



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

**MAY 17 2019**

Case No. M-2018-01170

Mr. John Greenewald  
27305 W. Live Oak Rd.  
Ste. 1203  
Castaic, CA 91384

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

I refer to your letter dated February 08, 2018, requesting mandatory review and release of one (1) Department of State document under Executive Order 13526.


We have determined that this document may be released with excisions. All released material is enclosed.

The material in the excised portions of this document continues, despite the passage of time, to meet the classification requirements of Sections 3.3(b)(1) and 3.3(b)(6) of the Executive Order and is therefore exempt from disclosure. It contains still-sensitive information concerning confidential human sources or organizations and information which would cause serious harm to relations between the United States and another government if released. All non-exempt material that is reasonably segregable from the exempt material has been released.

You have the right to appeal our determination by writing, within 60 days, to the Chairman, Appeals Review Panel, c/o Appeals Officer, A/GIS/IPS/PP/LA, U.S. Department of State, SA-2, Room 8100, Washington, D.C. 20522-8100. The appeal letter should refer to the case number shown above, clearly identify the decision being appealed, and provide supporting arguments when possible. For further information, see the Code of Federal Regulations, 22 CFR 171.13.

We have now completed the processing of your case. If you have any questions, you may write to the Office of Information Programs and Services, SA-2, Department of State, Washington, DC 20522-8100, or telephone us at (202) 261-8484. Please be sure to refer to the case number shown above in all correspondence about this case.

Sincerely,


  
Eric F. Stein, Director  
Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosures: telegram 1994Moscow032874

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and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

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<b>RELEASE IN PART</b> <b>25X1,25X6 Declass</b> <b>12/31/2044</b>
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 ACTION OES-09

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	P-01	SNP-00	SP-00	SS-00	T-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01
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R 161353Z NOV 94  
 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5556  
 INFO USEU BRUSSELS  
 USMISSION USVIENNA  
 AMEMBASSY BONN  
 DIRFBI WASHDC  
 WHITEHOUSE WASHDC  
 NRC WASHDC  
 DOE WASHDC

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 13 MOSCOW 032874

STATE FOR ACDA (GOODBY), PM/NE, EUR/RPM AND  
 EUR/ISCA/CAST;  
 DOE FOR S-1 (BERLS), NN-1 (LUONGO), NN-42 (ROONEY)  
 AND PO-70;  
 NRC FOR OIP;  
 WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC (STERN) AND OSTP (VON HIPPEL);

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 DIR FBI FOR SSA PAUL DEMINIKI;

<b>REVIEW AUTHORITY: Marvin Russell, Senior</b> <b>Reviewer</b>
--

USVIENNA FOR USVIE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, MNUC, TRGY, ASEC, RS

SUBJECT: OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION,  
CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING IN RUSSIA

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

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SUMMARY  
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2. WHILE MANY DIFFERENT SYSTEMS ARE IN PLACE IN RUSSIA TO INSURE THE SECURITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AGAINST THEFT OR DIVERSION, FEW IF ANY OF THESE SYSTEMS WOULD MEET U.S.-STYLE STANDARDS FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY. SOVIET NUCLEAR SECURITY SYSTEMS WERE BASED ON CONCEPTS OF ISLOATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND SPECIALISTS AND ON PROTECTION AGAINST EXTERNAL THREATS (FREQUENTLY SEEN AS U.S. SPYING OR SABOTAGE).

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\_\_\_\_\_. GOR ACTIONS OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS INDICATE THAT THE GOVERNMENT AS A WHOLE INCREASINGLY RECOGNIZES CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH THE SECURITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND HAS BEGUN

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IMPROVEMENTS, ALTHOUGH FUNDING CONSTRAINTS REPRESENT A MAJOR BARRIER TO RAPID PROGRESS.

3. THIS CABLE PROVIDES A NON-TECHNICAL OVERVIEW OF RUSSIAN SYSTEMS FOR PROTECTING NUCLEAR MATERIALS FROM THEFT OR DIVERSION; ITS PURPOSE IS TO PROVIDE A BACKGROUND AGAINST WHICH MORE SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON RUSSIA'S SYSTEMS FOR THE SECURITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS CAN BE COMPARED. IT ALSO PROVIDES HISTORICAL AND OTHER BACKGROUND INFORMATION IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A

CONTEXT FOR EVALUATING INFORMATION ON THE STRENGTHS  
AND WEAKNESSES OF RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR MATERIAL  
PROTECTION, CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS AS WELL AS  
ON CURRENT EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THOSE SYSTEMS. END  
SUMMARY.

-----  
OVERVIEW  
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4. SEIZURES IN RUSSIA, GERMANY AND ELSEWHERE OF  
NUCLEAR MATERIALS WHICH MAY HAVE ORIGINATED FROM  
RUSSIA HAVE FOCUSED CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION ON THE  
SECURITY OF RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR STOCKPILE AGAINST THEFT  
OR DIVERSION. THIS CABLE PROVIDES A NON-TECHNICAL  
OVERVIEW OF THE SYSTEMS CURRENTLY IN PLACE IN RUSSIA  
TO PROTECT NUCLEAR MATERIALS. IT IS INTENDED TO  
ASSIST READERS ACTIVE IN EFFORTS TO ASSIST RUSSIA IN  
IMPROVING THE SECURITY ITS NUCLEAR STOCKPILE BETTER  
UNDERSTAND DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIA BY PROVIDING A  
BACKDROP AGAINST WHICH REPORTS ON SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF  
THE OVERALL SYSTEM AND AREAS OF U.S.-RUSSIAN

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COOPERATION CAN BE PUT INTO PERSPECTIVE. WHILE  
SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF BOTH STRONG AND WEAK POINTS IN  
RUSSIA'S SYSTEMS FOR PROTECTING NUCLEAR MATERIALS ARE  
CITED, THEY ARE CITED FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY;  
THIS CABLE DOES NOT PROVIDE COMPREHENSIVE INFORMATION  
ON ALL ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION, CONTROL  
AND ACCOUNTING (MPC&A) IN RUSSIA.

