LIVING ON THE EQUIVALENT OF 20,000 DOLLARS WOULD NUMBER AMONG THE SOVIET ECONOMIC ELITE.

-- THE LIMITED SUCCESS THE SOVIET ECONOMY HAD ENJOYED IN THE PAST WAS DEPENDENT ON CONSTANT ADDITIONS TO THE LABOR FORCE AND ON THE AVAILABILITY OF PLENTIFUL AND INEXPENSIVE RESOURCES. NOW THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS USED UP ITS SURPLUS LABOR POOL AND ITS RESOURCES ARE MORE COSTLY, ITS GROWTH RATES HAVE PLUMMETED.

-- THE SOVIET UNION, IN FACT, IS NO LONGER CLOSING THE GAP BETWEEN ITSELF AND THE DEVELOPED WEST. INDEED, THE GAP IN PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION HAS REMAINED CONSTANT OR WIDENED OVER THE PAST DECADE AND MOST ECONOMISTS PREDICT THAT IT WILL FURTHER WIDEN IN THE FUTURE.

7. (U) SYSTEMIC ECONOMIC PROBLEMS (SHORTAGES AND CORRUPTION)

-- THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS CHARACTERIZED BY PERVERSIVE SHORTAGES OF CONSUMER GOODS AND THE WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION THESE SHORTAGES GENERATE. THESE FEATURES, MOREOVER, ARE NOT TEMPORARY PROBLEMS WHICH WILL SOLVE THEMSELVES THROUGH CONTINUED PROGRESS OVER TIME. THEY ARE PROBLEMS ENDEMIC TO THE SOVIET SYSTEM OF CENTRALIZED ECONOMIC PLANNING. THIS SYSTEM, BASED ON THE NOTION THAT A SMALL GROUP OF PLANNERS CAN EFFICIENTLY ALLOCATE RESOURCES FOR AN ENTIRE ECONOMY, HAS CREATED INSTEAD AN ECONOMY OF

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BOTTLENECKS, SHORTAGES AND WASTE.

-- IN THE SOVIET UNION, UNLIKE ANYWHERE IN THE DEVELOPED WEST, THE MOST BASIC CONSUMER GOODS ARE IN CONTINUOUS SHORT SUPPLY AND RATIONING REMAINS A COMMON FACT OF SOVIET LIFE. THE SITUATION HAS BEEN SO BAD IN SOME LOCALITIES IN RECENT YEARS THAT FOOD RIOTS HAVE

REPORTEDLY OCCURRED.

-- IN 1981, IZVESTIA REPORTED THE INTRODUCTION OF RATIONING FOR SOME CONSUMER STAPLES IN TWELVE MAJOR SOVIET CITIES, INCLUDING IRKUTSK, KAZAN, TBILISI, VOLOGDA, AND NABEREZHNYE CHELNY (NOW CALLED BREZHNEV). MEAT AND BUTTER HAVE BOTH BEEN FORMALLY RATIONED IN THE CITY OF SVERDLOVSK AND ITS SURROUNDING VILLAGES FOR SEVERAL YEARS. PRESUMABLY, THE SAME IS TRUE OF MANY OTHER AREAS CLOSED TO FOREIGN VISITORS.

-- THE LONG LINES OF PEOPLE QUEUING FOR SCARCE ITEMS ON SOVIET CITY STREETS HAVE BECOME FAMOUS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IS SO CAPRICIOUS THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO TELL WHAT WILL BE AVAILABLE FROM ONE DAY TO THE NEXT. THIS IS WHY SOVIET HOUSEWIVES FREQUENTLY JOIN LINES WITHOUT ENQUIRING WHAT IS FOR SALE. THEY SIMPLY ASSUME THEY HAD BETTER GET WHATEVER IT IS WHILE IT'S AVAILABLE.

-- THIS IS ALSO ONE IMPORTANT CAUSE OF SOVIET PRODUCTIVITY PROBLEMS, SINCE IN ADDITION TO HOUSEWIVES, EMPLOYEES OF BOTH SEXES COMMONLY TAKE UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCES FROM THEIR JOBS TO CHASE AFTER SCARCE NECESSITIES.

-- THESE ENDLESS SHORTAGES FORCE THE AVERAGE SOVIET FAMILY TO SPEND TWO HOURS SHOPPING EVERY DAY JUST TO  
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OBTAIN THE BASIC NECESSITIES OF LIFE.

-- THE ENDLESS WAITING IS BAD ENOUGH, BUT THE SOVIET CONSUMER OFTEN FINDS THAT THE PRODUCT WAITING FOR HIM AT THE FRONT OF THE LINE IS HARDLY WORTH THE WAIT. THE QUALITY, VARIETY AND DESIGN OF THE CONSUMER GOODS AVAILABLE IN THE SOVIET UNION ARE, IN FACT, NOTORIOUSLY POOR BY BOTH WESTERN AND EAST EUROPEAN STANDARDS, AND RETAIL TRADE AND PERSONAL SERVICE FACILITIES ARE SCARCE, PRIMITIVE AND INEFFICIENT.

-- AS ONE MIGHT EXPECT, THE CHRONIC SHORTAGE OF BASIC CONSUMER GOODS HAS FOSTERED THE CREATION OF AN ENORMOUS BLACK MARKET IN SCARCE ITEMS. THIS HAS IN TURN LED TO WIDESPREAD OFFICIAL CORRUPTION, AS PERSONS WITH ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OVER SCARCE COMMODITIES DIVERT THEM FOR PERSONAL GAIN.