5. DETAILED INFORMATION ON SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF  
RUSSIA'S MPC&A SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN INCLUDED IN NUMEROUS  
REPORTING CABLES FROM THIS EMBASSY AS WELL AS FROM  
REPORTS PREPARED BY VISITORS TO RUSSIA FROM THE  
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), U.S. NATIONAL  
LABORATORIES, THE IAEA AND EURATOM AS WELL AS FROM  
OTHER SOURCES. WHILE MOST OF THE INFORMATION  
CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT IS ALREADY AVAILABLE FROM  
THESE SOURCES, THIS MESSAGE PULLS TOGETHER TO PRESENT  
AN OVERALL PICTURE. THIS REPORT DOES NOT COVER  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY.

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THE SAFETY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS IN RUSSIA  
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6. WHILE EXISTING SECURITY MEASURES AT FACILITIES

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ACTION OES-09

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	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PM-00	PRS-01
	P-01	SNP-00	SP-00	SS-00	T-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01
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R 161353Z NOV 94  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5557  
INFO USEU BRUSSELS  
USMISSION USVIENNA  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
DIRFBI WASHDC  
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC  
NRC WASHDC  
DOE WASHDC

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STATE FOR ACDA (GOODBY), PM/NE, EUR/RPM AND  
EUR/ISCA/CAST;  
DOE FOR S-1 (BERLS), NN-1 (LUONGO), NN-42 (ROONEY)  
AND PO-70;  
NRC FOR OIP;  
WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC (STERN) AND OSTP (VON HIPPEL);

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DIR FBI FOR SSA PAUL DEMINIKI;  
USVIENNA FOR USVIE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, MNUC, TRGY, ASEC, RS  
SUBJECT: OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION,  
CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING IN RUSSIA

WITH ACCESS TO NUCLEAR MATERIALS UNDERSTANDABLY VARY  
GREATLY DEPENDING ON THE NATURE OF THE NUCLEAR  
MATERIAL LOCATED IN A GIVEN FACILITY, FEW IF ANY OF  
THE SYSTEMS ESTOFF HAS SEEN WOULD MEET U.S. STANDARDS  
FOR PROTECTION. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT ALL NUCLEAR  
SECURITY SYSTEMS ARE UNIFORMLY WEAK. THE OPPOSITE IS  
TRUE -- SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AT A NUMBER OF  
FACILITIES ARE QUITE IMPRESSIVE.

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8. FINALLY, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AFFLICTING RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR INDUSTRY ALSO ADDS TO THE RISK OF DIVERSION. MANY NUCLEAR WORKERS ARE LEAVING THEIR JOBS AND THOSE THAT REMAIN RECEIVE LOW PAY WHICH OFTEN ARRIVES MONTHS LATE. RUMORS OF LAYOFFS AND CLOSURES CIRCULATE FREQUENTLY, INCLUDING RUMORS THAT THE GOVERNMENT MAY CLOSE ENTIRELY SOME OF ITS "SECRET" NUCLEAR CITIES WHICH ARE HOME TO ALMOST 1,000,000 PEOPLE.

9. WHILE WESTERN OBSERVERS TEND TO SEE MANY "OBVIOUS" WEAKNESS IN RUSSIA'S SYSTEMS FOR SECURING THE SAFETY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS, THE RUSSIAN (AND FORMER SOVIET) AUTHORITIES WHO DESIGNED AND IMPLEMENTED CURRENT SYSTEMS ARE QUICK TO DEFEND THEIR WORK AND TO TAKE OFFENSE AT PERCEIVED SLIGHTS. THESE RUSSIAN EXPERTS CITE THE FACT THAT THEIR SECURITY SYSTEMS WORKED ESSENTIALLY FLAWLESSLY FOR OVER 40 YEARS. WHILE A

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PART OF THE RISK FACING RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR STOCKPILE CAN  
BE TRACED TO THE DETERIORATION OF SECURITY MEASURES  
SINCE THE BREAK-UP OF THE SOVIET UNION, THE MOST  
IMPORTANT FACTORS WHICH HAVE LED TO INCREASED RISK ARE  
CHANGES IN THE NATURE OF THE THREAT AND IN THE NATURE  
OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY. SECURITY SYSTEMS IN PLACE TODAY  
WERE DESIGNED DURING THE SOVIET PERIOD, WHEN THE  
NATION WAS CHARACTERIZED BY A POWERFUL CENTRALIZED  
STATE WITH A PERVASIVE SECURITY NETWORK. THE MEASURES  
NEEDED TO INSURE NUCLEAR SECURITY IN SUCH AN  
ENVIRONMENT WERE VERY DIFFERENT THAN THOSE THAT HAVE  
ALWAYS BEEN NEEDED IN WESTERN COUNTRIES OR WHICH ARE  
NEEDED IN RUSSIA TODAY.