-- CORRUPTION EXISTS IN ALL SOCIETIES, BUT IN THE SOVIET UNION IT IS A PERVASIVE AND NORMAL PART OF LIFE. STEALING FROM THE STATE IS SO COMMON THAT THE SOVIET

PEOPLE HAVE COME TO TAKE IT FOR GRANTED. ANECDOTES ABOUT CORRUPTION AND BRIBERY HAVE BECOME A STAPLE OF SOVIET HUMOR.

-- THE LEADERS OF THE SOVIET UNION ARE AWARE OF THE PROBLEM, OF COURSE. ANDROPOV, AND NOW GORBACHEV, HAVE MADE A CRACKDOWN ON CORRUPTION A MAJOR ELEMENT OF THEIR DOMESTIC POLICIES. IT HAS BEEN FREQUENTLY RAISED AT PARTY PLENUMS AND THE SOVIET MEDIA IS REplete WITH STORIES OF CORRUPTION, BRIBERY AND THE EXECUTIONS OF THOSE UNFORTUNATE ENOUGH TO BE SELECTED AS EXAMPLES OF  
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EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW. WHAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP SEEMINGLY FAILS TO REALIZE OR SIMPLY WILL NOT FACE IS THAT AN ECONOMY OF SHORTAGES INEVITABLY BREEDS CORRUPTION.

-- SOME WESTERN ECONOMISTS ESTIMATE THAT AS MUCH AS 25 PERCENT OF THE SOVIET GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT MAY BE DIVERTED TO BLACK MARKET PURPOSES EVERY YEAR. EVEN THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES DO NOT DENY THE PERVASIVENESS OF THE BLACK MARKET ECONOMY. AN ARTICLE IN THE AUGUST 19, 1985 EDITION OF IZVESTIYA, FOR EXAMPLE, REPORTED THAT APPROXIMATELY HALF OF ALL CONSUMER SERVICES IN ESTONIA ARE PROVIDED BY ILLEGAL PRIVATEERS.

-- IT MUST BE EMPHASIZED ONCE AGAIN THAT THE CHRONIC SHORTAGES AND WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION WHICH CHARACTERIZE CONTEMPORARY SOVIET LIFE ARE FUNDAMENTAL FEATURES OF THE SOVIET ECONOMIC SYSTEM. THEY REFLECT THE SYSTEMIC INFLEXIBILITY OF A CENTRALIZED ECONOMIC PLANNING SYSTEM WHICH BREEDS BOTTLENECKS AND INEFFICIENCIES.

-- THE SOVIET CONSUMER IS FURTHER DISADVANTAGED BY THE HISTORICAL SOVIET PREFERENCE FOR SPENDING ON DEFENSE AND HEAVY INDUSTRY AT THE EXPENSE OF THE CONSUMER SECTOR.

-- SOVIET PER CAPITA SPENDING FOR DEFENSE, FOR EXAMPLE, IS, IN RELATIVE TERMS, TWICE AS HIGH AS IN ANY DEVELOPED WESTERN COUNTRY. WE ESTIMATE THAT THE SOVIET UNION SPENDS 14 PERCENT OF ITS GNP ON DEFENSE, COMPARED TO ONLY 7 PERCENT FOR THE UNITED STATES.

-- GIVEN THESE SYSTEMIC ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND EMPHASIS ON HEAVY INDUSTRY AND WEAPONS PROCUREMENT, IT IS LITTLE WONDER THAT SOVIET AUTHORITIES AND PRESS COMMENTATORS CHRONICALLY COMPLAIN ABOUT THE EVILS OF "CONSUMERISM," AND AGAINST THE EXCESSIVE ACCUMULATION OF MATERIAL GOODS.

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#### 8. (U) SOVIET AGRICULTURE

-- THE SOVIET SYSTEM OF COLLECTIVIZED AGRICULTURE ALSO CONTRIBUTES TO THE HARSHNESS OF SOVIET LIFE. MUCH OF THE PROBLEM IN FOOD SUPPLY, FOR EXAMPLE, STEMS FROM THE LOW PRODUCTIVITY OF COLLECTIVIZED SOVIET AGRICULTURE. AS IS WELL KNOWN, THE FORCED COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE IN THE EARLY 1930'S DIVESTED SOVIET FARMERS OF THEIR LAND. WHAT IS NOT SO WELL KNOWN IS THAT THE BRUTAL CONFISCATION OF GRAIN SUPPLIES THAT ACCOMPANIED IT RESULTED IN A WIDESPREAD FAMINE THAT KILLED AS MANY AS SIX MILLION OF

THEM IN THE UKRAINE ALONE. COLLECTIVIZATION NOT ONLY KILLED SIX MILLION PEOPLE, BUT IT PERMANENTLY CRIPPLED SOVIET AGRICULTURE.

-- THE SOVIET UNION, IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY DAYS THE WORLD'S LARGEST GRAIN EXPORTER, IS NOW THE WORLD'S LARGEST GRAIN IMPORTER.

-- 20 PERCENT OF THE SOVIET WORK FORCE WORKS IN AGRICULTURE AS COMPARED TO 3 PERCENT IN THE UNITED STATES, YET THE SOVIETS OFTEN HAVE TO IMPORT UP TO 25 PERCENT OF THEIR GRAIN. AMERICAN FARMERS, WHO OWN THEIR OWN LAND, ARE TEN TIMES MORE PRODUCTIVE THAN THEIR SOVIET COUNTERPARTS.