10. FINALLY, MANY WITHIN THE GOR ARE WELL AWARE OF  
THE WEAKNESS IN SECURITY SYSTEMS DESCRIBED IN THIS  
REPORT. THE GOR'S CHIEF NUCLEAR SAFETY WATCHDOG,  
GOSATOMNADZOR, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS BOTH STUDIED THE  
PROBLEM AND RECEIVED REPEATED INSTRUCTIONS TO INCREASE  
SECURITY AND TO MANDATE IMPROVED ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS.  
OTHER GROUPS, INCLUDING THE NUCLEAR SOCIETY OF RUSSIA  
AND THE SOCIETY FOR NONPROLIFERATION, HAVE COMMENTED  
PUBLICLY ON THE NEED FOR TIGHTER CONTROLS.  
UNFORTUNATELY, GOSATOMNADZOR OFFICIALS IN CHARGE OF

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ACTION OES-09

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	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PM-00	PRS-01
	P-01	SNP-00	SP-00	SS-00	T-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5558  
INFO USEU BRUSSELS  
USMISSION USVIENNA  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
DIRFBI WASHDC  
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC  
NRC WASHDC  
DOE WASHDC

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 13 MOSCOW 032874

STATE FOR ACDA (GOODBY), PM/NE, EUR/RPM AND  
EUR/ISCA/CAST;  
DOE FOR S-1 (BERLS), NN-1 (LUONGO), NN-42 (ROONEY)  
AND PO-70;  
NRC FOR OIP;  
WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC (STERN) AND OSTP (VON HIPPEL);

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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 32874 03 OF 13 161351Z  
DIR FBI FOR SSA PAUL DEMINIKI;  
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, MNUC, TRGY, ASEC, RS  
SUBJECT: OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION,  
CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING IN RUSSIA

THE SECURITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS REPORT THAT THE

PRIMARY PROBLEM IS ONE OF MONEY. UPGRADING PHYSICAL SECURITY AND ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS VIRTUALLY FROM SCRATCH WILL BE VERY EXPENSIVE. AMERICAN MPC&A EXPERTS WHO HAVE VISITED VARIOUS NUCLEAR FACILITIES IN RUSSIA GENERALLY AGREE THAT THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF MONEY NEEDED COULD BE MEASURED IN THE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS WITH AN ANNUAL OPERATING BUDGET OF UP TO USD ONE BILLION.

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THE PEAK OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION: THE CLOSED CITIES  
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11. RUSSIA'S TEN CLOSED "SECRET" NUCLEAR CITIES POSSESS THE MOST SENSITIVE NUCLEAR MATERIALS/TECHNOLOGIES IN RUSSIA AND ARE THE BEST PROTECTED OF THE FACILITIES COVERED IN THIS REPORT.

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12. THE FIRST ELEMENT OF THE "SECURITY SYSTEM" AT THE CLOSED CITIES IS PHYSICAL SPACE -- ALL OF THE NUCLEAR CITIES ARE PHYSICALLY REMOTE FROM POPULATION CENTERS. WHILE THEY ARE LOCATED IN THE SAME GENERAL AREA WITH THE OPEN CITIES AFTER WHICH THEY ARE NAMED, THE CLOSED CITIES ARE LOCATED BETWEEN 40 AND 150 KILOMETERS AWAY FROM THEIR NEIGHBORS. IN ADDITION, MOST CLOSED CITIES ARE LOCATED IN VERY REMOTE REGIONS, MANY OF WHICH WERE CLOSED TO FOREIGN TRAVEL UNTIL RECENTLY.

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15. THIS OUTER PERIMETER FENCE SURROUNDS THE ENTIRE CLOSED CITY. THESE CITIES RANGE IN POPULATION FROM A LOW OF ABOUT 45,000 TO A HIGH OF OVER 100,000. FROM THE TIME THESE CITIES WERE FOUNDED UP UNTIL LESS THAN A DECADE AGO, NOT ONLY DID THE FENCES KEEP PEOPLE OUT OF THE CLOSED CITIES, THEY KEPT THE RESIDENTS IN. VERY FEW RESIDENTS OF CLOSED CITIES WERE ALLOWED TO TRAVEL WITHIN RUSSIA; EVEN FEWER WERE ALLOWED FOREIGN TRAVEL RIGHTS. WHEN ONE MEMBER OF A FAMILY WAS ALLOWED TO TRAVEL, OTHERS WERE FORCED TO STAY BEHIND. A NUMBER OF YOUNGER (UNDER 40) CLOSED CITY RESIDENTS WITH WHOM ESTOFF HAS SPOKEN REPORT THAT THEY WERE BORN IN THEIR CLOSED CITY AND NEVER LEFT FOR ANY REASON UNTIL THE LAST FEW YEARS. WHILE SOME OUTSTANDING STUDENTS WERE ALLOWED TO TRAVEL TO MOSCOW OR ELSEWHERE FOR HIGHER EDUCATION, MANY OTHERS COMPLETED THEIR

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5559  
INFO USEU BRUSSELS  
USMISSION USVIENNA  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
DIRFBI WASHDC  
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC  
NRC WASHDC  
DOE WASHDC

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 13 MOSCOW 032874

STATE FOR ACDA (GOODBY), PM/NE, EUR/RPM AND  
EUR/ISCA/CAST;  
DOE FOR S-1 (BERLS), NN-1 (LUONGO), NN-42 (ROONEY)  
AND PO-70;

NRC FOR OIP;  
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PAGE 02            MOSCOW   32874   04 OF 13   161352Z  
DIR FBI FOR SSA PAUL DEMINIKI;  
USVIENNA FOR USVIE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, MNUC, TRGY, ASEC, RS  
SUBJECT: OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION,  
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EDUCATIONS INSIDE THE CLOSED CITY.

16. THE GEOGRAPHIC SIZE OF THE CLOSED CITIES HELPED SUPPORT THEIR ISOLATION. LARGE LAND AREAS -- SOMETIMES MEASURING HUNDREDS OF SQUARE MILES -- ARE ENCLOSED BY THE TIGHTLY GUARDED PERIMETER FENCES DESCRIBED ABOVE. FARMS, FOOD PROCESSING AND LIGHT INDUSTRIES, STORES, SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS AND CULTURAL FACILITIES ARE ALL LOCATED WITHIN THE FENCE, THUS MINIMIZING THE NEED FOR CONTACT WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD. DELIVERIES OF SUPPLIES ARE PROCESSED BY A "SPECIAL SERVICES" RUN ORGANIZATION. IN THE PAST, MOST TRUCKS WERE EITHER UNLOADED AT SPECIAL WAREHOUSES ON THE BORDERS OF THE CLOSED CITY OR ELSE DRIVERS WERE REQUIRED TO RELINQUISH CONTROL OF THEIR VEHICLES AT THE BORDER OF THE CLOSED CITY TO OTHER DRIVERS WHO WORKED ONLY WITHIN THE CITY. TODAY, SUPPLY TRUCKS APPEARS TO TRAVEL WITH RELATIVE FREEDOM IN AND OUT OF THE GATES.

17. AT PRESENT, WHILE RESIDENTS MUST STILL FILE PAPERWORK REQUESTING PASSES TO LEAVE, PERMISSION TO TRAVEL WITHIN RUSSIA IS REPORTEDLY GRANTED ROUTINELY.

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FOREIGN TRAVEL IS STILL MORE TIGHTLY CONTROLLED, WITH  
FOREIGN PASSPORTS ONLY ISSUED AFTER LONG SECURITY  
CHECKS. THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE FROM WITHIN THE CLOSED  
CITIES ARE REPORTEDLY EITHER WAITING FOR PERMISSION TO  
TRAVEL ABROAD OR ARE APPEALING DENIALS.

18. ACCESS TO CLOSED CITIES BY OUTSIDERS IS STILL  
TIGHTLY CONTROLLED. ALL VISITS BY FOREIGNERS REQUIRE  
30 DAYS ADVANCE NOTICE. VISITS BY RUSSIAN NATIONALS  
REQUIRE AT LEAST 10 DAYS NOTICE AND ARE NOT APPROVED  
WITHOUT A SPONSOR INSIDE THE CLOSED CITY AND A VALID  
REASON FOR TRAVEL.

19. WITHIN THE CLOSED CITIES, RESIDENTIAL AREAS ARE  
PHYSICALLY SEPARATED FROM PRODUCTION/RESEARCH AREAS.  
DESIGN BUREAUS AND OTHER BUILDINGS IN WHICH ONLY  
"PAPER WORK" IS PERFORMED TEND TO BE LOCATED  
RELATIVELY CLOSE TO THE MAIN POPULATION CENTERS;  
LABORATORIES AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES ARE LOCATED  
FARTHER AWAY. EACH INDIVIDUAL BUILDING OR FACILITY IS  
PROTECTED BY ITS OWN SECURITY, GENERALLY CONSISTING OF  
ONE OR MORE FENCES AND SECURITY GUARDS.

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ACTION OES-09

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EPAE-00 SNIS-00 NISC-01 SSD-01 PMB-00 DSCC-00 G-00  
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R 161353Z NOV 94  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5560  
INFO USEU BRUSSELS  
USMISSION USVIENNA  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
DIRFBI WASHDC  
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC  
NRC WASHDC  
DOE WASHDC

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 05 OF 13 MOSCOW 032874

STATE FOR ACDA (GOODBY), PM/NE, EUR/RPM AND  
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AND PO-70;  
NRC FOR OIP;  
WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC (STERN) AND OSTP (VON HIPPEL);

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
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DIR FBI FOR SSA PAUL DEMINIKI;  
USVIENNA FOR USVIE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, MNUC, TRGY, ASEC, RS  
SUBJECT: OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION,  
CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING IN RUSSIA

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GAPS IN THE SECURITY NET  
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22.

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


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ACTION OES-09

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
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DIR FBI FOR SSA PAUL DEMINIKI;  
USVIENNA FOR USVIE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, MNUC, TRGY, ASEC, RS  
SUBJECT: OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION,  
CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING IN RUSSIA



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NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION AT OTHER SITES  
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[REDACTED]

THE  
FACTORS WHICH DETERMINE THE LEVEL OF SECURITY AT A  
GIVEN FACILITY ARE:

-- DOES THE FACILITY HAVE ACCESS TO PLUTONIUM?

-- IS THE FACILITY CONSIDERED TO BE "MILITARY" OR  
"CIVILIAN" IN NATURE? WITHIN THE "MILITARY" CATEGORY,  
IS IT A "WEAPONS" (AS OPPOSED TO "FUEL") FACILITY?

-- DOES THE FACILITY DEVELOP OR POSSESS TECHNOLOGY  
WHICH IS CONSIDERED MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT OR THE  
POSSIBLE TARGET OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE?