-- EACH YEAR APPROXIMATELY 20 PERCENT OF THE GRAIN, FRUIT, AND VEGETABLE HARVEST, AND AS MUCH AS 50 PERCENT OF THE POTATO CROP PERISHES BECAUSE OF POOR STORAGE, TRANSPORTATION AND DISTRIBUTION TECHNIQUES.

-- EVEN THOUGH PRIVATE PLOTS IN THE SOVIET UNION OCCUPY ONLY 4 PERCENT OF THE COUNTRY'S ARABLE LAND, THEY ACCOUNT CONFIDENTIAL

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FOR ABOUT 60 PERCENT OF THE COUNTRY'S PRODUCTION OF POTATOES AND HONEY, OVER 40 PERCENT OF ITS FRUITS, BERRIES AND EGGS, AND ABOUT 30 PERCENT OF ITS MEAT, MILK, AND VEGETABLES. PRIVATE PLOTS, IN FACT, PRODUCE 25 PERCENT OF THE SOVIET UNION'S TOTAL CROP OUTPUT.

#### 9. (U) HOUSING

-- HOUSING IN THE SOVIET UNION IS IN AS SHORT SUPPLY AS MOST CONSUMER GOODS.

-- AT LEAST TWENTY PERCENT OF ALL URBAN FAMILIES STILL SHARE KITCHEN AND TOILET FACILITIES WITH OTHER FAMILIES. FIVE PERCENT MORE LIVE IN FACTORY DORMITORIES. YOUNG MARRIED COUPLES ARE TYPICALLY FORCED TO LIVE WITH THEIR PARENTS AND MUST WAIT YEARS FOR HOUSING OF THEIR OWN.

-- THE HOUSING THAT DOES EXIST IS EXTREMELY CRAMPED, MORE SO THAN IN ANY OTHER DEVELOPED COUNTRY IN THE WORLD. THE AVERAGE SOVIET HAS 14 SQUARE METERS OF LIVING SPACE, FOR EXAMPLE, COMPARED TO THE 49 SQUARE METERS

AVAILABLE TO THE AVERAGE AMERICAN. THIS MEANS THAT THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY TWO PEOPLE FOR EVERY ROOM IN THE SOVIET UNION, COMPARED WITH TWO ROOMS FOR EVERY PERSON IN THE UNITED STATES.

-- SOVIET STATISTICS REVEAL THAT IN 1983, 32 PERCENT OF ALL URBAN HOUSING HAD NO HOT WATER, 23 PERCENT WAS WITHOUT GAS, 19 PERCENT WITHOUT INDOOR BATHS, 12 PERCENT WITHOUT CENTRAL HEATING, 11 PERCENT WITHOUT SEWAGE FACILITIES AND 9 PERCENT WITHOUT WATER.

-- THE HOUSING SITUATION IS WORSE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, AND CONTAINS MANY FEATURES REMINISCENT OF THE 19TH CENTURY -- OR EVEN THE 18TH. THERE, FOR THE MOST PART, CONFIDENTIAL

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HEATING IS WITH FIREPLACES, FOOD IS COOKED ON WOOD STOVES OR IN WOOD-FIRED OVENS, OUTHOUSES PROVIDE THE TOILET FACILITIES, WATER FREQUENTLY IS FROM A WELL.

-- ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE NEW HOUSING BUILT IN THE SOVIET UNION IN RECENT YEARS, ALMOST ALL OF IT CONSISTS OF CHEAPLY AND SHODDILY CONSTRUCTED HIGH-RISE APARTMENT BUILDINGS WHICH ARE EVEN MORE POORLY MAINTAINED. MOREOVER, NEW BUILDING LAGS CONSIDERABLY BEHIND THE INCREASE IN NEW HOUSEHOLDS.

-- AT THE CURRENT RATE OF BUILDING, IGNORING THE FACT THAT POORLY CONSTRUCTED SOVIET HOUSING RAPIDLY DETERIORATES, THE PER CAPITA SPACE AVAILABLE TO SOVIET CITIZENS WILL BEGIN TO APPROACH THE WESTERN STANDARD IN APPROXIMATELY 150 YEARS.

-- SOVIET HOUSING WOES SHOULD COME AS NO SURPRISE GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION SPENDS LESS THAN ONE FIFTH AS MUCH ON HOUSING AS THE UNITED STATES AND WELL UNDER HALF OF WHAT IS SPENT IN SPAIN AND JAPAN.

10. (U) SOVIET WOMEN

-- WOMEN IN THE SOVIET UNION USUALLY OCCUPY THE LOWEST STATUS AND LOWEST PAYING JOBS IN SOVIET SOCIETY. ONE-THIRD OF ALL WORKING SOVIET WOMEN, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE EMPLOYED AS AGRICULTURAL LABORERS. BY CONTRAST, ONLY 1.5 PERCENT OF AMERICAN WOMEN ARE SO EMPLOYED.

-- SOVIET AUTHORITIES OFTEN POINT TO THE LIBERAL MATERNITY BENEFITS ACCORDED TO SOVIET WOMEN. YET THE

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SOVIET UNION IS CURRENTLY SUFFERING FROM A SEVERE LABOR SHORTAGE BROUGHT ON BY DECLINING BIRTH RATES. THIS REDUCTION IN BIRTH RATES, IN TURN, IS DUE TO THE EXTRAORDINARILY HIGH ABORTION RATE. THE AVERAGE SOVIET WOMAN HAS BETWEEN FIVE AND SEVEN ABORTIONS PER CHILD BEARING LIFETIME. THE FACT IS THAT THE LOW SOVIET STANDARD OF LIVING COMPELS WOMEN TO WORK TO SUPPLEMENT THE FAMILY INCOME. MATERNITY BENEFITS, WITH EXTRA MOUTHS TO FEED AND BODIES TO CLOTHE, ARE, IN MANY INSTANCES, SIMPLY NOT ENOUGH TO ENCOURAGE A FAMILY TO LET A CHILD BE BORN.