-- WHICH MINISTRY MAINTAINS EFFECTIVE CONTROL OVER THE  
FACILITY?

27. THE FEWER TIMES THE ANSWER TO ONE OF THE ABOVE  
QUESTIONS IS "YES," THE LOWER THE SECURITY AT THE  
FACILITY WILL BE. [REDACTED]

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
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
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
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MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING  
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35. WHILE MODERN PRACTICES OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING (MC&A) ARE COMPLEX AND OFTEN DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN, THEY ARE A KEY ELEMENT IN THE PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS. BY TRACKING NUCLEAR MATERIALS AS THEY MOVE FROM PLACE TO PLACE, OWNER TO OWNER AND EVEN FROM ONE PHYSICAL FORM TO ANOTHER, MC&A PROCEDURES PROVIDE A MEANS OF DISCOURAGING THE THEFT OR DIVERSION OF MATERIALS BY PERSONS WITHIN THE INDUSTRY BY MAKING IT LIKELY THAT ANY SUCH DIVERSION WOULD BE DETECTED DURING AN AUDIT AND COULD BE TRACED TO THROUGH ACCOUNTING RECORDS. UNFORTUNATELY IN RUSSIA, WHERE THE POSSIBILITY THAT WORKERS MAY CHOOSE TO STEAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS IS EXACERBATED BY THE WORST FINANCIAL CRISIS THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY HAS FACED IN ITS 50-YEAR HISTORY, MC&A PROCEDURES ARE ALMOST NON-EXISTENT.

36. WHILE MINATOM AUTHORITIES MAINTAIN THAT FULLY

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ACTION OES-09

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 09 OF 13 MOSCOW 032874

STATE FOR ACDA (GOODBY), PM/NE, EUR/RPM AND  
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DIR FBI FOR SSA PAUL DEMINIKI;  
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
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FUNCTIONAL MC&A SYSTEMS ARE IN PLACE THROUGHOUT  
RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR COMPLEX, WHAT PASSES FOR MC&A IN  
RUSSIA IS A ARCHAIC PAPER-BASED SYSTEM OF RECEIPTS AND  
SEALS. EVERY PERSON AND ORGANIZATION HANDLING NUCLEAR  
MATERIALS SIGNS FOR THE MATERIAL ON RECEIPT AND  
RECEIVES A SIGNATURE WHEN THE MATERIALS ARE TURNED  
OVER TO ANOTHER PERSON OR INSTITUTE. UNFORTUNATELY,  
THE MOUNDS OF RECEIPTS WHICH THIS PRACTICE GENERATES  
ARE SIMPLY ACCUMULATED AND STORED. THEIR UTILITY IN  
TRACKING NUCLEAR MATERIALS IS VERY LIMITED. WHILE A  
RECEIPT COULD BE USED TO DOCUMENT THAT A PARTICULAR  
ENTERPRISE RECEIVED A SHIPMENT OF A NUCLEAR MATERIAL  
ON A CERTAIN DATE, THERE IS NO ON-GOING ACCOUNTING OF  
NUCLEAR STOCKPILES. SUCH A MATERIAL BALANCE GENERALLY  
CANNOT BE MAINTAINED SINCE THE INFORMATION RECORDED ON  
A RECEIVING DOCUMENT CANNOT BE MATCHED EXACTLY TO  
MATERIALS LEAVING. WHENEVER THE MATERIAL RECEIVED  
CHANGES FORM -- FROM HEU OXIDE IN POWDER FORM TO  
METALLIC HEU, FOR EXAMPLE, CHANGES IN WEIGHT AND  
CHEMICAL COMPOSITION RESULT IN A SITUATION IN WHICH  
THERE IS NO METHOD IN PLACE TO MATCH THE MATERIALS  
FLOWING INTO A FACILITY EXACTLY WITH MATERIALS FLOWING  
OUT.

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
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37. WHILE A CAREFUL ANALYSIS OF RECORDS COULD THEORETICALLY LEAD TO A VERY GOOD ESTIMATE OF STOCKS ON HAND, THE PROBLEM IS COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT THE RECORDS ARE MAINTAINED ONLY AS STATIC DOCUMENTS.



TRACING THE MOVEMENT OF MATERIAL BASED ON THESE RECEIPTS IS NOT POSSIBLE. WHILE INVENTORIES ARE SOMETIMES TAKEN AT FACILITIES, THESE INVENTORIES CANNNOT BE RECONCILED TO THE STACK OF RECEIVING AND SHIPPING DOCUMENTS.

38. A MEMBER OF A VISITING EURATOM DELEGATION SUMMARIZED THE SITUATION HIS GROUP OBSERVED BY STATING THAT THEY HAD CONCLUDED THAT NO SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR ACCOUNTING EXISTED IN RUSSIA. EACH OF THE SIX ORGANIZATIONS HE SURVEYED CLAIMED TO HAVE A SYSTEM, BUT EACH SYSTEM WAS DIFFERENT AND THERE WAS NO INTEGRATION. THE SYSTEMS ALSO LACKED COMPUTERIZATION OR ANY OTHER METHOD FOR PRODUCING RELIABLE RUNNING TOTALS. HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE LACK OF BASIC LEGISLATION UNDERPINNING THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY MADE THE PROCESS OF ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM EVEN MORE DIFFICULT.




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DOE WASHDC

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STATE FOR ACDA (GOODBY), PM/NE, EUR/RPM AND  
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DOE FOR S-1 (BERLS), NN-1 (LUONGO), NN-42 (ROONEY)  
AND PO-70;  
NRC FOR OIP;  
WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC (STERN) AND OSTP (VON HIPPEL);

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DIR FBI FOR SSA PAUL DEMINIKI;  
USVIENNA FOR USVIE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
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SUBJECT: OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION,  
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40. AT LEAST AT RUSSIA'S CLOSED NUCLEAR CITIES, THERE  
ARE ELEMENTS TO THEIR MC&A SYSTEMS WHICH DO NOT

GENERALLY EXIST IN THE WEST AND WHICH PROVIDE SOME ADDED LEVEL OF ADDED SECURITY. IN THE CLOSED CITIES, INFORMATION CONCERNING STOCKPILES OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS IS TIGHTLY CONTROLLED, AND CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES OF SOME OF THE CLOSED CITIES HAVE PROVIDED INSIGHTS INTO THE EXTENT TO WHICH SYSTEMS OF CONTROL OVER INFORMATION ARE USED TO SUPPLEMENT SECURITY MEASURES. THE SYSTEMS SURROUNDING THE PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION REACTORS AT TOMSK-7 AND KRASNOYARSK-26 PROVIDE A GOOD EXAMPLE. FUEL IS LOADED AND UNLOADED INTO/FROM THE REACTORS BY A SPECIAL CORPS OF TECHNICIANS. A COMPLETELY SEPARATE GROUP OPERATES THE REACTORS AND A THIRD GROUP PROCESSES THE FUEL AFTER IRRADIATION. THE WORKERS WHO OPERATE THE PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION REACTORS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO KNOW THE EXACT COMPOSITION OF THE FUEL ELEMENTS IN THE REACTORS THEY OPERATE. SIMILARLY, THE WORKERS WHO PROCESS THE SPENT FUEL TO SEPARATE THE PLUTONIUM FROM OTHER ELEMENTS DO NOT KNOW EITHER THE EXACT

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COMPOSITION OF THE ORIGINAL FUEL OR THE EXACT CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH IT WAS PROCESSED IN THE REACTOR. DUE TO THESE GAPS IN INFORMATION, NO WORKER OR SINGLE GROUP OF WORKERS KNOWS EXACTLY HOW MUCH PLUTONIUM, URANIUM, ETC., SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR EXTRACTION FROM THE SPENT FUEL. WHAT EACH GROUP DOES KNOW, HOWEVER, IS THAT THE FSK-RUN SECURITY FORCE HAS ALL THE INFORMATION NEEDED TO CALCULATE THE ACTUAL QUANTITY OF MATERIALS FINALLY EXTRACTED FROM PROCESSED FUEL. SUCH CALCULATIONS CAN BE COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL QUANTITIES RECOVERED DURING THE PROCESSING OF THE IRRADIATED FUEL. THIS SYSTEM PROVIDES FOR THE CONTROL OF MORE THAN JUST NUCLEAR MATERIALS; EACH GROUP INVOLVED IN THE CREATION OF PLUTONIUM STOCKPILES KNOWS IT MUST FOLLOW DIRECTIONS EXACTLY OR RISK BEING CAUGHT.

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THE HISTORY  
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41. THE HISTORICAL BASIS FOR THE MIS-MATCH BETWEEN

RUSSIAN MPC&A SYSTEMS AND THE CURRENT THREAT CLIMATE IS OF MORE THAN ACADEMIC INTEREST. ANYONE HOPING TO ENGAGE RUSSIAN AUTHORITIES IN COOPERATIVE EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE SECURITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS IN RUSSIA SHOULD REMEMBER THAT RUSSIAN MPC&A SYSTEMS WERE, ON THE WHOLE, VERY CAREFULLY DESIGNED BY HIGHLY QUALIFIED EXPERTS TO RESPOND TO THE THREAT CLIMATE WHICH EXISTED AT THE TIME. RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECURITY EXPERTS FEEL UNJUSTLY ATTACKED AND TEND TO REACT NEGATIVELY BY CUTTING OFF DISCUSSIONS WHEN OUTSIDE OBSERVERS MAKE

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STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT RUSSIAN SYSTEMS FOR MPC&A ARE POORLY DESIGNED. GIVEN THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT, A MORE CORRECT (AND LESS CONTROVERSIAL) STATEMENT IS THAT RUSSIAN MPC&A SYSTEMS NEED TO BE UPDATED TO MORE EFFECTIVELY PROTECT AGAINST NEW THREATS WHICH HAVE DEVELOPED ONLY RECENTLY.

42. AT THE TIME RUSSIAN EXPERTS FROM THE FORMER SOVIET UNION DEVELOPED THE SYSTEMS FOR PROTECTING NUCLEAR MATERIALS THAT ARE STILL IN USE TODAY, THEY PROCEEDED BASED UPON SEVERAL ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING THE THREAT ENVIRONMENT WHICH ARE NO LONGER VALID. KNOWLEDGE OF THESE ASSUMPTIONS CAN HELP UNDERSTAND WHY RUSSIA'S SYSTEMS OPERATE THE WAY THEY DO. KEY ASSUMPTIONS WERE:

-- THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES REPRESENTED THE SOURCE OF THE PRIMARY THREAT TO WEAPONS NUCLEAR MATERIALS. THIS "AMERICAN THREAT" INCLUDED BOTH AN INTELLIGENCE ASPECT -- ATTEMPTS TO STEAL SOVIET NUCLEAR SECRETS -- AND A PHYSICAL ASPECT -- POSSIBLE ATTEMPTS TO STEAL OR SABOTAGE SOVIET NUCLEAR STOCKPILES/FACILITIES.