-- UNLIKE SOVIET MEN, THE WORKING DAY OF A SOVIET WOMAN DOES NOT END AS SHE LEAVES THE FIELD OR FACTORY. SOVIET WOMEN ARE EXPECTED TO DO THE COOKING AND THE HOUSEWORK AND THE WAITING IN LINE.

-- IN THE WEST, WOMEN HAVE EFFECTIVELY BANDED TOGETHER TO FIGHT DISCRIMINATION AND SEXISM, BUT SOVIET WOMEN HAVE NO ACCESS TO EFFECTIVE POLITICAL POWER. IN ITS ENTIRE HISTORY, ONLY ONE WOMAN HAS EVER SERVED ON THE POLITBURO; NONE SERVES THERE NOW. FEWER THAN FIVE PER CENT OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND ONLY ONE QUARTER OF COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS ARE FEMALE.

-- IN THE LATE 1970'S THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES CRUSHED A DISSIDENT ORGANIZATION OF FEMINIST ACTIVISTS - CENTERED AROUND THE SAMIZDAT JOURNAL "MARIYA" - WHO HAD BANDED TOGETHER TO PUBLICIZE THE PLIGHT OF WOMEN IN SOVIET SOCIETY.

11. (U) HEALTH CARE

-- SOVIET AUTHORITIES ARE OFTEN FOND OF POINTING OUT THAT HEALTH CARE IN THE SOVIET UNION IS FREE. AS WITH SO MUCH THAT IS FREE OR SUBSIDIZED IN THE SOVIET UNION,

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HOWEVER, YOU GET WHAT YOU PAY FOR.

-- ALTHOUGH THERE ARE PLENTY OF BEDS IN SOVIET HOSPITALS, THE PEOPLE WHO LIE IN THEM LEAD A PRECARIOUS EXISTENCE. ONE THIRD OF THEM, FOR EXAMPLE, DEVELOP POST-OPERATIVE INFECTIONS DUE TO UNSANITARY CONDITIONS IN THE OPERATING ROOM. THREE PERCENT IS CONSIDERED HIGH IN THE WEST.

-- THE DOCTORS WHO CARE FOR THEM, MOREOVER, ARE POORLY TRAINED BY WESTERN STANDARDS. MEDICINE IS NOT A HIGH-PRESTIGE OCCUPATION IN THE SOVIET UNION AND DOCTORS ARE AMONG THE LOWEST PAID WORKERS IN SOVIET SOCIETY.

SIGNIFICANTLY, 70 PERCENT OF THESE LOW-PAID PHYSICIANS ARE WOMEN.

-- SOVIET MEDICINE IS NOT IMMUNE TO THE SAME SHORTAGES THAT AFFLICT THE REST OF SOVIET SOCIETY. MEDICAL EQUIPMENT AND MANY MEDICINES ARE IN EXTREMELY SHORT SUPPLY. ONE THIRD OF ALL SOVIET HOSPITALS, FOR EXAMPLE, DO NOT HAVE ADEQUATE FACILITIES FOR BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS. BASIC ITEMS SUCH AS BANDAGES AND ASPIRIN ARE OFTEN DIFFICULT TO FIND. FOOD RATIONS ARE SO SMALL THAT PATIENTS MUST SUPPLEMENT THEIR DIET WITH FOOD FROM HOME.

-- IN NOVOSIBIRSK, FOR EXAMPLE, WHICH IS HOME TO MANY LEADING SOVIET ACADEMIC INSTITUTES AND WHERE ONE WOULD EXPECT SUPPLIES TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY BETTER THAN NORMAL, ONLY 11 PERCENT OF THE 216 DRUGS ON THE LIST OF MEDICATIONS TO BE PRESCRIBED IN THE THE EVENT OF SPECIFIC ILLNESSES ARE ACTUALLY AVAILABLE.

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12. (U) ALCOHOLISM AND INCREASING DEATH RATES

-- ALTHOUGH THESE PROBLEMS IN THEIR HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM ARE SERIOUS, THEY ARE NOT THE MOST SERIOUS MEDICAL PROBLEM FACING THE SOVIET UNION TODAY. DRAMATICALLY, OVER THE COURSE OF THE PAST TWO DECADES A SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION HAS OCCURRED IN THE OVERALL HEALTH STATUS OF THE SOVIET POPULATION.

-- STATISTICS AND STUDIES SHOW, AND SOVIET AUTHORITIES

DO NOT DENY, THAT THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN SOVIET DEATH AND MORBIDITY RATES OVER THE PAST TWENTY YEARS THE LIFE EXPECTANCY OF SOVIET MALES HAS DECREASED DURING THAT PERIOD BY MORE THAN FOUR YEARS, FROM 66 IN THE MID-1960'S TO UNDER 62 YEARS TODAY. RECENT STUDIES INDICATE THIS FIGURE MAY EVEN HAVE FALLEN TO AS LOW AS 56 YEARS. IN THE UNITED STATES DURING THE SAME PERIOD, MALE LIFE EXPECTANCY INCREASED FROM 66 TO 71 YEARS. INFANT MORTALITY IN THE USSR HAS INCREASED FROM 26.2 PER 1,000 LIVE BIRTHS IN 1971 TO PERHAPS 40 PER 1,000 TODAY. U.S. INFANT MORTALITY DURING THE SAME PERIOD HAS DECREASED FROM 24.7 PER 1,000 TO 10.7.

-- THE SOVIET FIGURE FOR INFANT MORTALITY IS NECESSARILY AN ESTIMATE SINCE SOVIET AUTHORITIES STOPPED PUBLISHING INFANT MORTALITY STATISTICS AFTER 1974 WHEN THE RATE HAD REACHED 31.9 PER 1,000, ALREADY MUCH HIGHER THAN IN ANY DEVELOPED WESTERN COUNTRY.

-- THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO STOPPED PUBLISHING LIFE EXPECTANCY FIGURES. THE REASON WHY THEY HAVE DONE SO IS OBVIOUS ENOUGH. THE DECREASE IN MALE LIFE EXPECTANCY AND THE INCREASE IN INFANT MORTALITY IN THE SOVIET UNION ARE HISTORIC EVENTS. NEVER BEFORE HAS A DEVELOPED, INDUSTRIALIZED NATION SUFFERED A DECLINE IN THESE  
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DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS IN TIME OF PEACE.

-- THE REASONS FOR THIS DECLINE ARE EVEN MORE DISTURBING FOR ANYONE TEMPTED TO LOOK TO COMMUNISM AS A MODEL FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

-- FACTORS SUCH AS POOR HEALTH CARE, INCREASED SMOKING AND FREQUENTLY UNREGULATED INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION ARE IMPORTANT, BUT PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTOR IS ALCOHOL. SOME STATISTICS WILL MAKE CLEAR THE STAGGERING IMPLICATIONS OF THE USE OF ALCOHOL IN THE SOVIET UNION.

-- THE SOVIET UNION RANKS FIRST IN THE WORLD IN THE PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF HARD LIQUOR, MUCH OF IT IN THE FORM OF HOME-BREWED MOONSHINE KNOWN AS "SAMOGON." (PRONOUNCED SAHM'-OH-GOHN) ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS RISEN AN AVERAGE OF 4.5 PERCENT A YEAR OVER THE PAST 25 YEARS. THAT MEANS THAT IN TWO AND A HALF DECADES

ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION HAS MORE THAN DOUBLED.

-- THE DEATH RATE FROM ALCOHOL POISONING ALONE IN THE SOVIET UNION IS 88 TIMES THE U.S. RATE, AND ALCOHOL AND ITS EFFECTS MAY BE THE LEADING CAUSE OF DEATH AMONG SOVIET MALES.

-- ALCOHOL ABUSE IN THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT SIMPLY A MALE PROBLEM. ALCOHOL ABUSE IS THE THIRD LEADING CAUSE OF ILLNESS AMONG SOVIET WOMEN AND IS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN BOTH THE RISING NUMBER OF BIRTH DEFECTS AND THE INCREASING INFANT MORTALITY RATE.

-- BY 1980 THE NET SOCIAL COST OF ALCOHOL ABUSE IN DECREASED LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE SOVIET UNION AMOUNTED CONFIDENTIAL

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TO A STAGGERING 8 TO 9 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NATIONAL INCOME.

-- MUCH OF THE HEAVY DRINKING IN THE SOVIET UNION OCCURS IN THE WORK PLACE. PROFESSOR R. LIRMYAN OF THE SOVIET ACADEMY OF THE USSR MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, WRITING IN A 1982 ISSUE OF "MOLODOY KOMMUNIST", REPORTED THAT 37 PERCENT OF THE MALE WORK FORCE IS CHRONICALLY DRUNK. NOT SURPRISINGLY, DRUNKENNESS IS THE LEADING CAUSE OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS.

-- A POLL CITED IN A MARCH 1984 EDITION OF A SOVIET NEWSPAPER, "SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA" REVEALED THAT HALF THE SOVIET POPULATION REGARDS DRUNKENNESS AS THE NUMBER ONE SOCIAL PROBLEM IN THE SOVIET UNION. 74 PERCENT SAID THEY WERE ALARMED OVER THE EXTENT OF PUBLIC DRUNKENNESS.

-- THESE STATISTICS MAKE CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET UNION NOW SUFFERS FROM AN ALCOHOL ABUSE PROBLEM OF EPIDEMIC PROPORTIONS, SERIOUS ENOUGH TO CAUSE A SIGNIFICANT RISE IN THE NATIONAL DEATH RATE.

-- VITALIY FEDORCHUK, THE SOVIET MINISTER FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS, INTERVIEWED IN THE AUGUST 29, 1984 ISSUE OF "LITERATURNAYA GAZETA," CANDIDLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOVIET MORTALITY AND SICKNESS RATES HAVE BEEN ON THE INCREASE AND HE SPECIFICALLY CITED ALCOHOL ABUSE AS THE CAUSE.

-- NO ONE FACTOR HAS FORCED THE SOVIET PEOPLE TO DOUBLE

THEIR CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL. IT IS THE SYSTEM ITSELF WHICH HAS DRIVEN THE SOVIET PEOPLE TO DRINK, WHICH HAS CRAMMED THEM INTO SHABBY, OVERCROWDED APARTMENTS, WHICH HAS FORCED THEM TO SPEND MUCH OF THEIR LIVES WAITING IN LINES FOR SCARCE, LOW-QUALITY MERCHANDISE, WHICH HAS GUARANTEED THEM A JOB, BUT GIVEN THEM NO REASON TO WORK, WHICH HAS ROBBED THEM OF CONTROL OVER THEIR OWN LIVES.