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STATE FOR ACDA (GOODBY), PM/NE, EUR/RPM AND  
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AND PO-70;  
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
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CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING IN RUSSIA

-- DUE TO THE NATURE OF SOVIET SOCIETY, THERE WAS NO  
DOMESTIC "BLACK MARKET" FOR STOLEN NUCLEAR MATERIALS.  
IN ADDITION, THE BORDERS OF THE SOVIET UNION WERE  
TIGHTLY CLOSED, GREATLY REDUCING THE CHANCE THAT A  
THIRD COUNTRY OR A TERRORIST GROUP WOULD ATTEMPT TO  
TARGET SOVIET NUCLEAR MATERIALS.

-- PERSONNEL WITH ACCESS TO SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS  
(NUCLEAR MATERIALS NEEDED FOR THE CREATION OF A  
NUCLEAR WARHEAD) WERE TIGHTLY CONTROLLED AND  
MONITORED. THEY COULD NOT GENERALLY TRAVEL OUTSIDE  
THE CLOSED, SECRET CITIES WHERE THEY WORKED. EVEN  
THOSE FEW WHO COULD TRAVEL EITHER WITHIN RUSSIA OR, IN  
RARE INSTANCES, ABROAD, KNEW THAT SOVIET SECURITY  
SERVICES WORKED ALONG SIDE THEM AT ALL TIMES AND  
TRACKED BOTH THEM AND THEIR FAMILIES. THE THREAT OF  
CERTAIN AND SEVERE RETRIBUTION VIRTUALLY ELIMINATED  
THE POSSIBILITY THAT NUCLEAR WORKERS WOULD BECOME  
INVOLVED IN UNAUTHORIZED DIVERSIONS OF NUCLEAR  
MATERIALS.

-- PERSONS WITH ACCESS TO THE MOST SENSITIVE MATERIALS  
(WEAPONS-GRADE PLUTONIUM, FOR EXAMPLE) WERE KEPT

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RELATIVELY ISOLATED FROM ONE ANOTHER. INFORMATION FLOWS CONCERNING THE PROCESSING AND USE OF THESE MOST SENSITIVE MATERIALS WERE TIGHTLY CONTROLLED IN ORDER TO GUARD AGAINST ANY (PRESUMABLY U.S.-INSPIRED) CONSPIRACY TO DIVERT, STEAL OR DAMAGE NUCLEAR MATERIALS OR THE SECRETS ASSOCIATED WITH THEM.

43. THE FACT THAT THE FSK IS STILL IN CHARGE OF SECURITY AT THE CLOSED CITIES IS AN INDICATION OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH "OLD" THINKING STILL PERMEATES MODERN RUSSIA: THE "COUNTERINTELLIGENCE" SERVICE CONTROLS SECURITY BECAUSE THE THREAT IS PRESUMED TO FROM FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. WHILE FSK OFFICIALS APPEAR QUITE GENUINELY INTERESTED IN IMPROVING SECURITY AT RUSSIAN FACILITIES AGAINST DOMESTIC CRIMINALS, THEIR FUNDAMENTAL FOCUS IS STILL ON FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING THE USG.

44. THE LEVEL OF CONTROL -- AND THE USE OF STATE TERROR TO EXERT CONTROL -- IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION CANNOT BE OVER STATED. THIS USE OF TERROR SHAPED THE SECURITY AND THREAT ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH OFFICIALS OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION DESIGNED SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY. FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM, SOVIET SECURITY SERVICES REPEATEDLY DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO USE ANY LEVEL OF TERROR TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OVER PEOPLE INVOLVED IN THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM. INSIDE RUSSIA'S CLOSED CITIES, MANY SCIENTISTS ARE ONLY JUST NOW BEGINNING TO MENTION THE NAMES OF COLLEAGUES WHO DISAPPEARED, SOMETIMES TOGETHER WITH THEIR ENTIRE

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FAMILY. THE PRESUMPTION WAS ALWAYS THAT THE PERSON HAD BEEN SOMEHOW INVOLVED IN PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES. MANY STORIES AND EVEN BITS OF BLACK HUMOR DEAL WITH THE HEAVY HAND OF THE KGB AND WITH SECURITY IN THE SYSTEM OF CLOSED NUCLEAR CITIES.

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ACTION OES-09

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	ACDE-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CEQ-00	CIAE-00
	CFE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	DS-00	EB-01	EUR-01	OIGO-01
	HHS-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	L-01	MCO-01
	ADS-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	OIC-02	PA-01	PM-00	PRS-01
	P-01	SNP-00	SP-00	SS-00	T-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01
	EPAE-00	SNIS-00	NISC-01	SSD-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	G-00

/059W

-----88E012 161421Z /38

R 161353Z NOV 94  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5567  
INFO USEU BRUSSELS  
USMISSION USVIENNA  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
DIRFBI WASHDC  
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC  
NRC WASHDC  
DOE WASHDC

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 12 OF 13 MOSCOW 032874

STATE FOR ACDA (GOODBY), PM/NE, EUR/RPM AND  
EUR/ISCA/CAST;  
DOE FOR S-1 (BERLS), NN-1 (LUONGO), NN-42 (ROONEY)  
AND PO-70;  
NRC FOR OIP;  
WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC (STERN) AND OSTP (VON HIPPEL);