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-- THE SOVIET SYSTEM, FAR FROM ENDING INDUSTRIAL ALIENATION, HAS CREATED A STERILE INDUSTRIAL WASTELAND WHICH FAILS TO MEET BASIC HUMAN SPIRITUAL AND MATERIAL NEEDS.

-- RECENTLY, IN MAY 1985, THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES ANNOUNCED YET ANOTHER CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE ABUSE OF ALCOHOL. PRODUCTION IS TO BE CUT BACK, THE DRINKING AGE RAISED, AND PENALTIES AGAINST THE MANUFACTURE OF HOME BREW INCREASED. WHILE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THESE MEASURES MAY MEET WITH SOME SUCCESS, WE NOTE THAT SIMILAR CAMPAIGNS HAVE ALWAYS FAILED IN THE PAST. ALCOHOL ABUSE IN THE SOVIET UNION IS LIKELY TO REMAIN AN ALARMINGLY SERIOUS PROBLEM UNTIL THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BEGINS TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE PROFOUND SOCIAL MALAISE THAT GAVE RISE TO THE PROBLEM IN THE FIRST PLACE.

### 13. (U) CRIME

-- AS SOVIET AUTHORITIES THEMSELVES ADMIT, ALCOHOL ABUSE HAS ALSO LED TO A STEADILY INCREASING CRIME RATE. THE MYTH THAT IT IS ONLY WESTERN OR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THAT SUFFER FROM CRIME IS DEVASTATED BY THE FACT THE THE

PRISON POPULATION OF THE SOVIET UNION IS 3 TIMES HIGHER PER CAPITA THAN THAT OF THE UNITED STATES.

-- WE ALSO NOTE THAT, AS WITH LIFE EXPECTANCY AND INFANT MORTALITY, THE SOVIETS DO NOT PUBLISH CRIME STATISTICS. WE KNOW THAT THE SOVIET UNION STOPPED PUBLISHING THESE OTHER STATISTICS BECAUSE THEY DEMONSTRATED THE GROWING FAILURE OF THE SOVIET

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SOCIO-ECONOMIC SYSTEM. IT IS NOT DIFFICULT, THEN, TO SURMISE WHY THE SOVIETS HAVE NEVER PUBLISHED CRIME STATISTICS. IF THEY WANT TO CRITICIZE US FOR CRIME IN THE WEST, LET THEM PUBLISH THEIR OWN CRIME STATISTICS.

14. (U) INEQUALITY: THE NOMENKLATURA

-- MARXIST-LENINIST IDEOLOGY AFTER ALL CLAIMS TO BE BASED ON THE NOTION OF EGALITARIANISM. THIS, WE ARE TOLD, IS WHAT THE "GREAT OCTOBER REVOLUTION" WAS ALL ABOUT. ONE WOULD THEREFORE EXPECT THAT WHATEVER PROBLEMS THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT HAVE, THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES WOULD ENSURE THAT NO CLASS OR GROUP OR INDIVIDUALS WOULD BE ACCORDED PRIVILEGES NOT AVAILABLE TO OTHER MEMBERS OF SOVIET SOCIETY.

-- BUT THE TRUTH IS THAT THE VARIOUS SOVIET ELITES (THE PARTY, THE MILITARY, THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS, THE SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL INTELLIGENTSIA, THE CULTURAL AND SPORTS ESTABLISHMENTS) HAVE DELIBERATELY SHIELDED THEMSELVES FROM THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HARDSHIPS FACED BY THE REST OF THE POPULATION.

-- THE PRIVILEGED 5 PERCENT OF THE SOVIET POPULATION, CALLED THE NOMENKLATURA, HAVE ACCESS TO SPECIAL "CLOSED" STORES THAT ARE SPECIALLY STOCKED WITH FOREIGN GOODS NOT AVAILABLE IN REGULAR STORES, AS WELL AS BOUNTIFUL SUPPLIES OF SOVIET GOODS THAT ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY ELSEWHERE. THE AVERAGE SOVIET CITIZEN IS FORBIDDEN FROM ENTERING THESE STORES, WHICH ARE UNMARKED AND HAVE OPAQUE WINDOWS TO PREVENT THE CURIOUS FROM LOOKING IN.

-- HOUSING SPACE IS ALLOCATED BY STATE AUTHORITIES ON THE BASIS OF SOCIAL STATUS. MANY LEADING SOVIET ORGANIZATIONS HAVE THEIR OWN HOUSING STOCKS WHICH ARE OF GOOD STANDARD AND CENTRALLY LOCATED.

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-- THE FOURTH DIRECTORATE OF THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH RUNS A CLOSED SYSTEM OF HOSPITALS, CLINICS AND DISPENSARIES FOR THE SOVIET ELITES, PROVIDING SERVICES FAR BETTER THAN THE LOW QUALITY CARE AVAILABLE TO THE

GENERAL POPULATION.

-- THE SOVIET RULING OLIGARCHY ALSO HAS ACCESS TO SUCH SPECIAL BENEFITS AS FOREIGN TRAVEL, AUTOMOBILES, ADMISSION TO THE BEST SCHOOLS, COUNTRY HOUSES, ACCESS TO CULTURAL EVENTS AND PAID VACATIONS IN CHOICE RESORTS, WHICH ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO THE AVERAGE CITIZEN. EVEN THE CENTER LANES OF MAJOR STREETS IN MOSCOW AND OTHER LARGE CITIES ARE CLOSED-OFF FOR THEIR EXCLUSIVE PERSONAL USE.

-- THIS IS THE REALITY OF THE SO-CALLED CLASSLESS, EGALITARIAN SOCIETY THE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP HAS CREATED.

15. (U) CONCLUSION

-- WE IN THE WEST DO NOT CLAIM TO BE PERFECT. WE HAVE SERIOUS PROBLEMS WHICH DESERVE SERIOUS ATTENTION. BUT DESPITE OUR MANY PROBLEMS, WE BELIEVE THAT WE IN THE WEST, WITH OUR PLURALISTIC, MIXED-MARKET ECONOMIES, HAVE GONE FURTHER TOWARD MEETING BASIC HUMAN SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPIRATIONS THAN THE SOVIET SYSTEM EVER HAS OR EVER WILL.

-- WE TALK OPENLY ABOUT OUR PROBLEMS, WHILE THE SOVIET REACTION IS TO TRY TO HIDE THEIRS AND PRETEND THAT THEY DON'T EXIST. WHEN SOVIET PROPAGANDISTS CRITICIZE THE WEST AS VICTIMIZED BY MONOPOLIES, AND POPULATED BY  
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SOCIETIES IN WHICH THE RICH FEW LIVE OFF THE NUMBERLESS POOR, THEY ARE UNWITTINGLY HOLDING UP A MIRROR TO THEIR OWN SOCIETY. NO SYSTEM IS WITHOUT FLAWS, BUT WE AT LEAST OFFER THE PROSPECT OF FREEDOM WITH PROSPERITY. THE SOVIET SYSTEM OFFERS NEITHER. END TALKING POINTS. SHULTZ

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Washington, D.C. 20520

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TO: Interagency Working Group on European Public Diplomacy

FROM: EUR/P - Steve Steiner *SES*

SUBJECT: Report on 12/16 Meeting; Agenda for 12/21 Meeting

SPECIAL NOTE: The next meeting will take place on Tuesday, December 21, 2:00 p.m. in the EUR Conference Room (6226). The room has been reserved from 2-3:30 p.m. in case we need the extra time. We will use this meeting to have the briefing and discussion which we were not able to have on December 16: namely, the briefing by Al Richman of State/PA on American attitudes on key arms control questions and comparative notes by Steve Shaffer of USIA/REU on European perspectives. We will then focus on how we should fine tune our approach on both sides of the Atlantic.

Also at the Tuesday 12/21 meeting, Paula Dobriansky of the NSC staff will provide a briefing on her just-completed trip to Europe, where she made several public appearances. This will provide a valuable additional contribution to the discussion based on the reports by Messrs. Richman and Shaffer.

#### Report on 12/16 Meeting

Entire session was taken up with comments by and the question and answer session with Professor Franz Alting van Gesau, Director of the JFK Institute at Tilburg University in The Netherlands. Professor van Gesau, who is also Chairman of the Dutch Government's Advisory Committee on Arms Control, gave his reflections on public opinion in The Netherlands on security questions and on the state of the Dutch "peace" movement. Among his observations:

- The Dutch "peace movement" is no longer interested in a dialogue with the Dutch or other governments. It has gone past that point and is now considering taking its actions exclusively in the streets. It claims to want a dialogue with the Dutch government and claims the Dutch government is unresponsive. But this is simply a propoganda point to legitimize "going to the streets."

- The U.S. can only help indirectly in the debate in Europe, as each Allied government must take the lead in its own country. We should, however, provide materials to assist Allied governments and supportive private groups, provide speakers for appropriate forums and keep European sensitivities in mind in our own public statements.

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- There is an historic contradiction in European attitudes toward the U.S. Under the Carter Administration, for example, we were faulted for lack of firm leadership. Now, we are sometimes faulted for putting "too much pressure" on the Allies.

- We have allowed the debate in Europe to focus too much on weaponry. Our focus in Europe should be more political, emphasizing the differences of the systems in East and West. Europeans are aware of Soviet weapons. We need to heighten European perceptions that it is not so much the weapons themselves that are dangerous, but the greater propensity that the Soviets--given their internal system and international conduct--might use them. In other words, we should emphasize the totalitarian threat posed by the USSR.

- At the same time, we should emphasize Western strengths, not weaknesses. Playing up only Soviet strengths can make European publics fearful and fatalistic.

- We should work with selected media, private organizations and European governments to improve the dialogue, and encourage Allied governments to show "more civil courage" in taking the case to their publics.

- On the "peace" movement, we should expose its links to the USSR, emphasizing particularly the political links (as financial links are harder to establish). And we should expose how Soviet political campaigns are conducted in the West and how sincere public concerns about nuclear issues are exploited. USG materials such as USIA's "Soviet Propaganda Alerts" are helpful in this regard, but at least in the case of The Netherlands the U.S. does not seem to be giving them sufficient distribution.

Agenda for Tuesday 12/21: Discussion of European and American public concerns on arms control issues--Richman, Shaffer, Dobriansky, etc.--as noted above.

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INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION COMMITTEE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOVIET PROPAGANDA

RECORD OF MEETING

SEPTEMBER 20, 1985 - 10:30 a.m.