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

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DIR FBI FOR SSA PAUL DEMINIKI;  
USVIENNA FOR USVIE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, MNUC, TRGY, ASEC, RS  
SUBJECT: OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION,  
CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING IN RUSSIA

25X1  
25X6

25X1  
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 TERROR WAS A  
TOOL THAT WAS USED NOT ONLY TO PROTECT SECRETS AND  
MATERIALS, IT WAS EVEN USED AS A MOTIVATION TECHNIQUE.  
WITH THE THREAT OF TERROR SO CONSTANT, IT IS  
UNDERSTANDABLE WHY SECURITY FORCES DID NOT FEEL THAT  
SPECIFIC TECHNICAL MEASURES TO GUARD AGAINST  
INDIVIDUAL MALFEASANCE BY NUCLEAR WORKERS WAS NEEDED.-----  
THE FUTURE  
-----

48. THE ACTIONS OF THE GOR OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS CLEARLY INDICATE THAT THE GOVERNMENT AS A WHOLE RECOGNIZES THAT NUCLEAR SECURITY IS A PROBLEM AND IS TAKING STEPS TO ADDRESS THE SITUATION. OFFICIALS FROM THE NUCLEAR WATCHDOG GOSATOMNADZOR, THE FSK, THE MVD, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, LOCAL POLICE, NUCLEAR INSTITUTES AND EVEN INDIVIDUAL NUCLEAR WORKERS HAVE ALL COMMENTED BOTH IN THE PRESS AND TO U.S. OFFICIALS ON PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S COMMITMENT TO INSURING THAT RUSSIA LIVES UP TO ITS RESPONSIBILITIES TO CONTROL NUCLEAR MATERIALS. WHILE MANY INCREMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS IN SECURITY CAN BE IMPLEMENTED, A LACK OF FUNDING WILL IMPEDE PROGRESS FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. COMMENTING ON THE DIFFICULT PROCESS OF CONVINCING A RANGE OF POWERFUL MINISTRIES AND GOVERNMENT BODIES TO AGREE ON A UNIFIED PLAN FOR IMPROVING THE SECURITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS IN RUSSIA,

THE GOSATOMNADZOR OFFICIAL WHO LED A INTERMINISTERIAL  
COMMITTEE FORMED BY PRESIDENT YELTSIN TO EXAMINE THE

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MATTER TOLD ESTOFF THAT, IN THE END, THE ONLY PROBLEM  
WHICH COULD NOT BE RESOLVED WAS FUNDING.

49. U.S. EXPERTS ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR  
SECURITY HAVE VISITED A VARIETY OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR  
FACILITIES OVER THE PAST YEAR. BASED ON ROUGH  
"GUESTIMATES" FROM THESE EXPERTS, THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF  
FUNDING NEEDED IS HUGE, PROBABLY IN THE BILLIONS OF  
DOLLARS. IN COMPARING SYSTEMS OBSERVED IN RUSSIA TO  
THOSE IN PLACE IN THE U.S., MORE THAN ONE EXPERT HAS  
COMMENTED THAT THE ANNUAL BUDGET FOR OPERATING SYSTEMS  
EVER AFTER THEY ARE INSTALLED COULD EXCEED ONE BILLION  
DOLLARS.

50. THE INDIVIDUAL PRIORITIES OF ORGANIZATIONS  
INVOLVED IN THE PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS  
COMPOUNDS THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY A LACK OF FUNDING.  
WITH BUDGETS TIGHT ALL AROUND, DEVOTING SCARCE  
RESOURCES TO FIXING OLD PROBLEMS IS NOT ALWAYS THE  
HIGHEST PRIORITY. AT MINATOM, IN PARTICULAR, THERE IS  
A STRONG TENDENCY TO DEVOTE ALL AVAILABLE RESOURCES TO  
KEEPING EXISTING PROGRAMS -- CIVILIAN/COMMERICAL AS  
WELL AS WEAPONS -- FUNCTIONING IN THE HOPE (HOWEVER  
UNREALISTIC) THAT FUNDING LEVELS WILL SOMEDAY RETURN

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ACTION OES-09

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	ACDE-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CEQ-00	CIAE-00
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	HHS-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	L-01	MCO-01
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	EPAE-00	SNIS-00	NISC-01	SSD-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	G-00
	/059W						

-----88E017 161423Z /38

R 161353Z NOV 94  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5568  
INFO USEU BRUSSELS  
USMISSION USVIENNA  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
DIRFBI WASHDC  
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC  
NRC WASHDC  
DOE WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 13 OF 13 MOSCOW 032874

STATE FOR ACDA (GOODBY), PM/NE, EUR/RPM AND  
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TO PREVIOUS LEVELS. IN ORDER TO BUILD SUPPORT FOR ITS  
GROWTH PLANS (PLANS WHICH INCLUDE MOVING TO A CLOSED  
FUEL CYCLE FOR CIVILIAN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND USING  
PLUTONIUM DERIVED FROM WEAPONS AS A CIVIL REACTOR  
FUEL), MINATOM'S LEADERSHIP APPEARS TO BELIEVE THAT IT  
MUST DENY THAT SECURITY IS A PROBLEM. OTHERWISE, IT  
MIGHT BE COMPELLED TO DIVERT SCARCE FUNDS FROM ITS  
DEVELOPMENT BUDGETS TO SECURITY. PICKERING

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