A. Discussion

The Chair (Michael D. Schneider, USIA, acting) opened by introducing several new officers in USIA whose offices bear on the work of the Subcommittee: Marvin Stone, Deputy Director of USIA and Chair of the Subcommittee's parent committee, Phillip Arnold, Director of the USIA Policy Guidance Staff, Michael Pistor, Acting Deputy Associate Director and Director of the USIA Press and Publications Service, and Nils Wessell, Director of the USIA Office of Research. Mr. Schneider briefly reviewed the organization and work of the Subcommittee for the benefit of newcomers.

B. European Views of Gorbachev and The November Reagan-Gorbachev Meeting

James McGregor (USIA/P/G) reported on a cabled questionnaire to all European Missions which asked for their assessment of European views of Gorbachev as a leader and views of the meeting between the General Secretary and the President in November.

European publics see Gorbachev as vigorous, intelligent, and highly motivated, but little different from his predecessors in the policies he pushes and the positions he represents, however much better the arguments might be packaged. Gorbachev's Time interview received widespread play, but few Europeans read anything into it beyond a change in style. Media attention has receded in most countries to a steady but lower level, usually overshadowed by domestic events. Few Europeans have high expectations for the meeting, but most are encouraged by the fact that we and the Soviets are at least planning to talk to one another. Initial optimistic hopes for a significant outcome of the meeting have also been tempered by more realistic expectations. There is a widespread perception that the U.S. is reacting in an excessively negative manner in its preparations for the meeting and in conducting the U.S.-Soviet relationship overall. European Missions advised that public diplomacy on the meeting be tough but forthcoming, positive, not defensive, and above all, show flexibility and willingness to consider Soviet offers.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hare,  
Senior Reviewer

Classified by: P - Michael D. Schneider  
Declassify: OADR

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Nils Wessell and Steven Grant (USIA/P/R) summarized a report which analyzed Gorbachev's statements on Soviet foreign policy. The analysis found that Gorbachev's writings and speeches do not reveal major inconsistencies and contradictions, but they do tailor tone and content to suit the audience and policy objectives. While outright contradictions were not found, there is evidence of a possible evolution in Gorbachev's views. Moreover, Gorbachev's messages to foreign peace activists are often not repeated to citizens at home.

A discussion ensued on how to deal with Gorbachev's apparent success in building a positive image in Europe. Herbert Romerstein (USIA/P) suggested that programming agencies contrast his rhetoric and image with facts about actual Soviet conditions and actions. John Lenczowski (NSC) recommended that media "gushing" on Gorbachev's style be played back to journalists in an effort to illustrate how his image had been blown out of proportion. Lisa Jamison (USIA/VOA/G) pointed out that the Soviets are especially sensitive to the label of "propaganda" being attached to their proposals. She later noted that the Soviets were vulnerable in a number of areas, including spy scandals, technology transfer revelations, human rights violations, and their activities in Afghanistan. Nils Wessell (USIA/P/R) suggested that the Soviet attempt to contrast their "reasonableness" with U.S. "belligerence" be countered by focusing attention on Afghanistan.

C. Mitterrand-Gorbachev Meeting

Rick Ruth (USIA/EU) noted that Gorbachev has scheduled two interviews with French journalists as part of his upcoming visit in France, one of which would be a joint press conference with President Mitterrand on October 4.

Phillip Brown (USIA/EU) suggested that we prevail upon the French to ask Gorbachev the tough questions. Brown (who is TDY from Paris) recommended that USG public statements on the Mitterrand-Gorbachev meeting we avoid deprecating the results, but rather welcome the meeting and consultations as a positive sign.

D. Possible Soviet UN General Assembly Initiative on Arms Control

Miller Crouch (USIA/EU) noted that the Soviets may push in the current UN General Assembly session for an international conference on arms control under UN auspices, and perhaps propose that a new UN agency be created.

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E. Soviet Focus on Arms Control and SDI

Herbert Romerstein (USIA/P) discussed the Soviet anti-SDI offensive, noting that the Soviets have mobilized their front organizations. John Lenczowski (NSC) described the Soviet attempt to focus attention on arms control as part of their strategic deception effort to distract attention from the main causes of tension in the world.

F. Soviet Propaganda Opportunities Calendar

The second issue of the listing of events and anniversaries which the Soviets might use for propaganda campaigns was passed out. The Chair requested the Subcommittee members to submit additions or corrections as soon as possible.

G. Talking Points on Soviet Pre-November Propaganda

John Schmidt (STATE/EUR/SOV) passed out a paper which contained possible responses to Soviet propaganda during the run-up to the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in November. Mr. Schmidt characterized the paper as part of an attempt to develop an overall strategy to deal with the pre-meeting propaganda campaign and requested comments on it.

H. USIA Activities

The Chair listed a number of projects USIA has in progress to deal with Soviet propaganda, especially in preparation for the November meeting in Geneva. These projects include special Soviet Propaganda Alerts, an Issue Analysis for Posts on Soviet propaganda, a paper which shows how Soviet propaganda has not been moderated in spite of what they claim, an update of the prior USIA study on appearances of Soviets on U.S. television, a new study of Soviet appearances in U.S. print media, a lexicon of commonly used Soviet terms on arms control, and a special effort to follow Soviet propaganda during the pre-November period.

I. Actions

The following actions on the part of the Subcommittee were requested by the Chair:

1. That comments on the paper submitted by John Schmidt (STATE/EUR/SOV) be forwarded to him.

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2. That the Soviet Propaganda Opportunities Calendar be reviewed and suggested passed to James McGregor (USIA/P/G).
3. That the most important items from (2) be extracted and a brief recommendation prepared for the September 28 meeting of the International Information Committee.

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